All language subtitles for M.2003-S22E05-Holding.Pattern.FlyDubai.981.WEBDL-1080pEAC3.5.1h264-PiTBULL_track4_[eng]

(aircraft engines)

- GPWS: Terrain, terrain...
- PILOT: No, no, no, no, no, no.

- GPWS: Pull up.
- (groans)

(aircraft engines)
(explosion)

NARRATOR: Security footage of Flydubai
Flight 981 captures its final moments.

INVESTIGATOR 2:
Oh, it's diving hard.

JOHN NANCE: The level of violence
of the impact was catastrophic.

NARRATOR: 62 people are killed
in the fatal dive.

Investigators soon discover
the pilots had aborted two landings.

ÁLAVA: Rostov Tower, we're going around.

PHIL DERNER: A go-around is done just when
conditions are not perfect.

Did they say why they were going
around a second time?

They just said, "Going around."

Check your speed.

(aircraft engine)

CONTROLLER: The next thing I knew,
the plane was diving towards the runway.

Investigators needed to find out
how the two go-arounds were different.

INVESTIGATOR 1:
One turns to disaster. Why?

- (thunder)
- PILOT (over radio): Mayday, mayday!

(theme music)

GWPS: Pull up.

(indistinct radio transmissions)

(aircraft engines)

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 closes in
on Rostov-on-Don International Airport

in southwest Russia.

Rostov Tower, Sky Dubai niner-eight-one.
We're at 2,600 feet.

2,300 feet is our next target altitude.

NARRATOR: Eleven miles out,
Captain Aristos Sokratous

and First Officer Alejandro Cruz Álava
prepare the Boeing 737-800 for touchdown.

DERNER: Both pilots
had a pretty good amount

of flying hours in the 737 specifically.
These were experienced pilots.

CONTROLLER (over radio): Flight
niner-eight-one, Rostov Tower.

Wind, 240 degrees, gusts, 30 knots.
You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

NARRATOR: The controller reports the
weather conditions at the airport.

Thick clouds cover Rostov-on-Don.
High winds are battering the runways.

(rain)

The weather in Rostov at that time was

pretty low cloud with wind gusts.

It was typical for
that time of year for Rostov.

If you look at the geography
with the sea and the hills around it,

then, yes, you can expect some challenges.

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 departed
Dubai International Airport at 10:37 PM.

It's a four-hour flight
northwest to Rostov-on-Don.

It's a bumpy ride
for the 55 passengers onboard.

The flight is expected to land in minutes.

150 knots.

NARRATOR: Eight miles out,
the pilots reduce speed

as they begin the final descent.

DERNER: On approach, pilots know exactly
what the airplane is doing,

they know the conditions
that they're flying in.

- Flaps 30.
- Flaps 30.

DERNER: They're going to drop
the flaps bit by bit

when they're going to drop their landing
gear. It's a very gradual process.

It should be a bit bumpy, and then later,
it should be calm.

NARRATOR: The pilots expect turbulence on
approach, but anticipate a smooth landing.

The runway is just four miles away,
but there's a threat ahead.

COMPUTER: Go around.
Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: The onboard radar
has detected dangerous winds.

COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead.
Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: Wind shear is a rapid change
in direction and speed of wind.

If a pilot experiences a strong headwind
that suddenly changes to a tailwind,

the aircraft might not have enough lift to
remain airborne,

especially at low altitude.

NANCE: The wind shear alert is built
into the aircraft's avionics to tell you

you're going into wind currents
that could be problematic.

- COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead.
- Wind shear. Go around.

NARRATOR: Just 1,000 feet
above the ground,

landing at Rostov-on-Don
becomes too risky.

(aircraft engines)

ÁLAVA: Rostov Tower,
this is niner-eight-one.

We're conducting a go-around
due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The pilots abort their approach.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Every pilot is prepared
to make a go-around on every approach.

It's something the pilots do
off the top of their heads.

There's no manual involved.

(plane engines)

DERNER: They have no limit to the amount
of approaches that they can try

as long they have enough fuel, so why not
go around and just try it again?

Flight 981. Copy?

NARRATOR: Flight 981 is
one of four incoming flights

controllers are managing
as high winds delay landings.

Aeroflot 1166, be advised.

Sky Dubai 981
reports wind shear on landing.

DERNER: The air traffic controller's
workload was definitely increased

in this environment, and they have to
start juggling all those cards in the air.

