Original subtitles

(aircraft engines)

- GPWS: Terrain, terrain... - PILOT: No, no, no, no, no, no.

- GPWS: Pull up. - (groans)

(aircraft engines) (explosion)

NARRATOR: Security footage of Flydubai Flight 981 captures its final moments.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Oh, it's diving hard.

JOHN NANCE: The level of violence of the impact was catastrophic.

NARRATOR: 62 people are killed in the fatal dive.

Investigators soon discover the pilots had aborted two landings.

ÁLAVA: Rostov Tower, we're going around.

PHIL DERNER: A go-around is done just when conditions are not perfect.

Did they say why they were going around a second time?

They just said, "Going around."

Check your speed.

(aircraft engine)

CONTROLLER: The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway.

Investigators needed to find out how the two go-arounds were different.

INVESTIGATOR 1: One turns to disaster. Why?

- (thunder) - PILOT (over radio): Mayday, mayday!

(theme music)

GWPS: Pull up.

(indistinct radio transmissions)

(aircraft engines)

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 closes in on Rostov-on-Don International Airport

in southwest Russia.

Rostov Tower, Sky Dubai niner-eight-one. We're at 2,600 feet.

2,300 feet is our next target altitude.

NARRATOR: Eleven miles out, Captain Aristos Sokratous

and First Officer Alejandro Cruz Álava prepare the Boeing 737-800 for touchdown.

DERNER: Both pilots had a pretty good amount

of flying hours in the 737 specifically. These were experienced pilots.

CONTROLLER (over radio): Flight niner-eight-one, Rostov Tower.

Wind, 240 degrees, gusts, 30 knots. You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

NARRATOR: The controller reports the weather conditions at the airport.

Thick clouds cover Rostov-on-Don. High winds are battering the runways.

(rain)

The weather in Rostov at that time was

pretty low cloud with wind gusts.

It was typical for that time of year for Rostov.

If you look at the geography with the sea and the hills around it,

then, yes, you can expect some challenges.

NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 departed Dubai International Airport at 10:37 PM.

It's a four-hour flight northwest to Rostov-on-Don.

It's a bumpy ride for the 55 passengers onboard.

The flight is expected to land in minutes.

150 knots.

NARRATOR: Eight miles out, the pilots reduce speed

as they begin the final descent.

DERNER: On approach, pilots know exactly what the airplane is doing,

they know the conditions that they're flying in.

- Flaps 30. - Flaps 30.

DERNER: They're going to drop the flaps bit by bit

when they're going to drop their landing gear. It's a very gradual process.

It should be a bit bumpy, and then later, it should be calm.

NARRATOR: The pilots expect turbulence on approach, but anticipate a smooth landing.

The runway is just four miles away, but there's a threat ahead.

COMPUTER: Go around. Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: The onboard radar has detected dangerous winds.

COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead. Wind shear ahead.

NARRATOR: Wind shear is a rapid change in direction and speed of wind.

If a pilot experiences a strong headwind that suddenly changes to a tailwind,

the aircraft might not have enough lift to remain airborne,

especially at low altitude.

NANCE: The wind shear alert is built into the aircraft's avionics to tell you

you're going into wind currents that could be problematic.

- COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead. - Wind shear. Go around.

NARRATOR: Just 1,000 feet above the ground,

landing at Rostov-on-Don becomes too risky.

(aircraft engines)

ÁLAVA: Rostov Tower, this is niner-eight-one.

We're conducting a go-around due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The pilots abort their approach.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Every pilot is prepared to make a go-around on every approach.

It's something the pilots do off the top of their heads.

There's no manual involved.

(plane engines)

DERNER: They have no limit to the amount of approaches that they can try

as long they have enough fuel, so why not go around and just try it again?

Flight 981. Copy?

NARRATOR: Flight 981 is one of four incoming flights

controllers are managing as high winds delay landings.

Aeroflot 1166, be advised.

Sky Dubai 981 reports wind shear on landing.

DERNER: The air traffic controller's workload was definitely increased

in this environment, and they have to start juggling all those cards in the air.

NARRATOR: As Flight 981 climbs...

Aeroflot 1166, you're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

(airplane engines)

NARRATOR: An Aeroflot flight prepares to land.

