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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,082 --> 00:00:01,334 - Rotate. 2 00:00:05,797 --> 00:00:09,134 (narrator): Just seconds after takeoff from Addis Ababa... 3 00:00:09,259 --> 00:00:10,552 - Gear up. 4 00:00:10,718 --> 00:00:13,762 - ...the pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 5 00:00:13,887 --> 00:00:15,265 are faced with an emergency. 6 00:00:15,390 --> 00:00:17,850 - Master caution, anti-ice. 7 00:00:19,853 --> 00:00:24,107 - You're literally fighting to maintain control of the jet. 8 00:00:24,232 --> 00:00:26,317 - Stab trim cutout? - Yes, yes, do it! 9 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:29,278 - But the procedure they've been taught 10 00:00:29,403 --> 00:00:32,365 for the Boeing 737 MAX 8... 11 00:00:33,658 --> 00:00:34,701 ...doesn't work. 12 00:00:34,826 --> 00:00:37,202 - They knew what to do and they tried to do it. 13 00:00:37,327 --> 00:00:39,329 - Investigators are astonished. 14 00:00:39,455 --> 00:00:41,750 If the pilots knew the proper procedure, 15 00:00:41,915 --> 00:00:43,710 why didn't it work? 16 00:00:44,293 --> 00:00:45,878 - Boeing didn't say anything about the trim wheel 17 00:00:46,045 --> 00:00:47,463 being difficult to move. 18 00:00:47,588 --> 00:00:49,882 (whirring) 19 00:00:50,424 --> 00:00:52,218 - Could the pilots have been misled 20 00:00:52,343 --> 00:00:54,387 about how to save their plane? 21 00:00:54,554 --> 00:00:57,724 - They still left the Boeing MAX unairworthy, 22 00:00:57,891 --> 00:01:02,771 and it cost the life of my daughter and 157 people. 23 00:01:02,936 --> 00:01:04,063 (intense music) 24 00:01:04,188 --> 00:01:05,482 - Mayday, mayday! 25 00:01:07,275 --> 00:01:09,611 (rapid beeping) 26 00:01:10,861 --> 00:01:13,656 (indistinct radio chatter) 27 00:01:16,950 --> 00:01:18,828 (electricity crackling) 28 00:01:28,962 --> 00:01:32,759 (narrator): Boarding has commenced for 149 passengers 29 00:01:32,926 --> 00:01:36,137 on a short flight from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 00:01:36,304 --> 00:01:37,846 to Nairobi, Kenya. 31 00:01:37,971 --> 00:01:39,641 - Perfect, thank you. 32 00:01:43,352 --> 00:01:45,313 (man): This was really a UN shuttle flight. 33 00:01:45,480 --> 00:01:47,189 There was a UN environmental conference 34 00:01:47,314 --> 00:01:48,983 happening in Nairobi so, 35 00:01:49,150 --> 00:01:50,651 there were about a couple dozen people on the plane 36 00:01:50,818 --> 00:01:52,945 who were headed to that conference. 37 00:01:55,240 --> 00:01:57,282 - All right, ground equipment is removed 38 00:01:57,449 --> 00:01:58,951 and engine area is clear. 39 00:01:59,076 --> 00:02:04,122 - The captain on today's fight is 29-year-old Yared Getachew. 40 00:02:04,248 --> 00:02:05,542 - The captain was considered 41 00:02:05,667 --> 00:02:07,627 one of the best pilots in the airline. 42 00:02:07,794 --> 00:02:08,669 He had 8,000 hours 43 00:02:08,836 --> 00:02:11,506 which was unheard of for someone that young. 44 00:02:13,174 --> 00:02:14,842 - Before Start checklist complete. 45 00:02:15,008 --> 00:02:16,468 Request pushback clearance. 46 00:02:16,593 --> 00:02:20,514 - Ground, Ethiopian 302 requesting pushback clearance. 47 00:02:20,681 --> 00:02:24,519 - 25-year-old Ahmed Nur Mohammed is the First Officer. 48 00:02:24,686 --> 00:02:27,729 (man on radio): Ethiopian 302 you are cleared to push. 49 00:02:28,730 --> 00:02:30,358 (Peter): Ethiopian Airlines was considered 50 00:02:30,525 --> 00:02:33,026 the model airline in Africa. 51 00:02:33,193 --> 00:02:35,155 It had the best run training school, 52 00:02:35,280 --> 00:02:36,823 and it had a well-oiled system 53 00:02:36,990 --> 00:02:39,533 for bringing new pilots into the airline. 54 00:02:40,742 --> 00:02:43,830 (narrator): They're on a Boeing 737 MAX 8, 55 00:02:43,996 --> 00:02:45,747 a brand-new passenger jet 56 00:02:45,873 --> 00:02:48,710 that's already at the centre of a major investigation 57 00:02:48,877 --> 00:02:50,336 in Indonesia. 58 00:02:50,502 --> 00:02:53,798 (tense music) 59 00:02:55,216 --> 00:02:56,675 - Five months earlier, 60 00:02:56,800 --> 00:02:59,429 a MAX 8 crashed into the Java Sea 61 00:02:59,554 --> 00:03:02,806 killing all 189 people on board. 62 00:03:05,518 --> 00:03:08,896 That accident is still under investigation. 63 00:03:14,276 --> 00:03:16,528 Just before 8:30AM, 64 00:03:16,695 --> 00:03:19,407 Flight 302 taxies towards the runway 65 00:03:19,574 --> 00:03:22,994 at Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport. 66 00:03:24,037 --> 00:03:25,038 - Ethiopian three-zero-two, 67 00:03:25,163 --> 00:03:26,705 cross runway zero-seven left at alpha 68 00:03:26,872 --> 00:03:28,498 and hold short of zero-seven right. 69 00:03:28,625 --> 00:03:30,210 (First Officer): Cross zero-seven left at alpha 70 00:03:30,376 --> 00:03:33,503 and hold short, Ethiopian three-zero-two. 71 00:03:34,588 --> 00:03:36,549 - Pre-Takeoff checklist, please. 72 00:03:37,967 --> 00:03:39,551 - Landing lights. 73 00:03:40,844 --> 00:03:41,888 - On. 74 00:03:47,100 --> 00:03:49,520 - Among the passengers on today's flight 75 00:03:49,645 --> 00:03:53,566 is 24-year-old Canadian, Danielle Moore. 76 00:03:55,276 --> 00:03:57,778 She is travelling to the UN summit. 77 00:03:59,112 --> 00:04:01,741 - She really astonished us when she told us that 78 00:04:01,907 --> 00:04:04,577 she would be going to the United Nations 79 00:04:04,702 --> 00:04:06,578 Environmental Assembly in Nairobi. 80 00:04:06,746 --> 00:04:10,624 And she was selected out of a number of people. 81 00:04:10,792 --> 00:04:13,503 We thought this was so tremendous. 82 00:04:16,589 --> 00:04:19,758 - Flight 302 reaches Runway 07 Right, 83 00:04:19,926 --> 00:04:21,678 the longest runway at the airport. 84 00:04:21,803 --> 00:04:23,595 (First Officer): Ethiopian three-zero-two 85 00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:25,097 ready for departure. 86 00:04:25,265 --> 00:04:26,808 - Three-zero-two, clear for takeoff, 87 00:04:26,974 --> 00:04:27,808 runway seven right. 88 00:04:27,976 --> 00:04:29,102 Have a good flight. 89 00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:36,943 - Ready? - Ready. 90 00:04:37,109 --> 00:04:40,530 (uplifting music) 91 00:04:42,532 --> 00:04:44,784 Takeoff thrust set. 92 00:04:49,455 --> 00:04:51,123 Speed increasing. 93 00:04:56,503 --> 00:04:59,631 (heartbeat pulsing) 94 00:05:03,135 --> 00:05:06,097 (narrator): Flight 302 departs on time. 95 00:05:11,352 --> 00:05:14,479 The 725-mile flight to Nairobi 96 00:05:14,647 --> 00:05:16,982 should take just over two hours. 97 00:05:19,193 --> 00:05:20,902 - The MAX 8 was designed for routes like this. 98 00:05:21,029 --> 00:05:23,864 It's a short hop, quick turnaround plane. 99 00:05:25,532 --> 00:05:27,034 It also had much more fuel efficiency 100 00:05:27,200 --> 00:05:30,996 compared to the previous version of the MAX, about 20 percent. 101 00:05:32,457 --> 00:05:33,749 (automated voice): V1. 102 00:05:33,874 --> 00:05:35,126 - Rotate. 