All language subtitles for M.2003-S21E04-Grounded.Boeing.Max.8.Lion.Air.Flight.610.WEBDL-1080pEAC3.5.1h264-PiTBULL_track4_[eng]

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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,794 --> 00:00:06,006 NARRATOR: Just minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia... 2 00:00:06,089 --> 00:00:06,965 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Lion six-one-zero. 3 00:00:07,048 --> 00:00:09,092 I have no reliable altitude information. 4 00:00:09,175 --> 00:00:10,385 All instruments disagree. 5 00:00:10,468 --> 00:00:13,764 NARRATOR: ...pilots fight to control one of the world's newest airliners... 6 00:00:13,847 --> 00:00:15,015 HARVINO: Fly up. 7 00:00:15,098 --> 00:00:17,351 - NARRATOR: ...the Boeing Max 8. - HARVINO: Up! Up! 8 00:00:17,434 --> 00:00:18,936 DAVID CARBAUGH: They never really figured out 9 00:00:19,019 --> 00:00:20,228 what was going on. 10 00:00:20,311 --> 00:00:23,106 NARRATOR: And end up crashing into the Java Sea. 11 00:00:24,524 --> 00:00:26,693 RAY NURCAHYO: This was a very serious accident. 12 00:00:26,776 --> 00:00:28,778 What does the tracking data show? 13 00:00:28,862 --> 00:00:31,323 NARRATOR: Investigators follow an erratic flight path... 14 00:00:31,406 --> 00:00:32,574 NURCAHYO: They're off course 15 00:00:32,657 --> 00:00:34,534 and their altitude's all over the place. 16 00:00:34,617 --> 00:00:36,036 NARRATOR: ...a history of maintenance issues... 17 00:00:36,119 --> 00:00:38,455 CAPTAIN: Did we have problems? You bet we did. 18 00:00:38,538 --> 00:00:41,166 NARRATOR: And learn about a treacherous piece of hidden software. 19 00:00:41,249 --> 00:00:43,293 BOEING REP: It looks like the MCAS kicked in. 20 00:00:43,376 --> 00:00:44,961 NURCAHYO: What's that? 21 00:00:45,045 --> 00:00:47,672 NARRATOR: What they uncover shocks the world 22 00:00:47,756 --> 00:00:49,716 and grounds an entire fleet. 23 00:00:49,799 --> 00:00:52,010 JOHN COX: The 737 MAX story 24 00:00:52,093 --> 00:00:55,346 will clearly be a watershed event in aviation history. 25 00:00:55,764 --> 00:00:57,849 (lightning strikes) 26 00:00:57,932 --> 00:00:59,697 MAN (on radio): Mayday, mayday! 27 00:01:04,105 --> 00:01:06,357 (radio chatter) 28 00:01:30,799 --> 00:01:34,094 NARRATOR: It's just after 5 am in Jakarta, Indonesia, 29 00:01:35,053 --> 00:01:39,015 as 181 passengers settle in for a short domestic flight. 30 00:01:44,604 --> 00:01:45,772 In the cockpit... 31 00:01:45,855 --> 00:01:47,232 HARVINO: Fuel pumps. 32 00:01:47,315 --> 00:01:50,139 NARRATOR: Harvino performs pre-flight procedures. 33 00:01:52,570 --> 00:01:54,512 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Fuel pumps are on. 34 00:01:55,115 --> 00:01:58,174 NARRATOR: The Captain on this flight is Bhavye Suneja 35 00:01:58,368 --> 00:02:00,578 who has more than 6,000 flying hours. 36 00:02:05,208 --> 00:02:07,335 The passengers are onboard the latest version 37 00:02:07,418 --> 00:02:12,423 of the renowned Boeing 737, known as the Max 8. 38 00:02:14,926 --> 00:02:17,679 David Carbaugh is a former Boeing test pilot. 39 00:02:19,389 --> 00:02:21,891 {\an8}CARBAUGH: The Max is the fourth iteration 40 00:02:21,975 --> 00:02:24,060 {\an8}of the 737, 41 00:02:24,936 --> 00:02:27,407 one of the most successful airliners ever. 42 00:02:28,273 --> 00:02:31,067 And it was basically born out of a need 43 00:02:31,151 --> 00:02:34,154 to improve efficiency and performance. 44 00:02:36,573 --> 00:02:38,366 NARRATOR: The Max 8 has quickly become 45 00:02:38,449 --> 00:02:40,743 Boeing's fastest-selling airplane, 46 00:02:40,827 --> 00:02:44,038 with more than 300 already in the skies 47 00:02:44,122 --> 00:02:46,541 and almost 5,000 in the order books. 48 00:02:47,709 --> 00:02:49,419 The one being used on today's flight 49 00:02:49,502 --> 00:02:51,914 was delivered to Lion Air two months ago. 50 00:02:54,841 --> 00:02:56,009 TOWER CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero, 51 00:02:56,092 --> 00:03:00,180 you are cleared to runway 2-5 left via Sierra Charlie One. 52 00:03:00,930 --> 00:03:03,225 Contact tower when you are in position. 53 00:03:04,475 --> 00:03:05,811 HARVINO: Lion six-one-zero, 54 00:03:05,894 --> 00:03:08,855 cleared to runway 2-5 left via Sierra Charlie One. 55 00:03:10,732 --> 00:03:11,983 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: All clear. No traffic. 56 00:03:12,066 --> 00:03:13,651 Let's run before takeoff. 57 00:03:14,944 --> 00:03:16,362 HARVINO: Flaps. 58 00:03:16,446 --> 00:03:19,157 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Flaps Five. Five indicated. 59 00:03:22,660 --> 00:03:25,539 NARRATOR: Lion Air Flight 610 is a 90-minute journey 60 00:03:25,622 --> 00:03:30,418 from Jakarta over the Java Sea to Bangka Island. 61 00:03:31,920 --> 00:03:34,923 The low-cost airline operates hundreds of these short flights 62 00:03:35,006 --> 00:03:36,257 every day. 63 00:03:37,926 --> 00:03:39,844 CARBAUGH: Indonesia is the fourth 64 00:03:39,928 --> 00:03:42,013 most populous country in the world. 65 00:03:42,931 --> 00:03:47,018 And with 17,000 islands, you gotta have an easy way 66 00:03:47,101 --> 00:03:50,337 to do short-range transportation to get to those places. 67 00:03:51,147 --> 00:03:55,485 And the Max is the ideal airplane for that kind of operation. 68 00:03:57,195 --> 00:03:58,613 TOWER CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero cleared 69 00:03:58,696 --> 00:04:00,448 for take-off Runway 2-5. 70 00:04:00,531 --> 00:04:02,649 Contact Terminal East when airborne. 71 00:04:03,409 --> 00:04:06,115 HARVINO: Lion six-one-zero cleared for takeoff. 72 00:04:18,716 --> 00:04:20,426 (engine roaring) 73 00:04:22,971 --> 00:04:24,264 NARRATOR: At 6:20... 74 00:04:24,347 --> 00:04:25,348 HARVINO: Rotate. 75 00:04:25,431 --> 00:04:28,608 NARRATOR: ...the Max 8 lifts off the runway at Jakarta. 76 00:04:31,062 --> 00:04:32,647 (control system beeps) 77 00:04:32,730 --> 00:04:34,672 But immediately, there's trouble. 78 00:04:36,150 --> 00:04:38,621 The Captain's control yoke starts shaking, 79 00:04:39,570 --> 00:04:42,041 a warning that the plane is about to stall. 80 00:04:43,283 --> 00:04:44,909 HARVINO: Takeoff config. 81 00:04:45,618 --> 00:04:47,501 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay... but what? 82 00:04:47,829 --> 00:04:51,418 NARRATOR: The pilots can't identify the source of the problem. 83 00:04:51,874 --> 00:04:54,463 They have no choice but to continue climbing. 84 00:04:57,338 --> 00:04:59,758 The passengers are unaware that the pilots are dealing 85 00:04:59,841 --> 00:05:01,426 with anything unusual. 86 00:05:04,095 --> 00:05:05,388 (control system alerts) 87 00:05:05,471 --> 00:05:06,806 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero, 88 00:05:06,889 --> 00:05:10,601 fly heading 2-4-8 and follow Standard Instrument Departure. 89 00:05:11,978 --> 00:05:13,813 HARVINO: Lion Air 610. 90 00:05:13,896 --> 00:05:16,066 NARRATOR: The air traffic controller has no idea 91 00:05:16,149 --> 00:05:18,326 that there's an issue in the cockpit. 92 00:05:24,115 --> 00:05:25,283 The pilots get a warning 93 00:05:25,366 --> 00:05:27,994 that their airspeed indicators do not agree. 94 00:05:28,077 --> 00:05:29,204 HARVINO: Airspeed disagree. 95 00:05:29,287 --> 00:05:30,913 What's going on? 96 00:05:31,956 --> 00:05:34,192 Should we request a return to Jakarta? 97 00:05:37,211 --> 00:05:39,035 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Landing gear up. 98 00:05:41,341 --> 00:05:42,634 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero, 99 00:05:42,717 --> 00:05:45,470 climb to flight level two-seven-zero. 100 00:05:47,221 --> 00:05:50,433 NARRATOR: Still unaware of any trouble, the controller instructs 101 00:05:50,516 --> 00:05:53,603 the crew to continue climbing to 27,000 feet. 102 00:05:58,149 --> 00:05:59,734 HARVINO: Altitude disagree. 