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(aircraft droning)
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- (yells) What have we done?
- (yells) I don't know, mate! I don't know.
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00:00:07,507 --> 00:00:09,635
NARRATOR:
The pilots of a turboprop airliner
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00:00:09,718 --> 00:00:12,887
face a nightmare situation
over Papua New Guinea.
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Mayday, mayday, mayday.
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(radio) Double engine failureand we're making an emergency landing.
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DI GIULIO: This crew lose
both engines at the same time.
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There is only really one outcome.
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(suspenseful music)
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(metallic screeching)
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NARRATOR: Investigators quickly
discover clues in the wreckage.
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Landing gear's up.
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- INVESTIGATOR 2: The flaps are up too.
- They weren't configured for landing.
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NARRATOR:
Something in the cockpit voice recording…
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Amplify what's left.
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BLANKENSTEIN:
Well, there it is.
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NARRATOR: …reveals a potentially deadly
flaw in an aircraft used around the world.
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We wanted to make sure that the
thousand aircraft that were out there
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were operating safely.
(plane droning)
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PILOT:
Mayday. Mayday.
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GPWS:
Pull up!
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(indistinct radio chatter)
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{\an8}(indistinct radio chatter)
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{\an8}NARRATOR: Airlines PNG
Flight 1600 soars 16,000 feet
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above Papua New Guinea's
Finisterre Mountain Range.
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We're at cruise.
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NARRATOR: Australian Captain Bill Spencer
is an experienced flight commander.
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Cruise power is set.
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NARRATOR: New Zealander
Campbell Wagstaff is the first officer
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on today's late afternoon flight.
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Both pilots were with
PNG for about a year.
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The captain had very good experience.
He had about 18,000 hours of flying time.
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The first officer
was also very experienced
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with just shy of 3,000 hours
flying experience himself.
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(indistinct low chatter)
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NARRATOR: One flight attendant
looks after the comfort
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and safety of the 29 passengers on board.
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Most are parents heading
to their children's graduation
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at Divine Word University at Madang.
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PNG Flight 1600 is midway
into a 30 minute flight
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to the town of Madang
on Papua New Guinea's north coast.
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- How's the arrival time looking?
- Seventeen after the hour. Right on time.
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NARRATOR:
The pilots are flying manually today
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because their autopilot is inoperative.
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They're at the controls
of a twin-engine Bombardier Dash 8,
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well suited to carrying passengers
around the Pacific Island.
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DI GIULIO: The airplane is able to operate
in and out of short runways,
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unprepared runways oftentimes, in smaller
communities where the facilities required
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to operate a larger passenger
aircraft wouldn't be available.
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(engines roar)
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NARRATOR: Two Pratt and Whitney
turboprop engines power a plane
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that's nearly 23 years old.
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DI GIULIO: The Dash 8 is one
of these airplanes that's become timeless.
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It's still operated by airlines
all over the world.
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As some of the major airlines
upgrade their airplanes
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to more modern jet aircraft,
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the Dash 8s find a new home
with other airlines
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because they're always in high demand.
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PILOT (radio): Charlie Bravo nearing
Madang. We're coming through it.
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- You hear that?
- Mm-hmm.
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NARRATOR: Forty miles from Madang, the
pilots get an update on the weather ahead.
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A storm is building
near their destination.
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- I'll take us around it, alright?
- Good idea.
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Turboprop aircraft cannot fly
as high as a jet airliner can,
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which means they can't go
over a lot of the weather
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they may experience on their flight.
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Madang Tower, Airlines PNG 1600.
We're diverting slightly to avoid weather.
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PNG 1600, Madang Tower. Diverting, copy.
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NARRATOR: Captain Spencer
navigates around the storm.
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(aircraft drones)
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MCNAIR: The captain's trying
to avoid clouds, which is normal.
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You want to give your
passengers a smooth ride.
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NARRATOR: But 38 miles from Madang,
the crew still can't see the airfield.
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- I'm gonna take us down.
- Copy.
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DI GIULIO: At a major airport,
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there are typically procedures
in place that we can fly
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that will bring us through the clouds
and point it right at the runway.
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Oftentimes, at more remote airports,
these procedures do not exist,
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so we have to descend
below a layer of clouds.
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Once you're below a layer of cloud,
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you can visually navigate to an airport
and conduct a safe approach and landing.
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NARRATOR: The crew advises the
tower of the revised flight path.
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WAGSTAFF (radio):
Madang Tower, PNG 1600.
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Passing 13,000 on descent,
estimated Madang at one six.
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CONTROLLER (radio): PNG 1600,
Madang Tower. Say again your level?
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Passing, uh, 12,300.
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CONTROLLER: Roger, runway zero-7. Rain
showers overhead passing from the east.
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NARRATOR: While Captain Spencer makes
a sharp descent through the clouds…
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(alarm beeping)
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…the plane picks up too much airspeed.
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DI GIULIO: Aerodynamically,
flying overspeed by a couple of knots
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is not really a big deal.
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Think of it like driving a couple miles
per hour over the speed limit in your car.
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(beeping continues)
WAGSTAFF: Airspeed, mate.
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Got it.
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DI GIULIO: There are several ways
to slow down the airplane.
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00:06:05,823 --> 00:06:08,034
You can increase
the pitch of the airplane,
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00:06:08,117 --> 00:06:12,588
and this will reduce the airspeed as the
airplane aerodynamically slows down.
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Additionally, you can reduce
the power to the engines.
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(high-pitched screeching)
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- (yells) What have we done?
- (yells) I don't know, mate. I don't know.
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NARRATOR: An ear-splitting sound
makes it almost impossible
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for the pilots to communicate.
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DI GIULIO:
It would be overwhelming.
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There's loud noises
that you're not familiar with.
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There's smoke. There's warnings
being generated by the airplane.
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And it's all happening at once.
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It's overspeeds. Overspeeds.
It looks like double propeller overspeeds.
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NARRATOR: First Officer Wagstaff notices
the propellers are rotating too fast.
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The plane is in a precarious state.
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DI GIULIO:
There could be control difficulties.
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There could be engine damage.
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And in severe cases,
there could be engine failure.
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(high-pitched screeching continues)
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(yells) What have we done?
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(yells) It's overspeeding.
Number two is shut down.
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(yells) I can't hear you!
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DI GIULIO: The crew would
have a very difficult time
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cutting through the noise
and trying to identify
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the initial root cause of these problems.
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(noise disappears)
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NARRATOR:
Finally, the deafening sound dissipates.
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- You got the left side working?
- No.
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Okay. We got nothing.
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NARRATOR: Both engines have failed.
The plane is descending fast.
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DI GIULIO:
This crew was faced with a scenario
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where they lose both the primary
and the backup system
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on both engines at the same time.
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That backs the crew
into a very difficult situation
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where there is only really
one outcome. A forced landing.
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00:08:05,985 --> 00:08:09,114
NARRATOR: A forced landing
means the pilots have no choice
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but to land immediately.
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Sixteen miles from Madang Airport,
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Captain Spencer turns the plane
back towards the coastline.
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He needs to find a safe place
to put the plane down.
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Tell the tower.
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Madang Tower. Mayday, mayday, mayday.
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(radio) Airlines PNG Flight 1600,double engine failure
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and we're making an emergency landing.
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Confirm you are able
to make it to the field?
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DI GIULIO:
The optimum scenario in a forced landing
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would be gliding to an airport.
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Failing that, the next best choice
would be landing close to a town or city.
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This may increase the odds
that the airport fire/rescue services
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can attend to both the aircraft
and its passengers and crew.
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NARRATOR:
But no such options exist.
