Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated:
1
00:00:02,210 --> 00:00:06,965
UPS 1354 heavy, runway one
eight, clear to land.
2
00:00:08,341 --> 00:00:11,136
NARRATOR: In a populated area,
near a highway...
3
00:00:11,928 --> 00:00:13,096
Oh, no!
4
00:00:13,471 --> 00:00:16,850
...an Airbus A300 crashes
short of the runway.
5
00:00:18,935 --> 00:00:21,230
WOMAN ON RADIO:
Tower, did you see that?
6
00:00:22,272 --> 00:00:24,390
NARRATOR: Neither
pilot has survived.
7
00:00:25,233 --> 00:00:26,818
LAURI ESPOSITO:
We're a very small pilot group.
8
00:00:26,901 --> 00:00:28,320
So you start thinking about
9
00:00:28,403 --> 00:00:31,781
who it may have been
and exactly what happened.
10
00:00:32,615 --> 00:00:34,826
NARRATOR: After listening
to conversations in the cockpit...
11
00:00:34,909 --> 00:00:36,286
MAN ON RADIO:
We're gonna do vertical speed.
12
00:00:36,369 --> 00:00:37,787
He kept us high.
13
00:00:37,871 --> 00:00:40,248
{\an8}...and running the flight
through a simulator...
14
00:00:40,331 --> 00:00:41,833
How'd she miss all this?
15
00:00:41,916 --> 00:00:45,211
...investigators are forced
to take a different approach.
16
00:00:45,587 --> 00:00:49,549
At 11:00 a.m, an eyewitness
spots her in the hotel restaurant.
17
00:00:49,632 --> 00:00:52,052
GREG FEITH:
You can set yourself up for failure
18
00:00:52,135 --> 00:00:54,959
in a safety critical job
like flying an aircraft.
19
00:00:55,430 --> 00:00:56,848
No!
20
00:01:02,854 --> 00:01:07,525
(MAN SPEAKING
INDISTINCTLY OVER RADIO)
21
00:01:14,074 --> 00:01:18,604
This is a true story. It is based on
official reports and eyewitness accounts.
22
00:01:22,707 --> 00:01:28,088
{\an8}NARRATOR: It's an early summer morning
when UPS flight 1354 climbs over Kentucky.
23
00:01:37,347 --> 00:01:40,995
{\an8}- Autopilot one command.
- FEMALE PILOT: Autopilot one command.
24
00:01:42,060 --> 00:01:46,564
Fifty-eight-year-old Cerea Beal
Jr. has been flying with UPS
25
00:01:46,648 --> 00:01:49,192
for more than 20 years.
26
00:01:49,275 --> 00:01:54,155
MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354,
climb and maintain flight level 280.
27
00:01:55,198 --> 00:01:58,952
Two eight zero, 1354.
28
00:01:59,035 --> 00:02:02,164
NARRATOR: Thirty-seven-year-old
First Officer Shanda Fanning
29
00:02:02,247 --> 00:02:05,189
has been with the delivery
company for seven years.
30
00:02:06,000 --> 00:02:10,296
They were respected. They were
experienced aviation professionals.
31
00:02:10,380 --> 00:02:14,263
They were very representative
of the type of pilots that UPS hires.
32
00:02:18,805 --> 00:02:21,850
- Two eight zero.
- Twenty-eight.
33
00:02:25,103 --> 00:02:28,940
{\an8}Tonight's flight from Louisville,
Kentucky, to Birmingham, Alabama,
34
00:02:29,023 --> 00:02:30,275
{\an8}takes about an hour.
35
00:02:30,608 --> 00:02:32,986
{\an8}MAP: Flight Path
36
00:02:33,069 --> 00:02:36,573
ESPOSITO: Overnight cargo is
a very time-sensitive product.
37
00:02:36,656 --> 00:02:41,411
Everybody's familiar with UPS
and their next day air product.
38
00:02:42,203 --> 00:02:44,581
So if we have an airplane that's late,
39
00:02:44,664 --> 00:02:47,500
it may affect scores
of our outbound flights.
40
00:02:48,126 --> 00:02:51,421
We don't have the luxury
of booking our packages
41
00:02:51,504 --> 00:02:53,298
on the next available flight
42
00:02:53,381 --> 00:02:57,010
because the next available
flight might not be for 24 hours.
43
00:02:58,928 --> 00:03:02,849
NARRATOR: The crew is flying
the newest version of the Airbu A300,
44
00:03:02,932 --> 00:03:06,186
equipped with advanced computer
and flight management systems
45
00:03:06,269 --> 00:03:08,313
to assist pilots.
46
00:03:10,481 --> 00:03:14,319
MAN ON RADIO:
Notice to airmen runway two-four closed.
47
00:03:15,695 --> 00:03:18,240
NARRATOR: Shortly after reaching
cruising altitude,
48
00:03:18,323 --> 00:03:22,911
the pilots receive a NOTAM,
a notice to airmen message.
49
00:03:23,745 --> 00:03:28,791
NOTAMs provide information
regarding hazards that you may encounter
50
00:03:28,875 --> 00:03:33,796
so that there are no surprises
en route, or when you arrive.
51
00:03:33,880 --> 00:03:37,967
MAN ON RADIO: Localizer
runway 18 in use.
52
00:03:38,051 --> 00:03:41,387
Landing and departing runway 18
53
00:03:42,513 --> 00:03:46,434
NARRATOR: The runway they were
expecting is closed for maintenance.
54
00:03:46,517 --> 00:03:48,061
They'll have to use an alternate.
55
00:03:48,144 --> 00:03:51,814
They're saying 24 is closed.
They want us to take runway 18.
56
00:03:51,898 --> 00:03:56,027
- Runway one-eight? It figures.
- I know.
57
00:03:56,110 --> 00:03:58,655
Especially since we're a little heavy.
58
00:03:58,738 --> 00:04:02,033
Yep. I guess I'll brief it.
Briefing guide.
59
00:04:04,244 --> 00:04:07,497
NARRATOR: The alternate
runway is shorter.
60
00:04:08,498 --> 00:04:10,750
With the plane nearly at maximum weight,
61
00:04:10,833 --> 00:04:14,892
they'll have to carefully manage
their speed and altitude on approach.
62
00:04:15,880 --> 00:04:18,883
Verify VNAV path on the approach chart.
63
00:04:20,176 --> 00:04:22,553
ESPOSITO: Pilots
prefer longer runways
64
00:04:22,637 --> 00:04:27,100
because with a shorter runway
there's not a lot of margin for error.
65
00:04:28,309 --> 00:04:30,780
Load the approach
into the flight computer.
66
00:04:32,855 --> 00:04:37,443
NARRATOR: Landing on runway 18
also involves a more demanding approach
67
00:04:37,527 --> 00:04:40,029
- known as a non
- precision approach.
68
00:04:42,073 --> 00:04:45,744
In a non-precision approach,
pilots pre-program the flight computer
69
00:04:45,827 --> 00:04:49,664
to follow a virtual glide path
or descent profile
70
00:04:49,747 --> 00:04:52,375
to the runway threshold.
71
00:04:53,042 --> 00:04:55,925
{\an8}A non-precision approach
is not practiced as much.
72
00:04:56,587 --> 00:04:59,632
{\an8}The only times flight crews ever see them
73
00:04:59,716 --> 00:05:03,303
perhaps would be in training
in a simulator
74
00:05:03,386 --> 00:05:05,857
and then maybe once in a while
on the line.