NARRATOR:
As Flight 981 climbs...

Aeroflot 1166, you're cleared
to land on runway 2-2.

(airplane engines)

NARRATOR: An Aeroflot flight
prepares to land.

Captain Sokratous pays close attention
to its communications.

I want to see what this guy will do.

DERNER: The crew at this
point is hoping that the crews

of other flights are able
to give them some information

that they might be able to use to make
some decisions about what to do next.

NARRATOR: That flight can't land
at Rostov-on-Don either.

PILOT: Aeroflot 1166,
we're going around due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The Aeroflot pilots also
encounter wind shear on final approach.

They're forced to abort.

That kind of seals the deal.
Flydubai's gonna have to either wait,

or they're gonna have to go to
an alternate airport.

NARRATOR: High over Rostov-on-Don,
passengers on Flight 981 are restless.

The pilots are holding at 15,000 feet,

circling near the airport,
waiting for a chance to land.

DERNER: The pilots sit
in a holding pattern since they

had enough fuel to be able to do so to
wait for weather conditions to improve.

NARRATOR: Three other planes are
also in a holding pattern.

The storm pounding
Rostov-on-Don isn't passing.

PILOT: Aeroflot 1166. We're diverting.

CONTROLLER (on radio): Sky Dubai 981,
for your information,

previous traffic
went to alternate airports.

NARRATOR: All the other flights decide
to divert to alternate airports instead.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The problem
with diverting is that

it's expensive and it's inconvenient.

The passengers don't end up
at their destination.

They have to be put up in hotels.

And with a low-cost airline,
it's the last thing it wants.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous continues
monitoring the weather radar.

Finally, he spots a clearing.

- I think I'd like to give it a try.
- ÁLAVA: I agree. Let's try.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's not unusual
for crews to take advantage

if there happens to be a break in the
weather pattern that provides

safe conditions to land the aircraft.

Sky Dubai 981.
Request descent for another approach.

NARRATOR: 15,000 feet over Rostov-on-Don,
the pilots again prepare to land.

Sky Dubai niner-eight-one, Rostov Tower.
You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

ÁLAVA (intercom): Good evening. Your first
officer here. We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: 13 miles from runway 2-2,
the pilots line up for a second approach.

CONTROLLER: Be advised. Low altitude
headwind 53 knots, light icing.

NARRATOR: Even though winds are strong,

controllers aren't reporting
wind shear at the runway.

- Flaps 30.
- Flaps 30.

NARRATOR: But as they approach,
they soon realize something's not right.

Check your speed.

OK. Go around.

NARRATOR: The pilots execute
another go-around.

(aircraft engines)

ÁLAVA: Keep it at 15 degrees,
nose up.

NARRATOR: Just 2,000 feet in the air,

Captain Sokratous is wrestling
with the Boeing 737.

Seconds later...

(passengers scream)

NARRATOR: Flight 981 is diving
straight at the runway.

- GPWS: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.
- (Álava yells)

- GPWS: Pull up.
- (Álava gasping)

Oh, my God!

GPWS: Terrain.

(explosion)

(sirens)

NARRATOR: Fire and emergency crews
rush to the end of runway 2-2.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The aircraft
punched a crater in the runway

about a meter and a half deep with
wreckage thrown everywhere.

NARRATOR: Firefighters battle
the flames through the night...

but there's no one to be rescued.

All 62 people onboard Flight
981 are killed in the crash.

Grieving families and the world
demand answers.

NARRATOR: Hours after Flydubai Flight 981
crashes on the runway at Rostov-on-Don,

investigators from the IAC, the Interstate
Aviation Committee, arrive on the scene.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The IAC is the lead air
accident investigation agency,

not just for Russia but for several of
the former Soviet states.

NARRATOR: The IAC must find
the cause for the horrific tragedy.

OK. That's great.
That belongs over here.

NARRATOR: Wreckage
from Flight 981 is laid out

in a nearby hangar for closer inspection.

A team from the United Arab Emirates
assists in the investigation.

(sighs)

So how fast did the plane hit the ground?

SOEJATMAN: The size of the debris would
tell whether it is a high-speed impact,

whether it is a low-speed impact.
There are clues in pieces of wreckage.

(sighs) There's not much left of it.

SOEJATMAN: It was all small pieces.

It describes a very high-speed and
violent impact with the ground.

