Original subtitles

When I woke up, we were suspended up in trees.

When I woke up, we were suspended up in trees.

Corporate Airlines Flight

5966 crashes on final approach to Kirksville, Missouri.

5966 crashes on final approach to Kirksville, Missouri.

I just thought, I need to get out of this plane

before it blows up.

before it blows up.

Only two people survive.

If you went to the accident site,

you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.

you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.

The wreckage provides no clues.

The instruments all checked out.

The instruments all checked out.

It was fit to fly.

And the cockpit voice recorder reveals

a team working well together...

No flags except for the vertical.

No flags except for the vertical.

Keep it slow.

...until the flight's final seconds.

No!

Trees!

Things went bad real fast,

Things went bad real fast,

so the question became, what happened?

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are starting our approach.

We lost both engines!

We lost both engines!

Emergency detected.

Mayday, mayday!

Brace for impact!

I think I lost one.

I think I lost one.

Investigation starting.

It's gonna crash!

If we have to go missed, we'll set at max power, flaps

If we have to go missed, we'll set at max power, flaps

10 positive, right gear up.

The pilots of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966

The pilots of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966

complete their approach briefing into Kirksville,

Missouri, Regional Airport.

Missouri, Regional Airport.

Then we'll climb 3,000 feet, then direct Kirksville VOR.

Captain Kim Sasse has been

Captain Kim Sasse has been

a pilot since the late 1980s but only

started flying professionally in the last five years.

started flying professionally in the last five years.

I'll ask you to walk me through that if we need it.

Roger that.

Roger that.

I will categorize Kim as a...

a bon vivant with a colorful language.

a bon vivant with a colorful language.

He was very calm when he was flying,

and his knowledge was excellent.

and his knowledge was excellent.

First officer Jonathan Palmer

has three years' professional flying experience

with regional airlines.

with regional airlines.

The pilots viewed their time with the regionals

as somewhat of the dues you pay to get to the airlines

as somewhat of the dues you pay to get to the airlines

or the high-end corporate jobs.

This is where you built your time.

This is where you built your time.

It's where you got your experience.

There are 13 passengers on tonight's flight.

There are 13 passengers on tonight's flight.

That flight was actually

a pretty smooth flight.

I don't remember any turbulence or bouncing or anything.

I don't remember any turbulence or bouncing or anything.

It was a nice flight.

Wendy Bonham is with a group of doctors traveling

Wendy Bonham is with a group of doctors traveling

to a medical conference.

Do you have another copy?

I left mine at home.

I left mine at home.

The topic of the conference

was compassion and medicine, which was a great topic,

was compassion and medicine, which was a great topic,

so I was kind of excited to go.

I'm really looking forward to some of these panels.

I'm really looking forward to some of these panels.

I had only started at Kirksville College

a few months before that, so I wasn't familiar with all

a few months before that, so I wasn't familiar with all

the people who were on board.

But they all knew each other really well,

and they were all chatting with each other.

and they were all chatting with each other.

So it was kind of fun to watch.

Tonight's flight is a short 50-minute trip

Tonight's flight is a short 50-minute trip

from St. Louis to Kirksville, Missouri,

where visibility is reduced.

where visibility is reduced.

The workload on short flights

The workload on short flights

is intense because as soon as you get the airplane squared

away from the takeoff, you've immediately got to start

away from the takeoff, you've immediately got to start

preparing it for the landing.

We're going into the crap.

Look, it's so eerie and creepy.

Ooh!

These pilots have flown multiple times

together over the last week and encountered

a lot of bad weather.

a lot of bad weather.

I get a suffocating feeling every time I see that.

I'm drowning!

I'm drowning!

The office in which pilots work is... is quite small.

The office in which pilots work is... is quite small.

It's got a wonderful view, but it is actually a quite tight

working environment.

And you're in that environment for 6, 8, 10 hours

And you're in that environment for 6, 8, 10 hours

during the day.

You have to find ways to get along.

You have to find ways to get along.

The pilots are flying a Jetstream 32,

a twin-engine, high-performance turboprop aircraft

a twin-engine, high-performance turboprop aircraft

built for short-range flights.

The Jetstream was designed for this type of work.

The Jetstream was designed for this type of work.

It was an economical airplane.

It was reasonably comfortable for the passengers,

It was reasonably comfortable for the passengers,

but it was capable of going in and out of smaller airports

and still being able to make a profit for the airline.

and still being able to make a profit for the airline.

The Jetstream is fuel efficient and reliable,

The Jetstream is fuel efficient and reliable,

but this particular model has no autopilot.

but this particular model has no autopilot.

