All language subtitles for M.2003-S21E02-Playing.Catch.Up.Execuflight.Flight.1526.WEBDL-1080pEAC3.5.1h264-PiTBULL_track4_[eng]

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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:01,918 --> 00:00:05,566 NARRATOR: A business jet shuttling passengers to Akron, Ohio... 2 00:00:05,672 --> 00:00:08,084 CAPTAIN OSCAR CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no! 3 00:00:09,217 --> 00:00:11,011 NARRATOR: ...slams into a residential neighborhood 4 00:00:11,094 --> 00:00:13,138 less than two miles from the runway. 5 00:00:13,221 --> 00:00:15,140 911 Call: We have a plane into a house. 6 00:00:15,223 --> 00:00:16,141 Heavy fire. 7 00:00:18,893 --> 00:00:20,835 NARRATOR: There are no survivors. 8 00:00:22,689 --> 00:00:26,401 Investigators search the wreckage but find few clues. 9 00:00:27,068 --> 00:00:28,445 JIM SILLIMAN: The aircraft was burned down 10 00:00:28,528 --> 00:00:30,293 to almost nothing on the hill. 11 00:00:33,867 --> 00:00:37,704 NARRATOR: But a close examination of radar data provides a lead. 12 00:00:38,788 --> 00:00:40,415 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: They’re cleared to descend 13 00:00:40,498 --> 00:00:42,876 and then they wait a full two minutes. 14 00:00:43,752 --> 00:00:44,669 Why? 15 00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:49,174 SILLIMAN: We really wondered what is the situation in the cockpit at that time? 16 00:00:49,257 --> 00:00:50,884 PASSENGER: Hey, you guys know where you’re going? 17 00:00:50,967 --> 00:00:52,052 FIRST OFFICER RENATO MARCHESE: There's going to be some weather, 18 00:00:52,135 --> 00:00:54,721 so I'd love to have you up here for the flight. 19 00:00:54,804 --> 00:00:57,275 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Whoa. Did you hear that? 20 00:00:58,892 --> 00:01:00,951 PILOT (off screen): Mayday! Mayday! 21 00:01:03,438 --> 00:01:04,856 Pull up! 22 00:01:06,107 --> 00:01:08,151 (indistinct radio chatter) 23 00:01:15,533 --> 00:01:18,578 ♪♪ 24 00:01:23,917 --> 00:01:29,339 {\an8}NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 is climbing towards cruising altitude 25 00:01:29,422 --> 00:01:31,007 {\an8}over the US Midwest. 26 00:01:35,553 --> 00:01:38,849 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Let's keep climbing with 1,500 feet per minute. 27 00:01:38,932 --> 00:01:40,697 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Roger. 28 00:01:46,022 --> 00:01:47,983 NARRATOR: On board are seven executives 29 00:01:48,066 --> 00:01:50,890 from a Florida-based property management company. 30 00:01:53,196 --> 00:01:54,406 PASSENGER (off screen): Sorry. 31 00:01:54,489 --> 00:01:57,492 NARRATOR: They’ve chartered the luxury jet from ExecuFlight, 32 00:01:57,575 --> 00:02:00,286 a private carrier based in Fort Lauderdale. 33 00:02:03,540 --> 00:02:05,625 Donnie Shackleford is a former captain 34 00:02:05,708 --> 00:02:07,293 who flew with ExecuFlight. 35 00:02:08,795 --> 00:02:10,172 DONNIE SHACKLEFORD: ExecuFlight caters to 36 00:02:10,255 --> 00:02:13,050 the people of south Florida for business purposes. 37 00:02:13,133 --> 00:02:17,971 {\an8}Also to entrepreneurs, athletes and even entertainers. 38 00:02:20,849 --> 00:02:22,497 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: 17,000 feet. 39 00:02:23,393 --> 00:02:27,355 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Roger. 17,000 feet. Leveling off. 40 00:02:32,944 --> 00:02:35,363 NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 is flying 41 00:02:35,446 --> 00:02:38,575 a short 35-minute flight northeast 42 00:02:38,658 --> 00:02:40,827 from Dayton to Akron, Ohio. 43 00:02:44,122 --> 00:02:46,791 First Officer Renato Marchese is the pilot 44 00:02:46,875 --> 00:02:49,335 flying the twin engine Hawker 700. 45 00:02:50,044 --> 00:02:52,088 He’s logged more than 4,000 hours 46 00:02:52,172 --> 00:02:54,215 flying various private jets. 47 00:02:56,718 --> 00:02:59,762 Captain Oscar Chavez is originally from Colombia 48 00:03:00,763 --> 00:03:02,807 and has logged over 6,000 hours 49 00:03:02,891 --> 00:03:05,185 flying private jets and cargo planes. 50 00:03:07,687 --> 00:03:10,941 SHACKLEFORD: The captain had flown with me as a first officer. 51 00:03:11,024 --> 00:03:12,692 He was a good pilot. 52 00:03:13,526 --> 00:03:17,238 Oscar and Renato both seemed to enjoy flying a great deal. 53 00:03:17,322 --> 00:03:19,322 It was a passion for both of them. 54 00:03:20,491 --> 00:03:21,962 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Hey guys. 55 00:03:22,327 --> 00:03:24,371 We’ve just reached our cruising altitude. 56 00:03:24,454 --> 00:03:25,663 You know the drill. 57 00:03:25,747 --> 00:03:28,499 We’ll be landing in Akron in half an hour. 58 00:03:30,210 --> 00:03:32,328 PASSENGER: Anyone else want a drink? 59 00:03:34,464 --> 00:03:37,592 SHACKLEFORD: The Hawker 700 passenger experience was more than comfortable. 60 00:03:37,675 --> 00:03:39,028 They had a good galley. 61 00:03:40,762 --> 00:03:42,138 Had plenty of headroom. 62 00:03:42,972 --> 00:03:46,226 The interiors were updated. It was a very nice airplane. 63 00:03:46,309 --> 00:03:47,602 PASSENGER: Cheers. 64 00:03:53,233 --> 00:03:54,442 CONTROLLER: Zipline 15-26, 65 00:03:54,525 --> 00:03:56,444 descend to 13-thousand. 66 00:03:57,654 --> 00:04:00,243 NARRATOR: Zipline is ExecuFlight’s call sign. 67 00:04:03,243 --> 00:04:05,453 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Descending to 13,000 feet. 68 00:04:05,536 --> 00:04:07,830 Thank you. Zipline 15-26. 69 00:04:09,749 --> 00:04:11,397 I’m gonna check the weather. 70 00:04:12,502 --> 00:04:14,588 AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT: Automated weather observation, 71 00:04:14,671 --> 00:04:19,175 wind two niner zero at zero seven, 72 00:04:19,259 --> 00:04:22,303 overcast 1,800, 73 00:04:22,387 --> 00:04:24,931 temperature zero niner Celsius. 74 00:04:25,515 --> 00:04:27,100 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: All right. 75 00:04:27,183 --> 00:04:28,810 We have overcast weather. 76 00:04:30,561 --> 00:04:34,150 NARRATOR: The crew prepares for possible bad weather in Akron. 77 00:04:35,984 --> 00:04:37,867 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Okay. Let's see. 78 00:04:38,278 --> 00:04:40,113 Akron, right. 79 00:04:41,739 --> 00:04:42,741 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Heading? 80 00:04:42,824 --> 00:04:44,648 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Two-forty-nine. 81 00:04:47,620 --> 00:04:50,415 NARRATOR: Flight 1526 continues its descent. 82 00:04:54,335 --> 00:04:57,005 Akron airport is less than 20 minutes away. 83 00:04:59,841 --> 00:05:02,841 PASSENGER: I'm gonna go check to see where we're at. 84 00:05:07,015 --> 00:05:09,251 Hey, you guys know where you’re going? 85 00:05:09,767 --> 00:05:11,061 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: You bet. 86 00:05:11,144 --> 00:05:13,380 Look, it says right here on the chart. 