103 00:06:00,401 --> 00:06:03,113 NARRATOR: The First Officer now notices that the altimeters 104 00:06:03,196 --> 00:06:05,239 also show conflicting readings. 105 00:06:06,532 --> 00:06:09,297 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Acknowledged. Altitude disagree. 106 00:06:09,452 --> 00:06:11,162 HARVINO: Lion six-one-zero. 107 00:06:11,245 --> 00:06:13,422 Confirm our current altitude, please. 108 00:06:15,375 --> 00:06:16,501 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion six-zero-one 109 00:06:16,584 --> 00:06:20,755 your present altitude is... 900 feet? 110 00:06:23,591 --> 00:06:25,635 NARRATOR: The pilots are getting conflicting data 111 00:06:25,718 --> 00:06:28,071 about their altitude and their airspeed. 112 00:06:31,307 --> 00:06:33,684 Captain Suneja expects his First Officer 113 00:06:33,768 --> 00:06:36,062 to carry out the procedure for this situation. 114 00:06:36,145 --> 00:06:39,381 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay. Memory items. Airspeed unreliable. 115 00:06:40,149 --> 00:06:43,027 HARVINO: Uh, what altitude should I request? 116 00:06:43,111 --> 00:06:45,406 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Yeah, uh, request, uh... 117 00:06:46,781 --> 00:06:48,366 proceed. 118 00:06:50,576 --> 00:06:53,400 NARRATOR: The situation is deteriorating quickly. 119 00:06:55,331 --> 00:06:57,542 Climbing above 1,000 feet, 120 00:06:57,625 --> 00:07:00,273 the pilots are still unsure of their airspeed. 121 00:07:01,212 --> 00:07:02,755 If they fly too slowly, 122 00:07:02,839 --> 00:07:05,383 the plane could stall and fall from the sky. 123 00:07:05,466 --> 00:07:07,135 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Request clearance 124 00:07:07,218 --> 00:07:08,803 to any holding point. 125 00:07:09,512 --> 00:07:11,306 NARRATOR: Captain Suneja wants to get the plane 126 00:07:11,389 --> 00:07:14,448 to a point where he can circle and solve the problem. 127 00:07:14,976 --> 00:07:16,144 HARVINO: Lion six-one-zero, 128 00:07:16,227 --> 00:07:18,063 request clearance to some holding point 129 00:07:18,146 --> 00:07:19,814 due to our current condition. 130 00:07:19,897 --> 00:07:21,316 Terminal Controller: Lion six-one-zero, 131 00:07:21,399 --> 00:07:23,870 what's the nature of your problem, please? 132 00:07:26,237 --> 00:07:27,405 HARVINO: We are experiencing 133 00:07:27,488 --> 00:07:30,018 a flight control problem, Lion six-one-zero. 134 00:07:36,831 --> 00:07:40,460 Where's the... airspeed... airspeed. 135 00:07:42,044 --> 00:07:43,380 There's no airspeed unreliable. 136 00:07:43,463 --> 00:07:45,214 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's there. 137 00:07:46,799 --> 00:07:48,426 HARVINO: Got it. 138 00:07:50,011 --> 00:07:52,513 Auto pilot if engaged, disengage. 139 00:07:53,681 --> 00:07:56,434 COX: Not every failure is a major emergency. 140 00:07:57,018 --> 00:08:00,813 {\an8}And checklists are designed to grade or evaluate 141 00:08:00,897 --> 00:08:03,483 {\an8}the severity of a system failure. 142 00:08:04,358 --> 00:08:07,320 So pilots are trained to methodically go 143 00:08:07,403 --> 00:08:08,988 through each step by step. 144 00:08:10,198 --> 00:08:11,699 HARVINO: Auto throttle if engaged, 145 00:08:11,782 --> 00:08:12,950 disengage. 146 00:08:13,034 --> 00:08:14,660 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Disengaged. 147 00:08:17,997 --> 00:08:20,409 NARRATOR: But the checklist isn't helping. 148 00:08:21,334 --> 00:08:22,960 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay. Okay. 149 00:08:23,753 --> 00:08:25,463 NARRATOR: Now flying 5,000 feet 150 00:08:25,546 --> 00:08:28,049 above the sea, Captain Suneja struggles 151 00:08:28,132 --> 00:08:29,780 to keep the plane's nose up. 152 00:08:30,343 --> 00:08:32,804 HARVINO: The flight path vector may be unreliable. 153 00:08:32,887 --> 00:08:34,514 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion 6-1-0, turn right 154 00:08:34,597 --> 00:08:37,808 heading zero-seven-zero to avoid traffic ahead. 155 00:08:37,892 --> 00:08:39,716 HARVINO: Set the pitch attitude. 156 00:08:39,936 --> 00:08:41,896 Roger, heading zero-seven-zero. 157 00:08:46,817 --> 00:08:48,194 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero, 158 00:08:48,277 --> 00:08:49,862 are you now descending? 159 00:08:50,696 --> 00:08:53,867 HARVINO: We're having flight control problems and are flying manually. 160 00:08:53,950 --> 00:08:55,285 Terminal Controller: Six-one-zero, 161 00:08:55,368 --> 00:08:57,787 maintain heading zero-five-zero. 162 00:09:00,540 --> 00:09:02,625 COX: The cabin would have realized 163 00:09:02,708 --> 00:09:04,836 that the airplane was not climbing as normal 164 00:09:04,919 --> 00:09:06,463 and that it had leveled off, 165 00:09:06,546 --> 00:09:09,966 and there was probably some up and down sensations. 166 00:09:12,677 --> 00:09:14,762 NARRATOR: Captain Suneja has been fighting 167 00:09:14,845 --> 00:09:17,669 to keep the plane's nose from pitching downwards. 168 00:09:18,182 --> 00:09:20,852 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Please take control for a moment. 169 00:09:20,935 --> 00:09:23,771 NARRATOR: He now assigns that task to his First Officer. 170 00:09:23,854 --> 00:09:25,023 HARVINO: I have control. 171 00:09:25,106 --> 00:09:28,165 NARRATOR: So he can troubleshoot the problem himself. 172 00:09:29,110 --> 00:09:31,028 HARVINO: Whoa. It's very... 173 00:09:32,613 --> 00:09:34,991 NARRATOR: The First Officer is also having difficulty 174 00:09:35,074 --> 00:09:36,701 keeping the aircraft level. 175 00:09:38,119 --> 00:09:40,580 COX: There was a wide variety, 176 00:09:40,663 --> 00:09:43,583 uh, of problems that they had to sort out, 177 00:09:43,666 --> 00:09:45,001 and the first thing was, 178 00:09:45,084 --> 00:09:47,753 what's common between all of these failures? 179 00:09:47,837 --> 00:09:51,190 Because that's how you start to sort through the problems. 180 00:09:52,800 --> 00:09:56,721 NARRATOR: Flight 610 is flying erratically over the Java Sea 181 00:09:56,804 --> 00:09:59,804 and becoming increasingly more difficult to control. 182 00:10:01,767 --> 00:10:03,686 The lives of everyone on board 183 00:10:03,769 --> 00:10:06,769 now depend on the pilots figuring out the problem... 184 00:10:07,732 --> 00:10:09,192 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: I don't know where we are. 185 00:10:09,275 --> 00:10:12,511 NARRATOR: ...and getting the plane to the ground safely. 186 00:10:12,653 --> 00:10:13,780 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Lion six-one-zero. 187 00:10:13,863 --> 00:10:15,740 I have no reliable altitude information. 188 00:10:15,823 --> 00:10:17,617 All instruments disagree. 189 00:10:17,700 --> 00:10:19,160 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Roger, Lion six-one-zero. 190 00:10:19,243 --> 00:10:20,786 No restrictions. 191 00:10:20,870 --> 00:10:23,248 CARBAUGH: When an aircraft declares an emergency, 192 00:10:23,331 --> 00:10:25,166 the controller's number one job 193 00:10:25,249 --> 00:10:27,720 is to provide assistance to that airplane. 194 00:10:28,794 --> 00:10:31,047 NARRATOR: The controller allows Flight 610 195 00:10:31,130 --> 00:10:33,674 to fly at any altitude the pilots choose. 196 00:10:34,592 --> 00:10:37,345 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Uh please clear 3,000 above and below of traffic. 