The Jetstream not having any autopilot

made our days very long.

made our days very long.

You had to constantly fly the airplane

and autopilot would be nice on those long sequences we

and autopilot would be nice on those long sequences we

were doing.

But on a positive part, the Jetstream

made you a very good pilot.

made you a very good pilot.

Flight 5966 is being monitored

by a central controller in Kansas City.

by a central controller in Kansas City.

There is no controller at Kirksville Airport.

There is no controller at Kirksville Airport.

CORP-X 5966, turn right heading 330.

Maintain 3,000 till established on localizer.

Maintain 3,000 till established on localizer.

Cleared runway 3-6 approach at Kirksville.

Cleared runway 3-6 approach at Kirksville.

3,000 till established, cleared for the approach.

Cleared for the approach.

Cleared for the approach.

16 miles south of the airport,

the pilots begin to configure the aircraft for landing.

the pilots begin to configure the aircraft for landing.

Course alive, cross check, no flags except for the vertical.

Course alive, cross check, no flags except for the vertical.

Keep it slow, all the time we need.

Let's go flaps 10, and we'll configure figure early, too.

Let's go flaps 10, and we'll configure figure early, too.

Give ourselves as much time as we can.

All right, flaps 10.

All right, flaps 10.

The crew is flying a nonprecision approach.

They don't have vertical landing guidance.

They don't have vertical landing guidance.

Configuring early reduces the workload

Configuring early reduces the workload

as they near the airport.

One of the things that...

in any approach but particularly in a nonprecision approach,

you want to minimize the number of variables,

and one of the ways you do that is you

and one of the ways you do that is you

get the airplane in a position to land earlier than normal.

Let's make sure the lights are up, please.

All right.

All right.

The lights at Kirksville are pilot activated.

The airports without a lot of traffic that goes in and out

The airports without a lot of traffic that goes in and out

of them... one of the ways that they reduce the cost

of them... one of the ways that they reduce the cost

of running the airport is they don't have

the lights on all the time.

The pilots have the ability to control those lights

The pilots have the ability to control those lights

with a series of microphone clicks

on a specific radio frequency.

on a specific radio frequency.

If those lights are not on, particularly when

you fly with a low visibility and at night,

you fly with a low visibility and at night,

you won't see the runway.

So if you don't see the runway, you can't land.

So if you don't see the runway, you can't land.

Seven times, I clicked it.

I "cleeked" it.

I "cleeked" it.

They're still too far out to see the lights.

Captain Sasse wants to avoid surprises.

Captain Sasse wants to avoid surprises.

All we can do is we can call Kirksville ops

and ask them to confirm they're up.

and ask them to confirm they're up.

The pilots confirm with airline

operations on the ground.

Kirksville ops, CORP-X 5966.

Kirksville ops, CORP-X 5966.

5966.

Yeah, could you tell me of the approach lights are up?

Yeah, could you tell me of the approach lights are up?

And I would do that when I didn't see the airport and say,

hey, did you see the lights coming on for the approach?

hey, did you see the lights coming on for the approach?

It's a good technique.

CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Lights are on.

Cool, thanks.

Cool, thanks.

There was one doctor up in the front who

There was one doctor up in the front who

didn't put her seat belt on, and I wanted to call out to her

didn't put her seat belt on, and I wanted to call out to her

and say, put your seat belt on.

and say, put your seat belt on.

But I... I didn't.

I wasn't afraid, but I just...

I wasn't afraid, but I just...

I'm a rule keeper and thought she

should have her seat belt on.

Two and a half miles from the airport, the pilots

search for the runway.

400.

It's very critical to maintain that

altitude because if you don't see the runway,

altitude because if you don't see the runway,

you've got to go missed because you cannot

land without seeing the runway.

land without seeing the runway.

Flight 5966 emerges from the clouds.

350.

Here we are.

Two miles from the runway,

the pilots are still looking for the approach lights.

the pilots are still looking for the approach lights.

And you're flying 336 feet above the ground,

And you're flying 336 feet above the ground,

so there's not a lot of room for error.

so there's not a lot of room for error.

What do you think?

Yeah, I could see ground there.

Yeah, I could see ground there.

I... I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

Approach lights in sight.

But just as the pilots appear to have

the runway lights in sight...

Flaps 35.

Flaps 35.

...something goes wrong.

No!

No!

Trees!

What's going on?

I just remember thinking, I can't

I just remember thinking, I can't

believe this is happening.

No! Stop!

Oh my god!

Oh holy crap!

Oh holy crap!

Corporate Airlines Flight 5966

Corporate Airlines Flight 5966

has crashed into a wooded area 1.2 miles south of the

Kirksville, Missouri, Airport.

