All language subtitles for Mayday.S26E07.Divided.in.Crisis.1080p.AMZN.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-Kitsune_track3_[eng]

V-1. Rotate.

As Air Algérie
Flight 62-89

lifts off from
Tamanrasset, Algeria...

Gear up.

...air traffic
controllers hear an explosion.

The plane crashes
into the desert.

102 people are killed.

Investigators examine engine
debris found on the runway.

It looks like there's
a fatigue crack

in the nozzle guide vane.

They know
an engine failed

but not why the
pilots couldn't recover.

Pilots
are expected to fly out

of a situation either
on takeoff or landing

where they've lost an engine.

The investigation reveals
a crew that was struggling

not with the plane...

Let go. Take your hand away.

I let go. I let go.

...but with each other.

Which one of them is actually
flying the plane?

Mayday! Mayday!

Pull up!

It's early afternoon

in the middle of the
Sahara Desert in Algeria.

The crew of Flight 62-89 readies
for its upcoming journey

at the remote
Tamanrasset Aguenar Airport.

Seatbelts...

There are 97
passengers on board.

Among them, members of
the local football team

headed to a tournament
and military personnel.

Seatbelts...
Seatbelts...

Though there are some
European nationals,

almost everyone
on board is Algerian.

Nav and instrument
transfer switches...

normal.

In the cockpit,
preflight checks are underway.

Yaw Damper...

on.

Today's flight is operated
by Air Algérie,

a state-owned national carrier.

Air Algérie
is a publicly owned

company that is owned
by the country of Algeria.

The country takes a lot of pride
in this particular airline

because it is the face
and name of the country

as it goes all
around the world.

62-89,
requesting latest weather.

Yes, the wind is calm.
Temperature two-three.

QNH 1-0-2-0. QFE 9-6-5.

Copied, we'll call you
back for engine start.

44-year-old Fatima Yousfi
is the first officer

of this flight.

She is Algeria's first
female commercial pilot.

The female first officer
was one of the first women

to be hired at an airline
in Algeria,

which would be a big deal
in such a male dominated field,

especially in that country.

As the first woman
to pilot a Boeing 7-47

transoceanic flight,

Lynn Rippelmeyer, knows what
it's like to blaze a trail.

Aviation was then, and still
is in some cases,

a boys' club.

Back in the beginning of when
women were initially beginning

in aviation here in the States,

maybe it's like it was for her,
that it was unusual.

Tamanrasset, 62-89,

we request clearance
for Ghardaïa.

Received,
we will call you back.

- Hey, Boualem.
- Hey.

We've got some Tamanrasset
football players back there.

Oh-ho. Tell them we're
rooting for them this weekend.

48-year-old
Captain Boualem Benaouicha

has over 10,000 flying hours.

A thousand of those hours
are on the Boeing 7-37.

The captain was highly
experienced, had been flying

for over 20 years and had flown
all kinds of aircraft

from small aircraft
to large jetliners.

- 62-89, Tamanrasset.
- Go ahead.

Start approved,
call back for taxi.

Roger.

At 3:00 p.m.,

the pilots get clearance
to start-up the engines.

Okay, Before Start checklist.
Fuel quantity.

9800 kg.

Pumps?

On.

Flight 62-89 is
a Boeing 7-37-200,

an early generation of the
popular twin-engine jetliner.

The Boeing 7-37 is one
of the most common types

of commercial airliners
in the world

and there are
different variations of it.

The Boeing 7-37-200 is
a original version of the 7-37,

so it's an older model.

And it's not as highly
sophisticated in technology

as the current 7-37s.

Flight 62-89 will be
departing from Tamanrasset,

with a scheduled
stop in Ghardaïa,

and then on to
the capital, Algiers.

The total flying time is
approximately three hours.

Ready to taxi,
Air Algérie 62-89.

62-89, Tamanrassat, taxi onto
runway zero two and backtrack,

wind 0-3-0 at ten knots.

