Original subtitles

UPS 1354 heavy, runway one eight, clear to land.

NARRATOR: In a populated area, near a highway...

Oh, no!

...an Airbus A300 crashes short of the runway.

WOMAN ON RADIO: Tower, did you see that?

NARRATOR: Neither pilot has survived.

LAURI ESPOSITO: We're a very small pilot group.

So you start thinking about

who it may have been and exactly what happened.

NARRATOR: After listening to conversations in the cockpit...

MAN ON RADIO: We're gonna do vertical speed.

He kept us high.

...and running the flight through a simulator...

How'd she miss all this?

...investigators are forced to take a different approach.

At 11:00 a.m, an eyewitness spots her in the hotel restaurant.

GREG FEITH: You can set yourself up for failure

in a safety critical job like flying an aircraft.

No!

(MAN SPEAKING INDISTINCTLY OVER RADIO)

This is a true story. It is based on official reports and eyewitness accounts.

NARRATOR: It's an early summer morning when UPS flight 1354 climbs over Kentucky.

- Autopilot one command. - FEMALE PILOT: Autopilot one command.

Fifty-eight-year-old Cerea Beal Jr. has been flying with UPS

for more than 20 years.

MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354, climb and maintain flight level 280.

Two eight zero, 1354.

NARRATOR: Thirty-seven-year-old First Officer Shanda Fanning

has been with the delivery company for seven years.

They were respected. They were experienced aviation professionals.

They were very representative of the type of pilots that UPS hires.

- Two eight zero. - Twenty-eight.

Tonight's flight from Louisville, Kentucky, to Birmingham, Alabama,

takes about an hour.

MAP: Flight Path

ESPOSITO: Overnight cargo is a very time-sensitive product.

Everybody's familiar with UPS and their next day air product.

So if we have an airplane that's late,

it may affect scores of our outbound flights.

We don't have the luxury of booking our packages

on the next available flight

because the next available flight might not be for 24 hours.

NARRATOR: The crew is flying the newest version of the Airbu A300,

equipped with advanced computer and flight management systems

to assist pilots.

MAN ON RADIO: Notice to airmen runway two-four closed.

NARRATOR: Shortly after reaching cruising altitude,

the pilots receive a NOTAM, a notice to airmen message.

NOTAMs provide information regarding hazards that you may encounter

so that there are no surprises en route, or when you arrive.

MAN ON RADIO: Localizer runway 18 in use.

Landing and departing runway 18

NARRATOR: The runway they were expecting is closed for maintenance.

They'll have to use an alternate.

They're saying 24 is closed. They want us to take runway 18.

- Runway one-eight? It figures. - I know.

Especially since we're a little heavy.

Yep. I guess I'll brief it. Briefing guide.

NARRATOR: The alternate runway is shorter.

With the plane nearly at maximum weight,

they'll have to carefully manage their speed and altitude on approach.

Verify VNAV path on the approach chart.

ESPOSITO: Pilots prefer longer runways

because with a shorter runway there's not a lot of margin for error.

Load the approach into the flight computer.

NARRATOR: Landing on runway 18 also involves a more demanding approach

- known as a non - precision approach.

In a non-precision approach, pilots pre-program the flight computer

to follow a virtual glide path or descent profile

to the runway threshold.

A non-precision approach is not practiced as much.

The only times flight crews ever see them

perhaps would be in training in a simulator

and then maybe once in a while on the line.

Verify the glide path agrees with the approach chart

within one degree.

Verify approach to point one degrees.

When you're shooting a non-precision approach,

your workload increases dramatically.

You have to watch your airspeed You have to watch your altitude

NARRATOR: Twenty-eight minutes into the flight,

UPS 1354 begins its descent towards Birmingham, Alabama.

MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354, descend at pilot's discretion.

Maintain 11,000.

NARRATOR: The crew is cleared to continue descending to 11,000 feet.

That works. We'll keep it going.

UPS 1354. We'll just keep her going down to 11.

MAN ON RADIO: Roger. UPS 1354.

They're generous today. Usually, they kind of take you up to 15

and hold you up there.

I know. They hold you up high.

NARRATOR: Visibility is poor as the plane descends to 11,000 feet

If you're flying in the clouds

and it's already nighttime, you have a black screen.

If you look out, there's nothing out there.

It's the black abyss, if you will.

UPS 1354 heavy, Birmingham Tower,

descend and maintain 2,500.