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Brief him that we're gonna ditch.
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Negative, negative, negative.
We'll probably be ditching.
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DI GIULIO: A ditching is a forced landing
that has to be made in open water.
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It is the last choice for pilots
if an alternative exists.
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NARRATOR: Flight 1600 is rapidly
losing altitude, and time is running out.
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Look there, a river.
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00:09:26,440 --> 00:09:30,861
DI GIULIO: From altitude, a riverbed
may look like a long safe area
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00:09:30,945 --> 00:09:33,906
to land the airplane
in a forced landing situation.
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I'll get as close to the
mouth of that river as I can.
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00:09:49,297 --> 00:09:52,550
Airlines PNG 1600,
we'll be ditching on a river.
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Confirm location.
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NARRATOR: Controllers need a
location so they can send help.
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Not sure the name of the river.
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00:10:02,143 --> 00:10:05,646
NARRATOR: The lives of the
32 people on board are at risk.
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DI GIULIO: Pilots will remain
focused right until the very end.
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A pilot will not stop fighting
to save their airplane.
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- Do you want me to shut both engines down?
- Yes! Shut everything down!
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DI GIULIO: Shutting down the engines
prior to a forced landing off field
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could help slow the spread of any
post-crash fire that may develop.
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00:10:27,335 --> 00:10:30,254
NARRATOR:
Flight 1600 is now a glider.
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(suspenseful music)
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The Dash 8 is only a few
hundred feet above the ground.
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00:10:37,845 --> 00:10:40,806
DI GIULIO:
At a certain point close to the ground,
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the pilots have to rely
on the decision they've made
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and hope that it was the right one.
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Brace. Brace!
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NARRATOR: Seconds from touching down,
Captain Spencer sees a deadly hazard.
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Boulders!
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DI GIULIO: All you would have
is your eyeballs.
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What you see from ten thousand feet, and
five thousand feet, and five hundred feet,
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00:11:00,785 --> 00:11:04,038
may look different as your
depth perception increases
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00:11:04,121 --> 00:11:05,164
as you're getting closer to the ground.
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NARRATOR:
Two hundred feet from the ground,
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Captain Spencer tries to avoid
huge boulders on the riverbed.
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00:11:11,962 --> 00:11:12,838
Brace. Brace!
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NARRATOR:
The only option is the riverbank.
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(thudding)
184
00:11:20,596 --> 00:11:23,057
(metallic screeching)
185
00:11:23,641 --> 00:11:27,603
(people chattering)
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00:11:28,479 --> 00:11:32,817
NARRATOR: Airlines PNG
Flight 1600 has crashed into bush
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00:11:32,900 --> 00:11:34,902
near the mouth of the Guabe River.
188
00:11:36,487 --> 00:11:38,489
Twenty-eight people are dead.
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00:11:40,032 --> 00:11:43,786
Just one passenger and the
three-member flight crew survive.
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00:11:46,997 --> 00:11:50,960
It was a dry riverbed. So the aircraft
broke up into many parts.
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00:11:51,419 --> 00:11:56,006
And then there was a post-impact fire
which destroyed a lot of the evidence.
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NARRATOR: The Papua New Guinea
Accident Investigation Commission
193
00:12:01,095 --> 00:12:02,847
rushes a team to the scene…
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00:12:04,682 --> 00:12:07,184
…and calls in help from other countries.
195
00:12:07,268 --> 00:12:09,812
I was pretty keen
to get the lay of the land
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00:12:09,895 --> 00:12:14,442
and see what this accident site looked
like, and also get boots on the ground.
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00:12:14,525 --> 00:12:18,613
NARRATOR: Eric Blankenstein from
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
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00:12:18,696 --> 00:12:21,365
is among the first
investigators at the scene.
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00:12:21,449 --> 00:12:25,745
BLANKENSTEIN: My first impressions were
that this was an incredibly large
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and difficult site to work,
201
00:12:27,371 --> 00:12:31,125
and that we needed to prepare
logistically to get this job done.
202
00:12:31,208 --> 00:12:34,045
NARRATOR: The length
and shape of the wreckage field
203
00:12:34,128 --> 00:12:36,172
indicate how the plane came down.
204
00:12:40,968 --> 00:12:42,511
Three hundred meters long.
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00:12:43,888 --> 00:12:46,307
It spreads out from the point of impact.
206
00:12:47,183 --> 00:12:49,727
BLANKENSTEIN:
If you have this long distance
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00:12:49,810 --> 00:12:52,313
and it has this V forming wreckage trail,
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it means to us that it's a low angle
of entry and also high speed.
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00:12:56,901 --> 00:12:58,945
So straight away, we would be
able to get the impression
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00:12:59,028 --> 00:13:03,532
that this off-field landing was
a particularly fast off-field landing.
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00:13:06,243 --> 00:13:09,371
BLANKENSTEIN: Let's see
how they configured the plane.
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00:13:09,455 --> 00:13:11,499
BLANKENSTEIN: Normally,
when you're doing a landing,
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00:13:11,582 --> 00:13:14,168
including an off-field landing,
you would have the flaps down
214
00:13:14,251 --> 00:13:16,462
so you can effectively land
the aircraft slower.
215
00:13:16,545 --> 00:13:18,715
The landing gear configuration, also,
216
00:13:18,798 --> 00:13:23,886
you would expect them to be in the down
position to soften that blow of impact.
217
00:13:27,973 --> 00:13:29,141
Landing gear is up.
218
00:13:30,226 --> 00:13:34,939
NARRATOR: Blankenstein finds the landing
gear actuator in the raised position.
219
00:13:35,773 --> 00:13:37,107
The flaps are up too.
220
00:13:41,529 --> 00:13:43,656
They weren't configured for landing.
221
00:13:44,448 --> 00:13:47,118
NARRATOR: Without the flaps
and landing gear deployed,
222
00:13:47,201 --> 00:13:50,204
the plane would have hit
the ground at high speed.
223
00:13:50,287 --> 00:13:53,082
But what triggered
the crisis is a mystery.
224
00:13:54,625 --> 00:13:56,126
This is the left engine.
225
00:13:57,002 --> 00:14:00,297
BLANKENSTEIN: The left engine
had separated from its wing
226
00:14:00,381 --> 00:14:02,299
and broken into two sections.
227
00:14:02,758 --> 00:14:05,523
NARRATOR:
Did the turboprop engines play a role?
228
00:14:05,803 --> 00:14:08,639
BLANKENSTEIN: Immediately,
my attention was drawn
229
00:14:08,722 --> 00:14:10,725
to some issues to do with the engines,
230
00:14:10,808 --> 00:14:14,353
although we don't try and
narrow down our focus too quickly.
231
00:14:14,436 --> 00:14:16,981
Not a lot of rotational
damage to the props.
232
00:14:17,064 --> 00:14:19,817
NARRATOR: They can tell
from the condition of the propellers
233
00:14:19,900 --> 00:14:22,862
that very little power
was coming from the engines.
234
00:14:23,779 --> 00:14:26,427
- Were the left props feathered?
- I'll check.
235
00:14:29,493 --> 00:14:30,828
NARRATOR:
If an engine fails,
236
00:14:30,911 --> 00:14:35,559
the pilots need to adjust the pitch of the
propellers so they don't create drag.
237
00:14:35,749 --> 00:14:37,126
It's called feathering.
238
00:14:37,209 --> 00:14:40,838
BLANKENSTEIN: Pilots generally
don't feather propellers of aircraft
239
00:14:40,921 --> 00:14:42,298
unless there's an engine problem.
