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1
00:00:00,082 --> 00:00:01,334
- Rotate.
2
00:00:05,797 --> 00:00:09,134
(narrator): Just seconds after
takeoff from Addis Ababa...
3
00:00:09,259 --> 00:00:10,552
- Gear up.
4
00:00:10,718 --> 00:00:13,762
- ...the pilots of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302
5
00:00:13,887 --> 00:00:15,265
are faced with an emergency.
6
00:00:15,390 --> 00:00:17,850
- Master caution, anti-ice.
7
00:00:19,853 --> 00:00:24,107
- You're literally fighting
to maintain control of the jet.
8
00:00:24,232 --> 00:00:26,317
- Stab trim cutout?
- Yes, yes, do it!
9
00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:29,278
- But the procedure
they've been taught
10
00:00:29,403 --> 00:00:32,365
for the Boeing 737 MAX 8...
11
00:00:33,658 --> 00:00:34,701
...doesn't work.
12
00:00:34,826 --> 00:00:37,202
- They knew what to do
and they tried to do it.
13
00:00:37,327 --> 00:00:39,329
- Investigators are astonished.
14
00:00:39,455 --> 00:00:41,750
If the pilots knew
the proper procedure,
15
00:00:41,915 --> 00:00:43,710
why didn't it work?
16
00:00:44,293 --> 00:00:45,878
- Boeing didn't say anything
about the trim wheel
17
00:00:46,045 --> 00:00:47,463
being difficult to move.
18
00:00:47,588 --> 00:00:49,882
(whirring)
19
00:00:50,424 --> 00:00:52,218
- Could the pilots
have been misled
20
00:00:52,343 --> 00:00:54,387
about how to save their plane?
21
00:00:54,554 --> 00:00:57,724
- They still left
the Boeing MAX unairworthy,
22
00:00:57,891 --> 00:01:02,771
and it cost the life
of my daughter and 157 people.
23
00:01:02,936 --> 00:01:04,063
(intense music)
24
00:01:04,188 --> 00:01:05,482
- Mayday, mayday!
25
00:01:07,275 --> 00:01:09,611
(rapid beeping)
26
00:01:10,861 --> 00:01:13,656
(indistinct radio chatter)
27
00:01:16,950 --> 00:01:18,828
(electricity crackling)
28
00:01:28,962 --> 00:01:32,759
(narrator): Boarding has
commenced for 149 passengers
29
00:01:32,926 --> 00:01:36,137
on a short flight
from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
30
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to Nairobi, Kenya.
31
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- Perfect, thank you.
32
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(man): This was really
a UN shuttle flight.
33
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There was a UN
environmental conference
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happening in Nairobi so,
35
00:01:49,150 --> 00:01:50,651
there were about a couple dozen
people on the plane
36
00:01:50,818 --> 00:01:52,945
who were headed
to that conference.
37
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- All right,
ground equipment is removed
38
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and engine area is clear.
39
00:01:59,076 --> 00:02:04,122
- The captain on today's fight
is 29-year-old Yared Getachew.
40
00:02:04,248 --> 00:02:05,542
- The captain was considered
41
00:02:05,667 --> 00:02:07,627
one of the best pilots
in the airline.
42
00:02:07,794 --> 00:02:08,669
He had 8,000 hours
43
00:02:08,836 --> 00:02:11,506
which was unheard of
for someone that young.
44
00:02:13,174 --> 00:02:14,842
- Before Start
checklist complete.
45
00:02:15,008 --> 00:02:16,468
Request pushback clearance.
46
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- Ground, Ethiopian 302
requesting pushback clearance.
47
00:02:20,681 --> 00:02:24,519
- 25-year-old Ahmed Nur Mohammed
is the First Officer.
48
00:02:24,686 --> 00:02:27,729
(man on radio): Ethiopian 302
you are cleared to push.
49
00:02:28,730 --> 00:02:30,358
(Peter): Ethiopian Airlines
was considered
50
00:02:30,525 --> 00:02:33,026
the model airline in Africa.
51
00:02:33,193 --> 00:02:35,155
It had the best run
training school,
52
00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:36,823
and it had a well-oiled system
53
00:02:36,990 --> 00:02:39,533
for bringing new pilots
into the airline.
54
00:02:40,742 --> 00:02:43,830
(narrator): They're on
a Boeing 737 MAX 8,
55
00:02:43,996 --> 00:02:45,747
a brand-new passenger jet
56
00:02:45,873 --> 00:02:48,710
that's already at the centre
of a major investigation
57
00:02:48,877 --> 00:02:50,336
in Indonesia.
58
00:02:50,502 --> 00:02:53,798
(tense music)
59
00:02:55,216 --> 00:02:56,675
- Five months earlier,
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00:02:56,800 --> 00:02:59,429
a MAX 8 crashed
into the Java Sea
61
00:02:59,554 --> 00:03:02,806
killing all 189 people on board.
62
00:03:05,518 --> 00:03:08,896
That accident is still
under investigation.
63
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Just before 8:30AM,
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00:03:16,695 --> 00:03:19,407
Flight 302 taxies
towards the runway
65
00:03:19,574 --> 00:03:22,994
at Addis Ababa's Bole
International Airport.
66
00:03:24,037 --> 00:03:25,038
- Ethiopian three-zero-two,
67
00:03:25,163 --> 00:03:26,705
cross runway
zero-seven left at alpha
68
00:03:26,872 --> 00:03:28,498
and hold short
of zero-seven right.
69
00:03:28,625 --> 00:03:30,210
(First Officer):
Cross zero-seven left at alpha
70
00:03:30,376 --> 00:03:33,503
and hold short,
Ethiopian three-zero-two.
71
00:03:34,588 --> 00:03:36,549
- Pre-Takeoff checklist, please.
72
00:03:37,967 --> 00:03:39,551
- Landing lights.
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00:03:40,844 --> 00:03:41,888
- On.
74
00:03:47,100 --> 00:03:49,520
- Among the passengers
on today's flight
75
00:03:49,645 --> 00:03:53,566
is 24-year-old Canadian,
Danielle Moore.
76
00:03:55,276 --> 00:03:57,778
She is travelling
to the UN summit.
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00:03:59,112 --> 00:04:01,741
- She really astonished us
when she told us that
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00:04:01,907 --> 00:04:04,577
she would be going to
the United Nations
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00:04:04,702 --> 00:04:06,578
Environmental Assembly
in Nairobi.
80
00:04:06,746 --> 00:04:10,624
And she was selected
out of a number of people.
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00:04:10,792 --> 00:04:13,503
We thought this was
so tremendous.
82
00:04:16,589 --> 00:04:19,758
- Flight 302 reaches
Runway 07 Right,
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00:04:19,926 --> 00:04:21,678
the longest runway
at the airport.
84
00:04:21,803 --> 00:04:23,595
(First Officer):
Ethiopian three-zero-two
85
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ready for departure.
86
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- Three-zero-two,
clear for takeoff,
87
00:04:26,974 --> 00:04:27,808
runway seven right.
88
00:04:27,976 --> 00:04:29,102
Have a good flight.
89
00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:36,943
- Ready?
- Ready.
90
00:04:37,109 --> 00:04:40,530
(uplifting music)
91
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Takeoff thrust set.
92
00:04:49,455 --> 00:04:51,123
Speed increasing.
93
00:04:56,503 --> 00:04:59,631
(heartbeat pulsing)
94
00:05:03,135 --> 00:05:06,097
(narrator): Flight 302
departs on time.
95
00:05:11,352 --> 00:05:14,479
The 725-mile flight to Nairobi
96
00:05:14,647 --> 00:05:16,982
should take just over two hours.
97
00:05:19,193 --> 00:05:20,902
- The MAX 8 was designed
for routes like this.
98
00:05:21,029 --> 00:05:23,864
It's a short hop,
quick turnaround plane.
99
00:05:25,532 --> 00:05:27,034
It also had much more
fuel efficiency
100
00:05:27,200 --> 00:05:30,996
compared to the previous version
of the MAX, about 20 percent.
101
00:05:32,457 --> 00:05:33,749
(automated voice): V1.
102
00:05:33,874 --> 00:05:35,126
- Rotate.
103
00:05:50,349 --> 00:05:52,184
Positive rate.
104
00:05:52,352 --> 00:05:53,811
- Gear up.
105
00:05:55,604 --> 00:05:57,147
- Gear up.
106
00:05:57,272 --> 00:05:59,525
(narrator): Less than
ten seconds after takeoff,
107
00:05:59,691 --> 00:06:02,027
the pilots get
a stick shaker warning,
108
00:06:02,195 --> 00:06:04,280
indicating that they're in
danger of losing lift
109
00:06:04,405 --> 00:06:06,073
and could stall.
