Original subtitles

(narration): While landing at Dutch Harbor, Alaska...

- Hang on. I'm sliding. (alarm ringing

(narration): The pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96 run out of runway.

- All I could see is water.

- Everyone brace!

- We're gonna go in.

(narration): Not everyone makes it out alive.

- You never wanna lose a passenger for any reason.

- It's pretty beat up.

(narration): NTSB investigators must piece together the evidence.

- We've got a dark, 170-foot-long skid mark.

- So the tire blew.

- We needed to do a deeper dive.

(narration): They soon discover a critical oversight.

- There's no numbering on these wires.

- That was really the "ah-hah" moment.

(theme music) - Mayday, mayday!

(indistinct radio chatter)

(narration): PenAir Flight 32-96 cruises over Alaska's Aleutian islands.

- We should be getting directions here to descend soon.

I'm gonna see if I can't get the weather.

- Yeah, it's changed.

The weather's been updated.

It's three one zero at one one knots.

(narration): 56-year-old Captain Paul Wells

is a new hire to PenAir

but has 25 years of experience with other airlines.

- Okay.

- Paul is an amazing guy.

I flew with him several times.

He was a true decision-maker as a captain.

(Anchorage): Peninsula 32-96 descend pilot's discretion.

Maintain flight level two niner zero.

- Pilot's discretion two niner zero Peninsula 32-96.

(narration): 39-year-old first officer Justin Lunn

has been with PenAir for five months.

- I couldn't have been with a better co-pilot.

He was a very thorough individual, uh, ex-military.

(narration): There are 39 passengers on today's flight,

including a high school swim team and their chaperones.

Commercial pilot Steve Ranney is escorting his son, Jacob.

- We were on the flight, um, to go to a swim meet.

We'd worked really hard raising the money for the trip.

It was a big deal.

(narration): It's a two-hour flight

from Anchorage to Unalaska airport -

also known as Dutch Harbor.

The journey crosses some of the most rugged and isolated terrain in the world.

- The flight is over a spectacular part of Alaska.

The entire Alaska Peninsula is in view.

- That's a great view.

Go grab a window seat further back.

- My son did move to a couple rows back

so that he could get that view too.

(narration): The pilots are flying a Swedish-made Saab 2000.

- The Saab 2000 is a twin-engine turbo jet aircraft.

It seats approximately fifty people.

It's a good aircraft for reaching remote communities in Alaska.

- Dutch Ops thirty-two ninety-six.

(narration): 30 minutes before landing,

the first officer contacts the weather observer

at Unalaska Airport for the latest conditions.

- Hello, 32-96.

Right now winds two one zero

at six knots gusting to fourteen.

Temperature 8. Dewpoint one.

Altimeter two niner five zero.

- Alright. Copy the weather.

(narration): The airport at Dutch Harbor has a short runway,

vulnerable to severe and unpredictable weather.

Pilots need special training to land here.

- The terrain around the area in Dutch Harbor is mountainous.

The wind conditions can change in seconds.

Turbulence can be bad; icing can be bad.

So we have dedicated weather observers.

That is invaluable.

- What did she say the wind was?

- Wind was two one zero.

- Pretty much a direct crosswind.

- Mm-hmm.

- I guess we can go ahead and start heading down.

- Alright.

(Anchorage): Peninsula 32-96,

are you planning on runway three one?

(narration): 20 minutes before landing,

Anchorage Air Traffic Control asks the pilots about their runway preference.

- Affirmative... uh, negative.

We want the R-NAV one three.

Peninsula 32-96.

(narration): Unalaska airport is on an island,

tucked behind a 1600-foot mountain.

Planes can land in either direction:

runway one three from the west

or runway three one from the east.

- Most pilots would prefer to use runway one three,

basically, because they have more room to maneuver,

more room to escape if you gotta punch out or you gotta go around.

- Just like the other day if there's any major changes in the wind, we'll just...

- We'll switch.

- We always prepared for the worst and hoped for the best.

Minimize risk, that's what we do.