197 00:10:37,428 --> 00:10:39,305 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Okay, will do. 198 00:10:39,388 --> 00:10:40,974 What altitude would you like? 199 00:10:41,057 --> 00:10:42,517 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Five... uh... 200 00:10:42,600 --> 00:10:44,269 HARVINO: It's diving. It's diving. 201 00:10:44,352 --> 00:10:45,645 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's okay. It's okay. 202 00:10:45,728 --> 00:10:48,787 NARRATOR: Flight 610 is now speeding towards the sea. 203 00:10:50,399 --> 00:10:52,399 And the pilots are out of options. 204 00:10:56,238 --> 00:10:57,823 HARVINO: Fly up. Up! Up! 205 00:11:00,868 --> 00:11:03,954 GPWS: Terrain. Terrain. Pull up. 206 00:11:11,962 --> 00:11:14,727 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: Lion six-one-zero, control. 207 00:11:17,301 --> 00:11:19,679 Lion Air six-one-zero, control. 208 00:11:21,889 --> 00:11:25,101 Citylink 8-8-2, please hold on current position. 209 00:11:26,560 --> 00:11:29,105 Do you have a visual on Lion six-one-zero, 210 00:11:29,188 --> 00:11:31,148 a Boeing 737 Max 8? 211 00:11:32,566 --> 00:11:35,444 PILOT: Negative. No other planes in sight. 212 00:11:37,405 --> 00:11:39,865 ♪ ♪ 213 00:11:42,827 --> 00:11:46,122 NARRATOR: Thirty minutes after crashing into the Java Sea, 214 00:11:46,205 --> 00:11:49,291 the wreckage of Lion Air Flight 610 is located. 215 00:11:50,668 --> 00:11:52,294 There are no survivors. 216 00:11:54,213 --> 00:11:57,007 Relatives of the passengers are flown to Jakarta 217 00:11:57,091 --> 00:11:58,676 for trauma counseling. 218 00:12:01,262 --> 00:12:04,974 While they wait for the recovery of the bodies of their loved ones, 219 00:12:05,057 --> 00:12:10,229 investigators from Indonesia's accident investigation branch, KNKT, 220 00:12:10,312 --> 00:12:13,650 need to understand why one of the best-selling new aircrafts 221 00:12:13,733 --> 00:12:15,901 in the world fell from the sky. 222 00:12:25,995 --> 00:12:28,819 NURCAHYO: Okay. What does the tracking data show? 223 00:12:29,874 --> 00:12:32,543 NARRATOR: Working with data from air traffic control, 224 00:12:32,626 --> 00:12:37,423 KNKT investigators focus on the flight path of Lion Air 610. 225 00:12:39,675 --> 00:12:41,343 NURCAHYO: They're off course 226 00:12:42,261 --> 00:12:44,673 and their altitude is all over the place. 227 00:12:45,973 --> 00:12:49,310 (speaking Indonesian) 228 00:12:49,393 --> 00:12:52,772 {\an8}NURCAHYO: From this data, we learned that this plane's altitude 229 00:12:52,855 --> 00:12:55,483 {\an8}was fluctuating. It kept going up and down. 230 00:12:56,817 --> 00:12:58,569 We wanted to find out why the pilot 231 00:12:58,652 --> 00:13:01,358 couldn't keep the plane at a constant altitude. 232 00:13:05,284 --> 00:13:08,204 NARRATOR: Investigators need to know if the controller can shed 233 00:13:08,287 --> 00:13:10,935 any light on the problems the crew was facing. 234 00:13:12,333 --> 00:13:13,333 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: They reported 235 00:13:13,334 --> 00:13:15,711 that they were having a control issue. 236 00:13:16,629 --> 00:13:17,630 Lion six-one-zero, 237 00:13:17,713 --> 00:13:20,125 what's the nature of your problem please? 238 00:13:22,635 --> 00:13:23,803 HARVINO: We are experiencing 239 00:13:23,886 --> 00:13:26,416 a flight control problem, Lion six-one-zero. 240 00:13:27,515 --> 00:13:28,766 TERMINAL CONTROLLER: That's all he said, 241 00:13:28,849 --> 00:13:30,976 a flight control problem. 242 00:13:32,394 --> 00:13:33,855 Soon after that, they reported 243 00:13:33,938 --> 00:13:36,690 that their instruments were unreliable. 244 00:13:37,650 --> 00:13:38,776 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Lion six-one-zero. 245 00:13:38,859 --> 00:13:40,737 I have no reliable altitude information. 246 00:13:40,820 --> 00:13:42,613 All instruments disagree. 247 00:13:42,696 --> 00:13:44,073 CONTROLLER: Roger, Lion six-one-zero. 248 00:13:44,156 --> 00:13:45,783 No restrictions. 249 00:13:45,866 --> 00:13:47,284 That was about it. 250 00:13:49,912 --> 00:13:53,415 (speaking Indonesian) 251 00:13:53,499 --> 00:13:55,001 NURCAHYO: From the information we received 252 00:13:55,084 --> 00:13:57,879 from the Air Traffic Controller, we didn't get the impression 253 00:13:57,962 --> 00:13:59,962 that the pilot was under pressure. 254 00:14:01,257 --> 00:14:03,008 The pilot's tone was normal. 255 00:14:03,759 --> 00:14:05,636 It didn't seem that he was stressed. 256 00:14:05,719 --> 00:14:08,806 (speaking Indonesian) 257 00:14:10,850 --> 00:14:15,104 NARRATOR: Since the pilots of Flight 610 reported flight control problems 258 00:14:15,187 --> 00:14:16,776 and unreliable instruments, 259 00:14:17,690 --> 00:14:20,609 investigators wonder if recent maintenance records 260 00:14:20,693 --> 00:14:23,404 could explain what brought down the Max 8 261 00:14:23,487 --> 00:14:25,489 only 11 minutes after takeoff. 262 00:14:29,535 --> 00:14:32,163 NURCAHYO: This flight had some problems with control. 263 00:14:32,246 --> 00:14:34,874 At that point, we needed to learn more 264 00:14:34,957 --> 00:14:37,193 about the plane's maintenance history. 265 00:14:37,418 --> 00:14:40,595 The angle of attack sensor was replaced the day before? 266 00:14:42,882 --> 00:14:46,969 NARRATOR: There are two angle of attack sensors on the 737 Max 8. 267 00:14:47,845 --> 00:14:49,639 The sensors calculate the angle 268 00:14:49,722 --> 00:14:52,433 between the plane's wing and the oncoming air. 269 00:14:53,642 --> 00:14:56,187 Their data helps determine if the plane's wings 270 00:14:56,270 --> 00:14:58,035 are providing sufficient lift. 271 00:14:58,939 --> 00:15:01,567 CARBAUGH: It's a very important piece of information. 272 00:15:01,650 --> 00:15:04,111 The pilots need to have some kind of warning 273 00:15:04,194 --> 00:15:06,155 {\an8}that they are approaching stall, 274 00:15:06,238 --> 00:15:09,297 {\an8}and so the angle of attack sensor is what gives that. 275 00:15:10,492 --> 00:15:12,912 NARRATOR: For several days, the left-side sensor 276 00:15:12,995 --> 00:15:14,878 had been giving faulty readings. 277 00:15:16,165 --> 00:15:18,251 It was finally replaced before the plane 278 00:15:18,334 --> 00:15:21,962 flew from Bali to Jakarta, one day before the accident. 279 00:15:25,257 --> 00:15:27,009 Investigators interview the crew 280 00:15:27,092 --> 00:15:30,262 who flew the same plane just hours before the crash 281 00:15:30,971 --> 00:15:32,807 to determine if there were any problems 282 00:15:32,890 --> 00:15:34,538 with the replacement sensor. 283 00:15:35,809 --> 00:15:37,353 CAPTAIN: Did we have problems? 284 00:15:37,436 --> 00:15:38,562 You bet we did. 285 00:15:41,774 --> 00:15:45,480 NURCAHYO: We conducted an interview with the crew of flight 043. 286 00:15:45,861 --> 00:15:50,156 We learned from them that after takeoff the crew was also having problems. 287 00:15:53,243 --> 00:15:56,185 NARRATOR: What investigators hear next is chilling. 288 00:15:58,666 --> 00:16:01,843 The Captain explains that when he lifted off from Bali, 289 00:16:02,878 --> 00:16:04,463 there were simultaneous warnings 290 00:16:04,546 --> 00:16:07,605 that his airspeed and altitude indicators had failed. 291 00:16:08,801 --> 00:16:10,136 CAPTAIN: Airspeed disagree. 292 00:16:10,219 --> 00:16:11,762 Altitude disagree. 293 00:16:11,845 --> 00:16:15,683 NARRATOR: A few seconds later, the MAX 8's stick shaker activated, 294 00:16:15,766 --> 00:16:18,185 indicating that a stall was imminent. 295 00:16:18,268 --> 00:16:20,092 CAPTAIN: Keep climbing. Gear up. 296 00:16:21,855 --> 00:16:25,484 {\an8}COX: All the modern airliners have three sets 297 00:16:25,567 --> 00:16:28,946 {\an8}of independently powered essential flight instruments, 298 00:16:29,029 --> 00:16:32,825 air speed and altitude, and also the attitude of the airplane. 