110
00:06:06,239 --> 00:06:08,368
- If you experience a stall
right after departure,
111
00:06:08,493 --> 00:06:11,496
it can be extremely serious.
112
00:06:12,330 --> 00:06:15,499
- Captain Getachew reduces
his plane's pitch angle
113
00:06:15,624 --> 00:06:17,210
in an effort to prevent a stall.
114
00:06:17,376 --> 00:06:20,880
(woman): If you are taking off
and you get a stick shaker,
115
00:06:21,005 --> 00:06:22,297
crews are going to be
hesitant, you know,
116
00:06:22,422 --> 00:06:23,758
to push their nose over
117
00:06:23,924 --> 00:06:25,717
because they're close
to the ground.
118
00:06:29,388 --> 00:06:30,472
(beeping)
119
00:06:30,597 --> 00:06:33,142
(First Officer):
Master caution, anti-ice.
120
00:06:33,267 --> 00:06:34,936
- Okay...
121
00:06:37,270 --> 00:06:38,731
- When master cautions come on,
122
00:06:38,856 --> 00:06:41,943
the first thing is
to diagnose what's occurred
123
00:06:42,109 --> 00:06:46,155
and consider what implications
it has on the flight.
124
00:06:47,782 --> 00:06:49,741
(sighs)
- What's going on?
125
00:06:49,909 --> 00:06:51,869
- Captain Getachew
doesn't understand
126
00:06:51,994 --> 00:06:53,662
what's behind
the multiple warnings.
127
00:06:53,787 --> 00:06:55,705
- There's a lot going on here
128
00:06:55,832 --> 00:06:58,792
and it's a very distracting,
loud environment
129
00:06:58,960 --> 00:07:00,669
with the stick shaker going.
130
00:07:02,546 --> 00:07:03,965
Where do you start
131
00:07:04,131 --> 00:07:09,094
to deal with this complex
emergency that you have?
132
00:07:10,847 --> 00:07:14,851
- Flight 302 is only a few
hundred feet off the ground
133
00:07:14,976 --> 00:07:18,186
as the pilots struggle
to understand the problem.
134
00:07:21,065 --> 00:07:23,109
As far as passengers
are concerned,
135
00:07:23,275 --> 00:07:25,152
this is a routine takeoff.
136
00:07:25,318 --> 00:07:27,989
(tense music)
137
00:07:28,155 --> 00:07:30,116
(stick whirring)
138
00:07:30,241 --> 00:07:31,575
- Okay, contact radar.
139
00:07:31,700 --> 00:07:35,037
- Captain Getachew decides
to continue climbing.
140
00:07:35,162 --> 00:07:36,330
- If you have a problem,
141
00:07:36,496 --> 00:07:38,582
the thing you wanna do
is get it away from the ground
142
00:07:38,707 --> 00:07:42,210
where you can sort through
your problems.
143
00:07:42,962 --> 00:07:46,299
- Radar, Ethiopian
three-zero-two, good morning.
144
00:07:46,465 --> 00:07:48,842
Crossing 8,400
145
00:07:49,010 --> 00:07:50,969
and climbing to three-two-zero.
146
00:07:51,136 --> 00:07:54,140
- First Officer Mohammed
reports his altitude,
147
00:07:54,306 --> 00:07:56,976
8,400 feet above sea level,
148
00:07:57,143 --> 00:08:00,645
which is only 750 feet
above the ground.
149
00:08:01,981 --> 00:08:05,193
- Continue climb to flight level
three-four-zero.
150
00:08:05,859 --> 00:08:07,486
(First Officer):
Climb to three-four-zero,
151
00:08:07,611 --> 00:08:09,362
Ethiopian three-zero-two.
152
00:08:10,071 --> 00:08:11,782
- Flaps up.
153
00:08:13,075 --> 00:08:14,202
- Flaps up.
154
00:08:14,784 --> 00:08:15,828
(narrator): Retracting the flaps
155
00:08:15,995 --> 00:08:18,706
should help
the aircraft climb...
156
00:08:21,583 --> 00:08:23,836
...but it has
the opposite effect.
157
00:08:24,002 --> 00:08:26,005
1,500 feet from the ground,
158
00:08:26,130 --> 00:08:31,010
the jetliner with 157 people
on board begins to fall.
159
00:08:31,135 --> 00:08:33,346
- We are having
flight control problems.
160
00:08:34,096 --> 00:08:36,933
(automated voice):
Don't sink. Don't sink.
161
00:08:37,058 --> 00:08:42,270
- You've gone from
a series of cautions,
162
00:08:42,395 --> 00:08:44,732
a series of system malfunctions,
163
00:08:44,899 --> 00:08:46,900
now into a flight
control problem
164
00:08:47,068 --> 00:08:50,862
where you're literally fighting
to maintain control of the jet.
165
00:08:54,574 --> 00:08:58,246
- Passengers now sense
that there is something wrong.
166
00:09:00,456 --> 00:09:02,707
- One woman whose brother
was on the airplane
167
00:09:02,875 --> 00:09:05,794
and he called her
soon after takeoff.
168
00:09:06,879 --> 00:09:08,838
He knew something was wrong.
169
00:09:09,549 --> 00:09:12,717
The plane was not climbing
the way aircraft normally do.
170
00:09:12,885 --> 00:09:16,597
- The 737's nose
continues to pitch down.
171
00:09:16,764 --> 00:09:18,140
- Trim...
172
00:09:18,265 --> 00:09:23,062
- Captain Getachew uses the trim
switch to level his plane.
173
00:09:23,895 --> 00:09:26,023
The trim switch
controls the position
174
00:09:26,148 --> 00:09:27,900
of the horizontal stabilizer,
175
00:09:28,067 --> 00:09:30,736
keeping the plane
balanced during flight.
176
00:09:30,903 --> 00:09:34,030
It can be used to adjust
the pitch of the airplane.
177
00:09:35,448 --> 00:09:39,286
Captain Getachew manages
to raise the nose slightly,
178
00:09:40,704 --> 00:09:42,247
but not for long.
179
00:09:44,082 --> 00:09:46,084
The plane dips again,
180
00:09:46,251 --> 00:09:48,212
bringing it closer
to the ground.
181
00:09:48,337 --> 00:09:50,588
(automated voice):
Too low. Terrain.
182
00:09:50,756 --> 00:09:53,259
(narrator): And the pilots
are struggling.
183
00:09:53,884 --> 00:09:55,428
(automated voice):
Too low. Terrain.
184
00:09:55,553 --> 00:09:59,390
- Now you start dealing with
how do we regain control,
185
00:10:00,308 --> 00:10:03,602
and to keep the nose up
while we sort through this.
186
00:10:03,769 --> 00:10:06,313
And that's where the time
can become critical.
187
00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:08,815
(music intensifies)
188
00:10:11,485 --> 00:10:14,447
(straining)
- Pull up. Pull up!
189
00:10:15,238 --> 00:10:17,699
(narrator): Less than
three minutes after takeoff
190
00:10:17,824 --> 00:10:20,578
and only 1,800 feet
above the ground,
191
00:10:20,703 --> 00:10:23,789
the pilots of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302
192
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,876
are desperately trying
to get their plane to climb.
193
00:10:27,001 --> 00:10:28,501
- Pull up!
194
00:10:28,669 --> 00:10:31,713
- Okay, advise
we maintain 6,500.
195
00:10:31,838 --> 00:10:33,716
We have a flight
control problem.
196
00:10:34,382 --> 00:10:36,802
- They're trying to reach
the minimum safe altitude
197
00:10:36,968 --> 00:10:38,971
surrounding the airport.
198
00:10:41,390 --> 00:10:43,308
(First Officer):
Ethiopian three-zero-two,
199
00:10:43,476 --> 00:10:45,394
we'd like to maintain 6,500.
200
00:10:45,519 --> 00:10:47,645
We have a flight
control problem.
201
00:10:47,813 --> 00:10:48,938
- Say again?
202
00:10:49,064 --> 00:10:50,524
- We have a flight
control problem
203
00:10:50,690 --> 00:10:52,985
and we'd like to maintain 6,500.
204
00:10:53,986 --> 00:10:55,780
- Approved
and report intention.
205
00:10:55,905 --> 00:10:59,033
- We'll call you.
Ethiopian three-zero-two.