Roger, taxing
to runway zero two,

then backtracking, 62-89.

As they taxi to the runway,

passengers settle
in for the journey.

We are ready, 62-89.

62-89, Tamanrasset, cleared
for takeoff runway zero two,

wind 3-3-0 at twelve knots.

Cleared for
takeoff on runway zero two,

Air Algérie 62-89.

You have 90 knots...

100 knots...

V1... rotate.

But seconds after takeoff...

Gear up.

...a loud explosion
rocks the airplane.

Bismillah.
What's going on?

The pilots assess
the situation.

- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.

Passengers sense something
has gone wrong.

We have a small problem,
62-89.

62-89,
Tamanrasset.

The 7-37 is approaching
a stall.

62-89, are you
in an emergency?

Don't sink.

Don't sink. Don't sink.

The pilots make
desperate attempts

to recover the aircraft.

But their efforts are in vain.

The plane goes into a freefall.

The passengers brace themselves.

The plane bursts into flames
and skids across the desert

just outside
Tamanrasset airport.

Emergency response
is immediately activated

and firefighters
rush to the scene.

The impact and the fire that
ensued afterwards

made survival very unlikely for
the passengers in the aircraft.

But then, against all odds,
rescuers discover a survivor.

Not within the wreckage,
but lying in the distant sand,

clinging to life.

A gentleman seated all the way
in the back

that didn't have
his seatbelt on,

so when the airplane crashed
and, uh, broke apart,

he was thrown free.

He shows only faint signs
of life, as an ambulance

rushes him to hospital
in critical condition.

Defying all expectations,
the man's condition

soon stabilizes
and he begins to recover.

This passenger's luck
cannot be overstated

in what was Algeria's worst
aviation accident at the time.

He is the sole survivor out of
103 passengers and crew.

While the country mourns the
tragic loss of a football squad,

Algerian and French families
grieve their loved ones

and soon demand answers.

The investigation
into the crash of Flight 62-89

is conducted by
a Commission of Inquiry

established by the
Algerian Ministry of Transport.

They receive support from
several international agencies,

including the NTSB,

America's National
Transportation Safety Board.

I was the US Accredited
Representative for this accident

to assist the Algerians.

Initially I wasn't going
to travel to the scene, however,

the US Ambassador to Algeria
requested our assistance.

While Algerian Investigators
await the arrival

of their American colleagues,

they interview the Tamanrasset
air traffic controller.

Did the pilots indicate
that there was an issue?

The first officer called
only seconds after takeoff.

We have a small problem,
62-89.

Pilots typically are hesitant
to call 'mayday mayday'

or, uh, announce some type
of an emergency,

particularly if, uh,
they really don't know what

the situation and the critical
nature of the situation is.

And what was the problem?

They didn't say but I heard
something that

sounded like an explosion.

Seconds later, the plane
was falling out of the sky.

You said an explosion?

That's what it sounded like.

Like a bomb?

I couldn't say.

So, in 2003 Algeria
was not the safest place.

There was bombings
and terrorist activities

because they were coming out
of 11 years of civil war.

When the plane fell,
was it in one piece?

Yes, it was.

Investigators found
the airplane intact.

There were no claims
of responsibility by terrorists,

so it pretty much ruled out
that there was

some type of nefarious means
to bring the aircraft down.

Can you describe
how the plane fell?

It was...

nose up and crashed near
the threshold of runway 20.

The controller and other
witnesses saw

that the airplane
was struggling to climb,

had a nose high pitch attitude
and then impact the ground.

Eyewitnesses recall
that the plane struggled

to gain enough lift
to remain airborne,

an indication
it was in a stall.

One week after the incident,

Algerian Investigators are
joined by a member of the NTSB.

The Air Traffic Controller
and witnesses

describe seeing a stall.

And one witness remarked
that the landing gear was down.

If the landing gear is still
down while the aircraft

is trying to climb, it creates
a lot of drag on that airplane.

