All language subtitles for M.2003-S24E07-Disaster.at.Dutch.Harbor.PenAir.Flight.3296.WEBDL-1080pEAC3.5.1h264-NOGRP_track3_[eng]

(narration): While landing
at Dutch Harbor, Alaska...

- Hang on. I'm sliding.
(alarm ringing

(narration): The pilots
of PenAir Flight 32-96
run out of runway.

- All I could see is water.

- Everyone brace!

- We're gonna go in.

(narration):
Not everyone
makes it out alive.

- You never wanna lose
a passenger for any reason.

- It's pretty beat up.

(narration):
NTSB investigators must
piece together the evidence.

- We've got a dark,
170-foot-long skid mark.

- So the tire blew.

- We needed
to do a deeper dive.

(narration): They soon discover
a critical oversight.

- There's no numbering
on these wires.

- That was really
the "ah-hah" moment.

(theme music)
- Mayday, mayday!

(indistinct radio chatter)

(narration): PenAir
Flight 32-96 cruises over
Alaska's Aleutian islands.

- We should be getting
directions here to descend soon.

I'm gonna see
if I can't get the weather.

- Yeah, it's changed.

The weather's been updated.

It's three one zero
at one one knots.

(narration): 56-year-old
Captain Paul Wells

is a new hire to PenAir

but has 25 years of experience
with other airlines.

- Okay.

- Paul is an amazing guy.

I flew with him several times.

He was a true decision-maker
as a captain.

(Anchorage): Peninsula 32-96
descend pilot's discretion.

Maintain flight level
two niner zero.

- Pilot's discretion
two niner zero Peninsula 32-96.

(narration): 39-year-old
first officer Justin Lunn

has been with PenAir
for five months.

- I couldn't have been
with a better co-pilot.

He was a very thorough
individual, uh, ex-military.

(narration):
There are 39 passengers
on today's flight,

including a high school
swim team and their chaperones.

Commercial pilot Steve Ranney
is escorting his son, Jacob.

- We were on the flight,
um, to go to a swim meet.

We'd worked really hard
raising the money for the trip.

It was a big deal.

(narration): It's a two-hour
flight

from Anchorage
to Unalaska airport -

also known as Dutch Harbor.

The journey crosses some
of the most rugged and isolated
terrain in the world.

- The flight is over
a spectacular part of Alaska.

The entire Alaska Peninsula
is in view.

- That's a great view.

Go grab a window seat
further back.

- My son did move
to a couple rows back

so that he could get
that view too.

(narration): The pilots are
flying a Swedish-made Saab 2000.

- The Saab 2000 is
a twin-engine turbo
jet aircraft.

It seats approximately
fifty people.

It's a good aircraft
for reaching remote communities
in Alaska.

- Dutch Ops thirty-two
ninety-six.

(narration): 30 minutes
before landing,

the first officer contacts
the weather observer

at Unalaska Airport
for the latest conditions.

- Hello, 32-96.

Right now winds two one zero

at six knots
gusting to fourteen.

Temperature 8.
Dewpoint one.

Altimeter two niner five zero.

- Alright.
Copy the weather.

(narration): The airport
at Dutch Harbor has
a short runway,

vulnerable to severe
and unpredictable weather.

Pilots need special training
to land here.

- The terrain around
the area in Dutch Harbor
is mountainous.

The wind conditions
can change in seconds.

Turbulence can be bad;
icing can be bad.

So we have dedicated
weather observers.

That is invaluable.

- What did she say the wind was?

- Wind was two one zero.

- Pretty much
a direct crosswind.

- Mm-hmm.

- I guess we can go ahead
and start heading down.

- Alright.

(Anchorage): Peninsula 32-96,

are you planning
on runway three one?

(narration):
20 minutes before landing,

Anchorage Air Traffic Control
asks the pilots
about their runway preference.

- Affirmative...
uh, negative.

We want the R-NAV one three.

Peninsula 32-96.

(narration): Unalaska airport
is on an island,

tucked behind
a 1600-foot mountain.

Planes can land
in either direction:

runway one three from the west

or runway three one
from the east.

- Most pilots would prefer
to use runway one three,

basically, because they have
more room to maneuver,

more room to escape
if you gotta punch out
or you gotta go around.

- Just like the other day
if there's any major changes
in the wind, we'll just...