87 00:05:15,606 --> 00:05:16,775 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: I'd love to have you up here the whole time, 88 00:05:16,858 --> 00:05:18,777 but there's going to be some weather, 89 00:05:18,860 --> 00:05:20,486 so we can't be distracted. 90 00:05:23,740 --> 00:05:26,409 SHACKLEFORD: It's not like the airlines where you have a closed door. 91 00:05:26,492 --> 00:05:27,494 There's an open door. 92 00:05:27,577 --> 00:05:30,955 I mean they can walk up to the cockpit and ask questions. 93 00:05:36,336 --> 00:05:40,048 NARRATOR: As flight 1526 descends to 9,000 feet... 94 00:05:41,049 --> 00:05:43,385 AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT: Akron visibility one and a half 95 00:05:43,468 --> 00:05:48,681 mist, sky condition overcast six hundred broken. 96 00:05:49,974 --> 00:05:53,895 NARRATOR: ... the crew learns the weather in Akron is getting worse. 97 00:05:53,978 --> 00:05:57,096 AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT: Temperature one one Celsius. 98 00:05:58,858 --> 00:06:02,279 NARRATOR: They need to know if it's still possible to land there. 99 00:06:02,362 --> 00:06:05,068 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: One and a half mile visibility. 100 00:06:06,574 --> 00:06:08,451 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: What visibility does this approach want? 101 00:06:08,534 --> 00:06:10,887 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: One and a quarter miles. 102 00:06:11,079 --> 00:06:13,021 All right, so we have visibility. 103 00:06:16,042 --> 00:06:19,807 NARRATOR: Six minutes from Akron, the crew has a new distraction. 104 00:06:20,713 --> 00:06:23,758 A flight instructor is teaching a student pilot 105 00:06:23,841 --> 00:06:26,928 how to land in bad weather on the same runway 106 00:06:27,011 --> 00:06:29,263 assigned to Flight 1526. 107 00:06:33,601 --> 00:06:35,837 CONTROLLER (off screen): Zipline 1526, 108 00:06:36,020 --> 00:06:38,315 we do have another aircraft that’s inbound to the airport 109 00:06:38,398 --> 00:06:40,108 that is slower than you. 110 00:06:40,191 --> 00:06:42,693 Fly heading 3-6-0. 111 00:06:42,777 --> 00:06:44,445 Reduce speed one seven zero. 112 00:06:44,529 --> 00:06:46,489 Descend and maintain 3000. 113 00:06:49,409 --> 00:06:51,786 NARRATOR: The crew is asked to alter their course, 114 00:06:51,869 --> 00:06:54,539 delay their descent and maintain their altitude 115 00:06:54,622 --> 00:06:55,873 at 3,000 feet. 116 00:06:59,585 --> 00:07:02,755 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Speed is one seven zero and 360. 117 00:07:03,089 --> 00:07:04,382 Zipline 1526. 118 00:07:12,640 --> 00:07:15,477 CONTROLLER: Zipline 1526, the Piper is on the ground. 119 00:07:15,560 --> 00:07:18,325 You are cleared for localizer two-five approach. 120 00:07:18,646 --> 00:07:21,399 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (on radio): Cleared for localizer two-five. Thank you. 121 00:07:21,482 --> 00:07:22,942 Zipline 1526. 122 00:07:32,285 --> 00:07:36,164 NARRATOR: The Piper radios Flight 1526 with a weather update. 123 00:07:37,457 --> 00:07:38,458 PIPER INSTRUCTOR (on radio): Hey guys, 124 00:07:38,541 --> 00:07:40,460 we just landed on the localizer, 125 00:07:40,543 --> 00:07:42,426 and broke out right at minimums. 126 00:07:43,254 --> 00:07:45,019 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Appreciate it. 127 00:07:46,841 --> 00:07:49,886 DAVID LAWRENCE: They said, "we broke out right at minimums," 128 00:07:49,969 --> 00:07:52,430 {\an8}which means you're at the minimum 129 00:07:52,513 --> 00:07:54,749 {\an8}visibility necessary for the approach. 130 00:07:56,934 --> 00:08:00,354 NARRATOR: Flight 1526 is now four miles from the runway 131 00:08:00,438 --> 00:08:02,440 as it starts its final approach. 132 00:08:04,775 --> 00:08:08,893 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Can you check if I've got everything? Ignition? 133 00:08:09,530 --> 00:08:10,949 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Everything is all set. 134 00:08:11,032 --> 00:08:12,200 Standby. 135 00:08:17,497 --> 00:08:19,624 NARRATOR: Two and a half miles from the airport, 136 00:08:19,707 --> 00:08:22,355 the pilots are still searching for the runway. 137 00:08:30,009 --> 00:08:32,720 Finally, the plane breaks through the clouds. 138 00:08:33,971 --> 00:08:35,389 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Ground. 139 00:08:37,767 --> 00:08:38,935 Keep going. 140 00:08:40,728 --> 00:08:43,606 (plane roaring) 141 00:08:44,815 --> 00:08:46,400 Okay, okay! Level out now! 142 00:08:49,529 --> 00:08:51,471 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: I got it. 143 00:08:51,989 --> 00:08:57,411 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. Pull up. 144 00:09:00,289 --> 00:09:02,172 PASSENGER: Hey, what's going on? 145 00:09:03,751 --> 00:09:07,964 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. 146 00:09:11,008 --> 00:09:13,636 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no, no, no! 147 00:09:15,846 --> 00:09:16,722 (screams) 148 00:09:23,896 --> 00:09:26,857 (sirens wailing) 149 00:09:29,026 --> 00:09:30,862 911 CALL: We have a plane into a house. 150 00:09:30,945 --> 00:09:33,948 Heavy fire. We have a lot of wires down. 151 00:09:39,662 --> 00:09:42,331 NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 has crashed 152 00:09:42,415 --> 00:09:44,651 into a two-story residential building. 153 00:09:51,007 --> 00:09:52,633 Everyone onboard is dead. 154 00:09:56,053 --> 00:10:00,433 The NTSB must now determine what caused this fatal accident. 155 00:10:08,774 --> 00:10:12,903 ExecuFlight 1526 plunged into a residential neighborhood 156 00:10:12,987 --> 00:10:14,614 in Akron, Ohio. 157 00:10:17,033 --> 00:10:18,952 Incredibly, none of the residents 158 00:10:19,035 --> 00:10:21,245 were home during the crash. 159 00:10:21,329 --> 00:10:23,372 But the neighborhood is on edge. 160 00:10:23,998 --> 00:10:28,002 MAN: You just don't think a plane would drop in a residential area like this. 161 00:10:28,085 --> 00:10:29,253 This is crazy. 162 00:10:35,801 --> 00:10:39,096 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It looks like the left wing hit first. 163 00:10:39,889 --> 00:10:42,772 NARRATOR: When NTSB investigators arrive on scene, 164 00:10:43,184 --> 00:10:46,479 they notice a large gouge leading to the crash site. 165 00:10:57,657 --> 00:11:00,159 {\an8}LAWRENCE: One of the first things I noticed as I was walking up 166 00:11:00,242 --> 00:11:02,912 {\an8}was a large gouge in the front yard 167 00:11:03,329 --> 00:11:05,271 in front of one of the townhomes. 168 00:11:06,499 --> 00:11:09,460 It obviously told me that there was a control problem 169 00:11:09,543 --> 00:11:11,602 with this airplane on the approach. 170 00:11:19,136 --> 00:11:20,971 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Flaps at 45. 171 00:11:22,807 --> 00:11:25,602 NARRATOR: Investigators closely examine the wreckage 172 00:11:25,685 --> 00:11:28,156 to determine how the plane was configured. 173 00:11:29,855 --> 00:11:32,734 LAWRENCE: One of the things that we did learn very early on 174 00:11:32,817 --> 00:11:35,403 was that the flaps were at a forty-five degree, 175 00:11:35,486 --> 00:11:37,863 or full configuration, for this landing. 