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NARRATOR: Just minutes after takeoff
from Jakarta, Indonesia...
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Lion six-one-zero.
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I have no reliable altitude information.
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00:00:09,175 --> 00:00:10,385
All instruments disagree.
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00:00:10,468 --> 00:00:13,764
NARRATOR: ...pilots fight to control
one of the world's newest airliners...
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HARVINO:
Fly up.
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- NARRATOR: ...the Boeing Max 8.
- HARVINO: Up! Up!
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00:00:17,434 --> 00:00:18,936
DAVID CARBAUGH:
They never really figured out
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what was going on.
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NARRATOR: And end up crashing
into the Java Sea.
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00:00:24,524 --> 00:00:26,693
RAY NURCAHYO:
This was a very serious accident.
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What does the tracking data show?
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00:00:28,862 --> 00:00:31,323
NARRATOR: Investigators follow
an erratic flight path...
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NURCAHYO:
They're off course
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and their altitude's all over the place.
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NARRATOR: ...a history
of maintenance issues...
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CAPTAIN: Did we have problems?
You bet we did.
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NARRATOR: And learn about a treacherous
piece of hidden software.
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BOEING REP:
It looks like the MCAS kicked in.
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NURCAHYO:
What's that?
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NARRATOR:
What they uncover shocks the world
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and grounds an entire fleet.
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JOHN COX:
The 737 MAX story
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will clearly be a watershed
event in aviation history.
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(lightning strikes)
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MAN (on radio):
Mayday, mayday!
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(radio chatter)
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NARRATOR: It's just after 5 am
in Jakarta, Indonesia,
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as 181 passengers settle in
for a short domestic flight.
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In the cockpit...
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HARVINO:
Fuel pumps.
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NARRATOR:
Harvino performs pre-flight procedures.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Fuel pumps are on.
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NARRATOR: The Captain on this flight
is Bhavye Suneja
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who has more than 6,000 flying hours.
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The passengers are onboard
the latest version
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of the renowned Boeing 737,
known as the Max 8.
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David Carbaugh
is a former Boeing test pilot.
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{\an8}CARBAUGH:
The Max is the fourth iteration
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{\an8}of the 737,
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one of the most successful airliners ever.
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And it was basically born out of a need
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to improve efficiency and performance.
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NARRATOR:
The Max 8 has quickly become
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Boeing's fastest-selling airplane,
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with more than 300 already in the skies
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and almost 5,000 in the order books.
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The one being used on today's flight
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was delivered to Lion Air two months ago.
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TOWER CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero,
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you are cleared to runway 2-5
left via Sierra Charlie One.
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Contact tower when you are in position.
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HARVINO:
Lion six-one-zero,
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cleared to runway 2-5 left
via Sierra Charlie One.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
All clear. No traffic.
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Let's run before takeoff.
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HARVINO:
Flaps.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Flaps Five. Five indicated.
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NARRATOR: Lion Air Flight 610
is a 90-minute journey
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from Jakarta over the Java Sea
to Bangka Island.
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The low-cost airline operates
hundreds of these short flights
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every day.
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CARBAUGH:
Indonesia is the fourth
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most populous country in the world.
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And with 17,000 islands,
you gotta have an easy way
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to do short-range transportation
to get to those places.
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And the Max is the ideal airplane
for that kind of operation.
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TOWER CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero cleared
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for take-off Runway 2-5.
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Contact Terminal East when airborne.
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HARVINO: Lion six-one-zero
cleared for takeoff.
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(engine roaring)
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NARRATOR: At 6:20...
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HARVINO:
Rotate.
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NARRATOR: ...the Max 8
lifts off the runway at Jakarta.
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(control system beeps)
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But immediately, there's trouble.
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The Captain's control yoke starts shaking,
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a warning that the plane
is about to stall.
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HARVINO:
Takeoff config.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Okay... but what?
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NARRATOR: The pilots can't identify
the source of the problem.
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They have no choice
but to continue climbing.
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00:04:57,338 --> 00:04:59,758
The passengers are unaware
that the pilots are dealing
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with anything unusual.
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(control system alerts)
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero,
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fly heading 2-4-8 and follow
Standard Instrument Departure.
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HARVINO:
Lion Air 610.
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NARRATOR:
The air traffic controller has no idea
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that there's an issue in the cockpit.
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The pilots get a warning
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that their airspeed indicators
do not agree.
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HARVINO:
Airspeed disagree.
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What's going on?
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Should we request a return to Jakarta?
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Landing gear up.
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero,
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climb to flight level two-seven-zero.
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NARRATOR: Still unaware of any trouble,
the controller instructs
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the crew to continue
climbing to 27,000 feet.
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HARVINO:
Altitude disagree.
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NARRATOR: The First Officer
now notices that the altimeters
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also show conflicting readings.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Acknowledged. Altitude disagree.
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HARVINO:
Lion six-one-zero.
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Confirm our current altitude, please.
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion six-zero-one
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your present altitude is...
900 feet?
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NARRATOR:
The pilots are getting conflicting data
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about their altitude and their airspeed.
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Captain Suneja expects his First Officer
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to carry out the procedure
for this situation.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay.
Memory items. Airspeed unreliable.
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HARVINO: Uh, what altitude
should I request?
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Yeah, uh, request, uh...
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proceed.
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NARRATOR:
The situation is deteriorating quickly.
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Climbing above 1,000 feet,
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00:06:57,625 --> 00:07:00,273
the pilots are still
unsure of their airspeed.
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00:07:01,212 --> 00:07:02,755
If they fly too slowly,
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the plane could stall
and fall from the sky.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Request clearance
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to any holding point.
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00:07:09,512 --> 00:07:11,306
NARRATOR:
Captain Suneja wants to get the plane
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to a point where he can circle
and solve the problem.
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HARVINO:
Lion six-one-zero,
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request clearance to some holding point
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due to our current condition.
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Terminal Controller:
Lion six-one-zero,
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what's the nature of your problem, please?
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HARVINO:
We are experiencing
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a flight control problem,
Lion six-one-zero.
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Where's the... airspeed... airspeed.
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There's no airspeed unreliable.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
It's there.
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HARVINO:
Got it.
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Auto pilot if engaged, disengage.
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COX: Not every failure
is a major emergency.
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{\an8}And checklists are designed
to grade or evaluate
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00:08:00,897 --> 00:08:03,483
{\an8}the severity of a system failure.
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00:08:04,358 --> 00:08:07,320
So pilots are trained to methodically go
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through each step by step.
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HARVINO:
Auto throttle if engaged,
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disengage.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Disengaged.
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NARRATOR:
But the checklist isn't helping.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Okay. Okay.
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NARRATOR:
Now flying 5,000 feet
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above the sea, Captain Suneja struggles
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to keep the plane's nose up.
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HARVINO: The flight path vector
may be unreliable.
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion 6-1-0, turn right
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heading zero-seven-zero
to avoid traffic ahead.
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HARVINO:
Set the pitch attitude.
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Roger, heading zero-seven-zero.
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero,
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are you now descending?
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HARVINO: We're having flight control
problems and are flying manually.
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Terminal Controller:
Six-one-zero,
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maintain heading zero-five-zero.
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COX:
The cabin would have realized
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that the airplane was not
climbing as normal
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00:09:04,919 --> 00:09:06,463
and that it had leveled off,
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and there was probably some
up and down sensations.
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NARRATOR:
Captain Suneja has been fighting
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to keep the plane's nose
from pitching downwards.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Please take control for a moment.
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NARRATOR: He now assigns that task
to his First Officer.
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HARVINO:
I have control.
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NARRATOR: So he can troubleshoot
the problem himself.
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HARVINO:
Whoa. It's very...
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NARRATOR: The First Officer
is also having difficulty
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keeping the aircraft level.
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COX:
There was a wide variety,
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uh, of problems that they had to sort out,
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and the first thing was,
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what's common between
all of these failures?
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Because that's how you start
to sort through the problems.
