Original subtitles

WENDY: When I woke up, we were suspended up in trees.

NARRATOR: Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 crashes

on final approach to Kirksville, Missouri.

WENDY: I just thought, I need to get out of this plane before it blows up.

NARRATOR: Only two people survive.

TOM: If you went to the accident site,

you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.

NARRATOR: The wreckage provides no clues.

WOMAN: Instruments all checked out. It was fit to fly.

NARRATOR: And the Cockpit Voice Recorder reveals

a team working well together...

PALMER (over tape): No flags except for...

The vertical.

Keep it slow.

NARRATOR: Until the flight’s final seconds.

- SASSE: No! - PALMER: Trees!

TOM: Things went bad real fast.

So the question became;

What happened?

MAN: Mayday, mayday.

(theme music playing)

(radio chatter)

If we have to go missed, we'll set max power.

Flaps ten positive rate, gear up.

NARRATOR: The pilots of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966

complete their approach briefing

into Kirksville, Missouri, Regional Airport.

Then we'll climb 3,000 feet, then direct Kirksville VOR.

NARRATOR: Captain Kim Sasse has been a pilot since the

late 1980s, but only started flying professionally in the last five years.

I'll ask you to walk me through that if we need it.

Roger that.

I will categorize Kim as a...

A bon vivant with a colorful language.

He was very calm when he was flying.

And his knowledge was excellent.

NARRATOR: First Officer Jonathon Palmer has three years

professional flying experience with regional airlines.

The pilots viewed your time with the regionals

as somewhat of the dues you pay to get to the airlines or

the high-end corporate jobs.

This is where you built your time,

it's where you got your experience.

NARRATOR: There are 13 passengers on tonight’s flight.

WENDY: That flight was actually a pretty smooth flight.

I don't remember any turbulence or bouncing or anything.

It was a nice flight.

NARRATOR: Wendy Bonham is with a group of doctors traveling

to a medical conference.

Do you have another copy? I left mine at home.

The topic of the conference was Compassion in Medicine,

which was a great topic.

So I was kind of excited to go.

I’m really looking forward to some of these panels.

I had only started at Kirksville College a few months

before that, so I wasn't familiar with all the people who

were on board, but they all knew each other really well and

they were all chatting with each other.

So it was kinda fun to watch.

NARRATOR: Tonight’s flight is a short,

50-minute trip from Saint Louis to Kirksville, Missouri,

where visibility is reduced.

The workload on short flights is intense because as

soon as you get the airplane squared away from the takeoff

you've immediately got to start preparing it for the landing.

SASSE: We're going into the crap.

Look, it's so eerie and creepy.

Ooh.

NARRATOR: These pilots have flown multiple times together

over the last week and encountered a lot of bad weather.

I get a suffocating feeling every time I see that.

(choking)

I'm drowning.

The office in which pilots work is... is quite small.

It's got a wonderful view,

but it is actually a quite tight working environment,

and you're in that environment for six, eight, ten hours, uh,

during a day.

You have to find ways to get along.

NARRATOR: The pilots are flying a Jetstream 32,

a twin engine high-performance turboprop aircraft built for

short-range flights.

The Jetstream was designed for this type of work.

It was an economical airplane.

It was reasonably comfortable for the passengers,

but it was capable of going in and out of smaller airports,

and still being able to make a profit for the airline.

NARRATOR: The Jetstream is fuel efficient and reliable,

but this particular model has no autopilot.

The Jetstream not having any autopilot made our days very long.

You had to constantly fly the airplane,

and autopilot would be nice on those long sequences that we were doing.

But on a positive part, the Jetstream makes you

a very good pilot.

NARRATOR: Flight 5966 is being monitored by a

central controller in Kansas City as

there is no controller at Kirksville Airport.

ATC: Corp Ex 5966, turn right heading three, three, zero.

Maintain 3,000 until established on localizer.

ATC (over radio): Cleared runway three six approach at Kirksville.

3,000 till established. Cleared for the approach.

Cleared for the approach.

