Original subtitles

Three risky runways.

Three risky runways.

Line green manual flight.

One in Sao Paulo.

TAM 3054, clear to land.

TAM 3054, clear to land.

Another in the Himalayas.

Pakistan 268 report position.

And a third on the coast of Norway.

And a third on the coast of Norway.

You are cleared for a visual approach.

Runway 33.

Each one pushing pilots...

Each one pushing pilots...

Down to 11,500.

...to call on all their training.

You have mountains to get over,

and then you have to drop down to land.

and then you have to drop down to land.

And there's still...

No spoilers.

Full brakes.

...to pull off...

Decelerate

...notoriously difficult landings.

...notoriously difficult landings.

It can't!

Decelerate.

Stop!

Stop!

What's happening?

What's happening?

No, no, no!

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

we are starting our approach.

We lost both engines!

Put the mask over your nose.

Emergency.

Mayday!

Mayday!

Brace for impact!

Brace for impact!

It's going to crash!

TAM Airlines, Flight 3054

is en route from the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre.

is en route from the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre.

The Airbus A320 is headed for Sao Paulo's Congonhas

The Airbus A320 is headed for Sao Paulo's Congonhas

Airport 90 minutes away.

There are 181 passengers aboard the evening flight.

There are 181 passengers aboard the evening flight.

Captain Enrique Stefanini Di Sacco and First Officer Kleyber

Captain Enrique Stefanini Di Sacco and First Officer Kleyber

Lima learn that heavy rain in Sao Paulo

Lima learn that heavy rain in Sao Paulo

has temporarily shut down 35L, the main runway

has temporarily shut down 35L, the main runway

at their destination.

Did they say when it would reopen?

No.

No.

For now, the crew remains

on course, waiting for weather updates from Sao Paulo.

on course, waiting for weather updates from Sao Paulo.

Congonhas Airport lies at the center

Congonhas Airport lies at the center

of Brazil's most populous city.

When pilots begin landing at Congonhas.

When pilots begin landing at Congonhas.

They're more worried that when operating

at any other national airport.

At its heart, is 35L, runway built on a hilltop

and surrounded by urban sprawl.

and surrounded by urban sprawl.

To make matters worse, it's just over 6,000 long,

To make matters worse, it's just over 6,000 long,

which is short for large jets.

This makes 35L of the most treacherous

runways in the world.

As you approach the runway, your adrenaline

As you approach the runway, your adrenaline

is really pumping.

For us pilots, it's like landing on an aircraft carrier.

For us pilots, it's like landing on an aircraft carrier.

As flight 354 nears Sao Paulo,

As flight 354 nears Sao Paulo,

the crew gets an update.

3054 35L is the active runway.

3054 35L is the active runway.

Runway 35L has reopened.

But Stefanini has an additional challenge to landing.

But Stefanini has an additional challenge to landing.

Remember, we only have one reverse, sir.

Remember, we only have one reverse, sir.

Yes, only the left.

The right thrust reverser, one of two

The right thrust reverser, one of two

on the Airbus, isn't working.

That reduces the plane's stopping power.

That reduces the plane's stopping power.

The devices are designed to slow the aircraft

The devices are designed to slow the aircraft

by reversing the direction of the engine's forward thrust.

Thrust reversers, they act like brakes

when you land the aircraft.

You deploy them only after the aircraft is on the ground.

You deploy them only after the aircraft is on the ground.

TAM 3054 35L clear to land.

TAM 3054 35L clear to land.

The runway is wet and it's slippery.

The wind is 330 at 8 knots.

The wind is 330 at 8 knots.

On final approach, the captain decides to take over

from the autopilot.

Line green manual flight.

Line green manual flight.

The concern was that after touching down

The concern was that after touching down

the pilots needed to be sure that they

would be able to stop their plane

before the end of the runway.

100, 100.

One dot now.

OK.

OK.

20 retard.

Middle.

The plane is not slowing.

The plane is not slowing.

Reverse number one only.

And it's hurdling dangerously fast

And it's hurdling dangerously fast

toward the end of the runway.

Decelerate.

It can't!

Look at this!

Look at this!

Turn!

Turn!

Flight 3054 has slammed

into a TAM Airlines office building and a gas station

into a TAM Airlines office building and a gas station

beside it.

All 187 passengers and crew are dead.

All 187 passengers and crew are dead.

A dozen people on the ground are also killed.

It's the worst aviation accident in South American history.