Captain Sokratous pays close attention to its communications.

I want to see what this guy will do.

DERNER: The crew at this point is hoping that the crews

of other flights are able to give them some information

that they might be able to use to make some decisions about what to do next.

NARRATOR: That flight can't land at Rostov-on-Don either.

PILOT: Aeroflot 1166, we're going around due to wind shear.

NARRATOR: The Aeroflot pilots also encounter wind shear on final approach.

They're forced to abort.

That kind of seals the deal. Flydubai's gonna have to either wait,

or they're gonna have to go to an alternate airport.

NARRATOR: High over Rostov-on-Don, passengers on Flight 981 are restless.

The pilots are holding at 15,000 feet,

circling near the airport, waiting for a chance to land.

DERNER: The pilots sit in a holding pattern since they

had enough fuel to be able to do so to wait for weather conditions to improve.

NARRATOR: Three other planes are also in a holding pattern.

The storm pounding Rostov-on-Don isn't passing.

PILOT: Aeroflot 1166. We're diverting.

CONTROLLER (on radio): Sky Dubai 981, for your information,

previous traffic went to alternate airports.

NARRATOR: All the other flights decide to divert to alternate airports instead.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The problem with diverting is that

it's expensive and it's inconvenient.

The passengers don't end up at their destination.

They have to be put up in hotels.

And with a low-cost airline, it's the last thing it wants.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous continues monitoring the weather radar.

Finally, he spots a clearing.

- I think I'd like to give it a try. - ÁLAVA: I agree. Let's try.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's not unusual for crews to take advantage

if there happens to be a break in the weather pattern that provides

safe conditions to land the aircraft.

Sky Dubai 981. Request descent for another approach.

NARRATOR: 15,000 feet over Rostov-on-Don, the pilots again prepare to land.

Sky Dubai niner-eight-one, Rostov Tower. You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

ÁLAVA (intercom): Good evening. Your first officer here. We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: 13 miles from runway 2-2, the pilots line up for a second approach.

CONTROLLER: Be advised. Low altitude headwind 53 knots, light icing.

NARRATOR: Even though winds are strong,

controllers aren't reporting wind shear at the runway.

- Flaps 30. - Flaps 30.

NARRATOR: But as they approach, they soon realize something's not right.

Check your speed.

OK. Go around.

NARRATOR: The pilots execute another go-around.

(aircraft engines)

ÁLAVA: Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: Just 2,000 feet in the air,

Captain Sokratous is wrestling with the Boeing 737.

Seconds later...

(passengers scream)

NARRATOR: Flight 981 is diving straight at the runway.

- GPWS: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. - (Álava yells)

- GPWS: Pull up. - (Álava gasping)

Oh, my God!

GPWS: Terrain.

(explosion)

(sirens)

NARRATOR: Fire and emergency crews rush to the end of runway 2-2.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The aircraft punched a crater in the runway

about a meter and a half deep with wreckage thrown everywhere.

NARRATOR: Firefighters battle the flames through the night...

but there's no one to be rescued.

All 62 people onboard Flight 981 are killed in the crash.

Grieving families and the world demand answers.

NARRATOR: Hours after Flydubai Flight 981 crashes on the runway at Rostov-on-Don,

investigators from the IAC, the Interstate Aviation Committee, arrive on the scene.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The IAC is the lead air accident investigation agency,

not just for Russia but for several of the former Soviet states.

NARRATOR: The IAC must find the cause for the horrific tragedy.

OK. That's great. That belongs over here.

NARRATOR: Wreckage from Flight 981 is laid out

in a nearby hangar for closer inspection.

A team from the United Arab Emirates assists in the investigation.

(sighs)

So how fast did the plane hit the ground?

SOEJATMAN: The size of the debris would tell whether it is a high-speed impact,

whether it is a low-speed impact. There are clues in pieces of wreckage.

(sighs) There's not much left of it.

SOEJATMAN: It was all small pieces.

It describes a very high-speed and violent impact with the ground.

It makes us question what really happened.

Let's see it.

NARRATOR: Investigators wonder how the plane could have gathered so much speed

during an attempted landing.

