All language subtitles for M.2003-S22E08-Turboprop.Terror.Flagship.Airlines.Flight.3379.WEBDL-1080pEAC3.5.1h264-PiTBULL_track4_[eng]

On approach to Raleigh-Durham Airport...

Did we just have a flame-out?

The pilots decide to abort their landing.

When you have an engine failure
you lose 80% of your performance.

Let’s go missed approach.

But the plan falls apart.

Lower the nose!

We were going down.

Only five of the 20 people
onboard survive.

NTSB investigators are puzzled
by the wreckage of Flight 3379.

It appears the engines were
rotating at full power.

So what went wrong?

Only by taking a test flight
to the brink of disaster.

PILOT Yawing to the left.

Will an astonishing
sequence of events be revealed.

This airplane had to crash.

No!

Mayday! Mayday!

[Do Not Translate Title]

THIS IS A TRUE STORY. IT IS BASED ON
OFFICIAL REPORTS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS.

TURBOPROP TERROR

American Eagle Flight 3379 approaches

Raleigh-Durham International Airport.

DECEMBER 13, 1994

Okay. Can you do the descent
checklist, please?

In the cockpit, Captain Mike
Hillis and First Officer Matthew Sailor,

prepare for landing.

Altimeter 30, 31, set, cross-checked.

30, 31, set, cross-checked.

DOUG TAUBER FORMER JETSTREAM PILOT

These were young pilots just
starting off in their career.

They were looking to go work at
the major airlines where the pay

and benefits were substantially better.

The pilots are flying a Jetstream 3201,

a twin turbo-prop airplane
designed for short flights.

It’s a workhorse for regional
airlines like American Eagle.

Turbo-prop engines run
more efficiently at lower altitudes.

They’re actually more fuel efficient.
So on these short-haul routes,

the Jetstream pretty much fit that market.

Flight 3379 took off at 6:00 PM
from Greensboro, North Carolina.

It’s a 35-minute flight to Raleigh-Durham
airport.

Well folks, at this time,
we're about 10.8 miles...

From Raleigh-Durham International Airport,

about five minutes out and about to begin
our approach.

The weather tonight's not very good in
Raleigh.

Two-mile visibility because of rain and
fog,

and the winds are out of the north at six
miles an hour.

There are 18 passengers onboard tonight.

Among them, college student Lauren
Anderson.

I had been up the night before.

LAUREN ANDERSON PASSENGER, FLIGHT 3379

I’d stayed up all night, pulled an
all-nighter,

wrote a paper and slid it under the door
of my English professor that morning,

so I was pretty tired.
It had been a long week of finals.

I was ready to get home.

Eagle Flight 3379, reduce to one
seven zero,

then descend and maintain 3,000.

Ten miles from Raleigh-Durham,

Flight 3379 is cleared to begin its
descent.

One 70 then 3,000, 3379.

The flight crew reduces engine power.

In a turbo-prop plane, the engine power

and the propellor speed are controlled
separately.

The Jetstream 32 had no autopilot.
So you were always hand-flying it.

It was one of the most demanding airplanes
on a pilot’s flying skills.

Descending to 3000 feet,
the crew keeps a close eye on the weather.

When you get a chance, look out
your window and see if

you see any of that ice.

Yeah, I was looking out there.
I don't see anything right now.

Icing can be a major threat to an
aircraft.

It not only increases the weight of it,

but also spoils the aerodynamics
over the wing.

Icing isn't the only hazard
facing the pilots.

Eagle Flight 3379, caution wake
turbulence. You’re spacing on a 727.

Turn left one niner zero.

There’s a 727 landing ahead of
Flight 3379,

which creates a potential hazard for the
Jetstream.

Heavy aircraft tend to
generate very strong

horizontal tornadoes called vortexes,
that come off the wing tips.

If a smaller aircraft has an
encounter with wake turbulence,

it could be so powerful that it’s beyond
the control

of the pilot to counteract it.

Left one niner zero, 3379.

For safety, the pilots

make a minor adjustment to their course.

Eagle Flight 3379, Raleigh.

Cleared to land, wind zero one zero at
eight, traffic three and a half mile...

Final, at 727.

Cleared to land five left. 3379.

Once the Boeing 727 touches
down, Flight 3379 will be cleared to land.

We didn't anticipate any issues.

It was the same old, same old, I’d say.

Probably had taken that flight three
times already that year.