75
00:05:07,473 --> 00:05:09,809
Verify the glide path agrees
with the approach chart
76
00:05:09,892 --> 00:05:11,394
within one degree.
77
00:05:12,270 --> 00:05:16,816
Verify approach to point one degrees.
78
00:05:19,902 --> 00:05:22,447
When you're shooting
a non-precision approach,
79
00:05:22,530 --> 00:05:25,199
your workload increases dramatically.
80
00:05:25,283 --> 00:05:28,931
You have to watch your airspeed
You have to watch your altitude
81
00:05:30,788 --> 00:05:32,582
NARRATOR: Twenty-eight minutes
into the flight,
82
00:05:32,665 --> 00:05:37,879
UPS 1354 begins its descent
towards Birmingham, Alabama.
83
00:05:39,797 --> 00:05:44,010
MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354,
descend at pilot's discretion.
84
00:05:44,093 --> 00:05:46,220
Maintain 11,000.
85
00:05:47,764 --> 00:05:51,809
NARRATOR: The crew is cleared to
continue descending to 11,000 feet.
86
00:05:52,101 --> 00:05:53,984
That works. We'll keep it going.
87
00:05:56,189 --> 00:05:59,609
UPS 1354.
We'll just keep her going down to 11.
88
00:05:59,692 --> 00:06:01,569
MAN ON RADIO:
Roger. UPS 1354.
89
00:06:05,114 --> 00:06:07,784
They're generous today.
Usually, they kind of take you up to 15
90
00:06:07,867 --> 00:06:09,077
and hold you up there.
91
00:06:09,160 --> 00:06:10,925
I know. They hold you up high.
92
00:06:12,497 --> 00:06:17,710
NARRATOR: Visibility is poor as
the plane descends to 11,000 feet
93
00:06:18,795 --> 00:06:20,255
If you're flying in the clouds
94
00:06:20,338 --> 00:06:24,175
and it's already nighttime,
you have a black screen.
95
00:06:24,258 --> 00:06:27,136
If you look out,
there's nothing out there.
96
00:06:27,220 --> 00:06:29,514
It's the black abyss, if you will.
97
00:06:32,225 --> 00:06:35,103
UPS 1354 heavy, Birmingham Tower,
98
00:06:35,186 --> 00:06:37,980
descend and maintain 2,500.
99
00:06:38,064 --> 00:06:42,318
Runway 24 is still closed.
You want 18?
100
00:06:43,528 --> 00:06:45,947
NARRATOR: The controller
confirms that the crew cannot use
101
00:06:46,030 --> 00:06:47,949
the airport's longer runway.
102
00:06:49,117 --> 00:06:50,326
Yeah.
103
00:06:51,160 --> 00:06:53,747
- Yes sir. One-eight'll work.
- MAN ON RADIO: Copy that.
104
00:06:53,830 --> 00:06:57,417
Turn right ten degrees,
join the localizer.
105
00:06:57,500 --> 00:07:00,294
Okay. Turn right,
join the localizer.
106
00:07:05,091 --> 00:07:07,093
ESPOSITO: The last few minutes
before landing
107
00:07:07,176 --> 00:07:09,353
can be very busy for the flight crew.
108
00:07:10,430 --> 00:07:13,960
A lot's going on, and you have
to be at the top of your game.
109
00:07:16,727 --> 00:07:19,230
- Flaps fifteen.
- Speed checks.
110
00:07:20,773 --> 00:07:22,442
Flaps fifteen.
111
00:07:24,610 --> 00:07:29,316
NARRATOR: Eight miles from the airport,
the crew configures th plane for landing.
112
00:07:29,740 --> 00:07:34,537
MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354 heavy,
runway 18, clear to land.
113
00:07:35,288 --> 00:07:37,915
FANNING: One eight
cleared to land 1354.
114
00:07:40,960 --> 00:07:45,214
Speed brakes armed.
Ignition continuous relight.
115
00:07:46,090 --> 00:07:47,855
Landing checklist is complete.
116
00:07:50,386 --> 00:07:52,180
NARRATOR: Five miles
from the runway,
117
00:07:52,263 --> 00:07:54,849
the captain realizes
something's not right.
118
00:07:56,184 --> 00:07:57,852
Unbelievable. Too high.
119
00:08:00,062 --> 00:08:04,817
NARRATOR: The autopilot hasn't initiated
its final descent to the airport.
120
00:08:04,901 --> 00:08:08,901
The captain tries to get the
plane back on its programmed glide path.
121
00:08:11,699 --> 00:08:15,203
If the plane remains too high
this close to the runway,
122
00:08:15,286 --> 00:08:17,205
the crew could overshoot it.
123
00:08:20,124 --> 00:08:22,835
Instruments cross-checked.
No flags.
124
00:08:23,794 --> 00:08:27,089
The first officer sees
no problems with the descent.
125
00:08:28,758 --> 00:08:29,967
Two miles to go.
126
00:08:34,972 --> 00:08:37,851
I've got the runway
in sight out there, 12 o'clock.
127
00:08:37,934 --> 00:08:39,817
FANNING: Got the
runway in sight.
128
00:08:42,355 --> 00:08:43,648
Autopilot's off.
129
00:08:45,942 --> 00:08:50,196
NARRATOR: The captain prepares
to fly the plane manually to touchdown.
130
00:08:50,279 --> 00:08:53,700
Pilots switch off the autopilot
to land the airplane manually
131
00:08:53,783 --> 00:08:56,953
in the situation
of a non-precision approach.
132
00:08:57,662 --> 00:09:02,458
It's a required maneuver to
actually manually land the aircraft.
133
00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:06,588
NARRATOR:
As they get closer to the airport...
134
00:09:06,671 --> 00:09:09,090
- (MACHINE BEEPS)
- Did I hit something?
135
00:09:09,715 --> 00:09:11,885
- AUTOMATED VOICE: Caution.Terrain. -Oh, no!
136
00:09:11,968 --> 00:09:14,345
Too low. Terrain.
137
00:09:15,137 --> 00:09:16,889
Oh, God!
138
00:09:18,933 --> 00:09:22,816
The pilots can't control the
plane as it cuts through a smal grove.
139
00:09:27,858 --> 00:09:29,068
No!
140
00:09:31,279 --> 00:09:32,738
Oh, my God!
141
00:09:40,871 --> 00:09:46,043
NARRATOR: UPS flight 1354
crashes just one mile short of the runway.
142
00:09:49,380 --> 00:09:52,842
- WOMAN ON RADIO: Tower, did yousee that? -Yes, yes.
143
00:09:54,594 --> 00:09:56,762
Airport 12, there's been a crash.
144
00:09:56,846 --> 00:09:59,932
UPS 1354 heavy crashed on the hill.
145
00:10:00,016 --> 00:10:03,936
Attention, aircraft crash
three miles final runway 18.
146
00:10:11,068 --> 00:10:13,446
(SIRENS BLARING)
147
00:10:15,656 --> 00:10:20,703
NARRATOR: Rescue crews rush to
extinguish the flames of UPS Flight 1354.
148
00:10:31,213 --> 00:10:34,592
Despite the plane coming down
in a populated area
149
00:10:34,675 --> 00:10:38,054
and crossing a highway
in Birmingham, Alabama,
150
00:10:38,137 --> 00:10:40,264
no one on the ground is injured
151
00:10:41,932 --> 00:10:44,060
Tragically, both pilots are killed.