206
00:11:00,034 --> 00:11:01,493
(John): First and foremost
they said,
207
00:11:01,659 --> 00:11:03,203
"Okay, we have
a flight control problem,"
208
00:11:03,371 --> 00:11:04,413
and that says
209
00:11:04,538 --> 00:11:05,789
get other airplanes
away from me.
210
00:11:05,914 --> 00:11:08,918
And that was a very
appropriate thing to do.
211
00:11:09,669 --> 00:11:11,669
- Set 6,500.
212
00:11:12,797 --> 00:11:14,339
- 6,500 set.
213
00:11:18,385 --> 00:11:19,886
(beeping)
- Speed!
214
00:11:20,054 --> 00:11:23,223
(narrator): As they fight
to climb to 6,500 feet,
215
00:11:23,390 --> 00:11:26,852
the plane's speed becomes
dangerously high.
216
00:11:30,398 --> 00:11:33,275
They try to raise
the plane's nose further
217
00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:35,151
to decrease speed.
218
00:11:35,276 --> 00:11:37,237
- Pitch up with me.
219
00:11:40,073 --> 00:11:43,493
- Even with both pilots pulling
back on their control columns,
220
00:11:43,618 --> 00:11:45,413
the plane refuses to climb.
221
00:11:45,578 --> 00:11:49,500
- The forces necessary to hold
that yoke are increasing
222
00:11:49,625 --> 00:11:51,419
and they're increasing
quite rapidly.
223
00:12:03,805 --> 00:12:06,058
- Less than minutes
into the flight,
224
00:12:06,225 --> 00:12:09,270
Captain Getachew
decides to turn around.
225
00:12:09,437 --> 00:12:11,020
- Request a return vector.
226
00:12:11,146 --> 00:12:12,939
- Radar, Ethiopian
three-zero-two
227
00:12:13,107 --> 00:12:14,983
requesting vector
back to airport.
228
00:12:15,108 --> 00:12:17,486
(Peter): There was a lot
going on in that cockpit.
229
00:12:17,611 --> 00:12:18,821
There were indicators going off
230
00:12:18,946 --> 00:12:20,530
showing a disagreement
in altitude,
231
00:12:20,655 --> 00:12:22,323
disagreement in airspeed.
232
00:12:22,449 --> 00:12:23,951
The stick shaker was going off.
233
00:12:24,117 --> 00:12:26,245
So the best thing for them to do
was to turn around.
234
00:12:26,411 --> 00:12:28,872
- Confirm, do you want to hold
or make an approach?
235
00:12:28,997 --> 00:12:31,375
- Wish to commence approach.
(beeping)
236
00:12:35,044 --> 00:12:36,922
- Turn right to two-six-zero.
237
00:12:39,967 --> 00:12:41,885
- Two-six-zero.
238
00:12:47,098 --> 00:12:49,101
- The pilots have managed
to get their plane
239
00:12:49,226 --> 00:12:51,895
to 6,000 feet
above the ground.
240
00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,564
- Pitch up with me.
Not enough pitch.
241
00:12:54,689 --> 00:12:56,567
Not enough pitch!
242
00:12:56,692 --> 00:12:58,903
- ...but now
it starts to plummet.
243
00:12:59,028 --> 00:13:00,446
(automated voice): Sink Rate.
244
00:13:00,612 --> 00:13:03,115
(passengers screaming)
245
00:13:07,995 --> 00:13:10,456
(air whooshing)
246
00:13:11,122 --> 00:13:13,958
(Captain): Pitch up! Pitch!
247
00:13:14,083 --> 00:13:15,836
(automated voice):
Terrain, terrain. Pull up.
248
00:13:16,002 --> 00:13:17,462
(Captain):
Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!
249
00:13:17,587 --> 00:13:19,464
(automated voice):
Terrain, terrain. Pull up.
250
00:13:19,589 --> 00:13:21,634
(pilots screaming)
251
00:13:21,799 --> 00:13:24,385
(intense music)
252
00:13:25,762 --> 00:13:27,139
(metal clattering)
253
00:13:27,305 --> 00:13:29,975
- Flight 302
slams into the ground
254
00:13:30,141 --> 00:13:33,062
just 30 miles from the airport.
255
00:13:35,773 --> 00:13:37,399
It's the second MAX 8
256
00:13:37,525 --> 00:13:40,236
to have crashed
in less than five months.
257
00:13:40,361 --> 00:13:41,986
- In today's world,
258
00:13:42,111 --> 00:13:45,448
even a single accident
is an extreme rarity.
259
00:13:45,573 --> 00:13:50,328
To have two within five months,
it is inconsistent
260
00:13:50,496 --> 00:13:53,164
with the level of safety
of modern airliners.
261
00:13:54,040 --> 00:13:56,459
(melancholic music)
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00:13:56,584 --> 00:14:00,088
- Everyone wants an answer
to the same question:
263
00:14:01,048 --> 00:14:04,552
Is there something wrong
with Boeing's latest jet?
264
00:14:05,302 --> 00:14:06,720
- We begin tonight
with the mystery
265
00:14:06,886 --> 00:14:09,515
swirling around a deadly
plane crash overseas.
266
00:14:09,640 --> 00:14:11,933
The new Boeing 737 crashing
267
00:14:12,058 --> 00:14:14,019
just minutes after takeoff
in Ethiopia.
268
00:14:14,185 --> 00:14:17,773
157 people were
on board the flight
269
00:14:17,898 --> 00:14:19,525
and there were no survivors.
270
00:14:20,818 --> 00:14:23,194
- News of the Ethiopian
Airlines crash
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00:14:23,319 --> 00:14:26,073
quickly makes headlines
around the world.
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00:14:26,991 --> 00:14:30,118
- The phone rang
and my wife answered it,
273
00:14:30,243 --> 00:14:32,871
and I recall hearing her scream
274
00:14:32,996 --> 00:14:35,540
and saying, "Danielle is dead."
275
00:14:40,212 --> 00:14:44,049
My hearing her shriek
276
00:14:44,174 --> 00:14:48,053
and saying those words,
it was...
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00:14:48,220 --> 00:14:51,682
it was the death of me, too.
I died.
278
00:14:52,890 --> 00:14:59,063
This is the last thing that
any father wants to experience.
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00:15:14,121 --> 00:15:17,915
- A team from Ethiopia's
Accident Investigation Bureau
280
00:15:18,082 --> 00:15:22,087
is tasked with finding out
why Flight 302 crashed
281
00:15:22,254 --> 00:15:24,631
just five minutes after takeoff.
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00:15:25,381 --> 00:15:27,425
- To make a crater like this,
283
00:15:28,302 --> 00:15:30,511
the speed must have
been tremendous.
284
00:15:32,264 --> 00:15:34,808
- Much of the wreckage
is buried in a crater
285
00:15:34,975 --> 00:15:37,102
more than 30 feet deep.
286
00:15:37,227 --> 00:15:40,063
(Lorenda): You can tell that
it was in a high energy state,
287
00:15:40,188 --> 00:15:43,150
that just due to it
creating a crater,
288
00:15:43,317 --> 00:15:47,196
that it had to have
some kind of angle to it.
289
00:15:50,156 --> 00:15:53,618
- The plane's two black boxes
are quickly found.
290
00:15:57,039 --> 00:15:59,375
The Ethiopian government
decides to send them
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00:15:59,500 --> 00:16:04,129
to France's investigative agency
to have the data downloaded.
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00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:13,554
In Indonesia, the investigation
into the previous MAX 8 accident
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00:16:13,680 --> 00:16:17,058
is still underway
as investigators get the news
294
00:16:17,183 --> 00:16:20,145
about the Ethiopian
Airlines accident.
295
00:16:21,355 --> 00:16:26,235
- First time I heard about
Ethiopian Flight 302 crash,
296
00:16:26,360 --> 00:16:31,198
I was shocked, knowing that
another 737 MAX has gone down.
297
00:16:31,865 --> 00:16:36,245
- The Indonesian accident
involves Lion Air Flight 610,
298
00:16:36,370 --> 00:16:38,621
a MAX 8 that took off
from Jakarta
299
00:16:38,746 --> 00:16:42,876
with 189 people on board
five months earlier.
300
00:16:43,626 --> 00:16:48,339
- I was afraid that the accident
was caused by similar issue
301
00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:52,970
with the Lion 601
that we were investigating.
302
00:16:53,095 --> 00:16:54,722
(beeping)
303
00:16:54,887 --> 00:16:59,100
- The Indonesian pilots also
began experiencing warnings
304
00:16:59,225 --> 00:17:00,601
shortly after takeoff,
305
00:17:00,728 --> 00:17:04,106
and also reported having
flight control problems.