NARRATOR: 16 miles south of the airport,

the pilots begin to configure the aircraft for landing.

Course alive, cross check. No flags except for the vertical.

SASSE: Keep it slow.

All the time we need.

Let's go flaps ten and we'll configure early too.

Give ourselves as much time as we can.

All right.

Flaps ten.

NARRATOR: The crew is flying a non-precision approach

They don't have vertical landing guidance.

Configuring early reduces the workload as they near the airport.

One of the things that in any approach,

but particularly in a non-precision approach,

you wanna minimize the number of variables.

And one of the ways you do that is you get the airplane in

a position to land earlier than normal.

Let’s make sure the lights are up please.

All right.

NARRATOR: The lights at Kirksville are pilot activated.

The airports without a lot of traffic that goes in and

out of them, one of the ways that they reduce the cost of running the airport

is they don't have the lights on all the time.

The pilots have the ability to control those lights with a

series of microphone clicks on a specific radio frequency.

If those lights are not on, uh,

particularly when you fly with a low visibility and at night,

you won't see the runway.

So if you don't see the runway, you can't land.

Seven times I clicked it.

I clicked it.

NARRATOR: They’re still too far out to see the lights.

Captain Sasse wants to avoid surprises.

What we can do is we can call Kirksville Ops,

and ask them to confirm they're up.

NARRATOR: The pilots confirm with Airline Operations on the ground.

Kirksville Ops, Corp Ex 59-66.

MAN (over radio): 59-66.

Yeah, could you tell me if the approach lights are up?

I would do that when I didn't see the airport, say hey, um, uh...

Did you see the lights coming on for the approach?

It's a good technique.

MAN (over radio): Lights are on.

Cool. Thanks.

WENDY: There was one doctor up in the front,

who didn't put her seatbelt on.

And I, uh, wanted to call out to her and say,

"Put your seatbelt on."

But I, it...

I didn't.

I wasn't afraid, but I just...

I'm a rule keeper and thought she should have her seatbelt on.

NARRATOR: Two-and-a-half miles from the airport,

the pilots search for the runway.

400.

ALTAI: It's very critical to maintain that altitude because

if you don't see the runway, you gotta go missed because

you cannot land without seeing the runway.

NARRATOR: Flight 5966 emerges from the clouds.

350. Here we are.

NARRATOR: Two miles from the runway,

the pilots are still looking for the approach lights

You're flying 336 feet above the ground.

So there’s not a lot of room for error.

What do you think?

Ah.

I can see ground there.

WARNING: Minimums. Minimums. Minimums.

PALMER: I, I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

NARRATOR: But just as the pilots appear to have

the runway lights in sight...

Flaps 35?

NARRATOR: Something goes wrong.

No.

WARNING: Sink Rate.

- SASSE: No! - PALMER: Trees!

WARNING: Pull up.

What’s going on?

I just remember thinking, I can't believe this is happening.

SASSE: No! Stop! Oh my God!

WARNING: Pull up.

PALMER: Holy crap!

NARRATOR: Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 has crashed into

a wooded area 1.2 miles south of the airport at Kirksville, Missouri.

When I woke up it was dark and it was quiet and

the only sound that I could hear then was just the sound of fire.

We were suspended up in trees.

NARRATOR: Wendy Bonham and her colleague, Doctor Krogh,

struggle to escape.

(moaning)

WENDY: I just felt like I needed to move.

I have always had a fear of blowing up and there was a fire

in the back of the plane.

And I just thought, I need to get out of this plane before it blows up.

I don’t remember walking from my seat to the side of the plane.

It was a ways down and there was fire down there.

NARRATOR: There is no other way out of the plane.

WENDY: I don't remember falling from the plane down to the ground.

I remember before and after.

And I stood up and I could see Doctor Krogh pretty close

to the plane, and he was laying down.

NARRATOR: The other 11 passengers and both pilots are dead.

WENDY: They were all really incredible people

that did incredible things for their communities.

And that's...

And that's hard for me.

ALTAI: For the pilot community,

this is something that is touching us,

because that could be us.

