All language subtitles for Air.Disasters.S20E20.1080p.PMTP.WEB-DL.DDP5.1.H.264-BLOOM_track3_[eng]

Singapore Six, you are cleared
for takeoff, runway 05 left.

Singapore Six, you are cleared
for takeoff, runway 05 left.

During the takeoff, your
heartbeat goes up a bit.

OK, thrust left toga toga.

Taking off
is a complex task.

Taking off
is a complex task.

- Ignition?
- Set.

Spoilers?

Armed.

Pilots need to carefully

execute multiple steps to
get their plane into the air.

execute multiple steps to
get their plane into the air.

100 knots.

But sometimes,
mistakes are made...

But sometimes,
mistakes are made...

They didn't follow
procedures precisely.

...with tragic results.

...with tragic results.

In Taiwan, a 747 fails
to take off in a typhoon.

In Taiwan, a 747 fails
to take off in a typhoon.

I thought I was going to die.

A departure from
Detroit goes horribly wrong.

A departure from
Detroit goes horribly wrong.

Why didn't the pilots
perform the task?

In a
matter of seconds,

In a
matter of seconds,

an MD82 is out of
control in Madrid.

Fly the plane.

Fly it!

Fly it!

On three
different flights,

small missteps ended in tragedy.

small missteps ended in tragedy.

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

We lost both engines.

...bag over your nose,

...bag over your nose,

emergency descent.

Brace for impact!

...a loved one.

Investigators are
starting to describe the...

Investigators are
starting to describe the...

It's going to crash!

Taipei, Taiwan, Singapore

Taipei, Taiwan, Singapore

Airlines Flight 6
taxis to the runway

through heavy wind and rain.

through heavy wind and rain.

Typhoon Jianxin is closing in
on Chiang Kai-Shek Airport.

Typhoon Jianxin is closing in
on Chiang Kai-Shek Airport.

Flight 6 needs to get airborne
before the storm hits.

Even a 747 can't take
off in an actual typhoon.

Even a 747 can't take
off in an actual typhoon.

It's the closer this storm
gets, the more likely

it is that these guys are
going to get stuck in Taipei.

it is that these guys are
going to get stuck in Taipei.

There are 179 people
on board the overnight flight

to Los Angeles.

to Los Angeles.

Singapore 6, for
your information,

Singapore 6, for
your information,

surface winds 020 at 24.

Casa 4-3.

Thank you, sir, Singapore 6.

Thank you, sir, Singapore 6.

Let me know when it's 30.

If the crosswinds
reach 30 knots, or almost 35

If the crosswinds
reach 30 knots, or almost 35

miles per hour,
captain Fong Chee Kong

will have to abort the takeoff.

As we were taxiing down the
runway, it was very windy,

As we were taxiing down the
runway, it was very windy,

and the plane was
moving left to right.

and the plane was
moving left to right.

Singapore 6, you are cleared
for takeoff, runway 05 left.

Singapore 6, you are cleared
for takeoff, runway 05 left.

OK, thrust left toga toga.

OK, thrust left toga toga.

OK, my control.

OK, my control.

The 747 accelerates
to reach the takeoff

speed of 180 miles an hour.

speed of 180 miles an hour.

V1.

V1.

As the
plane was gaining

As the
plane was gaining

speed to take off,
at a certain time,

the plane kind of lost it.

What's happening?

I felt the airplane
spinning around.

I felt the airplane
spinning around.

I thought I was going to die.

After skidding
down the runway...

After skidding
down the runway...

...the 747 finally
comes to a stop.

...the 747 finally
comes to a stop.

Then I opened my eyes

Then I opened my eyes

and I saw a fireball
coming at me.

Direct emergency
vehicles to runway 05 left.

Direct emergency
vehicles to runway 05 left.

Singapore 6, do you read?

Singapore 6?

Singapore 6?

Let's go, go, go.

The plane's
tanks are fully

The plane's
tanks are fully

loaded with tons of fuel...

...fuel for a fire that rescuers
battle in this violent storm.

...fuel for a fire that rescuers
battle in this violent storm.

It takes about 15 minutes to
control the fire and 45 minutes

to extinguish all of them.

to extinguish all of them.

So it's a difficult task
for the firefighters.

83 people have died.

There are 96 survivors,
including the pilots.

One of Asia's busiest airports
is immediately shut down.

One of Asia's busiest airports
is immediately shut down.

It's now up to the Aviation
Safety Council of Taiwan

It's now up to the Aviation
Safety Council of Taiwan

to determine the
cause of the disaster.

When I went to the crash
site, I can see all the wreckage

When I went to the crash
site, I can see all the wreckage

is spread the wrong way.

Flight 6 was cleared
for takeoff on runway 5 left,

Flight 6 was cleared
for takeoff on runway 5 left,

but much of the wreckage is
spread over runway 5 right.

but much of the wreckage is
spread over runway 5 right.

Investigators wonder
whether the typhoon

blew the plane off its runway.

blew the plane off its runway.

When you're an investigator
looking at a crash scene,

you have to keep an open mind.

you have to keep an open mind.