- We'll switch.

- We always prepared for the
worst and hoped for the best.

Minimize risk,
that's what we do.

(PA): Ladies and gentlemen,
in order to...

(narration):
Twelve miles from the airport,
passengers prepare for landing.

(PA): ...beneath
the seat in front of you.

- Alright.

Flaps twenty.
Flight attendant is secure.

Flaps set twenty.

Indicating twenty.

Gear down.

(narration): Four minutes
from the airport,

the crew begins
the landing procedure.

- Down three green.

(narration):
At less than a thousand feet...

the plane is rocked
by turbulence.

- Ah, bump.

There's a bit of a bump
there too.

- Yeah.

- Yeah, there you go.

- It's gonna be ugly
in here, isn't it?

- Paul was fighting the winds
as we were coming in.

(narration):
Seconds from touchdown,

Captain Wells notices he's
too high for a safe landing.

- An updraft may cause you
to balloon

and that causes you
to go high.

- What do you think?

- Go around.

- At Dutch Harbor,
I don't take chances.

If we're high,
we're going around.

- Max power.

(tense music)

- I would not have been able
to safely get back down

without putting people
at horrible risk.

- The pilot pulled up
and went around.

I was assuming it was
because of visibility issues.

- Dutch Harbor Traffic,
Peninsula 32-96 going around.

We're gonna come back around
for a visual.

- We were contending
with terrain,

a lower layer of clouds

and maintaining a safe airspeed.

You're very busy scanning inside
and outside of the airplane.

(narration): It only takes
three minutes before the pilots
of PenAir Flight 32-96

are ready to attempt
another landing.

- If we couldn't land
on this attempt, then we would
go to our alternate airport.

(automation): Two hundred.

- Plus ten. You got it?
- Got it.

(narration): The pilots are
seconds from touching down.

(automation): Sink rate.
- I know.

- It seemed like we floated down
the runway quite a bit,

which didn't alarm me too much.

(tires screeching)

- Down.

- Okay.
You got the yoke.

- I got it. Yeah. We're down
there. Eighty knots.

(narration): As the Captain
begins slowing the plane...

(alarm ringing)

...something isn't right.

- I was pushing on the brakes
harder

and noticing that

I'm not getting any more effect
from the brakes.

- When I saw the wind sock,
the wind was definitely strong.

And at that point,

all alarm bells went off in me.

- Brakes.

- I got 'em all the way down.

(narration): The pilots cannot
reduce their plane's speed.

- I had to make a decision
on whether to continue
the landing or abort.

In an instant, I realized that,

no, there's not enough room to
get the aircraft airborne again.

(narration): In the cabin,
Steve Ranney notices it too.

- Brace!

Everyone brace!

- I actually went
in the brace position.

And I told the passengers
around me to brace.

- Aah... hang on.

I'm sliding.
(alarm ringing)

(narration): The plane is
swerving back and forth.

- I thought I was gonna be able
to turn off into the taxi area

but I was going too fast.

(narration): The pilots
are running out of runway.

- All I could see is water.

(narration): The pilots of
PenAir Flight 32-96 are unable
to stop their airplane.

- I saw the perimeter road
and I told Paul...

- Go right. Go right!

- The only option was the road.

(narration): The plane crashes
through a fence,

strikes a boulder and
is propelled towards the water.

- It destroyed our exit plan.

(narration): They have only
a few seconds to stop.

- And all I could think of was,
"We're gonna go in."

(narration): The left engine
strikes a signal post
and road sign,

shattering the propellers
into deadly fragments.

(panting)

- Holy crap.

(exhales)
- We need to evacuate.

- Evacuate right hand side.

Get out and get away.

(narration): In the cabin,
it's eerily quiet.

- I could feel blood
running down my face.

And my shoulder was sore
and my head hurt.

It was very, very surreal.

(narration): A propeller blade

has pierced the cabin
and struck Steve Ranney.

- There was a propeller blade
stuck up in the ceiling
right up against me.

- Jacob, get off the plane,
don't wait for me.

(narration): Steve's son Jacob
is lucky to walk away
from the accident unharmed.

- He would not have survived
in the seat next to me,

because the blade
was literally right there.

(narration): But a passenger
near him is severely injured.

- I had had a fair amount
of training because of my job.