It takes a lot of thrust
and a lot of power to maintain

the climb to overcome all that
drag from the landing gear.

That would affect the
plane's ability to climb,

but that alone
wouldn't cause a stall.

There has to have been
something else.

- Do you have the load sheets?
- Yes. Right here.

One of the big questions
is about the aircraft weight,

because if you're too heavy,
you won't climb as well

as if you're within
the weight envelope.

Investigators review the
plane's load sheet

to see if the plane was
overweight before takeoff.

It looks like
the first officer

made some corrections here.

While reviewing the load
sheet, the First Officer notices

the fuel weight is wrong,

and changes it from 88-hundred
kilograms to the correct amount

of 9800 kilograms.

So with those corrections

the weight at takeoff
would have been

48,708 kilograms.

And the maximum weight allowed
at take off was 49,500 kg.

The first officer noticed
that there was a thousand

kilo difference and, uh,
the passenger count

was a little bit off,

which didn't make
a whole lot of difference

in the overall
weight and balance,

but did show that she was
very attentive in her duties.

The aircraft weight
was right up

against the maximum
takeoff weight.

Even though it was heavy,
the aircraft weight

shouldn't have affected
the performance too much.

What about mechanical failure?

I'll get the
maintenance reports.

Investigators make sure
that the maintenance is clean,

and the aircraft has
a clean bill of health

prior to the flight.

It was up to date
in its maintenance cycle.

No work deferred.
No technical exemptions.

The maintenance reports
provide no leads.

Maybe there was an
environmental factor at play.

Take a look at this.

Did the location of the
airport have something to do

with the stall?

The temperature is
23 degrees Celsius.

So it's hot.

Tamanrasset is in
a harsh desert climate

and the high temperatures

can affect the aircraft's
performance and climb.

And the airport sits at
4,518 feet above sea level.

At this altitude,
the air is already thin.

If you factor in the heat,
it's high-density altitude

that affects the performance
of the airplane.

So, it's generating much less
lift over the wings,

so it takes longer to get
the airplane airborne.

So just a few pounds
below max take-off weight.

High elevation airport.

High temperature.
Landing gear extended.

That could definitely
cause a plane to stall.

But that doesn't explain
the explosion.

Right. What are we missing?

Investigators study
the crash site of Flight 62-89

for evidence that could
explain the explosion

heard seconds after takeoff.

So, the first point
of impact is here...

5,396 feet from
the takeoff point.

Skidded through the airport
perimeter fence, across the road

and came to rest here,

less than three hundred feet
outside of the airport.

The plane is destroyed
by the fire

but the main wreckage
is practically in one piece,

except for the rear section.

And, look at this debris.

This was on the runway,
right about here.

Engine debris.

On the runway we found a large
quantity of engine debris

which is indicative
of an engine shelling

when a large quantity of engine
blades are thrown out

the back end of an engine.

It's an old adage
in accident investigation,

"What fails first falls first."

So, if they find debris prior
to finding the wreckage,

then they know that
happened prior to the accident.

So one of the engines
blew out.

That must have been the
explosion the controller heard.

What caused
the engine failure?

We needed to get our eyes
on those engines

to determine which failed
and why it failed.

Investigators begin
a visual inspection

of the plane's engines,
starting with the right one.

Take a look
at the fan blades.

Hmm. Heavy deformation.

It was definitely rotating
at the time of impact.

On the right engine showed
that it was turning at impact.

We don't know at exactly
what level of thrust

it was rotating at.

If the right engine
was operating on impact,

then did the left engine fail?

These turbine blades
have far fewer deformations

than the right engine.

It looks like it
was barely moving.

The hot section
is completely torn apart.

In an engine's hot section,

fuel is ignited
in a combustion chamber,

generating a powerful stream
of hot air

that spins the turbine blades.

The damage is evidence that
the left engine failed.

We knew that the failure was
in the hot section

and so we had to follow every
lead that we could

to determine where
the failure occurred.

