Original subtitles

CIA's business is all about understanding threats and taking risks.

Our mission is a secret one.

Of course, there are ramifications for exposing people that are undercover.

The press said we're going to publish your name and the fact that you were

allegedly poisoned.

It certainly was the most tightly compartmented operation in the history

United States.

The first thing the Pakistanis did was scramble their jets to shoot down our

helicopters. The experience told me that some things would not go according to

plan because there is always some aspect of it that goes wrong.

An American citizen has been handed to police one day after he shot dead two

people in Lahore.

Facing a possible death sentence.

This was jeopardizing the most important CIA operation that had been planned in

years. When he returned, he didn't look like someone who was going to survive?

There are no coincidences in espionage.

I had a one -year assignment to Pakistan, so I arrived in January 2011.

By the second week of June, I was pretty sick.

Went back to Washington.

Went to a doctor. They couldn't figure out what was going on.

Went back to Pakistan.

And ultimately, very quickly, within a couple of days, I couldn't function

anymore. His health had dramatically declined. He had lost an extraordinary

amount of weight in a very short amount of time.

You have to...

react to situations, and there are always situations that come up.

I never saw an operation in my career that went wholly as planned.

Never.

My name is Mark Kelton, and I was Chief of Station Islamabad, Pakistan.

The opportunity to come to Islamabad came out of the blue.

The job at COS Islamabad is a massive job.

When he was first selected to be our senior officer in Pakistan, a few

things went through my mind, and maybe some people could be surprised.

I was happy, happy for him, happy for the organization, because I knew what he

would bring to that mission.

I'm Jennifer Eubank. I was deputy director of the CIA for digital

Most of my career has been in Asia, Europe, and Eastern Europe.

Mark Kelton also happens to be my husband.

To foreign partners, Mark can be your best, strongest partner and supporter

our interests align, and probably your most formidable adversary if your

interests are not aligned.

He is a man of extraordinarily deep integrity.

He's got kind of a limitless reserve of strength and determination.

And now...

That can look like stubbornness at times to some people, but it's also

resilience.

I had no idea that Mark would be part of one of the most secretive missions that

CIA had ever pursued.

So I went to our counterterrorism center, got a briefing. The mission

described by the director, was A, attacking al -Qaeda, degrading al

B was to work with the local intelligence service counterparts, the

mission.

And the last thing which became the main mission was this compound in

Abbottabad. It was clear to me that the compound itself indicated that it had

been built and was being used to hide something or someone.

There was an urgency to get out there because the people in the field needed

leadership.

The highest -ranking American spy in Pakistan was rushed back to the U .S.

after his cover was blown. The identity of the CIA station chief was revealed in

a lawsuit accusing him of orchestrating drone missile strikes that killed

Pakistani civilians.

There was a concern of an increased threat against the previous COS.

Being publicly known as the chief of station and the media is not a way to

operate.

My name is Pat Wenninger. From the 2010 to 2011 time frame, I served as the

chief of base in the CIA in South Asia.

No matter where you work as the chief of station, normally the host nation knows

who you are.

But it's not something we talk about publicly ever.

That led to Mark's early arrival in January of 2011.

Director Panetta, in fact, his words were, get your butt out there, but he

didn't use butt.

It was a very difficult operating environment from a counter -terrorist

perspective.

I hadn't served in Pakistan before. I didn't speak the language, which is

uncomfortable. Pakistan is a dangerous place to operate in.

Americans identified as Americans are at risk. You've seen kidnappings, you've

seen killings, dating back to Daniel Pearl.

There were bombings there, Marriott Hotel bombing, 2008.

Newsweek magazine on the cover of it in 2007 said Pakistan was the most

dangerous nation in the world.

The security detail accompanied me everywhere I went around town.

I did not leave the embassy as frequently as I normally would have.

Really, the job is just all about risk, managing risk, and so that's a natural

part of your everyday life.

I was always conscious of the fact that if I was going to go out, it had to be

for a good reason.

Because it is a risky environment, and I'm responsible for the people that were

protecting me as well.

And that became more important as time went on.

The time, of course, the United States was involved in Afghanistan, and the

Taliban and the extremists would use bases and staging areas in Pakistan to

attack into Afghanistan.