176 00:11:40,616 --> 00:11:42,618 We knew they were trying to land. 177 00:11:44,161 --> 00:11:47,665 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So they’re configured to land, 178 00:11:47,748 --> 00:11:49,667 and then they crash less than two miles 179 00:11:49,750 --> 00:11:51,168 from the runway. 180 00:11:53,587 --> 00:11:58,175 Why? Let’s take a look at the engines. 181 00:12:06,475 --> 00:12:10,358 NARRATOR: Did the engines fail as the plane approached the airport? 182 00:12:11,939 --> 00:12:14,469 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It’s in pretty bad shape. 183 00:12:15,484 --> 00:12:17,695 {\an8}SILLIMAN: One of the things that we were looking for with the engines 184 00:12:17,778 --> 00:12:20,543 {\an8}at the accident site was if they were operating. 185 00:12:22,366 --> 00:12:24,577 We really wanted to see if there was dirt, 186 00:12:24,660 --> 00:12:27,660 concrete bits, that type of thing inside the engine. 187 00:12:28,956 --> 00:12:30,208 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Looks like, uh, 188 00:12:30,291 --> 00:12:33,544 building insulation, and soil. 189 00:12:34,295 --> 00:12:35,504 Okay. 190 00:12:36,088 --> 00:12:37,632 SILLIMAN: Those gave us indications 191 00:12:37,715 --> 00:12:40,539 that at impact these things were producing power. 192 00:12:42,928 --> 00:12:45,306 NARRATOR: The NTSB is no further ahead 193 00:12:45,389 --> 00:12:48,684 in solving the mystery of Flight 1526. 194 00:12:51,979 --> 00:12:54,509 A team is dispatched to Air Traffic Control, 195 00:12:55,608 --> 00:12:58,314 hoping the controller can provide some insight. 196 00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,203 CONTROLLER: No Mayday call. 197 00:13:05,618 --> 00:13:07,244 Nothing unusual. 198 00:13:08,496 --> 00:13:12,625 Oh well, they were delayed by a Piper that was ahead of them. 199 00:13:12,708 --> 00:13:16,587 I instructed them to change heading, reduce speed, 200 00:13:16,670 --> 00:13:20,674 and maintain 3,000 until cleared, 201 00:13:20,758 --> 00:13:25,679 which I did at, uh, 14:49:22 when they were five miles out. 202 00:13:28,015 --> 00:13:30,559 Zipline 1526, the Piper is on the ground, 203 00:13:30,643 --> 00:13:33,408 you are cleared for localizer two five approach. 204 00:13:34,563 --> 00:13:36,857 The Piper didn’t affect their landing. 205 00:13:39,735 --> 00:13:40,945 NARRATOR: The Piper was on the ground 206 00:13:41,028 --> 00:13:43,656 when the business jet was still about five miles 207 00:13:43,739 --> 00:13:45,366 from the airport, 208 00:13:45,449 --> 00:13:47,952 ample distance for a safe landing. 209 00:13:55,042 --> 00:13:56,085 At the crash site, 210 00:13:56,168 --> 00:13:59,421 investigators comb through the wreckage for more clues. 211 00:14:02,383 --> 00:14:03,593 LAWRENCE: What I needed to know 212 00:14:03,676 --> 00:14:07,304 was was there anything in the accident wreckage 213 00:14:07,388 --> 00:14:10,516 that was recoverable from an operational standpoint? 214 00:14:12,268 --> 00:14:15,980 The material that the pilots use, the cockpit, 215 00:14:16,063 --> 00:14:19,593 things that could be documented, that's what I wanted to see. 216 00:14:23,863 --> 00:14:26,158 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Hey, check this out. 217 00:14:27,825 --> 00:14:29,076 LAWRENCE: We found manuals 218 00:14:29,159 --> 00:14:31,807 that the pilots were required to have onboard. 219 00:14:33,247 --> 00:14:35,718 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Yeah. This is something. 220 00:14:36,750 --> 00:14:38,294 Grab an evidence bag. 221 00:14:39,461 --> 00:14:41,255 LAWRENCE: It was damaged, and it was burnt, 222 00:14:41,338 --> 00:14:43,162 but we were able to examine it. 223 00:14:49,680 --> 00:14:53,975 NARRATOR: Investigators then make their most significant discovery so far. 224 00:14:58,522 --> 00:15:02,193 LAWRENCE: We found the angle of attack indicator in the cockpit wreckage. 225 00:15:02,276 --> 00:15:04,779 That's important because at a certain angle of attack 226 00:15:04,862 --> 00:15:06,447 the wing will stall. 227 00:15:09,783 --> 00:15:12,489 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Now, what angle were you at? 228 00:15:14,538 --> 00:15:17,166 LAWRENCE: It was damaged extensively. 229 00:15:17,249 --> 00:15:20,249 But I could see that the needle was in the red band. 230 00:15:24,632 --> 00:15:25,758 {\an8}JOHN NANCE: When the angle of attack 231 00:15:25,841 --> 00:15:28,344 {\an8}indicates it's in the red, you're stalled. 232 00:15:28,427 --> 00:15:31,138 In other words, this wing was no longer flying. 233 00:15:31,889 --> 00:15:33,390 It's as simple as that. 234 00:15:34,808 --> 00:15:37,478 NARRATOR: Investigators determine that the plane stalled 235 00:15:37,561 --> 00:15:39,267 as it approached the airport. 236 00:15:41,607 --> 00:15:43,359 Now they must understand why. 237 00:15:44,818 --> 00:15:46,946 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. 238 00:15:53,702 --> 00:15:56,938 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: That’s great. Get that to Washington. 239 00:15:57,247 --> 00:16:01,365 NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder from ExecuFlight 1526 is recovered 240 00:16:01,877 --> 00:16:04,838 and sent to NTSB headquarters for analysis. 241 00:16:06,632 --> 00:16:09,719 LAWRENCE: When we found out the aircraft did have a cockpit voice recorder, 242 00:16:09,802 --> 00:16:12,054 the first thing we were very interested in doing 243 00:16:12,137 --> 00:16:14,515 {\an8}is making sure it got back to our labs. 244 00:16:15,641 --> 00:16:18,053 I didn't know if we had good information. 245 00:16:20,104 --> 00:16:23,190 NARRATOR: The CVR is doubly important in this case 246 00:16:23,524 --> 00:16:25,568 since the Hawker 700 wasn't equipped 247 00:16:25,651 --> 00:16:27,299 with a Flight Data Recorder. 248 00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:30,489 {\an8}NANCE: Flight data recorders are incredibly important 249 00:16:30,572 --> 00:16:33,200 {\an8}because they give us a no question look 250 00:16:33,283 --> 00:16:35,244 at precisely what the flight dynamics 251 00:16:35,327 --> 00:16:36,954 were all the way to impact. 252 00:16:39,915 --> 00:16:42,293 LAWRENCE: These investigations are like a jigsaw puzzle, 253 00:16:42,376 --> 00:16:44,420 and with a flight data recorder, 254 00:16:44,503 --> 00:16:45,963 the pieces of the puzzle are much bigger 255 00:16:46,046 --> 00:16:47,635 and easier to put together. 256 00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:49,926 By not having a flight data recorder, 257 00:16:50,009 --> 00:16:53,303 it didn't give us a whole lot of information early on 258 00:16:53,387 --> 00:16:54,972 in the investigation. 259 00:16:56,807 --> 00:16:59,685 NARRATOR: While investigators wait for the voice recording, 260 00:16:59,768 --> 00:17:01,312 they work with what they have: 261 00:17:01,395 --> 00:17:03,925 the documents found in the cockpit wreckage. 262 00:17:06,316 --> 00:17:08,444 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The weight and balance. 