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NARRATOR: Flight 610 is flying
erratically over the Java Sea
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and becoming increasingly
more difficult to control.
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The lives of everyone on board
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now depend on the pilots
figuring out the problem...
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
I don't know where we are.
185
00:10:09,275 --> 00:10:12,511
NARRATOR: ...and getting
the plane to the ground safely.
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CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Lion six-one-zero.
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I have no reliable altitude information.
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All instruments disagree.
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Roger, Lion six-one-zero.
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00:10:19,243 --> 00:10:20,786
No restrictions.
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CARBAUGH:
When an aircraft declares an emergency,
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the controller's number one job
193
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is to provide assistance to that airplane.
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NARRATOR:
The controller allows Flight 610
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to fly at any altitude the pilots choose.
196
00:10:34,592 --> 00:10:37,345
CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Uh please clear
3,000 above and below of traffic.
197
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TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Okay, will do.
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What altitude would you like?
199
00:10:41,057 --> 00:10:42,517
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Five... uh...
200
00:10:42,600 --> 00:10:44,269
HARVINO:
It's diving. It's diving.
201
00:10:44,352 --> 00:10:45,645
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
It's okay. It's okay.
202
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NARRATOR: Flight 610 is now
speeding towards the sea.
203
00:10:50,399 --> 00:10:52,399
And the pilots are out of options.
204
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HARVINO:
Fly up. Up! Up!
205
00:11:00,868 --> 00:11:03,954
GPWS:
Terrain. Terrain. Pull up.
206
00:11:11,962 --> 00:11:14,727
TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
Lion six-one-zero, control.
207
00:11:17,301 --> 00:11:19,679
Lion Air six-one-zero, control.
208
00:11:21,889 --> 00:11:25,101
Citylink 8-8-2,
please hold on current position.
209
00:11:26,560 --> 00:11:29,105
Do you have a visual on Lion six-one-zero,
210
00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:31,148
a Boeing 737 Max 8?
211
00:11:32,566 --> 00:11:35,444
PILOT: Negative.
No other planes in sight.
212
00:11:37,405 --> 00:11:39,865
♪ ♪
213
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NARRATOR: Thirty minutes after
crashing into the Java Sea,
214
00:11:46,205 --> 00:11:49,291
the wreckage of Lion Air
Flight 610 is located.
215
00:11:50,668 --> 00:11:52,294
There are no survivors.
216
00:11:54,213 --> 00:11:57,007
Relatives of the passengers
are flown to Jakarta
217
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for trauma counseling.
218
00:12:01,262 --> 00:12:04,974
While they wait for the recovery
of the bodies of their loved ones,
219
00:12:05,057 --> 00:12:10,229
investigators from Indonesia's accident
investigation branch, KNKT,
220
00:12:10,312 --> 00:12:13,650
need to understand why one
of the best-selling new aircrafts
221
00:12:13,733 --> 00:12:15,901
in the world fell from the sky.
222
00:12:25,995 --> 00:12:28,819
NURCAHYO: Okay.
What does the tracking data show?
223
00:12:29,874 --> 00:12:32,543
NARRATOR: Working with data
from air traffic control,
224
00:12:32,626 --> 00:12:37,423
KNKT investigators focus on
the flight path of Lion Air 610.
225
00:12:39,675 --> 00:12:41,343
NURCAHYO:
They're off course
226
00:12:42,261 --> 00:12:44,673
and their altitude is all over the place.
227
00:12:45,973 --> 00:12:49,310
(speaking Indonesian)
228
00:12:49,393 --> 00:12:52,772
{\an8}NURCAHYO: From this data,
we learned that this plane's altitude
229
00:12:52,855 --> 00:12:55,483
{\an8}was fluctuating.
It kept going up and down.
230
00:12:56,817 --> 00:12:58,569
We wanted to find out why the pilot
231
00:12:58,652 --> 00:13:01,358
couldn't keep the plane
at a constant altitude.
232
00:13:05,284 --> 00:13:08,204
NARRATOR: Investigators need to know
if the controller can shed
233
00:13:08,287 --> 00:13:10,935
any light on the problems
the crew was facing.
234
00:13:12,333 --> 00:13:13,333
TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
They reported
235
00:13:13,334 --> 00:13:15,711
that they were having a control issue.
236
00:13:16,629 --> 00:13:17,630
Lion six-one-zero,
237
00:13:17,713 --> 00:13:20,125
what's the nature of your problem please?
238
00:13:22,635 --> 00:13:23,803
HARVINO:
We are experiencing
239
00:13:23,886 --> 00:13:26,416
a flight control problem,
Lion six-one-zero.
240
00:13:27,515 --> 00:13:28,766
TERMINAL CONTROLLER:
That's all he said,
241
00:13:28,849 --> 00:13:30,976
a flight control problem.
242
00:13:32,394 --> 00:13:33,855
Soon after that, they reported
243
00:13:33,938 --> 00:13:36,690
that their instruments were unreliable.
244
00:13:37,650 --> 00:13:38,776
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Lion six-one-zero.
245
00:13:38,859 --> 00:13:40,737
I have no reliable altitude information.
246
00:13:40,820 --> 00:13:42,613
All instruments disagree.
247
00:13:42,696 --> 00:13:44,073
CONTROLLER:
Roger, Lion six-one-zero.
248
00:13:44,156 --> 00:13:45,783
No restrictions.
249
00:13:45,866 --> 00:13:47,284
That was about it.
250
00:13:49,912 --> 00:13:53,415
(speaking Indonesian)
251
00:13:53,499 --> 00:13:55,001
NURCAHYO:
From the information we received
252
00:13:55,084 --> 00:13:57,879
from the Air Traffic Controller,
we didn't get the impression
253
00:13:57,962 --> 00:13:59,962
that the pilot was under pressure.
254
00:14:01,257 --> 00:14:03,008
The pilot's tone was normal.
255
00:14:03,759 --> 00:14:05,636
It didn't seem that he was stressed.
256
00:14:05,719 --> 00:14:08,806
(speaking Indonesian)
257
00:14:10,850 --> 00:14:15,104
NARRATOR: Since the pilots of Flight 610
reported flight control problems
258
00:14:15,187 --> 00:14:16,776
and unreliable instruments,
259
00:14:17,690 --> 00:14:20,609
investigators wonder
if recent maintenance records
260
00:14:20,693 --> 00:14:23,404
could explain what brought down the Max 8
261
00:14:23,487 --> 00:14:25,489
only 11 minutes after takeoff.
262
00:14:29,535 --> 00:14:32,163
NURCAHYO: This flight had
some problems with control.
263
00:14:32,246 --> 00:14:34,874
At that point, we needed to learn more
264
00:14:34,957 --> 00:14:37,193
about the plane's maintenance history.
265
00:14:37,418 --> 00:14:40,595
The angle of attack sensor
was replaced the day before?
266
00:14:42,882 --> 00:14:46,969
NARRATOR: There are two angle of attack
sensors on the 737 Max 8.
267
00:14:47,845 --> 00:14:49,639
The sensors calculate the angle
268
00:14:49,722 --> 00:14:52,433
between the plane's wing
and the oncoming air.
269
00:14:53,642 --> 00:14:56,187
Their data helps determine
if the plane's wings
270
00:14:56,270 --> 00:14:58,035
are providing sufficient lift.
271
00:14:58,939 --> 00:15:01,567
CARBAUGH: It's a very important
piece of information.
272
00:15:01,650 --> 00:15:04,111
The pilots need to have
some kind of warning
273
00:15:04,194 --> 00:15:06,155
{\an8}that they are approaching stall,
274
00:15:06,238 --> 00:15:09,297
{\an8}and so the angle of attack
sensor is what gives that.
275
00:15:10,492 --> 00:15:12,912
NARRATOR:
For several days, the left-side sensor
276
00:15:12,995 --> 00:15:14,878
had been giving faulty readings.
277
00:15:16,165 --> 00:15:18,251
It was finally replaced before the plane
278
00:15:18,334 --> 00:15:21,962
flew from Bali to Jakarta,
one day before the accident.