- And gear down.
- Gear down.

The pilots configure the
plane for landing.

- Flaps 20.
- Flaps 20.

Just minutes before touchdown...

Why’s that ignition light on?
Did we just have a flame-out?

The engine ignition light illuminates.

Seeing the ignition light come on during
approach,

would typically raise a concern.

If combustion is
interrupted for any reason,

it's what pilots call a
flame-out or an engine failure.

I'm not sure what's going on with it.

If there is an engine failure,

the pilots need to reconsider landing.

The pilot would have to
make the decision whether to

continue the approach or abort the
approach,

and see what the problem is.

What do you want me to do?
Are you gonna continue?

Okay, yeah. I'm gonna continue.
Just back me up.

Captain Hillis decides to land.

All right.

Let’s go missed approach.

But then, he reverses his decision.

A go around
or a missed approach would have

given the pilot more time to run
an engine failure checklist.

When you’re on final,
you really don’t have that

much time to complete it.

Set max power.

Now, at 1500 feet,
Captain Hillis aborts the landing.

When you have an engine failure,

you not only lost half your power,
you lose 80% of your performance.

Flight 3379 isn’t climbing, and
it’s losing speed.

Lower the nose. Lower the nose!

At 1400 feet, the plane is stalling.

- You got it?
- Yeah.

They’re unable to climb.

They’re starting to lose directional
control of the aircraft.

Flight 3379 is turning steadily
to the left,

veering further off course.

Lower the nose!

Things are getting bad real fast and
they’re running out of time.

Here!

Plunging rapidly towards the ground,
the pilots fight to recover their plane.

There's no flight attendant on the plane.
There was a lot of commotion.

Um, you could hear some
kind of warning siren.

I... I was scared, people were scared.

We knew we were crashing,
I knew we were going down.

I just braced myself, literally putting
my hand,

and my foot on the seat in front of me.

Ah!

I had a moment that, "Okay, I need to
survive. I need to live through this."

No!

Ah!

Whoa!

When we crashed, um, I...

I just remember hitting ground very,
very fast, very hard.

Flight 3379 has just plowed through the
dense woods of North Carolina.

It’s now a pile of burning wreckage

The plane split literally in, in between
my seat and the seat in front of me.

I can remember taking my seatbelt off,

and hearing people moaning
and people screaming.

I couldn't see anything.
I don’t know if I lost my contacts,

or I just had fuel in my eyes.

I, I couldn't walk.

But my adrenaline was pumping.

I was in fight or flight mode.

My intuition was that I had...

I had to survive and, somehow,
I got away from the fire.

Morrisville firefighter David Farrell is
one of the first responders on site.

And your heart’s racing.

I mean, you know you’re
probably fixed to encounter

DAVID FARRELL FIRST RESPONDER

one of the worst things you've
ever been in, in your life.

And you could see the fire.
Your heart was in your throat.

You know, your adrenaline is pumping.
You're scared.

As I got closer to the scene,
something caught my eye.

And I looked down.

I saw a female pulling herself
away from the fire,

and she couldn't move her legs.

He had asked my name,
and I told him I needed to find

my suitcase and that I needed to get home.

And I said, "You... You're gonna make it.

Um, you're not gonna die on my watch.

"You’re through the worst of this, and
we're gonna get you out of here.

Lauren Anderson
is one of only five survivors.

15 others are killed.

I did break bones in my hand, um,
my clavicle, broke my ribs,

punctured my lungs.
I had broke and dislocated my back,

a tibia/fibula break in my left leg,
bones in my ankle.

Captain Mike Hillis
and First Officer Matthew Sailor

are among the dead.

National Transportation Safety Board
investigators are on site by morning.

Any luck finding the data recorders?

The team is still looking.
The weather wasn’t great last night.

Well I'm gonna need
the pilot’s record of icing,

and the weather data.

In this particular
accident, icing was very paramount because

BOB MACINTOSH NTSB INVESTIGATOR

3379 was, uh, was a second
accident for American Eagle.

Just a few weeks past,
we’d had another Jetstream

involved with icing conditions.

Was icing the reason
Flight 3379 failed to make it to

the airport just four miles away?

The landing gear is down.

Do we know how the flaps were set?

I'll check with our guy in the cockpit.

Strauch here. What can you tell us about
the flap selector?

BARRY STRAUCH NTSB PSYCHOLOGIST

The cockpit section was
particularly damaged.