Many times along the border of Pakistan, loyalty wasn't to the United States and

it wasn't to the Pakistani government. It was to the Taliban.

Mike Rogers, former chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,

Pakistan was hopeful in the war on terror. They understood that that lion

bite them as well as it could be biting your neighbor.

We knew that a large number of al -Qaeda operatives were located there.

So they understood that they, the Pakistanis, wanted to help us in the

against terrorism.

Yes, they were with us, but yes, that had some constraints.

It's the first time I heard the term frenemy.

Complicated is another way I'd put it. At the same time, they're also trying to

monitor and identify who the CIA officers are and what they're doing

unilaterally in their country.

You combine that with the political instability in that region.

It makes for a very challenging and high -threat environment to operate.

Capturing or killing bin Laden remains a high priority of this administration.

Part of what's happened is bin Laden has gone deep underground.

But we have the best minds, the best intelligence officers, the

best special forces who are thinking about this day and night.

Prior to my arrival, the compound had been under surveillance for about nine

ten months. It was 2010 when it was identified.

Abbottabad was effectively the home of the West Point of Pakistan.

We had to be very, very careful about getting near the compound because the

thing we wanted to do was spook the people that were in the compound.

There were a number of things that were apparent.

A, that the compound itself was a significant operational challenge.

12 -foot walls, balconies that you couldn't see into laterally. If you

down the driveway, you couldn't see left or right into the courtyards.

The compound itself was massively large compared to the areas around it, and we

had to be very careful as to who was exposed to it.

Within CIA, there is what we call compartmentation, where we take

sensitive activities and allow people insight into them based on their need to

know. In this case, the knowledge of the compound was highly restricted.

Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, that was not included.

That was a decision taken by the president himself and keeping it within

tightest possible circle. The great concern was that it would leak somehow.

I've been involved in a lot of tightly compartmented operations, but it

certainly was, given the stakes, the most important of those operations.

Operational planning is something that we do a lot of and try to take account

every possible problem that's out there. But invariably, things happen.

Mark Hilton arrived in country at the end of January.

Two days later, while he happened to be in meetings with senior Pakistani

government officials, according to published reports, two men on a

tried to rob the U .S. government security contractor at

gunpoint.

The U .S. says it was self -defense, but local police call it cold -blooded

murder. Imagine that you show up.

in country your second day to present your credentials to your host nation

counterparts in an event like this happens the u .s security contractor he

defended himself

I can't say it was a surprise because Pakistan is a dangerous place, and I

see that he could have taken any other action.

American citizen Raymond Davis has been handed to police on six -day physical

remand one day after he shot dead two people in Lahore. He was arrested and

charged with two counts of murder and illegal possession of a weapon.

Facing a possible death sentence, Raymond Davis has been catapulted from

obscure job at the American embassy in Pakistan to the center of a diplomatic

meltdown with a critical ally.

There was a perception that the U .S. security contractor was a former special

forces Rambo type operating unabated within Pakistan. There was anger within

Pakistani government, and there was a tremendous amount of anger with the

Pakistani populace.

It's going to be, as one of my Pakistani sources said, like an atomic bomb.

Not just for the Americans, but for the Pakistanis. So the threat was even more

significant for not only the security contractor that was illegally being

but those U .S. government officials operating in that region.

whether he was a diplomat or not.

A murderer is a murderer, and a murderer is a murderer.

So you had an already high threat environment where U .S. government

were operating, and you just poured gasoline and lit a match.

I would argue it takes a special kind of officer to operate within Pakistan, one

who understands what they're walking into first.

Second, somebody who understands tradecraft, has good judgment, and more

importantly, has courage.

I remember in 2010, I met with one of my superiors in Washington.

He said, bad things are going to happen.

You better be prepared.

You're in command, and you'll be in command for the good things only.

You're also in command for the bad things, and particularly when the bad

happen. That's when leadership is needed.

Mark was the right person for that role at the right time.

He is, in my opinion, the finest officer of his generation because of the

breadth of his experience.

I grew up in New Hampshire. My parents never went to college, working class

family. My dad was an airborne black hat paratrooper. So service of country was

in my family.