279
00:15:25,257 --> 00:15:27,009
Investigators interview the crew
280
00:15:27,092 --> 00:15:30,262
who flew the same plane
just hours before the crash
281
00:15:30,971 --> 00:15:32,807
to determine if there were any problems
282
00:15:32,890 --> 00:15:34,538
with the replacement sensor.
283
00:15:35,809 --> 00:15:37,353
CAPTAIN:
Did we have problems?
284
00:15:37,436 --> 00:15:38,562
You bet we did.
285
00:15:41,774 --> 00:15:45,480
NURCAHYO: We conducted an interview
with the crew of flight 043.
286
00:15:45,861 --> 00:15:50,156
We learned from them that after takeoff
the crew was also having problems.
287
00:15:53,243 --> 00:15:56,185
NARRATOR:
What investigators hear next is chilling.
288
00:15:58,666 --> 00:16:01,843
The Captain explains that
when he lifted off from Bali,
289
00:16:02,878 --> 00:16:04,463
there were simultaneous warnings
290
00:16:04,546 --> 00:16:07,605
that his airspeed and altitude
indicators had failed.
291
00:16:08,801 --> 00:16:10,136
CAPTAIN:
Airspeed disagree.
292
00:16:10,219 --> 00:16:11,762
Altitude disagree.
293
00:16:11,845 --> 00:16:15,683
NARRATOR: A few seconds later,
the MAX 8's stick shaker activated,
294
00:16:15,766 --> 00:16:18,185
indicating that a stall was imminent.
295
00:16:18,268 --> 00:16:20,092
CAPTAIN:
Keep climbing. Gear up.
296
00:16:21,855 --> 00:16:25,484
{\an8}COX: All the modern airliners
have three sets
297
00:16:25,567 --> 00:16:28,946
{\an8}of independently powered
essential flight instruments,
298
00:16:29,029 --> 00:16:32,825
air speed and altitude,
and also the attitude of the airplane.
299
00:16:33,867 --> 00:16:36,870
If there is a discrepancy,
you can determine
300
00:16:36,954 --> 00:16:39,013
which is providing inaccurate data.
301
00:16:39,957 --> 00:16:41,292
CAPTAIN:
Your instruments are correct.
302
00:16:41,375 --> 00:16:43,002
You have control.
303
00:16:44,503 --> 00:16:47,033
The failure was on my side,
so I handed off.
304
00:16:47,256 --> 00:16:48,841
Flaps up.
305
00:16:51,510 --> 00:16:53,888
NARRATOR: The Captain adjusts
his faulty instruments,
306
00:16:53,971 --> 00:16:56,390
so they display data
from the First Officer's side.
307
00:16:56,473 --> 00:16:58,892
- GPWS: Pull up.
- CAPTAIN: We're diving.
308
00:16:58,976 --> 00:17:00,644
Pitch up.
Keep trimming.
309
00:17:00,728 --> 00:17:03,728
That's when the plane
started diving, over and over.
310
00:17:04,148 --> 00:17:05,733
NARRATOR:
The Captain reports that the plane
311
00:17:05,816 --> 00:17:08,444
began a series of un-commanded dives.
312
00:17:09,194 --> 00:17:12,072
CAPTAIN:
Use your trim. That's it.
313
00:17:15,242 --> 00:17:18,746
NARRATOR: In order to keep the plane
climbing at a constant angle,
314
00:17:18,829 --> 00:17:20,206
the pilots set the position
315
00:17:20,289 --> 00:17:22,916
of their horizontal stabilizer at takeoff
316
00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:25,711
and make minor adjustments
during the flight.
317
00:17:25,794 --> 00:17:27,463
That's called trim.
318
00:17:27,546 --> 00:17:30,340
Trim can either be adjusted
by the autopilot
319
00:17:30,424 --> 00:17:32,009
or manually by the crew.
320
00:17:33,677 --> 00:17:37,347
But every time the first officer
tries to trim the nose up,
321
00:17:37,431 --> 00:17:39,892
the automated system pushes it back down.
322
00:17:41,518 --> 00:17:44,063
The First Officer is finding it
almost impossible
323
00:17:44,146 --> 00:17:45,735
to keep the plane climbing.
324
00:17:47,149 --> 00:17:49,443
COX:
The trim system on a modern jet
325
00:17:49,526 --> 00:17:51,403
has to be very powerful.
326
00:17:51,487 --> 00:17:53,322
The trim, in many cases,
327
00:17:53,405 --> 00:17:56,408
is actually more powerful
than the control column.
328
00:17:58,368 --> 00:18:00,997
NARRATOR: For some reason,
the MAX 8's stabilizer
329
00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:05,084
continues to move independently,
pushing the plane's nose down
330
00:18:05,167 --> 00:18:07,344
despite the First Officer's commands.
331
00:18:09,505 --> 00:18:11,632
CAPTAIN:
Let's see what's in the book.
332
00:18:11,715 --> 00:18:14,343
NARRATOR: When the automated system
moves the stabilizer,
333
00:18:14,426 --> 00:18:16,512
it also spins a large wheel
334
00:18:16,595 --> 00:18:18,831
that's located between the two pilots.
335
00:18:19,264 --> 00:18:20,641
This tells them that the system
336
00:18:20,724 --> 00:18:22,666
is adjusting the trim on its own.
337
00:18:24,895 --> 00:18:27,606
{\an8}(speaking Indonesian)
338
00:18:27,689 --> 00:18:30,568
{\an8}ONY WIBOWO: When the captain bent down
to look at the checklist manual
339
00:18:30,651 --> 00:18:33,112
to solve the problem during this flight,
340
00:18:33,195 --> 00:18:35,781
the third crew was the one
notifying the pilot
341
00:18:35,864 --> 00:18:37,982
that the trim was moving abnormally.
342
00:18:40,702 --> 00:18:42,079
CAPTAIN:
Runaway Stabilizer.
343
00:18:42,162 --> 00:18:43,747
Moving switches to cutout.
344
00:18:44,915 --> 00:18:47,793
NARRATOR: The crew realizes
the stabilizer's automatic
345
00:18:47,876 --> 00:18:49,641
trim system is malfunctioning.
346
00:18:50,379 --> 00:18:52,674
It's continually pushing the nose down.
347
00:18:54,258 --> 00:18:56,760
Disengaging the system resolves the issue.
348
00:18:57,761 --> 00:19:00,139
CARBAUGH:
When they cut out the trim switches,
349
00:19:00,222 --> 00:19:03,475
the system stopped doing nose down trim.
350
00:19:03,559 --> 00:19:06,687
CAPTAIN: Moving the switch to cutout
pretty much solved it.
351
00:19:06,770 --> 00:19:09,106
NARRATOR: The investigators learn
that the previous crew
352
00:19:09,189 --> 00:19:11,013
then did something astonishing.
353
00:19:13,443 --> 00:19:15,070
CAPTAIN: So we kept going.
354
00:19:16,947 --> 00:19:18,615
INVESTIGATOR:
You kept going?
355
00:19:22,369 --> 00:19:25,748
NURCAHYO: If they had decided to return
and land in Denpasar,
356
00:19:25,831 --> 00:19:28,184
it would have taken only 5 to 10 minutes
357
00:19:28,542 --> 00:19:30,127
and they could've landed safely.
358
00:19:30,210 --> 00:19:33,797
But they decided to continue
flying to Jakarta.
359
00:19:35,507 --> 00:19:36,717
CAPTAIN:
Lion Air 43.
360
00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:38,506
We'll continue on to Jakarta.
361
00:19:39,678 --> 00:19:41,597
NARRATOR:
Following a near catastrophe,
362
00:19:41,680 --> 00:19:45,267
with unreliable instruments
and the stick shaker blaring,
363
00:19:45,350 --> 00:19:48,880
the crew elected to continue
the 90-minute flight to Jakarta.
364
00:19:51,607 --> 00:19:53,734
COX:
It surprised all of us
365
00:19:53,817 --> 00:19:55,641
that they continued the flight.