It's the worst aviation accident in South American history.

Lieutenant Colonel Fernando Camargo

is an accident investigator with CENIPA, Brazil's aviation

is an accident investigator with CENIPA, Brazil's aviation

safety agency.

The Black boxes will not last long and the heat!

His first concern is to recover the plane's

His first concern is to recover the plane's

black boxes, and send them to experts

in Washington DC for scrutiny.

in Washington DC for scrutiny.

While they wait for results, investigators focus on runway

35L, looking for clues.

35L, looking for clues.

We knew that we would have to run a complete investigation

We knew that we would have to run a complete investigation

on the runway.

on the runway.

They soon make an important discovery.

It's still wet!

It's still wet!

Rainwater is pooling, creating puddles on the tarmac,

something that shouldn't happen.

something that shouldn't happen.

When this water gets in contact

with the landing gear, the tires,

with the landing gear, the tires,

it can generate what we call hydroplaning.

And this is a problem because a pilot will have little

or no control of his aircraft.

or no control of his aircraft.

How can water be pooling on one of the busiest

runways in Brazil?

To find out, the team studies files

To find out, the team studies files

from the government agency that runs Congonhas Airport.

They learn that runway 35L was resurfaced

one month before the accident.

one month before the accident.

In 2007, the runway at Congonhas underwent repairs.

In 2007, the runway at Congonhas underwent repairs.

It had been offering a very low level of traction.

It had been offering a very low level of traction.

There were many reports of skids.

But the resurfacing work

on the busiest runway at Congonhas

on the busiest runway at Congonhas

lacked a critical safety feature.

The runway is wet and it's slippery.

Proving to be done at a later date, no wonder it was wet.

Proving to be done at a later date, no wonder it was wet.

Channels cut into the tarmac carry away rainwater.

Without them, rain collects in puddles.

Without them, rain collects in puddles.

But even with a wet runway and only one operating

thrust reverser, the A320 should have been able to stop.

thrust reverser, the A320 should have been able to stop.

To figure out why it didn't, investigators

To figure out why it didn't, investigators

examine the plane's maintenance records.

They learn that the right thrust reverser was deactivated

They learn that the right thrust reverser was deactivated

because it was jamming.

But the aircraft was then flown without incident

for four consecutive days.

for four consecutive days.

This plane landed on the same runway

that day with the same problems had only one thrust

reverser, no issues whatsoever.

reverser, no issues whatsoever.

Not only had the plane landed repeatedly

with one thrust reverser.

with one thrust reverser.

It even touched down safely on runway 35L.

So why did this landing go so wrong?

The data from the badly burned flight recorders

The data from the badly burned flight recorders

has been retrieved by experts.

Here we go.

Here we go.

Investigators hope it will finally explain

what led to the disaster.

The speed is fine.

100, 100.

100, 100.

It came down fine.

The data confirms the brakes were working.

The data confirms the brakes were working.

Brakes were engaged.

And the plane didn't skid or slide.

But it also reveals a puzzling fact.

But it also reveals a puzzling fact.

It can't!

On landing, the plane's two engines

On landing, the plane's two engines

seemed to be working against each other.

Engine one.

The left engine was in reverse

to help slow the aircraft down.

But the right engine, the one with the disabled thrust

But the right engine, the one with the disabled thrust

reverser...

It's powering up.

It's powering up.

...was accelerating to climb power.

Decelerate!

It can't!

It can't!

Decelerate!

So engine two was thrusting when

it should have been idling.

That would explain the veer off to the left, right?

The question is, why would

this experienced crew touch down with one engine at climb power?

this experienced crew touch down with one engine at climb power?

They would have known it could doom the flight

and everyone on board.

and everyone on board.

Why flight 3054 engines were working against each other

is now the team's main focus.

is now the team's main focus.

We could establish roughly two main lines

We could establish roughly two main lines

of investigation, one, mechanical failure,

of investigation, one, mechanical failure,

and the other one, pilot error.

and the other one, pilot error.

The flight data and physical evidence shows

the engines were functioning.

Investigators turn their attention to the pilots.

Investigators turn their attention to the pilots.

They start with a captain's landing

They start with a captain's landing

prior to the one at Congonhas.

First, how did they land in Porto Alegre?

First, how did they land in Porto Alegre?