And so it was more or less
an automatic reflex to go over

and, you know,
check for his pulse,
see if he's still breathing.

(sirens wailing)

(narration): Within minutes,
emergency responders arrive

and transport 10 injured
passengers to hospital.

38-year-old passenger
David Oltman
later succumbs to his injuries.

In 10 years,
he's one of only two people

to be killed on a domestic
flight in the United States.

- I was met in the hospital
by a doctor,

they told me
he hadn't made it.

And that was a...
a crushing blow.

(narration): Investigators
from the NTSB,

the National Transportation
Safety Board are dispatched
to the area

as the plane is
hoisted onto a barge

and taken
to a secure location.

- We weren't able to offload it
the next day
because of the weather.

So it took a day
to get the airplane secured.

- We're on record at 5:46 p.m.

(narration): Investigators are
eager to interview the pilot.

- Memories tend to fade
and they tend to change,

so we want to get to the
information as soon as possible.

- I didn't even have any sleep
before I showed up
for that interview.

And so you're not, you know,
you're not a hundred percent
clear.

- Okay.

Take us through the events
leading up to the accident.

- Um...

everything was normal.

Just a nice flight.

- Everything was going fine
until it wasn't.

And this is pretty common
when we talk to pilots
after accidents.

- When I went to turn off
the anti-ice,

I got out of position on final.

(narration): Captain Wells
explains that the plane was hit
by an updraft

just as he took
his eyes off the gauges.

- What do you think?
- Go around.

- Max power.

- We were too high.

And instead of doing a
destabilized approach

and continue to the runway,

we elected to go around.

- So you're now set-up
for a second landing?

Do you remember your speed
at touchdown?

- One twenty-six.

- And where did you touch down?

- I planted it pretty much
on the thousand,

right on the touchdown zone.

Put it in reverse.

And then I noticed
that it stopped decelerating.

I pushed down
as hard as I could.

But there was no response
from the brakes.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- No response?

- Exactly.
Zero braking.

Like on ice.

- That was puzzling.

We knew we had to look
at the braking system

to understand
what was occurring there.

- Did you get an update
from the weather observer?

- Yes. They said...

anywhere from 10 to 20 knots.

The winds were changing.

- Any concerns at all
on the second approach?

- The winds were dying down
on the water.

It looked like
a direct crosswind.

I...

had no doubt that this was
gonna be a fine approach.

- The captain said that he
believed that they were flying
into a crosswind

and was confident
in that approach.

- Your FO did the pre-flight
on the aircraft?

- He did.

- Did he bring anything
to your attention at all

that was out of the ordinary?

- He did actually.

He noticed something
with one of the tires.

- Pre-flight inspection
complete.

- Any issues?

- A bald spot
on the left outboard.

(narration): Investigators
learn that a pre-flight
inspection of flight 32-96

revealed a worn tire
on the left outboard wheel.

- It's not showing any cord.

I'm not worried about it.

- It was not down
past the red line on the tire

and didn't, to me,
appear to be of any concern.

- I've had maintenance come
to look at tires

that are in very similar
conditions to this tire.

They've basically said
it's within serviceable limits

and you can continue
your flight.

- Have you reached any
conclusion,

just in your own head,

about what you think went wrong
or may have happened?

- If I had to make
my best guess,

I don't think
it was brake failure.

I think more than likely,

it was one of those showers
that put down some sleet or hail
on the runway,

and I just couldn't see it.

That's the only thing
I can think of.

- Anything else
you'd like to add?

- I can't be more proud...

I'm sorry.

- Take your time.

- I couldn't be more proud
of my crew.

- The captain did get
rather emotional

given his involvement
in the accident.

- So they came in
on runway one three,

and the pilot said his airspeed
was 126 knots

and they touched down
at the 1000-foot mark.

(narration): Why did Flight
32-96 come off the runway?

- At that speed they should
have been able to stop

well before
the end of the runway.

- Specifically
for runway overruns,

we're looking at how
the airplane was configured,

what those runway lengths were,

as well as what it takes
operationally

to fly that airplane
into that airport.

- What were the runway
conditions?

- Was there rain, ice, snow,

anything on that runway

that would have prevented
the airplane

from stopping on its surface?

- No rain.

7 degrees.

- So hydroplaning is
out of the question.

- Too warm for ice to form.

(narration): Investigators
eliminate the captain's theory.