366
00:19:57,321 --> 00:20:00,199
NARRATOR: The crew managed to make
a safe landing at Jakarta
367
00:20:00,282 --> 00:20:03,165
and reported the problem
to maintenance personnel.
368
00:20:04,369 --> 00:20:08,546
CAPTAIN: I reported the issue
and filled out the flight maintenance log.
369
00:20:08,665 --> 00:20:10,626
COX:
If the airplane experiences
370
00:20:10,709 --> 00:20:14,213
an abnormal or an unusual system failure,
371
00:20:14,296 --> 00:20:16,238
it goes into the maintenance log.
372
00:20:17,424 --> 00:20:18,926
NURCAHYO:
Air Speed and Altitude disagree,
373
00:20:19,009 --> 00:20:22,221
but not a word about
the stabilizer problem?
374
00:20:23,722 --> 00:20:25,683
NARRATOR:
Investigators are surprised to learn
375
00:20:25,766 --> 00:20:27,643
that the Captain of the previous flight
376
00:20:27,726 --> 00:20:30,938
said nothing about
the out-of-control stabilizer
377
00:20:31,021 --> 00:20:33,139
or the action he took to correct it.
378
00:20:34,775 --> 00:20:36,110
CAPTAIN:
Runaway Stabilizer.
379
00:20:36,193 --> 00:20:37,819
Moving switches to cutout.
380
00:20:39,363 --> 00:20:41,323
CARBAUGH:
The lives of the passengers
381
00:20:41,406 --> 00:20:43,450
and the crew that follows you
382
00:20:43,533 --> 00:20:46,495
is basically dependent on you
383
00:20:46,578 --> 00:20:48,705
filling out the paperwork correctly.
384
00:20:49,665 --> 00:20:51,313
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Good morning.
385
00:20:52,376 --> 00:20:54,002
HARVINO:
Good morning.
386
00:20:54,086 --> 00:20:55,421
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
They're done loading.
387
00:20:55,504 --> 00:20:57,965
So we should be able to get
out of here on time today.
388
00:20:58,048 --> 00:21:00,342
NARRATOR: A few hours later,
the passengers and crew
389
00:21:00,425 --> 00:21:03,178
of Flight 610 boarded the aircraft
390
00:21:04,304 --> 00:21:07,099
with no knowledge or warning
of the potential problems
391
00:21:07,182 --> 00:21:09,685
faced by the previous crew hours earlier.
392
00:21:10,560 --> 00:21:11,853
HARVINO:
Fuel pumps?
393
00:21:12,813 --> 00:21:14,755
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Fuel pumps are on.
394
00:21:16,233 --> 00:21:19,236
NARRATOR: Did a repeat of the problem
on this aircraft result
395
00:21:19,319 --> 00:21:23,156
in the deaths of the 181 passengers
and eight crew?
396
00:21:32,499 --> 00:21:35,044
NARRATOR: It takes three days
for search and rescue teams
397
00:21:35,127 --> 00:21:39,298
to lock onto the signal coming
from the Max 8's Flight Data Recorder.
398
00:21:39,381 --> 00:21:42,968
{\an8}Divers recover it
from a depth of 115 feet.
399
00:21:45,679 --> 00:21:48,682
The recorder has preserved data
from the accident flight
400
00:21:48,765 --> 00:21:53,687
and 18 previous flights covering
almost 1800 different parameters.
401
00:21:55,230 --> 00:21:57,733
NURCAHYO:
Master Caution goes off as soon
402
00:21:57,816 --> 00:21:59,651
as they leave the ground
403
00:21:59,735 --> 00:22:03,655
probably because Air Speed
and Altitude don't agree.
404
00:22:05,824 --> 00:22:08,076
Stick shaker activates here.
405
00:22:09,745 --> 00:22:13,981
NARRATOR: The data shows a repeat
of the problem on the previous flight--
406
00:22:14,916 --> 00:22:17,377
Faulty readings caused by a discrepancy
407
00:22:17,461 --> 00:22:20,403
between the left and right
angle of attack sensors.
408
00:22:21,965 --> 00:22:24,176
(speaking Indonesian)
409
00:22:24,259 --> 00:22:26,220
{\an8}WIBOWO:
From the FDR data we received,
410
00:22:26,303 --> 00:22:29,431
we learned that this plane had
faulty angle of attack readings
411
00:22:29,514 --> 00:22:31,691
that affected both flights similarly.
412
00:22:35,145 --> 00:22:38,398
NURCAHYO: Left and right
angle of attack values
413
00:22:38,482 --> 00:22:41,193
are off by 21 degrees
for the entire flight.
414
00:22:45,155 --> 00:22:48,784
{\an8}NURCAHYO: We suspected the new angle
of attack sensor installed in Bali
415
00:22:48,867 --> 00:22:51,453
was either faulty
or the installation process
416
00:22:51,536 --> 00:22:53,121
was done incorrectly.
417
00:22:56,166 --> 00:22:58,043
NARRATOR: The
mechanic who replaced the sensor
418
00:22:58,126 --> 00:23:00,629
before the flight from Bali to Jakarta
419
00:23:00,712 --> 00:23:02,923
failed to ensure it was calibrated,
420
00:23:03,548 --> 00:23:05,548
which resulted in faulty readings.
421
00:23:06,551 --> 00:23:10,305
{\an8}COX: There's a procedure that
would have shown it was erroneous
422
00:23:10,389 --> 00:23:12,182
{\an8}and that it was bad.
423
00:23:12,265 --> 00:23:14,267
They signed off that they did it.
424
00:23:14,351 --> 00:23:16,144
They could not have done it.
425
00:23:17,020 --> 00:23:19,273
NARRATOR: On the Max 8,
the angle of attack sensor
426
00:23:19,356 --> 00:23:21,827
doesn't just measure the airplane's angle.
427
00:23:22,401 --> 00:23:24,236
HARVINO:
Altitude disagree.
428
00:23:24,319 --> 00:23:27,731
NARRATOR: It helps calculate
precise airspeed and altitude.
429
00:23:29,950 --> 00:23:33,203
NURCAHYO: That explains
why airspeed and altitude
430
00:23:33,286 --> 00:23:35,539
disagreed throughout the whole flight.
431
00:23:35,622 --> 00:23:38,083
NARRATOR: The malfunctioning sensor
on the captain's side
432
00:23:38,166 --> 00:23:40,210
resulted in a difference between the left
433
00:23:40,293 --> 00:23:43,213
and right side speed
and altitude displays.
434
00:23:44,881 --> 00:23:46,383
NURCAHYO:
Then there's this.
435
00:23:46,466 --> 00:23:49,970
NARRATOR: The data clearly shows
that for every nose up trim input
436
00:23:50,053 --> 00:23:54,099
there was a corresponding
automatic nose-down trim input.
437
00:23:55,517 --> 00:23:59,106
NURCAHYO: It sounds like
what the crew of Flight 43 described.
438
00:23:59,271 --> 00:24:00,814
NARRATOR:
The data shows investigators
439
00:24:00,897 --> 00:24:04,074
that for some reason,
the plane's automated trim system
440
00:24:04,651 --> 00:24:07,154
was repeatedly dropping the plane's nose
441
00:24:07,237 --> 00:24:09,296
while the pilots fought to lift it.
442
00:24:12,909 --> 00:24:15,733
NURCAHYO: Twenty-six
separate nose-down commands.
443
00:24:16,872 --> 00:24:19,755
This doesn't look like
a runaway stabilizer to me.
444
00:24:20,417 --> 00:24:24,421
NARRATOR: Runaway stabilizer is
a common malfunction of the trim system,
445
00:24:24,504 --> 00:24:26,882
usually resulting in one continuous
446
00:24:26,965 --> 00:24:29,318
un-commanded movement of the stabilizer.
447
00:24:33,763 --> 00:24:36,183
NURCAHYO: The NTSB brought
a representative from Boeing
448
00:24:36,266 --> 00:24:38,149
to help us in our investigation.