It makes us question what really happened.

Let's see it.

NARRATOR: Investigators wonder how the
plane could have gathered so much speed

during an attempted landing.

INVESTIGATOR:
Oh, it's diving hard.

NARRATOR: Security footage gives them a
look at the last moments of Flight 981.

Flight 981's angle of descent
leads investigators to wonder

if the pilots were having problems
controlling their plane.

Maybe it's their flight controls?

No, I've seen it before.

NARRATOR: Boeing 737 flight controls
have a problematic history.

(aircraft engines)

March 3, 1991--

United Airlines Flight 585
banks hard right

and crashes while attempting
to land, killing all onboard.

Three years later, it happens again.

U.S. Air Flight 427 rolls left
and crashes near Pittsburgh.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Investigators
were tearing their hair out,

trying to figure it out.

NARRATOR: Two years pass without incident.
Then, while on approach to land,

the pilots of Eastwind Airlines Flight
517 lose control.

This time, the pilots regain
control of their plane

and land safely in Richmond, Virginia.

The plane is intact.
Investigators get their best lead yet.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: After
a five-year investigation,

the National Transportation
Safety Board concluded that

a power unit in the rudder
had been responsible

for what's called a rudder hard-over.

The rudder had moved to one side,

and that caused the aircraft to roll over
and then dive into the ground.

NARRATOR: Movements of rudder
and other control surfaces

occur when pilots push their
rudder pedal or pull the yoke.

Power control units turn those commands

into actual movements
of the control surfaces.

It's similar to
the power steering on a car.

Hey there.
Um, did you recover the PCUs?

NARRATOR: Investigators want to know if
any of Flight 981's control units failed.

- Yup, they're here.
- Great. We need to test them.

NARRATOR: Much of the Boeing 737 was
destroyed during high-speed impact,

but two of the power
control units have survived.

They could provide crucial information.

NANCE: PCUs are the heart and soul
of the flight controls of the airplane.

And one of the first questions,
if you have an airplane

that came screaming out of
the sky at a 50-degree angle is:

"Did we have a PCU problem
in the flight controls?"

NARRATOR: Investigators carefully examine
the PCUs of Flight 981.

They look for signs of a malfunction.

Nothing wrong with the PCUs.

NANCE: They were extensively examined and
found to have had absolutely no connection

to what brought this airplane
out of the sky.

NARRATOR: With flight control
issues ruled out,

the team turns to the controller
for insight.

Take me through what you saw.

They were on final approach.

CONTROLLER (on radio):
Flight 981, Rostov Tower.

You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

CONTROLLER: Then they aborted
their first attempt to land.

They reported wind shear.

ÁLAVA (on radio):
Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We are conducting a go-around
due to wind shear.

CONTROLLER: Sky Dubai 981,
make holding pattern at your convenience.

- They climbed and began holding.
- How long were they holding?

For a long time.

NARRATOR: Investigators learn
that the pilots held

for almost two hours, waiting
for the weather to improve.

ÁLAVA: Sky Dubai 981.
Request descent for another approach.

CONTROLLER: Then they asked to land.

NARRATOR: But something went wrong when
the pilots made their second approach.

ÁLAVA (on radio): Rostov Tower, this is
Sky Dubai 981. We're going around.

Did they say why they were going
around the second time?

CONTROLLER: No. They just said,
"Going around." That's all.

The next thing I knew, the plane was
diving towards the runway.

Did they report any problems
with the plane?

No. Nothing.

NARRATOR: IAC Investigators
still can't explain

why Flight 981 suddenly banked
and then dived into runway 2-2.

Something had gone wrong on
the second go-around,

but investigators didn't know what.
Was there a problem with the airplane?

Did the pilots make a mistake?
There was no knowing it yet.

OK. Two go-arounds.
One turns to disaster. Why?

Let's take a look at the first one.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to
FDR data

to better understand why
Flydubai Flight 981 performed

one successful go-around
but crashed during the second.

Investigators needed to figure out

how the two go-arounds
were different from each other.

Zoom in a bit.

INVESTIGATOR: Look.

NARRATOR: They confirm the pilots reacted

to a wind shear alarm
during the first approach.

And how did they respond?

The thrust jumps up to 102.

INVESTIGATOR (mutters): Power.

So he applied max power.
What about the flaps?

Flaps at 30.
And gear, it remained down.