There's a bunch of blades
missing from the hot section.

The missing pieces
are most likely

the debris that we found
on the runway.

We found that the hot section
was basically 'corn cobbed'

as we say. There was not many
blades left in the hot section

and there was metal
all over the place.

What caused
the blades to break?

Let's get some of these
parts out on the table.

We wanted to further
tear down the engine.

We wanted to look at the
failures under the microscope.

We wanted to look at
the metallurgical aspects

of the failure. We wanted to
look to see

if there was a bird strike.

Investigators begin
by examining components

from the hot section in search
of pre-existing defects.

I managed to remove the
sediment from the nozzle vane.

Nozzle guide vanes
direct the hot air flow

in the combustion chamber

to the blades of the
high-pressure turbine,

causing them to spin.

Interesting.

It looks like there's a fatigue
crack in the nozzle guide vane.

Investigators find evidence
of fatigue cracks

in two of the left engine's
nozzle guide vanes.

This type of cracking
occurs over time,

and as the engine ages,
these cracks get slightly larger

and eventually they will fail.

And it will destroy
the entire engine.

If this was
a progressive failure,

why wasn't it caught earlier?

This type of cracking
is typical of an older engine

and it's a progressive failure.

So that gets us into
the question of what was

the maintenance history,
what was the inspection criteria

that was used by the operator?

Investigators look into
the engine's repair history.

It looks like the left engine

was completely overhauled
four years ago.

When would have been
the last time

they looked at these
nozzle guide vanes?

During the Hot Section
Maintenance Inspection,

which was last year.

Any mention of cracking?

Any work done on any of them?

Inspections of the hot section
are meant to catch

fatigue cracks.
So why weren't these found?

Since this was an Algerian
registered aircraft,

it falls under the authority
of the Algerian civil

aviation authority for oversight
of the inspection not the FAA,

which typically has more
stringent requirements.

The crack formed
at some point.

It was missed during
the inspection last year.

It grew and grew until point
of failure

and then blew out at takeoff.

Yeah. That explains
why the engine failed,

not why the plane stalled.

Pilots are expected
to demonstrate their ability

to fly out of a situation

either on takeoff or landing
when they've lost an engine.

Investigators examine
the crew's training records

to determine if they knew how to
handle a single-engine failure

on take-off.

The first officer's last
exercise in engine failure

during takeoff
was four months ago.

The captain's training
was even more recent,

only two months
before the crash.

They both should have known
what to do in this situation.

They've got the airplane
veering to the left.

There's no way they didn't
know that engine failed.

So what did they
actually do?

Investigators
prepare to listen

to the cockpit voice recorder
from Air Algérie Flight 62-89.

It was very important for us
to listen to the CVR

to determine how the pilots
dealt with this engine failure.

I've got it cued up
to right before takeoff.

V1.

Rotate.

Gear up.

They hear the sound
of the engine failing

five seconds after takeoff.

Bismillah.
What's going on?

- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.

They transferred control
in the middle of an emergency?

That didn't even sound
like a proper transfer.

He just took the controls.

For another pilot
to take control

from the pilot who is flying,

the pilot needs to say,
'I've got it'.

Taking control of the airplane
without saying

he was taking control
made things worse for him

and for the first officer.

The captain
is the pilot monitoring.

He shouldn't be taking over.

He should be
diagnosing the problem.

So, do either of them
identify a left engine failure?

After handing over control
to the captain,

the first officer realizes
they aren't properly configured

to climb with only one engine.

Gear up, or are we okay?

But there's no response
from the captain.

We have a small problem,
62-89.

62-89,
Tamanrasset.

Just seconds after
the engine failure

the situation deteriorates
as the plane begins to stall.

There are no attempts
by the pilots to work together

to identify or troubleshoot
the problem.

Let go.
Take your hand away.

- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.

Take your hand away.
- I let go.

Don't sink. Don't sink.