240
00:14:42,381 --> 00:14:46,677
If you feather a propeller, you no
longer have propulsion to your aircraft.
241
00:14:46,760 --> 00:14:48,554
The left props were feathered.
242
00:14:48,637 --> 00:14:50,473
BLANKENSTEIN:
Did you check the right props?
243
00:14:50,556 --> 00:14:52,141
Yes, they're feathered too.
244
00:14:52,224 --> 00:14:54,059
BLANKENSTEIN:
When we identified
245
00:14:54,143 --> 00:14:57,396
that the propellers were both
in the feathered position,
246
00:14:57,479 --> 00:14:59,524
immediately we were of the understanding
247
00:14:59,607 --> 00:15:02,860
that there was an issue
with the engines themselves.
248
00:15:02,943 --> 00:15:06,030
BLANKENSTEIN: We're gonna need
these airlifted out of here.
249
00:15:06,113 --> 00:15:07,948
INVESTIGATOR 2:
I'll arrange it.
250
00:15:08,032 --> 00:15:11,786
BLANKENSTEIN: We were able to airlift
those out with a helicopter to Madang
251
00:15:11,869 --> 00:15:15,539
and then transport the
engine sections to Port Moresby
252
00:15:15,623 --> 00:15:20,169
where we could do a full and thorough
examination of those engines themselves.
253
00:15:26,425 --> 00:15:27,509
I've got the data.
254
00:15:27,593 --> 00:15:31,597
NARRATOR: David McNair from
the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
255
00:15:31,680 --> 00:15:33,265
joins the investigation.
256
00:15:34,183 --> 00:15:38,354
We had a notification from Papua New
Guinea that the Dash 8 had crashed.
257
00:15:38,437 --> 00:15:40,690
Of course, since the aircraft
is manufactured in Canada,
258
00:15:40,773 --> 00:15:42,566
that requires our involvement.
259
00:15:43,651 --> 00:15:45,653
MCNAIR:
Can we hook this up please?
260
00:15:47,029 --> 00:15:50,282
NARRATOR: They focus first
on the flight data recorder.
261
00:15:52,785 --> 00:15:56,455
MCNAIR: The information about
the engines on site was limited.
262
00:15:56,538 --> 00:15:59,292
The real evidence you're looking for
is the flight data recorder.
263
00:15:59,375 --> 00:16:01,085
A lot of these parameters would tell you
264
00:16:01,168 --> 00:16:03,796
when the engines did what
and how it happened.
265
00:16:03,879 --> 00:16:05,172
MCNAIR:
Check this out.
266
00:16:05,255 --> 00:16:08,593
NARRATOR: Investigators learn that
28 minutes into the flight,
267
00:16:08,676 --> 00:16:14,348
the rotations per minute, or RPMs,
spiked to 1,500 on both engines.
268
00:16:15,057 --> 00:16:17,685
It's the highest level the FDR can record.
269
00:16:19,687 --> 00:16:21,188
Well, that's not normal.
270
00:16:21,271 --> 00:16:23,774
FISHER: So the normal operation
of the propeller in the air
271
00:16:23,857 --> 00:16:25,693
is about 900 RPM to 1200.
272
00:16:26,694 --> 00:16:29,071
During the flight, they went above 1500.
273
00:16:30,239 --> 00:16:31,828
Double propeller overspeed.
274
00:16:32,825 --> 00:16:37,163
NARRATOR: Investigators discover evidence
of a frightening engine condition
275
00:16:37,246 --> 00:16:39,373
called a double propeller overspeed.
276
00:16:41,542 --> 00:16:46,714
Overspeeding propellers can destabilize
the turbines and cause catastrophic damage
277
00:16:46,797 --> 00:16:49,466
if pilots don't catch
the problem soon enough.
278
00:16:49,550 --> 00:16:52,428
FISHER: You want the engine
driving the propeller.
279
00:16:52,511 --> 00:16:54,764
You never want the propeller
driving the engine.
280
00:16:54,847 --> 00:16:58,142
And that condition is where
you see this overspeed.
281
00:16:58,642 --> 00:17:02,938
Both engines saw a propeller overspeed
condition, which is extremely rare.
282
00:17:03,480 --> 00:17:06,150
NARRATOR:
Could the double propeller overspeed
283
00:17:06,233 --> 00:17:09,028
have caused the crash of Flight 1600?
284
00:17:09,111 --> 00:17:12,281
MCNAIR: If the engine overspeeds
fast enough and hard enough,
285
00:17:12,364 --> 00:17:15,576
the parts will break, and then you don't
have control of that engine anymore.
286
00:17:15,659 --> 00:17:18,130
We need a closer look
inside those engines.
287
00:17:23,083 --> 00:17:25,044
BLANKENSTEIN:
Wow. Look at this.
288
00:17:26,754 --> 00:17:31,842
NARRATOR: Damage to the turbine blades
in Airlines PNG Flight 1600's left engine
289
00:17:31,925 --> 00:17:35,262
- provides unmistakable evidence.
- It's corn-cobbed.
290
00:17:36,013 --> 00:17:37,347
BLANKENSTEIN:
Right.
291
00:17:37,431 --> 00:17:40,601
NARRATOR: Corn-cobbing occurs
when the speed of the propeller
292
00:17:40,684 --> 00:17:44,938
is so fierce that it causes all the
blades in the turbines to shear off.
293
00:17:46,065 --> 00:17:50,652
The blades physically looked like they'd
been chewed out of the power turbine.
294
00:17:50,736 --> 00:17:54,198
So it gives a corncob look.
And that's a feature by design,
295
00:17:54,281 --> 00:17:59,161
that about 145 or 150
percent overspeed, they shed.
296
00:17:59,244 --> 00:18:04,166
NARRATOR: Corn-cobbing is a protective
measure that prevents the turbine blades
297
00:18:04,249 --> 00:18:07,419
from spinning quickly enough
to tear the engine apart.
298
00:18:10,297 --> 00:18:11,799
Have a look at the right.
299
00:18:13,759 --> 00:18:16,720
BLANKENSTEIN:
Well, the right looks perfectly okay.
300
00:18:17,137 --> 00:18:19,015
NARRATOR:
Unlike the left engine,
301
00:18:19,098 --> 00:18:22,976
the right turbine shows no obvious
signs of overspeed damage.
302
00:18:23,685 --> 00:18:27,648
The left engine had shed its turbine
blades whereas the right had not.
303
00:18:27,731 --> 00:18:31,276
Something completely different
happened to the right engine.
304
00:18:31,360 --> 00:18:33,279
BLANKENSTEIN:
The right engine was feathered,
305
00:18:33,362 --> 00:18:37,575
but mechanically, looking at the turbine
itself, it appeared to be undamaged.
306
00:18:37,658 --> 00:18:41,162
FISHER: We had assumed that both engines
had been damaged during the overspeed,
307
00:18:41,245 --> 00:18:44,623
but clearly the right engine
didn't see as much distress as the left.
308
00:18:44,706 --> 00:18:48,627
It certainly raised questions
going forward with the investigation.
309
00:18:49,962 --> 00:18:51,257
I can't figure it out.
310
00:18:52,548 --> 00:18:56,009
Regardless, wouldn't the
protective systems have kicked in?
311
00:18:57,177 --> 00:18:58,178
Good point.
312
00:18:59,221 --> 00:19:03,267
NARRATOR: There are three protections
designed to prevent each engine
313
00:19:03,350 --> 00:19:04,560
from overspeeding:
314
00:19:05,269 --> 00:19:10,941
a propeller control unit, an overspeed
control unit, and a backup system.