152
00:10:48,898 --> 00:10:53,546
Within hours, the National Transportation
Safety Board begins the investigation.
153
00:11:08,918 --> 00:11:12,755
It looks like the plane
struck some trees here,
154
00:11:14,215 --> 00:11:20,638
then crashed into the ground
here, and then slid for 1,400 feet.
155
00:11:22,139 --> 00:11:24,141
Did we find the nose?
156
00:11:24,850 --> 00:11:28,979
NARRATOR: The wreckage
is spread over a large area.
157
00:11:29,063 --> 00:11:34,360
Yes. I believe we did.
Uh, yeah, it's here.
158
00:11:36,821 --> 00:11:40,074
Investigators look for
the four corners of the aircraf
159
00:11:40,449 --> 00:11:44,038
to determine if the entire plan
has reached the accident site.
160
00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:48,041
BARRY STRAUCH:
The four corners refer to the nose,
161
00:11:48,124 --> 00:11:49,750
both wings and tail.
162
00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:53,504
You want to take all of them into account
163
00:11:55,005 --> 00:11:57,884
just because it tells such a
story about how the airplane struck.
164
00:11:57,967 --> 00:12:01,178
Tail and right wing were found here.
165
00:12:04,807 --> 00:12:08,477
Fragments of the left wing
were found here.
166
00:12:10,896 --> 00:12:13,608
NARRATOR: All four corners
are at the crash site.
167
00:12:13,691 --> 00:12:16,402
The plane was intact
until it hit the ground.
168
00:12:19,155 --> 00:12:21,157
It wasn't a structural problem.
169
00:12:24,869 --> 00:12:26,537
Did anyone see the accident?
170
00:12:29,039 --> 00:12:32,335
NARRATOR: If the plane was
intact, investigators wonder if the pilots
171
00:12:32,418 --> 00:12:35,671
were having difficulty
controlling it prior to impact.
172
00:12:38,257 --> 00:12:42,261
No eyewitnesses, just what
we documented at the crash site.
173
00:12:44,972 --> 00:12:47,267
Let's look at how they hit those trees.
174
00:12:50,478 --> 00:12:55,691
NARRATOR: Impact marks on trees
may provide additional clues.
175
00:12:55,775 --> 00:12:59,070
It's critical for investigators
to look at all the things
176
00:12:59,528 --> 00:13:01,322
that this aircraft may have struck.
177
00:13:01,405 --> 00:13:03,073
In this particular accident,
178
00:13:03,157 --> 00:13:06,040
we know that the airplane
had flown through trees.
179
00:13:07,703 --> 00:13:09,705
When you look at those trees,
180
00:13:09,789 --> 00:13:12,667
you wanna see what the attitude
of the aircraft was.
181
00:13:12,750 --> 00:13:14,752
Was it wings level?
Was it rolled one direction
182
00:13:14,835 --> 00:13:16,462
or the other direction?
183
00:13:16,545 --> 00:13:18,604
Was it a very steep pitch attitude?
184
00:13:26,347 --> 00:13:29,818
MALE INVESTIGATOR: What were
the height of the impact marks?
185
00:13:30,434 --> 00:13:33,896
{\an8}FEMALE INVESTIGATOR:
Tree 14, 43.1 feet.
186
00:13:38,025 --> 00:13:41,612
{\an8}NARRATOR: Investigators use the
height of the impact marks to determine
187
00:13:41,695 --> 00:13:45,282
the orientation of the plane
when it struck the trees.
188
00:13:49,995 --> 00:13:54,583
The plane is level.
These guys had control of the aircraft.
189
00:13:54,667 --> 00:13:56,043
Absolutely.
190
00:13:59,713 --> 00:14:04,510
NARRATOR: If the pilots were in
control of a structurally sound plane,
191
00:14:04,593 --> 00:14:08,123
what else could have caused the
to crash short of the runway?
192
00:14:11,851 --> 00:14:13,853
Maybe the engines failed.
193
00:14:16,272 --> 00:14:20,625
{\an8}It's imperative to look at the engines
to give us an idea of thrust levels.
194
00:14:21,110 --> 00:14:24,488
{\an8}And surprisingly, if the engines
are intact more or less
195
00:14:24,572 --> 00:14:26,574
you can tell this.
196
00:14:28,576 --> 00:14:30,578
Let's start with the blades.
197
00:14:32,496 --> 00:14:35,374
NARRATOR: Investigators examine
the A300's engines
198
00:14:35,457 --> 00:14:39,222
to see if they were generating
power at the time of the accident.
199
00:14:45,801 --> 00:14:47,803
The blades were spinning.
200
00:14:49,597 --> 00:14:52,391
BENZON: You can look in the
front of the engine and if the fan blades,
201
00:14:52,474 --> 00:14:56,004
for instance, are bent in the
opposite direction of rotation,
202
00:14:56,395 --> 00:15:00,858
that means that when the aircraft's
engine struck the ground it was on.
203
00:15:03,485 --> 00:15:05,487
Debris is shredded.
204
00:15:07,948 --> 00:15:11,619
NARRATOR: The debris ingested
during impact confirms to investigators
205
00:15:11,702 --> 00:15:13,704
that the engines were functioning.
206
00:15:17,124 --> 00:15:20,002
It wasn't engine failure.
207
00:15:22,338 --> 00:15:24,882
Maybe they ran into a storm.
208
00:15:27,384 --> 00:15:32,389
NARRATOR: With no real leads to
explain why the plane crashed,
209
00:15:32,473 --> 00:15:36,435
the team considers if weather
was a possible factor.
210
00:15:37,394 --> 00:15:42,399
If the weather was poor and the pilots
couldn't see the ground well at all,
211
00:15:42,483 --> 00:15:46,487
then perhaps they made mistakes
on the approach itself.
212
00:15:49,448 --> 00:15:53,286
MALE INVESTIGATOR: This is the weather
from two minutes before the accident.
213
00:15:53,369 --> 00:15:58,165
No storms, wind is calm.
This all looks pretty good.
214
00:16:01,126 --> 00:16:06,840
Wait. There was a broken cloud
ceiling at the airport, 1,000 feet.
215
00:16:07,883 --> 00:16:13,222
{\an8}This is the ground.
And this is the cloud cover.
216
00:16:13,305 --> 00:16:16,142
{\an8}NARRATOR: The cloud ceiling
is the distance from the ground
217
00:16:16,225 --> 00:16:19,144
{\an8}to the base of the lowest clouds.
218
00:16:19,228 --> 00:16:21,021
{\an8}That's pretty low.
219
00:16:22,147 --> 00:16:26,443
{\an8}Flight 1354 would only descend
from clouds at 1,000 feet.
220
00:16:27,695 --> 00:16:30,578
What was the decision altitude
for their approach?
221
00:16:33,492 --> 00:16:35,828
The decision altitude is the
altitude at which the crew
222
00:16:35,911 --> 00:16:41,083
must be able to see the runway
or else abandon their approach.
223
00:16:41,166 --> 00:16:44,170
BENZON: Decision heights,
they're all pretty much a hard floor
224
00:16:44,253 --> 00:16:46,672
especially in the weather,
that should not be broken.
225
00:16:46,755 --> 00:16:50,926
You should not go below
the decision altitude
226
00:16:51,010 --> 00:16:52,553
unless you see the runway.
227
00:16:56,974 --> 00:16:59,435
Decision altitude was 1,200 feet.