You have to assume it could
be any conceivable factor

from the machinery, the human
factors, to the weather,

from the machinery, the human
factors, to the weather,

to who knows what?

As the investigators,
we believe that we should

As the investigators,
we believe that we should

interview pilots or operator
as soon as possible,

because we believe that human
memory will fade over time.

because we believe that human
memory will fade over time.

Captain Fong
Chee Kong is interviewed

within hours of the crash.

within hours of the crash.

What happened?

We collided with
something on the runway.

We collided with
something on the runway.

There's something there.

There was something
on that runway.

Could you tell what it was?

No.

No.

We could not see all
the way down the runway.

The focus shifts from
the weather to the possibility

that there was an
obstacle on the runway.

Investigators examine
the wreckage for clues.

It's difficult
for us to collect

all of the information,
all of the wreckage,

because it's blown
into everywhere.

because it's blown
into everywhere.

Accidents during takeoff

can involve more
than one aircraft.

can involve more
than one aircraft.

In 1991, a SkyWest metroliner
preparing for takeoff

In 1991, a SkyWest metroliner
preparing for takeoff

from Los Angeles was crushed by
a US Air 737 which was coming

from Los Angeles was crushed by
a US Air 737 which was coming

in to land on the same runway.

34 people were killed.

34 people were killed.

Is that what happened to
Singapore Airlines Flight 6?

Any signs of another plane?

Any signs of another plane?

And no other flights
unaccounted for?

At Chiang
Kai-Shek Airport,

At Chiang
Kai-Shek Airport,

this theory is ruled out.

All of the debris appears to be
from just one plane, Flight 6.

All of the debris appears to be
from just one plane, Flight 6.

He didn't hit a plane.

Investigators worked through thousands

Investigators worked through thousands

of pieces of mangled wreckage.

Part of the flap
assembly, the right wing.

Part of the flap
assembly, the right wing.

They make an
unexpected discovery.

They make an
unexpected discovery.

Some wreckage doesn't
belong to the shattered 747.

It looks more like
construction equipment.

It looks more like
construction equipment.

Chiang Kai-Shek airport
has three runways.

Runway 5 left is the one
Flight 6 was instructed to use.

Runway 5 left is the one
Flight 6 was instructed to use.

Parallel to that
is runway 5 right,

Parallel to that
is runway 5 right,

a runway closed
for construction.

Investigators consider
the possibility

Investigators consider
the possibility

that Flight 6 hit material
from the construction site.

It wouldn't be hard to
imagine some large object

It wouldn't be hard to
imagine some large object

being blown into an engine or
knocking out the windshield.

There's lots of things
that could have happened.

There's lots of things
that could have happened.

There's something there.

There's something there.

When investigators
look at runway 5

When investigators
look at runway 5

right adjacent to Flight 6's
designated takeoff runway,

they see something that
doesn't make any sense...

they see something that
doesn't make any sense...

fresh tire tracks on a runway
that is supposed to be closed.

We can actually see the
time mark of this aircraft

We can actually see the
time mark of this aircraft

starting from the
takeoff point all the way

starting from the
takeoff point all the way

to the first impact point.

The tire
marks on runway 5

The tire
marks on runway 5

right lead investigators
to a startling conclusion.

This is
our point of impact.

This is
our point of impact.

It seems
flight 6 was taking

off from the wrong runway.

off from the wrong runway.

But how could two experienced
pilots make that mistake?

The only way to
determine what went wrong

The only way to
determine what went wrong

is with the data
from the black boxes.

When we get information out
of the recorder, we read it,

When we get information out
of the recorder, we read it,

then we can know the exact
position of the aircraft.

then we can know the exact
position of the aircraft.

Investigators
compare positioning information

from the flight data
recorder to a satellite

from the flight data
recorder to a satellite

image of the airport.

He's... he's lining up
with the wrong runway.

He's... he's lining up
with the wrong runway.

Somehow, the
plane ended up on runway

5 right instead of 5 left.

5 right instead of 5 left.

He was supposed to be here.

He was supposed to be here.

How did they end
up here instead?

1,243 meters down
the runway, he collides

1,243 meters down
the runway, he collides

with construction equipment.

It seems like the kind of
thing that shouldn't happen

ever under any circumstances.

ever under any circumstances.

Investigators need
to know why Singapore Airlines

Flight 6 tried to take off
from the wrong runway at Taiwan

Flight 6 tried to take off
from the wrong runway at Taiwan

Airport.

Investigator Thomas Wang
interviews Captain Fong again.

Did you receive this notice?

Did you receive this notice?

He has
questions about a notice

that runway 5 right was closed.

that runway 5 right was closed.

Of course I did.

Everyone did.

Everyone did.

We discussed it
during our briefing.

Tell them we'll take 5 left.

Tell them we'll take 5 left.

So why
didn't air traffic

controllers realize
that the 747 had

turned on to the wrong runway?

turned on to the wrong runway?

I couldn't see
them in that weather.

I couldn't see
them in that weather.