315
00:19:11,358 --> 00:19:15,654
BLANKENSTEIN: Both of these propellers
going above the maximum so rapidly
316
00:19:16,196 --> 00:19:18,615
would have to bypass those three systems.
317
00:19:19,158 --> 00:19:21,994
NARRATOR:
Did the engine protection systems fail?
318
00:19:22,327 --> 00:19:24,121
As in most investigations,
319
00:19:24,204 --> 00:19:29,626
you start looking at what were
the reasons why this was possible?
320
00:19:29,710 --> 00:19:33,005
Was there a system out there
that would prevent this from happening?
321
00:19:33,088 --> 00:19:36,441
The answer is yes. There was
a system. There was a design.
322
00:19:43,265 --> 00:19:44,850
BLANKENSTEIN:
Test results.
323
00:19:45,017 --> 00:19:47,769
NARRATOR:
Investigators analyze tests performed
324
00:19:47,853 --> 00:19:50,522
on the protection systems for Flight 1600.
325
00:19:51,106 --> 00:19:52,774
No data on the right engine.
326
00:19:53,442 --> 00:19:57,488
NARRATOR: Inspections performed
on the right engine protection systems
327
00:19:57,571 --> 00:20:00,741
are inconclusive due to
post-crash fire damage.
328
00:20:00,824 --> 00:20:04,620
Investigators send them to the
manufacturer for deeper analysis.
329
00:20:05,454 --> 00:20:08,123
Maybe they can figure out
what happened to it.
330
00:20:08,248 --> 00:20:09,625
What about the left?
331
00:20:09,708 --> 00:20:12,044
NARRATOR: The left engine
isn't as badly burned,
332
00:20:12,127 --> 00:20:15,047
and inspections provide a critical answer.
333
00:20:15,714 --> 00:20:18,009
All three protections were operational.
334
00:20:21,929 --> 00:20:25,891
NARRATOR: If the protection systems
on the left engine were working,
335
00:20:25,974 --> 00:20:29,645
why didn't they prevent an overspeed
and eventual corn-cobbing?
336
00:20:29,728 --> 00:20:31,813
(engine droning)
337
00:20:31,897 --> 00:20:36,485
Bypassing three systems
of protection at the same time
338
00:20:36,568 --> 00:20:38,946
would be a statistical improbability.
339
00:20:39,029 --> 00:20:43,677
So we knew that there was something else
involved in these propeller overspeeds.
340
00:20:46,870 --> 00:20:50,249
Let's see what the pilots have
to say about what happened.
341
00:20:50,457 --> 00:20:54,711
NARRATOR: The team reviews transcripts
of interviews with the two pilots.
342
00:20:55,045 --> 00:20:59,341
BLANKENSTEIN: You obviously build a list
of questions you want answers to.
343
00:20:59,424 --> 00:21:02,344
What was in your mind's eye
at that point in time?
344
00:21:02,678 --> 00:21:06,014
Were you aware of why
the propellers oversped?
345
00:21:06,098 --> 00:21:08,725
You know, what were
your actions at the time?
346
00:21:08,809 --> 00:21:12,271
The captain said there was
a lot of cloud cover on approach.
347
00:21:12,354 --> 00:21:13,230
What else?
348
00:21:15,232 --> 00:21:17,442
- I'm gonna take us down.
- Copy.
349
00:21:18,944 --> 00:21:20,737
(engine rumbling)
350
00:21:21,530 --> 00:21:25,826
BLANKENSTEIN: But out of the blue,
the airspeed warnings started to sound.
351
00:21:27,077 --> 00:21:28,245
(alarm beeping)
352
00:21:28,328 --> 00:21:31,498
NARRATOR: As Captain Spencer started
his descent below the cloud,
353
00:21:31,581 --> 00:21:35,627
a warning sounded alerting him
that the plane was going too fast.
354
00:21:35,711 --> 00:21:37,212
(beeping continues)
355
00:21:38,714 --> 00:21:39,715
What did he do?
356
00:21:41,758 --> 00:21:43,802
He said he raised the nose.
357
00:21:45,637 --> 00:21:47,180
Pulled back on the power.
358
00:21:48,682 --> 00:21:49,725
Sounds right.
359
00:21:50,726 --> 00:21:51,601
Agreed.
360
00:21:52,894 --> 00:21:54,313
WAGSTAFF:
Airspeed, mate.
361
00:21:54,771 --> 00:21:55,647
Got it.
362
00:21:56,898 --> 00:22:00,444
DI GIULIO: If you get a speed
warning, you need to slow down.
363
00:22:00,527 --> 00:22:03,780
The first and most obvious
is being to reduce the power.
364
00:22:04,614 --> 00:22:08,368
Think of it like taking your foot off
the gas pedal in your car.
365
00:22:08,493 --> 00:22:13,332
NARRATOR: The Captain's testimony doesn't
provide any new leads for investigators.
366
00:22:14,249 --> 00:22:18,086
What did the first officer have to
say about the airspeed warning?
367
00:22:19,880 --> 00:22:23,258
Get this. He says once
the warning sounded,
368
00:22:23,675 --> 00:22:26,595
the Captain yanked
the power levers back quickly.
369
00:22:27,262 --> 00:22:31,433
NARRATOR: First Officer Wagstaff's
testimony adds a crucial detail.
370
00:22:31,516 --> 00:22:33,143
MCNAIR: And the co-pilot
particularly indicated that
371
00:22:33,226 --> 00:22:35,271
the power levers were
brought back very quickly,
372
00:22:35,354 --> 00:22:37,825
then the problem
happened right after that.
373
00:22:39,566 --> 00:22:41,610
(high-pitched screeching)
374
00:22:43,904 --> 00:22:46,031
SPENCER (yells):
What have we done?
375
00:22:48,950 --> 00:22:52,162
His instinct to pull the power
levers back was correct.
376
00:22:52,245 --> 00:22:55,749
But did something happen
when he pulled them back quickly?
377
00:22:59,211 --> 00:23:03,757
Maybe he pulled them back so fast they
went all the way into ground beta mode.
378
00:23:06,259 --> 00:23:09,721
NARRATOR: The power levers on
the Dash 8 have two settings:
379
00:23:09,805 --> 00:23:14,810
flight mode and ground beta mode,
used only when the plane is on the ground.
380
00:23:16,520 --> 00:23:20,065
BLANKENSTEIN: You need a mode
where you can taxi the aircraft
381
00:23:20,148 --> 00:23:24,903
and have direct pitch and power control
over the propellers themselves.
382
00:23:24,986 --> 00:23:28,740
It allows you to operate the aircraft
more simply on the ground.
383
00:23:28,824 --> 00:23:33,579
NARRATOR: Pilots are trained not to put
the plane into ground mode while airborne.
384
00:23:33,662 --> 00:23:37,041
FISHER: The only time to be in the ground
range is when you're on the ground,
385
00:23:37,124 --> 00:23:39,918
when you are starting the aircraft,
when you're maneuvering the aircraft,
386
00:23:40,001 --> 00:23:41,962
when you're taxiing the aircraft.
387
00:23:45,882 --> 00:23:48,593
If you put the plane
in ground mode mid-flight,
388
00:23:48,677 --> 00:23:51,388
would that disarm
those overspeed protections?
389
00:23:51,471 --> 00:23:53,390
Let's look at the flight manual.
390
00:24:04,609 --> 00:24:05,819
Listen to this.
391
00:24:06,903 --> 00:24:09,906
If pilots put the plane
into ground mode mid-flight,
392
00:24:09,990 --> 00:24:12,659
it would have disabled
the protection systems.