306
00:17:05,607 --> 00:17:08,193
Following a series of
altitude fluctuations,
307
00:17:08,359 --> 00:17:11,363
the pilots attempted
to return to the airport.
308
00:17:13,365 --> 00:17:16,617
The 737 plunged into
the Java Sea
309
00:17:16,743 --> 00:17:19,203
11 minutes after takeoff.
310
00:17:20,079 --> 00:17:21,623
The investigation
into that accident
311
00:17:21,749 --> 00:17:26,502
has zeroed in on an electronic
system known as MCAS,
312
00:17:26,627 --> 00:17:29,714
the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System.
313
00:17:29,839 --> 00:17:32,550
- It's a piece of software
in the flight control computer
314
00:17:32,675 --> 00:17:37,181
that directs the stabilizer
to push the nose down.
315
00:17:38,639 --> 00:17:41,643
- Investigators in Indonesia
have learned that MCAS
316
00:17:41,769 --> 00:17:46,065
was added to the MAX 8 to
compensate for a design problem.
317
00:17:46,732 --> 00:17:48,733
- In order to achieve
the fuel efficiency
318
00:17:48,858 --> 00:17:50,027
Boeing wanted to,
319
00:17:50,152 --> 00:17:52,195
it needed to put bigger engines
on the airplane
320
00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:53,946
and in certain
flight conditions,
321
00:17:54,114 --> 00:17:55,907
the nose had a tendency
to pitch up,
322
00:17:56,075 --> 00:17:58,618
and that's why MCAS
was introduced.
323
00:17:59,703 --> 00:18:02,079
- If the system sensed
the plane's nose
324
00:18:02,205 --> 00:18:03,581
was pitched too high,
325
00:18:03,749 --> 00:18:06,667
it would automatically adjust
the plane's stabilizer
326
00:18:06,793 --> 00:18:08,670
to lower the nose.
327
00:18:09,462 --> 00:18:12,590
Indonesian investigators have
determined that a faulty sensor
328
00:18:12,715 --> 00:18:15,469
on the Lion Air flight
led MCAS to conclude
329
00:18:15,635 --> 00:18:18,847
the plane was climbing
more steeply than it was,
330
00:18:18,972 --> 00:18:20,766
causing it to activate
repeatedly,
331
00:18:20,891 --> 00:18:22,433
until the plane hit the water.
332
00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:24,019
(automated voice):
Terrain. Pull up.
333
00:18:24,144 --> 00:18:26,395
- We found that
there was some issue
334
00:18:26,521 --> 00:18:28,773
with the design of the system.
335
00:18:30,274 --> 00:18:34,070
(narrator): There are 387
MAX 8's flying worldwide
336
00:18:34,195 --> 00:18:37,324
with another 5,000 on order.
337
00:18:38,282 --> 00:18:40,160
It's rapidly becoming
one of Boeing's
338
00:18:40,327 --> 00:18:42,078
most successful airliners.
339
00:18:42,203 --> 00:18:44,289
(Peter): The MAX 8 was
the fastest selling aircraft
340
00:18:44,414 --> 00:18:46,083
in Boeing's history.
341
00:18:46,208 --> 00:18:48,793
Airlines were really drawn
to the fuel efficiency.
342
00:18:49,545 --> 00:18:51,838
- The pressure is on
investigators to determine
343
00:18:52,004 --> 00:18:56,425
if a flaw with MCAS also
caused the Ethiopian accident.
344
00:18:56,551 --> 00:18:59,471
(Lorenda): There was worldwide
attention to this investigation.
345
00:18:59,596 --> 00:19:02,766
The whole team was under
a lot of pressure to get answers
346
00:19:02,891 --> 00:19:04,600
and to find out what happened.
347
00:19:09,522 --> 00:19:12,984
)
348
00:19:13,109 --> 00:19:15,444
- Ethiopian investigators
start with
349
00:19:15,570 --> 00:19:19,407
the last people who spoke
to the crew of Flight 302,
350
00:19:19,532 --> 00:19:20,992
air traffic controllers.
351
00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:22,161
- Thanks for your time.
352
00:19:22,286 --> 00:19:23,828
Can you take me
through the flight?
353
00:19:23,995 --> 00:19:25,329
- Normal taxi and takeoff.
354
00:19:25,454 --> 00:19:28,333
Nothing unusual until
two-and-a-half minutes later
355
00:19:28,458 --> 00:19:30,626
when they reported
a flight control problem.
356
00:19:32,962 --> 00:19:35,007
(First Officer):
Ethiopian three-zero-two,
357
00:19:35,132 --> 00:19:36,841
we'd like to maintain 6,500,
358
00:19:37,009 --> 00:19:39,552
we have a flight
control problem.
359
00:19:40,636 --> 00:19:42,055
- They asked to maintain
the current heading
360
00:19:42,222 --> 00:19:44,683
and requested permission
to hold at 6,500 feet.
361
00:19:44,849 --> 00:19:47,351
- And you approved the request?
362
00:19:47,476 --> 00:19:49,145
- I did, yes sir.
363
00:19:50,230 --> 00:19:52,523
(narrator): All investigators
know is that the pilots
364
00:19:52,648 --> 00:19:55,109
had a flight control problem
that developed early
365
00:19:55,234 --> 00:19:58,571
and prevented the crew
from continuing the flight.
366
00:19:59,364 --> 00:20:01,032
- They're aware that
they were dealing with
367
00:20:01,157 --> 00:20:02,658
a flight control issue.
368
00:20:02,783 --> 00:20:05,703
It would have been helpful
if they could have identified
369
00:20:05,870 --> 00:20:09,540
which control surface they were
having the problem with.
370
00:20:15,547 --> 00:20:18,841
- The team turns to
Flight 302's radar track
371
00:20:18,966 --> 00:20:21,720
to understand
the sequence of events.
372
00:20:23,012 --> 00:20:24,513
- Slow, shallow climb out.
373
00:20:27,558 --> 00:20:29,060
Now, look here.
374
00:20:29,228 --> 00:20:31,605
Instead of climbing,
they lose altitude,
375
00:20:31,771 --> 00:20:33,315
regain it, then lose more.
376
00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:38,194
- Instead of continuing to climb
or to maintain an altitude,
377
00:20:38,319 --> 00:20:41,572
there was actually
dips in the altitude.
378
00:20:42,866 --> 00:20:45,160
- The radar data
paints a picture
379
00:20:45,285 --> 00:20:48,372
of a crew struggling to keep
its plane in a climb.
380
00:20:48,497 --> 00:20:51,040
(automated voice):
Don't sink. Don't sink.
381
00:20:53,626 --> 00:20:57,880
- They're trying
to get to 6,500 feet
382
00:20:58,005 --> 00:21:01,801
but never get higher than 6,200.
383
00:21:01,969 --> 00:21:05,222
And they're starting to
make a turn back to the airport.
384
00:21:06,097 --> 00:21:07,098
Now they're in a dive,
385
00:21:07,266 --> 00:21:10,226
descending at 33,000 feet
per minute.
386
00:21:11,478 --> 00:21:13,814
- The speeds were at
the maximum for this aircraft.
387
00:21:13,981 --> 00:21:17,776
The intensity inside the plane
must have been terrifying.
388
00:21:20,362 --> 00:21:22,446
- Let me see
the Lion Air track please.
389
00:21:32,249 --> 00:21:33,458
A slow climb,
390
00:21:33,583 --> 00:21:36,168
a series of
altitude fluctuations...
391
00:21:37,753 --> 00:21:41,508
...a turn back to the airport,
and a rapid descent.
392
00:21:42,341 --> 00:21:43,635
They're pretty close.
393
00:21:49,141 --> 00:21:50,808
- The fact that
this plane crashed
394
00:21:50,933 --> 00:21:55,062
almost immediately after takeoff
in very similar circumstances
395
00:21:55,187 --> 00:21:57,648
raised a lot of questions
in everyone's minds.
396
00:21:57,816 --> 00:22:01,028
- Investigators turn to
a key piece of the wreckage
397
00:22:01,193 --> 00:22:05,156
for confirmation that MCAS
played a role in the accident.
398
00:22:05,281 --> 00:22:07,533
- It's in pretty good shape.
We got lucky.
399
00:22:07,701 --> 00:22:11,328
- A jackscrew, the device
that controls the position
400
00:22:11,454 --> 00:22:14,624
of the plane's horizontal
stabilizer, is recovered.
401
00:22:14,750 --> 00:22:16,542
(digital blipping)
402
00:22:17,418 --> 00:22:19,503
A ball nut moves along
the jackscrew
403
00:22:19,671 --> 00:22:22,174
to help adjust
the plane's pitch.