Seconds later, the Ground
Proximity Warning activates,

indicating the plane is getting

dangerously close
to the ground.

- Please!
- Take your hand away!

Both pilots really didn't know
what the other was doing,

didn't know what the other
expected of them,

and may well have been working
at cross purposes.

And as a result of that,
the team performance broke down.

Don't sink. Don't sink.

I don't hear a single
mention of engine failure.

And why was he telling
her to let go so many times?

Was she trying to take back
control of the plane?

Which one of them
is actually flying the plane?

When all is said and done, the
pilots did not work together.

Without more information
from the flight data recorder,

we really don't know
exactly what they did

to control the airplane.

Investigators turn to the
Flight Data Recorder, or FDR,

from Flight 62-89 to determine
how the pilots tried to recover

from the loss
of the left engine.

Flight data recorders
are important to investigators

because it gives them
information on how the pilots

were operating the airplane
and how they were managing

the critical situation
they were in.

Not much here.

Older plane, older FDR.

It doesn't actually tell us

how the pilots were handling
the engine failure.

Because we only had five
parameters on the FDR,

we had to go to Boeing
and ask for a detailed

aircraft performance analysis
to determine what happened

on this accident flight.

Using the FDR's limited data,

Boeing's performance
study includes a reconstruction

of engine operations
and flight controls

in the final moments
of the flight.

So, there is the left engine
losing its thrust

after it blows out.

That's odd.

The data from the fully
functioning right engine

shows something unexpected.

Look at the thrust
from the right engine.

Yes, it seems to be
going up and down.

But we know
it was working fine.

That can only mean
one thing.

Bismillah.
What's going on?

The team finds evidence

of thrust being added
to the right engine.

Let go, let go.

And then pulled back.

I let go. I let go.

When one engine fails,

what you need is maximum
power on the other engine,

not reduce it.

So thrust is pulled down,

then back up, then down,
then back up again.

We have a small problem,
62-89.

62-89,
Tamanrasset.

Let go.

It's as if they were having
some sort of a tug of war?

They shouldn't have been.

The first officer did
the right thing by increasing

the power to the right engine.

What likely happened is that
the captain wasn't fully aware

of which engine had failed.
However, the first officer

knew that the
left engine had failed

and was trying to push up the
throttle on the right engine

to keep them from stalling.

Let go.
Take your hand away.

- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.

Take your hand away.
- I let go. I let go.

Don't sink. Don't sink.

The captain's basically
telling the first officer

to get out of his way,
to leave him alone,

to let him be in charge
of the airplane by himself,

which he was.

Knowing that the
left engine had failed,

the first officer might have
been trying to help things out

by increasing the power
on the right engine.

- Please!
- Take your hand away!

The moment the captain reduced
the thrust on the right engine

and never returned it
to takeoff thrust,

with the gear down,
it doomed the flight.

The pilots should have
been able to work together

to recover the plane.

These planes are designed
to fly with a team.

Pilot flying, pilot not flying,
both have very specific roles

that they are trained to do,
especially in emergencies.

They stay in their roles,
they help each other,

they work as a team,
and this crash

could have been avoided
if they would have done that.

Why didn't the crew
of Air Algérie Flight 62-89

work together to prevent
the loss of 102 lives.

Okay. I'll cue it up to
pre-flight preparations.

Investigators return
to the cockpit voice recording

of Flight 62-89

to understand why there
was a lack of coordination

between the two pilots.

Nav and instrument
transfer switches... Normal.

Yaw Damper... On.

They listen as the
First Officer works through

the Pre-flight checklist.

They're surprised by what
they don't hear.

Where's the captain?

Is she doing the flight
preparation by herself?

Pressurization
Mode Selector... Auto.

Okay, flight instruments...

We found that the
first officer was actually

in the cockpit by herself

conducting most
of the pre-flight work

without the captain.

It's unusual for the captain
not to be present

during the pre-flight because
there were responsibilities

that the captain has to get his
side of the airplane ready.