449
00:24:38,727 --> 00:24:43,190
We asked them to explain
why in both Flight 610 and 043,
450
00:24:43,273 --> 00:24:45,568
the same plane continued to pitch down.
451
00:24:45,901 --> 00:24:48,528
(speaking Indonesian)
452
00:24:52,199 --> 00:24:55,670
NURCAHYO: We're trying to understand
these automatic inputs.
453
00:24:56,119 --> 00:24:58,708
BOEING REP: It looks
like the MCAS kicked in.
454
00:25:00,540 --> 00:25:01,835
NURCAHYO: What's that?
455
00:25:03,126 --> 00:25:07,464
NARRATOR: Boeing points to an obscure
automated system known as MCAS--
456
00:25:08,173 --> 00:25:11,173
The Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System.
457
00:25:13,637 --> 00:25:16,637
WIBOWO: That's when we first learned
about the MCAS.
458
00:25:18,058 --> 00:25:22,176
NARRATOR: To understand what could have
caused the crash of Flight 610,
459
00:25:22,270 --> 00:25:26,149
investigators need to go back
seven years to 2011
460
00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:30,695
when Boeing first announced
the development of the MAX 8.
461
00:25:32,030 --> 00:25:33,698
DAVID:
The 737 MAX
462
00:25:33,782 --> 00:25:36,409
{\an8}was basically born out of a need
463
00:25:36,493 --> 00:25:41,581
{\an8}to improve the performance
and sales of the 737.
464
00:25:44,167 --> 00:25:48,088
NARRATOR: In 2010,
Boeing's main competitor, Airbus,
465
00:25:48,171 --> 00:25:50,257
unveiled the A320 neo,
466
00:25:51,466 --> 00:25:53,677
a fuel-efficient short-haul airplane.
467
00:25:54,261 --> 00:25:56,221
It was an immediate hit with airlines
468
00:25:56,304 --> 00:25:58,640
at a time of rising fuel costs.
469
00:26:00,475 --> 00:26:02,769
COX:
Boeing was caught by surprise.
470
00:26:03,311 --> 00:26:07,732
The A320 neo was significantly
more fuel-efficient.
471
00:26:08,483 --> 00:26:11,570
So all of a sudden,
they were faced with a dilemma.
472
00:26:11,653 --> 00:26:15,323
Do you design a new airplane,
4-or 5-year project,
473
00:26:15,407 --> 00:26:18,285
or do you modify the existing 737?
474
00:26:21,705 --> 00:26:23,832
NARRATOR: But there were problems
with taking a plane
475
00:26:23,915 --> 00:26:25,917
that was designed in the 1960s
476
00:26:26,668 --> 00:26:29,845
and turning it into a fast
and fuel-efficient aircraft.
477
00:26:32,007 --> 00:26:34,551
CARBAUGH:
To improve the performance of the MAX,
478
00:26:34,634 --> 00:26:40,015
they decided to install more
fuel efficient, larger engines.
479
00:26:41,266 --> 00:26:43,602
NARRATOR: The only way
to make those larger engines fit
480
00:26:43,685 --> 00:26:46,896
was to slide them forward on the wings.
481
00:26:46,980 --> 00:26:49,357
COX:
The design engineers had a problem
482
00:26:49,441 --> 00:26:52,027
with the ground
clearance from the engines.
483
00:26:52,110 --> 00:26:56,072
And on a 737, you can't increase
the size of the main landing gear
484
00:26:56,156 --> 00:26:57,991
because of the size of the wheel wells.
485
00:26:58,074 --> 00:27:01,578
It has to fit there.
So the only thing they could do
486
00:27:01,661 --> 00:27:04,539
was to move the engines
further forward and up.
487
00:27:05,624 --> 00:27:08,742
NARRATOR: That solved one problem
but created another.
488
00:27:10,045 --> 00:27:13,840
It caused the 737
to pitch up at low speeds,
489
00:27:13,923 --> 00:27:16,927
particularly when it was already
in a nose up position
490
00:27:17,010 --> 00:27:18,595
like during takeoffs.
491
00:27:19,346 --> 00:27:21,723
COX:
So they created software
492
00:27:21,806 --> 00:27:24,893
that would recognize
the airplane approaching stall
493
00:27:25,477 --> 00:27:28,730
and artificially force the nose down,
494
00:27:28,813 --> 00:27:33,485
and logically they turned to
the trim system to do that.
495
00:27:33,568 --> 00:27:35,195
NURCAHYO:
And that's the problem
496
00:27:35,278 --> 00:27:36,446
you solved with MCAS?
497
00:27:36,529 --> 00:27:39,941
BOEING REP: Yes, it made the MAX
handle like any other 737.
498
00:27:40,825 --> 00:27:43,578
COX:
MCAS was a design
499
00:27:43,662 --> 00:27:45,914
for a very low probability event.
500
00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:48,709
HARVINO:
It's diving. It's diving!
501
00:27:48,792 --> 00:27:50,335
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
It's okay.
502
00:27:50,418 --> 00:27:52,379
NURCAHYO: How were
they trained to respond?
503
00:27:52,462 --> 00:27:55,215
BOEING REP: Well, they weren't.
Not specifically.
504
00:27:55,298 --> 00:27:57,008
HARVINO:
Fly up. Up! Up!
505
00:27:58,843 --> 00:28:02,639
NARRATOR: Could Boeing's high-tech
solution to a design problem
506
00:28:02,722 --> 00:28:05,309
have inadvertently
put thousands of passengers
507
00:28:05,392 --> 00:28:07,352
around the world at risk?
508
00:28:13,608 --> 00:28:16,820
NARRATOR: In order to eliminate
the need for costly pilot training,
509
00:28:16,903 --> 00:28:19,197
Boeing had to convince authorities
510
00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:21,408
that the Max 8 handled the same way
511
00:28:21,491 --> 00:28:23,660
as all previous 737s.
512
00:28:24,452 --> 00:28:28,873
{\an8}CARBAUGH: Different handling
characteristics will automatically require
513
00:28:28,957 --> 00:28:31,376
time in the simulator and extra training.
514
00:28:32,877 --> 00:28:36,298
NARRATOR: Boeing argued that since
MCAS operated in the background
515
00:28:36,381 --> 00:28:38,800
without the need for any pilot input,
516
00:28:38,883 --> 00:28:41,295
it didn't affect the airplane's handling.
517
00:28:43,596 --> 00:28:45,949
INVESTIGATOR:
Not a word about MCAS here.
518
00:28:46,307 --> 00:28:48,602
NARRATOR:
Boeing never included mention of MCAS
519
00:28:48,685 --> 00:28:50,450
in the flight control manuals.
520
00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:54,107
They argued that since the system
521
00:28:54,190 --> 00:28:56,151
was not under control of the crew,
522
00:28:56,234 --> 00:28:57,764
it should not be included.
523
00:28:59,112 --> 00:29:01,995
NURCAHYO: It's like the system
doesn't even exist.
524
00:29:05,952 --> 00:29:07,913
{\an8}Boeing thinks that
it's an automatic system
525
00:29:07,996 --> 00:29:09,289
{\an8}for safety purposes
526
00:29:09,372 --> 00:29:11,843
and has nothing to do
with pilot operation.
527
00:29:14,502 --> 00:29:16,963
NARRATOR:
According to Boeing, the MCAS software
528
00:29:17,046 --> 00:29:19,508
would automatically move
the plane's stabilizer
529
00:29:19,591 --> 00:29:21,676
to push the plane's nose down
530
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:25,430
if it started to pitch up under
very specific circumstances.
531
00:29:28,433 --> 00:29:32,198
BOEING REP: It only kicks in
when these three conditions are met.
532
00:29:33,688 --> 00:29:36,358
NARRATOR:
Boeing explains that MCAS only activates
533
00:29:36,441 --> 00:29:39,500
when it senses that the angle
of attack is excessive,
534
00:29:41,154 --> 00:29:42,989
when the autopilot is off,
535
00:29:43,990 --> 00:29:45,932
and when the flaps are retracted.