299 00:16:33,867 --> 00:16:36,870 If there is a discrepancy, you can determine 300 00:16:36,954 --> 00:16:39,013 which is providing inaccurate data. 301 00:16:39,957 --> 00:16:41,292 CAPTAIN: Your instruments are correct. 302 00:16:41,375 --> 00:16:43,002 You have control. 303 00:16:44,503 --> 00:16:47,033 The failure was on my side, so I handed off. 304 00:16:47,256 --> 00:16:48,841 Flaps up. 305 00:16:51,510 --> 00:16:53,888 NARRATOR: The Captain adjusts his faulty instruments, 306 00:16:53,971 --> 00:16:56,390 so they display data from the First Officer's side. 307 00:16:56,473 --> 00:16:58,892 - GPWS: Pull up. - CAPTAIN: We're diving. 308 00:16:58,976 --> 00:17:00,644 Pitch up. Keep trimming. 309 00:17:00,728 --> 00:17:03,728 That's when the plane started diving, over and over. 310 00:17:04,148 --> 00:17:05,733 NARRATOR: The Captain reports that the plane 311 00:17:05,816 --> 00:17:08,444 began a series of un-commanded dives. 312 00:17:09,194 --> 00:17:12,072 CAPTAIN: Use your trim. That's it. 313 00:17:15,242 --> 00:17:18,746 NARRATOR: In order to keep the plane climbing at a constant angle, 314 00:17:18,829 --> 00:17:20,206 the pilots set the position 315 00:17:20,289 --> 00:17:22,916 of their horizontal stabilizer at takeoff 316 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:25,711 and make minor adjustments during the flight. 317 00:17:25,794 --> 00:17:27,463 That's called trim. 318 00:17:27,546 --> 00:17:30,340 Trim can either be adjusted by the autopilot 319 00:17:30,424 --> 00:17:32,009 or manually by the crew. 320 00:17:33,677 --> 00:17:37,347 But every time the first officer tries to trim the nose up, 321 00:17:37,431 --> 00:17:39,892 the automated system pushes it back down. 322 00:17:41,518 --> 00:17:44,063 The First Officer is finding it almost impossible 323 00:17:44,146 --> 00:17:45,735 to keep the plane climbing. 324 00:17:47,149 --> 00:17:49,443 COX: The trim system on a modern jet 325 00:17:49,526 --> 00:17:51,403 has to be very powerful. 326 00:17:51,487 --> 00:17:53,322 The trim, in many cases, 327 00:17:53,405 --> 00:17:56,408 is actually more powerful than the control column. 328 00:17:58,368 --> 00:18:00,997 NARRATOR: For some reason, the MAX 8's stabilizer 329 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:05,084 continues to move independently, pushing the plane's nose down 330 00:18:05,167 --> 00:18:07,344 despite the First Officer's commands. 331 00:18:09,505 --> 00:18:11,632 CAPTAIN: Let's see what's in the book. 332 00:18:11,715 --> 00:18:14,343 NARRATOR: When the automated system moves the stabilizer, 333 00:18:14,426 --> 00:18:16,512 it also spins a large wheel 334 00:18:16,595 --> 00:18:18,831 that's located between the two pilots. 335 00:18:19,264 --> 00:18:20,641 This tells them that the system 336 00:18:20,724 --> 00:18:22,666 is adjusting the trim on its own. 337 00:18:24,895 --> 00:18:27,606 {\an8}(speaking Indonesian) 338 00:18:27,689 --> 00:18:30,568 {\an8}ONY WIBOWO: When the captain bent down to look at the checklist manual 339 00:18:30,651 --> 00:18:33,112 to solve the problem during this flight, 340 00:18:33,195 --> 00:18:35,781 the third crew was the one notifying the pilot 341 00:18:35,864 --> 00:18:37,982 that the trim was moving abnormally. 342 00:18:40,702 --> 00:18:42,079 CAPTAIN: Runaway Stabilizer. 343 00:18:42,162 --> 00:18:43,747 Moving switches to cutout. 344 00:18:44,915 --> 00:18:47,793 NARRATOR: The crew realizes the stabilizer's automatic 345 00:18:47,876 --> 00:18:49,641 trim system is malfunctioning. 346 00:18:50,379 --> 00:18:52,674 It's continually pushing the nose down. 347 00:18:54,258 --> 00:18:56,760 Disengaging the system resolves the issue. 348 00:18:57,761 --> 00:19:00,139 CARBAUGH: When they cut out the trim switches, 349 00:19:00,222 --> 00:19:03,475 the system stopped doing nose down trim. 350 00:19:03,559 --> 00:19:06,687 CAPTAIN: Moving the switch to cutout pretty much solved it. 351 00:19:06,770 --> 00:19:09,106 NARRATOR: The investigators learn that the previous crew 352 00:19:09,189 --> 00:19:11,013 then did something astonishing. 353 00:19:13,443 --> 00:19:15,070 CAPTAIN: So we kept going. 354 00:19:16,947 --> 00:19:18,615 INVESTIGATOR: You kept going? 355 00:19:22,369 --> 00:19:25,748 NURCAHYO: If they had decided to return and land in Denpasar, 356 00:19:25,831 --> 00:19:28,184 it would have taken only 5 to 10 minutes 357 00:19:28,542 --> 00:19:30,127 and they could've landed safely. 358 00:19:30,210 --> 00:19:33,797 But they decided to continue flying to Jakarta. 359 00:19:35,507 --> 00:19:36,717 CAPTAIN: Lion Air 43. 360 00:19:36,800 --> 00:19:38,506 We'll continue on to Jakarta. 361 00:19:39,678 --> 00:19:41,597 NARRATOR: Following a near catastrophe, 362 00:19:41,680 --> 00:19:45,267 with unreliable instruments and the stick shaker blaring, 363 00:19:45,350 --> 00:19:48,880 the crew elected to continue the 90-minute flight to Jakarta. 364 00:19:51,607 --> 00:19:53,734 COX: It surprised all of us 365 00:19:53,817 --> 00:19:55,641 that they continued the flight. 366 00:19:57,321 --> 00:20:00,199 NARRATOR: The crew managed to make a safe landing at Jakarta 367 00:20:00,282 --> 00:20:03,165 and reported the problem to maintenance personnel. 368 00:20:04,369 --> 00:20:08,546 CAPTAIN: I reported the issue and filled out the flight maintenance log. 369 00:20:08,665 --> 00:20:10,626 COX: If the airplane experiences 370 00:20:10,709 --> 00:20:14,213 an abnormal or an unusual system failure, 371 00:20:14,296 --> 00:20:16,238 it goes into the maintenance log. 372 00:20:17,424 --> 00:20:18,926 NURCAHYO: Air Speed and Altitude disagree, 373 00:20:19,009 --> 00:20:22,221 but not a word about the stabilizer problem? 374 00:20:23,722 --> 00:20:25,683 NARRATOR: Investigators are surprised to learn 375 00:20:25,766 --> 00:20:27,643 that the Captain of the previous flight 376 00:20:27,726 --> 00:20:30,938 said nothing about the out-of-control stabilizer 377 00:20:31,021 --> 00:20:33,139 or the action he took to correct it. 378 00:20:34,775 --> 00:20:36,110 CAPTAIN: Runaway Stabilizer. 379 00:20:36,193 --> 00:20:37,819 Moving switches to cutout. 380 00:20:39,363 --> 00:20:41,323 CARBAUGH: The lives of the passengers 381 00:20:41,406 --> 00:20:43,450 and the crew that follows you 382 00:20:43,533 --> 00:20:46,495 is basically dependent on you 383 00:20:46,578 --> 00:20:48,705 filling out the paperwork correctly. 384 00:20:49,665 --> 00:20:51,313 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Good morning. 385 00:20:52,376 --> 00:20:54,002 HARVINO: Good morning. 386 00:20:54,086 --> 00:20:55,421 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: They're done loading. 387 00:20:55,504 --> 00:20:57,965 So we should be able to get out of here on time today. 388 00:20:58,048 --> 00:21:00,342 NARRATOR: A few hours later, the passengers and crew 389 00:21:00,425 --> 00:21:03,178 of Flight 610 boarded the aircraft 390 00:21:04,304 --> 00:21:07,099 with no knowledge or warning of the potential problems 391 00:21:07,182 --> 00:21:09,685 faced by the previous crew hours earlier. 392 00:21:10,560 --> 00:21:11,853 HARVINO: Fuel pumps? 393 00:21:12,813 --> 00:21:14,755 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Fuel pumps are on. 394 00:21:16,233 --> 00:21:19,236 NARRATOR: Did a repeat of the problem on this aircraft result 395 00:21:19,319 --> 00:21:23,156 in the deaths of the 181 passengers and eight crew? 396 00:21:32,499 --> 00:21:35,044 NARRATOR: It takes three days for search and rescue teams 397 00:21:35,127 --> 00:21:39,298 to lock onto the signal coming from the Max 8's Flight Data Recorder. 