263 00:17:08,527 --> 00:17:10,362 Will you look at that? 264 00:17:12,114 --> 00:17:14,992 LAWRENCE: We found that the weight and balance 265 00:17:15,075 --> 00:17:17,828 didn't account for the auxiliary power unit. 266 00:17:17,911 --> 00:17:20,330 It's a, uh, little jet engine in the back 267 00:17:20,414 --> 00:17:23,532 that helps power the aircraft when it's on the ground. 268 00:17:24,793 --> 00:17:27,029 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So they had no APU. 269 00:17:30,174 --> 00:17:32,259 NARRATOR: The team wonders how this compares 270 00:17:32,342 --> 00:17:34,813 to what they discovered at the crash site. 271 00:17:37,723 --> 00:17:39,488 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Hello, APU. 272 00:17:42,561 --> 00:17:45,314 LAWRENCE: We saw that the APU was onboard 273 00:17:45,397 --> 00:17:47,456 ‘cause we found it in the wreckage. 274 00:17:48,442 --> 00:17:52,947 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It looks like they were carrying more weight than they thought. 275 00:17:53,030 --> 00:17:55,574 NARRATOR: Investigators believe they’ve found an error 276 00:17:55,657 --> 00:17:58,246 in the plane’s documented weight and balance. 277 00:17:59,995 --> 00:18:01,956 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Were they too heavy? 278 00:18:02,039 --> 00:18:04,510 I wonder how much this plane truly weighed. 279 00:18:06,710 --> 00:18:08,838 NARRATOR: The pilots made their calculations 280 00:18:08,921 --> 00:18:10,923 without accounting for an APU, 281 00:18:11,965 --> 00:18:13,965 but there clearly was one onboard. 282 00:18:15,969 --> 00:18:17,263 {\an8}SILLIMAN: We certainly had a concern 283 00:18:17,346 --> 00:18:18,764 {\an8}about whether or not the airplane 284 00:18:18,847 --> 00:18:20,847 {\an8}was within its weight and balance. 285 00:18:22,017 --> 00:18:25,271 NARRATOR: The NTSB calculates the actual weight of the plane 286 00:18:25,354 --> 00:18:27,147 during its final flight. 287 00:18:28,732 --> 00:18:32,111 NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: The APU weighs 300 pounds. 288 00:18:34,404 --> 00:18:37,324 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: And according to the aircraft refueler, 289 00:18:37,407 --> 00:18:40,994 they were loaded with 8160 pounds of fuel, 290 00:18:41,078 --> 00:18:43,622 but they only wrote down 7700. 291 00:18:45,791 --> 00:18:48,127 So how much in total were they over by? 292 00:18:50,796 --> 00:18:53,465 Ah, they were only 286 pounds overweight. 293 00:18:55,592 --> 00:18:58,679 NARRATOR: The plane’s actual weight was slightly more 294 00:18:58,762 --> 00:19:00,527 than what the pilots recorded. 295 00:19:03,183 --> 00:19:04,393 LAWRENCE: It wouldn't have really made 296 00:19:04,476 --> 00:19:06,888 a performance difference on the aircraft. 297 00:19:07,521 --> 00:19:10,149 NARRATOR: The weight of the APU and the additional fuel 298 00:19:10,232 --> 00:19:13,291 was not enough to affect the balance of the airplane. 299 00:19:14,528 --> 00:19:17,281 LAWRENCE: But it did tell us that this crew and this company 300 00:19:17,364 --> 00:19:20,129 wasn't following their procedures appropriately. 301 00:19:20,534 --> 00:19:24,064 Somebody wasn't watching what they were supposed to be doing. 302 00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:27,458 NARRATOR: Investigators need to look elsewhere 303 00:19:27,541 --> 00:19:30,669 to explain why Flight 1526 stalled. 304 00:19:32,296 --> 00:19:35,841 SILLIMAN: We knew that there was not a flight data recorder on this airplane, 305 00:19:35,924 --> 00:19:37,384 so that's frustrating because 306 00:19:37,467 --> 00:19:40,554 we don't have the precise details about the airspeed, 307 00:19:40,637 --> 00:19:43,285 the altitude and the attitude of the aircraft. 308 00:19:44,558 --> 00:19:45,810 NARRATOR: To solve the case, 309 00:19:45,893 --> 00:19:49,396 the NTSB begins compiling what data they do have, 310 00:19:50,105 --> 00:19:52,482 the radar data from air traffic control. 311 00:19:55,235 --> 00:19:58,118 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Show me what you've got so far. 312 00:19:59,531 --> 00:20:01,075 SILLIMAN: A turning point in our investigation came 313 00:20:01,158 --> 00:20:04,787 when our engineer was able to recreate our aircraft performance 314 00:20:04,870 --> 00:20:06,455 from the radar data. 315 00:20:12,002 --> 00:20:16,548 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. They're 150 knots 316 00:20:16,632 --> 00:20:18,759 four minutes before the crash. 317 00:20:21,053 --> 00:20:22,095 Keep going. 318 00:20:24,306 --> 00:20:25,558 SILLIMAN: Our aircraft performance expert 319 00:20:25,641 --> 00:20:29,144 was able to estimate the airspeed of the airplane, 320 00:20:29,228 --> 00:20:31,188 the angle of attack, the attitude, 321 00:20:31,271 --> 00:20:33,523 the altitude and rate of descent. 322 00:20:37,527 --> 00:20:39,405 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: As the plane approached the airport, 323 00:20:39,488 --> 00:20:41,657 you expect the airspeed to decrease. 324 00:20:42,741 --> 00:20:45,869 It drops from 300 down to 150. 325 00:20:45,953 --> 00:20:47,329 Everything normal. 326 00:20:49,164 --> 00:20:52,753 NARRATOR: Investigators find nothing unusual about the flight, 327 00:20:53,627 --> 00:20:56,255 until they focus on the last two minutes. 328 00:20:57,005 --> 00:20:58,257 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look here. 329 00:20:58,340 --> 00:21:01,009 The speed drops to 130 knots 330 00:21:01,093 --> 00:21:03,887 and then it keeps dropping to 98 knots. 331 00:21:03,971 --> 00:21:06,223 No wonder they stalled. 332 00:21:08,183 --> 00:21:09,643 SILLIMAN: The thing that really stood out 333 00:21:09,726 --> 00:21:12,229 was the excessive rate of descent at the very end 334 00:21:12,312 --> 00:21:13,730 was at 98 knots, 335 00:21:13,814 --> 00:21:15,873 which was gonna stall the airplane. 336 00:21:18,860 --> 00:21:20,821 NANCE: Airspeed is life. 337 00:21:20,904 --> 00:21:22,364 This is one of the most important points 338 00:21:22,447 --> 00:21:24,783 in flying any airplane but especially, 339 00:21:24,866 --> 00:21:25,866 especially a jet. 340 00:21:27,577 --> 00:21:31,582 NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: Maybe they were trying to stay clear of the Piper? 341 00:21:31,665 --> 00:21:32,833 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: I doubt it. 342 00:21:32,916 --> 00:21:35,461 The controller told them the runway was clear 343 00:21:35,544 --> 00:21:37,462 three minutes before it stalled. 344 00:21:39,214 --> 00:21:43,385 NARRATOR: The airspeed data leaves investigators with more questions. 345 00:21:44,177 --> 00:21:47,119 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's look at the altitude data. 346 00:21:48,932 --> 00:21:51,727 NARRATOR: The team reviews the plane’s descent profile 347 00:21:51,810 --> 00:21:54,105 for the period leading up to the crash. 348 00:21:56,273 --> 00:21:59,568 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The early part of the descent looks pretty normal. 