They learned that during the previous landing

in Porto Alegre, Captain Stefanini pulled back

in Porto Alegre, Captain Stefanini pulled back

both thrust levers, exactly the right procedure for landing

both thrust levers, exactly the right procedure for landing

with only one reverser.

And now both levers to reverse.

And now both levers to reverse.

That a captain knew the procedure,

he performed the correct procedure hours

he performed the correct procedure hours

before in the previous landing.

before in the previous landing.

So what did he do differently in Sao Paulo?

So what did he do differently in Sao Paulo?

OK.

OK, now Congonhas.

Left lever to idle, then reverse.

Left lever to idle, then reverse.

20 retard.

20 retard.

Retard.

Instead of throttling back both levers,

he only brought the left engine to idle,

he only brought the left engine to idle,

leaving the right one at full power.

Then once the aircraft touched down,

he activated the left thrust reverser to slow the plane,

he activated the left thrust reverser to slow the plane,

but kept the right engine at climb power.

That is quite different.

I don't get it.

How could a guy that knew the aircraft, that knew

How could a guy that knew the aircraft, that knew

the correct procedure, that executed a correct procedure,

the correct procedure, that executed a correct procedure,

how could he do something different?

how could he do something different?

It doesn't make sense.

We could really use your help on this.

We could really use your help on this.

Investigators enlist the help of another pilot.

OK.

He shares an outdated procedure for landing an A320

with a single thrust reverser that pilots find

with a single thrust reverser that pilots find

useful on wet short runways.

It brings the plane to a quicker stop.

The former procedure was taking both levers to idle,

The former procedure was taking both levers to idle,

The former procedure was taking both levers to idle,

and then just the lever corresponding to the engine

with the reverser operating normally that would

with the reverser operating normally that would

be taken to reverse position.

be taken to reverse position.

But Captain Stefanini never brought

the right engine to idle.

Did they get it wrong?

Did they get it wrong?

Investigators learn of previous accidents

caused by pilots mishandling thrust levers on landing.

caused by pilots mishandling thrust levers on landing.

That old procedure led pilots to error.

That old procedure led pilots to error.

To reduce the risk of pilots making that mistake,

To reduce the risk of pilots making that mistake,

Airbus modified the procedure.

The team now speculates that Captain Stefanini, hoping

to bring the A320 to a quicker stop on a rain

to bring the A320 to a quicker stop on a rain

slicked 35L opted for the old procedure.

slicked 35L opted for the old procedure.

But in doing so made a critical error.

It is completely understandable

It is completely understandable

that he had tried a former procedure

that he had tried a former procedure

and under such pressure made a mistake.

To test their theory, investigators

recreate the final moments of the flight in a simulator.

recreate the final moments of the flight in a simulator.

OK.

Engine one to idle.

Engine two stays at climb.

Right away, Lieutenant Vanessa Dias notices

Right away, Lieutenant Vanessa Dias notices

how difficult it is to distinguish

the position of the thrust levers inside a dark cockpit.

the position of the thrust levers inside a dark cockpit.

20 retard, retard.

Engine one to reverse.

Don't touch number two.

Brakes.

In the simulator we were able to program

in every known factor.

in every known factor.

The chronology of events, the wet surface,

position of the levers.

We also went off the runway and had

an accident in the simulator.

The team now understands why TAM Airlines

The team now understands why TAM Airlines

Flight 3054 ended in tragedy.

Flight 3054 ended in tragedy.

To increase the plane stopping power on a short, slick runway,

To increase the plane stopping power on a short, slick runway,

Captain Stefanini tried an old procedure for landing

with a disabled thrust reverser.

with a disabled thrust reverser.

Line green, manual flight.

But he was out of practice,

and combined with the stress of touching down in rainy weather,

and combined with the stress of touching down in rainy weather,

the captain became so unnerved he

the captain became so unnerved he

botched the simple procedure.

It's possible that tension might

It's possible that tension might

block a crucial motor response.

It can affect the pilot's ability to react.

There was no alarm to warn the crew

There was no alarm to warn the crew

that one engine was revving forward

while the other was in reverse.

First Officer Lima tried to figure

out what was going wrong.

out what was going wrong.

Decelerate!

Decelerate!

But in a dark cockpit overwhelmed by a landing going

But in a dark cockpit overwhelmed by a landing going

badly, he didn't catch the faulty thrust

lever settings either.

Look at this!

A runway with a dangerous reputation so worried

A runway with a dangerous reputation so worried

the pilots they made a deadly mistake.