103 00:05:50,349 --> 00:05:52,184 Positive rate. 104 00:05:52,352 --> 00:05:53,811 - Gear up. 105 00:05:55,604 --> 00:05:57,147 - Gear up. 106 00:05:57,272 --> 00:05:59,525 (narrator): Less than ten seconds after takeoff, 107 00:05:59,691 --> 00:06:02,027 the pilots get a stick shaker warning, 108 00:06:02,195 --> 00:06:04,280 indicating that they're in danger of losing lift 109 00:06:04,405 --> 00:06:06,073 and could stall. 110 00:06:06,239 --> 00:06:08,368 - If you experience a stall right after departure, 111 00:06:08,493 --> 00:06:11,496 it can be extremely serious. 112 00:06:12,330 --> 00:06:15,499 - Captain Getachew reduces his plane's pitch angle 113 00:06:15,624 --> 00:06:17,210 in an effort to prevent a stall. 114 00:06:17,376 --> 00:06:20,880 (woman): If you are taking off and you get a stick shaker, 115 00:06:21,005 --> 00:06:22,297 crews are going to be hesitant, you know, 116 00:06:22,422 --> 00:06:23,758 to push their nose over 117 00:06:23,924 --> 00:06:25,717 because they're close to the ground. 118 00:06:29,388 --> 00:06:30,472 (beeping) 119 00:06:30,597 --> 00:06:33,142 (First Officer): Master caution, anti-ice. 120 00:06:33,267 --> 00:06:34,936 - Okay... 121 00:06:37,270 --> 00:06:38,731 - When master cautions come on, 122 00:06:38,856 --> 00:06:41,943 the first thing is to diagnose what's occurred 123 00:06:42,109 --> 00:06:46,155 and consider what implications it has on the flight. 124 00:06:47,782 --> 00:06:49,741 (sighs) - What's going on? 125 00:06:49,909 --> 00:06:51,869 - Captain Getachew doesn't understand 126 00:06:51,994 --> 00:06:53,662 what's behind the multiple warnings. 127 00:06:53,787 --> 00:06:55,705 - There's a lot going on here 128 00:06:55,832 --> 00:06:58,792 and it's a very distracting, loud environment 129 00:06:58,960 --> 00:07:00,669 with the stick shaker going. 130 00:07:02,546 --> 00:07:03,965 Where do you start 131 00:07:04,131 --> 00:07:09,094 to deal with this complex emergency that you have? 132 00:07:10,847 --> 00:07:14,851 - Flight 302 is only a few hundred feet off the ground 133 00:07:14,976 --> 00:07:18,186 as the pilots struggle to understand the problem. 134 00:07:21,065 --> 00:07:23,109 As far as passengers are concerned, 135 00:07:23,275 --> 00:07:25,152 this is a routine takeoff. 136 00:07:25,318 --> 00:07:27,989 (tense music) 137 00:07:28,155 --> 00:07:30,116 (stick whirring) 138 00:07:30,241 --> 00:07:31,575 - Okay, contact radar. 139 00:07:31,700 --> 00:07:35,037 - Captain Getachew decides to continue climbing. 140 00:07:35,162 --> 00:07:36,330 - If you have a problem, 141 00:07:36,496 --> 00:07:38,582 the thing you wanna do is get it away from the ground 142 00:07:38,707 --> 00:07:42,210 where you can sort through your problems. 143 00:07:42,962 --> 00:07:46,299 - Radar, Ethiopian three-zero-two, good morning. 144 00:07:46,465 --> 00:07:48,842 Crossing 8,400 145 00:07:49,010 --> 00:07:50,969 and climbing to three-two-zero. 146 00:07:51,136 --> 00:07:54,140 - First Officer Mohammed reports his altitude, 147 00:07:54,306 --> 00:07:56,976 8,400 feet above sea level, 148 00:07:57,143 --> 00:08:00,645 which is only 750 feet above the ground. 149 00:08:01,981 --> 00:08:05,193 - Continue climb to flight level three-four-zero. 150 00:08:05,859 --> 00:08:07,486 (First Officer): Climb to three-four-zero, 151 00:08:07,611 --> 00:08:09,362 Ethiopian three-zero-two. 152 00:08:10,071 --> 00:08:11,782 - Flaps up. 153 00:08:13,075 --> 00:08:14,202 - Flaps up. 154 00:08:14,784 --> 00:08:15,828 (narrator): Retracting the flaps 155 00:08:15,995 --> 00:08:18,706 should help the aircraft climb... 156 00:08:21,583 --> 00:08:23,836 ...but it has the opposite effect. 157 00:08:24,002 --> 00:08:26,005 1,500 feet from the ground, 158 00:08:26,130 --> 00:08:31,010 the jetliner with 157 people on board begins to fall. 159 00:08:31,135 --> 00:08:33,346 - We are having flight control problems. 160 00:08:34,096 --> 00:08:36,933 (automated voice): Don't sink. Don't sink. 161 00:08:37,058 --> 00:08:42,270 - You've gone from a series of cautions, 162 00:08:42,395 --> 00:08:44,732 a series of system malfunctions, 163 00:08:44,899 --> 00:08:46,900 now into a flight control problem 164 00:08:47,068 --> 00:08:50,862 where you're literally fighting to maintain control of the jet. 165 00:08:54,574 --> 00:08:58,246 - Passengers now sense that there is something wrong. 166 00:09:00,456 --> 00:09:02,707 - One woman whose brother was on the airplane 167 00:09:02,875 --> 00:09:05,794 and he called her soon after takeoff. 168 00:09:06,879 --> 00:09:08,838 He knew something was wrong. 169 00:09:09,549 --> 00:09:12,717 The plane was not climbing the way aircraft normally do. 170 00:09:12,885 --> 00:09:16,597 - The 737's nose continues to pitch down. 171 00:09:16,764 --> 00:09:18,140 - Trim... 172 00:09:18,265 --> 00:09:23,062 - Captain Getachew uses the trim switch to level his plane. 173 00:09:23,895 --> 00:09:26,023 The trim switch controls the position 174 00:09:26,148 --> 00:09:27,900 of the horizontal stabilizer, 175 00:09:28,067 --> 00:09:30,736 keeping the plane balanced during flight. 176 00:09:30,903 --> 00:09:34,030 It can be used to adjust the pitch of the airplane. 177 00:09:35,448 --> 00:09:39,286 Captain Getachew manages to raise the nose slightly, 178 00:09:40,704 --> 00:09:42,247 but not for long. 179 00:09:44,082 --> 00:09:46,084 The plane dips again, 180 00:09:46,251 --> 00:09:48,212 bringing it closer to the ground. 181 00:09:48,337 --> 00:09:50,588 (automated voice): Too low. Terrain. 182 00:09:50,756 --> 00:09:53,259 (narrator): And the pilots are struggling. 183 00:09:53,884 --> 00:09:55,428 (automated voice): Too low. Terrain. 184 00:09:55,553 --> 00:09:59,390 - Now you start dealing with how do we regain control, 185 00:10:00,308 --> 00:10:03,602 and to keep the nose up while we sort through this. 186 00:10:03,769 --> 00:10:06,313 And that's where the time can become critical. 187 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:08,815 (music intensifies) 188 00:10:11,485 --> 00:10:14,447 (straining) - Pull up. Pull up! 189 00:10:15,238 --> 00:10:17,699 (narrator): Less than three minutes after takeoff 190 00:10:17,824 --> 00:10:20,578 and only 1,800 feet above the ground, 191 00:10:20,703 --> 00:10:23,789 the pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 192 00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,876 are desperately trying to get their plane to climb. 193 00:10:27,001 --> 00:10:28,501 - Pull up! 194 00:10:28,669 --> 00:10:31,713 - Okay, advise we maintain 6,500. 195 00:10:31,838 --> 00:10:33,716 We have a flight control problem. 196 00:10:34,382 --> 00:10:36,802 - They're trying to reach the minimum safe altitude 197 00:10:36,968 --> 00:10:38,971 surrounding the airport. 198 00:10:41,390 --> 00:10:43,308 (First Officer): Ethiopian three-zero-two, 199 00:10:43,476 --> 00:10:45,394 we'd like to maintain 6,500. 200 00:10:45,519 --> 00:10:47,645 We have a flight control problem. 201 00:10:47,813 --> 00:10:48,938 - Say again? 202 00:10:49,064 --> 00:10:50,524 - We have a flight control problem 203 00:10:50,690 --> 00:10:52,985 and we'd like to maintain 6,500. 204 00:10:53,986 --> 00:10:55,780 - Approved and report intention. 