When interviewed, the controller

said that night's storm
limited visibility

to around 2,000 feet.

to around 2,000 feet.

And they confirmed
runway 5 left.

And they confirmed
runway 5 left.

That's the last I
heard from them.

Hmm.

Hmm.

1,600 meters between the
runway and the tower.

There's no way he saw them.

The crew assumed
the tower was monitoring

their progress,
but the controller

their progress,
but the controller

had lost sight of the plane.

Investigators now
try to determine

how the pilots lost their way.

how the pilots lost their way.

We couldn't see very far,
but we could see far enough.

Co-pilot was studying
the map while I

followed the taxi lights.

followed the taxi lights.

It led us directly
to the runway.

OK, green lights are here.

OK, green lights are here.

It appears that
the crew had no trouble

seeing their taxi route.

seeing their taxi route.

Was this
the map you were using?

Yes.

Yes.

You didn't
have any trouble reading it?

I wasn't reading it.

My first officer and relief
pilot were following the map.

My first officer and relief
pilot were following the map.

I only glanced at it
when the route changed.

They changed the route?

They changed the route?

Yes.

Wang learns that the ground
controller issued a last-minute

change to their taxi route.

change to their taxi route.

Singapore 6, request taxi.

Singapore 6 taxi to
runway 06 via taxiway...

Singapore 6 taxi to
runway 06 via taxiway...

correction, runway 05
left via taxiway 00

west cross and November papa.

west cross and November papa.

Pilots have to
deal with last-minute

changes all the time.

The situation
becomes complicated.

The situation
becomes complicated.

It becomes hairy.

Now, you've got a typhoon
bearing down on you.

You've got gusts, so
you're under pressure.

You've got gusts, so
you're under pressure.

Did additional
workload in the cockpit

cause the pilots to
make a fatal mistake?

cause the pilots to
make a fatal mistake?

Investigators turn to the
cockpit voice recorder.

Coming in fast.

Coming in fast.

The longer we delay, the
worse it's going to get.

The CVR
reveals that the crew

The CVR
reveals that the crew

wanted to get off the ground
before the weather closed in.

wanted to get off the ground
before the weather closed in.

Singapore 6, runway 05 left,
wind 020 at 28, gusts 50.

Singapore 6, runway 05 left,
wind 020 at 28, gusts 50.

Cleared for takeoff.

Normally, a 747 taxi
is about 25 knots.

Normally, a 747 taxi
is about 25 knots.

On this night, they
were going nine knots.

They were doing exactly
what they should have

done, taking it nice and slow.

done, taking it nice and slow.

The pilots
pass signs that

clearly identify the runways.

I'm going to go
very slow here.

I'm going to go
very slow here.

Otherwise, we'll skid.

Indeed, he's crawling.

Indeed, he's crawling.

020, from the left.

020.

The winds consume
the crew's attention.

28.5.

It's getting close to 30, sir.

It's getting close to 30, sir.

OK.

The captain was taxiing the
aircraft in very slow speed,

The captain was taxiing the
aircraft in very slow speed,

and the first officer is doing
the before takeoff checklist,

and the first officer is doing
the before takeoff checklist,

and the relief pilot is working
on the crosswind component.

So all pilot, they are
occupied by something.

So all pilot, they are
occupied by something.

They do not have
enough attention

to actually check which
runway they are taxiing onto.

to actually check which
runway they are taxiing onto.

They believe they are
making a right turn

They believe they are
making a right turn

onto the correct runway.

Unfortunately, that's
not the correct runway.

That's 05 right.

That's 05 right.

Captain Fong's extreme caution

might have worked against him.

might have worked against him.

OK, nine knots.

Because the
turn took so long,

Because the
turn took so long,

Captain Fong may have
believed that he'd gone

further than he actually did.

So much time had passed that
he may have thought he had

So much time had passed that
he may have thought he had

actually reached runway 5 left.

The big irony of this crash
is that they were taking off

The big irony of this crash
is that they were taking off

in very dangerous circumstances
near the limit of what their

in very dangerous circumstances
near the limit of what their

plane was capable of handling.

But it wasn't the
weather that did them in,

but rather the
pressure of dealing

but rather the
pressure of dealing

with the storm distracted
them from what turned

out to be the real question.

Were they in the right place?

Were they in the right place?

V1.

V1.

There's something there.

One of the lessons
of this accident

One of the lessons
of this accident

is that you can have an
exemplary crew performing

their duties with utmost care,
and they still make a mistake

their duties with utmost care,
and they still make a mistake

with fatal consequences.

Taiwan's
Aviation Safety Council

recommends immediate
changes to pilots'

recommends immediate
changes to pilots'

procedures and training.

Currently turning

Currently turning

left onto taxiway November 1.

New checklists
are designed that include

a visual step, obliging
pilots to confirm

a visual step, obliging
pilots to confirm

that they're on the correct
runway before takeoff.

Singapore 006 reminded
us again that if there is

Singapore 006 reminded
us again that if there is

ambiguity in the cockpit
and you're on the ground,

you need to resolve, and
stop, and get that resolved,

you need to resolve, and
stop, and get that resolved,

particularly in very,
very inclement weather.