He has a deep sense of duty and responsibility to a country that he

Even as a young boy, he asked to go off to military academy because he wanted to

serve. After I came out of grad school, I was hired by CIA as a Soviet military

analyst. I had never been outside the United States, never.

I was a Reagan baby going in to fight the Soviet Union. We're talking 1981 -82

here. At that time, Soviet operations was the holiest of holies. It was the

center of operations against the evil empire.

When you're a young officer, of course, you're out there trying to cut your

teeth to make an impression early on. It was also scary.

It's not physical fear so much. It's fear of making a mistake that's going to

jeopardize someone else. It's nerve -wracking.

So managing that fear was something that I had to learn.

Once it happened, I had confidence in myself to deal with any of the

that would confront me.

By the time I got to Pakistan, I was a very experienced officer.

Pakistani police say an American diplomat carried out an intentional and

-blooded murder.

A judge ordered that Raymond Davis remain in custody for at least another

weeks. Normally when a person with diplomatic status is arrested by a local

government, the embassy is called, the ambassador will come and get them out

back in the charge of the United States.

That did not happen here. And this seems to be shaping up as a battle between

the CIA and the ISI, the Pakistani Secret Service. This is a proxy war. He

in fact, charged with murder.

Raven Davis is interrogated by the Lahore police.

He's got a story and he's sticking to it.

My name is Mark Mazzetti. I'm a correspondent for The New York Times

national security, foreign affairs, intelligence.

The Pakistani government isn't quite buying it.

And

the

U .S. government's position is pretty clear.

If our diplomats are in another country, then they are not subject to that

country's local prosecution.

The Pakistani said, well...

We don't think he's actually a diplomat. We think he's a spy.

The court has arrived to the conclusion in our past order that he doesn't enjoy

immunity. He has to face trial before this court.

That in itself is a major diplomatic meltdown in a country that was still

essential for the United States. Beyond the demonstrations that were happening

outside and the danger that they created for people working in the consulate or

in the embassy.

The fact that he was detained in an area that was beyond the reach of the United

States, there was always worry that what might happen to him in jail.

There was great concern for his safety.

At the same time, we were trying to find HVT -1, high -value target one, which,

of course, was Bin Laden.

The pressure grew to get greater specificity as to who was inside the

We reviewed a piece of surveillance that showed a person we called the pacer

walking in the compound in the area behind the main building.

And that person was the focus. Who is that person?

Another senior terrorist leader, an important Gulf Arab hiding for other

reasons. Director Panetta met me and said, we've got to find other ways to

look into this compound.

So we undertook activity that allowed us.

ultimately, to identify the sexes, ethnicities, nationalities of everybody

in that compound, except one.

I'm not going to tell you how we did that, but we did that.

And when you looked at those sexes, ages, ethnicities, it matched exactly

Laden's family and the families of the couriers, which gave me a good degree of

confidence. I'm 95 % sure it's Bin Laden.

The concern was that that circle of knowledge would expand and that

could leak, hence the need to reach a decision as quickly as possible on what

were going to do.

The problem was, of course, the embassy security contractor is sitting in a

jail.

We had to get him released because we couldn't go forward with the operation

of fear of his security, depending on how the raid came out.

The extremists could take action against him, bring him in direct physical

threat. That was a great worry.

This was possibly jeopardizing the most important CIA operation that had been

planned in years.

So it was an imperative to get him out.

Al -Qaeda is not a forgiving organization.

So we were concerned that even the security contractors in Pakistani

we'd seen incidents before where Pakistani police or others had worked in

conjunction with the extremist groups, and that could have put him at direct

risk.

The U .S.

negotiates for him to be basically in a wing effectively by himself.

where the guards were not heavily armed because there was a suspicion an

accident might happen and a guard might shoot him trying to escape or something

like that.

And then another provision that was built in was because they were worried

actually him being poisoned, they negotiated for dogs to taste his food.

So it was a very tenuous and difficult time.

probably an all -time low in the relationship between the United States

government and Pakistan.

While this is happening, in the backdrop, you have the planning of the

raid, and Mark is leading both those efforts.