205 00:10:55,905 --> 00:10:59,033 - We'll call you. Ethiopian three-zero-two. 206 00:11:00,034 --> 00:11:01,493 (John): First and foremost they said, 207 00:11:01,659 --> 00:11:03,203 "Okay, we have a flight control problem," 208 00:11:03,371 --> 00:11:04,413 and that says 209 00:11:04,538 --> 00:11:05,789 get other airplanes away from me. 210 00:11:05,914 --> 00:11:08,918 And that was a very appropriate thing to do. 211 00:11:09,669 --> 00:11:11,669 - Set 6,500. 212 00:11:12,797 --> 00:11:14,339 - 6,500 set. 213 00:11:18,385 --> 00:11:19,886 (beeping) - Speed! 214 00:11:20,054 --> 00:11:23,223 (narrator): As they fight to climb to 6,500 feet, 215 00:11:23,390 --> 00:11:26,852 the plane's speed becomes dangerously high. 216 00:11:30,398 --> 00:11:33,275 They try to raise the plane's nose further 217 00:11:33,400 --> 00:11:35,151 to decrease speed. 218 00:11:35,276 --> 00:11:37,237 - Pitch up with me. 219 00:11:40,073 --> 00:11:43,493 - Even with both pilots pulling back on their control columns, 220 00:11:43,618 --> 00:11:45,413 the plane refuses to climb. 221 00:11:45,578 --> 00:11:49,500 - The forces necessary to hold that yoke are increasing 222 00:11:49,625 --> 00:11:51,419 and they're increasing quite rapidly. 223 00:12:03,805 --> 00:12:06,058 - Less than minutes into the flight, 224 00:12:06,225 --> 00:12:09,270 Captain Getachew decides to turn around. 225 00:12:09,437 --> 00:12:11,020 - Request a return vector. 226 00:12:11,146 --> 00:12:12,939 - Radar, Ethiopian three-zero-two 227 00:12:13,107 --> 00:12:14,983 requesting vector back to airport. 228 00:12:15,108 --> 00:12:17,486 (Peter): There was a lot going on in that cockpit. 229 00:12:17,611 --> 00:12:18,821 There were indicators going off 230 00:12:18,946 --> 00:12:20,530 showing a disagreement in altitude, 231 00:12:20,655 --> 00:12:22,323 disagreement in airspeed. 232 00:12:22,449 --> 00:12:23,951 The stick shaker was going off. 233 00:12:24,117 --> 00:12:26,245 So the best thing for them to do was to turn around. 234 00:12:26,411 --> 00:12:28,872 - Confirm, do you want to hold or make an approach? 235 00:12:28,997 --> 00:12:31,375 - Wish to commence approach. (beeping) 236 00:12:35,044 --> 00:12:36,922 - Turn right to two-six-zero. 237 00:12:39,967 --> 00:12:41,885 - Two-six-zero. 238 00:12:47,098 --> 00:12:49,101 - The pilots have managed to get their plane 239 00:12:49,226 --> 00:12:51,895 to 6,000 feet above the ground. 240 00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,564 - Pitch up with me. Not enough pitch. 241 00:12:54,689 --> 00:12:56,567 Not enough pitch! 242 00:12:56,692 --> 00:12:58,903 - ...but now it starts to plummet. 243 00:12:59,028 --> 00:13:00,446 (automated voice): Sink Rate. 244 00:13:00,612 --> 00:13:03,115 (passengers screaming) 245 00:13:07,995 --> 00:13:10,456 (air whooshing) 246 00:13:11,122 --> 00:13:13,958 (Captain): Pitch up! Pitch! 247 00:13:14,083 --> 00:13:15,836 (automated voice): Terrain, terrain. Pull up. 248 00:13:16,002 --> 00:13:17,462 (Captain): Mayday! Mayday! Mayday! 249 00:13:17,587 --> 00:13:19,464 (automated voice): Terrain, terrain. Pull up. 250 00:13:19,589 --> 00:13:21,634 (pilots screaming) 251 00:13:21,799 --> 00:13:24,385 (intense music) 252 00:13:25,762 --> 00:13:27,139 (metal clattering) 253 00:13:27,305 --> 00:13:29,975 - Flight 302 slams into the ground 254 00:13:30,141 --> 00:13:33,062 just 30 miles from the airport. 255 00:13:35,773 --> 00:13:37,399 It's the second MAX 8 256 00:13:37,525 --> 00:13:40,236 to have crashed in less than five months. 257 00:13:40,361 --> 00:13:41,986 - In today's world, 258 00:13:42,111 --> 00:13:45,448 even a single accident is an extreme rarity. 259 00:13:45,573 --> 00:13:50,328 To have two within five months, it is inconsistent 260 00:13:50,496 --> 00:13:53,164 with the level of safety of modern airliners. 261 00:13:54,040 --> 00:13:56,459 (melancholic music) 262 00:13:56,584 --> 00:14:00,088 - Everyone wants an answer to the same question: 263 00:14:01,048 --> 00:14:04,552 Is there something wrong with Boeing's latest jet? 264 00:14:05,302 --> 00:14:06,720 - We begin tonight with the mystery 265 00:14:06,886 --> 00:14:09,515 swirling around a deadly plane crash overseas. 266 00:14:09,640 --> 00:14:11,933 The new Boeing 737 crashing 267 00:14:12,058 --> 00:14:14,019 just minutes after takeoff in Ethiopia. 268 00:14:14,185 --> 00:14:17,773 157 people were on board the flight 269 00:14:17,898 --> 00:14:19,525 and there were no survivors. 270 00:14:20,818 --> 00:14:23,194 - News of the Ethiopian Airlines crash 271 00:14:23,319 --> 00:14:26,073 quickly makes headlines around the world. 272 00:14:26,991 --> 00:14:30,118 - The phone rang and my wife answered it, 273 00:14:30,243 --> 00:14:32,871 and I recall hearing her scream 274 00:14:32,996 --> 00:14:35,540 and saying, "Danielle is dead." 275 00:14:40,212 --> 00:14:44,049 My hearing her shriek 276 00:14:44,174 --> 00:14:48,053 and saying those words, it was... 277 00:14:48,220 --> 00:14:51,682 it was the death of me, too. I died. 278 00:14:52,890 --> 00:14:59,063 This is the last thing that any father wants to experience. 279 00:15:14,121 --> 00:15:17,915 - A team from Ethiopia's Accident Investigation Bureau 280 00:15:18,082 --> 00:15:22,087 is tasked with finding out why Flight 302 crashed 281 00:15:22,254 --> 00:15:24,631 just five minutes after takeoff. 282 00:15:25,381 --> 00:15:27,425 - To make a crater like this, 283 00:15:28,302 --> 00:15:30,511 the speed must have been tremendous. 284 00:15:32,264 --> 00:15:34,808 - Much of the wreckage is buried in a crater 285 00:15:34,975 --> 00:15:37,102 more than 30 feet deep. 286 00:15:37,227 --> 00:15:40,063 (Lorenda): You can tell that it was in a high energy state, 287 00:15:40,188 --> 00:15:43,150 that just due to it creating a crater, 288 00:15:43,317 --> 00:15:47,196 that it had to have some kind of angle to it. 289 00:15:50,156 --> 00:15:53,618 - The plane's two black boxes are quickly found. 290 00:15:57,039 --> 00:15:59,375 The Ethiopian government decides to send them 291 00:15:59,500 --> 00:16:04,129 to France's investigative agency to have the data downloaded. 292 00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:13,554 In Indonesia, the investigation into the previous MAX 8 accident 293 00:16:13,680 --> 00:16:17,058 is still underway as investigators get the news 294 00:16:17,183 --> 00:16:20,145 about the Ethiopian Airlines accident. 295 00:16:21,355 --> 00:16:26,235 - First time I heard about Ethiopian Flight 302 crash, 296 00:16:26,360 --> 00:16:31,198 I was shocked, knowing that another 737 MAX has gone down. 297 00:16:31,865 --> 00:16:36,245 - The Indonesian accident involves Lion Air Flight 610, 298 00:16:36,370 --> 00:16:38,621 a MAX 8 that took off from Jakarta 299 00:16:38,746 --> 00:16:42,876 with 189 people on board five months earlier. 300 00:16:43,626 --> 00:16:48,339 - I was afraid that the accident was caused by similar issue 301 00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:52,970 with the Lion 601 that we were investigating. 302 00:16:53,095 --> 00:16:54,722 (beeping) 303 00:16:54,887 --> 00:16:59,100 - The Indonesian pilots also began experiencing warnings 304 00:16:59,225 --> 00:17:00,601 shortly after takeoff, 305 00:17:00,728 --> 00:17:04,106 and also reported having flight control problems. 