(PA): Ladies and gentlemen, in order to...

(narration): Twelve miles from the airport, passengers prepare for landing.

(PA): ...beneath the seat in front of you.

- Alright.

Flaps twenty. Flight attendant is secure.

Flaps set twenty.

Indicating twenty.

Gear down.

(narration): Four minutes from the airport,

the crew begins the landing procedure.

- Down three green.

(narration): At less than a thousand feet...

the plane is rocked by turbulence.

- Ah, bump.

There's a bit of a bump there too.

- Yeah.

- Yeah, there you go.

- It's gonna be ugly in here, isn't it?

- Paul was fighting the winds as we were coming in.

(narration): Seconds from touchdown,

Captain Wells notices he's too high for a safe landing.

- An updraft may cause you to balloon

and that causes you to go high.

- What do you think?

- Go around.

- At Dutch Harbor, I don't take chances.

If we're high, we're going around.

- Max power.

(tense music)

- I would not have been able to safely get back down

without putting people at horrible risk.

- The pilot pulled up and went around.

I was assuming it was because of visibility issues.

- Dutch Harbor Traffic, Peninsula 32-96 going around.

We're gonna come back around for a visual.

- We were contending with terrain,

a lower layer of clouds

and maintaining a safe airspeed.

You're very busy scanning inside and outside of the airplane.

(narration): It only takes three minutes before the pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

are ready to attempt another landing.

- If we couldn't land on this attempt, then we would go to our alternate airport.

(automation): Two hundred.

- Plus ten. You got it? - Got it.

(narration): The pilots are seconds from touching down.

(automation): Sink rate. - I know.

- It seemed like we floated down the runway quite a bit,

which didn't alarm me too much.

(tires screeching)

- Down.

- Okay. You got the yoke.

- I got it. Yeah. We're down there. Eighty knots.

(narration): As the Captain begins slowing the plane...

(alarm ringing)

...something isn't right.

- I was pushing on the brakes harder

and noticing that

I'm not getting any more effect from the brakes.

- When I saw the wind sock, the wind was definitely strong.

And at that point,

all alarm bells went off in me.

- Brakes.

- I got 'em all the way down.

(narration): The pilots cannot reduce their plane's speed.

- I had to make a decision on whether to continue the landing or abort.

In an instant, I realized that,

no, there's not enough room to get the aircraft airborne again.

(narration): In the cabin, Steve Ranney notices it too.

- Brace!

Everyone brace!

- I actually went in the brace position.

And I told the passengers around me to brace.

- Aah... hang on.

I'm sliding. (alarm ringing)

(narration): The plane is swerving back and forth.

- I thought I was gonna be able to turn off into the taxi area

but I was going too fast.

(narration): The pilots are running out of runway.

- All I could see is water.

(narration): The pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96 are unable to stop their airplane.

- I saw the perimeter road and I told Paul...

- Go right. Go right!

- The only option was the road.

(narration): The plane crashes through a fence,

strikes a boulder and is propelled towards the water.

- It destroyed our exit plan.

(narration): They have only a few seconds to stop.

- And all I could think of was, "We're gonna go in."

(narration): The left engine strikes a signal post and road sign,

shattering the propellers into deadly fragments.

(panting)

- Holy crap.

(exhales) - We need to evacuate.

- Evacuate right hand side.

Get out and get away.

(narration): In the cabin, it's eerily quiet.

- I could feel blood running down my face.

And my shoulder was sore and my head hurt.

It was very, very surreal.

(narration): A propeller blade

has pierced the cabin and struck Steve Ranney.

- There was a propeller blade stuck up in the ceiling right up against me.

- Jacob, get off the plane, don't wait for me.

(narration): Steve's son Jacob is lucky to walk away from the accident unharmed.

- He would not have survived in the seat next to me,

because the blade was literally right there.

(narration): But a passenger near him is severely injured.

- I had had a fair amount of training because of my job.

And so it was more or less an automatic reflex to go over

and, you know, check for his pulse, see if he's still breathing.