A lot of the controls, a lot of the
instruments we were unable to document.

The flap selector is
fused in a 20-degree position.

Copy that.

The flap extension was also
very interesting because, uh,

it was, uh, in the landing configuration.

Thank you very much.

If the plane was iced up as they were
landing, then that's trouble.

We had to start making major inquiries
into the possibility

of an icing involvement.

These are pilot reports from five other
planes flying into Raleigh.

We do have pilots reporting light icing.
But just trace icing at high altitudes.

Investigators learn
that the other pilots flying

near Raleigh-Durham weren't reporting any
significant issues with icing.

The icing, although it was, uh,
present in the area, was, uh,

absolutely no factor in
the accident investigation.

They were all set to land.
So what went wrong?

Maybe they had engine trouble.

The investigators had a major
challenge trying to

figure out if one of the engines
had malfunctioned in some way.

Hey can you bring that
blade over here, please?

Thank you. Thank you, sir.

Now is this blade from the left propeller?

Uh, yes. This is from the right propeller.

The team examines the propellers
for an indication that they were rotating.

And look at the damage right here.

The way the blade
is damaged provides a clue.

If you’ve got turning
propellers on your airplane, they

tend to grab in, into things
and bend forward as they hit

the debris of trees and so on.

It appears the engines
were rotating at full power.

So he’s four miles from the airport.

He’s configured to land. What happened?

As we spent more time on
site with the 3379 wreckage,

the questions just kept coming.

It made it very clear that this accident
was gonna be a real puzzler.

Were the pilots reporting any problems
during their approach?

Let me have a look.

NTSB investigators
hope the pilots’ conversations

with air traffic controllers
can shed some light on why

Flight 3379 crashed before
reaching Raleigh-Durham Airport.

They’re the last
people to talk to the crew and

we want to know if there was anything
unusual in their conversations.

No. There wasn't anything
out of the ordinary.

Eagle Flight 3379, reduce to
one seven zero,

then descend and maintain 3,000.

The controller tells investigators that
Flight 3379’s approach seemed routine.

One 70 then 3,000.

3379.

Was there any conflicting
traffic as they were coming in?

Well, yes. There was a
727 landing right ahead of them.

I warned them about wake turbulence.

Eagle flight 3379, caution wake
turbulence.

You’re spacing on a 727. Turn left one
niner zero.

The wake turbulence
issue is particularly critical.

This would be a factor that we
were gonna have to deal with.

Thank you very much. ATC Sure.

- How fast does a wake vortex descend?
- Uh, 300 feet per minute.

Investigators compare
the flight path of Flight 3379

with the estimated path of
the wake vortex.

All right. Let’s see what we got.

They use recorded
radar returns for both planes

and factor in the weather
at the time of the accident.

- It looks like Flight 3379 missed it.
- By more than 600 feet.

The Jetstream did not fly
through any of those vortexes.

Wake turbulence did not affect

the flight path of the accident aircraft.

But the radar data
reveals that something happened

along the flight path.

According to this, he veers off
course after missing the wake vortices.

He’s off to the left. Why?

Why is this aircraft over here
to the left of the final approach path,

configured to land?

Okay. Can you do the
descent check list please?

The team turn to
the cockpit voice recorder,

hoping they might find an explanation for
the unusual left turn.

We were gonna really have to
look at what was going on,

on the flight deck, with the cockpit crew
What were they saying?

What were their intentions?

Altimeter 30, 31 set, cross-checked.

Pressurization set and checked.
Ice protection is on.

Investigators hear
the captain and first officer

planning the approach with precision.

Okay, reviewed.

So far so good.

The flight crew seems
to be working in perfect tandem

as Flight 3379 approaches the airport.

Why is that ignition light on?

Did we just have a flame-out?

Did he just say flame-out?
Yeah, play that again.

Did we just have a flame-out?

When the captain
talks about the ignition light,

that all... that came out of nowhere.

- We had a flame-out.
- We lost the left one?

Yeah.

They discover that the ignition light
illuminated moments before the crash.

This ignition light introduced
the thought of a lost engine.

Considering the
physical evidence we’d seen,

this idea was very strange.

You would expect during
that period that there would be

some sort of confirmation.

Nothing happened other
than absolute quiet.

We needed to try and
figure out what was going on.

These are the engine sound waves from when
the ignition light went on.