306 00:17:05,607 --> 00:17:08,193 Following a series of altitude fluctuations, 307 00:17:08,359 --> 00:17:11,363 the pilots attempted to return to the airport. 308 00:17:13,365 --> 00:17:16,617 The 737 plunged into the Java Sea 309 00:17:16,743 --> 00:17:19,203 11 minutes after takeoff. 310 00:17:20,079 --> 00:17:21,623 The investigation into that accident 311 00:17:21,749 --> 00:17:26,502 has zeroed in on an electronic system known as MCAS, 312 00:17:26,627 --> 00:17:29,714 the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. 313 00:17:29,839 --> 00:17:32,550 - It's a piece of software in the flight control computer 314 00:17:32,675 --> 00:17:37,181 that directs the stabilizer to push the nose down. 315 00:17:38,639 --> 00:17:41,643 - Investigators in Indonesia have learned that MCAS 316 00:17:41,769 --> 00:17:46,065 was added to the MAX 8 to compensate for a design problem. 317 00:17:46,732 --> 00:17:48,733 - In order to achieve the fuel efficiency 318 00:17:48,858 --> 00:17:50,027 Boeing wanted to, 319 00:17:50,152 --> 00:17:52,195 it needed to put bigger engines on the airplane 320 00:17:52,320 --> 00:17:53,946 and in certain flight conditions, 321 00:17:54,114 --> 00:17:55,907 the nose had a tendency to pitch up, 322 00:17:56,075 --> 00:17:58,618 and that's why MCAS was introduced. 323 00:17:59,703 --> 00:18:02,079 - If the system sensed the plane's nose 324 00:18:02,205 --> 00:18:03,581 was pitched too high, 325 00:18:03,749 --> 00:18:06,667 it would automatically adjust the plane's stabilizer 326 00:18:06,793 --> 00:18:08,670 to lower the nose. 327 00:18:09,462 --> 00:18:12,590 Indonesian investigators have determined that a faulty sensor 328 00:18:12,715 --> 00:18:15,469 on the Lion Air flight led MCAS to conclude 329 00:18:15,635 --> 00:18:18,847 the plane was climbing more steeply than it was, 330 00:18:18,972 --> 00:18:20,766 causing it to activate repeatedly, 331 00:18:20,891 --> 00:18:22,433 until the plane hit the water. 332 00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:24,019 (automated voice): Terrain. Pull up. 333 00:18:24,144 --> 00:18:26,395 - We found that there was some issue 334 00:18:26,521 --> 00:18:28,773 with the design of the system. 335 00:18:30,274 --> 00:18:34,070 (narrator): There are 387 MAX 8's flying worldwide 336 00:18:34,195 --> 00:18:37,324 with another 5,000 on order. 337 00:18:38,282 --> 00:18:40,160 It's rapidly becoming one of Boeing's 338 00:18:40,327 --> 00:18:42,078 most successful airliners. 339 00:18:42,203 --> 00:18:44,289 (Peter): The MAX 8 was the fastest selling aircraft 340 00:18:44,414 --> 00:18:46,083 in Boeing's history. 341 00:18:46,208 --> 00:18:48,793 Airlines were really drawn to the fuel efficiency. 342 00:18:49,545 --> 00:18:51,838 - The pressure is on investigators to determine 343 00:18:52,004 --> 00:18:56,425 if a flaw with MCAS also caused the Ethiopian accident. 344 00:18:56,551 --> 00:18:59,471 (Lorenda): There was worldwide attention to this investigation. 345 00:18:59,596 --> 00:19:02,766 The whole team was under a lot of pressure to get answers 346 00:19:02,891 --> 00:19:04,600 and to find out what happened. 347 00:19:09,522 --> 00:19:12,984 ) 348 00:19:13,109 --> 00:19:15,444 - Ethiopian investigators start with 349 00:19:15,570 --> 00:19:19,407 the last people who spoke to the crew of Flight 302, 350 00:19:19,532 --> 00:19:20,992 air traffic controllers. 351 00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:22,161 - Thanks for your time. 352 00:19:22,286 --> 00:19:23,828 Can you take me through the flight? 353 00:19:23,995 --> 00:19:25,329 - Normal taxi and takeoff. 354 00:19:25,454 --> 00:19:28,333 Nothing unusual until two-and-a-half minutes later 355 00:19:28,458 --> 00:19:30,626 when they reported a flight control problem. 356 00:19:32,962 --> 00:19:35,007 (First Officer): Ethiopian three-zero-two, 357 00:19:35,132 --> 00:19:36,841 we'd like to maintain 6,500, 358 00:19:37,009 --> 00:19:39,552 we have a flight control problem. 359 00:19:40,636 --> 00:19:42,055 - They asked to maintain the current heading 360 00:19:42,222 --> 00:19:44,683 and requested permission to hold at 6,500 feet. 361 00:19:44,849 --> 00:19:47,351 - And you approved the request? 362 00:19:47,476 --> 00:19:49,145 - I did, yes sir. 363 00:19:50,230 --> 00:19:52,523 (narrator): All investigators know is that the pilots 364 00:19:52,648 --> 00:19:55,109 had a flight control problem that developed early 365 00:19:55,234 --> 00:19:58,571 and prevented the crew from continuing the flight. 366 00:19:59,364 --> 00:20:01,032 - They're aware that they were dealing with 367 00:20:01,157 --> 00:20:02,658 a flight control issue. 368 00:20:02,783 --> 00:20:05,703 It would have been helpful if they could have identified 369 00:20:05,870 --> 00:20:09,540 which control surface they were having the problem with. 370 00:20:15,547 --> 00:20:18,841 - The team turns to Flight 302's radar track 371 00:20:18,966 --> 00:20:21,720 to understand the sequence of events. 372 00:20:23,012 --> 00:20:24,513 - Slow, shallow climb out. 373 00:20:27,558 --> 00:20:29,060 Now, look here. 374 00:20:29,228 --> 00:20:31,605 Instead of climbing, they lose altitude, 375 00:20:31,771 --> 00:20:33,315 regain it, then lose more. 376 00:20:33,440 --> 00:20:38,194 - Instead of continuing to climb or to maintain an altitude, 377 00:20:38,319 --> 00:20:41,572 there was actually dips in the altitude. 378 00:20:42,866 --> 00:20:45,160 - The radar data paints a picture 379 00:20:45,285 --> 00:20:48,372 of a crew struggling to keep its plane in a climb. 380 00:20:48,497 --> 00:20:51,040 (automated voice): Don't sink. Don't sink. 381 00:20:53,626 --> 00:20:57,880 - They're trying to get to 6,500 feet 382 00:20:58,005 --> 00:21:01,801 but never get higher than 6,200. 383 00:21:01,969 --> 00:21:05,222 And they're starting to make a turn back to the airport. 384 00:21:06,097 --> 00:21:07,098 Now they're in a dive, 385 00:21:07,266 --> 00:21:10,226 descending at 33,000 feet per minute. 386 00:21:11,478 --> 00:21:13,814 - The speeds were at the maximum for this aircraft. 387 00:21:13,981 --> 00:21:17,776 The intensity inside the plane must have been terrifying. 388 00:21:20,362 --> 00:21:22,446 - Let me see the Lion Air track please. 389 00:21:32,249 --> 00:21:33,458 A slow climb, 390 00:21:33,583 --> 00:21:36,168 a series of altitude fluctuations... 391 00:21:37,753 --> 00:21:41,508 ...a turn back to the airport, and a rapid descent. 392 00:21:42,341 --> 00:21:43,635 They're pretty close. 393 00:21:49,141 --> 00:21:50,808 - The fact that this plane crashed 394 00:21:50,933 --> 00:21:55,062 almost immediately after takeoff in very similar circumstances 395 00:21:55,187 --> 00:21:57,648 raised a lot of questions in everyone's minds. 396 00:21:57,816 --> 00:22:01,028 - Investigators turn to a key piece of the wreckage 397 00:22:01,193 --> 00:22:05,156 for confirmation that MCAS played a role in the accident. 398 00:22:05,281 --> 00:22:07,533 - It's in pretty good shape. We got lucky. 399 00:22:07,701 --> 00:22:11,328 - A jackscrew, the device that controls the position 400 00:22:11,454 --> 00:22:14,624 of the plane's horizontal stabilizer, is recovered. 