349 00:21:59,651 --> 00:22:02,321 They're doing a dive-and-drive approach. 350 00:22:02,404 --> 00:22:06,241 They level off at 9000, 5000, 4000. 351 00:22:07,451 --> 00:22:11,371 Look at that. That's odd. Can you blow that up? 352 00:22:14,624 --> 00:22:17,095 NARRATOR: They make an important discovery. 353 00:22:19,338 --> 00:22:20,297 NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Look. 354 00:22:20,380 --> 00:22:23,842 They hold at 3000 feet for an entire two minutes. 355 00:22:23,925 --> 00:22:25,218 That's way too long. 356 00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,055 And then they plunge steeply. 357 00:22:31,224 --> 00:22:34,401 Bring up the final approach they were supposed to take. 358 00:22:41,443 --> 00:22:42,944 It's not even close. 359 00:22:44,863 --> 00:22:46,532 LAWRENCE: On normal approaches, 360 00:22:46,615 --> 00:22:49,493 the glide path allows the airplane to descend 361 00:22:49,576 --> 00:22:52,997 on a gentle three-degree path all the way down to the runway. 362 00:22:53,080 --> 00:22:54,456 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It looks like they started 363 00:22:54,539 --> 00:22:56,304 their final approach too late. 364 00:22:57,626 --> 00:23:00,754 NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: And then have to race to catch up. 365 00:23:00,837 --> 00:23:04,049 NARRATOR: The data shows that after delaying their approach, 366 00:23:04,132 --> 00:23:06,510 the pilots descended very steeply 367 00:23:06,593 --> 00:23:08,470 and at twice the normal rate. 368 00:23:09,221 --> 00:23:12,516 LAWRENCE: Once they started diving the airplane down to 2,000 feet a minute 369 00:23:12,599 --> 00:23:14,059 to get to that lower altitude, 370 00:23:14,142 --> 00:23:16,103 that approach was unstable, 371 00:23:16,186 --> 00:23:17,687 and at that point in time 372 00:23:17,771 --> 00:23:20,007 they should have executed a go around. 373 00:23:21,066 --> 00:23:23,402 NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: The controller told us 374 00:23:23,485 --> 00:23:26,074 they acknowledged his instruction to descend. 375 00:23:27,656 --> 00:23:28,949 CONTROLLER: Zipline 15-26, 376 00:23:29,032 --> 00:23:30,367 the Piper is on the ground. 377 00:23:30,450 --> 00:23:32,828 You are cleared for localizer two five approach. 378 00:23:32,911 --> 00:23:34,455 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Cleared for localizer two five. 379 00:23:34,538 --> 00:23:35,664 Thank you. 380 00:23:36,748 --> 00:23:39,043 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: They're cleared to descend 381 00:23:39,126 --> 00:23:41,837 and then they wait a full two minutes. 382 00:23:43,463 --> 00:23:44,798 Why? 383 00:23:47,843 --> 00:23:52,432 SILLIMAN: We really wondered what is the situation in the cockpit at that time? 384 00:23:58,353 --> 00:24:01,940 NARRATOR: NTSB Investigators turn to the cockpit voice recorder 385 00:24:02,023 --> 00:24:04,943 from Flight 1526 to understand 386 00:24:05,026 --> 00:24:08,321 why the pilots delayed their final descent into Akron. 387 00:24:09,614 --> 00:24:13,732 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Take it from the first instruction about that Piper. 388 00:24:16,371 --> 00:24:17,664 CONTROLLER (on radio): Zipline 1526, 389 00:24:17,747 --> 00:24:19,666 we do have an aircraft inbound to the airport 390 00:24:19,749 --> 00:24:21,251 that is slower than you. 391 00:24:21,334 --> 00:24:23,378 Fly heading 3-6-0. 392 00:24:23,462 --> 00:24:25,547 Reduce speed one-seven-zero. 393 00:24:25,630 --> 00:24:27,591 Descend and maintain 3000. 394 00:24:27,674 --> 00:24:29,134 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen): Down to 3000, 395 00:24:29,217 --> 00:24:32,179 one seven zero is the speed and 360. 396 00:24:32,721 --> 00:24:36,725 Zipline 1526. Down to 3000. 397 00:24:37,142 --> 00:24:39,186 He wants 170 knots. 398 00:24:39,269 --> 00:24:42,681 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Okay, I'll have to drag everything. 399 00:24:46,485 --> 00:24:48,320 LAWRENCE: Somebody lowered the landing gear 400 00:24:48,403 --> 00:24:49,947 {\an8}to start slowing the airplane up 401 00:24:50,030 --> 00:24:53,492 {\an8}and creating drag to hopefully get a little bit more spacing 402 00:24:53,575 --> 00:24:55,693 between them and the other airplane. 403 00:24:57,162 --> 00:24:59,039 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Did you hear what he said? 404 00:24:59,122 --> 00:25:00,499 There’s another plane on the approach. 405 00:25:00,582 --> 00:25:01,708 He's slower than us. 406 00:25:01,791 --> 00:25:04,144 We don't know if he's on the ground yet. 407 00:25:06,421 --> 00:25:07,881 LAWRENCE: The captain was very concerned 408 00:25:07,964 --> 00:25:10,884 about the spacing between them and the training flight 409 00:25:10,967 --> 00:25:13,386 and was saying that to the co-pilot. 410 00:25:15,889 --> 00:25:17,015 (airplane engines slow) 411 00:25:17,098 --> 00:25:19,268 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Did you hear that? 412 00:25:19,351 --> 00:25:23,469 NARRATOR: Investigators hear the sound of the engine thrust decreasing. 413 00:25:23,855 --> 00:25:26,620 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's see the airspeed again. 414 00:25:30,779 --> 00:25:33,823 The airspeed drops from 170 415 00:25:33,907 --> 00:25:35,825 down to 140. 416 00:25:36,368 --> 00:25:38,957 That is way slower than he needs to be going. 417 00:25:43,792 --> 00:25:46,087 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Look, you’re going 140. 418 00:25:46,711 --> 00:25:49,381 CONTROLLER (on radio): Zipline 1526, the Piper is on the ground. 419 00:25:49,464 --> 00:25:51,925 You are cleared for localizer two-five approach. 420 00:25:52,008 --> 00:25:53,385 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Cleared for localizer two-five. 421 00:25:53,468 --> 00:25:54,886 Thank you. 422 00:25:56,263 --> 00:25:59,808 NARRATOR: Flight 1526 is now at 3,000 feet 423 00:25:59,891 --> 00:26:02,774 and positioned to fly straight into Akron airport. 424 00:26:04,354 --> 00:26:07,296 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: They should start their descent. 425 00:26:08,483 --> 00:26:12,154 NARRATOR: Why did the pilots delay their descent for two minutes, 426 00:26:12,237 --> 00:26:13,822 forcing them to catch up? 427 00:26:15,991 --> 00:26:17,659 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: You're going one-twenty. 428 00:26:17,742 --> 00:26:19,919 You can't keep decreasing your speed. 429 00:26:20,829 --> 00:26:23,916 LAWRENCE: Once the copilot received the warning from the captain 430 00:26:23,999 --> 00:26:25,500 that they were too slow, 431 00:26:25,584 --> 00:26:28,820 the co-pilot should have increased thrust significantly. 432 00:26:29,713 --> 00:26:32,713 NARRATOR: But instead, the pilots get into a debate. 433 00:26:33,216 --> 00:26:35,552 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: No. One-twenty. Where did you get one-twenty? 434 00:26:35,635 --> 00:26:37,221 It's more like one-twenty-five, 435 00:26:37,304 --> 00:26:38,764 which is the approach speed. 