When visibility is
reduced, you need to be

When visibility is
reduced, you need to be

sure where the airplane is.

The crash
of Singapore 6

isn't the first time a series
of missteps during takeoff

isn't the first time a series
of missteps during takeoff

leads to disaster.

Detroit Metropolitan Airport,
more than 1,100 airplanes

Detroit Metropolitan Airport,
more than 1,100 airplanes

used one of its four
runways every day.

Northwest Airlines
flight 255, an MD80,

is bound for Phoenix, Arizona.

is bound for Phoenix, Arizona.

There are 149
passengers on board.

Captain John Maus is in command.

A Las Vegas native, 57-year-old
Maus is a veteran pilot.

A Las Vegas native, 57-year-old
Maus is a veteran pilot.

His first officer
is 35-year-old David

His first officer
is 35-year-old David

Dodds of Galena, Illinois.

Look at this.

Look at this.

Today, storms
darken the flight path

between Detroit and Phoenix.

between Detroit and Phoenix.

Several are moving quickly
toward the airport.

Several are moving quickly
toward the airport.

There's a line here
and another one here

about 25 miles wide.

about 25 miles wide.

Well, if we get out
of here pretty quick,

we won't have a delay.

Northwest 255, cleared to go.

Already running a half-hour late,

Already running a half-hour late,

Flight 255 is cleared
to taxi to the runway.

OK, we're cleared to push.

Let's do the checklist.

Brakes?

Set.

Windshield heat?

It's on.

It's on.

Boost pumps?

We've got six.

Pumps and pressure?

Pumps and pressure?

On and checked.

Damn, it's starting to rain.

To beat the storms,
they must leave immediately.

To beat the storms,
they must leave immediately.

They're all on.

Before start
checklist is complete.

Before start
checklist is complete.

Flight 255
moves away from the gate

and toward the runway,
but the bad weather...

and toward the runway,
but the bad weather...

Northwest 255, no exit at
Charlie runway, 3 center.

Northwest 255, no exit at
Charlie runway, 3 center.

...forces a
last-minute runway change.

OK.

To Charlie for 3
center, Northwest 255.

Charlie for 3 center right.

Charlie for 3 center right.

OK.

Ladies and gentlemen,
we're currently

Ladies and gentlemen,
we're currently

number one for departure.

We should be rolling
in a couple of minutes.

Blacker than hell out there.

Where's Charlie at?

By the time they
get to the new runway,

they are 45 minutes
behind schedule.

they are 45 minutes
behind schedule.

Northwest 255, runway 3
center, clear for takeoff.

Northwest 255, runway 3
center, clear for takeoff.

Flight 255
hurtles down runway 3C.

Flight 255
hurtles down runway 3C.

Clamp, a hundred knots.

V1, rotate.

The pilots angle the
plane's nose up for liftoff.

But less than 50
feet off the ground,

But less than 50
feet off the ground,

flight 255 is in trouble.

Moments after takeoff...

Tower lifeguard copter 102.

Tower lifeguard copter 102.

...Northwest Airlines
Flight 255 is out of control.

...Northwest Airlines
Flight 255 is out of control.

The trail of debris is
more than a mile long.

Remarkably, a four-year-old
girl has survived the crash.

Rescuers spend hours
searching the wreckage

for other survivors.

for other survivors.

But the young girl
is the only one.

But the young girl
is the only one.

154 people on board,
including Captain

Maus and First Officer Dodds
have been killed in the crash.

Maus and First Officer Dodds
have been killed in the crash.

On the ground, two
people died in their cars

On the ground, two
people died in their cars

when they were hit by the plane.

Investigator Jack
Drake and his team

from the National
Transportation Safety Board

begin the search for clues.

begin the search for clues.

You know when you're at a
crash site because you get

You know when you're at a
crash site because you get

this combination of burned
plastic, and kerosene,

and sometimes combined with
fire retardant foam that

and sometimes combined with
fire retardant foam that

has its own distinctive odor.

The cockpit
voice recorder is intact,

The cockpit
voice recorder is intact,

but the flight data recorder
has been damaged in the crash.

Both recorders are sent to the
NTSB Lab in Washington, DC.

Both recorders are sent to the
NTSB Lab in Washington, DC.

John Clark is the team's
flight performance engineer.

John Clark is the team's
flight performance engineer.

He searches for ground
scars and other impact marks

He searches for ground
scars and other impact marks

and interviews witnesses
to piece together

where the plane fell, and how.

where the plane fell, and how.

When I first started
seeing the wreckage,

your mind immediately starts
turning to sorting out where it

your mind immediately starts
turning to sorting out where it

hit, how it hit... not where
the wreckage ended up,

but those first few inches where
the airplane was coming down.

but those first few inches where
the airplane was coming down.

According to witnesses,

Flight 255 lifted off
in a nose-high position,

Flight 255 lifted off
in a nose-high position,

but then couldn't climb.

V1, rotate.

V1, rotate.