- Textbook wind shear go-around.
- INVESTIGATOR 2: Yeah.

KAMINSKI-MORROW:
If a pilot encounters wind shear,

he'll typically perform what's called
a wind shear escape maneuver.

And that involves increasing
the engine power to maximum.

You leave the flaps down.
You leave the gear down.

COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear. Go around.

DERNER: The first go-around was pretty
routine. They responded appropriately.

They did exactly
what they should have done.

This is the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Investigators analyze
the second attempt at landing,

focusing in on the last moments
before the crash.

Now did they get another wind shear
warning the second time?

No. Nothing.

Look.

There's a leap in airspeed
from 153 to 176 in seconds.

NARRATOR: Ten seconds before the
pilots abort,

a sudden increase in the plane's
airspeed was recorded.

SOEJATMAN: The investigators saw
the airspeed fluctuating

for more than 20 knots
within a few seconds.

It's a pretty strong gust of wind. They
can see that on the flight data recorder.

NARRATOR: Investigators determine that
a strong gust of wind struck the plane.

NANCE: You can feel the wind increase
on the nose of the airplane.

It's probably also moving the airplane
a little bit left or right.

It's not a pleasant position to be in.

- How did the pilots respond this time?
- Let me see.

Well, they added max power.

OK, go around.

And what about the flaps and landing gear?

Flaps are retracted, gear retracted.

NARRATOR: The data reveals that
on the second go-around,

the pilots performed
a different procedure.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: They didn't fly the wind
shear escape maneuver

during the second go-around.

Well, it looks like they were
doing a standard go-around.

NARRATOR: On a standard go-around,
the flaps and landing gear are retracted.

Except they did it at max power.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Given
how streamlined the aircraft is,

with the landing gear up
and the flaps largely retracted,

the use of maximum power is
very much overkill.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude
that on the second attempt,

the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures.

They used the power of
a wind shear escape maneuver

with the gear and flap settings
of a traditional go-around.

So what would that do to the plane?

We'll need to take a look at all
the factors at play.

They were holding on for nearly two hours.

That's... four tons of fuel they burned.

NARRATOR: The weight of the Boeing 737

is a critical factor in the plane's
performance.

Adding the weight of the plane...

Total weight, that's 54 tons.

- That's a light plane.
- Yeah.

SOEJATMAN: At this weight, you know,
the crew would feel a faster acceleration.

Max power, no drag from flaps
or landing gear, low weight.

This plane could have been
accelerating dangerously fast.

This is really an accelerated situation.

This is a very powerful
airplane doing something

that feels like you
just went into afterburner.

How much quicker did this plane pick up
speed on the second go-around?

We need to do modeling on this.

It was really incumbent
upon the investigators

to look further into the question
of the acceleration.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to computer
modeling to answer a crucial question.

Here's all the data for
the first and second go-around.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: How did the rate of acceleration
differ at the start of the two attempts?

INVESTIGATOR 2: First go-around,
the speed increased by 17 knots.

And the second?

INVESTIGATOR 2: Second go-around...
25-knot increase.

It's a difference of 8 knots
between the two go-arounds.

Mm. Yeah.

NANCE: It was a key part of the findings

when they realized that
over 40% difference existed

between the acceleration from the first
go-around to the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Could the increase
in acceleration have affected

the pilots themselves?

They calculate the impact
of the second go-around.

Wow. Look at the backward force
experienced by the pilot.

McGRATH: And that faster acceleration
on the second go-around

would have pushed him back into the seat.

NARRATOR: The team also examines
the impact of vertical acceleration.

INVESTIGATOR 2: The G-force would have
lifted the pilots upwards.

McGRATH: The pilot would have
felt a slight unweighting.

He would come up out of the seat.

So a sudden acceleration like this,
both horizontal and vertical...

that'll play tricks on your mind.

NARRATOR: Were Captain Sokratous' senses
his worst enemy?

Maybe he experienced
a somatogravic illusion.

ÁLAVA: Check your speed.

OK. Go around.

NARRATOR: A somatogravic illusion is a
dangerous form of spatial disorientation.

When a plane accelerates quickly with
no visual reference of the horizon,

the gravitational forces cause a pitch-up
illusion in the inner ear.

The little hairs in
the inner ear bend backwards,

tricking the brain into
thinking the head is tilting up.