During my time working against Russia, the risks were very high. If you failed,

the person that suffered was not only you, but the person you were responsible

for. What you learn is, of course, a tremendous number of hours went into

operational activity.

Like Eisenhower said, plans are useless. Planning is everything.

Constant planning for all possible contingencies, things that could happen.

This is a highly risky and uncertain business. Things do tend to go wrong.

You rely on your training. You rely on your experience.

You judge the situation, assess it in the moment, and then execute.

In planning for the raid, remember that you're conducting an operation inside a

foreign country without that country's knowledge.

There could be resistance on the site, and there could be casualties.

So these were all the factors that weighed heavily on decision -makers in

Washington. Ultimately, the SEALs were selected because they had access to

aircraft and the ability to bring to bear all of the capabilities of the

States military.

One of those unforgettable days, I was standing in my kitchen talking to my

wife. The phone rang. The voice on the other end of the line said, Hey, Dave,

you and the boss got to get to CIA headquarters.

Something is up.

My name's Dave Cooper. At the time, I was the command master chief of the

Special Warfare Development Group. Our relationship with the CIA depends on the

day. When the CIA called, it was usually a political hostage, a nuclear threat,

some kind of counterterrorism operation.

The training for this particular operation was done on a mock -up of the

compound that was built by CIA based on our intelligence gathering.

We built them a model that they could practice on. I'm John Pereira. I served

CIA for 31 years.

I was the deputy director of CIA for support, and I was in that role prior to

and during the bin Laden raid.

We were responsible for making sure the people are ready, they're in place, they

have what they need.

But the facility itself had to be protected from any visibility.

Meaning that we didn't want adversary countries to know that we were planning

for an operation against a compound that looked like the bin Laden compound.

So we did it in a remote location. We had to have this as protected as we

possibly get it.

The folks that do cybersecurity, they know a great deal about the satellites

that our adversaries have. They can track those satellites through the sky.

So when those satellites came overhead, we simply took a break. You know, we

went inside.

There were things that we couldn't confirm.

And going into that day, of course, those are all the ones that you're

about. We don't know what the inside looks like. We know what the outside

like. What we were able to build is something that had some modularity to

could reconfigure it so they could train on different scenarios once they got

inside. Staircase here, windows there.

And that's typical of what we call shoot houses, right? They are modular, so you

can just mix it up for the guys.

At some point, there are going to be stairs right in front of them. The next

time they come in, that's going to be a hallway, and the stairs will be over to

the left. On at least one occasion, they're going to go up a stairway that

doesn't go anywhere.

They would take out a door, go through, we would rebuild that door. So we don't

want it to be routine, right? Keep the guys sharp, keep them thinking, keep

on their toes, so to speak.

Then we come together to talk about how we're actually going to do the full

mission profiles and working out contingencies.

And the mindset is we don't prepare against surprise, we prepare to be

surprised. What will cause us to fail?

I had known that something was brewing, not from work.

But I just knew that for a period of weeks, he was unavailable.

Sleep was at a premium.

Most nights, three, four hours of sleep, maybe.

It was an exhausting period.

In public, you know, it's looking like Raymond Davis is going to stand trial.

while the U .S. and Pakistan are secretly negotiating what to do. The

was able to work with Pakistani authorities.

Led by an effort by the consul general in Lahore, Carmela Conroy.

She used to meet with him every day to ensure his safety.

She really had a critical role in leading the U .S. government charge,

locally and with the embassy, to help resolve this.

Raymond Davis was released after Pakistan paid $2 .3 million in so

money to the families of the two men he shot and killed.

Under Sharia law, the families of the victims have to forgive the perpetrator

the crime, and they're paid money for it.

Davis has no idea what's going on. He doesn't speak Urdu, and he's basically

spirited out of the court, thrown into a car, driven to the airport, where a

plane was waiting to basically get him out of Pakistan. And only then did he

realize that, you know, he's now a free man.

This was a very difficult time, and I think Mark's leadership was critical in

getting us through that.

People ask me what a day in the life is like as an intelligence officer. Each

day is different.

Different challenges, different threats, lots of early mornings, lots of late

nights, lots of weekends, lots of time away from home.