Kirksville, Missouri, Airport.

When I woke up, it was dark, and it was quiet.

When I woke up, it was dark, and it was quiet.

And the only sound that I could hear then

was just the sound of fire.

was just the sound of fire.

We were suspended up in trees.

Wendy Bonham and her colleague

Wendy Bonham and her colleague

Dr. Krogh struggle to escape.

I just felt like I needed to move.

I just felt like I needed to move.

I have always had a fear of blowing up,

and there was a fire in the back of the plane.

and there was a fire in the back of the plane.

And I just thought, I need to get out of this plane

before it blows up.

I don't remember walking from my seat to the side of the plane.

It was a ways down, and there was fire down there.

It was a ways down, and there was fire down there.

There is no other way out of the plane.

I don't remember falling from the plane down

I don't remember falling from the plane down

to the ground.

I remember before and after.

And I stood up, and I could see Dr. Krogh

And I stood up, and I could see Dr. Krogh

pretty close to the plane.

And he was laying down.

The other 11 passengers and both pilots

are dead.

They were all really incredible

people that did incredible things for their communities,

people that did incredible things for their communities,

and that's...

and that's hard for me.

For the pilot community,

this is something that is touching us,

this is something that is touching us,

because that could be us.

That could be me.

We want to know why, what happened.

We want to know why, what happened.

It's up to the National Transportation

It's up to the National Transportation

Safety Board to investigate.

But there's not much left of the plane for them to examine.

But there's not much left of the plane for them to examine.

Most of the aircraft itself

was consumed by the fire.

There wasn't a lot left.

I mean, there's engines, propellers, and other things,

but if you went to the accident site,

but if you went to the accident site,

you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.

What a mess.

This is what we have from structures.

This is what we have from structures.

Although the plane was almost completely destroyed,

an on-site team is able to analyze the debris.

I'm amazed that we were able to get

I'm amazed that we were able to get

this much data from that heap.

Investigators turn to the wreckage analysis

to determine if the plane had any mechanical problems that

to determine if the plane had any mechanical problems that

could have caused the accident.

We've gone through that wreckage

with a fine-tooth comb.

Engines, controls, instruments all checked out.

Engines, controls, instruments all checked out.

Looking at all the data

we had from the accident site, it

appeared that the airplane was fully functional at the time it

appeared that the airplane was fully functional at the time it

hit the ground.

So the plane's working fine.

So the plane's working fine.

They might still have lost control.

They examined the direction

of the plane's trail of debris.

of the plane's trail of debris.

They first hit the trees here, just over 1.3

They first hit the trees here, just over 1.3

miles short of the runway.

They fly another 775 feet.

They hit another set of trees here.

They hit another set of trees here.

The plane was headed straight for the runway the entire time.

The plane was headed straight for the runway the entire time.

We had enough information

that, looking at all the pieces, this accent started to look

that, looking at all the pieces, this accent started to look

like it was a human performance issue and not

an airplane issue.

What kind of an approach were they flying that night?

What kind of an approach were they flying that night?

A nonprecision to runway 3-6.

A nonprecision to runway 3-6.

Unfortunately, the accident rate for nonprecision

approaches is dramatically higher

approaches is dramatically higher

than on those approaches with an instrument landing system.

What do we know about the weather that night?

Wind was nominal, no turbulence or rain to speak of.

Wind was nominal, no turbulence or rain to speak of.

Hold on a sec.

Cloud ceiling was low, 300 feet.

Cloud ceiling was low, 300 feet.

The cloud ceiling is the distance between the base

of the clouds and the ground.

Visibility was three to five miles.

So they're flying blind through the clouds.

So they're flying blind through the clouds.

It's misty.

Visibility is poor.

Visibility is poor.

Those are bad conditions for a nonprecision approach.

Question is, are they bad enough to cause this accident?

Question is, are they bad enough to cause this accident?

Well, let's find out.

In low-visibility conditions,

In low-visibility conditions,

a nonprecision approach is very challenging

to fly because you come down to the lowest altitude.

to fly because you come down to the lowest altitude.

You have to level off there, and you... you fly along looking

You have to level off there, and you... you fly along looking

for the runway environment.

Investigators speak to a pilot

Investigators speak to a pilot

who landed in Kirksville ahead of Flight 5966.

How bad was the weather that night?

How bad was the weather that night?

Flying was smooth, but visibility

was right on the cusp, maybe two to five miles.

was right on the cusp, maybe two to five miles.

Half the state had been soupy for a couple of days.

How was the visibility for landing?

How was the visibility for landing?

No issues.

If it had been worse, we would have gone around.