Though you might be going level,
but if you cannot see outside,

that sensation on your vestibular system
is overwhelming and, you know,

you would really feel that
you're climbing up.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The somatogravic illusion

is one of the most lethal
traps in aviation.

Keep the nose up. 15 degrees!

KAMINSKI-MORROW:
It's an extremely convincing illusion.

What was the actual pitch of the plane

after it accelerated
during the second go-around?

Almost 20 seconds after,

the actual pitch was 8.8 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: Investigators look for evidence
that the pilots of Flight 981

became severely disoriented in the dark.

(aircraft engines)

KAMINSKI-MORROW: If you imagine that this
glass of water

represents the fluid in your ear, if you
accelerated this along a smooth surface,

the water be pushed up against the
back of the glass, very much like this.

In other words, it's the same effect
as if you'd simply tilted the glass.

If you take visual information away,

what tends to happen is that the pilot
forgets about the acceleration

and assumes that everything he's feeling
is due to the pitch.

- And what was the pilot's perceived pitch?
- Mm.

McGRATH: Combining
the horizontal and vertical

acceleration experienced by
the pilot, we can calculate

the pitch that is perceived by the pilot.

This is called the illusionary pitch.

INVESTIGATOR 2: The pilot's perceived
pitch was 21.6 degrees.

NARRATOR: They compare
the plane's actual pitch

to the pilot's illusionary pitch
during the second go-around.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Ten seconds later,
the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.

And the pilot perceived it
to be 26.7 degrees, nose up.

Wow. That's a huge difference.

McGRATH: This puts the captain
into a situation that

he potentially will be experiencing
a somatogravic illusion.

The captain is feeling one thing, but the
aircraft is doing something else.

Get this. Near the end of the flight,
the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees...

and the perceived pitch becomes
well over 40.

NARRATOR: Investigators discover
three instances

where there was a dramatic difference

between the plane's actual
and the pilot's perceived pitch.

ÁLAVA:
Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: It's evidence that
the pilots may have experienced

a somatogravic illusion
during the second go-around.

Could the feeling of the rapid
acceleration have affected

how the pilots flew the plane?
They dig deeper into the flight data.

Well, the captain pushed forward
on the yoke.

He was trying to pitch the plane downward.

That's what his senses
were telling him to do.

NANCE: The captain,
responding more to his feelings

than to what he was seeing on any
instrumentation in front of him,

he decides that he needs to push the
airplane forward

and counteract this massive pitch up.

He's trying to save them by pitching down.

Wow. Check this out.
He pushed the stabilizer trim down.

NARRATOR: From the data, investigators see
the captain didn't just push the yoke.

Be careful!

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The captain
applies the stabilizer trim

because he's pushing - trying to push
the nose of the aircraft down.

- But for how long?
- Hmm.

Yeah, he held the
trim switch for twelve seconds.

DERNER: Holding the switch
for 12 seconds is unheard of.

That should never be held
for that amount of time.

NARRATOR: The team discovers that
instead of pitching the plane up to climb,

the captain is pitching
the plane towards the ground...

No, no, no, no, no, no.

NARRATOR: E ventually putting
the plane into a fatal dive.

(aircraft engines)

The sudden change in direction is jarring.

SOEJATMAN: At that time, you would feel
like you're in a rollercoaster.

You know, when you're coming
up to the peak as you're diving at speed,

it's similar to that sensation.

NARRATOR: The pitch down has another
disorienting effect on the pilots' senses.

The pitching down of the aircraft
would have caused both the captain

and the first officer to experience
a dramatic change in the G-forces.

Oh, my God!

(gasps)

McGRATH: That would increase the
confusion in the cockpit

as to what's going on.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the
various G-forces on Captain Sokratous

caused his complete spatial
disorientation.

SOEJATMAN: The captain pushing
and pulling on the yoke,

stomping on the rudder in the dive,
you know, that shows confusion.

He's probably disorientated.

Oh, my God!

SOEJATMAN:
You know, he's trying desperately

to get out of that sensation
that he's feeling.

NARRATOR: But there's one question that
still troubles investigators.

Was the first officer feeling
the illusion as well?

McGRATH: Even though
the accelerations

experienced by both pilots was the same,

the perception of what is
happening can differ.

And that can be due to
many different factors:

expectation, what are they looking at,
their age, their experience.

Start it at the second go-around, please.

NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder
could tell investigators

if the first officer was also under the
influence of the somatogravic illusion.

SOKRATOUS (on recording): OK, go-around.

Careful.

(gasping)

ÁLAVA (on recording):
No, no, no, no, no, no.

Don't. Don't do that.

He sees something wrong.

ÁLAVA: No. Pull it. Pull it. Pull it!

- He's telling him to pull back the yoke.
- ÁLAVA (on recording): Pull it!

If he's feeling the same
illusion as the captain,

it sure doesn't seem like he was
affected by it.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first officer knew
how much trouble the aircraft was in.

He knew the captain wasn't
responding the way he should.

Oh, my God!

- GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
- (Álava yells on recording)

NARRATOR: Investigators are left wondering
why the first officer didn't intervene.

You look at this first officer
trying his best and wonder,

"Why didn't you just take control
and say, 'I've got the airplane'?"

(Álava grunts)

(aircraft engines and explosion)

(sighs)

He's been flying the 737-800 for
nearly two years. He's fully certified.

NARRATOR: Investigators look into the
first officer's background

to understand why he didn't take control
of Flight 981

when he saw that the captain
was making grave mistakes.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Look.

His trainer wrote notes on his assessment.
And this one's telling.

NARRATOR: They find notes left by one
of his flight instructors that alarm them.

One thing that could have
possibly saved this aircraft

was discovered in a note that was left
behind by a flight instructor.

"He needs to be a bit more assertive
in what is needed from the captain."

And it continues.

"Tell him what you want done
and do not wait

"for the captain to enquire with you
or direct you in this regard."

He's not the type to take control.

No! Pull it. Pull it.
Pull it. Pull it!

KAMINSKI-MORROW:
The first officer could see that

the captain was experiencing enormous
problems, trying to control the go-around.

He really should have taken some decisive
action and intervened.

Oh, my God!

I still don't understand something.

Why did they try to land
the plane in the first place?

DERNER: The big mystery was,
"Why was this crew so determined

"to land at Rostov-on-Don
when every other flight

"had already diverted?"

NARRATOR: A storm was pummeling
Rostov-on-Don Airport

as Flight 981 circled above.

Why didn't the pilots
divert to another airport?

Investigators look for answers
in the cockpit voice recording.

CONTROLLER (on recording):
Sky Dubai 981,

for your information, previous traffic
went to alternate airports.

So the other flights diverted? There's no
need. I'm gonna keep flying.

Investigators just couldn't understand why

they wanted to fly in
circles for almost two hours.

SOKRATOUS (on recording):
I'm gonna try this approach.

And if I can't make it,
we'll have a go-around,

and I will head to Mineralnye Vody, OK?

DISPATCHER (on recording):
OK, Captain, understood.

- Who's he talking to?
- Oh, the dispatcher in Dubai.

NARRATOR: Investigators finally
get an indication

of the captain's rationale for
attempting another landing.

As the captain decides
whether to divert, he contacts

Flydubai's flight dispatcher
in the United Arab Emirates.

DISPATCHER (on radio): We would like to
recommend you hold max as possible.

Dispatchers manage the entire
fleet's operation for a specific airline.

NANCE: The dispatcher and the captain

are co-equally responsible
for the safety of the flight.

There is a very delicate dance
that goes on

between and among the
dispatchers and the captains.

The captain follows with the
dispatcher's recommendation.

NARRATOR: Minutes turn to hours as the
pilots wait for a chance to land.

I don't know, man. If we divert, we're
gonna exceed our flying hours.

- What are you looking at?
- Maximum duty hours.

He's calculating his duty hours.

NARRATOR: Regulations limit how many hours
pilots can fly during a duty period.

We've been in the air for 5 1/2 hours now.

NARRATOR: The team learns that
the pilots were concerned they

might exceed their duty hours.

Stop. Roll the map.

They'd been flying
for at least five hours.

It will take another hour to reach their
alternate airport, wait out the storm.

And they still have to get back

to Rostov-On-Don
before returning to Dubai.

Diverting would put them
over their duty hours for the day.

Right.

I think it will be clear by the time
we do this approach now.

And even if we start now,
I think we'll be good.

ÁLAVA (on recording): We'll be good.

OK. Is he landing because it's clear, or
because he wants to get on the ground?

DERNER: The conversation on the flight
deck before the second approach clearly

showed that they weren't really thinking
so much about the safety of the landing,

just the fact that they wanted to land.