(sirens wailing)

(narration): Within minutes, emergency responders arrive

and transport 10 injured passengers to hospital.

38-year-old passenger David Oltman later succumbs to his injuries.

In 10 years, he's one of only two people

to be killed on a domestic flight in the United States.

- I was met in the hospital by a doctor,

they told me he hadn't made it.

And that was a... a crushing blow.

(narration): Investigators from the NTSB,

the National Transportation Safety Board are dispatched to the area

as the plane is hoisted onto a barge

and taken to a secure location.

- We weren't able to offload it the next day because of the weather.

So it took a day to get the airplane secured.

- We're on record at 5:46 p.m.

(narration): Investigators are eager to interview the pilot.

- Memories tend to fade and they tend to change,

so we want to get to the information as soon as possible.

- I didn't even have any sleep before I showed up for that interview.

And so you're not, you know, you're not a hundred percent clear.

- Okay.

Take us through the events leading up to the accident.

- Um...

everything was normal.

Just a nice flight.

- Everything was going fine until it wasn't.

And this is pretty common when we talk to pilots after accidents.

- When I went to turn off the anti-ice,

I got out of position on final.

(narration): Captain Wells explains that the plane was hit by an updraft

just as he took his eyes off the gauges.

- What do you think? - Go around.

- Max power.

- We were too high.

And instead of doing a destabilized approach

and continue to the runway,

we elected to go around.

- So you're now set-up for a second landing?

Do you remember your speed at touchdown?

- One twenty-six.

- And where did you touch down?

- I planted it pretty much on the thousand,

right on the touchdown zone.

Put it in reverse.

And then I noticed that it stopped decelerating.

I pushed down as hard as I could.

But there was no response from the brakes.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- No response?

- Exactly. Zero braking.

Like on ice.

- That was puzzling.

We knew we had to look at the braking system

to understand what was occurring there.

- Did you get an update from the weather observer?

- Yes. They said...

anywhere from 10 to 20 knots.

The winds were changing.

- Any concerns at all on the second approach?

- The winds were dying down on the water.

It looked like a direct crosswind.

I...

had no doubt that this was gonna be a fine approach.

- The captain said that he believed that they were flying into a crosswind

and was confident in that approach.

- Your FO did the pre-flight on the aircraft?

- He did.

- Did he bring anything to your attention at all

that was out of the ordinary?

- He did actually.

He noticed something with one of the tires.

- Pre-flight inspection complete.

- Any issues?

- A bald spot on the left outboard.

(narration): Investigators learn that a pre-flight inspection of flight 32-96

revealed a worn tire on the left outboard wheel.

- It's not showing any cord.

I'm not worried about it.

- It was not down past the red line on the tire

and didn't, to me, appear to be of any concern.

- I've had maintenance come to look at tires

that are in very similar conditions to this tire.

They've basically said it's within serviceable limits

and you can continue your flight.

- Have you reached any conclusion,

just in your own head,

about what you think went wrong or may have happened?

- If I had to make my best guess,

I don't think it was brake failure.

I think more than likely,

it was one of those showers that put down some sleet or hail on the runway,

and I just couldn't see it.

That's the only thing I can think of.

- Anything else you'd like to add?

- I can't be more proud...

I'm sorry.

- Take your time.

- I couldn't be more proud of my crew.

- The captain did get rather emotional

given his involvement in the accident.

- So they came in on runway one three,

and the pilot said his airspeed was 126 knots

and they touched down at the 1000-foot mark.

(narration): Why did Flight 32-96 come off the runway?

- At that speed they should have been able to stop

well before the end of the runway.

- Specifically for runway overruns,

we're looking at how the airplane was configured,

what those runway lengths were,

as well as what it takes operationally

to fly that airplane into that airport.

- What were the runway conditions?

- Was there rain, ice, snow,

anything on that runway

that would have prevented the airplane

from stopping on its surface?

- No rain.

7 degrees.

- So hydroplaning is out of the question.

- Too warm for ice to form.

(narration): Investigators eliminate the captain's theory.

Weather conditions did not make the runway slippery.