That clue could
indicate that the plane didn't

have enough speed to
get off the ground

or that high winds prevented
it from lifting off.

or that high winds prevented
it from lifting off.

Until technicians can
decode the damaged FDR,

Until technicians can
decode the damaged FDR,

the team must rely on physical
evidence from the crash site.

the team must rely on physical
evidence from the crash site.

Investigators study the
cockpit center console.

One thing stands out...

Is this the way it was found?

Is this the way it was found?

...the lever
that extends and retracts

the wing's flaps and slats.

the wing's flaps and slats.

Flaps and slats are extensions
that slide out of the back

in front of the wing.

in front of the wing.

They make the wings larger,
increasing the amount of lift

they can provide.

They must always be
extended for takeoff.

They must always be
extended for takeoff.

But the way the flap
handle is damaged

suggests the plane's flaps were
not extended when it crashed.

suggests the plane's flaps were
not extended when it crashed.

The pin had left a mark.

The pin had left a mark.

This happens
because the aircraft

comes to a very sudden stop
and the handle jangles around...

comes to a very sudden stop
and the handle jangles around...

metal-to-metal contact that's
exaggerated by the impact.

metal-to-metal contact that's
exaggerated by the impact.

That indicator
was that the flaps

were zero, or fully
retracted, and the slats

were zero, or fully
retracted, and the slats

were retracted as well.

Even without
data from the FDR,

investigators can determine
the flap position at takeoff.

investigators can determine
the flap position at takeoff.

B1, rotate.

Flaps and slats are moved

by cables running to the wings.

by cables running to the wings.

Each component of the slat
system has its own drive

system, and one...
one of those was

system, and one...
one of those was

interrupted by the light pole
that passed through the wing.

When they
examine the left wing,

When they
examine the left wing,

investigators see that the
cable controlling the slats

sliced in two when
the wing hit the pole.

sliced in two when
the wing hit the pole.

By examining the cut
cable, investigators

By examining the cut
cable, investigators

can tell whether the slats
and flaps were extended

or retracted.

or retracted.

It severed two cables.

It severed two cables.

If you lined up those
two severed ends,

it corresponded
with the slats being

in the full retracted position.

in the full retracted position.

When data is finally
extracted from the FDR,

the report confirms what
the cut cables suggested.

the report confirms what
the cut cables suggested.

The flaps were not
extended on takeoff.

It's a major breakthrough.

It's a major breakthrough.

Jack Drake now knows what
brought down Flight 255.

Jack Drake now knows what
brought down Flight 255.

But the flight data
recorder can't answer

a more troubling question.

So why weren't
the flaps deployed?

So why weren't
the flaps deployed?

For some
reason, a seasoned crew

allowed a critical misstep
to occur while getting

allowed a critical misstep
to occur while getting

their plane off the ground.

Why did the crew of
Northwest Airlines Flight 255

fail to extend the
flaps on takeoff?

fail to extend the
flaps on takeoff?

Investigators listened to
the cockpit voice recorder

again for answers.

again for answers.

It indicates that a
last-minute runway change led

to confusion in the cockpit.

to confusion in the cockpit.

Northwest 255, no exit at
Charlie runway, 3 center.

Did he say 3 center?

Did he say 3 center?

3 center, yeah.

That's why I was thinking
we had to go that way.

I was thinking 2-1.

I was thinking 2-1.

Well, he made a
wrong turn, which

might have been
confusing because they

had to go a different route.

had to go a different route.

Ground, Northwest 255...

I guess we went by Charlie.

We're going to 3 center right.

Northwest 255, affirmative.

Northwest 255, affirmative.

Make a left turn.

They finally arrived
at the runway 45 minutes late.

They finally arrived
at the runway 45 minutes late.

We're OK for that
center runway, aren't we?

We're OK for that
center runway, aren't we?

Befoe they lost their
way, the crew of Flight 255

carried out a number
of checklists,

carried out a number
of checklists,

but missed the taxi checklist.

They apparently didn't
consider the checklist.

They apparently didn't
consider the checklist.

And key in the checklist
is the configuration

of the aircraft for departure.

of the aircraft for departure.

The first item on
the taxi checklist is flaps.

And because they didn't
run the checklist,

And because they didn't
run the checklist,

the crew neglected to set their
flaps to takeoff position.

I think Charlie was...

I think Charlie was...

No, it is Charlie.

Are you sure?

I think so.

I think so.

They hadn't done this
checklist at the time

they normally would.

they normally would.

And as the activities
piled up that were

potential distractions, they
were further and further away

potential distractions, they
were further and further away

from the point at
which they would

normally perform that function.

After the
checklists, there

After the
checklists, there

is a last line of
defense designed

to prevent pilots from
taking off without flaps set.

to prevent pilots from
taking off without flaps set.

An alarm should
have sounded when

the pilot started down the
runway with their flaps

retracted.

retracted.

Maybe it went off, but
we just can't hear it.

But no alarm
is heard on the CVR.

But no alarm
is heard on the CVR.

When investigators
consult other MD80 pilots,

they're told the takeoff
configuration warning

they're told the takeoff
configuration warning

was a nuisance at times.