Runway 24 is still closed. You want 18?

NARRATOR: The controller confirms that the crew cannot use

the airport's longer runway.

Yeah.

- Yes sir. One-eight'll work. - MAN ON RADIO: Copy that.

Turn right ten degrees, join the localizer.

Okay. Turn right, join the localizer.

ESPOSITO: The last few minutes before landing

can be very busy for the flight crew.

A lot's going on, and you have to be at the top of your game.

- Flaps fifteen. - Speed checks.

Flaps fifteen.

NARRATOR: Eight miles from the airport, the crew configures th plane for landing.

MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354 heavy, runway 18, clear to land.

FANNING: One eight cleared to land 1354.

Speed brakes armed. Ignition continuous relight.

Landing checklist is complete.

NARRATOR: Five miles from the runway,

the captain realizes something's not right.

Unbelievable. Too high.

NARRATOR: The autopilot hasn't initiated its final descent to the airport.

The captain tries to get the plane back on its programmed glide path.

If the plane remains too high this close to the runway,

the crew could overshoot it.

Instruments cross-checked. No flags.

The first officer sees no problems with the descent.

Two miles to go.

I've got the runway in sight out there, 12 o'clock.

FANNING: Got the runway in sight.

Autopilot's off.

NARRATOR: The captain prepares to fly the plane manually to touchdown.

Pilots switch off the autopilot to land the airplane manually

in the situation of a non-precision approach.

It's a required maneuver to actually manually land the aircraft.

NARRATOR: As they get closer to the airport...

- (MACHINE BEEPS) - Did I hit something?

- AUTOMATED VOICE: Caution. Terrain. -Oh, no!

Too low. Terrain.

Oh, God!

The pilots can't control the plane as it cuts through a smal grove.

No!

Oh, my God!

NARRATOR: UPS flight 1354 crashes just one mile short of the runway.

- WOMAN ON RADIO: Tower, did you see that? -Yes, yes.

Airport 12, there's been a crash.

UPS 1354 heavy crashed on the hill.

Attention, aircraft crash three miles final runway 18.

(SIRENS BLARING)

NARRATOR: Rescue crews rush to extinguish the flames of UPS Flight 1354.

Despite the plane coming down in a populated area

and crossing a highway in Birmingham, Alabama,

no one on the ground is injured

Tragically, both pilots are killed.

Within hours, the National Transportation Safety Board begins the investigation.

It looks like the plane struck some trees here,

then crashed into the ground here, and then slid for 1,400 feet.

Did we find the nose?

NARRATOR: The wreckage is spread over a large area.

Yes. I believe we did. Uh, yeah, it's here.

Investigators look for the four corners of the aircraf

to determine if the entire plan has reached the accident site.

BARRY STRAUCH: The four corners refer to the nose,

both wings and tail.

You want to take all of them into account

just because it tells such a story about how the airplane struck.

Tail and right wing were found here.

Fragments of the left wing were found here.

NARRATOR: All four corners are at the crash site.

The plane was intact until it hit the ground.

It wasn't a structural problem.

Did anyone see the accident?

NARRATOR: If the plane was intact, investigators wonder if the pilots

were having difficulty controlling it prior to impact.

No eyewitnesses, just what we documented at the crash site.

Let's look at how they hit those trees.

NARRATOR: Impact marks on trees may provide additional clues.

It's critical for investigators to look at all the things

that this aircraft may have struck.

In this particular accident,

we know that the airplane had flown through trees.

When you look at those trees,

you wanna see what the attitude of the aircraft was.

Was it wings level? Was it rolled one direction

or the other direction?

Was it a very steep pitch attitude?

MALE INVESTIGATOR: What were the height of the impact marks?

FEMALE INVESTIGATOR: Tree 14, 43.1 feet.

NARRATOR: Investigators use the height of the impact marks to determine

the orientation of the plane when it struck the trees.

The plane is level. These guys had control of the aircraft.

Absolutely.

NARRATOR: If the pilots were in control of a structurally sound plane,

what else could have caused the to crash short of the runway?

Maybe the engines failed.

It's imperative to look at the engines to give us an idea of thrust levels.

And surprisingly, if the engines are intact more or less

you can tell this.

Let's start with the blades.

NARRATOR: Investigators examine the A300's engines

to see if they were generating power at the time of the accident.

The blades were spinning.