That could be me.

We wanna know why?

What happened?

NARRATOR: It's up to the National Transportation Safety Board

to investigate.

But there’s not much left of the plane for them to examine.

Most of the aircraft itself was consumed by the fire.

There wasn't a lot left.

I mean, there's engines,

propellers and other things but, uh,

if you went to the accident site you wouldn't recognize it as an airplane.

What a mess.

This is what we have from Structures.

NARRATOR: Although the plane was almost completely destroyed

an on-site team is able to analyze the debris.

I'm amazed that we were able to get this much data from that heap.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to the wreckage analysis

to determine if the plane had any mechanical problems that

could have caused the accident.

Uh, we've gone through that wreckage with a fine-tooth comb.

Engines, controls, instruments all checked out.

TOM: Looking at all the data we have from the accident site,

it appeared that the airplane was fully functional at the time

it hit the ground.

So the plane’s working fine.

They might still have lost control.

NARRATOR: They examine the direction of the plane’s trail of debris.

They first hit the trees here,

just over 1.3 miles short of the runway.

They fly another 775 feet

and hit another set of trees, here.

The plane was headed straight for the runway the entire time.

TOM: We had enough information that looking at all the pieces,

this accident started to look like it was a human performance issue

and not an airplane issue.

What kind of an approach were they flying that night?

A non-precision to runway three-six.

Unfortunately, the accident rate for non-precision approaches

is dramatically higher than on those approaches

with an instrument landing system.

Hmm.

What do we know about the weather that night?

Uh, wind was nominal, no turbulence or rain to speak of.

Hold on a sec.

The cloud ceiling was low, 300 feet.

NARRATOR: The cloud ceiling is the distance between the base

of the clouds and the ground.

Visibility was three to five miles.

So they’re flying blind through the clouds.

It’s misty, visibility is poor.

Those are bad conditions for a non-precision approach.

The question is, are they bad enough to cause this accident?

Well, let's find out.

JOHN: In low visibility conditions,

a non-precision approach is very challenging to fly because

you come down to the lowest altitude,

you have to level off there, and you...

You fly along looking for the runway environment.

NARRATOR: Investigators speak t a pilot who landed in Kirksvill

ahead of Flight 5966.

How bad was the weather that night?

Flying was smooth, but visibility was right on

the cusp, maybe two to five miles.

Half the state had been soupy for a couple days.

How was the visibility for landing?

No issues.

If it had been worse, we would have gone around.

NARRATOR: Why did Flight 5966 crash when other aircraft flew

the same approach safely that night?

TOM: So the question became;

What went wrong that day?

And that takes time to put together.

We've got their performance data ready to go.

Let's see how they handled the approach.

NARRATOR: Using a combination of data from the flight recorde

and radar, investigators analyz the flight’s descent profile.

TOM: It was important for the team to take a look at the descent profile.

How did it wind up where it did?

So we start backing up during the whole approach,

where it was during these segments.

So they come in like this and continue straight to the ground.

Can we see their MDA?

So the plane was supposed to level off at the minimum descent altitude

before continuing to descend to the runway.

Why would they blow right past the MDA like that?

If they didn't level off at the minimum descent altitude,

why not?

What didn't they see, or what didn't they do?

How fast where they descending?

1200 feet per minute.

What should they have been doing?

Um...

Below 300 feet of altitude,

the max is 900 feet per minute.

TOM: Once you get to minimum descent altitude,

you should stop your descent altogether and continue on.

NARRATOR: Why did Flight 5966 descend so low and so fast?

They continued that descent speed right up until they crashed.

Why didn't they slow down before striking the trees?

NARRATOR: Investigators listen to the cockpit voice recorder t

understand why the pilots of Corporate Airlines 5966 crashed

short of the runway in Missouri.

Ready.

Okay, let’s take it back to five minutes before the accident,

when they’re lined up for the runway.

Mm-hmm.

MALCOLM: The cockpit voice recorder,

is one of the most critical elements in the investigation.