398 00:21:39,381 --> 00:21:42,968 {\an8}Divers recover it from a depth of 115 feet. 399 00:21:45,679 --> 00:21:48,682 The recorder has preserved data from the accident flight 400 00:21:48,765 --> 00:21:53,687 and 18 previous flights covering almost 1800 different parameters. 401 00:21:55,230 --> 00:21:57,733 NURCAHYO: Master Caution goes off as soon 402 00:21:57,816 --> 00:21:59,651 as they leave the ground 403 00:21:59,735 --> 00:22:03,655 probably because Air Speed and Altitude don't agree. 404 00:22:05,824 --> 00:22:08,076 Stick shaker activates here. 405 00:22:09,745 --> 00:22:13,981 NARRATOR: The data shows a repeat of the problem on the previous flight-- 406 00:22:14,916 --> 00:22:17,377 Faulty readings caused by a discrepancy 407 00:22:17,461 --> 00:22:20,403 between the left and right angle of attack sensors. 408 00:22:21,965 --> 00:22:24,176 (speaking Indonesian) 409 00:22:24,259 --> 00:22:26,220 {\an8}WIBOWO: From the FDR data we received, 410 00:22:26,303 --> 00:22:29,431 we learned that this plane had faulty angle of attack readings 411 00:22:29,514 --> 00:22:31,691 that affected both flights similarly. 412 00:22:35,145 --> 00:22:38,398 NURCAHYO: Left and right angle of attack values 413 00:22:38,482 --> 00:22:41,193 are off by 21 degrees for the entire flight. 414 00:22:45,155 --> 00:22:48,784 {\an8}NURCAHYO: We suspected the new angle of attack sensor installed in Bali 415 00:22:48,867 --> 00:22:51,453 was either faulty or the installation process 416 00:22:51,536 --> 00:22:53,121 was done incorrectly. 417 00:22:56,166 --> 00:22:58,043 NARRATOR: The mechanic who replaced the sensor 418 00:22:58,126 --> 00:23:00,629 before the flight from Bali to Jakarta 419 00:23:00,712 --> 00:23:02,923 failed to ensure it was calibrated, 420 00:23:03,548 --> 00:23:05,548 which resulted in faulty readings. 421 00:23:06,551 --> 00:23:10,305 {\an8}COX: There's a procedure that would have shown it was erroneous 422 00:23:10,389 --> 00:23:12,182 {\an8}and that it was bad. 423 00:23:12,265 --> 00:23:14,267 They signed off that they did it. 424 00:23:14,351 --> 00:23:16,144 They could not have done it. 425 00:23:17,020 --> 00:23:19,273 NARRATOR: On the Max 8, the angle of attack sensor 426 00:23:19,356 --> 00:23:21,827 doesn't just measure the airplane's angle. 427 00:23:22,401 --> 00:23:24,236 HARVINO: Altitude disagree. 428 00:23:24,319 --> 00:23:27,731 NARRATOR: It helps calculate precise airspeed and altitude. 429 00:23:29,950 --> 00:23:33,203 NURCAHYO: That explains why airspeed and altitude 430 00:23:33,286 --> 00:23:35,539 disagreed throughout the whole flight. 431 00:23:35,622 --> 00:23:38,083 NARRATOR: The malfunctioning sensor on the captain's side 432 00:23:38,166 --> 00:23:40,210 resulted in a difference between the left 433 00:23:40,293 --> 00:23:43,213 and right side speed and altitude displays. 434 00:23:44,881 --> 00:23:46,383 NURCAHYO: Then there's this. 435 00:23:46,466 --> 00:23:49,970 NARRATOR: The data clearly shows that for every nose up trim input 436 00:23:50,053 --> 00:23:54,099 there was a corresponding automatic nose-down trim input. 437 00:23:55,517 --> 00:23:59,106 NURCAHYO: It sounds like what the crew of Flight 43 described. 438 00:23:59,271 --> 00:24:00,814 NARRATOR: The data shows investigators 439 00:24:00,897 --> 00:24:04,074 that for some reason, the plane's automated trim system 440 00:24:04,651 --> 00:24:07,154 was repeatedly dropping the plane's nose 441 00:24:07,237 --> 00:24:09,296 while the pilots fought to lift it. 442 00:24:12,909 --> 00:24:15,733 NURCAHYO: Twenty-six separate nose-down commands. 443 00:24:16,872 --> 00:24:19,755 This doesn't look like a runaway stabilizer to me. 444 00:24:20,417 --> 00:24:24,421 NARRATOR: Runaway stabilizer is a common malfunction of the trim system, 445 00:24:24,504 --> 00:24:26,882 usually resulting in one continuous 446 00:24:26,965 --> 00:24:29,318 un-commanded movement of the stabilizer. 447 00:24:33,763 --> 00:24:36,183 NURCAHYO: The NTSB brought a representative from Boeing 448 00:24:36,266 --> 00:24:38,149 to help us in our investigation. 449 00:24:38,727 --> 00:24:43,190 We asked them to explain why in both Flight 610 and 043, 450 00:24:43,273 --> 00:24:45,568 the same plane continued to pitch down. 451 00:24:45,901 --> 00:24:48,528 (speaking Indonesian) 452 00:24:52,199 --> 00:24:55,670 NURCAHYO: We're trying to understand these automatic inputs. 453 00:24:56,119 --> 00:24:58,708 BOEING REP: It looks like the MCAS kicked in. 454 00:25:00,540 --> 00:25:01,835 NURCAHYO: What's that? 455 00:25:03,126 --> 00:25:07,464 NARRATOR: Boeing points to an obscure automated system known as MCAS-- 456 00:25:08,173 --> 00:25:11,173 The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. 457 00:25:13,637 --> 00:25:16,637 WIBOWO: That's when we first learned about the MCAS. 458 00:25:18,058 --> 00:25:22,176 NARRATOR: To understand what could have caused the crash of Flight 610, 459 00:25:22,270 --> 00:25:26,149 investigators need to go back seven years to 2011 460 00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:30,695 when Boeing first announced the development of the MAX 8. 461 00:25:32,030 --> 00:25:33,698 DAVID: The 737 MAX 462 00:25:33,782 --> 00:25:36,409 {\an8}was basically born out of a need 463 00:25:36,493 --> 00:25:41,581 {\an8}to improve the performance and sales of the 737. 464 00:25:44,167 --> 00:25:48,088 NARRATOR: In 2010, Boeing's main competitor, Airbus, 465 00:25:48,171 --> 00:25:50,257 unveiled the A320 neo, 466 00:25:51,466 --> 00:25:53,677 a fuel-efficient short-haul airplane. 467 00:25:54,261 --> 00:25:56,221 It was an immediate hit with airlines 468 00:25:56,304 --> 00:25:58,640 at a time of rising fuel costs. 469 00:26:00,475 --> 00:26:02,769 COX: Boeing was caught by surprise. 470 00:26:03,311 --> 00:26:07,732 The A320 neo was significantly more fuel-efficient. 471 00:26:08,483 --> 00:26:11,570 So all of a sudden, they were faced with a dilemma. 472 00:26:11,653 --> 00:26:15,323 Do you design a new airplane, 4-or 5-year project, 473 00:26:15,407 --> 00:26:18,285 or do you modify the existing 737? 474 00:26:21,705 --> 00:26:23,832 NARRATOR: But there were problems with taking a plane 475 00:26:23,915 --> 00:26:25,917 that was designed in the 1960s 476 00:26:26,668 --> 00:26:29,845 and turning it into a fast and fuel-efficient aircraft. 477 00:26:32,007 --> 00:26:34,551 CARBAUGH: To improve the performance of the MAX, 478 00:26:34,634 --> 00:26:40,015 they decided to install more fuel efficient, larger engines. 479 00:26:41,266 --> 00:26:43,602 NARRATOR: The only way to make those larger engines fit 480 00:26:43,685 --> 00:26:46,896 was to slide them forward on the wings. 481 00:26:46,980 --> 00:26:49,357 COX: The design engineers had a problem 482 00:26:49,441 --> 00:26:52,027 with the ground clearance from the engines. 483 00:26:52,110 --> 00:26:56,072 And on a 737, you can't increase the size of the main landing gear 484 00:26:56,156 --> 00:26:57,991 because of the size of the wheel wells. 485 00:26:58,074 --> 00:27:01,578 It has to fit there. So the only thing they could do 486 00:27:01,661 --> 00:27:04,539 was to move the engines further forward and up. 487 00:27:05,624 --> 00:27:08,742 NARRATOR: That solved one problem but created another. 488 00:27:10,045 --> 00:27:13,840 It caused the 737 to pitch up at low speeds, 489 00:27:13,923 --> 00:27:16,927 particularly when it was already in a nose up position 490 00:27:17,010 --> 00:27:18,595 like during takeoffs. 491 00:27:19,346 --> 00:27:21,723 COX: So they created software 492 00:27:21,806 --> 00:27:24,893 that would recognize the airplane approaching stall 493 00:27:25,477 --> 00:27:28,730 and artificially force the nose down, 494 00:27:28,813 --> 00:27:33,485 and logically they turned to the trim system to do that. 495 00:27:33,568 --> 00:27:35,195 NURCAHYO: And that's the problem 496 00:27:35,278 --> 00:27:36,446 you solved with MCAS? 497 00:27:36,529 --> 00:27:39,941 BOEING REP: Yes, it made the MAX handle like any other 737. 