401 00:22:14,750 --> 00:22:16,542 (digital blipping) 402 00:22:17,418 --> 00:22:19,503 A ball nut moves along the jackscrew 403 00:22:19,671 --> 00:22:22,174 to help adjust the plane's pitch. 404 00:22:26,886 --> 00:22:28,597 - Five inches. 405 00:22:32,224 --> 00:22:33,851 Full nose down trim. 406 00:22:34,728 --> 00:22:36,687 - The evidence shows that the plane 407 00:22:36,812 --> 00:22:39,523 went into its final dive because the stabilizer 408 00:22:39,691 --> 00:22:43,653 had moved to an extreme nose down position. 409 00:22:45,238 --> 00:22:47,074 - Full nose down trim is not something 410 00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:51,453 that you ever see in the normal flight of a 737. 411 00:22:51,578 --> 00:22:54,039 In the 15 years that I flew it, 412 00:22:54,164 --> 00:22:57,876 I don't know that we ever got even close to full nose down. 413 00:23:00,545 --> 00:23:02,755 - The Lion Air flight is identical. 414 00:23:02,923 --> 00:23:06,385 A pitch trim of 1.5 degrees resulting in a rapid descent. 415 00:23:08,427 --> 00:23:10,387 The pilots wouldn't do that. 416 00:23:10,555 --> 00:23:12,973 - The jackscrew all but confirms 417 00:23:13,099 --> 00:23:15,726 that Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 418 00:23:15,851 --> 00:23:17,770 and Lion Air Flight 610 419 00:23:17,937 --> 00:23:19,231 had the same cause, 420 00:23:19,396 --> 00:23:22,901 a malfunction of the plane's electronic MCAS system. 421 00:23:23,068 --> 00:23:25,987 - That was literally the smoking gun 422 00:23:26,113 --> 00:23:27,446 that definitively told them 423 00:23:27,614 --> 00:23:29,366 what had happened to the airplane. 424 00:23:31,076 --> 00:23:32,411 - There's now enough evidence 425 00:23:32,577 --> 00:23:35,454 to convince aviation authorities around the world 426 00:23:35,622 --> 00:23:38,959 that the MAX 8 presents a risk to passengers. 427 00:23:39,126 --> 00:23:42,546 - We're gonna be issuing an emergency order of prohibition 428 00:23:42,671 --> 00:23:48,844 to ground all flights of the 737 MAX 8. 429 00:23:49,552 --> 00:23:53,056 - The question now facing Ethiopian investigators is 430 00:23:53,181 --> 00:23:55,599 how could this have happened again? 431 00:24:00,230 --> 00:24:03,149 - These documents came out four months ago. 432 00:24:03,316 --> 00:24:05,568 - Following the accident in Indonesia, 433 00:24:05,693 --> 00:24:09,114 both Boeing and the FAA issued bulletins 434 00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:11,450 advising pilots of the steps to take 435 00:24:11,616 --> 00:24:14,703 if MCAS began forcing the nose down. 436 00:24:16,078 --> 00:24:19,915 The documents advise pilots to follow the existing procedure 437 00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:24,503 for a malfunctioning trim system and disengage the autopilot, 438 00:24:25,462 --> 00:24:29,300 set the stabilizer trim switches to cutout, 439 00:24:30,218 --> 00:24:32,471 and to use their manual trim wheel 440 00:24:32,596 --> 00:24:36,308 to counteract the automatic downward stabilizer movement. 441 00:24:37,017 --> 00:24:39,810 - Boeing and the FAA felt that the airworthiness directive 442 00:24:39,935 --> 00:24:42,481 was all pilots needed to be able to recover from 443 00:24:42,646 --> 00:24:45,442 what they thought would be an extremely rare event. 444 00:24:53,616 --> 00:24:55,993 - Did the pilots know about this procedure? 445 00:24:56,118 --> 00:24:57,913 - You'd hope so. 446 00:24:59,705 --> 00:25:01,833 (John): The airline has an obligation 447 00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:03,001 to train the pilots 448 00:25:03,167 --> 00:25:06,212 to ensure that there is a sufficient understanding 449 00:25:06,378 --> 00:25:09,382 of what the information is trying to tell them 450 00:25:09,549 --> 00:25:11,760 so that they act appropriately. 451 00:25:12,594 --> 00:25:14,511 - We incorporated the Boeing bulletin 452 00:25:14,678 --> 00:25:16,513 into our flight manual. 453 00:25:23,395 --> 00:25:25,315 - Were your pilots advised of the revision? 454 00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:28,359 - All our pilots were fully briefed, of course. 455 00:25:36,076 --> 00:25:38,369 - The pilots of Flight 302 456 00:25:38,494 --> 00:25:41,414 knew the procedure for disabling MCAS. 457 00:25:41,580 --> 00:25:44,626 The question is, did they follow it? 458 00:25:51,549 --> 00:25:54,469 - Here it is, let's load it up. 459 00:25:54,594 --> 00:25:56,303 - The cockpit voice recording 460 00:25:56,428 --> 00:25:58,722 from Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 461 00:25:58,847 --> 00:26:02,851 has been successfully downloaded by technicians in France. 462 00:26:02,978 --> 00:26:05,396 - Okay, let's hear it. 463 00:26:08,191 --> 00:26:09,358 (automated voice): V1. 464 00:26:09,483 --> 00:26:12,569 (First Officer): Rotate. Positive rate. 465 00:26:13,154 --> 00:26:14,571 (Captain): Gear up. 466 00:26:15,322 --> 00:26:16,657 - Takeoff roll is normal. 467 00:26:16,782 --> 00:26:19,286 (narrator): Investigators listen for clues that can explain 468 00:26:19,452 --> 00:26:22,414 how MCAS brought down the plane. 469 00:26:22,579 --> 00:26:23,914 (First Officer): Climb to three-four-zero. 470 00:26:24,039 --> 00:26:25,750 Ethiopian three-zero-two. 471 00:26:26,751 --> 00:26:28,377 (Captain): Flaps up. 472 00:26:29,296 --> 00:26:30,587 - Flaps up. 473 00:26:30,713 --> 00:26:32,757 (narrator): The MCAS system is designed to activate 474 00:26:32,882 --> 00:26:36,344 only when it senses that three conditions are met: 475 00:26:36,469 --> 00:26:40,097 nose up, flaps fully retracted, 476 00:26:40,264 --> 00:26:42,433 and autopilot off. 477 00:26:42,558 --> 00:26:44,853 (alarm) 478 00:26:45,811 --> 00:26:48,272 - That's the autopilot disconnecting. 479 00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:50,942 - Okay, so now they've met the three conditions 480 00:26:51,108 --> 00:26:52,777 for MCAS activation. 481 00:26:54,487 --> 00:26:57,449 - Investigators continue listening for evidence that 482 00:26:57,616 --> 00:27:01,118 MCAS activated, pitching the plane downwards. 483 00:27:01,869 --> 00:27:03,622 (Captain): We're having flight control problems. 484 00:27:03,747 --> 00:27:05,456 - Right on cue. 485 00:27:06,374 --> 00:27:07,626 (stick whirring) 486 00:27:07,751 --> 00:27:10,002 (automated voice): Don't sink. Don't sink. 487 00:27:10,170 --> 00:27:11,796 - He's losing altitude. 488 00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:15,341 - Don't sink. Don't sink. 489 00:27:15,508 --> 00:27:17,760 - MCAS is pushing the nose down. 490 00:27:19,346 --> 00:27:20,722 (Captain): Trim... 491 00:27:20,847 --> 00:27:25,518 Come on, trim with me. Trim up. Trim up, trim up! 492 00:27:25,684 --> 00:27:27,770 Come on, trim up! (grunting with effort) 493 00:27:27,895 --> 00:27:30,482 (narrator): Investigators hear the pilots struggling 494 00:27:30,607 --> 00:27:32,274 to trim their plane nose up. 495 00:27:32,399 --> 00:27:35,069 - So you begin to get this tug of war 496 00:27:35,194 --> 00:27:37,530 between the pilot trimming nose up 497 00:27:37,696 --> 00:27:40,075 and MCAS trimming nose down. 498 00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:43,078 But MCAS is relentless. It doesn't stop. 499 00:27:43,203 --> 00:27:45,413 - Trim! Trim up. 500 00:27:48,208 --> 00:27:50,376 - The team then hears an exchange 501 00:27:50,542 --> 00:27:52,878 that transforms the investigation. 