228
00:17:05,524 --> 00:17:09,236
{\an8}If the clouds didn't break
until 1,000 feet,
229
00:17:09,319 --> 00:17:12,865
they wouldn't have seen the
runway at their decision altitude.
230
00:17:12,948 --> 00:17:15,948
FEMALE INVESTIGATOR:
So why didn't they turn around?
231
00:17:16,827 --> 00:17:21,540
{\an8}That low to the ground, at night,
you don't have time to hint and hope.
232
00:17:22,332 --> 00:17:25,744
{\an8}You have to go around
and get it together and try it again.
233
00:17:27,796 --> 00:17:32,051
NARRATOR: Did lack of visibility
cause the pilots to descend too rapidly
234
00:17:32,134 --> 00:17:34,136
and crash short of the runway?
235
00:17:35,512 --> 00:17:37,689
Maybe the controller knows something.
236
00:17:49,068 --> 00:17:51,716
Were they concerned
at all about the approach?
237
00:17:52,237 --> 00:17:54,865
NARRATOR: Investigators
interview the air traffic controller
238
00:17:54,948 --> 00:17:57,743
to understand why
the pilots of Flight 1354
239
00:17:57,826 --> 00:18:01,080
descended so low while in thick clouds.
240
00:18:02,331 --> 00:18:07,086
They didn't say anything.
Everything seemed fine.
241
00:18:09,838 --> 00:18:13,759
The air traffic controller
can tell the investigator what he heard
242
00:18:13,842 --> 00:18:18,263
from the flight crew if they
heard or reported anything unusual,
243
00:18:18,347 --> 00:18:20,349
anything that he wasn't expecting.
244
00:18:21,600 --> 00:18:24,395
Was there anything
out of the ordinary that night?
245
00:18:24,478 --> 00:18:29,066
Yeah. The runway they were
scheduled to land on was closed.
246
00:18:29,775 --> 00:18:35,072
So they had to use the
alternate. It's a non-precision approach.
247
00:18:37,324 --> 00:18:43,163
UPS 1354 heavy, Birmingham
Tower, descend and maintain 2,500.
248
00:18:43,247 --> 00:18:46,917
Runway 24 is still closed.
You want 18?
249
00:18:47,251 --> 00:18:50,504
- Yeah.
- Yes, sir, 18 will work.
250
00:18:53,382 --> 00:18:56,760
So they shot a non-precision
with no eyes on the runway?
251
00:19:00,013 --> 00:19:01,682
STRAUCH: Knowing
what the weather was,
252
00:19:01,765 --> 00:19:03,768
knowing what the crew
thought the weather was,
253
00:19:03,851 --> 00:19:06,979
knowing what information they
were given about the weather
254
00:19:07,062 --> 00:19:10,566
told us a lot about how
they executed the approach.
255
00:19:10,941 --> 00:19:12,943
Thank you.
256
00:19:15,737 --> 00:19:18,741
NARRATOR: Why did the crew
continue their non precision approach
257
00:19:18,824 --> 00:19:20,284
in heavy clouds?
258
00:19:22,035 --> 00:19:24,683
Do we have the data
from the flight recorders?
259
00:19:26,165 --> 00:19:30,001
Those two black boxes
are very critical to investigators
260
00:19:30,002 --> 00:19:32,179
because they're electronic witnesses.
261
00:19:37,593 --> 00:19:40,429
Here's the approach
they should have taken.
262
00:19:40,512 --> 00:19:42,723
The plan was to come in slow and steady,
263
00:19:42,806 --> 00:19:44,808
at about a three-degree angle.
264
00:19:46,435 --> 00:19:48,478
NARRATOR: Using the FDR data,
265
00:19:48,562 --> 00:19:53,901
investigators reconstruct
the final approach path of Flight 1354.
266
00:19:55,444 --> 00:19:57,209
Here's what they actually did.
267
00:20:02,951 --> 00:20:06,038
{\an8}In this particular instance,
the critical phase of flight,
268
00:20:06,121 --> 00:20:10,209
which was approach, were they
doing what they were supposed to be doing?
269
00:20:10,292 --> 00:20:12,586
Investigators can compare
that then against
270
00:20:12,669 --> 00:20:14,846
what the airplane was actually doing.
271
00:20:15,923 --> 00:20:19,593
NARRATOR: The crew's approach
was far from a steady descent.
272
00:20:20,844 --> 00:20:23,315
The controller cleared them to 2,500 feet.
273
00:20:24,806 --> 00:20:29,478
But they leveled out a little higher
than that, which shouldn't be a problem.
274
00:20:35,484 --> 00:20:36,610
Flaps 15.
275
00:20:36,693 --> 00:20:38,904
FANNING: Speed checks, flaps 15.
276
00:20:39,988 --> 00:20:45,035
MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354 heavy,
runway 18, cleared to land.
277
00:20:47,079 --> 00:20:49,081
It looks like they fly past
the descent profile
278
00:20:49,164 --> 00:20:51,833
they pre-programmed
into the computer here.
279
00:20:53,335 --> 00:20:55,337
They try and get back on track
but end up descending
280
00:20:55,420 --> 00:20:58,215
steeply below the flight path
and never recover.
281
00:21:01,969 --> 00:21:03,793
How fast were they coming down?
282
00:21:05,973 --> 00:21:08,350
NARRATOR: Did the crew
descend too quickly
283
00:21:08,433 --> 00:21:10,769
as they tried to get back on track?
284
00:21:14,731 --> 00:21:21,029
- Huh. Check this out.
- Wow, 1,500 feet per minute.
285
00:21:21,113 --> 00:21:24,055
The descent is way too fast so
close to the ground.
286
00:21:24,783 --> 00:21:28,662
NARRATOR: They confirm that the
plane descended at a rate
287
00:21:28,745 --> 00:21:30,748
outside safety guidelines
for a final approach.
288
00:21:30,831 --> 00:21:32,833
It's an important clue.
289
00:21:33,417 --> 00:21:36,837
Any pilot looking at this would
understand that they were descending
290
00:21:36,920 --> 00:21:40,257
way too fast this close to the runway.
291
00:21:42,968 --> 00:21:45,930
{\an8}FEITH: You would think that the
pilot would have started bottoming out,
292
00:21:46,013 --> 00:21:50,726
{\an8}that is slowing that rate of
descent a lot sooner than he did.
293
00:21:53,687 --> 00:21:55,940
What would make him think
he needed to descend that fast
294
00:21:56,023 --> 00:21:58,025
to get back on the glide path?
295
00:21:59,109 --> 00:22:03,530
NARRATOR: Investigators dig
deeper into the FDR data.
296
00:22:05,073 --> 00:22:08,035
That's a strange way
to program the autopilot.
297
00:22:09,661 --> 00:22:13,874
NARRATOR: The team notices that just after
the plane flew past the descent profile,
298
00:22:13,957 --> 00:22:18,378
{\an8}the autopilot is set to a mode
called Vertical Speed.
299
00:22:20,380 --> 00:22:23,842
The mode is used to descend
quickly at higher altitudes,
300
00:22:23,925 --> 00:22:27,095
not on final approach.
301
00:22:27,637 --> 00:22:30,683
BENZON: This complicates the job
of the pilot, very, very much.
302
00:22:30,766 --> 00:22:32,768
{\an8}He has less time to think about things.
303
00:22:32,851 --> 00:22:35,228
{\an8}He has less time to react to things.