It cost 199 lives.

In the wake of the accident the runways at Congonhas

In the wake of the accident the runways at Congonhas

have been grooved for runoff, and are regularly inspected.

have been grooved for runoff, and are regularly inspected.

New rules are in place dictating wet weather landing procedures.

Pakistan 268 is at 1-6 miles.

And when a difficult approach into an airport

And when a difficult approach into an airport

in the Himalayas leads to an error in the cockpit,

in the Himalayas leads to an error in the cockpit,

the landing takes a tragic turn.

No, no, no!

Pakistan International Airlines

Pakistan International Airlines

Flight 268 is heading to Kathmandu,

the capital of Nepal.

the capital of Nepal.

The country is home to eight of the world's

tallest mountain peaks.

Captain Iftikhar Janjua is in command of the Airbus A300.

Captain Iftikhar Janjua is in command of the Airbus A300.

He's a former officer in the Pakistani Air Force.

He's a former officer in the Pakistani Air Force.

His first officer is Hassan Akhtar, a junior pilot

with the airline.

with the airline.

I'll take over from here, Akhtar.

Yes, commander.

I have control.

You have control.

You have control.

Flight 268 begins the approach into Kathmandu.

Flight 268 begins the approach into Kathmandu.

It could get bumpy.

Let's keep them seated.

Let's keep them seated.

Agreed, commander.

Fasten seat belt sign is on.

Fasten seat belt sign is on.

To clear the mountains,

pilots must reduce the plane's altitude at specific distances

pilots must reduce the plane's altitude at specific distances

from the airport.

Pakistan 268 approaching

overhead, Cimarron 150.

overhead, Cimarron 150.

And report their positions

to air traffic control.

Pakistan 268 descend to 11,500.

Pakistan 268 descend to 11,500.

No delay expected.

Roger, Sir, down to 11,500.

Roger, Sir, down to 11,500.

You have a range of mountains to the South

that you have to get over, and then you

that you have to get over, and then you

have to drop down quite steeply in order to be able to land

at the threshold of the runway.

at the threshold of the runway.

Sierra approach, commander.

Here it is.

Watch my levels.

At 10 miles out, Pakistan

At 10 miles out, Pakistan

Airlines 268 should take approximately

four minutes to touch down.

Pakistan 268 is at 10 miles.

Pakistan 268 is at 10 miles.

Report your level.

We crossed out of 8,500...

We crossed out of 8,500...

200 now.

Roger.

Clear for final.

Clear for final.

Report four miles runway 0-2.

We'll call you at four miles, Pakistan 268.

We'll call you at four miles, Pakistan 268.

Clear for final.

Runway 0-2.

Runway 0-2.

Air traffic control waits for the flight

crew's next position report.

Three minutes go by.

Pakistan 268 report position.

But there's no word from Flight 268.

But there's no word from Flight 268.

Pakistan 268, report position.

Pakistan 268 tower.

Pakistan 268 tower.

Pakistan 268, this is tower.

Pakistan 268, this is tower.

PIA Flight 268 has crashed

PIA Flight 268 has crashed

somewhere in the Himalayas.

By nightfall, the plane's wreckage

is found on a mountainside.

All 167 people were killed on impact.

The Nepalese government launches an investigation

into the crash of Flight 268.

into the crash of Flight 268.

Thanks for coming, Andrew.

Andrew Robinson from Britain's

Air Accidents Investigation branch,

joins the Nepalese team.

joins the Nepalese team.

The crash site is more than 7,000 feet up

the side of a mountain.

Reaching it is not the only problem.

In this case, it was just the aircraft

was just totally destroyed.

was just totally destroyed.

It was just complete obliteration of the aircraft.

This is the location of the crash site, nine miles south

of the airport.

of the airport.

The aircraft collided with a mountain

at an elevation of 7,280 feet.

at an elevation of 7,280 feet.

Where should they have been?

Can you pass me that approach chart, please?

Can you pass me that approach chart, please?

Thank you.

At 10 miles out, he should have been at 8,200 feet.

At 10 miles out, he should have been at 8,200 feet.

At 10 miles out, he should have been at 8,200 feet.

Flight 268's crew should have been following

the standard approach chart to get past the mountains

the standard approach chart to get past the mountains

and into Kathmandu.

Watch my levels.

The approach chart is designed to keep you clear of terrain,

The approach chart is designed to keep you clear of terrain,

so you had to follow the approach chart.

so you had to follow the approach chart.