INVESTIGATOR: Oh, it's diving hard.

NARRATOR: Security footage gives them a look at the last moments of Flight 981.

Flight 981's angle of descent leads investigators to wonder

if the pilots were having problems controlling their plane.

Maybe it's their flight controls?

No, I've seen it before.

NARRATOR: Boeing 737 flight controls have a problematic history.

(aircraft engines)

March 3, 1991--

United Airlines Flight 585 banks hard right

and crashes while attempting to land, killing all onboard.

Three years later, it happens again.

U.S. Air Flight 427 rolls left and crashes near Pittsburgh.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Investigators were tearing their hair out,

trying to figure it out.

NARRATOR: Two years pass without incident. Then, while on approach to land,

the pilots of Eastwind Airlines Flight 517 lose control.

This time, the pilots regain control of their plane

and land safely in Richmond, Virginia.

The plane is intact. Investigators get their best lead yet.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: After a five-year investigation,

the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that

a power unit in the rudder had been responsible

for what's called a rudder hard-over.

The rudder had moved to one side,

and that caused the aircraft to roll over and then dive into the ground.

NARRATOR: Movements of rudder and other control surfaces

occur when pilots push their rudder pedal or pull the yoke.

Power control units turn those commands

into actual movements of the control surfaces.

It's similar to the power steering on a car.

Hey there. Um, did you recover the PCUs?

NARRATOR: Investigators want to know if any of Flight 981's control units failed.

- Yup, they're here. - Great. We need to test them.

NARRATOR: Much of the Boeing 737 was destroyed during high-speed impact,

but two of the power control units have survived.

They could provide crucial information.

NANCE: PCUs are the heart and soul of the flight controls of the airplane.

And one of the first questions, if you have an airplane

that came screaming out of the sky at a 50-degree angle is:

"Did we have a PCU problem in the flight controls?"

NARRATOR: Investigators carefully examine the PCUs of Flight 981.

They look for signs of a malfunction.

Nothing wrong with the PCUs.

NANCE: They were extensively examined and found to have had absolutely no connection

to what brought this airplane out of the sky.

NARRATOR: With flight control issues ruled out,

the team turns to the controller for insight.

Take me through what you saw.

They were on final approach.

CONTROLLER (on radio): Flight 981, Rostov Tower.

You're cleared to land on runway 2-2.

CONTROLLER: Then they aborted their first attempt to land.

They reported wind shear.

ÁLAVA (on radio): Rostov Tower, this is 981.

We are conducting a go-around due to wind shear.

CONTROLLER: Sky Dubai 981, make holding pattern at your convenience.

- They climbed and began holding. - How long were they holding?

For a long time.

NARRATOR: Investigators learn that the pilots held

for almost two hours, waiting for the weather to improve.

ÁLAVA: Sky Dubai 981. Request descent for another approach.

CONTROLLER: Then they asked to land.

NARRATOR: But something went wrong when the pilots made their second approach.

ÁLAVA (on radio): Rostov Tower, this is Sky Dubai 981. We're going around.

Did they say why they were going around the second time?

CONTROLLER: No. They just said, "Going around." That's all.

The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway.

Did they report any problems with the plane?

No. Nothing.

NARRATOR: IAC Investigators still can't explain

why Flight 981 suddenly banked and then dived into runway 2-2.

Something had gone wrong on the second go-around,

but investigators didn't know what. Was there a problem with the airplane?

Did the pilots make a mistake? There was no knowing it yet.

OK. Two go-arounds. One turns to disaster. Why?

Let's take a look at the first one.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to FDR data

to better understand why Flydubai Flight 981 performed

one successful go-around but crashed during the second.

Investigators needed to figure out

how the two go-arounds were different from each other.

Zoom in a bit.

INVESTIGATOR: Look.

NARRATOR: They confirm the pilots reacted

to a wind shear alarm during the first approach.

And how did they respond?

The thrust jumps up to 102.

INVESTIGATOR (mutters): Power.

So he applied max power. What about the flaps?

Flaps at 30. And gear, it remained down.

- Textbook wind shear go-around. - INVESTIGATOR 2: Yeah.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: If a pilot encounters wind shear,

he'll typically perform what's called a wind shear escape maneuver.