304
00:22:36,229 --> 00:22:38,231
So it's simply not a good thing
305
00:22:42,069 --> 00:22:43,862
MALE INVESTIGATOR: Why were
they descending so quickly
306
00:22:43,945 --> 00:22:45,364
so close to the ground?
307
00:22:47,074 --> 00:22:49,826
NARRATOR: The FDR data
only tells investigators
308
00:22:49,910 --> 00:22:53,205
what the pilots did, not why.
309
00:22:54,331 --> 00:22:56,390
We need the cockpit voice recorder.
310
00:22:58,001 --> 00:23:01,838
STRAUCH: When you add to that
what the pilots were saying,
311
00:23:01,922 --> 00:23:04,922
and you match that with
what the airplane was doing,
312
00:23:05,884 --> 00:23:10,305
investigators have a pretty
complete picture of what was going on.
313
00:23:12,265 --> 00:23:16,269
- Okay, let's hear it.
- UPS 1534...
314
00:23:16,353 --> 00:23:20,273
The cockpit voice recorder,
it tells us, more or less,
315
00:23:20,357 --> 00:23:22,901
what's going through the minds
of the flight crew.
316
00:23:22,984 --> 00:23:24,611
BEAL JR: Runway 18...
317
00:23:24,694 --> 00:23:27,281
NARRATOR: They listen as the pilots
make their vertical spee adjustments
318
00:23:27,364 --> 00:23:29,449
while they configure their landing.
319
00:23:29,533 --> 00:23:33,120
FANNING: Cleared to land, 1354.
Speed brakes armed.
320
00:23:33,203 --> 00:23:37,416
Ignition continuous relight.
Landing checklist is complete.
321
00:23:37,499 --> 00:23:39,501
Unbelievable. Too high.
322
00:23:41,711 --> 00:23:44,173
FANNING: Let's see.
You're in vertical speed.
323
00:23:44,256 --> 00:23:47,717
Yeah, I'm gonna do vertical
speed. He kept us high.
324
00:23:50,345 --> 00:23:52,347
Hold it there.
325
00:23:55,475 --> 00:23:57,478
The Captain thinks the plane
didn't lock onto
326
00:23:57,561 --> 00:24:02,858
{\an8}the programmed descent profile
because the controller kept them too high.
327
00:24:04,484 --> 00:24:06,486
Bring up the recommended altitude.
328
00:24:07,821 --> 00:24:11,658
NARRATOR: Investigators check the altitude
the computer required the plane to reach
329
00:24:11,741 --> 00:24:14,995
{\an8}before commencing the automated descent.
330
00:24:15,078 --> 00:24:20,333
{\an8}Twenty-three hundred feet.
That's only a few hundred feet too high.
331
00:24:22,752 --> 00:24:25,506
Even though the captain believe
the plane didn't descend
332
00:24:25,589 --> 00:24:31,261
because the controller kept the too
high, the computer should have initiated
333
00:24:31,344 --> 00:24:35,140
its programmed descent
at that higher altitude.
334
00:24:36,850 --> 00:24:39,792
Maybe there was a problem
with the flight computer.
335
00:24:47,068 --> 00:24:51,186
Verify the glide path agrees
with the approach chart within one degree.
336
00:24:52,407 --> 00:24:54,701
NARRATOR: Did a malfunction
in the flight computer
337
00:24:54,784 --> 00:25:00,415
used to program the autopilot
lead to the crash of UPS Flight 1354?
338
00:25:05,086 --> 00:25:07,923
Verify approach to point one degrees.
339
00:25:09,966 --> 00:25:12,969
The flight management system
to an airline pilot
340
00:25:14,346 --> 00:25:15,806
in an airline operation like
this is very critical
341
00:25:15,889 --> 00:25:17,766
because it is the automation.
342
00:25:17,849 --> 00:25:21,144
It is the typical way of flying
a large aircraft.
343
00:25:21,228 --> 00:25:26,608
If you have bad data in, that
data will cause bad things to happen.
344
00:25:33,615 --> 00:25:38,620
Okay. Let's hook this up.
345
00:25:40,789 --> 00:25:43,667
NARRATOR: Investigators recover
the flight computer's memory card
346
00:25:43,750 --> 00:25:45,919
from the wreckage.
347
00:25:46,002 --> 00:25:49,839
They prepare to test it for
signs of errors or malfunctions
348
00:25:51,091 --> 00:25:55,262
The investigators went to great pains
to figure out what exactly was loaded
349
00:25:55,345 --> 00:25:57,347
{\an8}into the flight management computer.
350
00:25:57,430 --> 00:25:59,933
{\an8}It was damaged, so they had to
remove the motherboard,
351
00:26:00,016 --> 00:26:04,271
and place it in a functioning
unit and actually read it out.
352
00:26:05,605 --> 00:26:08,370
This should tell us
if the computer was working.
353
00:26:09,484 --> 00:26:13,488
NARRATOR: If the flight computer
was operational,
354
00:26:13,572 --> 00:26:16,658
investigators should be able
to download its memory.
355
00:26:18,410 --> 00:26:20,412
FEMALE INVESTIGATOR:
It's working.
356
00:26:22,163 --> 00:26:24,166
BENZON: It turned out that
there was nothing wrong
357
00:26:24,249 --> 00:26:25,834
with the flight management computer.
358
00:26:25,917 --> 00:26:27,920
But had there been, that could have been
359
00:26:28,003 --> 00:26:30,709
a very important part
of the accident sequence.
360
00:26:31,715 --> 00:26:35,760
- If the computer was working...
- It looks like they programmed it.
361
00:26:35,844 --> 00:26:40,307
The final approach is armed for
a gradual descent of three degrees.
362
00:26:40,390 --> 00:26:42,392
Wait a minute.
363
00:26:43,101 --> 00:26:46,688
They've got two separate
destinations programmed.
364
00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:50,442
They forgot to clear the conflict.
365
00:26:53,653 --> 00:26:56,240
NARRATOR: They discover
the crew missed a step
366
00:26:56,323 --> 00:26:59,743
in planning their route
to Birmingham airport.
367
00:26:59,826 --> 00:27:03,872
They failed to clear
a previously programmed destination.
368
00:27:03,955 --> 00:27:06,333
It's a troubling find.
369
00:27:06,416 --> 00:27:09,545
BENZON: You can load a flight
plan into it, and then if you deviate
370
00:27:09,628 --> 00:27:12,213
from that particular flight plan,
371
00:27:12,297 --> 00:27:16,468
the flight management computer
doesn't really know what's going on
372
00:27:16,551 --> 00:27:20,680
and can put out false data,
and that's called a discontinuity.
373
00:27:21,931 --> 00:27:23,934
NARRATOR: The crew
programmed the plane
374
00:27:24,017 --> 00:27:27,062
{\an8}to fly directly to Birmingham airport.
375
00:27:27,145 --> 00:27:30,274
{\an8}Twenty miles out,
they needed to clear their flight path
376
00:27:30,357 --> 00:27:34,319
and program a specific approach
to runway 18.
377
00:27:34,778 --> 00:27:37,781
But the crew didn't clear
the initial plan,
378
00:27:37,864 --> 00:27:42,535
which created the discontinuity
a confusion in the system.
379
00:27:43,620 --> 00:27:47,916
There was a conflict between
where the pilots told the airplane
380
00:27:47,999 --> 00:27:49,334
to start the approach
381
00:27:49,459 --> 00:27:52,671
and where the computer knew
the approach had to start,
382
00:27:52,754 --> 00:27:56,049
and that was a flight plan discontinuity.