BENZON: You can look in the front of the engine and if the fan blades,

for instance, are bent in the opposite direction of rotation,

that means that when the aircraft's engine struck the ground it was on.

Debris is shredded.

NARRATOR: The debris ingested during impact confirms to investigators

that the engines were functioning.

It wasn't engine failure.

Maybe they ran into a storm.

NARRATOR: With no real leads to explain why the plane crashed,

the team considers if weather was a possible factor.

If the weather was poor and the pilots couldn't see the ground well at all,

then perhaps they made mistakes on the approach itself.

MALE INVESTIGATOR: This is the weather from two minutes before the accident.

No storms, wind is calm. This all looks pretty good.

Wait. There was a broken cloud ceiling at the airport, 1,000 feet.

This is the ground. And this is the cloud cover.

NARRATOR: The cloud ceiling is the distance from the ground

to the base of the lowest clouds.

That's pretty low.

Flight 1354 would only descend from clouds at 1,000 feet.

What was the decision altitude for their approach?

The decision altitude is the altitude at which the crew

must be able to see the runway or else abandon their approach.

BENZON: Decision heights, they're all pretty much a hard floor

especially in the weather, that should not be broken.

You should not go below the decision altitude

unless you see the runway.

Decision altitude was 1,200 feet.

If the clouds didn't break until 1,000 feet,

they wouldn't have seen the runway at their decision altitude.

FEMALE INVESTIGATOR: So why didn't they turn around?

That low to the ground, at night, you don't have time to hint and hope.

You have to go around and get it together and try it again.

NARRATOR: Did lack of visibility cause the pilots to descend too rapidly

and crash short of the runway?

Maybe the controller knows something.

Were they concerned at all about the approach?

NARRATOR: Investigators interview the air traffic controller

to understand why the pilots of Flight 1354

descended so low while in thick clouds.

They didn't say anything. Everything seemed fine.

The air traffic controller can tell the investigator what he heard

from the flight crew if they heard or reported anything unusual,

anything that he wasn't expecting.

Was there anything out of the ordinary that night?

Yeah. The runway they were scheduled to land on was closed.

So they had to use the alternate. It's a non-precision approach.

UPS 1354 heavy, Birmingham Tower, descend and maintain 2,500.

Runway 24 is still closed. You want 18?

- Yeah. - Yes, sir, 18 will work.

So they shot a non-precision with no eyes on the runway?

STRAUCH: Knowing what the weather was,

knowing what the crew thought the weather was,

knowing what information they were given about the weather

told us a lot about how they executed the approach.

Thank you.

NARRATOR: Why did the crew continue their non precision approach

in heavy clouds?

Do we have the data from the flight recorders?

Those two black boxes are very critical to investigators

because they're electronic witnesses.

Here's the approach they should have taken.

The plan was to come in slow and steady,

at about a three-degree angle.

NARRATOR: Using the FDR data,

investigators reconstruct the final approach path of Flight 1354.

Here's what they actually did.

In this particular instance, the critical phase of flight,

which was approach, were they doing what they were supposed to be doing?

Investigators can compare that then against

what the airplane was actually doing.

NARRATOR: The crew's approach was far from a steady descent.

The controller cleared them to 2,500 feet.

But they leveled out a little higher than that, which shouldn't be a problem.

Flaps 15.

FANNING: Speed checks, flaps 15.

MAN ON RADIO: UPS 1354 heavy, runway 18, cleared to land.

It looks like they fly past the descent profile

they pre-programmed into the computer here.

They try and get back on track but end up descending

steeply below the flight path and never recover.

How fast were they coming down?

NARRATOR: Did the crew descend too quickly

as they tried to get back on track?

- Huh. Check this out. - Wow, 1,500 feet per minute.

The descent is way too fast so close to the ground.

NARRATOR: They confirm that the plane descended at a rate

outside safety guidelines for a final approach.

It's an important clue.

Any pilot looking at this would understand that they were descending

way too fast this close to the runway.

FEITH: You would think that the pilot would have started bottoming out,

that is slowing that rate of descent a lot sooner than he did.

What would make him think he needed to descend that fast

to get back on the glide path?

NARRATOR: Investigators dig deeper into the FDR data.

That's a strange way to program the autopilot.

NARRATOR: The team notices that just after the plane flew past the descent profile,

the autopilot is set to a mode called Vertical Speed.