It’s your most direct evidence on how the crew is interacting,

on how they’re following procedures,

on exactly what happens on the human side.

PALMER (over tape): Course alive.

Cross check.

No flags...

Except for the vertical.

Keep it slow.

All the time we need.

Let's go flaps ten and we'll configure early too.

Give ourselves as much time as we can.

All right. Flaps ten.

They’re configuring the plane to land early.

NARRATOR: The team hears evidence of a cautious and prepared crew.

Smart move in low visibility.

The crew on this flight knew that the weather was going

to be challenging, and one of the ways that they...

They tried to mitigate that, or to improve their chances of

a successful landing, was to get the airplane configured early.

Let’s make sure the lights are up please.

All right.

MALCOLM: There are cases where the captain does an exemplary job,

where he goes beyond the requirements.

He asked the first officer to call ahead to make sure,

from the ground, that the lights are working and

that they're turned up fully.

It's not required.

It's an excellent idea.

Especially in these conditions.

I'm hearing an organized crew here.

Take it to when they near the MDA.

If there's a big mistake, it'll likely be then.

JOHN: The minimum descent altitude is the lowest altitude

you're permitted to fly at until you see the runway environment.

400.

PALMER (over tape): 350. Here we are.

Okay. They're at the MDA. It’s decision time.

SASSE (over tape): So, what do you think?

Ah. I can see ground there.

WARNING: Minimums. Minimums. Minimums.

I, I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

Hold it there.

They’re two miles out, 300 feet up.

They’ve just come out of the clouds.

With the mist that night,

they probably couldn't see the runway lights.

There’s only farmland from here to the airport.

I can't see anything the captain could have

mistaken for a runway.

Why is the captain even looking for the approach lights?

So the captain’s the first one to say,

"I see something outside the airplane."

He sees the ground.

He sees lights.

He shouldn't be doing that.

He should be totally focused inside the airplane.

The first officer is supposed to see the approach lights

and call out, "Approach lights in sight, continue."

NARRATOR: But the CVR recording tells a different story.

Instead, they're both looking for the runway.

And nobody is paying attention to the plane's descent speed and altitude.

JOHN: The flying pilot should have been monitoring exclusively instruments.

And what sadly occurred was that the normal flight path continued

below the minimum descent altitude and neither one of them caught it.

SASSE (over tape): Now. No!

WARNING: Pull up.

PALMER (over tape): Trees!

And that is, it's very apparent when you hear this, trees.

And that, and it shocked both of them.

They did not expect to see that.

They spent four-and-a-half minutes following procedure.

They configure the plane early for landing.

Here, they make sure the runway lights are on early.

First officer calls out minimum descent altitude.

And from this point, 23 seconds from impact,

it all goes wrong.

Captain’s looking outside when he shouldn't.

The first officer doesn't challenge him.

Next thing, they're crashing.

It's surprising how much the captain's performance

suddenly fell apart at the end, that even listening to it,

he sounded like he was much better than that.

It's a surprise for me professionally that this can happen.

NARRATOR: Investigators need to find out how a crew that seemed

to be flying so well...

Flaps 35?

No. No!

WARNING: Sink rate. Pull up.

Trees!

NARRATOR: Made such crucial mistakes in the last seconds of the flight.

PALMER: Holy crap!

WARNING: Pull up.

All right, take it back 30 minutes before impact.

NARRATOR: Investigators return to the cockpit conversation for

clues to explain why the crew ignored established procedures

in the final 23 seconds of their flight.

SASSE (over tape): There.

My hair was down to my breast pocket.

- Are you serious? - Right here.

You could hold my hair like this.

I cannot see you with long hair like that.

I used to wear a black derby with the rim turned down.

It was my concert hat.

SASSE (over tape): I had a Fu Manchu.

Yeah, it was fun.

I cannot imagine you like that.

ATC (over radio): Corp Ex 59-66 climb and maintain one 2,000-er

1200-er.

One, 2,000, Corporate Ex 59-66.

12-er, 1,000-er.

I detect a bit of an attitude there.