- In this case the runway wasn't contaminated

but there was plenty of information that the runway can tell us.

- What about debris? Skid marks?

Where are we at with the runway survey?

- I got it here.

(narration): The team looks for any evidence left behind on the runway.

- The runway evidence was critical.

We walked the runway numerous times.

We documented the heck out of the runway.

- Starting at 1,835 feet past the threshold,

we've got a dark, 170-foot-long skid mark,

then there's further skidding down the runway.

(narration): Skid marks on the tarmac are made when the wheels lock.

- And then the plane crosses the centerline to the right,

and then straightens out.

Which tire skidded?

- Based on the position of the skid mark,

it's the outboard tire, left side.

(narration): The Saab 2000 has four main wheels that brake.

Why would only one of them skid?

- Wasn't that the one with the bald spot?

- Yup.

- The tire mark was a continuous black mark.

It didn't have any tread marks on it,

so we knew right off the bat

that the tire was skidding on the bald spot

and not on the tread.

- We also found tire fragments...

here.

- So the tire blew? - Yeah.

- Hold on.

That's one heck of a long skid.

Even a brand new tire would have blown.

- The fact that the airplane was skidding on the bald spot

may have caused it to burst a fraction of a second earlier,

but in the end, it wasn't a contributing factor.

- This shouldn't happen.

The plane has an anti-skid system.

(narration): The anti-skid system is activated

when one of the sensors on the main wheels detects a skid.

The brake pressure is released

either on both inboard wheels or both outboard wheels,

ensuring the plane remains stable

while allowing the other two wheels to slow the plane.

- After we first noticed that there was a flat spot and a hole in the tire,

we were immediately drawn to the anti-skid system

because that's the purpose of the anti-skid system, to stop skids.

(narration): Did the system fail, causing Flight 32-96 to run off the runway?

- Any news?

- It's gonna take some time for the technicians

to breakdown and test those brakes.

- Like you said, that is a long skid.

Why would they need to brake so hard for so long?

(narration): In the meantime, investigators consider other theories

about the long skid marks.

- Overweight?

(narration): Could the plane have exceeded

its maximum allowable landing weight,

requiring the pilot to brake harder than usual?

- A heavier airplane essentially has more inertia,

so when a heavier airplane comes in to land,

it would take longer to stop.

- According to the manifest,

the Captain calculated their landing weight at 45,213 pounds.

- And the maximum allowable?

- 46,114.

- 900 pounds under.

Close but within the limits.

- The airplane was not overloaded,

and we could rule out an overweight airplane

as a contributing factor for this event.

(narration): What else might cause a pilot to brake so hard?

- The captain said that they had a crosswind,

but maybe the direction changed to a tailwind.

- A tailwind during landing essentially means

that you are moving faster over the ground

than you normally would so you would take up more space on the runway to safely stop.

- The automated weather system only gives hourly reports.

Real-time updates come from a weather observer at the airport.

- I'll deal with that.

- I'll go help with the anti-skid system.

(narration): Could Flight 32-96 have been hit

by an unexpected gust of wind

causing it to land too fast and overshoot the runway?

- Thanks for coming in. - You bet.

(narration): Investigators question the onsite weather observer

at Unalaska Airport

about the wind conditions when PenAir Flight 32-96 landed.

- So first, um,

how early do you start providing crews with weather data?

- About 20 to 30 minutes out.

- And up until when?

- Two to three miles out.

- Dutch Harbor is a very unique airport.

The topography around the runway

actually leads to very rapidly changing weather conditions,

and so a weather observer on the ground

provides the ability to get updated information to pilots

as it's happening.

- And what was the weather like at the airport when PenAir was on approach?

- Oh, there was a storm coming in but at the time it was clear.

- And what about the wind on the first attempt?

- Uh, two seven zero degrees at 10 knots.

- It looks like a crosswind.

And the second attempt?

About three minutes out,

the wind had shifted around to two nine zero at 16 knots,

gusting to 30 knots.

- Thirty knot tailwind? - Mm-hmm.