And that involves increasing the engine power to maximum.

You leave the flaps down. You leave the gear down.

COMPUTER: Wind shear ahead.

Wind shear. Go around.

DERNER: The first go-around was pretty routine. They responded appropriately.

They did exactly what they should have done.

This is the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Investigators analyze the second attempt at landing,

focusing in on the last moments before the crash.

Now did they get another wind shear warning the second time?

No. Nothing.

Look.

There's a leap in airspeed from 153 to 176 in seconds.

NARRATOR: Ten seconds before the pilots abort,

a sudden increase in the plane's airspeed was recorded.

SOEJATMAN: The investigators saw the airspeed fluctuating

for more than 20 knots within a few seconds.

It's a pretty strong gust of wind. They can see that on the flight data recorder.

NARRATOR: Investigators determine that a strong gust of wind struck the plane.

NANCE: You can feel the wind increase on the nose of the airplane.

It's probably also moving the airplane a little bit left or right.

It's not a pleasant position to be in.

- How did the pilots respond this time? - Let me see.

Well, they added max power.

OK, go around.

And what about the flaps and landing gear?

Flaps are retracted, gear retracted.

NARRATOR: The data reveals that on the second go-around,

the pilots performed a different procedure.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: They didn't fly the wind shear escape maneuver

during the second go-around.

Well, it looks like they were doing a standard go-around.

NARRATOR: On a standard go-around, the flaps and landing gear are retracted.

Except they did it at max power.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: Given how streamlined the aircraft is,

with the landing gear up and the flaps largely retracted,

the use of maximum power is very much overkill.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that on the second attempt,

the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures.

They used the power of a wind shear escape maneuver

with the gear and flap settings of a traditional go-around.

So what would that do to the plane?

We'll need to take a look at all the factors at play.

They were holding on for nearly two hours.

That's... four tons of fuel they burned.

NARRATOR: The weight of the Boeing 737

is a critical factor in the plane's performance.

Adding the weight of the plane...

Total weight, that's 54 tons.

- That's a light plane. - Yeah.

SOEJATMAN: At this weight, you know, the crew would feel a faster acceleration.

Max power, no drag from flaps or landing gear, low weight.

This plane could have been accelerating dangerously fast.

This is really an accelerated situation.

This is a very powerful airplane doing something

that feels like you just went into afterburner.

How much quicker did this plane pick up speed on the second go-around?

We need to do modeling on this.

It was really incumbent upon the investigators

to look further into the question of the acceleration.

NARRATOR: Investigators turn to computer modeling to answer a crucial question.

Here's all the data for the first and second go-around.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: How did the rate of acceleration differ at the start of the two attempts?

INVESTIGATOR 2: First go-around, the speed increased by 17 knots.

And the second?

INVESTIGATOR 2: Second go-around... 25-knot increase.

It's a difference of 8 knots between the two go-arounds.

Mm. Yeah.

NANCE: It was a key part of the findings

when they realized that over 40% difference existed

between the acceleration from the first go-around to the second go-around.

NARRATOR: Could the increase in acceleration have affected

the pilots themselves?

They calculate the impact of the second go-around.

Wow. Look at the backward force experienced by the pilot.

McGRATH: And that faster acceleration on the second go-around

would have pushed him back into the seat.

NARRATOR: The team also examines the impact of vertical acceleration.

INVESTIGATOR 2: The G-force would have lifted the pilots upwards.

McGRATH: The pilot would have felt a slight unweighting.

He would come up out of the seat.

So a sudden acceleration like this, both horizontal and vertical...

that'll play tricks on your mind.

NARRATOR: Were Captain Sokratous' senses his worst enemy?

Maybe he experienced a somatogravic illusion.

ÁLAVA: Check your speed.

OK. Go around.

NARRATOR: A somatogravic illusion is a dangerous form of spatial disorientation.

When a plane accelerates quickly with no visual reference of the horizon,

the gravitational forces cause a pitch-up illusion in the inner ear.

The little hairs in the inner ear bend backwards,

tricking the brain into thinking the head is tilting up.