Flaps.

Flaps.

Slats

Flaps.

If you're doing a
single-engine taxi,

If you're doing a
single-engine taxi,

you have to push the throttle up
further to get a power to taxi,

and you set off the
take-off warning system.

and you set off the
take-off warning system.

And if it's going off
routinely all the time,

it gets on their nerves.

So apparently, pilots
were routinely silencing

So apparently, pilots
were routinely silencing

those take-off warnings.

Investigators suspect
that the crew of Flight 255

Investigators suspect
that the crew of Flight 255

pulled a breaker to avoid the
irritating take-off warning.

pulled a breaker to avoid the
irritating take-off warning.

It is determined that
the downing of Flight 255

was caused by pilot error.

The FAA orders a
modification to the alarm

system of all
commercial jetliners

to prevent nuisance alarms.

to prevent nuisance alarms.

I think a big
lesson learned is

that a strict adherence to
checklists is very important.

that a strict adherence to
checklists is very important.

The checklist, in my mind,
is kind of the fabric

The checklist, in my mind,
is kind of the fabric

that holds a flight together.

It has to be
religiously followed.

21 years after
Flight 255's deadly crash,

21 years after
Flight 255's deadly crash,

another tragedy shows flight
crews were still missing

another tragedy shows flight
crews were still missing

critical steps during takeoff.

Madrid-Barajas Airport, Spain.

Ladies and gentlemen,
thank you for your patience.

Ladies and gentlemen,
thank you for your patience.

We hope to be on the
move again very soon.

At the last minute,
Spanair Flight 5022 is delayed.

At the last minute,
Spanair Flight 5022 is delayed.

There's a problem with
a temperature probe.

There's a problem with
a temperature probe.

While it's checked out, the
air conditioning is turned off.

Passengers are
sweltering in the heat.

Passengers are
sweltering in the heat.

So we're done?

So we're done?

Yeah, pop the breaker, sir.

You're good to go.

OK, thanks.

OK, thanks.

After a delay
of more than an hour,

Spanair Flight 5022
finally gets going.

Spanair Flight 5022
finally gets going.

There are 166
passengers on board

There are 166
passengers on board

the flight bound for
the Canary Islands.

Today, Captain Antonio
Luna is in command.

Today, Captain Antonio
Luna is in command.

A former Spanish Air
Force pilot, he's been

A former Spanish Air
Force pilot, he's been

with Spanair for nine years.

Now's our time.

About an hour and a
quarter behind schedule.

First Officer Francisco

First Officer Francisco

Mulet joined the company
just a year and a half ago.

Spanair 5022, you're next
in line on runway 36 left.

Spanair 5022, you're next
in line on runway 36 left.

Spanair 5022, you're next
in line on runway 36 left.

OK, here we go.

Preparing for
takeoff is an extremely

busy time for the flight crew.

busy time for the flight crew.

They've got multiple checklists
that they have to run.

The ignition.

Set.

Spoilers.

Armed.

Armed.

Make certain the aircraft
is properly configured,

the thrust is set right,
the brakes, et cetera.

the thrust is set right,
the brakes, et cetera.

Air conditioning?

So there are a
plethora of factors

that are all running through
their mind simultaneously.

that are all running through
their mind simultaneously.

Hey, Spanair 5022, you
are cleared for takeoff,

runway 3-6, left.

runway 3-6, left.

Cleared for
takeoff, Spanair 5022.

Just after 2 PM,
the MD82 aircraft starts

Just after 2 PM,
the MD82 aircraft starts

speeding down the runway.

speeding down the runway.

100.

The captain
monitors their speed.

They can't lift off until
they reach 157 knots,

They can't lift off until
they reach 157 knots,

or almost 181 miles per hour.

or almost 181 miles per hour.

V1, rotate.

Suddenly, an alarm sounds.

Something is wrong.

Something is wrong.

Engine failure?

How the hell do you
turn off that warning?

How the hell do you
turn off that warning?

The plane is less
than 40 feet off the ground.

Fly the plane.

Fly it.

Oh, oh, oh, damn.

Oh, oh, oh, damn.

Just seconds after takeoff,

Just seconds after takeoff,

Flight 5022 slams into a
riverbank alongside the runway.

Airport fire crews
race to the scene.

The plane with 172
people on board

is now shattered wreckage
spread over half a mile.

is now shattered wreckage
spread over half a mile.

Only 18 people survive the
crash of Spanair Flight 5022.

Only 18 people survive the
crash of Spanair Flight 5022.

147 passengers are dead.

147 passengers are dead.

So are both pilots.

It was a tremendous tragedy.

It was a tremendous tragedy.

All the country was
affected by that.

Spain recruits an
international team of experts

to investigate the
country's worst

aviation disaster in 25 years.

aviation disaster in 25 years.

OK, people, it looks like we
have our work cut out for us.

Marks on the ground
paint a vivid picture...

Marks on the ground
paint a vivid picture...

Here's our first impact.

...that
reveals just how soon

flight 5022 hit the ground.

flight 5022 hit the ground.