- That would be an excessive tailwind.

If a pilot decides to land with that tailwind,

they essentially become a test pilot.

- What about when they landed? What was the tailwind then?

- The winds were 15 knots.

(narration): Investigators confirm their suspicions about a tailwind on landing.

- Thank you for your time. - My pleasure.

- One danger associated with landing in a tailwind

is excessive groundspeed

which potentially puts you in a situation

where you run out of runway to safely stop the airplane.

- What's the Saab 2000 max tailwind for landing?

(narration): Was a 15-knot tailwind too much for the Saab to manage?

- 15 knots.

- Right at the limit.

Why would they risk it?

- Down.

Okay. You got the yoke.

- I got it. Yeah. We're down there.

(narration): Investigators now know the pilots of PenAir 32-96

approached a difficult airport in tricky conditions,

touching down with a tailwind nearing the plane's limits.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- Okay.

Weight roughly 45,000 pounds.

Speed at touchdown: 126 knots.

(narration): Investigators calculate how a 15-knot tailwind

affects the pilots' ability to stop.

- Our aircraft performance group developed several scenarios

to understand whether an aircraft would be able to stop,

given those circumstances.

- Tailwind, 15 knots. Flaps 20...

And let's do a loss of half the braking power because of the skid.

(narration): When the left outboard tire began to skid,

the Saab's anti-skid system would have released brake pressure

to both outboard wheels,

drastically reducing braking power.

- They had room to spare.

- With a tailwind of 15 knots and two working brakes,

the plane could have stopped.

(sighs) - What are we missing?

- Let's look at the FDR data.

Hold on a sec.

Just after touch down, there's an anti-skid fault caution.

(narration): This supports investigators' earlier suspicions

that an anti-skid failure played a part in the accident.

- Hang on. I'm sliding.

- We gotta get to the bottom of that warning.

(sighs)

- In this case, we did have a fault

on the flight data recorder

related to this system that we couldn't explain.

And so with that information, uh,

we needed to do a deeper dive in a lab.

- No issues with the control unit, wheel sensors.

Same with the control valves.

- We tested all the components of the anti-skid system.

There were no significant faults.

So it was a mystery.

- There's still the cables that connect the components.

(narration): Investigators focus on the wires that carry signals from the wheels.

- Right here.

Let's take a look at the wiring.

(narration): They request that the cables be removed from the left landing gear

as that was the side that locked.

- Hey, there.

Can we get those wire harnesses sent up to the lab?

- When the airplane departed the runway,

it hit a ditch and some larger boulders,

and it collapsed the left main gear,

which caused the wiring to fracture.

- These are pretty beat up.

(narration): Investigators examine where the cables were connected to the wheels.

- These are identical.

I can't tell the left one from the right.

(narration): The team discovers a potential design flaw

within the anti-skid system.

- The connectors at the wheels didn't have any distinguishing features,

so this created a potential for mis-wiring.

(narration): Could the brake cables have been connected to the wrong wheels?

Investigators examine the wires inside the cables.

- Normally we're able to open up a wiring bundle

and look at the wire numbers on the wires

and compare it to an electrical diagram

and determine if it's connected properly.

- There's no numbering on these wires.

- We found the wires were so small,

the manufacturer didn't put wire numbers on them,

so we were concerned about not being able

to determine if they were correctly connected.

(narration): There should be three wires inside the anti-skid cables.

- So we got three here.

(narration): Then investigators notice something out of the ordinary...

- There's four wires here.

There's an extra wire on the top half of this cable.

(narration): The wiring inside the top and bottom half of the outboard cable doesn't match.

- There's four on each of these.

(narration): The top outboard cable and the bottom inboard cable

each had an extra wire, which means only one thing...

- They're crossed.

No wonder the anti-skid system failed.

(narration): When the left outboard wheel began to skid,

the anti-skid system mistakenly released pressure to the inboard brakes.

As a result, the skid continued

and the left outboard tire burst.

- That was really the "ah-hah" moment.