536
00:29:46,367 --> 00:29:48,453
An extremely rare combination.
537
00:29:49,829 --> 00:29:53,416
COX: Professional pilots
don't typically stall airplanes.
538
00:29:53,500 --> 00:29:57,504
{\an8}So the likelihood of an MCAS activation
539
00:29:57,587 --> 00:29:59,470
{\an8}was thought to be extremely low.
540
00:30:01,549 --> 00:30:03,510
INVESTIGATOR:
This is the data from both flights.
541
00:30:03,593 --> 00:30:06,596
NARRATOR: Tragically, the data shows
that because of the faulty
542
00:30:06,679 --> 00:30:09,182
maintenance on the angle of attack sensor,
543
00:30:09,265 --> 00:30:12,977
Flight 610 ended up meeting
all three conditions.
544
00:30:17,065 --> 00:30:18,608
NURCAHYO:
The series of problems occurred
545
00:30:18,691 --> 00:30:22,044
when the left angle of attack sensor
was replaced in Bali.
546
00:30:26,324 --> 00:30:29,118
NARRATOR:
Investigators dig deeper into the data
547
00:30:29,202 --> 00:30:32,372
and discover the MCAS system
had no failsafe.
548
00:30:36,292 --> 00:30:40,234
NURCAHYO: The MCAS installed in the plane
relied on only one sensor.
549
00:30:42,382 --> 00:30:46,052
NARRATOR: MCAS only took data
from one angle of attack sensor,
550
00:30:46,135 --> 00:30:47,762
not both.
551
00:30:49,430 --> 00:30:52,976
Most protection systems
are designed with redundancies.
552
00:30:53,059 --> 00:30:55,187
CAPTAIN: Your instruments
are correct. You have control.
553
00:30:55,270 --> 00:30:58,741
NARRATOR: So a single failure
doesn't result in catastrophe.
554
00:31:00,066 --> 00:31:01,442
CAPTAIN: Flaps up.
555
00:31:01,526 --> 00:31:03,736
COX:
What Boeing did not adequately do
556
00:31:03,820 --> 00:31:06,739
was assess all of the other failures
557
00:31:06,823 --> 00:31:09,284
that that single component would have.
558
00:31:10,410 --> 00:31:12,996
NURCAHYO:
The faulty angle of attack sensor
559
00:31:13,079 --> 00:31:15,668
wrongly showed the plane
pitching up steeply.
560
00:31:16,457 --> 00:31:19,399
The autopilot was disengaged
for the entire flight.
561
00:31:20,086 --> 00:31:23,339
And then right here,
they retract the flaps.
562
00:31:24,716 --> 00:31:28,386
Exactly the same as the previous flight.
563
00:31:30,680 --> 00:31:37,687
That's when MCAS kicks in
and starts pushing the nose down.
564
00:31:40,106 --> 00:31:44,342
NARRATOR: Up to this point, the crew
only had a minor instrument problem.
565
00:31:45,695 --> 00:31:46,905
By raising the flaps...
566
00:31:46,988 --> 00:31:48,114
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Okay. Okay.
567
00:31:48,197 --> 00:31:48,823
NARRATOR: ...the pilots
568
00:31:48,907 --> 00:31:51,951
unknowingly triggered
a much more serious problem.
569
00:31:55,496 --> 00:31:59,026
BOEING REP: We assumed that pilots
would know how to respond.
570
00:31:59,876 --> 00:32:01,878
NARRATOR:
Boeing made the assumption
571
00:32:01,961 --> 00:32:03,922
that pilots would respond
to the un-commanded MCAS
572
00:32:04,005 --> 00:32:06,758
inputs by disengaging the automatic trim.
573
00:32:09,093 --> 00:32:11,179
COX: The Boeing assumptions
were that the pilots
574
00:32:11,262 --> 00:32:16,100
would instantly recognize
the inadvertent MCAS activation
575
00:32:16,893 --> 00:32:18,893
and treat it within three seconds.
576
00:32:20,313 --> 00:32:22,315
NARRATOR:
Investigators examine the flight data
577
00:32:22,398 --> 00:32:24,609
of the previous Lion Air flight
578
00:32:24,692 --> 00:32:27,904
to see how that crew reacted
to the MCAS activation.
579
00:32:29,280 --> 00:32:31,199
NURCAHYO:
The first MCAS input
580
00:32:31,282 --> 00:32:32,867
on Flight 43 is here.
581
00:32:34,285 --> 00:32:37,163
The Captain pulls back
on his control column
582
00:32:37,246 --> 00:32:39,040
and applies manual trim,
583
00:32:39,123 --> 00:32:42,877
then fights against the MCAS
for 3 minutes and 40 seconds
584
00:32:42,961 --> 00:32:45,004
before hitting the cutout switch.
585
00:32:45,088 --> 00:32:46,298
COX:
I think the assumption
586
00:32:46,381 --> 00:32:49,550
that they were going to recognize and act
587
00:32:49,634 --> 00:32:54,597
within three seconds was very
optimistic, if not unrealistic.
588
00:32:57,141 --> 00:32:58,351
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Lion six-one-zero.
589
00:32:58,434 --> 00:33:00,395
I have no reliable altitude information.
590
00:33:00,478 --> 00:33:02,063
All instruments disagree.
591
00:33:02,772 --> 00:33:06,359
NARRATOR: Unlike the previous crew,
the pilots of Flight 610
592
00:33:06,526 --> 00:33:09,644
struggled with the problem
for more than 10 minutes...
593
00:33:10,113 --> 00:33:11,739
HARVINO:
Fly up. Up. Up!
594
00:33:12,448 --> 00:33:16,331
NARRATOR: ...and never made the connection
to a runaway stabilizer.
595
00:33:21,833 --> 00:33:24,961
Investigators need to understand
why two crews,
596
00:33:25,044 --> 00:33:28,756
facing an identical problem,
reacted so differently.
597
00:33:35,930 --> 00:33:38,141
NARRATOR:
Investigators struggle to understand
598
00:33:38,224 --> 00:33:42,603
why the pilots of Lion Air Flight 610
lost control of the aircraft.
599
00:33:43,479 --> 00:33:46,774
After nearly three months
of searching the ocean floor,
600
00:33:46,858 --> 00:33:49,736
the cockpit voice recorder
is finally recovered
601
00:33:49,819 --> 00:33:51,404
and taken for analysis.
602
00:33:54,866 --> 00:33:57,535
{\an8}WIBOWO: The CVR was the key
to our investigation.
603
00:33:57,618 --> 00:33:59,579
Together with the FDR data,
604
00:33:59,662 --> 00:34:03,015
the CVR could reveal all
the mystery in our investigation.
605
00:34:06,127 --> 00:34:07,545
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER:
Lion 6-1-0
606
00:34:07,628 --> 00:34:09,255
cleared for takeoff.
607
00:34:09,797 --> 00:34:12,884
NARRATOR: Investigators hope
the recording will help to explain
608
00:34:12,967 --> 00:34:16,846
why the crew of Flight 610
couldn't identify the problem
609
00:34:16,929 --> 00:34:19,106
and take corrective action to fix it.
610
00:34:19,515 --> 00:34:20,808
HARVINO:
Rotate.
611
00:34:22,435 --> 00:34:23,686
(beeping)
612
00:34:23,770 --> 00:34:25,855
Takeoff config.
613
00:34:26,314 --> 00:34:28,079
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Okay, but what?
614
00:34:28,608 --> 00:34:30,860
NARRATOR:
The faulty angle of attack sensor
615
00:34:30,943 --> 00:34:34,473
triggers a series of warnings
as soon as the plane lifts off.
616
00:34:36,824 --> 00:34:37,951
HARVINO:
Airspeed disagree.
617
00:34:38,034 --> 00:34:39,619
What's going on?
618
00:34:41,871 --> 00:34:44,107
Should we request a return to Jakarta?