Another way for investigators to
determine if the engines were operating,

is to analyze their sound on
the cockpit voice recording.

This study is attempting to
home in on blade passing frequencies,

blade passing meaning all these
revolutions of the propeller.

Call up the comparison.

They compare the
engine sounds from Flight 3379

to other engines operating at 100%.

We were looking at the acoustics of the
engine performance,

and it’s relatively easy to match that
against the acoustics of a working engine.

They’re almost identical.

Investigators hear
evidence that both engines were

running at full speed.

The sound analysis told
us that the sounds generated by

the engines on this aircraft were
consistent with

two engines generating power.

The ignition light must have misled the
pilots

into believing the left engine flamed out.

When really it hadn't.

This sound analysis put the idea of
an engine failure, uh, to bed.

It just wasn't a factor in the accident.

This discovery
leaves investigators puzzled.

Why was that ignition light on if
there was nothing wrong with the engine?

Why is that ignition light on?

Did we just have a flame-out?

Investigators examine
Jetstream manuals to determine

why an ignition light
would come on even though

the plane’s engines were fully
operational.

So what activates it?

It’s wired to a negative torque system.

Negative torque
occurs when the air loads on

the propellers cause
them to drive the engines,

instead of the engines
driving the propellers.

It can be a sign of a flame out.

This is the same
scenario you would have as when

you put your car in
low gear going down a hill,

and use the transmission to drag.

Uh, it says the
ignition light will activate if

they advance the
propeller speed too quickly.

There is a situation when you would be at

a low power setting on your torque and

as you go speeds high in
preparation for landing,

if you move those
speed levers up too quickly

that could trigger the negative torque to
cause that light to come on.

HILLIS Go ahead. Flaps ten.

Investigators
return to the CVR to learn if

the pilots mention
increasing the propeller speed.

Let’s go ahead and go speeds high.

They hear Captain Hillis advancing

the propellers to 100% for landing.

Why’s that ignition light on?

There it is.

He advanced the propeller speed and boom.

The ignition light illuminates.

The team discovers that the
pilots created negative torque.

Negative torque doesn't necessarily mean
there was an engine failure.

You would get a transient situation for a
second or two.

That could trigger that light to come on.

We had a flame-out.

He misdiagnoses the situation.

Well surely he checks his engines’ RPMs.

What do you want me to do?
Are you gonna continue?

Okay, yeah, I'm gonna continue.
Just back me up.

He’s not even checking to see if
there’s an actual engine failure.

Look at your instruments.

Determine whether or not the, uh, both
engines are generating power.

It’s not that hard.
They’re trained for that.

If he had, he would
have seen the engine power

was where he put it:

100% full power.

If you don't know if you have an
engine failure,

but you’re responding to a potential
engine failure,

that’s not very good. And that could very
easily cause an accident.

Let's go missed approach.

So what actions did the pilots
take during the missed approach?

Okay.

So how did they configure their
plane for the missed approach?

They set engine power to max.

Set max power.

As they should have. What else?

Um, there's no mention
of reducing the flaps to ten,

or retracting landing gear.

A go around would be done by
informing the other pilot,

then apply max power,

retract the gear, retract the flaps.

But the pilots’
failure to raise the gear or

retract the flaps
doesn’t explain the accident.

Hard to believe that
configuration caused the plane

to veer to the left and crash.

Well, there’s only one way to find out.

There was a necessity to
conduct some flight tests because

we really wanted to figure out
what the crew had introduced in

the configuration that would make the
aircraft deviate from

this intended flight path.

Okay, let’s go max power.

Investigators
turn to test pilots for help.

They'll take a Jetstream 3201
to its limits to try to solve the mystery.

Sometimes you have to put yourself in
an uncomfortable position and, uh,

you know what’s gonna happen
if you go too far.

Max power.

Flaps to 20.

They start by
duplicating the configuration

the pilots had set
for the missed approach.

- Flaps 20.
- Gear down.

Okay. Gear down.

Okay it’s a bit slower than a
regular missed approach,

So why did Flight 3379
turn to the left and crash?

Let’s do the same
configuration but put max power

on the right engine but not the left.

Roger that.

They try a different configuration in

the hope of recreating
the pilots’ actions.

Max power, right engine.

Yawing to the left.

I can't climb like this.

Investigators finally
understand how Captain Hillis

executed the missed approach.

Set max power.