498 00:27:40,825 --> 00:27:43,578 COX: MCAS was a design 499 00:27:43,662 --> 00:27:45,914 for a very low probability event. 500 00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:48,709 HARVINO: It's diving. It's diving! 501 00:27:48,792 --> 00:27:50,335 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's okay. 502 00:27:50,418 --> 00:27:52,379 NURCAHYO: How were they trained to respond? 503 00:27:52,462 --> 00:27:55,215 BOEING REP: Well, they weren't. Not specifically. 504 00:27:55,298 --> 00:27:57,008 HARVINO: Fly up. Up! Up! 505 00:27:58,843 --> 00:28:02,639 NARRATOR: Could Boeing's high-tech solution to a design problem 506 00:28:02,722 --> 00:28:05,309 have inadvertently put thousands of passengers 507 00:28:05,392 --> 00:28:07,352 around the world at risk? 508 00:28:13,608 --> 00:28:16,820 NARRATOR: In order to eliminate the need for costly pilot training, 509 00:28:16,903 --> 00:28:19,197 Boeing had to convince authorities 510 00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:21,408 that the Max 8 handled the same way 511 00:28:21,491 --> 00:28:23,660 as all previous 737s. 512 00:28:24,452 --> 00:28:28,873 {\an8}CARBAUGH: Different handling characteristics will automatically require 513 00:28:28,957 --> 00:28:31,376 time in the simulator and extra training. 514 00:28:32,877 --> 00:28:36,298 NARRATOR: Boeing argued that since MCAS operated in the background 515 00:28:36,381 --> 00:28:38,800 without the need for any pilot input, 516 00:28:38,883 --> 00:28:41,295 it didn't affect the airplane's handling. 517 00:28:43,596 --> 00:28:45,949 INVESTIGATOR: Not a word about MCAS here. 518 00:28:46,307 --> 00:28:48,602 NARRATOR: Boeing never included mention of MCAS 519 00:28:48,685 --> 00:28:50,450 in the flight control manuals. 520 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:54,107 They argued that since the system 521 00:28:54,190 --> 00:28:56,151 was not under control of the crew, 522 00:28:56,234 --> 00:28:57,764 it should not be included. 523 00:28:59,112 --> 00:29:01,995 NURCAHYO: It's like the system doesn't even exist. 524 00:29:05,952 --> 00:29:07,913 {\an8}Boeing thinks that it's an automatic system 525 00:29:07,996 --> 00:29:09,289 {\an8}for safety purposes 526 00:29:09,372 --> 00:29:11,843 and has nothing to do with pilot operation. 527 00:29:14,502 --> 00:29:16,963 NARRATOR: According to Boeing, the MCAS software 528 00:29:17,046 --> 00:29:19,508 would automatically move the plane's stabilizer 529 00:29:19,591 --> 00:29:21,676 to push the plane's nose down 530 00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:25,430 if it started to pitch up under very specific circumstances. 531 00:29:28,433 --> 00:29:32,198 BOEING REP: It only kicks in when these three conditions are met. 532 00:29:33,688 --> 00:29:36,358 NARRATOR: Boeing explains that MCAS only activates 533 00:29:36,441 --> 00:29:39,500 when it senses that the angle of attack is excessive, 534 00:29:41,154 --> 00:29:42,989 when the autopilot is off, 535 00:29:43,990 --> 00:29:45,932 and when the flaps are retracted. 536 00:29:46,367 --> 00:29:48,453 An extremely rare combination. 537 00:29:49,829 --> 00:29:53,416 COX: Professional pilots don't typically stall airplanes. 538 00:29:53,500 --> 00:29:57,504 {\an8}So the likelihood of an MCAS activation 539 00:29:57,587 --> 00:29:59,470 {\an8}was thought to be extremely low. 540 00:30:01,549 --> 00:30:03,510 INVESTIGATOR: This is the data from both flights. 541 00:30:03,593 --> 00:30:06,596 NARRATOR: Tragically, the data shows that because of the faulty 542 00:30:06,679 --> 00:30:09,182 maintenance on the angle of attack sensor, 543 00:30:09,265 --> 00:30:12,977 Flight 610 ended up meeting all three conditions. 544 00:30:17,065 --> 00:30:18,608 NURCAHYO: The series of problems occurred 545 00:30:18,691 --> 00:30:22,044 when the left angle of attack sensor was replaced in Bali. 546 00:30:26,324 --> 00:30:29,118 NARRATOR: Investigators dig deeper into the data 547 00:30:29,202 --> 00:30:32,372 and discover the MCAS system had no failsafe. 548 00:30:36,292 --> 00:30:40,234 NURCAHYO: The MCAS installed in the plane relied on only one sensor. 549 00:30:42,382 --> 00:30:46,052 NARRATOR: MCAS only took data from one angle of attack sensor, 550 00:30:46,135 --> 00:30:47,762 not both. 551 00:30:49,430 --> 00:30:52,976 Most protection systems are designed with redundancies. 552 00:30:53,059 --> 00:30:55,187 CAPTAIN: Your instruments are correct. You have control. 553 00:30:55,270 --> 00:30:58,741 NARRATOR: So a single failure doesn't result in catastrophe. 554 00:31:00,066 --> 00:31:01,442 CAPTAIN: Flaps up. 555 00:31:01,526 --> 00:31:03,736 COX: What Boeing did not adequately do 556 00:31:03,820 --> 00:31:06,739 was assess all of the other failures 557 00:31:06,823 --> 00:31:09,284 that that single component would have. 558 00:31:10,410 --> 00:31:12,996 NURCAHYO: The faulty angle of attack sensor 559 00:31:13,079 --> 00:31:15,668 wrongly showed the plane pitching up steeply. 560 00:31:16,457 --> 00:31:19,399 The autopilot was disengaged for the entire flight. 561 00:31:20,086 --> 00:31:23,339 And then right here, they retract the flaps. 562 00:31:24,716 --> 00:31:28,386 Exactly the same as the previous flight. 563 00:31:30,680 --> 00:31:37,687 That's when MCAS kicks in and starts pushing the nose down. 564 00:31:40,106 --> 00:31:44,342 NARRATOR: Up to this point, the crew only had a minor instrument problem. 565 00:31:45,695 --> 00:31:46,905 By raising the flaps... 566 00:31:46,988 --> 00:31:48,114 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay. Okay. 567 00:31:48,197 --> 00:31:48,823 NARRATOR: ...the pilots 568 00:31:48,907 --> 00:31:51,951 unknowingly triggered a much more serious problem. 569 00:31:55,496 --> 00:31:59,026 BOEING REP: We assumed that pilots would know how to respond. 570 00:31:59,876 --> 00:32:01,878 NARRATOR: Boeing made the assumption 571 00:32:01,961 --> 00:32:03,922 that pilots would respond to the un-commanded MCAS 572 00:32:04,005 --> 00:32:06,758 inputs by disengaging the automatic trim. 573 00:32:09,093 --> 00:32:11,179 COX: The Boeing assumptions were that the pilots 574 00:32:11,262 --> 00:32:16,100 would instantly recognize the inadvertent MCAS activation 575 00:32:16,893 --> 00:32:18,893 and treat it within three seconds. 576 00:32:20,313 --> 00:32:22,315 NARRATOR: Investigators examine the flight data 577 00:32:22,398 --> 00:32:24,609 of the previous Lion Air flight 578 00:32:24,692 --> 00:32:27,904 to see how that crew reacted to the MCAS activation. 579 00:32:29,280 --> 00:32:31,199 NURCAHYO: The first MCAS input 580 00:32:31,282 --> 00:32:32,867 on Flight 43 is here. 581 00:32:34,285 --> 00:32:37,163 The Captain pulls back on his control column 582 00:32:37,246 --> 00:32:39,040 and applies manual trim, 583 00:32:39,123 --> 00:32:42,877 then fights against the MCAS for 3 minutes and 40 seconds 584 00:32:42,961 --> 00:32:45,004 before hitting the cutout switch. 585 00:32:45,088 --> 00:32:46,298 COX: I think the assumption 586 00:32:46,381 --> 00:32:49,550 that they were going to recognize and act 587 00:32:49,634 --> 00:32:54,597 within three seconds was very optimistic, if not unrealistic. 588 00:32:57,141 --> 00:32:58,351 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Lion six-one-zero. 589 00:32:58,434 --> 00:33:00,395 I have no reliable altitude information. 590 00:33:00,478 --> 00:33:02,063 All instruments disagree. 591 00:33:02,772 --> 00:33:06,359 NARRATOR: Unlike the previous crew, the pilots of Flight 610 592 00:33:06,526 --> 00:33:09,644 struggled with the problem for more than 10 minutes... 