404
00:22:26,886 --> 00:22:28,597
- Five inches.
405
00:22:32,224 --> 00:22:33,851
Full nose down trim.
406
00:22:34,728 --> 00:22:36,687
- The evidence shows
that the plane
407
00:22:36,812 --> 00:22:39,523
went into its final dive
because the stabilizer
408
00:22:39,691 --> 00:22:43,653
had moved to an extreme
nose down position.
409
00:22:45,238 --> 00:22:47,074
- Full nose down trim
is not something
410
00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:51,453
that you ever see in
the normal flight of a 737.
411
00:22:51,578 --> 00:22:54,039
In the 15 years that I flew it,
412
00:22:54,164 --> 00:22:57,876
I don't know that we ever got
even close to full nose down.
413
00:23:00,545 --> 00:23:02,755
- The Lion Air flight
is identical.
414
00:23:02,923 --> 00:23:06,385
A pitch trim of 1.5 degrees
resulting in a rapid descent.
415
00:23:08,427 --> 00:23:10,387
The pilots wouldn't do that.
416
00:23:10,555 --> 00:23:12,973
- The jackscrew all but confirms
417
00:23:13,099 --> 00:23:15,726
that Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302
418
00:23:15,851 --> 00:23:17,770
and Lion Air Flight 610
419
00:23:17,937 --> 00:23:19,231
had the same cause,
420
00:23:19,396 --> 00:23:22,901
a malfunction of the plane's
electronic MCAS system.
421
00:23:23,068 --> 00:23:25,987
- That was literally
the smoking gun
422
00:23:26,113 --> 00:23:27,446
that definitively told them
423
00:23:27,614 --> 00:23:29,366
what had happened
to the airplane.
424
00:23:31,076 --> 00:23:32,411
- There's now enough evidence
425
00:23:32,577 --> 00:23:35,454
to convince aviation authorities
around the world
426
00:23:35,622 --> 00:23:38,959
that the MAX 8 presents
a risk to passengers.
427
00:23:39,126 --> 00:23:42,546
- We're gonna be issuing an
emergency order of prohibition
428
00:23:42,671 --> 00:23:48,844
to ground all flights
of the 737 MAX 8.
429
00:23:49,552 --> 00:23:53,056
- The question now facing
Ethiopian investigators is
430
00:23:53,181 --> 00:23:55,599
how could this
have happened again?
431
00:24:00,230 --> 00:24:03,149
- These documents
came out four months ago.
432
00:24:03,316 --> 00:24:05,568
- Following the accident
in Indonesia,
433
00:24:05,693 --> 00:24:09,114
both Boeing and the FAA
issued bulletins
434
00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:11,450
advising pilots
of the steps to take
435
00:24:11,616 --> 00:24:14,703
if MCAS began forcing
the nose down.
436
00:24:16,078 --> 00:24:19,915
The documents advise pilots
to follow the existing procedure
437
00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:24,503
for a malfunctioning trim system
and disengage the autopilot,
438
00:24:25,462 --> 00:24:29,300
set the stabilizer trim
switches to cutout,
439
00:24:30,218 --> 00:24:32,471
and to use their manual
trim wheel
440
00:24:32,596 --> 00:24:36,308
to counteract the automatic
downward stabilizer movement.
441
00:24:37,017 --> 00:24:39,810
- Boeing and the FAA felt that
the airworthiness directive
442
00:24:39,935 --> 00:24:42,481
was all pilots needed
to be able to recover from
443
00:24:42,646 --> 00:24:45,442
what they thought would be
an extremely rare event.
444
00:24:53,616 --> 00:24:55,993
- Did the pilots
know about this procedure?
445
00:24:56,118 --> 00:24:57,913
- You'd hope so.
446
00:24:59,705 --> 00:25:01,833
(John): The airline
has an obligation
447
00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:03,001
to train the pilots
448
00:25:03,167 --> 00:25:06,212
to ensure that there is
a sufficient understanding
449
00:25:06,378 --> 00:25:09,382
of what the information
is trying to tell them
450
00:25:09,549 --> 00:25:11,760
so that they act appropriately.
451
00:25:12,594 --> 00:25:14,511
- We incorporated
the Boeing bulletin
452
00:25:14,678 --> 00:25:16,513
into our flight manual.
453
00:25:23,395 --> 00:25:25,315
- Were your pilots advised
of the revision?
454
00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:28,359
- All our pilots were
fully briefed, of course.
455
00:25:36,076 --> 00:25:38,369
- The pilots of Flight 302
456
00:25:38,494 --> 00:25:41,414
knew the procedure
for disabling MCAS.
457
00:25:41,580 --> 00:25:44,626
The question is,
did they follow it?
458
00:25:51,549 --> 00:25:54,469
- Here it is, let's load it up.
459
00:25:54,594 --> 00:25:56,303
- The cockpit voice recording
460
00:25:56,428 --> 00:25:58,722
from Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302
461
00:25:58,847 --> 00:26:02,851
has been successfully downloaded
by technicians in France.
462
00:26:02,978 --> 00:26:05,396
- Okay, let's hear it.
463
00:26:08,191 --> 00:26:09,358
(automated voice): V1.
464
00:26:09,483 --> 00:26:12,569
(First Officer): Rotate.
Positive rate.
465
00:26:13,154 --> 00:26:14,571
(Captain): Gear up.
466
00:26:15,322 --> 00:26:16,657
- Takeoff roll is normal.
467
00:26:16,782 --> 00:26:19,286
(narrator): Investigators listen
for clues that can explain
468
00:26:19,452 --> 00:26:22,414
how MCAS brought down
the plane.
469
00:26:22,579 --> 00:26:23,914
(First Officer):
Climb to three-four-zero.
470
00:26:24,039 --> 00:26:25,750
Ethiopian three-zero-two.
471
00:26:26,751 --> 00:26:28,377
(Captain): Flaps up.
472
00:26:29,296 --> 00:26:30,587
- Flaps up.
473
00:26:30,713 --> 00:26:32,757
(narrator): The MCAS system
is designed to activate
474
00:26:32,882 --> 00:26:36,344
only when it senses that
three conditions are met:
475
00:26:36,469 --> 00:26:40,097
nose up, flaps fully retracted,
476
00:26:40,264 --> 00:26:42,433
and autopilot off.
477
00:26:42,558 --> 00:26:44,853
(alarm)
478
00:26:45,811 --> 00:26:48,272
- That's the autopilot
disconnecting.
479
00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:50,942
- Okay, so now they've met
the three conditions
480
00:26:51,108 --> 00:26:52,777
for MCAS activation.
481
00:26:54,487 --> 00:26:57,449
- Investigators continue
listening for evidence that
482
00:26:57,616 --> 00:27:01,118
MCAS activated,
pitching the plane downwards.
483
00:27:01,869 --> 00:27:03,622
(Captain): We're having
flight control problems.
484
00:27:03,747 --> 00:27:05,456
- Right on cue.
485
00:27:06,374 --> 00:27:07,626
(stick whirring)
486
00:27:07,751 --> 00:27:10,002
(automated voice):
Don't sink. Don't sink.
487
00:27:10,170 --> 00:27:11,796
- He's losing altitude.
488
00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:15,341
- Don't sink. Don't sink.
489
00:27:15,508 --> 00:27:17,760
- MCAS is pushing the nose down.
490
00:27:19,346 --> 00:27:20,722
(Captain): Trim...
491
00:27:20,847 --> 00:27:25,518
Come on, trim with me.
Trim up. Trim up, trim up!
492
00:27:25,684 --> 00:27:27,770
Come on, trim up!
(grunting with effort)
493
00:27:27,895 --> 00:27:30,482
(narrator): Investigators hear
the pilots struggling
494
00:27:30,607 --> 00:27:32,274
to trim their plane nose up.
495
00:27:32,399 --> 00:27:35,069
- So you begin to
get this tug of war
496
00:27:35,194 --> 00:27:37,530
between the pilot
trimming nose up
497
00:27:37,696 --> 00:27:40,075
and MCAS trimming nose down.
498
00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:43,078
But MCAS is relentless.
It doesn't stop.
499
00:27:43,203 --> 00:27:45,413
- Trim! Trim up.
500
00:27:48,208 --> 00:27:50,376
- The team then hears
an exchange
501
00:27:50,542 --> 00:27:52,878
that transforms
the investigation.
502
00:27:55,548 --> 00:27:58,343
- Stab trim cutout?
Stab trim cutout?