Though you might be going level, but if you cannot see outside,

that sensation on your vestibular system is overwhelming and, you know,

you would really feel that you're climbing up.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The somatogravic illusion

is one of the most lethal traps in aviation.

Keep the nose up. 15 degrees!

KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's an extremely convincing illusion.

What was the actual pitch of the plane

after it accelerated during the second go-around?

Almost 20 seconds after,

the actual pitch was 8.8 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: Investigators look for evidence that the pilots of Flight 981

became severely disoriented in the dark.

(aircraft engines)

KAMINSKI-MORROW: If you imagine that this glass of water

represents the fluid in your ear, if you accelerated this along a smooth surface,

the water be pushed up against the back of the glass, very much like this.

In other words, it's the same effect as if you'd simply tilted the glass.

If you take visual information away,

what tends to happen is that the pilot forgets about the acceleration

and assumes that everything he's feeling is due to the pitch.

- And what was the pilot's perceived pitch? - Mm.

McGRATH: Combining the horizontal and vertical

acceleration experienced by the pilot, we can calculate

the pitch that is perceived by the pilot.

This is called the illusionary pitch.

INVESTIGATOR 2: The pilot's perceived pitch was 21.6 degrees.

NARRATOR: They compare the plane's actual pitch

to the pilot's illusionary pitch during the second go-around.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Ten seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees.

And the pilot perceived it to be 26.7 degrees, nose up.

Wow. That's a huge difference.

McGRATH: This puts the captain into a situation that

he potentially will be experiencing a somatogravic illusion.

The captain is feeling one thing, but the aircraft is doing something else.

Get this. Near the end of the flight, the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees...

and the perceived pitch becomes well over 40.

NARRATOR: Investigators discover three instances

where there was a dramatic difference

between the plane's actual and the pilot's perceived pitch.

ÁLAVA: Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: It's evidence that the pilots may have experienced

a somatogravic illusion during the second go-around.

Could the feeling of the rapid acceleration have affected

how the pilots flew the plane? They dig deeper into the flight data.

Well, the captain pushed forward on the yoke.

He was trying to pitch the plane downward.

That's what his senses were telling him to do.

NANCE: The captain, responding more to his feelings

than to what he was seeing on any instrumentation in front of him,

he decides that he needs to push the airplane forward

and counteract this massive pitch up.

He's trying to save them by pitching down.

Wow. Check this out. He pushed the stabilizer trim down.

NARRATOR: From the data, investigators see the captain didn't just push the yoke.

Be careful!

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The captain applies the stabilizer trim

because he's pushing - trying to push the nose of the aircraft down.

- But for how long? - Hmm.

Yeah, he held the trim switch for twelve seconds.

DERNER: Holding the switch for 12 seconds is unheard of.

That should never be held for that amount of time.

NARRATOR: The team discovers that instead of pitching the plane up to climb,

the captain is pitching the plane towards the ground...

No, no, no, no, no, no.

NARRATOR: E ventually putting the plane into a fatal dive.

(aircraft engines)

The sudden change in direction is jarring.

SOEJATMAN: At that time, you would feel like you're in a rollercoaster.

You know, when you're coming up to the peak as you're diving at speed,

it's similar to that sensation.

NARRATOR: The pitch down has another disorienting effect on the pilots' senses.

The pitching down of the aircraft would have caused both the captain

and the first officer to experience a dramatic change in the G-forces.

Oh, my God!

(gasps)

McGRATH: That would increase the confusion in the cockpit

as to what's going on.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the various G-forces on Captain Sokratous

caused his complete spatial disorientation.

SOEJATMAN: The captain pushing and pulling on the yoke,

stomping on the rudder in the dive, you know, that shows confusion.

He's probably disorientated.

Oh, my God!

SOEJATMAN: You know, he's trying desperately

to get out of that sensation that he's feeling.

NARRATOR: But there's one question that still troubles investigators.

Was the first officer feeling the illusion as well?

McGRATH: Even though the accelerations

experienced by both pilots was the same,

the perception of what is happening can differ.

And that can be due to many different factors:

expectation, what are they looking at, their age, their experience.

Start it at the second go-around, please.

NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder could tell investigators

if the first officer was also under the influence of the somatogravic illusion.

SOKRATOUS (on recording): OK, go-around.