593 00:33:10,113 --> 00:33:11,739 HARVINO: Fly up. Up. Up! 594 00:33:12,448 --> 00:33:16,331 NARRATOR: ...and never made the connection to a runaway stabilizer. 595 00:33:21,833 --> 00:33:24,961 Investigators need to understand why two crews, 596 00:33:25,044 --> 00:33:28,756 facing an identical problem, reacted so differently. 597 00:33:35,930 --> 00:33:38,141 NARRATOR: Investigators struggle to understand 598 00:33:38,224 --> 00:33:42,603 why the pilots of Lion Air Flight 610 lost control of the aircraft. 599 00:33:43,479 --> 00:33:46,774 After nearly three months of searching the ocean floor, 600 00:33:46,858 --> 00:33:49,736 the cockpit voice recorder is finally recovered 601 00:33:49,819 --> 00:33:51,404 and taken for analysis. 602 00:33:54,866 --> 00:33:57,535 {\an8}WIBOWO: The CVR was the key to our investigation. 603 00:33:57,618 --> 00:33:59,579 Together with the FDR data, 604 00:33:59,662 --> 00:34:03,015 the CVR could reveal all the mystery in our investigation. 605 00:34:06,127 --> 00:34:07,545 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Lion 6-1-0 606 00:34:07,628 --> 00:34:09,255 cleared for takeoff. 607 00:34:09,797 --> 00:34:12,884 NARRATOR: Investigators hope the recording will help to explain 608 00:34:12,967 --> 00:34:16,846 why the crew of Flight 610 couldn't identify the problem 609 00:34:16,929 --> 00:34:19,106 and take corrective action to fix it. 610 00:34:19,515 --> 00:34:20,808 HARVINO: Rotate. 611 00:34:22,435 --> 00:34:23,686 (beeping) 612 00:34:23,770 --> 00:34:25,855 Takeoff config. 613 00:34:26,314 --> 00:34:28,079 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay, but what? 614 00:34:28,608 --> 00:34:30,860 NARRATOR: The faulty angle of attack sensor 615 00:34:30,943 --> 00:34:34,473 triggers a series of warnings as soon as the plane lifts off. 616 00:34:36,824 --> 00:34:37,951 HARVINO: Airspeed disagree. 617 00:34:38,034 --> 00:34:39,619 What's going on? 618 00:34:41,871 --> 00:34:44,107 Should we request a return to Jakarta? 619 00:34:45,083 --> 00:34:46,907 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Landing gear up. 620 00:34:51,130 --> 00:34:53,967 {\an8}NURCAHYO: After takeoff, the MCAS system was activated 621 00:34:54,050 --> 00:34:56,286 {\an8}and their plane started to pitch down. 622 00:34:57,804 --> 00:35:00,432 NARRATOR: The captain has noticed that the plane's stabilizer 623 00:35:00,515 --> 00:35:02,809 is now automatically trimming the nose down 624 00:35:02,892 --> 00:35:05,228 and does what Boeing assumed he would. 625 00:35:07,021 --> 00:35:10,608 He pulls back on the control column and uses manual trim 626 00:35:10,691 --> 00:35:13,152 to counteract the computerized inputs. 627 00:35:14,529 --> 00:35:15,947 NURCAHYO: Okay. 628 00:35:16,030 --> 00:35:17,678 Boeing was right about that. 629 00:35:18,241 --> 00:35:21,594 NARRATOR: But the captain never mentions the trim problem. 630 00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:24,789 He and his first officer are focused entirely 631 00:35:24,872 --> 00:35:27,708 on their faulty airspeed and altitude readings. 632 00:35:27,792 --> 00:35:30,002 HARVINO: Where is the... airspeed... 633 00:35:30,086 --> 00:35:33,464 airspeed. There's no airspeed unreliable. 634 00:35:33,548 --> 00:35:35,341 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's there. 635 00:35:36,134 --> 00:35:37,718 HARVINO: Got it. 636 00:35:39,095 --> 00:35:41,473 NURCAHYO: This is where we found significant differences 637 00:35:41,556 --> 00:35:44,267 between flight 043 and 610. 638 00:35:45,726 --> 00:35:48,688 NARRATOR: It takes Harvino nearly two minutes 639 00:35:48,771 --> 00:35:52,067 to locate the appropriate checklist for mismatched airspeed. 640 00:35:52,150 --> 00:35:55,361 COX: I think the first officer was pretty well task saturated, 641 00:35:55,444 --> 00:35:58,990 {\an8}and one of the things that task saturation does in humans, 642 00:35:59,073 --> 00:36:01,242 {\an8}it limits our ability to communicate. 643 00:36:01,325 --> 00:36:04,796 We don't hear well, and we don't verbalize things very well. 644 00:36:05,204 --> 00:36:06,664 HARVINO: Flaps up four degrees 645 00:36:06,747 --> 00:36:08,395 and seventy-five percent N1. 646 00:36:09,417 --> 00:36:11,377 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: There it is. 647 00:36:11,460 --> 00:36:14,422 NARRATOR: When the automated trim system pushes the nose down, 648 00:36:14,505 --> 00:36:17,508 the large wheel makes a characteristic sound. 649 00:36:19,844 --> 00:36:21,387 {\an8}CARBAUGH: When the trim wheel moves, 650 00:36:21,470 --> 00:36:23,139 {\an8}it makes a sound like a freight train. 651 00:36:23,222 --> 00:36:24,515 (engine hissing) 652 00:36:24,599 --> 00:36:26,247 It's meant to be noticeable. 653 00:36:26,893 --> 00:36:28,952 HARVINO: The following are reliable: 654 00:36:29,562 --> 00:36:33,482 Attitude, N1, ground speed. 655 00:36:33,566 --> 00:36:35,193 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Check. 656 00:36:36,027 --> 00:36:38,154 NURCAHYO: They still don't notice it. 657 00:36:39,655 --> 00:36:40,865 Wrong about that. 658 00:36:40,948 --> 00:36:44,478 COX: He didn't put it together that every time he trimmed up, 659 00:36:44,827 --> 00:36:47,298 the MCAS system was trimming it back down. 660 00:36:48,539 --> 00:36:50,249 NURCAHYO: Thirty-four times. 661 00:36:50,333 --> 00:36:55,087 He applies nose up trim 34 times and doesn't think to wonder why. 662 00:36:58,633 --> 00:37:03,638 Did not recognize the problem and take the corrective action 663 00:37:03,721 --> 00:37:05,598 Boeing predicted they would. 664 00:37:05,681 --> 00:37:07,183 CARBAUGH: In this particular case, 665 00:37:07,266 --> 00:37:12,230 Boeing made assumptions about design, and pilot experience, 666 00:37:12,313 --> 00:37:15,524 and training that didn't add up. 667 00:37:17,401 --> 00:37:20,225 CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Please take control for a moment. 668 00:37:20,404 --> 00:37:21,989 HARVINO: I have control. 669 00:37:22,782 --> 00:37:25,785 NARRATOR: Investigators now hear another crucial difference 670 00:37:25,868 --> 00:37:28,579 between Flight 610 and the previous flight. 671 00:37:29,622 --> 00:37:31,975 NURCAHYO: That's it? Please take control? 672 00:37:33,209 --> 00:37:34,419 Not a word about the fact 673 00:37:34,502 --> 00:37:37,630 that he's had to make more than 30 trim inputs. 674 00:37:40,591 --> 00:37:42,301 CARBAUGH: I think the captain 675 00:37:42,385 --> 00:37:44,429 was very frustrated with the first officer. 676 00:37:44,512 --> 00:37:46,347 HARVINO: Whoa. It's very... 677 00:37:47,098 --> 00:37:48,641 CARBAUGH: And I am sure he didn't 678 00:37:48,724 --> 00:37:51,430 really wanna hand it over to the first officer, 679 00:37:51,852 --> 00:37:54,480 but he felt that he needed to in order to figure out 680 00:37:54,563 --> 00:37:56,740 what was going on with the checklist. 681 00:37:57,358 --> 00:38:00,945 NARRATOR: But because there's no mention of MCAS in the manual, 682 00:38:01,028 --> 00:38:03,734 there isn't a checklist for the crew to follow. 683 00:38:04,365 --> 00:38:06,367 - HARVINO: It's diving! It's diving! - CAPTAIN SUNEJA: Okay. 684 00:38:06,450 --> 00:38:08,703 NARRATOR: With no warning from the Captain about the need 685 00:38:08,786 --> 00:38:10,371 for repeated nose up trim, 686 00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:13,728 the First Officer quickly becomes overwhelmed. 