619
00:34:45,083 --> 00:34:46,907
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Landing gear up.
620
00:34:51,130 --> 00:34:53,967
{\an8}NURCAHYO: After takeoff,
the MCAS system was activated
621
00:34:54,050 --> 00:34:56,286
{\an8}and their plane started to pitch down.
622
00:34:57,804 --> 00:35:00,432
NARRATOR: The captain has noticed
that the plane's stabilizer
623
00:35:00,515 --> 00:35:02,809
is now automatically
trimming the nose down
624
00:35:02,892 --> 00:35:05,228
and does what Boeing assumed he would.
625
00:35:07,021 --> 00:35:10,608
He pulls back on the control column
and uses manual trim
626
00:35:10,691 --> 00:35:13,152
to counteract the computerized inputs.
627
00:35:14,529 --> 00:35:15,947
NURCAHYO:
Okay.
628
00:35:16,030 --> 00:35:17,678
Boeing was right about that.
629
00:35:18,241 --> 00:35:21,594
NARRATOR: But the captain
never mentions the trim problem.
630
00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:24,789
He and his first officer
are focused entirely
631
00:35:24,872 --> 00:35:27,708
on their faulty airspeed
and altitude readings.
632
00:35:27,792 --> 00:35:30,002
HARVINO:
Where is the... airspeed...
633
00:35:30,086 --> 00:35:33,464
airspeed.
There's no airspeed unreliable.
634
00:35:33,548 --> 00:35:35,341
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
It's there.
635
00:35:36,134 --> 00:35:37,718
HARVINO:
Got it.
636
00:35:39,095 --> 00:35:41,473
NURCAHYO: This is where we found
significant differences
637
00:35:41,556 --> 00:35:44,267
between flight 043 and 610.
638
00:35:45,726 --> 00:35:48,688
NARRATOR: It takes Harvino
nearly two minutes
639
00:35:48,771 --> 00:35:52,067
to locate the appropriate checklist
for mismatched airspeed.
640
00:35:52,150 --> 00:35:55,361
COX: I think the first officer
was pretty well task saturated,
641
00:35:55,444 --> 00:35:58,990
{\an8}and one of the things that
task saturation does in humans,
642
00:35:59,073 --> 00:36:01,242
{\an8}it limits our ability to communicate.
643
00:36:01,325 --> 00:36:04,796
We don't hear well, and we don't
verbalize things very well.
644
00:36:05,204 --> 00:36:06,664
HARVINO:
Flaps up four degrees
645
00:36:06,747 --> 00:36:08,395
and seventy-five percent N1.
646
00:36:09,417 --> 00:36:11,377
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
There it is.
647
00:36:11,460 --> 00:36:14,422
NARRATOR: When the automated trim system
pushes the nose down,
648
00:36:14,505 --> 00:36:17,508
the large wheel makes
a characteristic sound.
649
00:36:19,844 --> 00:36:21,387
{\an8}CARBAUGH:
When the trim wheel moves,
650
00:36:21,470 --> 00:36:23,139
{\an8}it makes a sound like a freight train.
651
00:36:23,222 --> 00:36:24,515
(engine hissing)
652
00:36:24,599 --> 00:36:26,247
It's meant to be noticeable.
653
00:36:26,893 --> 00:36:28,952
HARVINO:
The following are reliable:
654
00:36:29,562 --> 00:36:33,482
Attitude, N1, ground speed.
655
00:36:33,566 --> 00:36:35,193
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Check.
656
00:36:36,027 --> 00:36:38,154
NURCAHYO:
They still don't notice it.
657
00:36:39,655 --> 00:36:40,865
Wrong about that.
658
00:36:40,948 --> 00:36:44,478
COX: He didn't put it together
that every time he trimmed up,
659
00:36:44,827 --> 00:36:47,298
the MCAS system was trimming it back down.
660
00:36:48,539 --> 00:36:50,249
NURCAHYO:
Thirty-four times.
661
00:36:50,333 --> 00:36:55,087
He applies nose up trim 34 times
and doesn't think to wonder why.
662
00:36:58,633 --> 00:37:03,638
Did not recognize the problem
and take the corrective action
663
00:37:03,721 --> 00:37:05,598
Boeing predicted they would.
664
00:37:05,681 --> 00:37:07,183
CARBAUGH:
In this particular case,
665
00:37:07,266 --> 00:37:12,230
Boeing made assumptions
about design, and pilot experience,
666
00:37:12,313 --> 00:37:15,524
and training that didn't add up.
667
00:37:17,401 --> 00:37:20,225
CAPTAIN SUNEJA:
Please take control for a moment.
668
00:37:20,404 --> 00:37:21,989
HARVINO:
I have control.
669
00:37:22,782 --> 00:37:25,785
NARRATOR: Investigators now hear
another crucial difference
670
00:37:25,868 --> 00:37:28,579
between Flight 610
and the previous flight.
671
00:37:29,622 --> 00:37:31,975
NURCAHYO:
That's it? Please take control?
672
00:37:33,209 --> 00:37:34,419
Not a word about the fact
673
00:37:34,502 --> 00:37:37,630
that he's had to make
more than 30 trim inputs.
674
00:37:40,591 --> 00:37:42,301
CARBAUGH: I think the captain
675
00:37:42,385 --> 00:37:44,429
was very frustrated
with the first officer.
676
00:37:44,512 --> 00:37:46,347
HARVINO:
Whoa. It's very...
677
00:37:47,098 --> 00:37:48,641
CARBAUGH:
And I am sure he didn't
678
00:37:48,724 --> 00:37:51,430
really wanna hand it over
to the first officer,
679
00:37:51,852 --> 00:37:54,480
but he felt that he needed to
in order to figure out
680
00:37:54,563 --> 00:37:56,740
what was going on with the checklist.
681
00:37:57,358 --> 00:38:00,945
NARRATOR: But because there's
no mention of MCAS in the manual,
682
00:38:01,028 --> 00:38:03,734
there isn't a checklist
for the crew to follow.
683
00:38:04,365 --> 00:38:06,367
- HARVINO: It's diving! It's diving!
- CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay.
684
00:38:06,450 --> 00:38:08,703
NARRATOR: With no warning
from the Captain about the need
685
00:38:08,786 --> 00:38:10,371
for repeated nose up trim,
686
00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:13,728
the First Officer quickly
becomes overwhelmed.
687
00:38:15,167 --> 00:38:18,587
COX: Sadly, this first officer
was pretty well overwhelmed
688
00:38:18,671 --> 00:38:22,091
and as the system trimmed the nose down,
689
00:38:22,174 --> 00:38:25,886
he was not nearly aggressive
enough in responding to that.
690
00:38:29,265 --> 00:38:33,477
NURCAHYO: In flight 610, the pilot
didn't deactivate the automatic trim
691
00:38:33,561 --> 00:38:36,773
and the plane's nose kept coming
down because of the MCAS.
692
00:38:36,856 --> 00:38:39,327
And it didn't stop
until the plane crashed.
693
00:38:41,027 --> 00:38:43,196
NARRATOR:
One minute after taking control,
694
00:38:43,279 --> 00:38:45,323
the first officer watches helplessly
695
00:38:45,406 --> 00:38:47,908
as the plane plunges towards the Java Sea.
696
00:38:49,201 --> 00:38:50,828
HARVINO:
Fly up. Up. Up!
697
00:38:51,620 --> 00:38:55,124
NARRATOR: KNKT Investigators
discover that Boeing's assumptions
698
00:38:55,207 --> 00:38:56,876
of how pilots would recognize
699
00:38:56,959 --> 00:38:59,920
and overcome
an un-commanded nose down trim
700
00:39:00,004 --> 00:39:02,548
on the Max 8 were fatally flawed.
701
00:39:11,891 --> 00:39:15,480
NURCAHYO: They sure didn't act the way
Boeing said they would.
702
00:39:15,895 --> 00:39:17,646
INVESTIGATOR:
Here it is.