393
00:24:13,994 --> 00:24:16,288
(alarm beeping)
394
00:24:16,371 --> 00:24:18,206
(high-pitched screeching)
395
00:24:18,999 --> 00:24:22,252
FISHER: If he's pulled
the power levers back rapidly,
396
00:24:22,335 --> 00:24:25,005
you're now into no man's land.
397
00:24:25,380 --> 00:24:29,676
You're on the precipice of disaster
because you have no propeller control.
398
00:24:32,220 --> 00:24:34,514
So this is a case of pilot error then.
399
00:24:35,390 --> 00:24:36,308
Maybe.
400
00:24:37,893 --> 00:24:38,852
But maybe not.
401
00:24:39,853 --> 00:24:44,649
Don't the power levers have a protective
gate between flight mode and ground mode?
402
00:24:47,527 --> 00:24:48,570
That's correct.
403
00:24:50,697 --> 00:24:52,866
NARRATOR:
A mechanical stop, or gate,
404
00:24:52,949 --> 00:24:57,204
prevents pilots from moving the power
levers into ground mode by mistake.
405
00:24:58,163 --> 00:25:02,751
Triggers on the power lever lift the gate,
allowing movement to ground mode.
406
00:25:04,044 --> 00:25:06,505
You have to physically move
your hand around
407
00:25:06,588 --> 00:25:10,008
the front of the power levers
to reach those two small tabs,
408
00:25:10,091 --> 00:25:12,886
and you pull them vertically up
and then you can move it back.
409
00:25:12,969 --> 00:25:16,389
But it's certainly nothing
you would want to do in the air.
410
00:25:16,473 --> 00:25:19,852
NARRATOR: Investigators need
to find out if the mechanical gate
411
00:25:19,935 --> 00:25:23,104
was working properly on Flight 1600.
412
00:25:24,397 --> 00:25:27,400
It looks like some of the
pieces survived the crash.
413
00:25:33,323 --> 00:25:37,953
The trigger springs are burned from the
post-crash fire, but they're still good.
414
00:25:38,036 --> 00:25:39,997
NARRATOR:
Did the power lever triggers fail,
415
00:25:40,080 --> 00:25:43,333
(alarm beeping)
allowing the propellers to overspeed?
416
00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:46,336
(high-pitched screeching)
417
00:25:47,963 --> 00:25:49,506
The wreckage information was limited.
418
00:25:49,589 --> 00:25:51,717
Quite a bit of stuff
was destroyed by the fire.
419
00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:53,844
But the things that were
there were analyzed.
420
00:25:53,927 --> 00:25:56,805
In this case, one of them
was the trigger spring.
421
00:25:56,888 --> 00:26:01,241
NARRATOR: The spring is supposed to
hold the power lever triggers in place.
422
00:26:01,601 --> 00:26:04,072
BLANKENSTEIN:
They've still got resistance.
423
00:26:05,647 --> 00:26:10,319
FISHER: The spring was working correctly
and the triggers were working as designed,
424
00:26:10,402 --> 00:26:12,904
and so we could see that
in the inspection.
425
00:26:13,780 --> 00:26:18,743
If the triggers were working, how easy
would it be for the captain to lift them
426
00:26:19,744 --> 00:26:21,871
and pull the lever into ground mode?
427
00:26:24,374 --> 00:26:27,628
BLANKENSTEIN: We decided to look
at the human factors aspects
428
00:26:27,711 --> 00:26:31,256
of the protection system,
trying to ascertain
429
00:26:31,339 --> 00:26:35,928
how much you needed to lift the triggers
to take it below the flight idle gate.
430
00:26:42,892 --> 00:26:46,354
So I ran a test on the levers.
431
00:26:47,022 --> 00:26:50,400
First, I tested the levers
to see how well the gate works.
432
00:26:50,483 --> 00:26:52,152
I didn't touch the triggers.
433
00:26:54,863 --> 00:26:58,700
- The levers came to a full stop.
- The gate worked as designed.
434
00:26:58,783 --> 00:27:02,203
Correct. So then I did
it again, this time quickly.
435
00:27:03,455 --> 00:27:07,167
NARRATOR: Blankenstein simulates
the captain's physical reaction
436
00:27:07,250 --> 00:27:08,668
to the airspeed warning.
437
00:27:09,336 --> 00:27:11,880
Without even trying,
I pulled the triggers.
438
00:27:22,766 --> 00:27:24,685
INVESTIGATOR 2:
That shouldn't happen.
439
00:27:24,768 --> 00:27:27,145
NARRATOR:
The team discovers how easily the pilots
440
00:27:27,228 --> 00:27:30,315
could have put the plane
into ground mode by mistake.
441
00:27:30,565 --> 00:27:33,860
BLANKENSTEIN: We noted
during testing of the power levers
442
00:27:33,943 --> 00:27:38,323
that if you were moving
the power levers back quite rapidly,
443
00:27:38,531 --> 00:27:40,992
we could see how it would be quite simple
444
00:27:41,076 --> 00:27:43,995
to actually inadvertently
pull the triggers
445
00:27:44,079 --> 00:27:46,550
without even realizing that you'd done it.
446
00:27:46,748 --> 00:27:50,210
NARRATOR: The pilots only needed to lift
the triggers six millimeters
447
00:27:50,293 --> 00:27:54,214
for the levers to move past flight idle
and into ground mode.
448
00:27:54,297 --> 00:27:57,801
DI GIULIO: I don't think anybody
who flew the airplane at the time
449
00:27:57,884 --> 00:28:01,554
was aware that a six
millimeter pull of one trigger
450
00:28:01,638 --> 00:28:05,558
could cause both engines to go into
propeller overspeed condition.
451
00:28:07,936 --> 00:28:12,232
NARRATOR: But did Captain Spencer
actually do what investigators suspect?
452
00:28:15,902 --> 00:28:18,905
We're four minutes
before they crash. Let's start.
453
00:28:19,322 --> 00:28:22,784
NARRATOR: Investigators listen
to the cockpit voice recorder
454
00:28:22,867 --> 00:28:27,623
to confirm their theory that the captain
pulled the power levers into ground mode.
455
00:28:27,706 --> 00:28:30,250
SPENCER (recording):
I'm gonna take us down.
456
00:28:30,333 --> 00:28:31,960
WAGSTAFF (recording):
Copy.
457
00:28:32,127 --> 00:28:36,548
NARRATOR: They hear the Captain begin
an early descent to avoid bad weather.
458
00:28:37,090 --> 00:28:41,845
MCNAIR: The cockpit voice recorder records
the voices of the people in the cockpit
459
00:28:41,928 --> 00:28:44,264
but it also captures all the noises,
460
00:28:44,347 --> 00:28:47,308
and the noises can be
very useful for analysis.
461
00:28:48,351 --> 00:28:51,234
NARRATOR: Soon after,
the airspeed warning sounds.
462
00:28:51,730 --> 00:28:54,649
It fits with what the captain
told investigators.
463
00:28:54,733 --> 00:28:56,943
(alarm beeping)
464
00:28:57,026 --> 00:28:59,696
- WAGSTAFF: Airspeed, mate.
- SPENCER: Got it.
465
00:29:02,157 --> 00:29:05,410
(high-pitched screeching)
Whoa. That is a wall of sound.
466
00:29:07,829 --> 00:29:10,300
It's the sound of the propeller overspeed.
467
00:29:11,916 --> 00:29:14,169
(high-pitched screeching)
468
00:29:18,590 --> 00:29:20,175
FISHER:
It's very, very loud
469
00:29:20,258 --> 00:29:22,594
'cause the propeller tips
are breaking the speed of sound
470
00:29:22,677 --> 00:29:26,556
and so you get these
really, really high sonic booms
471
00:29:26,639 --> 00:29:29,601
back and forth, a lot of
vibration, a lot of noise.