502 00:27:55,548 --> 00:27:58,343 - Stab trim cutout? Stab trim cutout? 503 00:27:58,510 --> 00:27:59,719 - Yes, yes, do it! 504 00:28:01,346 --> 00:28:03,056 - Stab trim cutout. 505 00:28:03,222 --> 00:28:04,683 - Can you pause for a second? 506 00:28:05,224 --> 00:28:07,394 - They did it. 507 00:28:10,562 --> 00:28:12,190 They set the trim switches to cutout, 508 00:28:12,315 --> 00:28:14,358 exactly as Boeing advised them to do. 509 00:28:14,526 --> 00:28:16,693 (Lorenda): I think that's the surprise. 510 00:28:16,860 --> 00:28:21,407 The crew attempted to do that procedure 511 00:28:21,574 --> 00:28:22,951 and it wasn't successful. 512 00:28:23,076 --> 00:28:26,370 - The autopilot disengaged. We heard the alarm. 513 00:28:27,997 --> 00:28:30,916 They set their stabilizer trim switches to cutout. 514 00:28:32,167 --> 00:28:36,172 Now they need to manually trim to get their nose back up. 515 00:28:36,297 --> 00:28:37,549 Let's hear. 516 00:28:38,590 --> 00:28:40,885 (Captain): Pitch up, pitch up, pitch up. 517 00:28:41,010 --> 00:28:42,553 Do it with me. 518 00:28:43,221 --> 00:28:45,889 (straining) Is the trim engaged? 519 00:28:46,057 --> 00:28:48,725 (First Officer): No. Shall I try manually? 520 00:28:48,893 --> 00:28:49,935 (Captain): Try it! 521 00:28:53,106 --> 00:28:55,149 - The 737 has a manual backup 522 00:28:55,274 --> 00:28:58,235 about how to move trim using cables. 523 00:28:58,403 --> 00:29:01,405 And the wheel has actually got a handle in it 524 00:29:01,572 --> 00:29:03,532 where you can manually trim it. 525 00:29:05,868 --> 00:29:07,744 (straining) - It's not working. 526 00:29:09,664 --> 00:29:11,915 - Not enough pitch. Not enough pitch. 527 00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:13,917 (narrator): But the pilots are not able 528 00:29:14,085 --> 00:29:15,962 to adjust the pitch manually. 529 00:29:16,128 --> 00:29:19,089 - They don't physically have enough strength 530 00:29:19,214 --> 00:29:21,300 to move the horizontal stabilizer 531 00:29:21,468 --> 00:29:23,385 via the manual trim wheel. 532 00:29:24,596 --> 00:29:26,431 - They're trying to do this. 533 00:29:26,556 --> 00:29:28,767 - But it doesn't sound like it's working. 534 00:29:31,644 --> 00:29:34,062 - And then they come up with a solution 535 00:29:34,189 --> 00:29:35,815 that seals their fate. 536 00:29:36,607 --> 00:29:38,777 (Captain): Put them up. 537 00:29:38,902 --> 00:29:41,112 - No. Oh, no. No. 538 00:29:41,780 --> 00:29:44,324 (narrator): Unable to pitch the plane up manually, 539 00:29:44,491 --> 00:29:47,660 the pilots make one final desperate move. 540 00:29:48,536 --> 00:29:50,954 They re-engage the automatic trim 541 00:29:51,079 --> 00:29:53,124 to help move the stabilizer. 542 00:29:56,627 --> 00:29:59,129 (Lorenda): Unfortunately, that wakes the beast. 543 00:29:59,254 --> 00:30:00,507 And then it's gonna sit there 544 00:30:00,673 --> 00:30:02,925 and it's gonna trim it down one more time again 545 00:30:03,050 --> 00:30:05,135 so it works against them. 546 00:30:05,636 --> 00:30:06,805 (automated voice): Caution. Terrain. 547 00:30:06,971 --> 00:30:10,224 (Captain): Pitch up! Pitch up! Pitch up! 548 00:30:10,349 --> 00:30:11,975 - There was no way to control the airplane. 549 00:30:12,100 --> 00:30:14,979 The pitch was going to continue to go nose down. 550 00:30:15,104 --> 00:30:16,314 (alarm beeping) 551 00:30:16,439 --> 00:30:18,232 (automated voice): Caution. Terrain. 552 00:30:18,357 --> 00:30:21,485 Terrain, terrain. Pull up, pull up. 553 00:30:21,653 --> 00:30:23,445 (Captain): Mayday! Mayday! Mayday! 554 00:30:23,570 --> 00:30:26,074 (pilots screaming) 555 00:30:26,199 --> 00:30:27,491 (radio static) 556 00:30:29,868 --> 00:30:33,664 - They knew what to do. They tried to do it. 557 00:30:34,833 --> 00:30:39,671 - But for whatever reason, it didn't work. 558 00:30:41,172 --> 00:30:43,966 (narrator): The Ethiopians have made a stunning discovery; 559 00:30:44,091 --> 00:30:47,553 one they quickly share with the world. 560 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:52,558 - The crew performed all the procedures repeatedly, 561 00:30:52,724 --> 00:30:55,310 provided by the manufacturer, 562 00:30:55,435 --> 00:31:00,066 but was not able to control the aircraft. 563 00:31:04,529 --> 00:31:06,530 - Stab trim cutout? Stab trim cutout? 564 00:31:06,655 --> 00:31:07,824 - Yes, yes, do it! 565 00:31:07,949 --> 00:31:11,452 - Investigators are left with a burning question. 566 00:31:11,578 --> 00:31:12,995 - Stab trim cutout. 567 00:31:13,120 --> 00:31:16,081 - If the pilots did what Boeing advised, 568 00:31:16,249 --> 00:31:19,126 why weren't they able to pull out of the dive 569 00:31:19,251 --> 00:31:20,920 that MCAS put them into? 570 00:31:21,087 --> 00:31:21,921 (Captain): Pitch up! 571 00:31:22,087 --> 00:31:24,214 (intense music) 572 00:31:29,095 --> 00:31:31,638 - Investigators turn to the flight data recorder 573 00:31:31,763 --> 00:31:34,392 from Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 574 00:31:34,517 --> 00:31:37,895 to better understand why MCAS was activated, 575 00:31:38,061 --> 00:31:40,022 causing the plane to crash. 576 00:31:40,772 --> 00:31:44,027 - Right here, ten seconds after takeoff. 577 00:31:44,152 --> 00:31:47,655 Readings for angle of attack, airspeed, and altitude 578 00:31:47,780 --> 00:31:49,406 begin to diverge. 579 00:31:50,491 --> 00:31:52,492 - MCAS is only supposed to activate 580 00:31:52,618 --> 00:31:56,079 when the MAX 8 reaches an extreme angle of attack, 581 00:31:56,247 --> 00:31:57,874 or high-pitch angle. 582 00:31:57,999 --> 00:31:59,250 (digital blipping) 583 00:31:59,375 --> 00:32:01,627 A sensor on each side of the airplane 584 00:32:01,793 --> 00:32:03,378 calculates the angle of attack 585 00:32:03,503 --> 00:32:06,924 by measuring the plane's angle into the oncoming air. 586 00:32:11,261 --> 00:32:13,097 - Sure looks like a sensor issue. 587 00:32:13,222 --> 00:32:15,391 The captain's side can't be right. 588 00:32:15,516 --> 00:32:17,393 - Absolutely. 589 00:32:17,518 --> 00:32:19,311 - The data shows a steep spike 590 00:32:19,479 --> 00:32:22,022 in the captain's angle of attack reading. 591 00:32:25,443 --> 00:32:28,945 - That explains the stickshaker. - Yup, false alarm. 592 00:32:30,572 --> 00:32:33,617 - The plane was never in danger of stalling. 593 00:32:33,742 --> 00:32:36,788 The warning was triggered by faulty pitch data 594 00:32:36,913 --> 00:32:40,208 from a malfunction in an angle of attack sensor. 595 00:32:40,333 --> 00:32:41,960 - The captain's side shows a pitch up 596 00:32:42,085 --> 00:32:44,212 of as much as 74 degrees. 597 00:32:44,337 --> 00:32:46,838 The first officer's side is correct, 598 00:32:47,005 --> 00:32:49,341 a steady 15-degree pitch. 