- I think I'd like to give it a try.
- ÁLAVA: I agree. Let's try.

Stop the recording.

So they decide to circle for two hours

after a four-hour flight
in the middle of the night.

NARRATOR: Did the long flight affect the
pilots' ability to land the plane safely?

NANCE: Two hours of hold,
six hours total time.

Aren't we seeing a decline in the decision
making capabilities because of fatigue?

- Tired?
- (huff) No.

NARRATOR: As investigators break
down flight 981's journey

from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don,
they identify a glaring problem.

INVESTIGATOR 1: They were actually
in the air for more than six hours.

It's almost 5 AM their time
when they're landing.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The circadian rhythm is

the body's natural alignment
with the day and night cycle.

The quiet period is roughly
for a four-hour period

between 2:00 in the morning
and 6:00 in the morning.

That's the point at which your mental
ability is pretty much at its lowest.

- I think I'd like to give it a try.
- I agree. Let's try.

NARRATOR: Investigators determine the crew
was suffering from operational fatigue

as they launched their second approach.

Good evening. Your first officer here.
We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: The decision to make
a second attempt

to land at Rostov-on-Don triggers a
chain of events that ends in catastrophe.

ÁLAVA: Check your speed.

As the aircraft
is hit by this sudden wind,

the crew is forced into
executing another go-around.

OK. Go around.

And this time, it was all gonna go wrong.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous
executes a wind shear go-around,

pushing the throttle to maximum power.

The first officer performs
a standard go-around,

retracting the flaps
and raising the landing gear.

Both pilots were essentially
flying two different airplanes from there.

KAMINSKI-MORROW:
This blunder factors heavily

into the catastrophe that followed.

NARRATOR: Flight 981 climbs
from Rostov-on-Don at high speed.

SOEJATMAN: When you're light on fuel

and you put the maximum thrust,
you will accelerate.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's what happened in the
last few seconds that doomed Flight 981.

Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: At this moment, Captain
Sokratous fights an inner battle.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The acceleration of the
aircraft makes the captain feel

as though the aircraft is pitching up a
lot more than it actually is.

NARRATOR: His spatial orientation
deteriorates rapidly.

NANCE: Your vestibular senses
in your middle ear

are all telling you the wrong thing.

NARRATOR: The captain counters the pitch-
up feeling of a somatogravic illusion

by pushing the yoke forward.

The captain has lost touch
with the reality

of what's happening to the airplane.

NARRATOR: Then, the final blow.

The captain holds that stabilizer trim
button down for about 12 seconds.

With the sudden forcing of
the aircraft's nose down

and stabilizer trim,
the aircraft transitions

from a climb very suddenly into a dive.

McGRATH: The aircraft is now in
a very dangerous situation,

which the captain is unable to overcome.

- My God!
- GPWS: Terrain.

NANCE:
They're accelerating rapidly.

And the first officer finally
gets on the yoke and tries to pull,

but the controls on the left side
govern where the airplane is.

NANCE: And you get to a certain
point, and there's no recovery.

NARRATOR: Nosediving at full
throttle towards the runway,

Captain Sokratous
is completely disoriented.

When he adds rudder at the last moment,

he's lost all awareness of how
the plane is flying.

(Álava yells)

(aircraft engines)

The pilots in this case were
conducting the flight very well

right up until those last few moments,
and then it all really just fell apart.

(helicopter)

NARRATOR: The IAC investigation
into the crash of Flight 981

is a landmark case of how spatial
disorientation can end in disaster.

SOEJATMAN: This accident is
a wake-up call for the industry.

This is one of the accidents
that paved the way

into increased training
in spatial disorientation.

NARRATOR: In their final report,
investigators blame

the captain's string of errors
on his diminished psychological state.

The IAC recommends that Flydubai
provide better training

on the manual operation
of stabilizer trim,

so their pilots don't make
the same mistake again.

Research into human factors,
including situations like this,

where disorientation likely occurred,

is at the forefront
of aviation safety research.

We are training our pilots on simulators

to experience to illusions before
they experience them in the air

so they can recognize those situations.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: I think
the Flydubai accident shows

how quickly your senses can overtake you.

And one of the key lessons is
for pilots to trust in their instruments,

to take a step back from what they
may think they're experiencing,

to actually understand
what the aeroplane is doing.

You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.