Believing his left engine has failed,

the captain increases power
only to the right engine.

(alarm beeping)

Lower the nose. Lower the nose!

The imbalance in
engine power robs the plane of

the airspeed it needs to
climb out with the gear down

and the flaps extended.

No! Whoa!

The flight test told us an
airplane with that configuration,

could not have been flown safely.
It had to crash.

He had that plane configured all wrong.

Investigators
conclude that the captain didn’t

configure his plane
correctly for a missed approach.

If the captain thought one
of his engines failed,

they should have performed a
single engine missed approach.

He didn't do that either.

So he set himself up for a
nearly unflyable airplane.

- You got it?
- Yeah.

NTSB investigators focus squarely on

the captain of Flight 3379,
29-year-old Michael Hillis.

To come across an accident where
a response was

botched as poorly as this one,
it begs the question,

how did he get there?

He’s got 2,294 hours in turbo-props.

3,499 total flying hours.

Well he’s young, but he's no rookie.

NTSB investigators
scrutinize the personnel records

of the pilots of Flight 3379.

We want to find out the
background of the pilots.

Is there anything in their
performance that can reveal

something about their performance on
the night of the accident?

From American Eagle’s files,

the team learns that Michael Hillis was
licensed to fly

multiple turbo-prop airplanes.

He starts officer training on the
Jetstream in March 1991.

We’ve got single
engine missed approaches today.

Are you ready for that?

Yes, sir.

Investigators dig deeper into
Captain Hillis' pilot records.

All right, I am cutting your left engine.

We like to see an airman with airmanship.

So we had to look back at
the training information.

Hmm. Look at this. A trainer’s evaluation.

Okay, you’re losing
airspeed that you’re gonna need.

How do you get it back?

I’m not sure.

Oh, well this is telling.

He’s messing up single engine missed
approaches.

It was very obvious that this
captain was having

serious troubles with his, uh,
airmanship development.

Single engine missed approaches,
engine failures.

- When is this?
- Uh, April 1992.

That was two years before the accident.
He had more than enough time to improve.

Well, he must’ve dug in.
He makes Captain a few months later.

By the time pilots become airline
pilots, they’re pretty good.

The, the selection process is so
rigorous that you don't get to

be an airline pilot unless you
had considerable capabilities.

That’s all I have here.

Are there any American Eagle
pilots that will talk to us about him?

Let’s find out.

The NTSB wants to
know more about Hillis’ career.

Usually in the pilot
file there'll be some little notes

about the issues
that have been encountered by

other persons in flying with the captain.

What can you tell me about Mike Hillis?

(sighs)

Well we were pretty broken up about this.

Investigators track down

American Eagle's Raleigh-Durham base
manager.

Unfortunately, we had a lot
of complaints about his flying.

I was really
surprised to hear him say that.

Complaints? From whom?

Well several first officers
that flew with him out of Raleigh.

Co-pilots were whispering, uh,
to their colleagues.

It was something not normal.

And we had co-pilots that
were afraid to fly with him.

They’d keep a close eye on what he was
doing.

Really?

If pilots are afraid to fly with this guy,

which is essentially what the base
manager told us,

that’s very revealing about the accident.

Thanks, Nat.

I hate to say it,
but this is a really questionable pilot.

We got a picture of a pilot who
could fly okay.

But when he was faced with something
unexpected,

his performance would start deteriorating.

How’d this guy
end up at American Eagle, huh?

- Where'd they find him?
- His application should be on file.

We try to get as much information as we
can for a complete pilot's history.

His previous job was with Comair.

Captain Hillis applied
to work for American Eagle in

October 1990 while he was
flying for another airline.

Find out if they did
a background check on this guy.

When investigators
ask American Eagle about

background checks on Mike Hillis, they’re
shocked by what they learn.

They did not go back and check
with previous employers.

The NTSB does
what American Eagle never did.

They requisition
Mike Hillis’ file from Comair.

When we compared his records at Comair,

with his records at American Eagle,
they were consistent.

Moody, unpredictable. Gets distracted.

Concerns about tunnel vision
in an emergency situation.

And he was potentially a dangerous pilot.

Tunnel vision in an emergency
situation. Comair could see it.

This guy wanted him fired.

This just keeps getting worse.

I've never encountered before or since,

a pilot who was recommended
to be terminated because

he was potentially unsafe.

Comair Recommended for
Dismissal. Well did they fire him?