599 00:32:49,509 --> 00:32:50,969 - Investigators discover 600 00:32:51,094 --> 00:32:54,137 the malfunction was only on the captain's side. 601 00:32:54,262 --> 00:32:58,558 - So, up until this point, the flight is actually fine. 602 00:32:59,309 --> 00:33:01,561 - On the Ethiopian airplane, 603 00:33:01,687 --> 00:33:04,107 something happened to that sensor 604 00:33:04,232 --> 00:33:05,942 just shortly after takeoff. 605 00:33:07,151 --> 00:33:11,030 - So one faulty sensor brings down the plane? 606 00:33:11,947 --> 00:33:14,575 (Lorenda): A single failure should not be catastrophic. 607 00:33:14,701 --> 00:33:16,911 There should be backup, there should be redundancies 608 00:33:17,036 --> 00:33:20,664 so if there is something that occurs within the system 609 00:33:20,831 --> 00:33:25,086 that the crew should be able to counter it. 610 00:33:27,046 --> 00:33:30,841 - The FDR data can show us when the MCAS activated. 611 00:33:32,343 --> 00:33:37,097 - The team studies how MCAS behaved for Flight 302. 612 00:33:38,182 --> 00:33:42,854 - Here, here, and here. 613 00:33:43,020 --> 00:33:45,732 The plane pitches down even though the pilots 614 00:33:45,897 --> 00:33:48,317 are pulling up on their control columns. 615 00:33:49,152 --> 00:33:52,362 - The faulty sensor led to four separate activations 616 00:33:52,529 --> 00:33:54,239 of the MCAS system, 617 00:33:54,407 --> 00:33:56,451 driving the plane's nose down 618 00:33:56,576 --> 00:33:59,203 as the pilots were trying to pitch up. 619 00:34:00,163 --> 00:34:02,831 The fourth MCAS activation pitched the nose down 620 00:34:02,956 --> 00:34:06,710 when the plane was only 6,000 feet above the ground. 621 00:34:07,795 --> 00:34:10,590 It put the plane into a steep and rapid descent... 622 00:34:10,757 --> 00:34:12,467 - Pitch up! Pitch up! 623 00:34:12,592 --> 00:34:15,094 - ...from which the pilots could not recover. 624 00:34:15,260 --> 00:34:16,762 (automated voice): Pull up. 625 00:34:17,596 --> 00:34:19,931 (metal clattering) 626 00:34:22,268 --> 00:34:25,146 (narrator): So why couldn't the pilots disable the MCAS 627 00:34:25,271 --> 00:34:28,565 even though they followed the recommended procedure? 628 00:34:29,233 --> 00:34:32,527 Investigators examine Flight 302's speed 629 00:34:32,652 --> 00:34:36,074 leading up to the crew's attempt to override the MCAS. 630 00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:39,951 - They lift off at 140 knots. Absolutely perfect. 631 00:34:40,119 --> 00:34:43,873 But as they climb, their speed increases. 632 00:34:43,998 --> 00:34:46,416 It reaches 340 knots 633 00:34:46,583 --> 00:34:48,878 by the time they try to use manual trim. 634 00:34:49,878 --> 00:34:52,757 The overspeed warning sounds here 635 00:34:52,882 --> 00:34:55,550 and stays on for the rest of the flight. 636 00:34:56,177 --> 00:35:02,016 (John): Normally, you would be in the 220-250 knot range. 637 00:35:02,141 --> 00:35:04,976 This was a hundred knots plus faster than that. 638 00:35:05,645 --> 00:35:07,813 - No wonder they couldn't move their trim wheel. 639 00:35:09,815 --> 00:35:13,527 - The speed increased the air load on the stabilizer, 640 00:35:13,652 --> 00:35:15,695 making it impossible for the pilots 641 00:35:15,822 --> 00:35:18,616 to move it manually with their trim wheel. 642 00:35:20,451 --> 00:35:23,036 (straining) - It's not working. 643 00:35:25,831 --> 00:35:27,958 - Once you get to high speed, 644 00:35:28,125 --> 00:35:32,003 you're no longer strong enough as a human to move it. 645 00:35:34,465 --> 00:35:35,882 - Why such high speed? 646 00:35:36,007 --> 00:35:38,594 - Have a look at their auto-throttle setting. 647 00:35:38,719 --> 00:35:39,719 They lift off 648 00:35:39,846 --> 00:35:42,056 with the auto-throttle in takeoff mode. 649 00:35:42,181 --> 00:35:43,306 Right about here, 650 00:35:43,474 --> 00:35:46,936 the auto-throttle should be pulling back from takeoff thrust 651 00:35:47,061 --> 00:35:48,311 to climb thrust. 652 00:35:49,105 --> 00:35:53,650 But that never happens. It stays at max takeoff thrust. 653 00:35:54,652 --> 00:35:56,945 - Same sensor, I guess. - Uh-huh. 654 00:35:57,070 --> 00:35:59,114 - The auto-throttle is also connected 655 00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:02,076 to the left-side angle of attack sensor. 656 00:36:02,201 --> 00:36:03,911 - Once the sensor failed, 657 00:36:04,036 --> 00:36:06,621 that disabled the auto throttle system, 658 00:36:06,746 --> 00:36:09,083 so the power stayed where it was. 659 00:36:11,835 --> 00:36:13,838 - We're having flight control problems. 660 00:36:14,005 --> 00:36:16,590 - As they dealt with the escalating crisis, 661 00:36:16,715 --> 00:36:19,677 the pilots didn't notice that their thrust levers 662 00:36:19,802 --> 00:36:22,804 remained at maximum takeoff power. 663 00:36:23,264 --> 00:36:25,016 - 737s are very powerful jets. 664 00:36:25,141 --> 00:36:30,188 And they will continue to accelerate very rapidly 665 00:36:30,313 --> 00:36:32,063 if you don't reduce the power. 666 00:36:33,648 --> 00:36:35,650 - Boeing didn't say anything about the trim wheel 667 00:36:35,775 --> 00:36:37,695 being difficult to move. 668 00:36:38,570 --> 00:36:40,780 - Or about airspeed. 669 00:36:42,574 --> 00:36:45,828 - The Ethiopian investigators now turn their attention 670 00:36:45,953 --> 00:36:50,541 to the advice Boeing gave pilots after the Lion Air accident. 671 00:36:50,666 --> 00:36:52,083 - The Lion Air flight 672 00:36:52,250 --> 00:36:54,837 had necessitated this airworthiness directive. 673 00:36:54,962 --> 00:36:57,715 So the question becomes, was that enough? 674 00:36:58,715 --> 00:37:00,175 - No mention of MCAS. 675 00:37:00,300 --> 00:37:04,639 No mention of how much force may be needed to trim manually. 676 00:37:04,764 --> 00:37:07,058 No mention of airspeed. 677 00:37:07,599 --> 00:37:10,061 - That's a lot to leave out. 678 00:37:10,228 --> 00:37:12,938 - The investigation has uncovered shortcomings 679 00:37:13,105 --> 00:37:17,275 in the guidance Boeing provided following the Lion Air accident. 680 00:37:19,779 --> 00:37:22,739 In Indonesia, investigators have discovered 681 00:37:22,907 --> 00:37:24,784 that a maintenance error led to the failure 682 00:37:24,951 --> 00:37:28,621 of the crucial angle of attack, or A-O-A sensor, 683 00:37:28,788 --> 00:37:30,248 in the Lion Air Accident. 684 00:37:30,373 --> 00:37:33,960 What caused its failure on the Ethiopian flight? 685 00:37:36,963 --> 00:37:39,507 Investigators examine maintenance records 686 00:37:39,632 --> 00:37:41,425 for any evidence of trouble. 687 00:37:41,592 --> 00:37:43,760 (Lorenda): So the Ethiopian investigation did look into 688 00:37:43,885 --> 00:37:47,056 the maintenance to the sensor. There was none. 689 00:37:47,181 --> 00:37:50,101 It's the original install to the airplane. 690 00:37:50,809 --> 00:37:53,853 - They do uncover several other maintenance issues 691 00:37:53,980 --> 00:37:56,273 on the four-month-old plane. 692 00:38:01,695 --> 00:38:04,907 - That's a lot of electrical faults for a brand-new airplane. 693 00:38:05,032 --> 00:38:09,119 - The Ethiopian team suspects the A-O-A sensor on Flight 302 694 00:38:09,244 --> 00:38:11,454 failed due to an underlying electrical fault. 