503
00:27:58,510 --> 00:27:59,719
- Yes, yes, do it!
504
00:28:01,346 --> 00:28:03,056
- Stab trim cutout.
505
00:28:03,222 --> 00:28:04,683
- Can you pause for a second?
506
00:28:05,224 --> 00:28:07,394
- They did it.
507
00:28:10,562 --> 00:28:12,190
They set the trim
switches to cutout,
508
00:28:12,315 --> 00:28:14,358
exactly as Boeing
advised them to do.
509
00:28:14,526 --> 00:28:16,693
(Lorenda): I think
that's the surprise.
510
00:28:16,860 --> 00:28:21,407
The crew attempted
to do that procedure
511
00:28:21,574 --> 00:28:22,951
and it wasn't successful.
512
00:28:23,076 --> 00:28:26,370
- The autopilot disengaged.
We heard the alarm.
513
00:28:27,997 --> 00:28:30,916
They set their stabilizer
trim switches to cutout.
514
00:28:32,167 --> 00:28:36,172
Now they need to manually trim
to get their nose back up.
515
00:28:36,297 --> 00:28:37,549
Let's hear.
516
00:28:38,590 --> 00:28:40,885
(Captain): Pitch up,
pitch up, pitch up.
517
00:28:41,010 --> 00:28:42,553
Do it with me.
518
00:28:43,221 --> 00:28:45,889
(straining)
Is the trim engaged?
519
00:28:46,057 --> 00:28:48,725
(First Officer): No.
Shall I try manually?
520
00:28:48,893 --> 00:28:49,935
(Captain): Try it!
521
00:28:53,106 --> 00:28:55,149
- The 737 has a manual backup
522
00:28:55,274 --> 00:28:58,235
about how to move trim
using cables.
523
00:28:58,403 --> 00:29:01,405
And the wheel has actually
got a handle in it
524
00:29:01,572 --> 00:29:03,532
where you can manually trim it.
525
00:29:05,868 --> 00:29:07,744
(straining)
- It's not working.
526
00:29:09,664 --> 00:29:11,915
- Not enough pitch.
Not enough pitch.
527
00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:13,917
(narrator): But the pilots
are not able
528
00:29:14,085 --> 00:29:15,962
to adjust the pitch manually.
529
00:29:16,128 --> 00:29:19,089
- They don't physically
have enough strength
530
00:29:19,214 --> 00:29:21,300
to move the horizontal
stabilizer
531
00:29:21,468 --> 00:29:23,385
via the manual trim wheel.
532
00:29:24,596 --> 00:29:26,431
- They're trying to do this.
533
00:29:26,556 --> 00:29:28,767
- But it doesn't sound like
it's working.
534
00:29:31,644 --> 00:29:34,062
- And then they come up
with a solution
535
00:29:34,189 --> 00:29:35,815
that seals their fate.
536
00:29:36,607 --> 00:29:38,777
(Captain): Put them up.
537
00:29:38,902 --> 00:29:41,112
- No. Oh, no. No.
538
00:29:41,780 --> 00:29:44,324
(narrator): Unable to pitch
the plane up manually,
539
00:29:44,491 --> 00:29:47,660
the pilots make one final
desperate move.
540
00:29:48,536 --> 00:29:50,954
They re-engage
the automatic trim
541
00:29:51,079 --> 00:29:53,124
to help move the stabilizer.
542
00:29:56,627 --> 00:29:59,129
(Lorenda): Unfortunately,
that wakes the beast.
543
00:29:59,254 --> 00:30:00,507
And then it's gonna sit there
544
00:30:00,673 --> 00:30:02,925
and it's gonna trim it down
one more time again
545
00:30:03,050 --> 00:30:05,135
so it works against them.
546
00:30:05,636 --> 00:30:06,805
(automated voice):
Caution. Terrain.
547
00:30:06,971 --> 00:30:10,224
(Captain): Pitch up!
Pitch up! Pitch up!
548
00:30:10,349 --> 00:30:11,975
- There was no way
to control the airplane.
549
00:30:12,100 --> 00:30:14,979
The pitch was going to
continue to go nose down.
550
00:30:15,104 --> 00:30:16,314
(alarm beeping)
551
00:30:16,439 --> 00:30:18,232
(automated voice):
Caution. Terrain.
552
00:30:18,357 --> 00:30:21,485
Terrain, terrain.
Pull up, pull up.
553
00:30:21,653 --> 00:30:23,445
(Captain): Mayday!
Mayday! Mayday!
554
00:30:23,570 --> 00:30:26,074
(pilots screaming)
555
00:30:26,199 --> 00:30:27,491
(radio static)
556
00:30:29,868 --> 00:30:33,664
- They knew what to do.
They tried to do it.
557
00:30:34,833 --> 00:30:39,671
- But for whatever reason,
it didn't work.
558
00:30:41,172 --> 00:30:43,966
(narrator): The Ethiopians
have made a stunning discovery;
559
00:30:44,091 --> 00:30:47,553
one they quickly share
with the world.
560
00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:52,558
- The crew performed
all the procedures repeatedly,
561
00:30:52,724 --> 00:30:55,310
provided by the manufacturer,
562
00:30:55,435 --> 00:31:00,066
but was not able
to control the aircraft.
563
00:31:04,529 --> 00:31:06,530
- Stab trim cutout?
Stab trim cutout?
564
00:31:06,655 --> 00:31:07,824
- Yes, yes, do it!
565
00:31:07,949 --> 00:31:11,452
- Investigators are left
with a burning question.
566
00:31:11,578 --> 00:31:12,995
- Stab trim cutout.
567
00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:16,081
- If the pilots did
what Boeing advised,
568
00:31:16,249 --> 00:31:19,126
why weren't they able to
pull out of the dive
569
00:31:19,251 --> 00:31:20,920
that MCAS put them into?
570
00:31:21,087 --> 00:31:21,921
(Captain): Pitch up!
571
00:31:22,087 --> 00:31:24,214
(intense music)
572
00:31:29,095 --> 00:31:31,638
- Investigators turn to
the flight data recorder
573
00:31:31,763 --> 00:31:34,392
from Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302
574
00:31:34,517 --> 00:31:37,895
to better understand
why MCAS was activated,
575
00:31:38,061 --> 00:31:40,022
causing the plane to crash.
576
00:31:40,772 --> 00:31:44,027
- Right here, ten seconds
after takeoff.
577
00:31:44,152 --> 00:31:47,655
Readings for angle of attack,
airspeed, and altitude
578
00:31:47,780 --> 00:31:49,406
begin to diverge.
579
00:31:50,491 --> 00:31:52,492
- MCAS is only
supposed to activate
580
00:31:52,618 --> 00:31:56,079
when the MAX 8 reaches
an extreme angle of attack,
581
00:31:56,247 --> 00:31:57,874
or high-pitch angle.
582
00:31:57,999 --> 00:31:59,250
(digital blipping)
583
00:31:59,375 --> 00:32:01,627
A sensor on each side
of the airplane
584
00:32:01,793 --> 00:32:03,378
calculates the angle of attack
585
00:32:03,503 --> 00:32:06,924
by measuring the plane's angle
into the oncoming air.
586
00:32:11,261 --> 00:32:13,097
- Sure looks like
a sensor issue.
587
00:32:13,222 --> 00:32:15,391
The captain's side
can't be right.
588
00:32:15,516 --> 00:32:17,393
- Absolutely.
589
00:32:17,518 --> 00:32:19,311
- The data shows a steep spike
590
00:32:19,479 --> 00:32:22,022
in the captain's angle
of attack reading.
591
00:32:25,443 --> 00:32:28,945
- That explains the stickshaker.
- Yup, false alarm.
592
00:32:30,572 --> 00:32:33,617
- The plane was never
in danger of stalling.
593
00:32:33,742 --> 00:32:36,788
The warning was triggered
by faulty pitch data
594
00:32:36,913 --> 00:32:40,208
from a malfunction in an angle
of attack sensor.
595
00:32:40,333 --> 00:32:41,960
- The captain's side
shows a pitch up
596
00:32:42,085 --> 00:32:44,212
of as much as 74 degrees.
597
00:32:44,337 --> 00:32:46,838
The first officer's
side is correct,
598
00:32:47,005 --> 00:32:49,341
a steady 15-degree pitch.
599
00:32:49,509 --> 00:32:50,969
- Investigators discover
600
00:32:51,094 --> 00:32:54,137
the malfunction was only
on the captain's side.
601
00:32:54,262 --> 00:32:58,558
- So, up until this point,
the flight is actually fine.