We don't have places anywhere in the world where two senior officers could

together. So we've done six years of separated deployments, and that presents

its own challenges to a couple, to a family.

So his middle of the night, I just knew that he was away.

And so I had started piecing together what I thought could be going on without

any real knowledge.

There were several options considered for the date, but we settled ultimately

May 1st, U .S. time.

May 2nd, it's 1230 a .m., was Pakistan time.

The run -up to the raid, of course, there was nerves.

Nervous anticipation.

What if the U .S. government launched an operation into Pakistan and come up

dry? What if it was a leak and bin Laden or whoever was there escaped?

What if, what if, what if?

We flew out to Afghanistan, got set up and ready to go with communications and

everybody in place, helicopters in place.

I was in my office with the officer from SEALS as well as the ambassador and

several other officers from my station. We were watching on live video feed the

target. The audio was provided by Admiral McRaven, who was listening to

tactical radio net of the SEALS.

We see the first helicopter come over the target and then slowly slide off the

target. When the helicopter went down, it was sort of a gasp. You know, there

were some people in the operations center that jumped up, said, hey,

trained for this, let them deal with it.

He did a controlled crash, and the seals all got out, and they did what they

were trained to do, and they did it perfectly.

The other thing we were worried about, of course, was the reaction of people

around. This was in the middle of a town.

Very shortly after the helicopter crashes, you have the curious onlookers

starting to come out of their houses.

What were the civilians going to do in this middle -class town when they

hearing helicopters and gunfire in the middle of the night? What were the

going to do? What was the military response going to be? We really didn't

an answer to any of those questions.

There are so many ways for this mission to go wrong.

We are invading a sovereign nation, generally frowned upon.

Our relationship with Pakistan was already on the rocks. But now imagine if

start killing innocent men, women, and even possibly children, how that will

look.

We had a sense that there was a stir happening when the helicopters came in.

didn't want any innocents to get hurt in this.

And so on the night the SEALs went in, they had their interpreter dressed up as

a Pakistani ISI agent. Everybody in Pakistan knows what ISI is, their

the FBI and the CIA.

Who, when those people started pouring out of their houses to see what the

ruckus was, he was there with a bullhorn essentially saying, ISI, go back inside

your houses.

And they all went back inside their houses and they didn't call the police.

that very creative bit of problem solving took two huge problems right off

table.

We did not encounter any civilians whatsoever and no police showed up.

We have video feed until they went into the main building. So all we're hearing

at that point is the relay of the tactical communications.

McRaven was walking us through as they went up.

And there was a period of quiet.

It felt to me like five or six hours. I think it was ten minutes.

It was less than ten minutes. It might have been less than five.

Several minutes later, we heard Geronimo.

Geronimo. Geronimo came pretty quickly, which, of course, was the designator for

bin Laden.

I can't tell you what that felt like. I mean, I liken it to the world just

changed.

We celebrated.

I cheered that. I mean, I...

You know, normally one wouldn't cheer the death of another man, but this guy

richly deserved it. I can tell you that the dozen or so people inside of that

Joint Operations Center erupted.

Closure, joy, elation, this chapter is over.

You know, if you go back and you remember how you felt on September 12th.

For me, personally speaking, there was no greater moment, I think, in my career

and the career of many officers who contributed to it when he was removed

the battlefield.

But that's quick. That elation doesn't last very long because now we've got to

get folks out.

Let's get everybody out safely, and then let's deal with the consequences.

The breachers went out and began to essentially rig that helicopter to blow.

We watched all of that. But, you know, the concerns then, of course, didn't

then. The first thing the Pakistanis did was scramble their jets to shoot down

our helicopters.

That was the only time that I was remotely nervous.

You have to do a time -distance problem right. The boys leave Abbottabad doing

150 miles an hour in their helicopter.

Forty minutes later, the two Pakistanis leave going 1 ,000 miles an hour in

their jets. How long until they shoot the boys out of the sky?

We never answered that question. Thankfully, the jets went the wrong way.

Literally went the wrong way.

And the guy flew back to the base in Afghanistan.