695 00:38:11,621 --> 00:38:16,835 The sensor failure is also being scrutinized by the NTSB. 696 00:38:17,003 --> 00:38:20,505 - We also looked at how the A-O-A could fail 697 00:38:20,672 --> 00:38:22,967 and what that failure would look like. 698 00:38:23,967 --> 00:38:26,971 - That analysis is coming to a very different conclusion 699 00:38:27,137 --> 00:38:29,306 about the origins of the failure. 700 00:38:29,472 --> 00:38:31,349 (vehicle honking) 701 00:38:35,813 --> 00:38:38,273 - 44 seconds after they start to roll, 702 00:38:38,398 --> 00:38:39,817 this happens. 703 00:38:39,983 --> 00:38:42,235 The captain's angle of attack, airspeed, 704 00:38:42,360 --> 00:38:44,112 and altitude values deviate. 705 00:38:44,237 --> 00:38:47,699 - The NTSB travels to Collins Aerospace, 706 00:38:47,867 --> 00:38:50,578 the manufacturer of the angle of attack sensor, 707 00:38:50,703 --> 00:38:53,621 and asks their engineers to look at the fault data 708 00:38:53,748 --> 00:38:55,498 for Flight 302. 709 00:38:55,666 --> 00:38:56,916 - Six seconds later, 710 00:38:57,043 --> 00:38:59,503 the heater on the sensor goes offline. 711 00:39:01,838 --> 00:39:05,800 (beeping) - Master caution, anti-ice. 712 00:39:05,925 --> 00:39:07,469 - Okay... 713 00:39:08,012 --> 00:39:12,516 - These simultaneous failures all point to one thing. 714 00:39:12,683 --> 00:39:15,643 - The sensor broke off, it's the only explanation. 715 00:39:16,771 --> 00:39:18,646 - To determine what could have caused 716 00:39:18,773 --> 00:39:20,565 the sensor to break off... 717 00:39:21,483 --> 00:39:23,235 - Have a look at this. 718 00:39:24,110 --> 00:39:28,574 - ...they compare the FDR data to data from a bird strike. 719 00:39:28,741 --> 00:39:30,867 - They're almost identical. 720 00:39:31,911 --> 00:39:36,248 (Lorenda): The U.S. investigation side 721 00:39:36,414 --> 00:39:42,545 felt that the data supported more of a in-flight impact 722 00:39:42,670 --> 00:39:45,715 with the angle of attack sensor. 723 00:39:47,009 --> 00:39:50,554 - The hazard posed by eagles and other large birds 724 00:39:50,721 --> 00:39:53,056 is well-known at Addis Ababa's airport. 725 00:39:53,181 --> 00:39:56,811 - The airport in Addis Ababa had had problems with bird strikes. 726 00:39:56,936 --> 00:40:00,021 The airport had several mitigation strategies in place 727 00:40:00,146 --> 00:40:01,565 because of that. 728 00:40:03,317 --> 00:40:04,485 (automated voice): V1. 729 00:40:04,610 --> 00:40:06,070 - Rotate. 730 00:40:06,904 --> 00:40:08,905 - Collins Aerospace concludes that, 731 00:40:09,072 --> 00:40:11,867 as Flight 302 lifted off the ground, 732 00:40:11,992 --> 00:40:16,913 a bird struck the sensor, tearing the vane from the hub. 733 00:40:17,539 --> 00:40:18,666 - Gear up. 734 00:40:18,791 --> 00:40:20,918 (stick whirring) 735 00:40:23,628 --> 00:40:25,338 - We are having flight control problems. 736 00:40:25,463 --> 00:40:26,799 - Whether the sensor failed 737 00:40:26,965 --> 00:40:29,427 due to electrical failure or a bird strike, 738 00:40:29,592 --> 00:40:34,264 investigators now know why Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 739 00:40:34,389 --> 00:40:36,851 crashed shortly after takeoff. 740 00:40:36,976 --> 00:40:39,395 - Here's the chain of events. 741 00:40:40,311 --> 00:40:44,315 The failed sensor triggers a series of warnings and alarms. 742 00:40:48,320 --> 00:40:50,239 - Gear up. (stick whirring) 743 00:40:55,494 --> 00:40:56,786 (alarm beeping) 744 00:40:56,954 --> 00:40:58,998 - The erroneous angle of attack data 745 00:40:59,164 --> 00:41:03,418 causes MCAS to activate, pitching the nose down. 746 00:41:03,543 --> 00:41:08,757 (automated voice): Don't sink. Don't sink. Don't sink. 747 00:41:11,927 --> 00:41:13,429 - They do what Boeing recommends 748 00:41:13,554 --> 00:41:15,221 and move the trim switches to cutout. 749 00:41:16,097 --> 00:41:18,641 - Stab trim cutout? Stab trim cutout? 750 00:41:18,766 --> 00:41:19,893 - Yes, yes do it! 751 00:41:21,728 --> 00:41:23,146 - Stab trim cutout. 752 00:41:23,313 --> 00:41:26,650 - But they're unable to manually trim. 753 00:41:26,775 --> 00:41:28,985 The wheel is almost impossible to move. 754 00:41:29,862 --> 00:41:31,362 They never recover. 755 00:41:34,366 --> 00:41:37,786 (grunting with effort) 756 00:41:37,911 --> 00:41:41,456 - Not enough pitch. Not enough pitch! 757 00:41:41,581 --> 00:41:43,291 - It was very obvious to them 758 00:41:43,416 --> 00:41:45,835 that they no longer had control of the airplane 759 00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:48,255 and that they couldn't stop this. 760 00:41:48,380 --> 00:41:50,132 Recovery was impossible. 761 00:41:50,799 --> 00:41:54,344 - Pitch up! Pitch! 762 00:41:54,844 --> 00:41:56,764 Mayday! Mayday! Mayday! 763 00:41:58,933 --> 00:42:01,976 (emotional music) 764 00:42:07,565 --> 00:42:10,110 (metal clattering) 765 00:42:14,907 --> 00:42:16,909 (narrator): For the NTSB, 766 00:42:17,076 --> 00:42:20,036 the MAX 8 accidents provided a valuable lesson 767 00:42:20,161 --> 00:42:23,666 about assumptions made by aircraft manufacturers 768 00:42:23,791 --> 00:42:27,043 regarding how pilots respond to emergencies. 769 00:42:27,168 --> 00:42:28,545 - I think these two accidents 770 00:42:28,670 --> 00:42:29,880 are gonna be the watershed events 771 00:42:30,047 --> 00:42:31,882 on how we look at the human factors 772 00:42:32,049 --> 00:42:34,384 for design and certification. 773 00:42:35,927 --> 00:42:38,012 - As a result of the two accidents, 774 00:42:38,137 --> 00:42:42,351 Boeing overhauls the MAX 8's MCAS system. 775 00:42:42,476 --> 00:42:46,813 The MCAS system now relies on information from two sensors. 776 00:42:46,938 --> 00:42:49,275 It will only activate once, 777 00:42:49,440 --> 00:42:52,110 and it will not override pilots' ability 778 00:42:52,277 --> 00:42:54,862 to control the airplane with the control column. 779 00:42:54,989 --> 00:42:57,782 Boeing also offers pilots enhanced training 780 00:42:57,949 --> 00:42:59,492 on the MCAS system. 781 00:43:02,788 --> 00:43:07,918 Many feel the changes Boeing made to the MAX 8 came too late. 782 00:43:11,880 --> 00:43:14,007 - Ethiopian 302 should have been prevented. 783 00:43:14,132 --> 00:43:17,677 Boeing should have got to the root causes of the problems 784 00:43:17,802 --> 00:43:19,429 on the Lion Air flight. 785 00:43:19,554 --> 00:43:20,389 Boeing didn't. 786 00:43:21,056 --> 00:43:23,934 - For the devastated family of Danielle Moore, 787 00:43:24,059 --> 00:43:25,561 Boeing's greater failure 788 00:43:25,686 --> 00:43:29,607 was not advising pilots about the danger of MCAS. 789 00:43:29,773 --> 00:43:31,190 - The bulletin from Boeing 790 00:43:31,317 --> 00:43:34,612 was not good enough to prevent an accident. 791 00:43:34,737 --> 00:43:37,197 The plane was still unsafe. 792 00:43:39,366 --> 00:43:45,288 And it cost the life of my daughter and 157 people. 793 00:43:50,293 --> 00:43:54,590 - In November 2020, after a 20-month grounding, 794 00:43:54,715 --> 00:43:57,300 the MAX 8 is cleared to fly. 795 00:43:57,467 --> 00:43:59,802 (soft piano music) 796 00:43:59,969 --> 00:44:03,222 Subtitling: difuze 61074

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