Why did Flight 5966 crash

when other aircraft flew the same approach safely

when other aircraft flew the same approach safely

that night?

So the question became,

So the question became,

what went wrong that day?

And that takes time to put together.

We've got the performance data ready to go.

Let's see how they handled the approach.

Let's see how they handled the approach.

Using a combination of data

from the flight recorder and radar,

investigators analyze the flight's descent profile.

investigators analyze the flight's descent profile.

It was important for the team to take

a look in the descent profile.

a look in the descent profile.

How did it wind up where it did?

So we start backing up during the whole approach where

So we start backing up during the whole approach where

it was during these segments.

So they come in like this and continue

straight to the ground.

straight to the ground.

Can we see their MDA?

Can we see their MDA?

So the plane was supposed to level off

at the minimum descent altitude before continuing

at the minimum descent altitude before continuing

to descend to the runway.

Why would they blow right past the MDA like that?

Why would they blow right past the MDA like that?

If they didn't level off at the minimum descent altitude,

If they didn't level off at the minimum descent altitude,

why not?

What didn't they see, or what didn't they do?

What didn't they see, or what didn't they do?

How fast were they descending?

1,200 feet per minute.

What should they have been doing?

Below 300 feet of altitude, the max is 900 feet per minute.

Below 300 feet of altitude, the max is 900 feet per minute.

Once you get to minimum descent altitude,

Once you get to minimum descent altitude,

you should stop your descent altogether and continue on.

Why did Flight 5966 descend so low and so fast?

Why did Flight 5966 descend so low and so fast?

And they continued that descent speed

And they continued that descent speed

right up until they crashed.

Why didn't they slow down before striking the trees?

Why didn't they slow down before striking the trees?

For answers, investigators

For answers, investigators

listened to the cockpit voice recorder, or CVR, of Corporate

Airlines 5966 to understand why it crashed short of the runway.

Airlines 5966 to understand why it crashed short of the runway.

Ready.

Ready.

OK, let's take it back to five minutes before the accident,

when they're lined up for the runway.

Mm-hmm.

The cockpit voice recorder

is one of the most critical elements in the investigation.

is one of the most critical elements in the investigation.

It's your most direct evidence on how the crew is interacting,

on how they're following procedures, on exactly

on how they're following procedures, on exactly

what happens on the human side.

Course alive, cross check,

Course alive, cross check,

no flags except for the vertical.

Keep it slow, all the time we need.

Keep it slow, all the time we need.

Let's go flaps 10, and we'll configure early, too.

Give ourselves as much time as we can.

Give ourselves as much time as we can.

All right, flaps 10.

They're configuring the plane to land early.

The team hears evidence of

a cautious and prepared crew.

a cautious and prepared crew.

Smart move in low visibility.

The crew on this flight

The crew on this flight

knew that the weather was going to be challenging,

and one of the ways that they...

and one of the ways that they...

they tried to mitigate that or to improve

their chances of a successful landing

was to get the airplane configured early.

was to get the airplane configured early.

Let's make sure the lights are up, please.

All right.

There are cases where

the captain does an exemplary job,

or he goes beyond the requirements.

or he goes beyond the requirements.

He asks the first officer to call ahead

to make sure from the ground that the lights are working

to make sure from the ground that the lights are working

and that they're turned up fully.

It's not required.

It's an excellent idea, especially in these conditions.

It's an excellent idea, especially in these conditions.

I'm hearing an organized crew here.

Take it to when they near the MDA.

Take it to when they near the MDA.

If there's a big mistake, it'll likely be then.

The minimum descent altitude is the lowest altitude

you're permitted to fly at until you see the runway environment.

you're permitted to fly at until you see the runway environment.

400.

350.

350.

Here we are.

OK, they're at the MDA.

It's decision time.

So what do you think?

So what do you think?

Yeah, I could see ground there.

Minimums, minimums, minimums.

Minimums, minimums, minimums.

I... I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

Approach lights in sight.

Hold it there.

They're two miles out, 300 feet up.

They're two miles out, 300 feet up.

They've just come out of the clouds.

With the mist that night, they probably

couldn't see the runway lines.

couldn't see the runway lines.

There's only farmland from here to the airport.

I can't see anything that the captain could

have mistaken for a runway.

have mistaken for a runway.

Why is the captain even looking

for the approach lights?

So the captain is the first one to say,

I see something outside the airplane.

He sees the ground.

He sees lights.

He sees lights.

He shouldn't be doing that.

He should be totally focused inside the airplane.

The first officer is supposed to see the approach lights

The first officer is supposed to see the approach lights

and call out, "Approach lights in sight.