A puzzle that had been worked on for a long time by a lot of extraordinary

people and extraordinary resources had been thrown at this objective for years.

And, you know, I'm biased because I share a life with this officer, this

but I felt like he brought that extra piece to the puzzle.

And so I was very proud.

This was Pakistan's fight back.

A senior military and intelligence team took over the compound and sealed all

roads leading to it. They're closing down, putting up the defenses, and going

the offensive.

Of course, we had worried about Pakistani reaction, and there was

in place to call senior officials in Pakistan and talk to them.

I've been doing this work for a long time, and I know that the elimination of

the leader of al -Qaeda does not eliminate the terrorist threat to the

States. It was maybe one chapter.

of a book.

Some of the contingencies that we had to work through is the level of security

for Americans in that area. Are we prepared to handle what might be a

And naturally, one would be concerned about senior officers involved in that

effort being publicly identified.

We knew that there would be risks there.

Do we have the right security levels there? Do we have the right tripwires

there? Can we tell if there's an action about to be taken? Do we have any

intelligence on specific retribution that they might be planning?

There was great concern. It's a prideful country. They're proud and protecting

their own sovereignty.

We demand of America to treat us as a sovereign nation, not to treat us as a

colony of theirs.

And we tried to the degree that we could to mitigate that by talking about the

fact that bin Laden was a common enemy, enemy of both our countries.

You know, according to published reports, the host nation was humiliated

they were furious with Mark.

I don't think that I personalized it or thought about me.

I would argue post -raid, if the senior officer on site was known to our

adversaries. That officer would have had a target on their back.

After the raid, I thought every American potentially had a

target on his back.

The al -Qaeda reacted, certainly.

There was a lot of animosity toward the United States in the wake of the raid.

But it became.

Pretty clear pretty early on that the reaction was more personal directed at

I wasn't the most popular man in the world after the operation.

Mark was the senior CIA officer on the ground. The environment, as you might

imagine, would have been very tense.

They were upset that we had violated their sovereignty.

But I was there to do a job, and I hope, you know, that they recognize that.

But if a personal relationship with the people you're working with is a problem,

or they feel trust has been violated, then sometimes it's easier to remove the

cause of the problem.

By first week, second week of June, I was pretty sick.

The symptoms weren't normal.

I spoke with Mark on the phone a few times about it. It was clear that

was off.

Very quickly, within a couple of days, I couldn't function anymore. By that

time, pain was a real issue.

His health had dramatically declined precipitously, I would say.

He had lost an extraordinary amount of weight in a very short amount of time in

a way that seems medically impossible.

I'm not going to get too much into the nature of the symptoms, but just to say

it was extremely painful.

And as they developed, they got worse.

His condition was unusual in its rapid development and unusual in

its symptomology, in my opinion. I'm not a doctor.

It happened in the middle of the night. I just reached the point where I was

close to collapse.

I wasn't doing any good for myself, but more importantly, I wasn't doing any

good for the people over there.

It's definitely stressful, right, trying to figure out what's going on.

You get to the point you're not able to function.

then there was only one choice.

And if you might imagine, if you were the senior CIA officer in Pakistan and

a role in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, in a country where people were not happy

about that, you wouldn't seek medical care there.

So really coming home was the only option.

And in his weakened state, it was definitely the best option.

If I recall correctly, he wasn't all that eager about leaving post?

But it was time.

It's almost unfathomable the sense of commitment and duty that he feels.

It's terrible. It felt like abandoning my post.

I wanted to be part of trying to fix the problem, to get things better with

Pakistan, and that was just not possible.

It was some tough love and strong encouragement on the part of a security

that basically said, sir, we're getting you out of here.

And at that point, he was candidly in such bad shape that he just said, fine.

An indicator of Mark's leadership, he was leading and making decisions and

giving guidance right up to the last moment before he departed.

It just tells you something about what a promise and a commitment means to him.

It's somehow woven into the very fiber of his being. I mean, you cannot

that from him.

When I came back, my wife was obviously very worried about my condition. I had

lost 40 pounds, you know, and was in great pain. So we did a lot of doctor's

appointments, but she was always there to help me. You know, and there was

concern about what was going on.