472
00:29:30,101 --> 00:29:31,770
MCNAIR:
Go back five seconds.
473
00:29:32,228 --> 00:29:35,648
I thought I heard something
before the propeller overspeed.
474
00:29:36,232 --> 00:29:39,277
NARRATOR: As they listen
to the cockpit conversation…
475
00:29:39,360 --> 00:29:41,947
- WAGSTAFF: Airspeed, mate.
- SPENCER: Got it.
476
00:29:42,030 --> 00:29:44,950
NARRATOR: …a tiny sound
catches the team's attention.
477
00:29:45,033 --> 00:29:47,327
(click)
Did you hear that?
478
00:29:49,120 --> 00:29:52,003
I heard something.
It's hard to tell what exactly.
479
00:29:52,540 --> 00:29:54,793
Can you delete the sound of the props?
480
00:29:58,588 --> 00:30:02,765
NARRATOR: Investigators sift through
the layers of sound in the cockpit.
481
00:30:03,218 --> 00:30:05,689
Try losing the sound of the alarm as well.
482
00:30:06,137 --> 00:30:08,097
(alarm beeping)
483
00:30:08,181 --> 00:30:09,224
(alarm stops)
484
00:30:10,099 --> 00:30:13,452
MCNAIR: Okay. Amplify what's left
and let's have a listen.
485
00:30:24,989 --> 00:30:26,074
(click)
486
00:30:27,325 --> 00:30:28,827
BLANKENSTEIN:
There it is.
487
00:30:28,910 --> 00:30:32,121
NARRATOR: Buried deep within
the noise of the cockpit,
488
00:30:32,205 --> 00:30:34,500
they discover what they're looking for.
489
00:30:35,291 --> 00:30:39,295
BLANKENSTEIN: This clicking sound
just before the propeller overspeed
490
00:30:39,379 --> 00:30:41,756
was perhaps the pilot in command
491
00:30:42,215 --> 00:30:45,677
pulling the triggers upwards
into the ground beta range.
492
00:30:47,512 --> 00:30:49,597
MCNAIR:
Now we're getting somewhere.
493
00:30:49,681 --> 00:30:53,351
NARRATOR: Right after the click,
they hear another critical sound.
494
00:30:53,434 --> 00:30:54,769
(muffled squeak)
495
00:30:55,186 --> 00:30:59,732
It's the beta warning horn, initially
drowned out by the overspeed noise.
496
00:30:59,858 --> 00:31:04,070
BLANKENSTEIN: The beta warning horn
sounds when you take the power levers
497
00:31:04,153 --> 00:31:06,155
into the ground beta range.
498
00:31:06,239 --> 00:31:07,448
(muffled squeak)
499
00:31:07,532 --> 00:31:10,702
It was intermittent,
and it was very difficult to hear
500
00:31:10,785 --> 00:31:13,079
above the sound
of the propellers themselves.
501
00:31:13,162 --> 00:31:15,207
So we could hear
these little tweeting sounds
502
00:31:15,290 --> 00:31:19,044
on the cockpit voice recorder
that indicate that that was the case.
503
00:31:19,127 --> 00:31:21,963
(engine droning)
504
00:31:23,214 --> 00:31:25,633
(alarm beeping)
505
00:31:27,844 --> 00:31:30,930
- WAGSTAFF: Airspeed, mate.
- Got it.
506
00:31:31,014 --> 00:31:34,768
NARRATOR: It's definitive proof that
confirms the investigators' suspicions.
507
00:31:34,851 --> 00:31:37,729
The captain put the plane
into ground mode mid-flight…
508
00:31:37,812 --> 00:31:38,688
(Pilots gasp)
509
00:31:39,522 --> 00:31:42,233
NARRATOR: …causing the
propellers to overspeed.
510
00:31:43,735 --> 00:31:45,403
FISHER:
The flight manual states specifically
511
00:31:45,486 --> 00:31:49,908
never to go below the flight idle gate.
It's prohibited as a matter of fact.
512
00:31:54,829 --> 00:31:59,542
But if it's so easy to do, how
come it hasn't happened before?
513
00:32:01,544 --> 00:32:02,962
That's a good question.
514
00:32:03,838 --> 00:32:08,468
NARRATOR: Was the crash of Flight 1600
caused by an unlikely pilot error,
515
00:32:08,927 --> 00:32:12,513
or was there a deficiency
with the Dash 8 that allowed it?
516
00:32:12,847 --> 00:32:16,851
FISHER: We need to find out
whether we have a problem with the fleet.
517
00:32:16,935 --> 00:32:18,854
We wanted to make sure
that the thousand aircraft
518
00:32:18,937 --> 00:32:20,730
that were out there were operating safely.
519
00:32:20,813 --> 00:32:22,857
(engines drone)
520
00:32:26,152 --> 00:32:28,696
INVESTIGATOR 2:
This can't be the only case.
521
00:32:28,780 --> 00:32:31,366
NARRATOR: Investigators look
for evidence of other pilots
522
00:32:31,449 --> 00:32:34,786
who have made the same mistake
as the crew of Flight 1600.
523
00:32:34,869 --> 00:32:36,037
(phone ringing)
524
00:32:39,415 --> 00:32:40,375
Yes?
525
00:32:45,630 --> 00:32:46,589
Really?
526
00:32:47,674 --> 00:32:50,969
BLANKENSTEIN: About two months
after the Madang accident,
527
00:32:51,052 --> 00:32:55,098
there was an incident involving a Dash 8
where the propellers had oversped.
528
00:32:55,181 --> 00:32:56,770
BLANKENSTEIN:
Right. Thanks.
529
00:32:58,601 --> 00:33:01,354
- It's happened again.
- What's happened?
530
00:33:01,813 --> 00:33:05,817
BLANKENSTEIN: An incident just
like Flight 1600. Just a few days ago.
531
00:33:05,900 --> 00:33:08,653
NARRATOR: The team learns
about another crew in Australia
532
00:33:08,736 --> 00:33:11,572
that put a Dash 8
into ground mode mid-flight.
533
00:33:11,656 --> 00:33:13,742
BLANKENSTEIN:
In that particular case,
534
00:33:13,825 --> 00:33:16,119
the first officer had their hand
on the power levers
535
00:33:16,202 --> 00:33:21,332
and they experienced
an updraft followed by a downdraft
536
00:33:21,416 --> 00:33:24,669
and inadvertently gripped
the triggers of the power levers
537
00:33:24,752 --> 00:33:27,964
and moved the power levers
below the flight idle gate.
538
00:33:28,506 --> 00:33:32,635
The pilots got out of it. They put
it back into flight idle right away.
539
00:33:33,386 --> 00:33:34,595
Everyone's fine.
540
00:33:37,890 --> 00:33:42,311
Those aren't the only
incidents. There are more.
541
00:33:44,022 --> 00:33:47,859
NARRATOR: The most recent incident
is just the tip of the iceberg.
542
00:33:47,942 --> 00:33:50,528
Investigators uncover six other cases
543
00:33:50,611 --> 00:33:55,241
where Dash 8 pilots mismanaged the
controls of the Pratt and Whitney engines
544
00:33:55,324 --> 00:33:58,953
by pulling the power levers
into the ground mode mid-flight.
545
00:33:59,454 --> 00:34:01,831
BLANKENSTEIN:
It was pretty obvious to us
546
00:34:01,914 --> 00:34:07,670
that inadvertent activation of the power
levers into the ground beta range
547
00:34:07,754 --> 00:34:10,214
can occur and will occur in the future.