The mode is used to descend quickly at higher altitudes,

not on final approach.

BENZON: This complicates the job of the pilot, very, very much.

He has less time to think about things.

He has less time to react to things.

So it's simply not a good thing

MALE INVESTIGATOR: Why were they descending so quickly

so close to the ground?

NARRATOR: The FDR data only tells investigators

what the pilots did, not why.

We need the cockpit voice recorder.

STRAUCH: When you add to that what the pilots were saying,

and you match that with what the airplane was doing,

investigators have a pretty complete picture of what was going on.

- Okay, let's hear it. - UPS 1534...

The cockpit voice recorder, it tells us, more or less,

what's going through the minds of the flight crew.

BEAL JR: Runway 18...

NARRATOR: They listen as the pilots make their vertical spee adjustments

while they configure their landing.

FANNING: Cleared to land, 1354. Speed brakes armed.

Ignition continuous relight. Landing checklist is complete.

Unbelievable. Too high.

FANNING: Let's see. You're in vertical speed.

Yeah, I'm gonna do vertical speed. He kept us high.

Hold it there.

The Captain thinks the plane didn't lock onto

the programmed descent profile because the controller kept them too high.

Bring up the recommended altitude.

NARRATOR: Investigators check the altitude the computer required the plane to reach

before commencing the automated descent.

Twenty-three hundred feet. That's only a few hundred feet too high.

Even though the captain believe the plane didn't descend

because the controller kept the too high, the computer should have initiated

its programmed descent at that higher altitude.

Maybe there was a problem with the flight computer.

Verify the glide path agrees with the approach chart within one degree.

NARRATOR: Did a malfunction in the flight computer

used to program the autopilot lead to the crash of UPS Flight 1354?

Verify approach to point one degrees.

The flight management system to an airline pilot

in an airline operation like this is very critical

because it is the automation.

It is the typical way of flying a large aircraft.

If you have bad data in, that data will cause bad things to happen.

Okay. Let's hook this up.

NARRATOR: Investigators recover the flight computer's memory card

from the wreckage.

They prepare to test it for signs of errors or malfunctions

The investigators went to great pains to figure out what exactly was loaded

into the flight management computer.

It was damaged, so they had to remove the motherboard,

and place it in a functioning unit and actually read it out.

This should tell us if the computer was working.

NARRATOR: If the flight computer was operational,

investigators should be able to download its memory.

FEMALE INVESTIGATOR: It's working.

BENZON: It turned out that there was nothing wrong

with the flight management computer.

But had there been, that could have been

a very important part of the accident sequence.

- If the computer was working... - It looks like they programmed it.

The final approach is armed for a gradual descent of three degrees.

Wait a minute.

They've got two separate destinations programmed.

They forgot to clear the conflict.

NARRATOR: They discover the crew missed a step

in planning their route to Birmingham airport.

They failed to clear a previously programmed destination.

It's a troubling find.

BENZON: You can load a flight plan into it, and then if you deviate

from that particular flight plan,

the flight management computer doesn't really know what's going on

and can put out false data, and that's called a discontinuity.

NARRATOR: The crew programmed the plane

to fly directly to Birmingham airport.

Twenty miles out, they needed to clear their flight path

and program a specific approach to runway 18.

But the crew didn't clear the initial plan,

which created the discontinuity a confusion in the system.

There was a conflict between where the pilots told the airplane

to start the approach

and where the computer knew the approach had to start,

and that was a flight plan discontinuity.

That's why the autopilot wouldn't initiate the descent path.

STRAUCH: The captain basically was chasing the incorrect guidance

that the display was telling him by trying to descend as quickly as he could,

when there was no reason for it.

NARRATOR: The team knows the crew didn't clear the conflict.

The question is why?

Let's listen to what was going on when they should have cleared it.

They focus on the moment the crew got the instruction from the controller

to go to runway 18.

- Okay. Here it is. - MAN ON RADIO: You want 18?

NARRATOR: The controller reminds the crew that

they must use an alternate runway.

- Yep. - Yessir, 18 will work.

Copy that. Turn right ten degrees, join the localizer.

Okay. Turn right, join the localizer.

I don't think we have many choices if runway six is closed.

(CHUCKLES)

NARRATOR: At that moment, the crew should have cleared the discontinuity

and reprogrammed the approach.

I know. What can we do?

I'm like, are you gonna unroll another one out there for us real quick?