383
00:27:57,592 --> 00:28:01,063
That's why the autopilot
wouldn't initiate the descent path.
384
00:28:03,390 --> 00:28:06,226
STRAUCH: The captain basically
was chasing the incorrect guidance
385
00:28:06,309 --> 00:28:09,980
that the display was telling him by
trying to descend as quickly as he could,
386
00:28:10,063 --> 00:28:12,023
when there was no reason for it.
387
00:28:13,858 --> 00:28:17,279
NARRATOR: The team knows
the crew didn't clear the conflict.
388
00:28:17,362 --> 00:28:20,448
The question is why?
389
00:28:20,532 --> 00:28:24,415
Let's listen to what was going
on when they should have cleared it.
390
00:28:25,286 --> 00:28:29,582
They focus on the moment the crew
got the instruction from the controller
391
00:28:29,666 --> 00:28:31,543
to go to runway 18.
392
00:28:33,670 --> 00:28:37,882
- Okay. Here it is.
- MAN ON RADIO: You want 18?
393
00:28:37,966 --> 00:28:39,968
NARRATOR: The controller
reminds the crew that
394
00:28:40,051 --> 00:28:42,095
they must use an alternate runway.
395
00:28:42,178 --> 00:28:45,432
- Yep.
- Yessir, 18 will work.
396
00:28:46,599 --> 00:28:50,186
Copy that. Turn right ten
degrees, join the localizer.
397
00:28:50,562 --> 00:28:52,680
Okay. Turn right,
join the localizer.
398
00:28:54,941 --> 00:28:57,569
I don't think we have many
choices if runway six is closed.
399
00:28:57,652 --> 00:28:59,112
(CHUCKLES)
400
00:29:02,824 --> 00:29:06,912
NARRATOR: At that moment, the
crew should have cleared the discontinuity
401
00:29:06,995 --> 00:29:08,997
and reprogrammed the approach.
402
00:29:09,080 --> 00:29:11,082
I know. What can we do?
403
00:29:11,166 --> 00:29:15,253
I'm like, are you gonna unroll
another one out there for us real quick?
404
00:29:15,336 --> 00:29:18,673
The crew make
a few light-hearted comments.
405
00:29:20,258 --> 00:29:25,180
- Gear down.
- Gear down. Speed checks.
406
00:29:25,972 --> 00:29:28,225
There was some glad-handing, a little bit.
407
00:29:28,308 --> 00:29:31,686
Some humorous comments being made there.
408
00:29:31,770 --> 00:29:32,979
(BOTH CHUCKLE)
409
00:29:33,062 --> 00:29:34,564
They should have probably knuckled down
410
00:29:34,647 --> 00:29:37,353
and focused strictly
on what needed to be done.
411
00:29:39,319 --> 00:29:43,555
The first officer gets distracted
and forgets to clear the discontinuity.
412
00:29:44,824 --> 00:29:50,163
Look, lapses in concentration
happen. That's why you have two pilots.
413
00:29:50,246 --> 00:29:53,041
But did the captain really miss this too?
414
00:29:54,334 --> 00:29:58,296
NARRATOR: Pilots are meant to
monitor each other to catch mistakes.
415
00:29:59,297 --> 00:30:02,717
So how did they both miss
such a critical step?
416
00:30:04,093 --> 00:30:06,304
This was five minutes before the accident.
417
00:30:06,387 --> 00:30:08,389
Plenty of time to see the mistake.
418
00:30:09,599 --> 00:30:12,352
FEITH: For investigators they
have to try and determine
419
00:30:12,435 --> 00:30:14,979
"Why didn't they see
this discontinuity."
420
00:30:15,063 --> 00:30:17,023
Why didn't they remedy it?
421
00:30:17,816 --> 00:30:20,193
What exactly were they seeing
on their displays
422
00:30:20,276 --> 00:30:21,903
during those five minutes?
423
00:30:22,946 --> 00:30:25,005
Let's run it through the simulator.
424
00:30:26,908 --> 00:30:29,791
The simulations
are very helpful to investigators.
425
00:30:30,787 --> 00:30:35,458
If the accident occurred because
of crew action or inaction,
426
00:30:35,542 --> 00:30:40,380
simulations can tell
investigators what the crew encountered.
427
00:30:40,463 --> 00:30:44,843
Take it to 4:42 where they
should have cleared the discontinuity.
428
00:30:47,554 --> 00:30:50,932
NARRATOR: Investigators prepare
to see exactly what the pilots saw
429
00:30:51,015 --> 00:30:54,102
during the final five minutes
of the flight.
430
00:30:54,185 --> 00:30:56,896
They scan the cockpit
instruments for clues
431
00:30:56,980 --> 00:31:01,025
as to why the first officer
didn't correct her error.
432
00:31:01,776 --> 00:31:04,112
In this case,
the first officer's job really was
433
00:31:04,195 --> 00:31:06,313
to glue her eyes to the instruments.
434
00:31:07,699 --> 00:31:11,578
She was the non-flying pilot
and that was really her only job.
435
00:31:11,661 --> 00:31:14,080
(CHUCKLES)
436
00:31:15,081 --> 00:31:17,292
I know. What else can we do?
437
00:31:17,375 --> 00:31:19,961
(BOTH CHUCKLE)
438
00:31:20,044 --> 00:31:23,840
- Gear down.
- Gear down.
439
00:31:25,800 --> 00:31:30,471
Have a look at this. It's telling them
to take two different approaches.
440
00:31:33,600 --> 00:31:37,145
NARRATOR: When the first officer
didn't clear the discontinuity,
441
00:31:37,228 --> 00:31:41,024
the flight computer displayed
two routes to the airport.
442
00:31:41,107 --> 00:31:43,943
That oughta tell you something's wrong.
443
00:31:44,027 --> 00:31:47,675
There should never be two.
You can't be two places at one time.
444
00:31:47,864 --> 00:31:50,992
STRAUCH: It should have been a single
line but the computer couldn't figure out,
445
00:31:51,075 --> 00:31:55,079
because of the discontinuity
where to start the approach.
446
00:31:57,206 --> 00:32:01,089
The discontinuity message
is right here on the flight computer too.
447
00:32:03,421 --> 00:32:08,509
Speed brakes armed.
Ignition continuous relight.
448
00:32:08,593 --> 00:32:11,054
Landing checklist is complete.
449
00:32:11,137 --> 00:32:14,974
Unbelievable. They kept us high.
450
00:32:20,521 --> 00:32:23,775
How'd she miss all this?
451
00:32:23,858 --> 00:32:26,194
NARRATOR: They conclude
that there were plenty of signs
452
00:32:26,277 --> 00:32:29,197
telling the pilots
what they had done wrong...
453
00:32:32,450 --> 00:32:34,452
- Oh, no!
- Did I hit something?
454
00:32:34,827 --> 00:32:38,415
...but they still don't
understand how they failed to notice them
455
00:32:38,498 --> 00:32:41,626
in time to prevent this tragic accident.
456
00:32:41,709 --> 00:32:43,711
Oh, God.
457
00:32:43,795 --> 00:32:45,797
FEITH: You can have information
buried in an instrument
458
00:32:45,880 --> 00:32:49,342
that isn't in your focal view
or in your peripheral vision.
459
00:32:49,425 --> 00:32:51,845
That's one thing.