Continue."

Continue."

But the voice recording

tells a different story.

Instead, they're both looking for the runway.

Instead, they're both looking for the runway.

And nobody is paying attention to the plane's

And nobody is paying attention to the plane's

descent speed and altitude.

The flying pilot should have been monitoring

The flying pilot should have been monitoring

exclusively instruments, and what sadly occurred

was that the normal flight path continued below

was that the normal flight path continued below

the minimum descent altitude.

And neither one of them caught it.

And neither one of them caught it.

No!

No!

JONATHAN PALMER (ON RECORDING): Trees!

And that is... is very apparent

when you hear this "Trees!"

when you hear this "Trees!"

And that... and it shocked both of them.

They did not expect to see that.

They did not expect to see that.

They spent four and a half minutes following procedure.

They spent four and a half minutes following procedure.

They configure the plane early for landing.

They configure the plane early for landing.

Here, they make sure the runway lights are on early.

First officer calls out minimum descent altitude.

First officer calls out minimum descent altitude.

And from this point, 23 seconds from impact, it all goes wrong.

And from this point, 23 seconds from impact, it all goes wrong.

Captain is looking outside when he shouldn't.

Captain is looking outside when he shouldn't.

The first officer doesn't challenge him.

Next thing, they're crashing.

It's surprising how much the captain's

It's surprising how much the captain's

performance suddenly fell apart at the end,

performance suddenly fell apart at the end,

that even listening to it, he sounded like he

was much better than that.

It's a surprise for me professionally

It's a surprise for me professionally

that this can happen.

Investigators need to find out how a crew that seemed

to be flying so well...

to be flying so well...

Flaps 35.

No!

No!

Trees!

...made such crucial mistakes in the last seconds

...made such crucial mistakes in the last seconds

of the flight.

Oh my god!

Oh holy crap!

Now take it back 30 minutes before impact.

Now take it back 30 minutes before impact.

Investigators return to the cockpit conversation

for clues to explain why the pilots ignored

for clues to explain why the pilots ignored

established procedures in the final 23 seconds

of their flight.

There.

My hair was down to my breast pocket.

My hair was down to my breast pocket.

Are you serious?

Right here.

You could hold my hair like this.

I cannot see you with long hair like that.

I used to wear a black derby with the rim turned down.

I used to wear a black derby with the rim turned down.

It was my concert hat.

I had a Fu Manchu.

I had a Fu Manchu.

Yeah, it was fun.

I cannot imagine you like that.

CORP-X 5966, climb and maintain

CORP-X 5966, climb and maintain

1-2,000er, 12,000er.

1-2,000er, 12,000er.

1-2,000 Corporate-X 5966, 12er, 1,000er.

1-2,000 Corporate-X 5966, 12er, 1,000er.

I detect a bit of an attitude there.

I detect a bit of an attitude there.

I might have to call him a jerk.

Does that seem a bit casual to you?

Yeah, but they're above 10,000,

Yeah, but they're above 10,000,

so cockpit doesn't have to be sterile at this point.

so cockpit doesn't have to be sterile at this point.

The philosophy of the sterile cockpit rule

is below 10,000 feet, the flight crew

is below 10,000 feet, the flight crew

is engaged in only what's required

to basically fly the airplane, no nonpertinent conversations.

to basically fly the airplane, no nonpertinent conversations.

Keep going?

I had a good time flying with you.

Yeah, me, too.

Yeah, me, too.

Just letting you know that.

You got to have fun.

That's truth, man.

You got to have fun.

You got to have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves

way too seriously in this job.

I've flown with them, and it sucks,

I've flown with them, and it sucks,

a month of fricking agony.

All you want to do strangle the jerk when

you get to the ground, man.

Oh.

Oh.

The conversation raises a major concern

for investigators.

for investigators.

Sure, they're joking, but the captain

is essentially telling him how he wants

the first officer to behave.

the first officer to behave.

That's disturbing, and it sets a disturbing atmosphere.

That's disturbing, and it sets a disturbing atmosphere.

It's a bad setting for the captain in terms of priorities.

OK, what's next?

Cruise check, power check.

Can you push this foot away?

Yes.

It's a relatively compact airplane,

It's a relatively compact airplane,

and the passengers in the front of the airplane

can sometimes put their foot into the cockpit area.

can sometimes put their foot into the cockpit area.

Cruise power, cruise check.

Cruise power, cruise check.

All you got to do is... you open the curtain a little bit,

and it's like, man.

and it's like, man.

Some people, I invite their feet up to make them

more comfortable, but damn.

I dropped my book on him purposely one time, right

on top of the arch of the foot.

Oh.