I might have to call him a jerk.

Does that seem a bit casual to you?

Uh, but they're above 10,000.

So the cockpit doesn't have to be sterile at this point.

The philosophy of the sterile cockpit rule is below

10,000 feet the flight crew is engaged in only what's required

to basically fly the airplane.

No non-pertinent conversations.

Keep going.

I have a good time flying with you.

Yeah, me too.

Just letting you know that.

You gotta have fun.

That’s truth man, you gotta have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves way too seriously in this job.

I've flown with them and it sucks.

A month of fricking agony.

All you wanna do is strangle the jerk when you get to the ground, you know?

Oh.

NARRATOR: The conversation raises a major concern for investigators.

Sure, they’re joking, but the captain is essentially

telling him how he wants the first officer to behave.

That’s disturbing, and it sets a disturbing atmosphere.

It’s a bad setting by the captain in terms of priorities.

Okay. What’s next?

(sighs)

Cruise check, power check.

Can you push his foot away?

Yes.

It’s a relatively compact airplane,

and the passengers in the front of the airplane can sometimes put

their foot into the cockpit area.

Cruise power, cruise check.

All you gotta do is you open the curtain a little bit.

It's like, man...

Some people I invite their feet up to make them

more comfortable, but damn.

I dropped my book on him purposely one time.

Right on top of the arch of the foot.

Oh.

Okay. Stop it.

The captain starts his cruise power checks,

but then interrupts himself to tell a story about

hurting a passenger.

Mm-hmm.

It's really inappropriate.

Uh, the lack of respect for passengers is,

is striking in his conversation.

- Your power levers. - Right on top of his foot.

The power spiked up a bit.

Oh.

The first officer has to tell the captain twice to adjust his power levers,

but he insists on telling this irrelevant story.

All right, well let's see if the first officer can get him back on track.

All I'm thinking about is a Philly frickin' cheesesteak and an iced tea.

Sounds good.

Uh, cruise power is set.

Altimeter is two, niner, niner, zero,

set and cross-checked.

Now the captain interrupts their checklist to discuss his dinner plans.

How did I get two, niner, niner, zero?

Because you’re an idiot.

It should be two, niner, niner, two?

You never set it when they cleared us to the runway?

NARRATOR: Investigators hear the captain mocking

the first officer while confirming their altimeter setting.

And I’ve been sitting here living a lie for the last 20 minutes.

Yeah, you lying scum bucket.

Okay.

Damn boost pumps are off,

pressurization is set and external lights...

You blustering scabby pustule.

Are externalized.

Your damn cruise checklist is fricking done.

The captain's jokes have totally eroded procedure.

Even the first officer has given in and turned

his checklist into a joke.

There would be pressure on the first officer.

Uh, he does go along with the joking,

but the captain is still the pilot in command,

and he has to set the tone.

There's a danger that the first officer will not focus

to the extent that's required.

NARRATOR: Did a breakdown in the cockpit command structure affect

the first officer’s actions at a critical moment?

350. Here we are.

What do you think?

Ah. I can see ground there.

WARNING: Minimums. Minimums. Minimums.

I, I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

You gotta have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves way too seriously

in this job.

Flaps 35?

The kind of atmosphere he set up earlier in making fun

of other pilots and making fun of the passengers sets up

the wrong tone.

It doesn’t encourage the first officer to object.

When things were falling apart, he...

He could have stepped in and done something.

It looks like a complete breakdown in command structure

led to this accident.

The question is, why?

Got their personnel files.

NARRATOR: Investigators study the pilots' training and

previous flights to determine if the crew of Flight 5966 had

a history of deviating from airline procedures.

It, It's very important to get a broad sense

of what the pilot's like from previous flights.

What is their reputation?

Have any of the problems that show up

in this accident shown up before?

Is this a recurring problem?

The captain left a well-paying job to become a pilot.

Plenty of hours, passed all the checks.

He had an interview lined up with a major airline.

You have a capable pilot, who’s devoted to aviation,

who gave up a, a computer industry job that paid several times as much money

because he wanted to be a pilot.