436 00:26:38,847 --> 00:26:40,516 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen): But you've still got the flaps to go. 437 00:26:40,599 --> 00:26:41,725 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: And when they go down... 438 00:26:41,808 --> 00:26:42,935 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: This is what I'm saying. 439 00:26:43,018 --> 00:26:44,228 If you continue decreasing your speed... 440 00:26:44,311 --> 00:26:45,437 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: But why? 441 00:26:45,520 --> 00:26:47,356 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Because we're gonna stall! I don't wanna stall! 442 00:26:47,439 --> 00:26:49,566 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: How do we...? 443 00:26:49,649 --> 00:26:51,826 NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Stop. 444 00:26:52,611 --> 00:26:55,280 They are so busy arguing about their speed 445 00:26:55,780 --> 00:26:58,133 that they forget to start their descent. 446 00:26:59,618 --> 00:27:01,828 SILLIMAN: There was about two minutes of conversation 447 00:27:01,911 --> 00:27:03,622 concerning the airplane's speed. 448 00:27:03,705 --> 00:27:07,667 {\an8}The pilot and first officer were actually arguing 449 00:27:07,751 --> 00:27:09,628 that it was getting too slow. 450 00:27:11,671 --> 00:27:14,258 NANCE: That delay of almost two minutes was critical. 451 00:27:14,341 --> 00:27:15,675 {\an8}He's already too slow, 452 00:27:15,759 --> 00:27:18,845 {\an8}and he's overflown the altitude he should be at, 453 00:27:18,928 --> 00:27:21,399 and now they've got to chase the approach. 454 00:27:21,681 --> 00:27:24,152 Now he's got to get the airplane down fast. 455 00:27:25,143 --> 00:27:26,270 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. 456 00:27:26,353 --> 00:27:29,883 NARRATOR: What investigators hear next is even more shocking. 457 00:27:30,982 --> 00:27:34,152 PIPER INSTRUCTOR: Hey guys, we just landed on the localizer 458 00:27:34,235 --> 00:27:36,118 and broke out right at minimums. 459 00:27:37,781 --> 00:27:39,741 SILLIMAN: They were notified that the small airplane 460 00:27:39,824 --> 00:27:41,707 had landed safely on the runway. 461 00:27:44,996 --> 00:27:47,055 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Full flaps. 462 00:27:51,252 --> 00:27:53,429 NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Stop. 463 00:27:53,630 --> 00:27:56,336 Full flaps at that speed? What was he thinking? 464 00:27:56,758 --> 00:27:58,758 Bring up the altitude graph again. 465 00:28:04,599 --> 00:28:05,851 NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: Well hey, 466 00:28:05,934 --> 00:28:08,699 that's why the plane starts to drop like a rock. 467 00:28:10,522 --> 00:28:14,776 NARRATOR: The team finally understands why Flight 1526 468 00:28:14,859 --> 00:28:17,946 ended up in a 2,000 feet per minute descent, 469 00:28:18,029 --> 00:28:20,115 twice the recommended rate. 470 00:28:22,158 --> 00:28:25,829 The First Officer was racing to get the plane back on course. 471 00:28:26,746 --> 00:28:28,040 SILLIMAN: The airplane is too high, 472 00:28:28,123 --> 00:28:29,249 it's too slow, 473 00:28:29,332 --> 00:28:32,043 and with full flaps rather than partial flaps. 474 00:28:32,711 --> 00:28:35,182 They really needed to get down in a hurry, 475 00:28:36,005 --> 00:28:37,966 and really that is our turning point when we said 476 00:28:38,049 --> 00:28:41,761 this airplane is not configured properly for the approach, 477 00:28:41,845 --> 00:28:44,389 and this puts the crew and passengers 478 00:28:44,472 --> 00:28:46,002 in really a lot of danger. 479 00:28:49,227 --> 00:28:53,875 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: He should have just called a missed approach and tried again. 480 00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:57,110 NARRATOR: Investigators now need to understand 481 00:28:57,193 --> 00:29:00,029 why the pilots continued their dangerous descent. 482 00:29:01,948 --> 00:29:05,301 SILLIMAN: When we look at the errors that the pilots made, 483 00:29:05,910 --> 00:29:08,997 we really had to wonder: What was their background? 484 00:29:12,292 --> 00:29:15,587 NARRATOR: NTSB Investigator Sathya Silva examines 485 00:29:15,670 --> 00:29:18,131 the pilots' personnel records to see 486 00:29:18,214 --> 00:29:21,567 if they explain their behavior on the day of the accident. 487 00:29:23,052 --> 00:29:24,262 SATHYA SILVA: The First Officer had more 488 00:29:24,345 --> 00:29:26,056 than 4000 hours of flight time. 489 00:29:26,139 --> 00:29:29,100 He was the pilot in command for 3200 hours, 490 00:29:30,143 --> 00:29:31,908 and he passed all his courses. 491 00:29:32,312 --> 00:29:33,772 NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Health? 492 00:29:33,855 --> 00:29:36,149 SILVA: He... yeah, he just turned 50. 493 00:29:36,816 --> 00:29:39,228 No sign of drug or alcohol in his system. 494 00:29:39,736 --> 00:29:42,238 But take a look at this. 495 00:29:44,115 --> 00:29:47,869 It looks like he pulled an all-nighter two nights before the accident. 496 00:29:47,952 --> 00:29:49,600 Could he have been fatigued? 497 00:29:50,789 --> 00:29:51,915 LAWRENCE: For the first officer 498 00:29:51,998 --> 00:29:54,751 what we found was he did not have 499 00:29:54,834 --> 00:29:58,421 the rest several days earlier that the regulations required. 500 00:29:59,881 --> 00:30:03,176 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's see what the airline has to say. 501 00:30:03,468 --> 00:30:04,970 LAWRENCE: So we wanted to take a look 502 00:30:05,053 --> 00:30:08,431 and see if a chronic fatigue problem 503 00:30:08,515 --> 00:30:11,101 may have manifested itself several days later, 504 00:30:11,184 --> 00:30:14,395 to hopefully explain why this crew 505 00:30:14,479 --> 00:30:15,647 and particularly the first officer 506 00:30:15,730 --> 00:30:17,378 was making so many mistakes. 507 00:30:20,401 --> 00:30:21,820 SILVA: Thanks for coming in. 508 00:30:21,903 --> 00:30:23,727 SHACKLEFORD: Happy to help out. 509 00:30:24,239 --> 00:30:27,868 NARRATOR: Silva interviews ExecuFlight captain Donnie Shackleford, 510 00:30:27,951 --> 00:30:30,162 who had flown with First Officer Marchese 511 00:30:30,245 --> 00:30:31,871 leading up to the crash. 512 00:30:33,206 --> 00:30:35,667 SILVA: Tell me about your last flight 513 00:30:35,750 --> 00:30:37,544 with the First Officer. 514 00:30:38,419 --> 00:30:40,714 SHACKLEFORD: Uh, two days before the accident 515 00:30:40,797 --> 00:30:42,507 we flew into Fort Lauderdale. 516 00:30:49,556 --> 00:30:53,851 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: They want me to fly to Mexico overnight, like now. 517 00:30:55,687 --> 00:30:57,864 {\an8}SHACKLEFORD: That would be fine to go 518 00:30:58,356 --> 00:31:00,400 {\an8}considering the duty time issue, 519 00:31:00,483 --> 00:31:03,486 {\an8}as long as they remained overnight in Mexico. 520 00:31:06,406 --> 00:31:09,325 SILVA: So did he sleep overnight in Mexico? 521 00:31:09,909 --> 00:31:11,494 SHACKLEFORD: Nope. 522 00:31:11,578 --> 00:31:13,637 Came right back to Fort Lauderdale. 