602
00:32:59,309 --> 00:33:01,561
- On the Ethiopian airplane,
603
00:33:01,687 --> 00:33:04,107
something happened
to that sensor
604
00:33:04,232 --> 00:33:05,942
just shortly after takeoff.
605
00:33:07,151 --> 00:33:11,030
- So one faulty sensor
brings down the plane?
606
00:33:11,947 --> 00:33:14,575
(Lorenda): A single failure
should not be catastrophic.
607
00:33:14,701 --> 00:33:16,911
There should be backup,
there should be redundancies
608
00:33:17,036 --> 00:33:20,664
so if there is something that
occurs within the system
609
00:33:20,831 --> 00:33:25,086
that the crew should be able
to counter it.
610
00:33:27,046 --> 00:33:30,841
- The FDR data can show us
when the MCAS activated.
611
00:33:32,343 --> 00:33:37,097
- The team studies how MCAS
behaved for Flight 302.
612
00:33:38,182 --> 00:33:42,854
- Here, here, and here.
613
00:33:43,020 --> 00:33:45,732
The plane pitches down
even though the pilots
614
00:33:45,897 --> 00:33:48,317
are pulling up
on their control columns.
615
00:33:49,152 --> 00:33:52,362
- The faulty sensor led to
four separate activations
616
00:33:52,529 --> 00:33:54,239
of the MCAS system,
617
00:33:54,407 --> 00:33:56,451
driving the plane's nose down
618
00:33:56,576 --> 00:33:59,203
as the pilots
were trying to pitch up.
619
00:34:00,163 --> 00:34:02,831
The fourth MCAS activation
pitched the nose down
620
00:34:02,956 --> 00:34:06,710
when the plane was only
6,000 feet above the ground.
621
00:34:07,795 --> 00:34:10,590
It put the plane into
a steep and rapid descent...
622
00:34:10,757 --> 00:34:12,467
- Pitch up! Pitch up!
623
00:34:12,592 --> 00:34:15,094
- ...from which the pilots
could not recover.
624
00:34:15,260 --> 00:34:16,762
(automated voice): Pull up.
625
00:34:17,596 --> 00:34:19,931
(metal clattering)
626
00:34:22,268 --> 00:34:25,146
(narrator): So why couldn't
the pilots disable the MCAS
627
00:34:25,271 --> 00:34:28,565
even though they followed
the recommended procedure?
628
00:34:29,233 --> 00:34:32,527
Investigators examine
Flight 302's speed
629
00:34:32,652 --> 00:34:36,074
leading up to the crew's
attempt to override the MCAS.
630
00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:39,951
- They lift off at 140 knots.
Absolutely perfect.
631
00:34:40,119 --> 00:34:43,873
But as they climb,
their speed increases.
632
00:34:43,998 --> 00:34:46,416
It reaches 340 knots
633
00:34:46,583 --> 00:34:48,878
by the time they try to use
manual trim.
634
00:34:49,878 --> 00:34:52,757
The overspeed warning
sounds here
635
00:34:52,882 --> 00:34:55,550
and stays on
for the rest of the flight.
636
00:34:56,177 --> 00:35:02,016
(John): Normally, you would be
in the 220-250 knot range.
637
00:35:02,141 --> 00:35:04,976
This was a hundred knots
plus faster than that.
638
00:35:05,645 --> 00:35:07,813
- No wonder they couldn't
move their trim wheel.
639
00:35:09,815 --> 00:35:13,527
- The speed increased the air
load on the stabilizer,
640
00:35:13,652 --> 00:35:15,695
making it impossible
for the pilots
641
00:35:15,822 --> 00:35:18,616
to move it manually
with their trim wheel.
642
00:35:20,451 --> 00:35:23,036
(straining)
- It's not working.
643
00:35:25,831 --> 00:35:27,958
- Once you get to high speed,
644
00:35:28,125 --> 00:35:32,003
you're no longer strong enough
as a human to move it.
645
00:35:34,465 --> 00:35:35,882
- Why such high speed?
646
00:35:36,007 --> 00:35:38,594
- Have a look at their
auto-throttle setting.
647
00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:39,719
They lift off
648
00:35:39,846 --> 00:35:42,056
with the auto-throttle
in takeoff mode.
649
00:35:42,181 --> 00:35:43,306
Right about here,
650
00:35:43,474 --> 00:35:46,936
the auto-throttle should be
pulling back from takeoff thrust
651
00:35:47,061 --> 00:35:48,311
to climb thrust.
652
00:35:49,105 --> 00:35:53,650
But that never happens.
It stays at max takeoff thrust.
653
00:35:54,652 --> 00:35:56,945
- Same sensor, I guess.
- Uh-huh.
654
00:35:57,070 --> 00:35:59,114
- The auto-throttle
is also connected
655
00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:02,076
to the left-side
angle of attack sensor.
656
00:36:02,201 --> 00:36:03,911
- Once the sensor failed,
657
00:36:04,036 --> 00:36:06,621
that disabled
the auto throttle system,
658
00:36:06,746 --> 00:36:09,083
so the power stayed
where it was.
659
00:36:11,835 --> 00:36:13,838
- We're having flight
control problems.
660
00:36:14,005 --> 00:36:16,590
- As they dealt with
the escalating crisis,
661
00:36:16,715 --> 00:36:19,677
the pilots didn't notice
that their thrust levers
662
00:36:19,802 --> 00:36:22,804
remained at maximum
takeoff power.
663
00:36:23,264 --> 00:36:25,016
- 737s are very powerful jets.
664
00:36:25,141 --> 00:36:30,188
And they will continue
to accelerate very rapidly
665
00:36:30,313 --> 00:36:32,063
if you don't reduce the power.
666
00:36:33,648 --> 00:36:35,650
- Boeing didn't say anything
about the trim wheel
667
00:36:35,775 --> 00:36:37,695
being difficult to move.
668
00:36:38,570 --> 00:36:40,780
- Or about airspeed.
669
00:36:42,574 --> 00:36:45,828
- The Ethiopian investigators
now turn their attention
670
00:36:45,953 --> 00:36:50,541
to the advice Boeing gave pilots
after the Lion Air accident.
671
00:36:50,666 --> 00:36:52,083
- The Lion Air flight
672
00:36:52,250 --> 00:36:54,837
had necessitated
this airworthiness directive.
673
00:36:54,962 --> 00:36:57,715
So the question becomes,
was that enough?
674
00:36:58,715 --> 00:37:00,175
- No mention of MCAS.
675
00:37:00,300 --> 00:37:04,639
No mention of how much force
may be needed to trim manually.
676
00:37:04,764 --> 00:37:07,058
No mention of airspeed.
677
00:37:07,599 --> 00:37:10,061
- That's a lot to leave out.
678
00:37:10,228 --> 00:37:12,938
- The investigation
has uncovered shortcomings
679
00:37:13,105 --> 00:37:17,275
in the guidance Boeing provided
following the Lion Air accident.
680
00:37:19,779 --> 00:37:22,739
In Indonesia, investigators
have discovered
681
00:37:22,907 --> 00:37:24,784
that a maintenance error
led to the failure
682
00:37:24,951 --> 00:37:28,621
of the crucial angle of attack,
or A-O-A sensor,
683
00:37:28,788 --> 00:37:30,248
in the Lion Air Accident.
684
00:37:30,373 --> 00:37:33,960
What caused its failure
on the Ethiopian flight?
685
00:37:36,963 --> 00:37:39,507
Investigators examine
maintenance records
686
00:37:39,632 --> 00:37:41,425
for any evidence of trouble.
687
00:37:41,592 --> 00:37:43,760
(Lorenda): So the Ethiopian
investigation did look into
688
00:37:43,885 --> 00:37:47,056
the maintenance to the sensor.
There was none.
689
00:37:47,181 --> 00:37:50,101
It's the original
install to the airplane.
690
00:37:50,809 --> 00:37:53,853
- They do uncover several
other maintenance issues
691
00:37:53,980 --> 00:37:56,273
on the four-month-old plane.
692
00:38:01,695 --> 00:38:04,907
- That's a lot of electrical
faults for a brand-new airplane.
693
00:38:05,032 --> 00:38:09,119
- The Ethiopian team suspects
the A-O-A sensor on Flight 302
694
00:38:09,244 --> 00:38:11,454
failed due to an underlying
electrical fault.
695
00:38:11,621 --> 00:38:16,835
The sensor failure is also being
scrutinized by the NTSB.
696
00:38:17,003 --> 00:38:20,505
- We also looked at how
the A-O-A could fail
697
00:38:20,672 --> 00:38:22,967
and what that failure
would look like.