687 00:38:15,167 --> 00:38:18,587 COX: Sadly, this first officer was pretty well overwhelmed 688 00:38:18,671 --> 00:38:22,091 and as the system trimmed the nose down, 689 00:38:22,174 --> 00:38:25,886 he was not nearly aggressive enough in responding to that. 690 00:38:29,265 --> 00:38:33,477 NURCAHYO: In flight 610, the pilot didn't deactivate the automatic trim 691 00:38:33,561 --> 00:38:36,773 and the plane's nose kept coming down because of the MCAS. 692 00:38:36,856 --> 00:38:39,327 And it didn't stop until the plane crashed. 693 00:38:41,027 --> 00:38:43,196 NARRATOR: One minute after taking control, 694 00:38:43,279 --> 00:38:45,323 the first officer watches helplessly 695 00:38:45,406 --> 00:38:47,908 as the plane plunges towards the Java Sea. 696 00:38:49,201 --> 00:38:50,828 HARVINO: Fly up. Up. Up! 697 00:38:51,620 --> 00:38:55,124 NARRATOR: KNKT Investigators discover that Boeing's assumptions 698 00:38:55,207 --> 00:38:56,876 of how pilots would recognize 699 00:38:56,959 --> 00:38:59,920 and overcome an un-commanded nose down trim 700 00:39:00,004 --> 00:39:02,548 on the Max 8 were fatally flawed. 701 00:39:11,891 --> 00:39:15,480 NURCAHYO: They sure didn't act the way Boeing said they would. 702 00:39:15,895 --> 00:39:17,646 INVESTIGATOR: Here it is. 703 00:39:18,606 --> 00:39:21,525 Without requiring exceptional skill or strength. 704 00:39:22,693 --> 00:39:25,822 NARRATOR: Investigators soon learn why Boeing's assumptions 705 00:39:25,905 --> 00:39:28,616 about how pilots would react were so wrong. 706 00:39:29,492 --> 00:39:31,243 To certify the MAX 8, 707 00:39:31,327 --> 00:39:34,747 Boeing assured the FAA that an "average" flight crew 708 00:39:34,830 --> 00:39:37,625 would be able to override the MCAS system. 709 00:39:38,376 --> 00:39:40,494 NURCAHYO: So were these guys average? 710 00:39:42,588 --> 00:39:44,353 Captain passed all his checks. 711 00:39:45,841 --> 00:39:47,551 Looks like a competent pilot. 712 00:39:51,889 --> 00:39:54,975 This guy is a whole different story. 713 00:39:56,644 --> 00:40:00,821 NARRATOR: Investigators are surprised by the First Officer's background. 714 00:40:01,023 --> 00:40:03,359 COX: The first officer on Lion Air Flight 610 715 00:40:03,442 --> 00:40:05,694 had had challenges in training. 716 00:40:05,778 --> 00:40:07,947 He had trouble staying up with the airplane, 717 00:40:08,030 --> 00:40:09,532 understanding the complexities. 718 00:40:09,615 --> 00:40:13,077 His manual flying skills were not optimum, 719 00:40:13,160 --> 00:40:15,496 and he required additional training. 720 00:40:16,497 --> 00:40:18,916 - HARVINO: It's diving! It's diving! - CAPTAIN SUNEJA: It's okay. It's okay. 721 00:40:18,999 --> 00:40:21,669 NARRATOR: Flight 610 proved that Boeing was wrong 722 00:40:21,752 --> 00:40:24,797 about how pilots would react to an MCAS failure. 723 00:40:24,880 --> 00:40:26,924 HARVINO: Fly up. Up. Up! 724 00:40:31,345 --> 00:40:33,765 CARBAUGH: They never really figured it out, 725 00:40:33,848 --> 00:40:36,517 and then the captain gave control to someone 726 00:40:36,600 --> 00:40:40,646 whose manual flying skills were not gonna save the day. 727 00:40:41,939 --> 00:40:43,441 NARRATOR: As a result of the accident, 728 00:40:43,524 --> 00:40:47,027 Boeing issues new guidelines for MAX 8 pilots 729 00:40:47,111 --> 00:40:49,071 informing them about MCAS 730 00:40:49,155 --> 00:40:52,075 and detailing the procedures to follow in the event 731 00:40:52,158 --> 00:40:54,394 it triggers an un-commanded nose down. 732 00:40:55,619 --> 00:40:59,123 The bulletin advises pilots to apply manual trim 733 00:40:59,206 --> 00:41:02,251 and to move the Stabilizer Trim switches to CUTOUT. 734 00:41:03,043 --> 00:41:06,297 COX: This was a reinforcement to the pilots that says: 735 00:41:06,380 --> 00:41:09,842 There is a system on the airplane that can move the trim. 736 00:41:10,759 --> 00:41:13,888 If it does so, treat it as a runaway stabilizer. 737 00:41:15,723 --> 00:41:17,850 NURCAHYO: Hey, turn the TV on. 738 00:41:24,190 --> 00:41:25,775 NEWS ANCHOR: Our breaking news. 739 00:41:25,858 --> 00:41:29,028 An Ethiopian Airlines has crashed shortly after takeoff 740 00:41:29,111 --> 00:41:31,030 from Addis Ababa, killing all one hundred... 741 00:41:31,113 --> 00:41:32,907 NARRATOR: The belief that Boeing's advisory 742 00:41:32,990 --> 00:41:35,284 would prevent another similar accident 743 00:41:35,367 --> 00:41:39,288 is shattered four months later when another MAX 8 crashes. 744 00:41:42,374 --> 00:41:45,253 Flight tracking data shows that Ethiopian Airlines 745 00:41:45,336 --> 00:41:49,006 Flight 302's altitude fluctuated throughout the flight. 746 00:41:50,758 --> 00:41:53,302 There's immediate speculation that, once again, 747 00:41:53,385 --> 00:41:55,846 Boeing's MCAS software is to blame. 748 00:41:57,598 --> 00:42:00,643 COX: In both accidents, the MCAS activated, 749 00:42:00,726 --> 00:42:05,314 causing this nose down trim situation to occur repeatedly. 750 00:42:05,856 --> 00:42:09,610 And in both cases, the crews let the airplane accelerate far, 751 00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:11,863 far greater speed than it should have been. 752 00:42:11,946 --> 00:42:13,072 Put those two together 753 00:42:13,155 --> 00:42:15,979 and the controllability of the airplane was lost. 754 00:42:16,992 --> 00:42:19,662 NARRATOR: This time the pilots knew about MCAS 755 00:42:19,745 --> 00:42:21,914 and what to do in case it activated. 756 00:42:23,040 --> 00:42:25,334 Yet, they still couldn't control the airplane. 757 00:42:25,417 --> 00:42:27,044 CARBAUGH: Boeing realized, well, 758 00:42:27,127 --> 00:42:31,674 if this crew can't handle it then other crews won't. 759 00:42:33,300 --> 00:42:37,555 NARRATOR: In spite of the FAA's assurance that the MAX 8 is airworthy, 760 00:42:37,638 --> 00:42:41,642 regulators around the world ground the global MAX 8 fleet 761 00:42:41,725 --> 00:42:43,902 until the problem with MCAS is fixed. 762 00:42:46,730 --> 00:42:48,524 WIBOWO: The main thing in our mind was we worried 763 00:42:48,607 --> 00:42:51,110 that all of the Boeing 737 Max 8s 764 00:42:51,193 --> 00:42:53,404 that are currently flying all over the world 765 00:42:53,487 --> 00:42:56,723 might have the potential to suffer the same catastrophe. 766 00:42:58,534 --> 00:43:00,946 NARRATOR: The FAA eventually follows suit. 767 00:43:02,955 --> 00:43:05,374 CONGRESSMAN: And our concern isn't with the mistakes that were made... 768 00:43:05,457 --> 00:43:07,835 NARRATOR: A US Congressional investigation determines 769 00:43:07,918 --> 00:43:10,671 that Boeing made faulty technical assumptions 770 00:43:10,754 --> 00:43:13,257 and errors in judgment, which led to these accidents. 771 00:43:13,340 --> 00:43:17,046 CONGRESSMAN: That pilots didn't know about this is unacceptable. 772 00:43:18,137 --> 00:43:21,015 NARRATOR: Boeing insists it's learned from these incidents 773 00:43:21,098 --> 00:43:23,767 and is determined to make the MAX 8 safe 774 00:43:23,851 --> 00:43:25,853 and regain public trust. 775 00:43:25,936 --> 00:43:27,688 NURCAHYO: Boeing has committed 776 00:43:27,771 --> 00:43:31,817 to making it easier for pilots to override the MCAS system. 777 00:43:35,029 --> 00:43:36,912 Once that override is activated, 778 00:43:37,740 --> 00:43:41,744 {\an8}the system will not continue to re-engage. 779 00:43:43,829 --> 00:43:47,291 {\an8}And they're developing a training program 780 00:43:47,374 --> 00:43:50,586 {\an8}to familiarize pilots with MCAS. 781 00:43:55,257 --> 00:43:59,011 {\an8}COX: The 737 MAX story will change 782 00:43:59,094 --> 00:44:01,180 {\an8}forever how airplanes are certified, 783 00:44:01,263 --> 00:44:05,392 {\an8}and the 737 MAX will clearly be a watershed event 784 00:44:05,476 --> 00:44:06,810 {\an8}in aviation history. 785 00:44:06,894 --> 00:44:08,896 {\an8}Captioned by Point.360 67410

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