Careful.

(gasping)

ÁLAVA (on recording): No, no, no, no, no, no.

Don't. Don't do that.

He sees something wrong.

ÁLAVA: No. Pull it. Pull it. Pull it!

- He's telling him to pull back the yoke. - ÁLAVA (on recording): Pull it!

If he's feeling the same illusion as the captain,

it sure doesn't seem like he was affected by it.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first officer knew how much trouble the aircraft was in.

He knew the captain wasn't responding the way he should.

Oh, my God!

- GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. - (Álava yells on recording)

NARRATOR: Investigators are left wondering why the first officer didn't intervene.

You look at this first officer trying his best and wonder,

"Why didn't you just take control and say, 'I've got the airplane'?"

(Álava grunts)

(aircraft engines and explosion)

(sighs)

He's been flying the 737-800 for nearly two years. He's fully certified.

NARRATOR: Investigators look into the first officer's background

to understand why he didn't take control of Flight 981

when he saw that the captain was making grave mistakes.

INVESTIGATOR 2: Look.

His trainer wrote notes on his assessment. And this one's telling.

NARRATOR: They find notes left by one of his flight instructors that alarm them.

One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft

was discovered in a note that was left behind by a flight instructor.

"He needs to be a bit more assertive in what is needed from the captain."

And it continues.

"Tell him what you want done and do not wait

"for the captain to enquire with you or direct you in this regard."

He's not the type to take control.

No! Pull it. Pull it. Pull it. Pull it!

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first officer could see that

the captain was experiencing enormous problems, trying to control the go-around.

He really should have taken some decisive action and intervened.

Oh, my God!

I still don't understand something.

Why did they try to land the plane in the first place?

DERNER: The big mystery was, "Why was this crew so determined

"to land at Rostov-on-Don when every other flight

"had already diverted?"

NARRATOR: A storm was pummeling Rostov-on-Don Airport

as Flight 981 circled above.

Why didn't the pilots divert to another airport?

Investigators look for answers in the cockpit voice recording.

CONTROLLER (on recording): Sky Dubai 981,

for your information, previous traffic went to alternate airports.

So the other flights diverted? There's no need. I'm gonna keep flying.

Investigators just couldn't understand why

they wanted to fly in circles for almost two hours.

SOKRATOUS (on recording): I'm gonna try this approach.

And if I can't make it, we'll have a go-around,

and I will head to Mineralnye Vody, OK?

DISPATCHER (on recording): OK, Captain, understood.

- Who's he talking to? - Oh, the dispatcher in Dubai.

NARRATOR: Investigators finally get an indication

of the captain's rationale for attempting another landing.

As the captain decides whether to divert, he contacts

Flydubai's flight dispatcher in the United Arab Emirates.

DISPATCHER (on radio): We would like to recommend you hold max as possible.

Dispatchers manage the entire fleet's operation for a specific airline.

NANCE: The dispatcher and the captain

are co-equally responsible for the safety of the flight.

There is a very delicate dance that goes on

between and among the dispatchers and the captains.

The captain follows with the dispatcher's recommendation.

NARRATOR: Minutes turn to hours as the pilots wait for a chance to land.

I don't know, man. If we divert, we're gonna exceed our flying hours.

- What are you looking at? - Maximum duty hours.

He's calculating his duty hours.

NARRATOR: Regulations limit how many hours pilots can fly during a duty period.

We've been in the air for 5 1/2 hours now.

NARRATOR: The team learns that the pilots were concerned they

might exceed their duty hours.

Stop. Roll the map.

They'd been flying for at least five hours.

It will take another hour to reach their alternate airport, wait out the storm.

And they still have to get back

to Rostov-On-Don before returning to Dubai.

Diverting would put them over their duty hours for the day.

Right.

I think it will be clear by the time we do this approach now.

And even if we start now, I think we'll be good.

ÁLAVA (on recording): We'll be good.

OK. Is he landing because it's clear, or because he wants to get on the ground?

DERNER: The conversation on the flight deck before the second approach clearly

showed that they weren't really thinking so much about the safety of the landing,

just the fact that they wanted to land.

- I think I'd like to give it a try. - ÁLAVA: I agree. Let's try.