The first impact marks are
just 200 feet from the runway.

The first impact marks are
just 200 feet from the runway.

The plane then
passed over a road

and slid another 1,800
feet before crashing

and slid another 1,800
feet before crashing

on the far side of the river.

This airplane left a
trail coming from the runway

This airplane left a
trail coming from the runway

to the edge of the
airport boundary.

So it was quite clear
for the investigation

So it was quite clear
for the investigation

that the airplane had big
problems just on liftoff.

Investigators wonder if engine failure

Investigators wonder if engine failure

compromised the takeoff.

If we find mud, soil, or
grass throughout the engine,

If we find mud, soil, or
grass throughout the engine,

we can determine that the
engine was fully operational

we can determine that the
engine was fully operational

at the time of the accident.

Both engines
are filled with debris

ingested during the crash.

ingested during the crash.

The finding means the
engines were running

when the plane made impact.

The engines were fine.

But something stopped
that plane from climbing.

But something stopped
that plane from climbing.

Controllers working the day of the crash

Controllers working the day of the crash

present a potential lead.

They had some kind of
maintenance issue right

before takeoff.

Madrid Spanair 5022,
we have a slight problem.

Madrid Spanair 5022,
we have a slight problem.

We have to exit the runway.

Investigators hear about the trouble

with the temperature sensor.

with the temperature sensor.

Oh, yeah.

I took a look, but
it wasn't serious.

The sensor, called
a REM air temperature probe,

The sensor, called
a REM air temperature probe,

measures the outside
air temperature

and feeds the information to the
plane's computer during flight.

and feeds the information to the
plane's computer during flight.

The sensor was sending
out faulty readings.

MAINTENANCE MAN (ON
RADIO): Check the ice

protection meter selector.

protection meter selector.

No, that didn't work either.

Without it, the
automation that adjusts engine

Without it, the
automation that adjusts engine

power won't function properly.

Look at that.

It says 104 degrees now.

It says 104 degrees now.

Maintenance workers were unable to repair

the faulty sensor.

MAINTENANCE MAN (ON
RADIO): Sensor 29.

MAINTENANCE MAN (ON
RADIO): Sensor 29.

All right, got it.

So they temporarily
cut the power to the sensor,

thereby disabling it.

thereby disabling it.

So we're done?

Yeah.

I popped the breaker,
so you're good to go.

OK, thanks.

OK, thanks.

Investigators wonder
if the disabled temperature

probe is somehow
linked to the crash.

probe is somehow
linked to the crash.

I don't see how this
could cause a problem.

I don't see how this
could cause a problem.

But they
quickly confirm

that the probe is not an
essential piece of equipment.

The crew can keep track
of the outside temperature

The crew can keep track
of the outside temperature

themselves and then adjust
engine power manually.

themselves and then adjust
engine power manually.

Something else prevented
the plane from climbing out.

What kind of wreckage have
we recovered from the wings?

What kind of wreckage have
we recovered from the wings?

Get me everything you have.

Investigators turn
to the MD82's control surfaces.

They study the lever
mechanism that pilots

use to adjust the flaps.

use to adjust the flaps.

The flap lever was
very... an essential

The flap lever was
very... an essential

part of the investigation.

Well, well, what have we here?

There's a
deep scratch at the zero

There's a
deep scratch at the zero

mark, the retracted position.

It's a startling
finding, one that

It's a startling
finding, one that

suggests the flaps
on flight 5022

were not extended on takeoff.

were not extended on takeoff.

It's disturbingly similar to
the crash of Northwest Airlines'

Flight 255, 21 years before.

Flight 255, 21 years before.

Did the pilots in Madrid,
like those in Detroit,

fail to set the flaps
properly before takeoff?

fail to set the flaps
properly before takeoff?

V1.

What happened to
prevent them from being

in the right position?

in the right position?

Rotate.

The answer
to that question could

explain why 154 people died.

explain why 154 people died.

Investigators need to know

if the pilots of
Spanair Flight 5022

took off without
the flaps extended.

took off without
the flaps extended.

They don't have
a voice recording

for the first takeoff attempt.

for the first takeoff attempt.

It was erased when the
MD82 left the runway

and powered down
for maintenance.

and powered down
for maintenance.

But they do have
all the information

from the flight data recorder.

Flaps were set at 11
degrees on the first taxi,

exactly where they should be.

exactly where they should be.

The flight data
recorder reveals that the flaps

were set correctly when the
plane taxied onto the runway

were set correctly when the
plane taxied onto the runway

the first time.

Then the pilots
noticed that there's

a malfunctioning
temperature probe.

a malfunctioning
temperature probe.

Madrid Spanair 5022,
we have a slight problem.

We have to exit the runway.

We have to exit the runway.

When the crew returned
to the terminal for repairs,

they retracted the flaps.

they retracted the flaps.

The flaps and slats are
retracted after coming off

the runway as part of
standard operating procedure.

the runway as part of
standard operating procedure.

- We're done?
- Yeah.

We popped the breaker,
so you're good to go.

Thanks.