Weather conditions did not make
the runway slippery.

- In this case the runway
wasn't contaminated

but there was plenty
of information that the runway
can tell us.

- What about debris? Skid marks?

Where are we at
with the runway survey?

- I got it here.

(narration): The team looks
for any evidence
left behind on the runway.

- The runway evidence
was critical.

We walked the runway
numerous times.

We documented
the heck out of the runway.

- Starting at 1,835 feet
past the threshold,

we've got a dark, 170-foot-long
skid mark,

then there's further skidding
down the runway.

(narration): Skid marks
on the tarmac are made
when the wheels lock.

- And then the plane crosses
the centerline to the right,

and then straightens out.

Which tire skidded?

- Based on the position
of the skid mark,

it's the outboard tire,
left side.

(narration): The Saab 2000
has four main wheels that brake.

Why would only one of them skid?

- Wasn't that the one
with the bald spot?

- Yup.

- The tire mark was
a continuous black mark.

It didn't have any tread marks
on it,

so we knew right off the bat

that the tire was skidding
on the bald spot

and not on the tread.

- We also found
tire fragments...

here.

- So the tire blew?
- Yeah.

- Hold on.

That's one heck of a long skid.

Even a brand new tire
would have blown.

- The fact that the airplane
was skidding on the bald spot

may have caused it to burst
a fraction of a second earlier,

but in the end,
it wasn't a contributing factor.

- This shouldn't happen.

The plane has
an anti-skid system.

(narration): The anti-skid
system is activated

when one of the sensors
on the main wheels
detects a skid.

The brake pressure is released

either on both inboard wheels
or both outboard wheels,

ensuring the plane
remains stable

while allowing the other
two wheels to slow the plane.

- After we first noticed
that there was a flat spot
and a hole in the tire,

we were immediately drawn
to the anti-skid system

because that's the purpose
of the anti-skid system,
to stop skids.

(narration): Did the system
fail, causing Flight 32-96
to run off the runway?

- Any news?

- It's gonna take some time
for the technicians

to breakdown and test
those brakes.

- Like you said,
that is a long skid.

Why would they need
to brake so hard for so long?

(narration): In the meantime,
investigators consider
other theories

about the long skid marks.

- Overweight?

(narration): Could the plane
have exceeded

its maximum allowable
landing weight,

requiring the pilot
to brake harder than usual?

- A heavier airplane essentially
has more inertia,

so when a heavier airplane
comes in to land,

it would take longer to stop.

- According to the manifest,

the Captain calculated their
landing weight at 45,213 pounds.

- And the maximum allowable?

- 46,114.

- 900 pounds under.

Close but within the limits.

- The airplane was
not overloaded,

and we could rule out
an overweight airplane

as a contributing factor
for this event.

(narration): What else might
cause a pilot to brake so hard?

- The captain said
that they had a crosswind,

but maybe the direction changed
to a tailwind.

- A tailwind during landing
essentially means

that you are moving faster
over the ground

than you normally would
so you would take up more space
on the runway to safely stop.

- The automated weather system
only gives hourly reports.

Real-time updates come from a
weather observer at the airport.

- I'll deal with that.

- I'll go help
with the anti-skid system.

(narration): Could Flight 32-96
have been hit

by an unexpected gust of wind

causing it to land too fast
and overshoot the runway?

- Thanks for coming in.
- You bet.

(narration): Investigators
question the onsite
weather observer

at Unalaska Airport

about the wind conditions
when PenAir Flight 32-96 landed.

- So first, um,

how early do you start providing
crews with weather data?

- About 20 to 30 minutes out.

- And up until when?

- Two to three miles out.

- Dutch Harbor
is a very unique airport.

The topography around the runway

actually leads to very rapidly
changing weather conditions,

and so a weather observer
on the ground

provides the ability
to get updated information
to pilots

as it's happening.

- And what was the weather like
at the airport
when PenAir was on approach?

- Oh, there was a storm coming
in but at the time it was clear.

- And what about the wind
on the first attempt?

- Uh, two seven zero degrees
at 10 knots.

- It looks like a crosswind.

And the second attempt?

About three minutes out,

the wind had shifted around
to two nine zero at 16 knots,

gusting to 30 knots.

- Thirty knot tailwind?
- Mm-hmm.

- That would be
an excessive tailwind.