523 00:31:15,456 --> 00:31:18,126 I talked to him the night before the crash. 524 00:31:18,209 --> 00:31:21,209 He told me that he was worn out from the other trip. 525 00:31:21,629 --> 00:31:25,133 Even though he was legal as far as the number of hours between, 526 00:31:25,216 --> 00:31:26,634 he was not rested. 527 00:31:28,511 --> 00:31:30,847 He should not have been on that flight. 528 00:31:33,558 --> 00:31:35,018 {\an8}SILVA: The fact that the First Officer 529 00:31:35,101 --> 00:31:38,479 {\an8}had to fly an overnight flight and not sleep when his body 530 00:31:38,563 --> 00:31:41,816 wanted to sleep resulted in circadian disruption. 531 00:31:43,484 --> 00:31:46,073 NANCE: We know that human beings have limits. 532 00:31:46,571 --> 00:31:48,907 If you’re not getting the appropriate sleep over time, 533 00:31:48,990 --> 00:31:51,826 your attitude can go to heck in a hand basket, 534 00:31:51,910 --> 00:31:53,616 and that can crash airplanes. 535 00:31:55,121 --> 00:31:57,791 NARRATOR: Because the First Officer did have the required 536 00:31:57,874 --> 00:32:00,345 amount of sleep the night before the crash, 537 00:32:00,710 --> 00:32:04,464 investigators can't definitively point to sleep deprivation 538 00:32:04,547 --> 00:32:07,018 as the cause of their poor decision making. 539 00:32:09,135 --> 00:32:10,595 There’s something about the flight 540 00:32:10,678 --> 00:32:12,208 that still troubles Silva. 541 00:32:14,140 --> 00:32:15,308 SILVA: How often would 542 00:32:15,391 --> 00:32:17,627 the First Officer be the pilot flying? 543 00:32:18,436 --> 00:32:21,495 SHACKLEFORD: Only if there were no paying passengers. 544 00:32:21,731 --> 00:32:24,817 - SILVA: Why? - SHACKLEFORD: Company policy. 545 00:32:25,610 --> 00:32:26,987 SILVA: The company did have 546 00:32:27,070 --> 00:32:28,989 a procedure to enable the first officers 547 00:32:29,072 --> 00:32:31,074 to get experience flying the aircraft, 548 00:32:31,157 --> 00:32:32,909 and those were in empty legs 549 00:32:32,992 --> 00:32:35,119 where passengers weren't on board. 550 00:32:36,871 --> 00:32:39,499 SHACKLEFORD: Renato should not have been flying. 551 00:32:39,582 --> 00:32:41,112 It should have been Oscar. 552 00:32:43,169 --> 00:32:44,796 NARRATOR: Silva discovers that the captain 553 00:32:44,879 --> 00:32:47,548 violated standard operating procedures. 554 00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:49,926 LAWRENCE: What we don't know, 555 00:32:50,009 --> 00:32:53,096 and what is a little confusing, is why in this case, 556 00:32:53,638 --> 00:32:56,057 when you had passengers in the back, 557 00:32:56,140 --> 00:32:58,768 you had weather that was gonna be a factor, 558 00:32:58,851 --> 00:33:02,146 and an approach that was gonna be relatively challenging, 559 00:33:04,273 --> 00:33:07,685 why this captain decided to allow his first officer to fly. 560 00:33:15,076 --> 00:33:18,371 NARRATOR: The NTSB wants to know why Captain Chavez 561 00:33:18,454 --> 00:33:19,872 broke company policy, 562 00:33:19,956 --> 00:33:22,375 allowing his first officer to fly the plane 563 00:33:22,458 --> 00:33:24,043 with clients onboard. 564 00:33:25,211 --> 00:33:26,800 SILVA: Take a look at this. 565 00:33:28,214 --> 00:33:30,626 The Captain didn't get much sleep either. 566 00:33:31,009 --> 00:33:33,845 He got a full night's sleep before the crash, 567 00:33:33,928 --> 00:33:35,472 but he didn't get a full eight hours 568 00:33:35,555 --> 00:33:37,890 for four nights before that. 569 00:33:39,142 --> 00:33:41,477 Maybe he was also fatigued. 570 00:33:41,561 --> 00:33:43,620 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: That's possible. 571 00:33:44,230 --> 00:33:47,442 {\an8}SILVA: As we looked further back into his records, 572 00:33:47,525 --> 00:33:52,196 {\an8}it looks like the days prior he actually only averaged 573 00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:53,865 about six hours of sleep. 574 00:33:56,159 --> 00:33:59,204 NARRATOR: Investigators listen for any indication of fatigue 575 00:33:59,287 --> 00:34:00,956 on the cockpit voice recorder. 576 00:34:01,039 --> 00:34:03,792 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's pick up where we left off, 577 00:34:03,875 --> 00:34:05,699 the start of the final descent. 578 00:34:08,838 --> 00:34:11,215 NARRATOR: Descending from 3,000 feet, 579 00:34:11,299 --> 00:34:13,652 the crew begins their landing checklist. 580 00:34:14,302 --> 00:34:17,639 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Can you check if I've got everything? Ignition? 581 00:34:17,722 --> 00:34:19,057 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Everything is all set. 582 00:34:19,140 --> 00:34:24,520 Standby... Yaw damper... autopilot... main air valves. 583 00:34:28,733 --> 00:34:30,694 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: He just stops in the middle 584 00:34:30,777 --> 00:34:32,248 of his landing checklist. 585 00:34:32,779 --> 00:34:35,074 SILVA: It's, it's like he's distracted. 586 00:34:37,116 --> 00:34:38,410 {\an8}LAWRENCE: There were checklists 587 00:34:38,493 --> 00:34:40,412 {\an8}that were supposed to be done all the way through. 588 00:34:40,495 --> 00:34:42,997 {\an8}And we found on the cockpit voice recorder 589 00:34:43,081 --> 00:34:47,670 all of the checklists that they should have complied with were never completed. 590 00:34:48,211 --> 00:34:50,547 NARRATOR: Instead of finishing the checklist, 591 00:34:50,630 --> 00:34:54,050 the captain’s focus turns to the plane’s erratic descent. 592 00:34:54,634 --> 00:34:57,137 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen): You're diving. Don't dive. 593 00:34:57,220 --> 00:34:58,471 Two thousand feet per minute. 594 00:34:58,554 --> 00:35:00,890 - Buddy. - FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Yeah. 595 00:35:00,973 --> 00:35:02,684 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Two thousand feet per minute! 596 00:35:02,767 --> 00:35:06,062 Don't go two thousand feet per minute! You with me there? 597 00:35:07,730 --> 00:35:09,983 LAWRENCE: The co-pilot was being coached 598 00:35:10,066 --> 00:35:13,528 so much by this captain that at this point - 599 00:35:13,611 --> 00:35:15,947 this is the very serious portion of the approach - 600 00:35:16,030 --> 00:35:19,033 you're gonna go down into weather that's very low 601 00:35:19,742 --> 00:35:21,202 and very significant. 602 00:35:22,495 --> 00:35:24,731 The captain should have taken control. 603 00:35:27,083 --> 00:35:29,711 {\an8}NANCE: When it's time for the captain to say, I got the airplane 604 00:35:29,794 --> 00:35:31,379 {\an8}‘cause you're not performing well enough, 605 00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,110 {\an8}there should be no question and no hesitation. 606 00:35:36,342 --> 00:35:38,931 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Why wouldn't he take over? 607 00:35:40,555 --> 00:35:43,308 NARRATOR: Investigators hear more than the effects of fatigue 608 00:35:43,391 --> 00:35:45,101 on the recording. 