Oh.

OK, stop it.

The captain starts his cruise power checks

The captain starts his cruise power checks

but then interrupts himself to tell a story

about hurting a passenger.

about hurting a passenger.

Mm-hmm.

It's really inappropriate.

The lack of respect for passengers is...

The lack of respect for passengers is...

is striking in this conversation.

Your power levers.

Right on top of his foot.

Right on top of his foot.

The power spiked up a bit.

The first officer has to tell the captain twice

to adjust his power levers, but he insists on telling

this irrelevant story.

All right, well, let's see if the first officer

can get him back on track.

All I'm thinking about is a Philly frickin' cheesesteak

and an iced tea.

Sounds good.

Sounds good.

Cruise power is set.

Altimeter is 2 9er 9er 0 set and cross-checked.

Altimeter is 2 9er 9er 0 set and cross-checked.

Now the captain interrupts their checklist

Now the captain interrupts their checklist

to discuss his dinner plans.

How'd I get 2 9er 9er 0?

Because you're an idiot.

Because you're an idiot.

It should be 2 9er 9er 2.

You never set it when they cleared to the runway?

You never set it when they cleared to the runway?

Investigators hear the captain

mocking the first officer while confirming

mocking the first officer while confirming

their altimeter setting.

And I've been sitting here living

a lie for the last 20 minutes.

Yeah, you lying scum bucket.

Yeah, you lying scum bucket.

OK.

Damn boost pumps are off.

Pressurization is set and external lights...

Pressurization is set and external lights...

You blustering, scabby pustule.

You blustering, scabby pustule.

...are externalized.

Your damn cruise checklist is frickin' done.

The captain's jokes have totally eroded procedure.

The captain's jokes have totally eroded procedure.

Even the first officer has given in

and turned his checklist into a joke.

and turned his checklist into a joke.

There would be pressure on the first officer.

He does go along with the joking.

But the captain is still the pilot in command,

But the captain is still the pilot in command,

and he has to set the tone.

There's a danger that the first officer will not focus

There's a danger that the first officer will not focus

to the extent that's required.

Did a breakdown in the cockpit command structure

Did a breakdown in the cockpit command structure

affect the first officer's actions at a critical moment?

350.

Here we are.

What do you think?

What do you think?

Yeah, I could see ground there.

Minimums, minimums, minimums.

Minimums, minimums, minimums.

I... I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

You got to have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves

way too seriously in this job.

Flaps 35.

The kind of atmosphere he set up earlier in making fun

of other pilots and making fun of the passengers

of other pilots and making fun of the passengers

sets up the wrong tone.

It doesn't encourage the first officer to object.

It doesn't encourage the first officer to object.

When things were falling apart, he...

he could have stepped in and done something.

It looks like a complete breakdown in command

It looks like a complete breakdown in command

structure led to this accident.

The question is, why?

The question is, why?

Got their personnel files.

Got their personnel files.

Investigators studied the pilots' training

and previous flights to determine

if the crew of Flight 5966 had a history of deviating

if the crew of Flight 5966 had a history of deviating

from airline procedures.

from airline procedures.

It's very important to get a broad sense of what the pilot's

like from previous flights.

like from previous flights.

What is their reputation?

Have any of the problems that show up in this accident

shown up before?

shown up before?

Is this a recurring problem?

Captain left a well-paying job to become a pilot,

Captain left a well-paying job to become a pilot,

plenty of hours, passed all the checks.

plenty of hours, passed all the checks.

He had an interview lined up with a major airline.

He had an interview lined up with a major airline.

You have a... a capable pilot who's devoted

to aviation who gave up a... a computer industry job that

to aviation who gave up a... a computer industry job that

paid several times as much money because he

wanted to be a pilot.

First officer checks out, too, 10 years' experience, squeaky

clean record, no incidents.

They were joking a fair bit, almost punch drunk.

They were joking a fair bit, almost punch drunk.

Do you think they may have been overtired?

Fatigue can greatly impact performance.

Fatigue can greatly impact performance.

You get more tired, and all of a sudden, your level of precision

can go downhill.

can go downhill.

The team turns to other Corporate Airlines pilots

for more insight into the crew.

for more insight into the crew.

Hi.

Did you see any unusual behavior from these pilots that

Did you see any unusual behavior from these pilots that

would suggest they were tired?

Actually, Captain Sasse did try

to take a nap here in the pilot's lounge

to take a nap here in the pilot's lounge

before the flight.

They noted that he's 6 foot 4, very tall,

They noted that he's 6 foot 4, very tall,

and the couch was actually quite small.

He didn't quite fit on it, so it couldn't

have been ideal for sleeping.

have been ideal for sleeping.