It's just inappropriate for the
captain not to be in the cockpit

during the pre-flight
and it's actually kind of rude.

It's only after the
First Officer completes

the pre-flight preparations that
the captain enters the cockpit.

The last QNH
1-0-1-9.

1-0-1-9, roger.

Good afternoon, Captain.

How are we looking?

Uh, good. I completed
the pre-flight checklist,

I tested your oxygen,
and everything is set to go.

Good, good.

Captain Benaouicha's late,

leaving his responsibilities
to the first officer.

When the captain showed up,

he was not in the mindset
of getting brought up to speed

or being part of the team
of setting the cockpit up

for the flight.

Heading.

Zero-two-zero.

Altitude.

Investigators then hear
the pilots performing

their Before Start Checklist.

Two-eight-zero.

You know,
I could have been on the team

with those boys back there?

Give me a break.

Who's the third voice?

A flight attendant?

The only male flight attendant
is the chief flight attendant.

Okay, takeoff speeds.

As part of the checklist,

the First Officer reviews
the takeoff speeds.

V1 - 144 knots.
VR - 146 knots.

You're saying you were
good enough to turn pro?

Oh yeah, I was a good
footie player.

Even had a scout
come and watch me play.

Yeah, they were scouting
you to mow the pitch.

Um, V2 - 150 knots.

Okay, that's enough.
I understand.

Can we go? I got it.
I got it. Let's go.

So the captain is just
carrying on a conversation with

his friend while they're doing
their Before Start Checklist?

What is even worse
is he cuts her off

before they could
even finish it.

One of the most important
parts of the information

that she was trying to give were
the takeoff speeds,

and then there should have been
a briefing

of an engine failure departure.

At this airport that was
a special departure

that needed to be briefed.
It was ignored.

Did the captain become
more focused

once they began to taxi?

Roger, taxing
for runway zero two.

What investigators
find most shocking

is what they hear next.

Where are we eating tonight?

That place across
from the hotel.

Oh. You always go back
to the same place.

I like what I like.

We are in Algiers!

Plenty of good spots to eat.

They are completely
distracted. They are violating

every sterile cockpit rule.

During critical
phases of flight,

extraneous conversations
and non-essential conversations

between the crew members
are prohibited.

Not only is the Captain
dismissing the First Officer

he has this casual attitude
about basic safety practices.

It's possible he was
more interested in talking

to the flight attendant than
reviewing the briefing

with the first officer.

It's possible that he had been
through so many

pre-flight takeoff briefings

that at that time
he felt it was unnecessary.

Bismillah.
What's going on?

- Let go. Let go.
- I let go, I let go.

As a result of his
dismissive attitude,

the captain is unprepared
to properly respond

when the crisis occurs
shortly after take-off.

Had the pilots completed their
pre-flight safety briefing,

their response
to the engine failure

might have been very different.

Gear up.

Engine failure, left engine.
Fly V2 plus 25.

Lowering the nose
to 12 degrees.

V2. Gear up.

Once the plane was stabilized,

the pilots could have returned
safely to the airport.

Engine failure is actually
a relatively common occurrence.

Every pilot needs to be
prepared and trained.

So, instead of letting
the first officer fly the plane

while he diagnoses the issue,

he tries to do
everything himself.

And transferring control
during an emergency situation?

There was never a positive
transfer of control.

The captain just took
the control yoke

away from the first officer,

so he injected himself
in the emergency.

- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.

The captain took control
at the worst possible time

when he was out of the loop.

And by not assigning
responsibility to her,

he gave himself
the responsibility

of doing two things at once

diagnosing the nature
of the engine problem

and then flying the airplane.

Please!

By trying to fly the plane
and diagnose the problem

on his own, the captain took
on too much.

It put the first officer
in a very difficult position.

She's now in the supportive
role, the non-flying role,

waiting to be told what to do,

and he's not giving any helpful
orders other than 'let go'.