Stop the recording.

So they decide to circle for two hours

after a four-hour flight in the middle of the night.

NARRATOR: Did the long flight affect the pilots' ability to land the plane safely?

NANCE: Two hours of hold, six hours total time.

Aren't we seeing a decline in the decision making capabilities because of fatigue?

- Tired? - (huff) No.

NARRATOR: As investigators break down flight 981's journey

from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don, they identify a glaring problem.

INVESTIGATOR 1: They were actually in the air for more than six hours.

It's almost 5 AM their time when they're landing.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The circadian rhythm is

the body's natural alignment with the day and night cycle.

The quiet period is roughly for a four-hour period

between 2:00 in the morning and 6:00 in the morning.

That's the point at which your mental ability is pretty much at its lowest.

- I think I'd like to give it a try. - I agree. Let's try.

NARRATOR: Investigators determine the crew was suffering from operational fatigue

as they launched their second approach.

Good evening. Your first officer here. We will be landing shortly.

Once again, we apologize for the delay.

NARRATOR: The decision to make a second attempt

to land at Rostov-on-Don triggers a chain of events that ends in catastrophe.

ÁLAVA: Check your speed.

As the aircraft is hit by this sudden wind,

the crew is forced into executing another go-around.

OK. Go around.

And this time, it was all gonna go wrong.

NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous executes a wind shear go-around,

pushing the throttle to maximum power.

The first officer performs a standard go-around,

retracting the flaps and raising the landing gear.

Both pilots were essentially flying two different airplanes from there.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: This blunder factors heavily

into the catastrophe that followed.

NARRATOR: Flight 981 climbs from Rostov-on-Don at high speed.

SOEJATMAN: When you're light on fuel

and you put the maximum thrust, you will accelerate.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's what happened in the last few seconds that doomed Flight 981.

Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up.

NARRATOR: At this moment, Captain Sokratous fights an inner battle.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: The acceleration of the aircraft makes the captain feel

as though the aircraft is pitching up a lot more than it actually is.

NARRATOR: His spatial orientation deteriorates rapidly.

NANCE: Your vestibular senses in your middle ear

are all telling you the wrong thing.

NARRATOR: The captain counters the pitch- up feeling of a somatogravic illusion

by pushing the yoke forward.

The captain has lost touch with the reality

of what's happening to the airplane.

NARRATOR: Then, the final blow.

The captain holds that stabilizer trim button down for about 12 seconds.

With the sudden forcing of the aircraft's nose down

and stabilizer trim, the aircraft transitions

from a climb very suddenly into a dive.

McGRATH: The aircraft is now in a very dangerous situation,

which the captain is unable to overcome.

- My God! - GPWS: Terrain.

NANCE: They're accelerating rapidly.

And the first officer finally gets on the yoke and tries to pull,

but the controls on the left side govern where the airplane is.

NANCE: And you get to a certain point, and there's no recovery.

NARRATOR: Nosediving at full throttle towards the runway,

Captain Sokratous is completely disoriented.

When he adds rudder at the last moment,

he's lost all awareness of how the plane is flying.

(Álava yells)

(aircraft engines)

The pilots in this case were conducting the flight very well

right up until those last few moments, and then it all really just fell apart.

(helicopter)

NARRATOR: The IAC investigation into the crash of Flight 981

is a landmark case of how spatial disorientation can end in disaster.

SOEJATMAN: This accident is a wake-up call for the industry.

This is one of the accidents that paved the way

into increased training in spatial disorientation.

NARRATOR: In their final report, investigators blame

the captain's string of errors on his diminished psychological state.

The IAC recommends that Flydubai provide better training

on the manual operation of stabilizer trim,

so their pilots don't make the same mistake again.

Research into human factors, including situations like this,

where disorientation likely occurred,

is at the forefront of aviation safety research.

We are training our pilots on simulators

to experience to illusions before they experience them in the air

so they can recognize those situations.

KAMINSKI-MORROW: I think the Flydubai accident shows

how quickly your senses can overtake you.

And one of the key lessons is for pilots to trust in their instruments,

to take a step back from what they may think they're experiencing,

to actually understand what the aeroplane is doing.

You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.