Any idea how long he was asleep?

Maybe an hour.

Thank you.

Fatigue is insidious in that you get an increasing

Fatigue is insidious in that you get an increasing

performance degradation once you are

performance degradation once you are

at a higher level of fatigue and performance impairment.

at a higher level of fatigue and performance impairment.

It can be somewhat like alcohol.

These are the classic signs of fatigue.

This is what we're looking for.

When I have a case that involves fatigue,

When I have a case that involves fatigue,

I go back to the cockpit voice recording again to see,

I go back to the cockpit voice recording again to see,

did they sound tired?

Here's something.

Visibility 4, mist.

Sky condition, overcast, 300.

Sky condition, overcast, 300.

An automated weather update

notifies the pilots of the poor visibility in Kirksville.

notifies the pilots of the poor visibility in Kirksville.

We're not getting in.

We're not getting in.

Crap.

We go all this damn way.

Let's try it.

Yeah, we're going to try it.

I don't want to come all the way out here for nothing tonight.

I don't want to come all the way out here for nothing tonight.

They haven't even gotten into the bad weather yet,

and the captain's determined to land in it.

and the captain's determined to land in it.

Yeah.

He's fixated on landing.

It had not been an easy duty day,

It had not been an easy duty day,

and so they're probably getting towards the end

of, like, we'd like to get this flight over.

of, like, we'd like to get this flight over.

But there's more than just fixation going on here.

But there's more than just fixation going on here.

The pilots' discussion provides

more evidence of fatigue.

When they find out the weather's bad,

the captain should be talking about options

the captain should be talking about options

other than landing.

Well, he has the opportunity to discuss options now.

What does he do?

I'll be so happy when we have an ILS.

I'll be so happy when we have an ILS.

The next job, everywhere we go, we'll have an ILS.

Yep.

The captain complains about not

The captain complains about not

having automated landing assistance, an ILS,

at the airport.

The only options he's talking about are future job prospects.

Instead of discussing options if they can't land,

Instead of discussing options if they can't land,

the captain is talking about his ambitions

of flying for a bigger company.

We're going into the crap.

Look, it's so eerie and creepy.

Ooh!

10 minutes earlier, they're upset about the bad weather,

but when they're actually in it, they're cracking jokes.

but when they're actually in it, they're cracking jokes.

The crew isn't responding fast enough

to the changing situation.

That can be a sign of fatigue.

People start to become giddy and are

People start to become giddy and are

not critical enough or... or... or enough careful

of their behavior.

After this, they don't discuss the weather

again for three minutes.

again for three minutes.

How's Kirksville looking weatherwise?

Visibility is three miles.

Visibility is three miles.

Sky condition overcast, 300.

Still overcast to 300 feet.

Still overcast to 300 feet.

And when they do check again, the visibility is still bad,

and they don't discuss options besides landing.

and they don't discuss options besides landing.

They discover that the crew

ignored multiple warnings about conditions on the approach.

ignored multiple warnings about conditions on the approach.

In fatigue, you don't respond to warnings, that there are

In fatigue, you don't respond to warnings, that there are

warnings that this is not working,

but that you're slow to respond to it.

but that you're slow to respond to it.

Just missing one piece.

You already have it.

You already have it.

The risky decision is to try to land when they can't decide

if they can see the runway.

if they can see the runway.

Yeah, I could see ground there.

Minimums, minimums, minimums.

I... I don't see anything.

I... I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

It's a decision the pilots

regret almost immediately.

regret almost immediately.

Flaps 35.

No!

No!

No!

Trees!

Investigators conclude that fatigue

played a major role in the crash of Flight 5966.

played a major role in the crash of Flight 5966.

...see the runway.

So they're fixated on landing.

So they're fixated on landing.

Uh-huh.

Right?

They don't consider any of the other options,

and they make the risky decision to land anyways.

and they make the risky decision to land anyways.

Mm-hmm.

All the signs are there.

I personally feel that fatigue is the largest

I personally feel that fatigue is the largest

human performance area that we can

address as an industry to prevent

address as an industry to prevent

accidents from happening.

It's not always obvious when someone is tired,

and it's not obvious to them.

and it's not obvious to them.

That scientific evidence is that people typically

underreport how tired they are.

underreport how tired they are.

before the accident flight?

Investigators analyze the pilots' duty

Investigators analyze the pilots' duty

hours leading up to the flight.

To study fatigue,

we look at the person is getting the amount of sleep

we look at the person is getting the amount of sleep

that they normally get.

We look at how long they've been awake.

We look at how long they've been awake.

We look at the time of day.