Why would an experienced
captain so brazenly dismiss

his First Officer's help,

risking the lives
of everyone onboard?

Investigators look
into the pilots' backgrounds

in an attempt to understand why
the captain took over

from his first officer
in the midst of an emergency.

So the captain actually
had twice as many flying hours

as the first officer.

The captain was both qualified
as a captain on a 7-3-7

but also as a first officer
on a 7-6-7.

Perhaps his attitude was
that flying the 7-37

was not that big of a deal
because I fly a 7-67

which is much more sophisticated
and highly technical.

But she had more hours
on the 7-37.

Not only did she have
more experience flying the 7-37

that's the only plane
that she was flying.

I think there's a good chance
that had she been left alone,

she would have flown the
airplane out of the scenario

that we saw in this accident.

The question is, would
he have reacted the same way

if the first officer was a man?

In 2003, at the time of this
crash, here in the States,

female airline pilots only
constituted less than 6%

of the pilot population.

And it really hasn't
changed that much

in the 20 years since then.

The first officer
was Algeria's first

female commercial
airline pilot.

My friend, male pilots
in this part of the world

aren't used to sharing
a cockpit with women.

I think Algeria
is becoming fairly westernized

but, in some cultures,
there is the feeling that a man

has to be up in the cockpit
in case anything goes wrong.

Why did this captain take
control from the first officer

when she was doing an okay job
at that point?

And I think you can't rule out
the possibility

that there may have been
some gender stereotyping

on his part that
played a role in it.

Sadly, this accident
was totally preventable.

Investigators now have
a clear picture

of what led to the crash
of Flight 62-89.

V1, 144 knots.
VR, 146 knots...

You're saying you were
good enough to turn pro?

After arriving late and
allowing the flight attendant

into the cockpit,
the captain interrupted

a crucial pre-flight
safety briefing.

Um, V2, 150 knots.

Okay, that's enough.
I understand.

Can we go? I got it.
I got it. Let's go.

The captain demonstrated
a lax attitude

towards cockpit protocols.

Fatigue cracks
in a nozzle guide vane

in the plane's left engine were
reaching their breaking point.

And when the guide vane failed,

it set off a chain reaction.

High-speed metal fragments
ripped the engine apart.

- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.

When crisis struck,

the captain decided he needed
to be the one to handle

the controls and took over
flying from his first officer

before even identifying
the problem.

The engine failure alone was
not the cause of this accident.

Engines fail
and pilots are trained

to handle those emergencies.

Failing to retract the landing
gear after the engine failure

made recovery more difficult.

Let go!
Take your hand away!

- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.

Take your hand away!
- I let go!

It was the captain's
assumption of control

of the aircraft without
properly identifying

the nature of the emergency,

his failure to raise
the landing gear,

and his lack of adherence
to standard operating procedures

that eventually
doomed the flight.

As a result of this accident,

Algeria's Commission of Inquiry
makes several recommendations.

They recommend
that Air Algérie,

along with other operators,
ensure that their

Crew Resource Management
training programs emphasize

the importance of
handover procedures

and task-sharing
in the cockpit.

In the 1980's, they had
captains who were trying to fly

a team airplane solo.

So, a lot of training went
into it to teach that your

best resource is your team.

You support each other and work
together as a team

for the safety of the airplane.

The fact that the captain
insisted on taking over control

of the airplane at that
critical moment...

cost everybody on that
airplane their lives.

I felt particularly
affected when I saw

that the accident
was preventable.

And I think the investigators
did the best job they could

trying to discover why the crew
made the errors that they did.

The next time that happens,
people won't die

as a result of that.

For Lynn Rippelmeyer,
it's one more example

of why the industry needs
to continue evolving.

The airlines now are much more
open to hiring women,

to not having gender bias,

realizing that women
do have a lot

to contribute to the industry.

And I think it's up to women
now to step up to the plate

and take the opportunities
that the career offers.

They're amazing.

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