The crew make a few light-hearted comments.

- Gear down. - Gear down. Speed checks.

There was some glad-handing, a little bit.

Some humorous comments being made there.

(BOTH CHUCKLE)

They should have probably knuckled down

and focused strictly on what needed to be done.

The first officer gets distracted and forgets to clear the discontinuity.

Look, lapses in concentration happen. That's why you have two pilots.

But did the captain really miss this too?

NARRATOR: Pilots are meant to monitor each other to catch mistakes.

So how did they both miss such a critical step?

This was five minutes before the accident.

Plenty of time to see the mistake.

FEITH: For investigators they have to try and determine

"Why didn't they see this discontinuity."

Why didn't they remedy it?

What exactly were they seeing on their displays

during those five minutes?

Let's run it through the simulator.

The simulations are very helpful to investigators.

If the accident occurred because of crew action or inaction,

simulations can tell investigators what the crew encountered.

Take it to 4:42 where they should have cleared the discontinuity.

NARRATOR: Investigators prepare to see exactly what the pilots saw

during the final five minutes of the flight.

They scan the cockpit instruments for clues

as to why the first officer didn't correct her error.

In this case, the first officer's job really was

to glue her eyes to the instruments.

She was the non-flying pilot and that was really her only job.

(CHUCKLES)

I know. What else can we do?

(BOTH CHUCKLE)

- Gear down. - Gear down.

Have a look at this. It's telling them to take two different approaches.

NARRATOR: When the first officer didn't clear the discontinuity,

the flight computer displayed two routes to the airport.

That oughta tell you something's wrong.

There should never be two. You can't be two places at one time.

STRAUCH: It should have been a single line but the computer couldn't figure out,

because of the discontinuity where to start the approach.

The discontinuity message is right here on the flight computer too.

Speed brakes armed. Ignition continuous relight.

Landing checklist is complete.

Unbelievable. They kept us high.

How'd she miss all this?

NARRATOR: They conclude that there were plenty of signs

telling the pilots what they had done wrong...

- Oh, no! - Did I hit something?

...but they still don't understand how they failed to notice them

in time to prevent this tragic accident.

Oh, God.

FEITH: You can have information buried in an instrument

that isn't in your focal view or in your peripheral vision.

That's one thing. But if it's prominently displayed

and you don't see it, the question that we as investigators have to answer

is "Why not?"

No!

NARRATOR: Investigators have identified serious piloting errors

in the crew of flight 1354.

How qualified were they?

They study the pilots' personnel records.

The captain's got more than 3,000 hours on the A300.

Passed all his latest checks. Looks good.

The first officer's a little new to the aircraft.

She's got plenty of experience, ticks all the boxes.

This approach was certainly not beyond their abilities.

They had good records.

(SIGHS)

Any other clues?

This could be something.

If you're flying this time of day, you always feel fatigued.

- BEAL JR: Yep. - I mean I was out, and I slept today.

- I slept good. - Me too.

And when my alarm went off, I am still thinking "I am so tired."

I know. Exactly.

- She was tired. - Mmm-hmm.

The question is "How tired?"

NARRATOR: Did the first officer get enough rest before the flight?

Being fatigued, it's been characterized like being inebriated.

You can see something, you can recognize that there's an issue there,

but you're not really analyzing the gravity of the situation.

The schedules that cargo pilots fly can be very punishing,

very demanding primarily because we operate throughout the nighttime hours.

We know that fatigue is a significant flight risk.

FEMALE INVESTIGATOR: She had a 14-hour rest period before her final shift.

How much rest did she actually get?

There's enough analytical data that demonstrates

that a human needs this amount of rest, period.

You can set reasonable rest periods,

and it's then up to the human to abide by that rest period

in a safety critical job like flying an aircraft.

It says here she swiped the key into her hotel room at just after 6:00 a.m.

But records show she was on her cell and tablet at 6:49 a.m.

At 11:00 a.m, an eyewitness spots her in the hotel restaurant.

Did she head back to her room for more rest after that?

Mmm. She didn't swipe back into her hotel room until 3:22 p.m.

But she was on her cell phone and tablet until 5:00 p.m.

From the evidence that investigators got,

it's clear she did not manage her rest period effectively,

and she could have.

So it looks like she had a rest period between 5:00 and 6:30.

But then she was back on her personal devices

and called her husband before reporting for duty at 8:30 p.m.