It requires a stepped approach in which pilots

It requires a stepped approach in which pilots

descend to lower altitudes at specific distances

from the airport.

from the airport.

How do you hit a mountain you're supposed

to clear by 1,000 feet?

to clear by 1,000 feet?

to clear by 1,000 feet?

to clear by 1,000 feet?

OK.

Let's see what the wreckage can tell us.

The team pours over evidence from Pakistan Airways

The team pours over evidence from Pakistan Airways

Flight 268's crash site.

Look at this.

Look at this.

The right wing impacts up here.

Robinson notices something about 4 feet

below the impact scar.

The top of a tree has been cut cleanly.

The top of a tree has been cut cleanly.

The wing couldn't have cut that tree.

So what did?

So what did?

What about the flaps?

What about the flaps?

Fully extended, exactly 1.3m below the wing.

Fully extended, exactly 1.3m below the wing.

For the team, it's a critical clue.

As the Airbus A300 slows for landing,

its wing flaps extend by as much as 25 degrees.

its wing flaps extend by as much as 25 degrees.

Hanging below the wings, the extended flaps

Hanging below the wings, the extended flaps

shaved a tree top as the plane hit the mountain.

Wings level no pitch down, flaps extended.

Wings level no pitch down, flaps extended.

In other words, the exact landing configuration.

In other words, the exact landing configuration.

This plane was absolutely not out of control.

The question is, if the pilots had the plane under

The question is, if the pilots had the plane under

control, why were they too low?

Flaps 10.

Flaps 10.

Flaps 10.

All right.

Let's look at this.

Investigators turn to the flight

Investigators turn to the flight

data recorder for an answer.

They started their descent at 16 miles out.

They're at 10,500 feet.

They're at 10,500 feet.

Then down to 9,500 at 13 miles.

8,200 at 10 miles.

8,200 at 10 miles.

Then quickly down to 7,500 until impact at 7280.

Then quickly down to 7,500 until impact at 7280.

So 1,000 feet too low, right from the get go.

What the aircraft flew was pretty much what

What the aircraft flew was pretty much what

the chart said, except that the pilot had

got one step ahead of himself.

So he's flying the correct altitude for the next position.

What if the problem is the actual approach chart itself?

Investigators scrutinize the approach chart

Investigators scrutinize the approach chart

for Kathmandu.

So is, let's say, 8,200 feet the right altitude

for 10 miles, or 8 miles?

for 10 miles, or 8 miles?

It's hard to say.

They realize the chart was difficult to read.

They realize the chart was difficult to read.

There was a large amount of information on it.

There was a large amount of information on it.

It was... there was a lot of clutter.

But that's not enough to explain why

But that's not enough to explain why

the crew was one step ahead.

Both pilots had made the descent into Kathmandu before,

Both pilots had made the descent into Kathmandu before,

using the exact same chart.

Inside the cockpit of another Airbus A300,

the team looks for answers.

the team looks for answers.

There's no place to clip an approach chart here.

Robinson notices that the pilots

Robinson notices that the pilots

would have had to repeatedly pick up the chart

to set their altitude.

Then quite by accident...

Then quite by accident...

Could it be?

...investigators find a key clue about the handling

...investigators find a key clue about the handling

of the chart.

If you pick up the chart and happen

to put your thumb over the 11,500 foot mark for 16

to put your thumb over the 11,500 foot mark for 16

nautical mile marker.

nautical mile marker.

In that case, it might have guided his eye

to the next height fix, and he might

to the next height fix, and he might

have assumed that that was the correct height

for the 16-mile marker point.

This definitely makes it look like 10,500

is the correct altitude at 16 miles.

is the correct altitude at 16 miles.

It's an important lead the team now believes

the captain misread the chart.

Kathmandu tower, good afternoon.

Pakistan 268 2-5 miles at 11,500.

Pakistan 268 2-5 miles at 11,500.

Just a few minutes before impact,

the first officer reports being 25

miles from the airport at the correct altitude of 11,500

miles from the airport at the correct altitude of 11,500

feet.

But then when the captain takes the chart,

his thumb may have obscured the next altitude.

his thumb may have obscured the next altitude.

There it is.

Watch my levels.

So instead of maintaining 11,500 feet,

So instead of maintaining 11,500 feet,

Captain Janjua dials in the altitude

he sees next on the chart.

Descending to 10,500.