548
00:34:10,757 --> 00:34:14,177
INVESTIGATOR 2: The NTSB
has been on top of this for years.
549
00:34:14,260 --> 00:34:16,262
They wanted stops on the power levers
550
00:34:16,345 --> 00:34:18,974
to prevent moving
into ground mode during flight.
551
00:34:19,057 --> 00:34:23,175
- BLANKENSTEIN: What about the FAA?
- I asked myself the same question.
552
00:34:29,484 --> 00:34:31,652
They followed suit. It was mandated.
553
00:34:31,736 --> 00:34:35,532
A lockout system was built for the
Dash 8 so this wouldn't happen again.
554
00:34:35,615 --> 00:34:36,991
They fixed the problem.
555
00:34:37,075 --> 00:34:39,744
MCNAIR:
The design of the system was reviewed,
556
00:34:39,827 --> 00:34:44,499
and there had been many changes as to try
and make this gate less easy to cross.
557
00:34:46,334 --> 00:34:48,544
They knew about this ten years ago.
558
00:34:48,628 --> 00:34:51,099
So why didn't Flight 1600
have this system?
559
00:34:53,382 --> 00:34:54,425
Have a look.
560
00:35:01,349 --> 00:35:04,477
- This is only in the US.
- INVESTIGATOR 2: Exactly.
561
00:35:04,769 --> 00:35:07,438
BLANKENSTEIN:
The Dash 8s in the United States
562
00:35:07,855 --> 00:35:11,859
had to incorporate a system
that prevented propeller overspeed
563
00:35:11,943 --> 00:35:14,195
when you went into the ground beta range.
564
00:35:14,278 --> 00:35:17,657
And the rest of the world
didn't incorporate that system.
565
00:35:17,740 --> 00:35:21,119
If they had mandated this here,
it could have saved lives.
566
00:35:22,036 --> 00:35:25,164
NARRATOR: Investigators
conclude that the power levers
567
00:35:25,248 --> 00:35:28,793
of hundreds of Dash 8s around
the world have a dangerous flaw.
568
00:35:28,876 --> 00:35:31,671
(engine droning)
569
00:35:31,754 --> 00:35:34,382
But there is one remaining
issue to resolve.
570
00:35:34,715 --> 00:35:37,260
Did we get the results
from the manufacturer
571
00:35:37,343 --> 00:35:39,637
of what happened to the right engine?
572
00:35:42,056 --> 00:35:46,292
NARRATOR: Even though both engines
experienced the same overspeed forces,
573
00:35:46,644 --> 00:35:50,773
why wasn't the right engine destroyed
in the same way the left one was?
574
00:35:55,278 --> 00:35:57,781
BLANKENSTEIN: It looks like the
switch that activates the propellers
575
00:35:57,864 --> 00:35:59,407
was improperly maintained.
576
00:36:03,703 --> 00:36:06,664
NARRATOR: Shortly after
the right propeller oversped,
577
00:36:06,747 --> 00:36:11,335
it got stuck in the feathered position
and was unable to produce any thrust.
578
00:36:12,378 --> 00:36:15,840
So it's effectively in neutral.
579
00:36:16,299 --> 00:36:20,553
It's not in drive. It's not in reverse.
It's just going with the airflow.
580
00:36:20,970 --> 00:36:25,516
NARRATOR: This prevented the right engine
from corn-cobbing like the left one.
581
00:36:25,766 --> 00:36:27,852
It's the final piece of the puzzle.
582
00:36:31,439 --> 00:36:34,901
So Captain Spencer puts
the plane in a fast descent.
583
00:36:36,611 --> 00:36:39,864
NARRATOR: Investigators finally
understand the sequence of events
584
00:36:39,947 --> 00:36:42,575
that caused Flight 1600 to crash.
585
00:36:43,034 --> 00:36:45,578
- I'm gonna take us down.
- Copy.
586
00:36:47,163 --> 00:36:51,292
NARRATOR: As it heads for Madang,
thick clouds are in the plane's path.
587
00:36:52,710 --> 00:36:54,879
The Captain wants to see the airport.
588
00:36:54,962 --> 00:36:58,216
Understandable.
But he starts going too fast.
589
00:37:00,092 --> 00:37:01,928
(alarm beeping)
590
00:37:04,805 --> 00:37:10,061
BLANKENSTEIN: Now, around here, at
10,500 feet, the airspeed warnings go off.
591
00:37:11,771 --> 00:37:14,148
(alarm beeping)
WAGSTAFF: Airspeed, mate.
592
00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:15,316
Got it.
593
00:37:16,192 --> 00:37:18,778
BLANKENSTEIN:
He pulls the power levers back,
594
00:37:18,861 --> 00:37:21,656
accidentally putting the
plane in ground mode.
595
00:37:21,739 --> 00:37:23,449
(high-pitched screeching)
596
00:37:26,535 --> 00:37:28,454
(airplane drones)
597
00:37:28,537 --> 00:37:29,747
(yells) What have we done?
598
00:37:29,830 --> 00:37:33,960
BLANKENSTEIN: Both engines
malfunction for different reasons,
599
00:37:34,043 --> 00:37:36,212
and the plane is now a glider.
600
00:37:38,297 --> 00:37:41,550
It was the worst of cases,
the worst of consequences
601
00:37:41,634 --> 00:37:45,987
when you lost both engines, and then
you have to do this off-field landing.
602
00:37:46,597 --> 00:37:50,351
INVESTIGATOR 2: How long did it take
for them to hit the ground?
603
00:37:50,726 --> 00:37:56,524
BLANKENSTEIN: The propellers oversped
here. So… four minutes, 18 seconds.
604
00:37:57,900 --> 00:38:00,820
That's not a lot of time
for an emergency landing.
605
00:38:00,903 --> 00:38:03,197
Madang tower. Mayday, mayday, mayday.
606
00:38:04,282 --> 00:38:08,035
NARRATOR: But was that enough time
to find a safe landing spot?
607
00:38:08,119 --> 00:38:10,955
MCNAIR: We needed to know:
How did the crew manage the flight?
608
00:38:11,038 --> 00:38:13,582
What could they have done?
What did they do?
609
00:38:22,800 --> 00:38:28,222
Investigators examine how the pilots
of Airlines PNG Flight 1600 reacted
610
00:38:28,306 --> 00:38:30,599
after both their engines failed.
611
00:38:31,892 --> 00:38:33,144
What were they doing?
612
00:38:33,811 --> 00:38:38,274
- (yells) What have we done?
- (yells) I don't know, mate. I don't know.
613
00:38:39,233 --> 00:38:40,901
Or what were they not doing?
614
00:38:42,737 --> 00:38:46,782
NARRATOR: They turn to the transcripts
from the cockpit conversation
615
00:38:46,866 --> 00:38:50,828
to see if the pilots performed checklists
from their quick reference handbook
616
00:38:50,911 --> 00:38:53,039
in the final four minutes of flight.
617
00:38:53,122 --> 00:38:57,335
MCNAIR: When you have both engines out,
you're faced with a forced landing.
618
00:38:57,418 --> 00:38:59,962
And there is a checklist
for forced landing.
619
00:39:01,297 --> 00:39:05,384
Mayday, mayday, mayday.
Airlines PNG Flight 1600.
620
00:39:05,468 --> 00:39:07,470
We're making an emergency landing.
621
00:39:07,553 --> 00:39:10,265
MCNAIR:
And the typical forced landing checklist
622
00:39:10,348 --> 00:39:13,309
has some basic guidance in terms
of what speed they should fly.