If a pilot decides to land
with that tailwind,

they essentially become
a test pilot.

- What about when they landed?
What was the tailwind then?

- The winds were 15 knots.

(narration): Investigators
confirm their suspicions
about a tailwind on landing.

- Thank you for your time.
- My pleasure.

- One danger associated
with landing in a tailwind

is excessive groundspeed

which potentially puts you
in a situation

where you run out of runway
to safely stop the airplane.

- What's the Saab 2000
max tailwind for landing?

(narration): Was a 15-knot
tailwind too much
for the Saab to manage?

- 15 knots.

- Right at the limit.

Why would they risk it?

- Down.

Okay.
You got the yoke.

- I got it. Yeah.
We're down there.

(narration): Investigators
now know the pilots
of PenAir 32-96

approached a difficult airport
in tricky conditions,

touching down with a tailwind
nearing the plane's limits.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- Okay.

Weight roughly 45,000 pounds.

Speed at touchdown: 126 knots.

(narration): Investigators
calculate how a 15-knot tailwind

affects the pilots'
ability to stop.

- Our aircraft performance group
developed several scenarios

to understand whether an
aircraft would be able to stop,

given those circumstances.

- Tailwind, 15 knots.
Flaps 20...

And let's do a loss
of half the braking power
because of the skid.

(narration): When the left
outboard tire began to skid,

the Saab's anti-skid system
would have released brake
pressure

to both outboard wheels,

drastically
reducing braking power.

- They had room to spare.

- With a tailwind of 15 knots
and two working brakes,

the plane could have stopped.

(sighs)
- What are we missing?

- Let's look at the FDR data.

Hold on a sec.

Just after touch down, there's
an anti-skid fault caution.

(narration): This supports
investigators' earlier
suspicions

that an anti-skid failure
played a part in the accident.

- Hang on.
I'm sliding.

- We gotta get to the bottom
of that warning.

(sighs)

- In this case,
we did have a fault

on the flight data recorder

related to this system
that we couldn't explain.

And so with that information,
uh,

we needed to do a deeper dive
in a lab.

- No issues with the control
unit, wheel sensors.

Same with the control valves.

- We tested all the components
of the anti-skid system.

There were no significant
faults.

So it was a mystery.

- There's still the cables
that connect the components.

(narration): Investigators
focus on the wires that carry
signals from the wheels.

- Right here.

Let's take a look at the wiring.

(narration): They request
that the cables be removed
from the left landing gear

as that was the side
that locked.

- Hey, there.

Can we get those wire harnesses
sent up to the lab?

- When the airplane departed
the runway,

it hit a ditch
and some larger boulders,

and it collapsed
the left main gear,

which caused the wiring
to fracture.

- These are pretty beat up.

(narration): Investigators
examine where the cables
were connected to the wheels.

- These are identical.

I can't tell the left one
from the right.

(narration): The team discovers
a potential design flaw

within the anti-skid system.

- The connectors at the wheels
didn't have any distinguishing
features,

so this created a potential
for mis-wiring.

(narration): Could the brake
cables have been connected
to the wrong wheels?

Investigators examine
the wires inside the cables.

- Normally we're able to open up
a wiring bundle

and look at the wire numbers
on the wires

and compare it
to an electrical diagram

and determine
if it's connected properly.

- There's no numbering
on these wires.

- We found the wires
were so small,

the manufacturer didn't put
wire numbers on them,

so we were concerned
about not being able

to determine if they were
correctly connected.

(narration): There should be
three wires inside
the anti-skid cables.

- So we got three here.

(narration): Then investigators
notice something
out of the ordinary...

- There's four wires here.

There's an extra wire
on the top half of this cable.

(narration): The wiring inside
the top and bottom half of the
outboard cable doesn't match.

- There's four on each of these.

(narration): The top outboard
cable and the bottom inboard
cable

each had an extra wire,
which means only one thing...

- They're crossed.

No wonder the anti-skid
system failed.

(narration): When the left
outboard wheel began to skid,

the anti-skid system mistakenly
released pressure
to the inboard brakes.

As a result, the skid continued

and the left outboard tire
burst.

- That was really
the "ah-hah" moment.