Descending to 10,500.

Oblivious to the fact that that altitude is actually

for the next step of the approach.

for the next step of the approach.

As investigators pursue their theory...

At 16 miles, they should be at 11,500.

At 16 miles, they should be at 11,500.

But they've descended to 10,500.

They uncover a new mystery.

They uncover a new mystery.

But then they report being at 11,500.

How could a misread chart

cause the crew to misreport their actual altitude?

cause the crew to misreport their actual altitude?

It's a fast and steep approach,

It's a fast and steep approach,

and unless you're a pilot with considerable experience

flying this route maybe several times in a week,

it's going to be very testing.

it's going to be very testing.

Flaps 15.

At the 16 mile marker...

Landing gear down.

...the captain has already dialed the flight's

...the captain has already dialed the flight's

descent 1,000 feet too low.

Gear down, three green.

But the first officer reports the altitude

But the first officer reports the altitude

listed on the approach chart...

11,500.

...without double checking

the data on his altimeter.

Captain Janjua doesn't notice the discrepancy

Captain Janjua doesn't notice the discrepancy

between the reported and the actual altitudes.

In quite a stressful environment,

In quite a stressful environment,

such as the arrival at this airport,

the build-up of pressure inside the pilot

the build-up of pressure inside the pilot

must be quite considerable.

Runway 0-2.

Both pilots appear to have made fatal mistakes.

Both pilots appear to have made fatal mistakes.

Air traffic control would normally spot the danger.

Air traffic control would normally spot the danger.

But without radar, the controller

couldn't warn the pilots they were flying too low.

couldn't warn the pilots they were flying too low.

In this case, without radar, it's really the responsibility

of the crew to make sure of where they are flying

of the crew to make sure of where they are flying

and their approach.

Investigators believe they

have discovered the chain of events that led to the crash.

have discovered the chain of events that led to the crash.

The first mistake happened before the 16-mile marker

The first mistake happened before the 16-mile marker

where the captain misread the approach chart.

where the captain misread the approach chart.

Here it is.

Watch my levels, and entered the altitude for the 13-mile marker

one step ahead.

one step ahead.

Descending to 10,500.

Landing gear down.

Landing gear down.

Then the first officer misreported the altitude.

Pakistan 268 is at 1-6 miles.

Pakistan 268 is at 1-6 miles.

Relaying where they should be...

11,500.

11,500.

...not where they actually were.

Shrouded in clouds, flight 268 remained

1,000 feet below the recommended safe altitude for descent.

1,000 feet below the recommended safe altitude for descent.

We crossed out of 8,500...

200 now.

200 now.

Next altitude 6,800 at eight miles.

Now crossing through 7,500, 7,400.

Now crossing through 7,500, 7,400.

What's happening?

No, no, no, no!

No, no, no, no!

In the aftermath of the tragedy,

investigators recommend simplifying and clarifying

investigators recommend simplifying and clarifying

the approach to Kathmandu.

They also urge installing air traffic

They also urge installing air traffic

radar at Kathmandu airport.

But what happens when critical equipment fails pilots...

Stop!

Just stop!

Just stop!

...on a notoriously difficult landing strip?

High above the Norwegian coast, Atlantic Airways 670

High above the Norwegian coast, Atlantic Airways 670

is flying a short 15-minute commuter flight.

We're all the way up.

It must be time to get ready to go down again.

It must be time to get ready to go down again.

The plane is making several stops.

Next is the island of Stord before flying

Next is the island of Stord before flying

to its final destination at Molde on the mainland's coast.

to its final destination at Molde on the mainland's coast.

The crew is flying a British Aerospace 146,

a four-engine commuter plane designed for steep approaches

a four-engine commuter plane designed for steep approaches

to shorter runways.

The runway is going to be in sight soon.

The runway is going to be in sight soon.

Why don't you see what the weather's doing?

34-year-old Captain Niklas

Djurhuus is at the controls.

Djurhuus is at the controls.

He's been a commercial pilot for more than a decade.

Control, Atlantic 6-7-0, can you

advise on current conditions?

The first officer, 38-year-old Jakob Evald,

The first officer, 38-year-old Jakob Evald,

joined Atlantic Airways just a few months ago.

joined Atlantic Airways just a few months ago.

Stord Airport is positioned on the edge of a rugged island

above rocky cliffs that border the runway on three sides.

above rocky cliffs that border the runway on three sides.

There is no margin for error.