He had really lost kind of all color. When I did see him, when he returned,

candidly, he didn't look like someone who was going to.

I worried more at that stage about the impact on my family and others. There

a period of uncertainty coming back as to whether I'd be able to continue a

career and all of that. It was pretty thick.

But, you know, I had good doctors, and, you know, we've been able to manage it.

I retired in 2015.

A Russian intelligence officer once told me, there's no such thing as a former

intelligence officer.

And that's absolutely true.

I will always be a CIA officer, always.

I still wake up in the night thinking about operational decisions I made or

didn't make.

Nobody ever leaves with everything they wanted to accomplish done.

You know, it's the nature of the business. It carries on.

Got a phone call from a journalist who said, we're going to publish your name

and the fact that you were allegedly poisoned in Pakistan.

You know, there were all sorts of theories about why that happened. We

know why I got sick.

I don't know till this day.

Was there a real explanation? No, never.

It could be I'll never get an answer to it.

That's something I live with.

Anything's within the realm of possibility, but, you know, I wouldn't,

be uncomfortable levying any accusations.

Foreign intelligence services, of course, have used poison and other

know, and we have demonstrated instances of it. I've written about it publicly,

of Russia using it against dissidents and people it considers traitors, but

never to my knowledge against a foreign intelligence officer.

It's a totally different thing.

Of course, I was not happy to get the phone call.

The story was going to associate me with the Bin Laden operation by name.

I was not so much worried about me, worried about my family.

I mean, there are people out there who definitely wouldn't like that.

My name being out there, there's a potential that somebody doesn't like CIA

like what I was allegedly involved with and comes to my door and harms me or my

family, right? That's the concern. There are enough crazy people out there.

So we appealed to them not to publish my name. The agency appealed to them as

well.

And the press decided, no, we're going to publish it.

which had safety and security ramifications for me and my family that

to this day.

It's not pleasant.

My name is pretty much all over the place. We're an open society.

Once somebody prints a story like that, it goes everywhere. It doesn't stop at

the borders of the United States.

I thought the story was poorly researched, poorly written. She'd never

published, and his inclusion of the name was both irresponsible and gratuitous.

It seemed designed, in my opinion, just to yield clicks online.

The salacious, scandalous, or kind of dramatic aspects of the story were never

anything that we conveyed to people.

But the article did, let's say, ratchet up our focus on safety,

safety for our family members, safety for our environment.

That's a reality that I live with.

That being said, you know, once it happened, I'd make the best of it and

A, document some of the history, and B, try to ensure that the American people

understand what CIA does in its name.

And they can be proud of them. They can be proud of the officers who served

there.

Otherwise, you would never have met me.

The job demands great sacrifice of you, so you have to give up some things

personally, particularly if you're in an operations field. You're out there

alone without your family. You're working long hours.

You might be in places that are dangerous.

The professional satisfaction might be quite high, but the cost to your family

can also be high.

It's been pros and cons.

I would say in the pro column, there's something special about being able to

share what is a unique life with someone who really understands it.

My wife was a very positive thinker. You know, she comes from my world, too. You

know, doesn't pay to dwell on the negative.

Focus on success.

She's the greatest thing that ever happened to me.

Support in that time was unbelievable.

And ultimately, she helped me through it, which I'll be forever grateful for.

Mark was an exemplary leader. I mean, he had the unique ability to

Have a strategic vision and execute that vision during an extremely complex

and challenging set of circumstances.

He had been, you know, kind of forged in the fire of some pretty challenging

work across decades.

I never saw an operational success at CIA that was a result of one person's

action. CIA works and fights as a team.

People with all different skills being brought together.

And that's true of the bin Laden operation.

Well, the lesson to our enemies is that if you attack the United States, we will

not quit. You can do everything you want to hide, but we will not quit. We will

find you, and you will pay a price for that.

It's not just a job, it's a way of life.

You choose that life, then you get the good and the bad that goes with it. And

from my perspective, it was overwhelmingly good.

Even when it was bad, it was good.

Looking back on it, it was worth it. It was worth it. We delivered a great

victory to the United States.

You know, joining the CIA, it isn't like the movie, no, but there are thrills

that are comparable.