But if it's prominently displayed
460
00:32:51,928 --> 00:32:55,265
and you don't see it, the question
that we as investigators have to answer
461
00:32:55,348 --> 00:32:56,933
is "Why not?"
462
00:32:58,351 --> 00:33:00,103
No!
463
00:33:04,190 --> 00:33:07,652
NARRATOR: Investigators have
identified serious piloting errors
464
00:33:07,735 --> 00:33:11,447
in the crew of flight 1354.
465
00:33:11,906 --> 00:33:13,908
How qualified were they?
466
00:33:15,493 --> 00:33:18,746
{\an8}They study the pilots' personnel records.
467
00:33:19,622 --> 00:33:23,251
{\an8}The captain's got more than
3,000 hours on the A300.
468
00:33:24,711 --> 00:33:28,339
{\an8}Passed all his latest checks.
Looks good.
469
00:33:31,300 --> 00:33:34,124
The first officer's
a little new to the aircraft.
470
00:33:35,346 --> 00:33:39,308
She's got plenty of experience,
ticks all the boxes.
471
00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:43,521
This approach was certainly not
beyond their abilities.
472
00:33:43,604 --> 00:33:45,606
They had good records.
473
00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:47,275
(SIGHS)
474
00:33:47,942 --> 00:33:49,736
Any other clues?
475
00:33:58,494 --> 00:34:00,496
This could be something.
476
00:34:07,378 --> 00:34:10,632
If you're flying this time of
day, you always feel fatigued.
477
00:34:10,715 --> 00:34:13,593
- BEAL JR: Yep.
- I mean I was out, and I slept today.
478
00:34:13,676 --> 00:34:16,137
- I slept good.
- Me too.
479
00:34:17,388 --> 00:34:21,476
And when my alarm went off,
I am still thinking "I am so tired."
480
00:34:21,809 --> 00:34:23,853
I know. Exactly.
481
00:34:27,982 --> 00:34:31,110
- She was tired.
- Mmm-hmm.
482
00:34:31,194 --> 00:34:33,196
The question is "How tired?"
483
00:34:35,364 --> 00:34:39,188
NARRATOR: Did the first officer
get enough rest before the flight?
484
00:34:39,744 --> 00:34:43,333
Being fatigued, it's been
characterized like being inebriated.
485
00:34:44,874 --> 00:34:48,044
You can see something, you can
recognize that there's an issue there,
486
00:34:48,127 --> 00:34:52,006
but you're not really
analyzing the gravity of the situation.
487
00:34:54,342 --> 00:34:57,695
The schedules that cargo pilots
fly can be very punishing,
488
00:34:58,471 --> 00:35:02,600
very demanding primarily because
we operate throughout the nighttime hours.
489
00:35:02,683 --> 00:35:05,937
We know that fatigue
is a significant flight risk.
490
00:35:08,981 --> 00:35:13,276
FEMALE INVESTIGATOR: She had a 14-hour
rest period before her final shift.
491
00:35:13,945 --> 00:35:16,004
How much rest did she actually get?
492
00:35:17,949 --> 00:35:21,702
There's enough analytical data
that demonstrates
493
00:35:21,786 --> 00:35:24,997
that a human needs
this amount of rest, period.
494
00:35:26,040 --> 00:35:29,460
You can set reasonable rest periods,
495
00:35:29,544 --> 00:35:34,298
and it's then up to the human
to abide by that rest period
496
00:35:34,382 --> 00:35:37,385
in a safety critical job
like flying an aircraft.
497
00:35:38,469 --> 00:35:42,822
It says here she swiped the key into
her hotel room at just after 6:00 a.m.
498
00:35:43,516 --> 00:35:49,272
But records show she was on her
cell and tablet at 6:49 a.m.
499
00:35:49,355 --> 00:35:55,278
At 11:00 a.m, an eyewitness
spots her in the hotel restaurant.
500
00:35:57,071 --> 00:36:00,324
Did she head back to her room
for more rest after that?
501
00:36:00,408 --> 00:36:06,914
Mmm. She didn't swipe back into
her hotel room until 3:22 p.m.
502
00:36:06,998 --> 00:36:11,752
But she was on her cell phone
and tablet until 5:00 p.m.
503
00:36:11,836 --> 00:36:13,838
From the evidence that investigators got,
504
00:36:13,921 --> 00:36:17,675
it's clear she did not manage
her rest period effectively,
505
00:36:17,758 --> 00:36:19,051
and she could have.
506
00:36:19,135 --> 00:36:22,930
So it looks like she had a rest
period between 5:00 and 6:30.
507
00:36:23,014 --> 00:36:25,141
But then she was
back on her personal devices
508
00:36:25,224 --> 00:36:29,437
and called her husband
before reporting for duty at 8:30 p.m.
509
00:36:35,276 --> 00:36:39,572
She can't have slept more
than 5.5 hours in her 14-hour layover.
510
00:36:39,655 --> 00:36:40,698
Yeah.
511
00:36:42,909 --> 00:36:45,912
NARRATOR: Five and a half hours
in fits and starts
512
00:36:46,329 --> 00:36:50,035
is less than the recommended
eight hours of uninterrupted sleep.
513
00:36:52,210 --> 00:36:54,328
Okay. Turn right,
join the localizer.
514
00:36:57,757 --> 00:37:01,169
I don't think we have many
choices if runway six is closed.
515
00:37:03,054 --> 00:37:05,807
STRAUCH: Interpreting information
during a non - precision approach,
516
00:37:05,890 --> 00:37:09,852
when you're fatigued,
when you have to do other dutie
517
00:37:09,936 --> 00:37:12,605
such as call out altitudes
and airspeeds and so on and so forth,
518
00:37:12,688 --> 00:37:13,940
is very difficult.
519
00:37:16,317 --> 00:37:19,445
NARRATOR: Investigators conclude
that the first officer's fatigue
520
00:37:19,528 --> 00:37:21,646
likely contributed to this accident.
521
00:37:23,241 --> 00:37:25,826
FEITH: The problem
is is that we have
522
00:37:25,910 --> 00:37:28,037
a number of accidents
in the cargo industry
523
00:37:28,120 --> 00:37:31,650
that have been related in some
way, shape or form to fatigue.
524
00:37:33,793 --> 00:37:37,088
The first accident that actually
referenced fatigue
525
00:37:37,171 --> 00:37:40,675
was almost 20 years ago, Guantanamo Bay.
526
00:37:40,758 --> 00:37:45,972
PILOT: One last flight guys.
Guantanamo Bay, here we come!
527
00:37:47,265 --> 00:37:52,311
NARRATOR: In AIA flight 808,
the crew had been awake for 15 hours
528
00:37:52,395 --> 00:37:55,856
before flying cargo
to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
529
00:37:58,526 --> 00:38:01,904
The flight ended in a horrific accident.
530
00:38:06,158 --> 00:38:11,998
The NTSB's findings in that investigation
changed the industry's view of fatigue.
531
00:38:13,874 --> 00:38:17,378
It shined light on the issue of
fatigue being as much of a safety risk
532
00:38:17,461 --> 00:38:20,339
as a mechanical issue on an airplane.
533
00:38:21,549 --> 00:38:24,719
NARRATOR: Pilots are no longer
expected to fly fatigued.
534
00:38:24,802 --> 00:38:27,722
Yet 15 accidents
have been attributed to fatigue
535
00:38:27,805 --> 00:38:31,267
between 1993 and 2013.