Planes that overshoot the runway can end up in the sea.

Planes that overshoot the runway can end up in the sea.

Control Atlantic 6-7-0, we'd like

to do a visual onto runway 3-3.

Affirmative, 6-7-0, the runway is free.

You are cleared for a visual approach.

You are cleared for a visual approach.

Runway 3-3.

We are stable.

We are stable.

We have landing speed.

And spoilers.

No spoilers.

Full brakes.

Full brakes.

We're not stopping!

Speed!

Flight 670 hurtles toward the edge of a cliff.

Captain Djurhuus uses all his might...

Captain Djurhuus uses all his might...

Hang on!

...trying to stop the plane.

Stop!

Stop!

Stop!

Just stop!

We're going over!

The door!

The door is stuck!

All 16 people aboard fight to save their lives.

All 16 people aboard fight to save their lives.

We have to get out of here.

The pilots escape through a side window.

The pilots escape through a side window.

Nearly all the passengers get out before the jet

Nearly all the passengers get out before the jet

is engulfed in flames.

Four people die in the accident.

Both pilots survive.

Both pilots survive.

Within hours, Norway's accident investigation board, the AIBN,

Within hours, Norway's accident investigation board, the AIBN,

is at the scene.

Watch your step, guys.

Watch your step, guys.

Investigators realized the wreckage

will give them few leads.

will give them few leads.

Fire destroyed most of the plane.

The team locates the black boxes.

But they've been exposed to intense heat

for two hours, more than twice what

for two hours, more than twice what

they're designed to endure.

Investigators hunt for the spoilers

from the plane's wings.

They're critical devices for landing the aircraft.

They're critical devices for landing the aircraft.

The BAE-146 has six spoilers that should have deployed

The BAE-146 has six spoilers that should have deployed

on touchdown to disrupt lift, which

helps the plane grip the runway and come to a safe stop.

helps the plane grip the runway and come to a safe stop.

So did the spoilers on flight 670 fail to deploy?

So did the spoilers on flight 670 fail to deploy?

It may be a difficult question for the team to answer.

It may be a difficult question for the team to answer.

All six of the plane spoilers were destroyed by fire.

All six of the plane spoilers were destroyed by fire.

Digging into this wreckage, we saw

that it was no switches, no wires, nothing

that it was no switches, no wires, nothing

that could be useful for us.

But we knew that the actuators possibly

could tell us something.

could tell us something.

Investigators are in luck.

The actuators that move the spoilers into place survived.

The actuators that move the spoilers into place survived.

OK, then.

OK, then.

Let's see what these can tell us.

The actuator is the one moving the spoilers up and down.

The actuator is the one moving the spoilers up and down.

The actuators is a sort of a jack, you see?

So it pushes the spoilers up and it locks them.

So it pushes the spoilers up and it locks them.

X-rays of the actuators confirm suspicions.

X-rays of the actuators confirm suspicions.

The spoilers never deployed.

Without them, flight 670 didn't have the usual amount

of stopping power.

But as a safety feature, the British Aerospace 146

But as a safety feature, the British Aerospace 146

can stop without spoilers, as long

can stop without spoilers, as long

as the speed is under control.

The last part of the runway, for instance, the speed should

have been so low, so spoilers or no spoilers,

have been so low, so spoilers or no spoilers,

shouldn't be that important.

So we knew early on that it must be something else in addition

So we knew early on that it must be something else in addition

to the spoilers.

But what?

But what?

That's the question now.

Stop!

Stop!

Just stop!

Investigators interview the captain

to find out what compounded the spoiler malfunction

to find out what compounded the spoiler malfunction

and led to the crash of Flight 670.

What happened when you first touched down?

What happened when you first touched down?

No spoilers.

Full brakes.

We were slowing down.

The plane was decelerating,

The plane was decelerating,

but not nearly quickly enough.

Talking to the crew, we got indications that the brake

Talking to the crew, we got indications that the brake

possibly was not working.

Investigators need to know how well the brakes

Investigators need to know how well the brakes

were working on the landing.

They pinned their hopes on the plane's skid marks.

They pinned their hopes on the plane's skid marks.

Close scrutiny reveals something odd.

Close scrutiny reveals something odd.

Anyone seen skid marks this color before?

Normal skid marks, they're like black lines

Normal skid marks, they're like black lines

along the runway.

But this was more like a lightly colored brownish type of marks.