He resigns from
Comair before they can fire him.

That captain should not have
been flying passengers.

Under any circumstances.

Did American Eagle know about
this guy’s performance history?

It doesn't look like they asked.

There's no record of Comair
providing it to American Eagle.

But the picture is crystal clear.

Michael Hillis’ flying career was
blemished by failed certification tests,

bad evaluations from trainers and

complaints from colleagues that were never
passed on to American Eagle.

One would have to ask themselves,

if you really knew the background of this
pilot,

would you put your wife or your child in
that aircraft?

And the answer would be no.

But there were two pilots in
the cockpit of Flight 3379.

Lower the nose. Lower the nose!

In this case, the ability of the first
officer to recognize,

that the captain's skills were deficient,
it took a long time.

Did the first officer
know who he was flying with?

Here.

Investigators wonder
if First Officer Sailor knew

he was teamed with an unreliable pilot.

No!

First Officer Matthew Ian Sailor.
25 years old.

He worked for American Eagle
for a year before the crash.

The NTSB looks into the work schedules of
First Officer Sailor and Captain Hillis.

Had he flown with Hillis before?

Nope, not once.

They discover the first officer was new
to this particular route.

- So was he based out of Raleigh?
- Uh, no. He worked out of Miami.

I think it was critical to this
accident that the first officer

was from a different base
than the captain.

The first officers in
Raleigh-Durham knew to keep

a close eye on him.

But he’s out of Miami.

This guy had no
idea who he was flying with.

Let's go ahead and go speeds high.

When First Officer Sailor
joins Captain Hillis in the cockpit,

on December the 13th, 1994,

he has no idea what
type of pilot he’s teamed with.

This pilot should never have
been a pilot in command of that aircraft.

As Flight 3379

is on final approach for Raleigh-Durham,
Captain Hillis is caught by surprise.

He misinterprets the illumination
of an ignition light.

Why’s that ignition light on?
Did we just have a flame-out?

I'm not sure what's going on with it.

We had a flame-out.

Captain Hillis doesn’t
realize that by increasing

the propeller speed too quickly,

he has created a momentary
negative torque condition.

He misdiagnosed it as an engine failure
and responded improperly.

I'm gonna continue.

Instead of landing,
Hillis decides to do a go-around.

Let's go missed approach.

Starting with the captain’s misdiagnosis
of an engine failure,

and his decision to go around,

it pretty much was
self-induced engine failure.

The pilots now face a severe emergency.

The gear was down. He was trying to climb.

Set max power.

It was impossible in that configuration.

They are basically about to
go off the edge of a cliff.

Lower the nose.

It falls to the first officer to
rectify the captain’s mistakes.

Here!

I think he could have saved the airplane.

But by the time he recognized that, uh,
it was too late.

Whoa!

15 people are killed
because of Hillis’ errors.

He made every mistake in the book in
the last two minutes of the flight.

I had anger, sure,
at that time for the pilot

and the co-pilot, for the errors
that they made.

Ultimately there was more
pointing fingers to the airline.

Had American Eagle accessed documents
about Hillis' past before they hired him,

he might not have been in that
cockpit on December 13th, 1994.

The final takeaway from 3379
is that we’ve gotta identify

those airmen that don't
display airmanship qualities.

The crash of Flight 3379
reveals deep flaws in

the standard hiring
practices of U.S. airlines.

Background information on pilots
is almost never shared amongst airlines.

If I was to apply for a job somewhere,
they would check my references.

This is a pilot.

Isn't it important that we find out
if this person is competent enough?

We asked for it in '88, '90...

Tragically, the case of Flight
3379 is not unprecedented.

And then again in '93.

In three previous accidents,

the NTSB recommended that
records from previous employers

be made available to a pilot’s
current employer.

Fourth time's a charm.

Now, for the fourth time,

the NTSB recommends that U.S.
airlines conduct

better background checks
on prospective pilots.

But still, no changes are
made to federal regulations.

I felt like I had to do something.

I had to speak for these
15 people that couldn't speak.

And I went and spoke in front of Congress.

In 1996, two years after the crash,

U.S. Congress passes the
Pilots Record Information Act

to ensure airlines have access to previous
companies’ pilot records.

The chances of a pilot falling
through the cracks,

as this captain did, have been reduced
because of that legislation.

It’s unfortunate for that to happen,
but that's what it took.

Captioned by Cotter Media Group.

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