623
00:39:13,392 --> 00:39:18,606
NARRATOR: Reducing speed gives
pilots more time to locate a suitable site
624
00:39:18,689 --> 00:39:20,866
and prepare for an emergency landing.
625
00:39:21,233 --> 00:39:24,904
The forced landing checklist
would tell them to lower the flaps
626
00:39:24,987 --> 00:39:27,990
and put the gear down
once they've chosen a site.
627
00:39:28,074 --> 00:39:31,327
NARRATOR: But there's no
discussion about the checklist.
628
00:39:32,912 --> 00:39:35,383
They weren't running
any checklists at all.
629
00:39:35,873 --> 00:39:40,403
DI GIULIO: Instead of establishing the
airplane in a best glide configuration,
630
00:39:40,836 --> 00:39:45,174
they increased their descent rate
and sacrificed a lot of the altitude
631
00:39:45,257 --> 00:39:49,762
that could have been advantageous for
them in selecting a forced landing site.
632
00:39:49,845 --> 00:39:51,305
Look there. A river.
633
00:39:52,765 --> 00:39:57,436
MCNAIR: The crew reacted, but they didn't
seem to do any sort of problem solving
634
00:39:57,520 --> 00:39:59,480
in terms of what was the best option.
635
00:39:59,563 --> 00:40:02,817
For example, they didn't
even discuss what speed to fly.
636
00:40:02,900 --> 00:40:05,371
If they configured
their plane for a glide,
637
00:40:05,861 --> 00:40:08,156
what speed would they have been flying?
638
00:40:08,406 --> 00:40:09,407
Hold on.
639
00:40:10,199 --> 00:40:14,787
NARRATOR: The investigators determine
the speed the pilots could have slowed to
640
00:40:14,870 --> 00:40:17,106
in order to maximize their glide time.
641
00:40:17,248 --> 00:40:20,543
1.3 times stall speed…
642
00:40:22,753 --> 00:40:25,673
2.5 miles per 1000 feet.
643
00:40:28,759 --> 00:40:30,177
That's 120 knots.
644
00:40:31,137 --> 00:40:35,308
NARRATOR: When they compare the glide
speed to that actual speed of the flight,
645
00:40:35,391 --> 00:40:38,394
investigators come to
an eye-opening realization.
646
00:40:38,811 --> 00:40:42,400
They were going up to 250 knots
after the propellers oversped.
647
00:40:42,815 --> 00:40:45,992
INVESTIGATOR 2:
Twice as fast as they should have been.
648
00:40:47,153 --> 00:40:50,156
NARRATOR: How much longer
could the pilots have stayed airborne
649
00:40:50,239 --> 00:40:53,242
if they had maintained
the recommended glide speed?
650
00:40:58,247 --> 00:41:02,012
They could have bought themselves
six more minutes of glide time.
651
00:41:02,793 --> 00:41:06,172
DI GIULIO: That additional time could have
come in very handy for several reasons.
652
00:41:06,255 --> 00:41:10,676
It would have conserved the energy of the
airplane and allowed them to fly longer.
653
00:41:10,759 --> 00:41:12,804
It also would have given them more time
654
00:41:12,887 --> 00:41:15,098
to perform the appropriate
drills and checklists
655
00:41:15,181 --> 00:41:17,683
that would have helped them have
a more successful outcome
656
00:41:17,766 --> 00:41:19,178
from the forced landing.
657
00:41:19,810 --> 00:41:22,688
I'll get as close to the mouth
of that river as I can.
658
00:41:22,771 --> 00:41:26,442
NARRATOR: Instead of slowing the plane
and assessing all his options,
659
00:41:26,525 --> 00:41:29,904
the captain tries to get on the
ground as quickly as possible.
660
00:41:29,987 --> 00:41:34,283
Following the overspeed, the rate of
descent of the airplane increased
661
00:41:34,366 --> 00:41:37,661
from 1,500 feet per minute
to 6,000 feet per minute.
662
00:41:38,746 --> 00:41:40,540
That's a staggering descent rate.
663
00:41:40,623 --> 00:41:44,669
The last thing that you would want to do
after having lost both your engines
664
00:41:44,752 --> 00:41:46,811
is trade away all of your altitude.
665
00:41:47,254 --> 00:41:49,799
NARRATOR: With less time
to plan for a ditching,
666
00:41:49,882 --> 00:41:52,426
the pilots choose
a difficult landing site.
667
00:41:53,052 --> 00:41:55,054
DI GIULIO:
Airplanes are designed to take
668
00:41:55,137 --> 00:41:58,057
the structural load of landing
on a firm surface
669
00:41:58,140 --> 00:42:02,140
using the systems that we have on
board, like landing gear and flaps.
670
00:42:02,228 --> 00:42:06,405
The systems aren't designed in a
conventional airplane to land on water.
671
00:42:07,149 --> 00:42:08,150
Boulders!
672
00:42:08,234 --> 00:42:12,280
NARRATOR: In the end, boulders prevented
any chance of ditching on water.
673
00:42:12,363 --> 00:42:14,246
Forced to land on the riverbank,
674
00:42:14,448 --> 00:42:18,911
PNG Flight 1600 wasn't properly
configured for landing on the ground.
675
00:42:19,036 --> 00:42:20,788
(suspenseful music)
676
00:42:22,164 --> 00:42:23,666
(thudding)
677
00:42:27,086 --> 00:42:29,129
(metallic screeching)
678
00:42:35,803 --> 00:42:37,972
MCNAIR:
So many people died on this accident.
679
00:42:38,055 --> 00:42:41,893
This was an eye-opener and made everybody
realize in fact something had to be done
680
00:42:41,976 --> 00:42:44,061
to prevent this kind of situation.
681
00:42:45,187 --> 00:42:46,105
Good job.
682
00:42:46,397 --> 00:42:51,235
NARRATOR: The investigation into the crash
of Airlines PNG Flight 1600 concludes
683
00:42:51,318 --> 00:42:52,987
with a clear recommendation.
684
00:42:53,070 --> 00:42:55,031
You can't just say pilot error
and be done with it.
685
00:42:55,114 --> 00:42:57,644
You have to say,
why was the error possible?
686
00:42:57,866 --> 00:43:02,455
Why wasn't the error eliminated? In this
case, it's the design of the airplane.
687
00:43:03,414 --> 00:43:06,626
NARRATOR: A change that has long
been made in the United States
688
00:43:06,709 --> 00:43:09,180
was not mandated in the rest of the world.
689
00:43:10,379 --> 00:43:13,466
BLANKENSTEIN: We had enough
evidence to be able to force change.
690
00:43:13,549 --> 00:43:15,259
We used the power of the pen and the facts
691
00:43:15,342 --> 00:43:18,762
and the evidence that we had
identifying safety issues,
692
00:43:18,846 --> 00:43:23,767
and we presented that to the manufacturer
and Transport Canada, and they did change.
693
00:43:24,977 --> 00:43:28,230
NARRATOR: A ground beta lockout
system is now mandatory
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in every Dash 8 aircraft worldwide.
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FISHER:
It was always a good airplane.
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{\an8}But now we've had to make the system so
that a purposeful act or unintentional act
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{\an8}is now safer. I mean, you can't
do it anymore if you wanted to.
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{\an8}BLANKENSTEIN:
So in this particular case,
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{\an8}we were able to really get down
to what had occurred
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{\an8}and make those safety improvements.
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{\an8}And as an investigator,
that's all you can ask for.
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{\an8}It's why we do the work that we do.
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{\an8}We just want to improve the system
and ultimately save lives in the future.
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