When you have crossed wires,

the airplane is then dumping the brake pressure

to the two perfectly good wheels

and allowing the other tire to skid.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

(narration): Without braking power

to the two inboard wheels

and a blown left outboard tire,

the pilots had a massively reduced ability to brake.

- You're reducing the effective braking capacity by 75%

and now, only the right outward tire is providing braking.

- The cables have to go through the entire landing gear.

(narration): How did maintenance workers mistakenly cross the wires of the braking system,

leaving the pilots of PenAir flight 32-96

with only one of four main landing gear brakes to stop their plane?

- See? It's not a straight line.

And the wheel attachments are identical.

- So imagine trying to feed two wires

through a small hole at the base of the landing gear.

How do you know which one went to the left,

and which one went to the right?

It would just be so easy to confuse the two.

- How long could these have been crossed?

- According to the records,

there was a full overhaul of the left main landing gear.

- When?

- January, 2017 .

(narration): The wires were crossed two and a half years prior to the accident.

- We found out that the aircraft had been sitting,

uh, for a couple of years in overhaul.

And there wasn't any sort of procedure

to check to see if there was any cross-wiring.

- So how many flights did it make once it was back in service?

- About 500.

(narration): They learn that the misrouted anti-skid wiring

went undetected for nearly four months.

- So why did 500 flights manage to stop but not these guys?

- Maybe the malfunction was happening just on a smaller scale.

- The balding tire.

(narration): Was the worn left outboard tire

an indication of the malfunctioning anti-skid system?

- We suspected that there were events of skidding,

but the difficult thing is

you would have to skid more than a second and a half

for the airplane to display a fault

that the system was malfunctioning.

- So this could have been happening gradually

with repeated small skids creating the bald spot on the tire.

- Yeah. But when they landed at that speed with that tailwind,

they braked longer and harder than in previous flights.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- That's really the insidious nature of this fault.

You're not gonna find out about this cross-wiring until you really need it

when you're slammin' on the brakes.

(brakes screeching)

- Hang on. I'm sliding.

(narration): With the hidden anti-skid fault,

investigators conclude

the pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

could not have stopped their plane on runway one three.

- There's one thing I'm curious about.

Could they have stopped if they landed into the wind on runway three one instead?

- It's possible.

- Their landing speeds would have been slower

and the drag caused by the extra wind

would have stopped it in time.

- Then why did they choose runway one three in the tailwind?

(narration): Did the pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

ignore crucial information about the wind

and execute a risky landing?

- The decision to land on runway one three

with the reported tailwind was an inappropriate decision.

This was an experienced crew

and we weren't sure what exactly had happened.

(narration): Investigators turn to the cockpit voice recorder for answers.

- Pull up from the go-around onward.

(Captain): What do you think? - Go around.

(Captain): Max power.

- Dutch Harbor traffic, Peninsula 32-96 going around.

We're gonna come back around for a visual.

- Yeah, we're just gonna get outta here,

do a one-eighty and come back in.

- Roger. Alright.

You're at a thousand feet.

- Pause for a second.

So the Captain says that he's doing a 180,

which would line him up with three one.

But that's not what he does.

He takes a sweeping 360-degree turn around the mountain to one three.

Why?

- We're at twelve hundred coming back around for a one...

uh, for a visual one three.

- Three one.

Three one.

- Three one? I thought we were doing one three.

- Uh, okay.

Sure.

We'll try it again.

- Stop the tape.

So the Captain wants to go to three one

but the first officer questions it.

- There was a back and forth between the captain and first officer

in terms of which runway to use.

I would categorize the captain's leadership as poor.

- Okay. Get a wind check from her again.

(narration): As the crew finalizes the second approach,

the Captain stays on top of the wind reports.

- Dutch Weather, thirty-two ninety-six, another wind check.

(weather observer): Right now,

midfield winds at three zero zero

at twenty-four knots.

- Oh, God.

(Captain): Ah crap.

- Stop the tape.

It sounds like they're not happy with that tailwind.

- And yet they kept going.

(narration): The CVR raises questions

about the captain's report of a crosswind.