First officer checks out too.

Ten years’ experience, squeaky clean record, no incidents.

They were joking a fair bit. Almost punch drunk.

Do you think they may have been overtired?

TOM: Fatigue can greatly impact performance.

You get more tired and all of a sudden your

level of precision can go downhill.

NARRATOR: The team turns to other Corporate Airlines pilots

for more insight into the crew.

WOMAN: Hi.

Did you see any unusual behavior from these pilots that

would suggest they were tired?

Actually, uh, Captain Sasse tried to take

a nap here in the pilot's lounge before the flight.

MALCOLM: They noted that he's six-foot-four,

very tall, and the couch was actually quite small.

He didn't quite fit on it.

So it couldn't have been ideal for sleeping.

Any idea how long he was asleep?

Maybe an hour.

Thank you.

Fatigue is insidious in that you get an

increasing performance degradation once you are

at a higher level of fatigue,

and performance impairment, it can be somewhat like alcohol.

These are the classic signs of fatigue.

This is what we're looking for.

MALCOLM: W hen I have a case that involves fatigue,

I go back to the cockpit voice recording again to see;

Do they sound tired?

Here’s something.

WARNING: Visibility four.

Mist.

Sky condition, overcast 300.

NARRATOR: An automated weather update notifies

the pilots of the poor visibility in Kirksville.

We’re not getting in.

Crap.

We go all this damn way.

Let's try it.

Yeah, we're gonna try it.

I don't wanna come all the way out here for nothing tonight.

They haven't even gotten into the bad weather yet

and the captain’s determined to land in it.

MAN: Yeah.

He’s fixated on landing.

It had not been an easy duty day,

and so they're probably getting towards the end of

like we'd like to get this flight over.

But there's more than just fixation going on here.

NARRATOR: The pilots’ discussion provides more

evidence of fatigue.

When they find out the weather’s bad,

the captain should be talking about options other than landing.

Well, he has the opportunity to discuss options now.

What does he do?

I'll be so happy when we have an ILS.

The next job, everywhere we go will have an ILS.

Yep.

NARRATOR: The captain complains about not having

automated landing assistance, an ILS, at the airport.

The only options he’s talking about are future job prospects.

NARRATOR: I nstead of discussing options if they can't land,

the captain is talking about his ambitions of flying for a bigger company.

SASSE: We’re going into the crap.

Look, it's so eerie and creepy.

Ooh.

Ten minutes earlier they're upset about the bad weather,

but when they're actually in it, they're cracking jokes.

NARRATOR: The crew isn't responding fast enough to

the changing situation.

MALCOLM: That can be a sign of fatigue.

People start to become giddy and are not critical enough or, or,

or enough careful of their behavior.

After this they don't discuss the weather again for...

Three minutes.

How’s Kirksville looking weather-wise?

WARNING: Visibility three miles

Sky condition overcast, 300.

Still overcast to 300 feet.

(yawns)

And when they do check again, the visibility is still bad,

and they don't discuss options besides landing.

NARRATOR: They discover that th crew ignored multiple warnings

about conditions on the approach.

In fatigue, you don't respond to warnings,

that there are warnings that this is not working but that

you're slow to respond to it.

MAN: Just missing one piece.

You already have it.

The risky decision is to try to land when they can't decide if

they can see the runway.

Ah, I can see ground there.

WARNING: Minimums. Minimums. Minimums.

I, I don't see anything.

Oh yeah, there it is.

Approach lights in sight.

NARRATOR: It’s a decision the pilots regret almost immediately.

Flaps 35?

- No. No! - Trees!

NARRATOR: Investigators conclud that fatigue played a major role

in the crash of Flight 5966.

So they've fixated on landing.

Uh-huh.

Right?

They don't consider any of the other options and they make

the risky decision to land anyways.

Mm-hmm.

MAN: All the signs are there.

I personally feel that fatigue is the largest

human performance area that we can address as an

industry to prevent accidents from happening.