703
00:39:18,606 --> 00:39:21,525
Without requiring exceptional
skill or strength.
704
00:39:22,693 --> 00:39:25,822
NARRATOR: Investigators soon learn
why Boeing's assumptions
705
00:39:25,905 --> 00:39:28,616
about how pilots would react
were so wrong.
706
00:39:29,492 --> 00:39:31,243
To certify the MAX 8,
707
00:39:31,327 --> 00:39:34,747
Boeing assured the FAA
that an "average" flight crew
708
00:39:34,830 --> 00:39:37,625
would be able to override the MCAS system.
709
00:39:38,376 --> 00:39:40,494
NURCAHYO:
So were these guys average?
710
00:39:42,588 --> 00:39:44,353
Captain passed all his checks.
711
00:39:45,841 --> 00:39:47,551
Looks like a competent pilot.
712
00:39:51,889 --> 00:39:54,975
This guy is a whole different story.
713
00:39:56,644 --> 00:40:00,821
NARRATOR: Investigators are surprised
by the First Officer's background.
714
00:40:01,023 --> 00:40:03,359
COX:
The first officer on Lion Air Flight 610
715
00:40:03,442 --> 00:40:05,694
had had challenges in training.
716
00:40:05,778 --> 00:40:07,947
He had trouble staying up
with the airplane,
717
00:40:08,030 --> 00:40:09,532
understanding the complexities.
718
00:40:09,615 --> 00:40:13,077
His manual flying skills were not optimum,
719
00:40:13,160 --> 00:40:15,496
and he required additional training.
720
00:40:16,497 --> 00:40:18,916
- HARVINO: It's diving! It's diving!
- CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's okay. It's okay.
721
00:40:18,999 --> 00:40:21,669
NARRATOR: Flight 610
proved that Boeing was wrong
722
00:40:21,752 --> 00:40:24,797
about how pilots would react
to an MCAS failure.
723
00:40:24,880 --> 00:40:26,924
HARVINO:
Fly up. Up. Up!
724
00:40:31,345 --> 00:40:33,765
CARBAUGH:
They never really figured it out,
725
00:40:33,848 --> 00:40:36,517
and then the captain
gave control to someone
726
00:40:36,600 --> 00:40:40,646
whose manual flying skills
were not gonna save the day.
727
00:40:41,939 --> 00:40:43,441
NARRATOR:
As a result of the accident,
728
00:40:43,524 --> 00:40:47,027
Boeing issues new guidelines
for MAX 8 pilots
729
00:40:47,111 --> 00:40:49,071
informing them about MCAS
730
00:40:49,155 --> 00:40:52,075
and detailing the procedures
to follow in the event
731
00:40:52,158 --> 00:40:54,394
it triggers an un-commanded nose down.
732
00:40:55,619 --> 00:40:59,123
The bulletin advises pilots
to apply manual trim
733
00:40:59,206 --> 00:41:02,251
and to move the Stabilizer Trim
switches to CUTOUT.
734
00:41:03,043 --> 00:41:06,297
COX: This was a reinforcement
to the pilots that says:
735
00:41:06,380 --> 00:41:09,842
There is a system on
the airplane that can move the trim.
736
00:41:10,759 --> 00:41:13,888
If it does so, treat it
as a runaway stabilizer.
737
00:41:15,723 --> 00:41:17,850
NURCAHYO:
Hey, turn the TV on.
738
00:41:24,190 --> 00:41:25,775
NEWS ANCHOR:
Our breaking news.
739
00:41:25,858 --> 00:41:29,028
An Ethiopian Airlines has
crashed shortly after takeoff
740
00:41:29,111 --> 00:41:31,030
from Addis Ababa,
killing all one hundred...
741
00:41:31,113 --> 00:41:32,907
NARRATOR:
The belief that Boeing's advisory
742
00:41:32,990 --> 00:41:35,284
would prevent another similar accident
743
00:41:35,367 --> 00:41:39,288
is shattered four months later
when another MAX 8 crashes.
744
00:41:42,374 --> 00:41:45,253
Flight tracking data
shows that Ethiopian Airlines
745
00:41:45,336 --> 00:41:49,006
Flight 302's altitude fluctuated
throughout the flight.
746
00:41:50,758 --> 00:41:53,302
There's immediate speculation
that, once again,
747
00:41:53,385 --> 00:41:55,846
Boeing's MCAS software is to blame.
748
00:41:57,598 --> 00:42:00,643
COX: In both accidents,
the MCAS activated,
749
00:42:00,726 --> 00:42:05,314
causing this nose down trim
situation to occur repeatedly.
750
00:42:05,856 --> 00:42:09,610
And in both cases, the crews
let the airplane accelerate far,
751
00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,863
far greater speed
than it should have been.
752
00:42:11,946 --> 00:42:13,072
Put those two together
753
00:42:13,155 --> 00:42:15,979
and the controllability
of the airplane was lost.
754
00:42:16,992 --> 00:42:19,662
NARRATOR: This time the pilots
knew about MCAS
755
00:42:19,745 --> 00:42:21,914
and what to do in case it activated.
756
00:42:23,040 --> 00:42:25,334
Yet, they still couldn't
control the airplane.
757
00:42:25,417 --> 00:42:27,044
CARBAUGH:
Boeing realized, well,
758
00:42:27,127 --> 00:42:31,674
if this crew can't handle it
then other crews won't.
759
00:42:33,300 --> 00:42:37,555
NARRATOR: In spite of the FAA's assurance
that the MAX 8 is airworthy,
760
00:42:37,638 --> 00:42:41,642
regulators around the world
ground the global MAX 8 fleet
761
00:42:41,725 --> 00:42:43,902
until the problem with MCAS is fixed.
762
00:42:46,730 --> 00:42:48,524
WIBOWO: The main thing
in our mind was we worried
763
00:42:48,607 --> 00:42:51,110
that all of the Boeing 737 Max 8s
764
00:42:51,193 --> 00:42:53,404
that are currently
flying all over the world
765
00:42:53,487 --> 00:42:56,723
might have the potential
to suffer the same catastrophe.
766
00:42:58,534 --> 00:43:00,946
NARRATOR:
The FAA eventually follows suit.
767
00:43:02,955 --> 00:43:05,374
CONGRESSMAN: And our concern isn't
with the mistakes that were made...
768
00:43:05,457 --> 00:43:07,835
NARRATOR: A US Congressional
investigation determines
769
00:43:07,918 --> 00:43:10,671
that Boeing made faulty
technical assumptions
770
00:43:10,754 --> 00:43:13,257
and errors in judgment,
which led to these accidents.
771
00:43:13,340 --> 00:43:17,046
CONGRESSMAN: That pilots didn't know
about this is unacceptable.
772
00:43:18,137 --> 00:43:21,015
NARRATOR: Boeing insists
it's learned from these incidents
773
00:43:21,098 --> 00:43:23,767
and is determined to make the MAX 8 safe
774
00:43:23,851 --> 00:43:25,853
and regain public trust.
775
00:43:25,936 --> 00:43:27,688
NURCAHYO:
Boeing has committed
776
00:43:27,771 --> 00:43:31,817
to making it easier for pilots
to override the MCAS system.
777
00:43:35,029 --> 00:43:36,912
Once that override is activated,
778
00:43:37,740 --> 00:43:41,744
{\an8}the system will not continue to re-engage.
779
00:43:43,829 --> 00:43:47,291
{\an8}And they're developing a training program
780
00:43:47,374 --> 00:43:50,586
{\an8}to familiarize pilots with MCAS.
781
00:43:55,257 --> 00:43:59,011
{\an8}COX:
The 737 MAX story will change
782
00:43:59,094 --> 00:44:01,180
{\an8}forever how airplanes are certified,
783
00:44:01,263 --> 00:44:05,392
{\an8}and the 737 MAX will clearly
be a watershed event
784
00:44:05,476 --> 00:44:06,810
{\an8}in aviation history.
785
00:44:06,894 --> 00:44:08,896
{\an8}Captioned by Point.360
67410
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