536
00:38:32,393 --> 00:38:38,190
Fatigue is real. We need to
recognize it. We need to mitigate it.
537
00:38:39,859 --> 00:38:43,154
NARRATOR: Investigators now know
that the first officer's fatigue
538
00:38:43,237 --> 00:38:45,239
played a part in this accident.
539
00:38:46,407 --> 00:38:48,534
{\an8}But a question still remains.
540
00:38:50,202 --> 00:38:53,498
Why didn't the captain
catch the first officer's mistakes?
541
00:38:53,581 --> 00:38:55,583
Was he fatigued too?
542
00:39:02,631 --> 00:39:04,633
{\an8}The captain had seven days off.
543
00:39:05,301 --> 00:39:08,804
Yeah, he went to bed early, had a nap.
544
00:39:11,182 --> 00:39:14,310
{\an8}NARRATOR: Records show
the captain of UPS 1354
545
00:39:14,393 --> 00:39:18,105
{\an8}met the required amount
of rest before the flight.
546
00:39:20,941 --> 00:39:24,779
Yeah, I'm gonna do a vertical
speed. He kept us high.
547
00:39:26,364 --> 00:39:32,495
The captain, he had some days off,
and so he should have been well-rested.
548
00:39:33,120 --> 00:39:35,123
We don't know all of his activities,
549
00:39:35,206 --> 00:39:38,084
{\an8}but he should have been
the most rested pilot.
550
00:39:44,465 --> 00:39:46,467
If not fatigue, then what?
551
00:39:48,094 --> 00:39:50,565
NARRATOR:
Investigators need to dig deeper.
552
00:39:51,055 --> 00:39:54,100
They return to the CVR
transcript for insight
553
00:39:54,183 --> 00:39:56,227
into the captain's frame of mind.
554
00:39:59,021 --> 00:40:05,820
Check this out. The Captain mentions
being too high four, five, six times.
555
00:40:07,905 --> 00:40:11,784
For a captain to be so fixated
on that one flight parameter
556
00:40:11,867 --> 00:40:14,495
puts up a red flag for investigators.
557
00:40:15,037 --> 00:40:16,747
It sounds like tunnel vision.
558
00:40:19,792 --> 00:40:22,628
BENZON: The captain was very
focused on his altitude.
559
00:40:22,711 --> 00:40:24,713
He said many, many times
560
00:40:24,797 --> 00:40:27,445
"We're high. We're high.
We need to get down."
561
00:40:28,676 --> 00:40:30,178
When you become that focused
562
00:40:30,261 --> 00:40:32,850
everything else
kind of flies out the window.
563
00:40:33,472 --> 00:40:36,476
They did seem to be fixated on
the fact that they were too high and then,
564
00:40:36,559 --> 00:40:39,324
at some point, of course,
they were far too low.
565
00:40:41,522 --> 00:40:46,652
NARRATOR: Investigators now know
what happened to UPS flight 1354.
566
00:40:48,863 --> 00:40:52,450
FANNING: Okay.
Turn right, join the localizer.
567
00:40:53,701 --> 00:40:57,329
I don't think we have many
choices if runway six is closed.
568
00:40:57,413 --> 00:40:59,623
(BOTH CHUCKLE)
569
00:40:59,707 --> 00:41:02,418
NARRATOR: A tired first officer
misses a critical step
570
00:41:02,501 --> 00:41:06,964
in preparing for the approach
into Birmingham...
571
00:41:07,298 --> 00:41:11,510
We know she was fatigued.
We know that the non-precision approaches
572
00:41:11,594 --> 00:41:13,712
increase the workload on the pilots.
573
00:41:14,638 --> 00:41:18,726
...and misses the cues telling
her she made the mistake.
574
00:41:19,685 --> 00:41:21,437
Final's activated.
575
00:41:25,149 --> 00:41:28,444
If you put them all together,
the workload, the fatigue,
576
00:41:28,527 --> 00:41:32,698
her role in helping the pilot
by monitoring the instruments,
577
00:41:32,781 --> 00:41:36,076
she never recognized
that there was this discontinuity.
578
00:41:37,244 --> 00:41:40,123
NARRATOR: Because of her
mistake, the plane overflies
579
00:41:40,206 --> 00:41:42,208
the pre-programmed descent path
580
00:41:42,541 --> 00:41:44,543
Unbelievable. He kept us high.
581
00:41:45,794 --> 00:41:49,048
FEITH: Safety is compromised
with distraction, complacency,
582
00:41:49,131 --> 00:41:53,014
and the fact that you get zoned
out, you get focused tunnel vision.
583
00:41:54,178 --> 00:41:56,806
NARRATOR: A captain
already fixated on altitude,
584
00:41:56,889 --> 00:41:59,225
misses the first officer's error...
585
00:41:59,308 --> 00:42:01,977
Let's see.
You're in vertical speed.
586
00:42:02,061 --> 00:42:05,314
- Yeah. I'm gonna do vertical
speed. -He kept us high.
587
00:42:06,148 --> 00:42:10,611
...forces the plane into a steep
descent to get back on track...
588
00:42:10,694 --> 00:42:13,864
They failed to recognize
that the automation
589
00:42:13,948 --> 00:42:16,772
wasn't doing what they thought
it would be doing.
590
00:42:17,535 --> 00:42:18,869
...and never recovers.
591
00:42:21,330 --> 00:42:23,448
- Oh, no!
- AUTOMATED VOICE: Terrain.
592
00:42:24,375 --> 00:42:26,919
FEITH: They realized
that they were in danger
593
00:42:27,002 --> 00:42:28,713
only seconds before the accident.
594
00:42:28,796 --> 00:42:31,090
By that point, it was too late.
595
00:42:47,189 --> 00:42:48,941
{\an8}NARRATOR: In their final report,
596
00:42:49,024 --> 00:42:53,696
{\an8}the NTSB recommend that cargo
operators require a crew briefing
597
00:42:53,779 --> 00:42:56,824
{\an8}on the threat of fatigue
before each flight.
598
00:43:01,495 --> 00:43:03,873
If you're fatigued, you gotta call it out
599
00:43:03,956 --> 00:43:06,875
because your performance
as a human degrades.
600
00:43:06,959 --> 00:43:10,371
And while we wanna push through
and accomplish the mission,
601
00:43:12,006 --> 00:43:17,511
the problem is you can set
yourself up or your crewmate fo failure
602
00:43:17,845 --> 00:43:20,306
because of your lack of performance.
603
00:43:26,437 --> 00:43:31,942
Since our accident in Birmingham,
the company has done a fantastic job
604
00:43:32,026 --> 00:43:34,028
in the training department.
605
00:43:35,571 --> 00:43:41,785
We've also negotiated for sleep
rooms so we can go take a mid - duty nap
606
00:43:41,994 --> 00:43:45,122
{\an8}during the sorting
of the packages process.
607
00:43:45,205 --> 00:43:47,970
{\an8}Our pilots will tell you
they're a game changer.
608
00:43:49,752 --> 00:43:55,049
{\an8}It took a lot of little errors by all
the major participants in this flight
609
00:43:55,132 --> 00:43:57,134
{\an8}to cause this airplane to crash
610
00:43:59,386 --> 00:44:02,097
{\an8}And in that respect
it's really unfortunate
611
00:44:02,181 --> 00:44:04,476
{\an8}and what makes this accident so tragic.
612
00:44:06,685 --> 00:44:09,156
{\an8}Captioned by National Captioning Institute
55425
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.