It's not always obvious when someone is tired,

and it's not obvious to them.

The scientific evidence is that people typically under-report

how tired they are.

Now, how much did these guys work before

the accident flight?

NARRATOR: Investigators analyze the pilots’ duty hours

leading up to the flight.

MALCOLM: To study fatigue, we look at if the person is getting

the amount of sleep that they normally get.

We look at how long they've been awake.

Uh, we look at the time of day.

Uh, those are scientifically worked out and

we can get an idea from that.

The night of the flight,

they had worked three days straight.

That'll tire you out.

Yeah, well they had seven-and-a-half hours of available rest time

the night before the flight.

That day they flew six flights,

an hour each, and they were on duty for 14 hours straight

starting at 5:45 am.

NARRATOR: The team discovers that the crew of Flight 5966

worked an extremely long day before the accident flight.

The day of the accident was very busy.

They had to get up about 4:00 in the morning.

Their first flight was around 5:00 in the morning.

They were originally scheduled for eight flights and they would

have been on duty for about 14 hours.

It’s, it’s, it’s quite a long day.

So it was an extremely long day,

not enough rest.

Add to that a plane with no autopilot.

What do the FAA regulations have to say about

working in those conditions?

NARRATOR: Were the pilots made to work too many hours

without sufficient rest?

Check this out.

Pilots can't fly more than eight flight hours in a day,

but that's it.

I flew in those days, and you had a maximum number of

flight hours in a day, but the number of duty hours and

the time of day was not even taken into consideration.

Isn't there data out there that says it isn’t safe to

fly if you’ve been up that long?

NARRATOR: A 2003 study of data from 55 accidents concluded tha

pilots who worked 13 or more duty hours had an accident rate

several times higher than those working shorter days.

Why isn't this information reflected in the regulations?

This might have something to do with it.

NARRATOR: Investigators discove the reason why the FAA’s rest

and duty regulations don’t reflect the latest research.

The last time these regulations were updated.

1964.

MALCOLM: You had a dedicated and very capable crew,

you had a company that was trying to do a good job.

Really, the regulations needed to be updated according to

scientific principles, to improve the safety for everyone.

NARRATOR: The team now has a comprehensive picture of

the accident of Corporate Airlines Flight 5966.

At the end of a 14-hour day, two tired pilots attempt

one final landing in challenging conditions.

I get a suffocating feeling every time I see that.

(choking)

I’m drowning!

NARRATOR: The captain’s joking and casual tone in the cockpit

undermines the command structure between

him and the first officer.

You gotta have fun.

That's truth man, you gotta have fun.

Too many of these jerks take themselves way too

seriously in this job.

NARRATOR: The pilots' roles break down so much that in

the critical 23 seconds before crashing,

neither of them is doing his job.

So what do you think?

NARRATOR: The captain ignores protocol and

takes his eyes off his instruments.

Ah. I can see ground there.

I, I don't see anything.

NARRATOR: And the first officer doesn't challenge him.

Flaps 35?

NARRATOR: The pilots’ fatigue likely contributed to

poor decision-making and fatal preoccupation with landing.

No.

WARNING: Sink rate.

No!

WARNING: Pull up.

PALMER: Trees!

SASSE: No. Stop. Oh my God!

PALMER: Holy crap!

NARRATOR: The NTSB recommends a overhaul of the FAA’s flight an

duty time regulations to consider elements like length o

duty day, start time, workload and other factors that can

affect pilots’ alertness.

MALCOLM: The NTSB had been advising changes in

the regulations, in the flight and duty time regulations,

for decades before this happened.

But I think with this accident, it really focused to a point

that industry realized that this was necessary.

JOHN: This was a push from the major airlines first that then

trickled down into other operations that were smaller

like the regional airlines and corporate operators.

NARRATOR: For Wendy Bonham, the change came at too high a cost.

WENDY: I'm comforted to hear that there were changes made in

the length of time that pilots can fly, um,

because of this crash.

I suppose it's something good that came out of something that

wasn't good at all.

Captioned by Cotter Media Group.