But this was more like a lightly colored brownish type of marks.

But this was more like a lightly colored brownish type of marks.

Equally strange, the skid marks were dotted

with unusual pieces of debris.

It smelled like rubber, and it felt like rubber,

It smelled like rubber, and it felt like rubber,

but soft and sticky.

The debris seems to be from the tires.

The debris seems to be from the tires.

But investigators have no idea why they

disintegrated so completely.

I have personally never seen such rubber

I have personally never seen such rubber

grains on the runway before.

So that was new to me.

Digging through the remains of the burnt fuselage

turns up an unexpected lead.

turns up an unexpected lead.

A kind of breakthrough came when we

started to remove the wreckage.

started to remove the wreckage.

One of the tires from Flight 670's landing gear

One of the tires from Flight 670's landing gear

survived the fire.

It's a lucky break.

Right away, the edges attract investigators' attention.

The rubber has a peculiar texture, just like the pieces

The rubber has a peculiar texture, just like the pieces

found on the runway.

More sticky rubber.

More sticky rubber.

The inner left-hand main landing gear had a flat spot

which indicates that the tire had

which indicates that the tire had

been skidding along the runway.

The tire manufacturer provides investigators

with an intriguing explanation.

Reverted rubber hydroplaning.

Reverted rubber hydroplaning.

If a rubber tire is skidding along a damp runway,

the extreme friction generates so much heat,

the extreme friction generates so much heat,

it turns the water into a cushion

of steam that can lift the tire off the runway surface.

of steam that can lift the tire off the runway surface.

And basically making it a lot more

And basically making it a lot more

difficult to get the required retardation

from the wheel brakes.

from the wheel brakes.

The extreme heat also breaks down the rubber

into sticky fragments, just like those found on the runway.

into sticky fragments, just like those found on the runway.

It looks like we got a match.

But reverted rubber hydroplaning only

occurs if the wheels lock, and the BAE-146 is

occurs if the wheels lock, and the BAE-146 is

equipped with anti-lock brakes.

And spoilers.

No spoilers.

Full breaks.

They're not supposed to lock

up and cause the plane to skid.

up and cause the plane to skid.

But that's exactly what happened.

Investigators need to know why.

OK, go ahead please.

OK, go ahead please.

They turned to the cockpit voice recorder

for leads.

Reducing thrust.

Listening closely, they

soon hear a distinctive chime...

We're not stopping!

...and compare it to a library of sounds.

...and compare it to a library of sounds.

Can you match that?

The chime indicates the plane's

The chime indicates the plane's

emergency brake has engaged.

We're not stopping!

Listen to those tires.

First, the chime of the emergency brake,

then they start skidding.

then they start skidding.

I think we found our smoking gun.

I think we found our smoking gun.

Anti-skid and touch-down protection

Anti-skid and touch-down protection

may not be available.

Investigators check the aircraft manual.

Investigators check the aircraft manual.

If the emergency brake is switched on,

anti-skid protection automatically turns off.

anti-skid protection automatically turns off.

This means the wheels can lock and the aircraft could skid.

That was the last piece in the puzzle that told us more

That was the last piece in the puzzle that told us more

about this braking situation.

Reducing thrust.

Investigators finally know

Investigators finally know

what led to flight 670's crash.

Once the spoilers didn't deploy...

No spoilers.

Full brakes.

Here, he switches on the emergency brake.

Here, he switches on the emergency brake.

We're not stopping!

And that's the final straw, which means

basically that the wheels locked as on a car

basically that the wheels locked as on a car

with no anti-skid brakes.

The plane's fate was sealed.

The plane's fate was sealed.

We're going over!

If you have a failure at a critical time,

like just after touchdown in a case like this, and the...

the normal systems for deceleration do not work,

the normal systems for deceleration do not work,

then you automatically go to the emergency brakes.

then you automatically go to the emergency brakes.

Hang on!

In their final report, the AIBN

urged improved pilot training for similar situations.

urged improved pilot training for similar situations.

They also called for longer safety areas

around runways, especially at airports like Stord that are

surrounded by steep terrain.

surrounded by steep terrain.

Three challenging landing attempts with tragic endings.

Three challenging landing attempts with tragic endings.

We're going over!

Each one a lesson in how pilots

should tackle risky landings.

should tackle risky landings.

The main task is to improve safety.

The main task is to improve safety.

And the other is telling the story so others

can learn from failures.

can learn from failures.