- They were surprised of the wind direction and speed,

but the interesting thing is that

they were aware of the tailwind limitation

for that particular aircraft

but they continued on with the decision to land.

- Try it again?

(Captain): Keep talking to weather.

(narration): Why would the pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

decide to land with a tailwind

on a short runway in Dutch Harbor, Alaska?

- 24 knots.

- Aright, we'll try it again.

- Alright. Last try. - Rog'.

- It's like the Captain's just going along with what his First Officer is saying.

He needs to take on more leadership.

(narration): The Captain suspected 3-1 was the better option

but he never stated his preference.

- The captain's capitulation to land on one three

does show ineffective leadership

and that he did not fully evaluate

the circumstances at hand

in order to make an objective decision.

- Maybe he was fixated on landing.

(narration): Instead of communicating their options,

they continue their approach.

- Give me speed. - Plus 15.

(narration): Investigators conclude the pilots' decision to land on runway one three

was intentional and inappropriate.

- By making that decision,

they put themselves at risk,

but they also put the passengers at risk.

- Crossed wires, tailwind,

some poor leadership; it all added up.

- And very little margin for error at such a tricky airport.

(narration): The pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

defend their decision to land on runway one three.

- We're at twelve hundred comin' back around for a one...

a visual one three.

- Three one.

Three one.

- Three one? I thought we were doin' one three.

- Uh, okay, sure.

We'll try again.

(narration): After the first landing attempt,

the Captain claims his first officer saw no change in wind conditions on the runway.

- He called my attention to it.

So I looked again to evaluate the situation.

He was correct. It was a crosswind.

- If the conditions hadn't changed,

I didn't see a reason to change the plan.

- Dutch Weather, thirty-two ninety-six, another wind check.

- Right now midfield winds at three zero zero at twenty-four knots.

- Oh God. - Oh crap.

- What we were seeing

was not what she was, uh, reporting at that point in time.

Those winds were clearly a crosswind.

- We could see the whitecaps

and then the windsock itself was showing a crosswind.

(narration): Commercial pilot and passenger Steve Ranney

saw something different.

- I saw a direct tailwind twenty to thirty knots.

As a commercial pilot that is something that I would not have attempted.

- When you get conflicting information from what you're seeing,

that is a tough call for a pilot.

- Down. - Okay, you got the yolk.

- I got it. Yeah. We're down there. 80 knots.

(narration): When the brakes malfunction,

the Captain is unable to slow the plane.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- We had no braking power at all.

If we had one operational brake still,

it would have locked up and blown as well.

- This particular aircraft didn't have an emergency brake.

So in the event that the main system failed,

there was no way to bring this aircraft to a braked stop.

(brakes screeching) - Hang on. I'm sliding.

(narration): Quick thinking in turning the plane towards a road

avoids a full plunge into Dutch Harbor.

- Go right! Go right!

- The key to not going into the water

was our decision to land on one three.

We had the perimeter road.

There was a lot more room on the one three side.

(narration): Tragically, fragments of the left propeller

ripped through the fuselage, killing a passenger.

- You never wanna lose a passenger for any reason.

Um...

that... that's been very hard for me.

(narration): Investigators conclude the probable cause of the accident

is incorrect wiring of the anti-skid system.

Contributing to the accident

is the pilots' inappropriate decision

to land on a runway with a powerful reported tailwind.

- That troubles me,

because are we supposed to just blindly rely on our weather observers,

or are we supposed to make a decision as the pilots

on what the best course of action is, based on what we see?

(narration): Saab released a service bulletin

advising operators to inspect the anti-skid system

for crossed wiring.

- You know you can't afford for human error

to be allowed in connecting wires.

That's a very basic thing,

especially on a critical safety system such as the brakes.

(narration): For Steve Ranney,

the ordeal changed his attitude about flying.

- It took quite a while for myself

to be comfortable again.

But we live in a place where we have to fly.

There's no choices about it.

I would hope that there are lessons here

as far as weather, and maintenance

that can keep accidents like this from happening again.