Taxiing back to the runway,

Taxiing back to the runway,

the pilot should have extended
the flaps for takeoff.

The MD82's preflight
checklists direct

the crew to check the flaps
and slats three times.

the crew to check the flaps
and slats three times.

Ignition.

Off.

Air conditioning.

Set.

Set.

On the after
start checklist, setting

the flaps is the final step.

the flaps is the final step.

Hydraulic pumps and valve?

Set and checked.

Set and checked.

Lights.

On.

Get permission from air
traffic control to taxi,

Get permission from air
traffic control to taxi,

will you?

Hold it, hold it, hold it.

Hold it, hold it, hold it.

What is he doing?

This is the worst possible
time to interrupt him.

The CVR reveals that
just as the first officer is

The CVR reveals that
just as the first officer is

about to check the flaps and
slats for the first time,

the captain instructs
him to make a radio call.

the captain instructs
him to make a radio call.

Ground, Spanair 5022
requesting taxi instructions.

Ground, Spanair 5022
requesting taxi instructions.

AIR CONTROLLER (ON
RADIO): Spanair 5022.

He didn't
return to the checklist

to finish that critical step.

to finish that critical step.

Humans are fallible.

And we know that when
we're multitasking,

it's very easy to forget
or miss a critical item.

it's very easy to forget
or miss a critical item.

And they never set the flaps.

The captain
and first officer then

failed to carry out
this critical step

on the final two checklists.

on the final two checklists.

Transponder.

Set.

Cabin.

Hang on, stop.

Hang on, stop.

Where's the takeoff briefing?

Investigators now know what caused

Investigators now know what caused

the crash of Spanair 5022.

V1, rotate.

V1, rotate.

The pilots
never extended their flaps

before takeoff, making it
impossible for the plane

before takeoff, making it
impossible for the plane

to climb.

And just as with
Northwest Flight 255,

And just as with
Northwest Flight 255,

investigators must
answer a key question.

Where's the warning?

Where's the warning?

If the flaps were not in...
set in the takeoff position,

there should be a
very conspicuous sound

there should be a
very conspicuous sound

saying that the aircraft
is not ready for takeoff.

Once again,
why didn't the alarm

Once again,
why didn't the alarm

sound to warn the pilots
that their flaps weren't set?

sound to warn the pilots
that their flaps weren't set?

These failures have
to be connected somehow.

Investigators look for a link

Investigators look for a link

between the failure of flight
5022's take-off warning...

OK, we have the relay switch.

...and the
failed temperature sensor.

...and the
failed temperature sensor.

...relay.

Look at that.

Look at that.

It says 104 degrees now.

Investigators trace the complex pathways

Investigators trace the complex pathways

for the temperature sensor
and the take-off warning.

They make a critical discovery.

They make a critical discovery.

The sensor and the
take-off warning

both pass through a
single electronic relay,

the R25 relay.

the R25 relay.

It was very shocking to find
out that two different systems,

like the take-off warning
system and the RAM

like the take-off warning
system and the RAM

air temperature
probe heating, were

controlled by the same device.

Investigators
suspect the m 25 relay failed,

disabling both the
temperature sensor

disabling both the
temperature sensor

and the take-off warning.

Technicians are not
able to recreate

Technicians are not
able to recreate

that failure in the lab.

But for one Carlos Lozano,
the theory makes sense.

But for one Carlos Lozano,
the theory makes sense.

That's it.

That's the link.

In my opinion, the relay 25
was the cause of the failure

In my opinion, the relay 25
was the cause of the failure

of the take-off warning system.

Right, got it.

With no
take-off alarm,

the pilots lost a
critical line of defense.

Just like the Northwest
Airlines pilots in Detroit,

the Madrid crew's failure
to follow the checklists

the Madrid crew's failure
to follow the checklists

led to tragedy.

The single biggest failure
in this accident is the failure

The single biggest failure
in this accident is the failure

of the take-off warning system.

This system was designed
considering that the humans can

This system was designed
considering that the humans can

make mistakes.

And this is a clear example that
the last line of defense fell.

And this is a clear example that
the last line of defense fell.

After the
crash of Spanair 5022,

After the
crash of Spanair 5022,

Boeing revised its checklists
again to make extending flaps

Boeing revised its checklists
again to make extending flaps

and slats even more prominent.

Three disastrous
take-offs lead to changes

that have made a critical
period of flight much safer.

that have made a critical
period of flight much safer.

Technology is helping us with
all three of these accidents.

Technology is helping us with
all three of these accidents.

The take-off warning systems
are better on the more modern

airplanes so that if a
crew attempts to take off,

airplanes so that if a
crew attempts to take off,

they get very definite warnings.

they get very definite warnings.

Moving map displays that are
now available for when you're

taxiing on low visibility, it
physically shows the airplane

taxiing on low visibility, it
physically shows the airplane

on an electronic map.

That reduces the ambiguity
about your position.

So technology is
helping us there,

So technology is
helping us there,

but it still comes
back to good decisions,

conservative decisions,
and the adherence

conservative decisions,
and the adherence

to standard operating practice.