When you have crossed wires,

the airplane is then
dumping the brake pressure

to the two perfectly good wheels

and allowing
the other tire to skid.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

(narration):
Without braking power

to the two inboard wheels

and a blown left outboard tire,

the pilots had a massively
reduced ability to brake.

- You're reducing the effective
braking capacity by 75%

and now, only the right outward
tire is providing braking.

- The cables have to go through
the entire landing gear.

(narration): How did maintenance
workers mistakenly cross the
wires of the braking system,

leaving the pilots of PenAir
flight 32-96

with only one of four
main landing gear brakes
to stop their plane?

- See?
It's not a straight line.

And the wheel attachments
are identical.

- So imagine trying
to feed two wires

through a small hole
at the base of the landing gear.

How do you know
which one went to the left,

and which one went to the right?

It would just be so easy
to confuse the two.

- How long could these
have been crossed?

- According to the records,

there was a full overhaul
of the left main landing gear.

- When?

- January, 2017 .

(narration): The wires were
crossed two and a half years
prior to the accident.

- We found out that the aircraft
had been sitting,

uh, for a couple of years
in overhaul.

And there wasn't any
sort of procedure

to check to see
if there was any cross-wiring.

- So how many flights
did it make
once it was back in service?

- About 500.

(narration): They learn that
the misrouted anti-skid wiring

went undetected
for nearly four months.

- So why did 500 flights manage
to stop but not these guys?

- Maybe the malfunction
was happening
just on a smaller scale.

- The balding tire.

(narration): Was the worn
left outboard tire

an indication of the
malfunctioning anti-skid system?

- We suspected that there were
events of skidding,

but the difficult thing is

you would have to skid
more than a second and a half

for the airplane to display
a fault

that the system was
malfunctioning.

- So this could have been
happening gradually

with repeated small skids
creating the bald spot
on the tire.

- Yeah. But when they landed at
that speed with that tailwind,

they braked longer and harder
than in previous flights.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- That's really the insidious
nature of this fault.

You're not gonna find out
about this cross-wiring
until you really need it

when you're slammin' on
the brakes.

(brakes screeching)

- Hang on.
I'm sliding.

(narration): With the hidden
anti-skid fault,

investigators conclude

the pilots of
PenAir Flight 32-96

could not have stopped
their plane on runway one three.

- There's one thing
I'm curious about.

Could they have stopped
if they landed into the wind
on runway three one instead?

- It's possible.

- Their landing speeds
would have been slower

and the drag
caused by the extra wind

would have stopped it in time.

- Then why did they choose
runway one three
in the tailwind?

(narration): Did the pilots
of PenAir Flight 32-96

ignore crucial information
about the wind

and execute a risky landing?

- The decision to land
on runway one three

with the reported tailwind
was an inappropriate decision.

This was an experienced crew

and we weren't sure
what exactly had happened.

(narration): Investigators
turn to the cockpit
voice recorder for answers.

- Pull up from the
go-around onward.

(Captain): What do you think?
- Go around.

(Captain): Max power.

- Dutch Harbor traffic,
Peninsula 32-96 going around.

We're gonna come back
around for a visual.

- Yeah, we're just gonna
get outta here,

do a one-eighty
and come back in.

- Roger.
Alright.

You're at a thousand feet.

- Pause for a second.

So the Captain says
that he's doing a 180,

which would line him up
with three one.

But that's not what he does.

He takes a sweeping 360-degree
turn around the mountain
to one three.

Why?

- We're at twelve hundred
coming back around for a one...

uh, for a visual one three.

- Three one.

Three one.

- Three one? I thought
we were doing one three.

- Uh, okay.

Sure.

We'll try it again.

- Stop the tape.

So the Captain wants to go
to three one

but the first officer
questions it.

- There was a back and forth
between the captain
and first officer

in terms
of which runway to use.

I would categorize the captain's
leadership as poor.

- Okay.
Get a wind check from her again.

(narration): As the crew
finalizes the second approach,

the Captain stays
on top of the wind reports.

- Dutch Weather, thirty-two
ninety-six, another wind check.

(weather observer): Right now,

midfield winds
at three zero zero

at twenty-four knots.

- Oh, God.

(Captain): Ah crap.

- Stop the tape.

It sounds like they're not happy
with that tailwind.

- And yet they kept going.

(narration):
The CVR raises questions

about the captain's report
of a crosswind.