698
00:38:23,967 --> 00:38:26,971
- That analysis is coming to
a very different conclusion
699
00:38:27,137 --> 00:38:29,306
about the origins
of the failure.
700
00:38:29,472 --> 00:38:31,349
(vehicle honking)
701
00:38:35,813 --> 00:38:38,273
- 44 seconds after
they start to roll,
702
00:38:38,398 --> 00:38:39,817
this happens.
703
00:38:39,983 --> 00:38:42,235
The captain's
angle of attack, airspeed,
704
00:38:42,360 --> 00:38:44,112
and altitude values deviate.
705
00:38:44,237 --> 00:38:47,699
- The NTSB travels
to Collins Aerospace,
706
00:38:47,867 --> 00:38:50,578
the manufacturer of
the angle of attack sensor,
707
00:38:50,703 --> 00:38:53,621
and asks their engineers
to look at the fault data
708
00:38:53,748 --> 00:38:55,498
for Flight 302.
709
00:38:55,666 --> 00:38:56,916
- Six seconds later,
710
00:38:57,043 --> 00:38:59,503
the heater on the sensor
goes offline.
711
00:39:01,838 --> 00:39:05,800
(beeping)
- Master caution, anti-ice.
712
00:39:05,925 --> 00:39:07,469
- Okay...
713
00:39:08,012 --> 00:39:12,516
- These simultaneous failures
all point to one thing.
714
00:39:12,683 --> 00:39:15,643
- The sensor broke off,
it's the only explanation.
715
00:39:16,771 --> 00:39:18,646
- To determine what
could have caused
716
00:39:18,773 --> 00:39:20,565
the sensor to break off...
717
00:39:21,483 --> 00:39:23,235
- Have a look at this.
718
00:39:24,110 --> 00:39:28,574
- ...they compare the FDR data
to data from a bird strike.
719
00:39:28,741 --> 00:39:30,867
- They're almost identical.
720
00:39:31,911 --> 00:39:36,248
(Lorenda): The U.S.
investigation side
721
00:39:36,414 --> 00:39:42,545
felt that the data supported
more of a in-flight impact
722
00:39:42,670 --> 00:39:45,715
with the angle of attack sensor.
723
00:39:47,009 --> 00:39:50,554
- The hazard posed by eagles
and other large birds
724
00:39:50,721 --> 00:39:53,056
is well-known at
Addis Ababa's airport.
725
00:39:53,181 --> 00:39:56,811
- The airport in Addis Ababa had
had problems with bird strikes.
726
00:39:56,936 --> 00:40:00,021
The airport had several
mitigation strategies in place
727
00:40:00,146 --> 00:40:01,565
because of that.
728
00:40:03,317 --> 00:40:04,485
(automated voice): V1.
729
00:40:04,610 --> 00:40:06,070
- Rotate.
730
00:40:06,904 --> 00:40:08,905
- Collins Aerospace
concludes that,
731
00:40:09,072 --> 00:40:11,867
as Flight 302
lifted off the ground,
732
00:40:11,992 --> 00:40:16,913
a bird struck the sensor,
tearing the vane from the hub.
733
00:40:17,539 --> 00:40:18,666
- Gear up.
734
00:40:18,791 --> 00:40:20,918
(stick whirring)
735
00:40:23,628 --> 00:40:25,338
- We are having flight
control problems.
736
00:40:25,463 --> 00:40:26,799
- Whether the sensor failed
737
00:40:26,965 --> 00:40:29,427
due to electrical failure
or a bird strike,
738
00:40:29,592 --> 00:40:34,264
investigators now know why
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302
739
00:40:34,389 --> 00:40:36,851
crashed shortly after takeoff.
740
00:40:36,976 --> 00:40:39,395
- Here's the chain of events.
741
00:40:40,311 --> 00:40:44,315
The failed sensor triggers
a series of warnings and alarms.
742
00:40:48,320 --> 00:40:50,239
- Gear up.
(stick whirring)
743
00:40:55,494 --> 00:40:56,786
(alarm beeping)
744
00:40:56,954 --> 00:40:58,998
- The erroneous
angle of attack data
745
00:40:59,164 --> 00:41:03,418
causes MCAS to activate,
pitching the nose down.
746
00:41:03,543 --> 00:41:08,757
(automated voice): Don't sink.
Don't sink. Don't sink.
747
00:41:11,927 --> 00:41:13,429
- They do what Boeing recommends
748
00:41:13,554 --> 00:41:15,221
and move the trim
switches to cutout.
749
00:41:16,097 --> 00:41:18,641
- Stab trim cutout?
Stab trim cutout?
750
00:41:18,766 --> 00:41:19,893
- Yes, yes do it!
751
00:41:21,728 --> 00:41:23,146
- Stab trim cutout.
752
00:41:23,313 --> 00:41:26,650
- But they're unable
to manually trim.
753
00:41:26,775 --> 00:41:28,985
The wheel is almost
impossible to move.
754
00:41:29,862 --> 00:41:31,362
They never recover.
755
00:41:34,366 --> 00:41:37,786
(grunting with effort)
756
00:41:37,911 --> 00:41:41,456
- Not enough pitch.
Not enough pitch!
757
00:41:41,581 --> 00:41:43,291
- It was very obvious to them
758
00:41:43,416 --> 00:41:45,835
that they no longer
had control of the airplane
759
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:48,255
and that they couldn't
stop this.
760
00:41:48,380 --> 00:41:50,132
Recovery was impossible.
761
00:41:50,799 --> 00:41:54,344
- Pitch up! Pitch!
762
00:41:54,844 --> 00:41:56,764
Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!
763
00:41:58,933 --> 00:42:01,976
(emotional music)
764
00:42:07,565 --> 00:42:10,110
(metal clattering)
765
00:42:14,907 --> 00:42:16,909
(narrator): For the NTSB,
766
00:42:17,076 --> 00:42:20,036
the MAX 8 accidents
provided a valuable lesson
767
00:42:20,161 --> 00:42:23,666
about assumptions
made by aircraft manufacturers
768
00:42:23,791 --> 00:42:27,043
regarding how pilots
respond to emergencies.
769
00:42:27,168 --> 00:42:28,545
- I think these two accidents
770
00:42:28,670 --> 00:42:29,880
are gonna be
the watershed events
771
00:42:30,047 --> 00:42:31,882
on how we look at
the human factors
772
00:42:32,049 --> 00:42:34,384
for design and certification.
773
00:42:35,927 --> 00:42:38,012
- As a result
of the two accidents,
774
00:42:38,137 --> 00:42:42,351
Boeing overhauls
the MAX 8's MCAS system.
775
00:42:42,476 --> 00:42:46,813
The MCAS system now relies
on information from two sensors.
776
00:42:46,938 --> 00:42:49,275
It will only activate once,
777
00:42:49,440 --> 00:42:52,110
and it will not override
pilots' ability
778
00:42:52,277 --> 00:42:54,862
to control the airplane
with the control column.
779
00:42:54,989 --> 00:42:57,782
Boeing also offers pilots
enhanced training
780
00:42:57,949 --> 00:42:59,492
on the MCAS system.
781
00:43:02,788 --> 00:43:07,918
Many feel the changes Boeing
made to the MAX 8 came too late.
782
00:43:11,880 --> 00:43:14,007
- Ethiopian 302
should have been prevented.
783
00:43:14,132 --> 00:43:17,677
Boeing should have got to
the root causes of the problems
784
00:43:17,802 --> 00:43:19,429
on the Lion Air flight.
785
00:43:19,554 --> 00:43:20,389
Boeing didn't.
786
00:43:21,056 --> 00:43:23,934
- For the devastated family
of Danielle Moore,
787
00:43:24,059 --> 00:43:25,561
Boeing's greater failure
788
00:43:25,686 --> 00:43:29,607
was not advising pilots
about the danger of MCAS.
789
00:43:29,773 --> 00:43:31,190
- The bulletin from Boeing
790
00:43:31,317 --> 00:43:34,612
was not good enough
to prevent an accident.
791
00:43:34,737 --> 00:43:37,197
The plane was still unsafe.
792
00:43:39,366 --> 00:43:45,288
And it cost the life
of my daughter and 157 people.
793
00:43:50,293 --> 00:43:54,590
- In November 2020,
after a 20-month grounding,
794
00:43:54,715 --> 00:43:57,300
the MAX 8 is cleared to fly.
795
00:43:57,467 --> 00:43:59,802
(soft piano music)
796
00:43:59,969 --> 00:44:03,222
Subtitling: difuze
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