Those are scientifically worked out,

and we can get an idea from that.

and we can get an idea from that.

The night of the flight, they had worked three days straight.

That'll tire you out.

That'll tire you out.

Yeah, well, they had seven and a half

hours of available rest time the night before the flight.

That day, they flew six flights, an hour each,

That day, they flew six flights, an hour each,

and they were on duty for 14 hours

straight starting at 5:45 AM.

straight starting at 5:45 AM.

The team discovers that the crew of Flight 5966

worked an extremely long day before the accident flight.

worked an extremely long day before the accident flight.

The day of the accident was very busy.

The day of the accident was very busy.

They had to get up about 4:00 in the morning.

Their first flight was around 5:00 in the morning.

Their first flight was around 5:00 in the morning.

They were originally scheduled for eight flights,

and they would have been on duty for about 14 hours.

and they would have been on duty for about 14 hours.

It's... it's... it's quite a long day.

So it was an extremely long day,

not enough rest, add to that, plane with no autopilot.

not enough rest, add to that, plane with no autopilot.

What do the FAA regulations have to say about working

What do the FAA regulations have to say about working

in those conditions?

Were the pilots made to work too many

Were the pilots made to work too many

hours without sufficient rest?

Check this out.

Pilots can't fly more than eight flight hours in a day,

but that's it.

but that's it.

I flew in those days, and you had a maximum number

of flight hours in a day.

of flight hours in a day.

But the number of duty hours and the time of day

was not even taken into consideration.

Isn't there data out there that says it isn't safe to fly

Isn't there data out there that says it isn't safe to fly

if you've been up that long?

A 2003 study of data from 55 accidents

A 2003 study of data from 55 accidents

concluded that pilots who worked 13 or more duty hours

concluded that pilots who worked 13 or more duty hours

had an accident rate several times higher

than those working shorter days.

Why isn't this information reflected in the regulations?

Why isn't this information reflected in the regulations?

This might have something to do with it.

Investigators discover the reason

Investigators discover the reason

why the FAA's rest and duty regulations don't

reflect the latest research.

reflect the latest research.

Last time these regulations were updated...

1964.

1964.

You had a dedicated and very capable

You had a dedicated and very capable

crew.

You had a company that was trying to do a good job.

You had a company that was trying to do a good job.

Really, the regulations needed to be updated

according to scientific principles

according to scientific principles

to improve the safety for everyone.

The team now has a comprehensive picture

The team now has a comprehensive picture

of the accident of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966.

At the end of a 14-hour day, two tired pilots

attempt one final landing in challenging conditions.

attempt one final landing in challenging conditions.

I got a suffocating feeling every time I see that.

I'm drowning!

The captain's joking and casual tone in the cockpit

The captain's joking and casual tone in the cockpit

undermines the command structure between him

and the first officer.

and the first officer.

You got to have fun.

That's truth, man.

You got to have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves

way too seriously in this job.

way too seriously in this job.

The pilots' roles break down so much

that in the critical 23 seconds before crashing,

that in the critical 23 seconds before crashing,

neither of them is doing his job.

So what do you think?

So what do you think?

The captain ignores protocol and takes

his eyes off his instruments.

Yeah, I can see ground there.

Yeah, I can see ground there.

I... I don't see anything.

And the first officer doesn't challenge him.

And the first officer doesn't challenge him.

Flaps 35.

The pilots' fatigue likely contributed

The pilots' fatigue likely contributed

to poor decision making and fatal

preoccupation with landing.

No!

No!

No!

Trees!

No! Stop!

No! Stop!

Oh my god!

Oh holy crap!

The NTSB recommends an overhaul of the FAA's flight

The NTSB recommends an overhaul of the FAA's flight

and duty time regulations to consider elements like length

of duty day, start time, workload, and other factors

of duty day, start time, workload, and other factors

that can affect pilots' alertness.

that can affect pilots' alertness.

The NTSB had been advising changes

in the regulations, in the flight and duty time

in the regulations, in the flight and duty time

regulations for decades before this happened,

but I think with this accident, it really focused to a point

but I think with this accident, it really focused to a point

that industry realized that this was necessary.

This was a push from the major airlines first that

This was a push from the major airlines first that

then trickled down into other operations that

then trickled down into other operations that

were smaller like the regional airlines

and corporate operators.

For Wendy Bonham, the change came at too high a cost.

For Wendy Bonham, the change came at too high a cost.

I'm comforted to hear that there were changes

I'm comforted to hear that there were changes

made in the length of time that pilots

can fly because of this crash.

can fly because of this crash.

I suppose, it's something good that came out of something

that wasn't good at all.