- They were surprised
of the wind direction and speed,

but the interesting thing
is that

they were aware of the tailwind
limitation

for that particular aircraft

but they continued on
with the decision to land.

- Try it again?

(Captain): Keep talking
to weather.

(narration): Why would the
pilots of PenAir Flight 32-96

decide to land with a tailwind

on a short runway
in Dutch Harbor, Alaska?

- 24 knots.

- Aright, we'll try it again.

- Alright. Last try.
- Rog'.

- It's like the Captain's
just going along with what
his First Officer is saying.

He needs to take on
more leadership.

(narration): The Captain
suspected 3-1 was
the better option

but he never stated
his preference.

- The captain's capitulation
to land on one three

does show ineffective leadership

and that he did not fully
evaluate

the circumstances at hand

in order to make
an objective decision.

- Maybe he was fixated
on landing.

(narration): Instead
of communicating their options,

they continue their approach.

- Give me speed.
- Plus 15.

(narration): Investigators
conclude the pilots' decision
to land on runway one three

was intentional
and inappropriate.

- By making that decision,

they put themselves at risk,

but they also put
the passengers at risk.

- Crossed wires, tailwind,

some poor leadership;
it all added up.

- And very little margin for
error at such a tricky airport.

(narration): The pilots
of PenAir Flight 32-96

defend their decision
to land on runway one three.

- We're at twelve hundred
comin' back around for a one...

a visual one three.

- Three one.

Three one.

- Three one? I thought
we were doin' one three.

- Uh, okay, sure.

We'll try again.

(narration): After the first
landing attempt,

the Captain claims his first
officer saw no change in wind
conditions on the runway.

- He called my attention to it.

So I looked again
to evaluate the situation.

He was correct.
It was a crosswind.

- If the conditions
hadn't changed,

I didn't see a reason
to change the plan.

- Dutch Weather, thirty-two
ninety-six, another wind check.

- Right now midfield winds
at three zero zero
at twenty-four knots.

- Oh God.
- Oh crap.

- What we were seeing

was not what she was, uh,
reporting at that point in time.

Those winds were clearly
a crosswind.

- We could see the whitecaps

and then the windsock itself
was showing a crosswind.

(narration): Commercial pilot
and passenger Steve Ranney

saw something different.

- I saw a direct tailwind
twenty to thirty knots.

As a commercial pilot
that is something
that I would not have attempted.

- When you get conflicting
information
from what you're seeing,

that is a tough call
for a pilot.

- Down.
- Okay, you got the yolk.

- I got it. Yeah.
We're down there. 80 knots.

(narration):
When the brakes malfunction,

the Captain is unable
to slow the plane.

- Brakes!

- I got 'em all the way down.

- We had no braking power
at all.

If we had one operational brake
still,

it would have locked up
and blown as well.

- This particular aircraft
didn't have an emergency brake.

So in the event that the main
system failed,

there was no way to bring
this aircraft to a braked stop.

(brakes screeching)
- Hang on. I'm sliding.

(narration): Quick thinking
in turning the plane
towards a road

avoids a full plunge
into Dutch Harbor.

- Go right!
Go right!

- The key to not going
into the water

was our decision to land
on one three.

We had the perimeter road.

There was a lot more room
on the one three side.

(narration): Tragically,
fragments of the left propeller

ripped through the fuselage,
killing a passenger.

- You never wanna lose
a passenger for any reason.

Um...

that... that's been very hard
for me.

(narration): Investigators
conclude the probable cause
of the accident

is incorrect wiring
of the anti-skid system.

Contributing to the accident

is the pilots' inappropriate
decision

to land on a runway with
a powerful reported tailwind.

- That troubles me,

because are we supposed
to just blindly rely
on our weather observers,

or are we supposed to make
a decision as the pilots

on what the best course of
action is, based on what we see?

(narration): Saab released
a service bulletin

advising operators
to inspect the anti-skid system

for crossed wiring.

- You know you can't afford
for human error

to be allowed
in connecting wires.

That's a very basic thing,

especially on a critical safety
system such as the brakes.

(narration): For Steve Ranney,

the ordeal changed
his attitude about flying.

- It took quite a while
for myself

to be comfortable again.

But we live in a place
where we have to fly.

There's no choices about it.

I would hope that
there are lessons here

as far as weather,
and maintenance

that can keep accidents like
this from happening again.