She can't have slept more than 5.5 hours in her 14-hour layover.

Yeah.

NARRATOR: Five and a half hours in fits and starts

is less than the recommended eight hours of uninterrupted sleep.

Okay. Turn right, join the localizer.

I don't think we have many choices if runway six is closed.

STRAUCH: Interpreting information during a non - precision approach,

when you're fatigued, when you have to do other dutie

such as call out altitudes and airspeeds and so on and so forth,

is very difficult.

NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the first officer's fatigue

likely contributed to this accident.

FEITH: The problem is is that we have

a number of accidents in the cargo industry

that have been related in some way, shape or form to fatigue.

The first accident that actually referenced fatigue

was almost 20 years ago, Guantanamo Bay.

PILOT: One last flight guys. Guantanamo Bay, here we come!

NARRATOR: In AIA flight 808, the crew had been awake for 15 hours

before flying cargo to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The flight ended in a horrific accident.

The NTSB's findings in that investigation changed the industry's view of fatigue.

It shined light on the issue of fatigue being as much of a safety risk

as a mechanical issue on an airplane.

NARRATOR: Pilots are no longer expected to fly fatigued.

Yet 15 accidents have been attributed to fatigue

between 1993 and 2013.

Fatigue is real. We need to recognize it. We need to mitigate it.

NARRATOR: Investigators now know that the first officer's fatigue

played a part in this accident.

But a question still remains.

Why didn't the captain catch the first officer's mistakes?

Was he fatigued too?

The captain had seven days off.

Yeah, he went to bed early, had a nap.

NARRATOR: Records show the captain of UPS 1354

met the required amount of rest before the flight.

Yeah, I'm gonna do a vertical speed. He kept us high.

The captain, he had some days off, and so he should have been well-rested.

We don't know all of his activities,

but he should have been the most rested pilot.

If not fatigue, then what?

NARRATOR: Investigators need to dig deeper.

They return to the CVR transcript for insight

into the captain's frame of mind.

Check this out. The Captain mentions being too high four, five, six times.

For a captain to be so fixated on that one flight parameter

puts up a red flag for investigators.

It sounds like tunnel vision.

BENZON: The captain was very focused on his altitude.

He said many, many times

"We're high. We're high. We need to get down."

When you become that focused

everything else kind of flies out the window.

They did seem to be fixated on the fact that they were too high and then,

at some point, of course, they were far too low.

NARRATOR: Investigators now know what happened to UPS flight 1354.

FANNING: Okay. Turn right, join the localizer.

I don't think we have many choices if runway six is closed.

(BOTH CHUCKLE)

NARRATOR: A tired first officer misses a critical step

in preparing for the approach into Birmingham...

We know she was fatigued. We know that the non-precision approaches

increase the workload on the pilots.

...and misses the cues telling her she made the mistake.

Final's activated.

If you put them all together, the workload, the fatigue,

her role in helping the pilot by monitoring the instruments,

she never recognized that there was this discontinuity.

NARRATOR: Because of her mistake, the plane overflies

the pre-programmed descent path

Unbelievable. He kept us high.

FEITH: Safety is compromised with distraction, complacency,

and the fact that you get zoned out, you get focused tunnel vision.

NARRATOR: A captain already fixated on altitude,

misses the first officer's error...

Let's see. You're in vertical speed.

- Yeah. I'm gonna do vertical speed. -He kept us high.

...forces the plane into a steep descent to get back on track...

They failed to recognize that the automation

wasn't doing what they thought it would be doing.

...and never recovers.

- Oh, no! - AUTOMATED VOICE: Terrain.

FEITH: They realized that they were in danger

only seconds before the accident.

By that point, it was too late.

NARRATOR: In their final report,

the NTSB recommend that cargo operators require a crew briefing

on the threat of fatigue before each flight.

If you're fatigued, you gotta call it out

because your performance as a human degrades.

And while we wanna push through and accomplish the mission,

the problem is you can set yourself up or your crewmate fo failure

because of your lack of performance.

Since our accident in Birmingham, the company has done a fantastic job

in the training department.

We've also negotiated for sleep rooms so we can go take a mid - duty nap

during the sorting of the packages process.

Our pilots will tell you they're a game changer.

It took a lot of little errors by all the major participants in this flight

to cause this airplane to crash

And in that respect it's really unfortunate

and what makes this accident so tragic.

Captioned by National Captioning Institute