609 00:35:46,310 --> 00:35:49,147 LAWRENCE: By having the first officer fly, 610 00:35:49,230 --> 00:35:53,192 this captain then was dividing his time being a captain 611 00:35:53,276 --> 00:35:54,982 and also being an instructor. 612 00:35:55,069 --> 00:35:59,198 We found he wasn't appropriately managing the cockpit as a captain. 613 00:36:01,784 --> 00:36:04,329 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Don't go 2000 feet per minute when you are 500 feet 614 00:36:04,412 --> 00:36:05,746 above the ground! 615 00:36:09,250 --> 00:36:12,309 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Bring up the altitude graph again. 616 00:36:16,507 --> 00:36:19,051 They're less than 500 feet off the ground. 617 00:36:19,135 --> 00:36:21,846 That's below their minimum descent altitude. 618 00:36:23,639 --> 00:36:28,019 LAWRENCE: It's critical that you do not descend below that altitude 619 00:36:28,102 --> 00:36:33,107 until you have a visual view of the airport or the runway. 620 00:36:36,527 --> 00:36:38,822 NARRATOR: But they continue to descend. 621 00:36:40,114 --> 00:36:41,467 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Ground. 622 00:36:42,325 --> 00:36:46,384 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: God. He, he can see the ground, but not the runway. 623 00:36:46,871 --> 00:36:49,249 NANCE: They're coming down from three thousand feet, 624 00:36:49,332 --> 00:36:51,251 and they've got to get to the minimum descent altitude, 625 00:36:51,334 --> 00:36:53,920 which is only five hundred feet above the ground. 626 00:36:54,003 --> 00:36:57,533 There's not much room to work with here if you screw this up. 627 00:37:00,092 --> 00:37:01,511 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Keep going. 628 00:37:01,594 --> 00:37:06,057 NARRATOR: The CVR reveals that the Captain violated a fundamental rule 629 00:37:06,140 --> 00:37:09,258 by continuing the descent without the runway in sight. 630 00:37:10,686 --> 00:37:12,105 NANCE: If you don't see the field 631 00:37:12,188 --> 00:37:13,600 then you do a go-around. 632 00:37:15,107 --> 00:37:17,485 NARRATOR: Because the pilots were still looking for the airport 633 00:37:17,568 --> 00:37:19,987 while descending below minimum altitude, 634 00:37:20,821 --> 00:37:23,699 neither of them noticed their decaying airspeed. 635 00:37:24,992 --> 00:37:26,494 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Okay level off now! 636 00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,401 FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Got it. 637 00:37:29,247 --> 00:37:30,957 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. 638 00:37:31,040 --> 00:37:33,877 NANCE: They'd been too slow for the last little while 639 00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:37,297 and they don’t recognize even with a stick shaker banging away 640 00:37:37,380 --> 00:37:39,715 that they are in an aerodynamic stall. 641 00:37:39,799 --> 00:37:41,801 GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. 642 00:37:41,884 --> 00:37:43,296 NANCE: That doomed them. 643 00:37:46,305 --> 00:37:49,423 NARRATOR: They weren’t able to recover from the stall. 644 00:37:50,393 --> 00:37:52,688 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no, no! 645 00:38:09,453 --> 00:38:11,331 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It was a perfect storm 646 00:38:11,414 --> 00:38:13,040 of their own making. 647 00:38:15,710 --> 00:38:18,588 NARRATOR: Investigators find enough evidence on the voice recording 648 00:38:18,671 --> 00:38:21,466 to conclude that fatigue was likely one component 649 00:38:21,549 --> 00:38:23,608 of the crew’s poor decision making. 650 00:38:24,969 --> 00:38:27,388 SILVA: We found that the captain's behavior 651 00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:29,707 could have been attributed to fatigue. 652 00:38:31,809 --> 00:38:34,729 NARRATOR: But fatigue alone doesn't explain the long list 653 00:38:34,812 --> 00:38:37,982 of botched procedures on Flight 1526. 654 00:38:39,191 --> 00:38:40,610 SILVA: They broke so many rules 655 00:38:40,693 --> 00:38:42,870 it makes you wonder who trained them. 656 00:38:44,238 --> 00:38:46,407 LAWRENCE: They weren't following their procedures. 657 00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:49,201 They missed checklists and callouts. 658 00:38:50,411 --> 00:38:52,330 They got delayed on the approach. 659 00:38:52,413 --> 00:38:54,943 They were flying in the wrong configuration. 660 00:38:56,208 --> 00:38:59,212 We decided to go back and take a look at their training. 661 00:38:59,295 --> 00:39:02,798 What was it that led up to them making these mistakes? 662 00:39:11,140 --> 00:39:13,642 NARRATOR: The NTSB orders up the employment 663 00:39:13,726 --> 00:39:16,896 and training records of the crew of Flight 1526 664 00:39:16,979 --> 00:39:18,564 for the last five years. 665 00:39:21,025 --> 00:39:23,202 SILVA: You're not gonna believe this. 666 00:39:25,321 --> 00:39:27,910 NARRATOR: They are shocked by what they find. 667 00:39:28,491 --> 00:39:30,451 SILVA: The captain’s termination notice 668 00:39:30,534 --> 00:39:32,946 says that he was fired from his last job. 669 00:39:34,705 --> 00:39:37,458 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that the Captain was dismissed 670 00:39:37,541 --> 00:39:40,012 because he failed to show up for training. 671 00:39:41,253 --> 00:39:42,714 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Get this. 672 00:39:42,797 --> 00:39:44,632 The First Officer was terminated 673 00:39:44,715 --> 00:39:47,186 because his performance was below standard. 674 00:39:48,969 --> 00:39:50,430 NARRATOR: The First Officer was let go 675 00:39:50,513 --> 00:39:53,043 because he struggled during flight training. 676 00:39:54,308 --> 00:39:56,519 SILVA: Both these guys had training issues 677 00:39:56,602 --> 00:40:00,648 and were fired because of them, and ExecuFlight knew about it. 678 00:40:03,025 --> 00:40:05,202 NANCE: The captain's prior employment 679 00:40:05,486 --> 00:40:08,781 was suspect in terms of why was he dismissed. 680 00:40:09,698 --> 00:40:12,160 The first officer's hiring in this particular case 681 00:40:12,243 --> 00:40:14,161 smacks of just warm body hiring, 682 00:40:14,245 --> 00:40:18,332 having somebody with at 98 degree temperature put in the right seat 683 00:40:18,416 --> 00:40:21,358 and say, we've got a co-pilot ‘cause he's licensed. 684 00:40:22,169 --> 00:40:24,839 NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So, why did ExecuFlight 685 00:40:24,922 --> 00:40:26,549 hire these guys? 686 00:40:28,551 --> 00:40:32,388 SILVA: We start to wonder: Did the company know 687 00:40:32,471 --> 00:40:33,848 about these deficiencies? 688 00:40:33,931 --> 00:40:35,990 If they did, did they address them? 689 00:40:37,810 --> 00:40:39,895 Okay, thanks again. Bye. 690 00:40:42,523 --> 00:40:44,692 I just got off the phone with the president. 691 00:40:44,775 --> 00:40:48,128 He said he knew about their history but hired them anyway. 692 00:40:51,449 --> 00:40:54,535 The President of ExecuFlight stated that he had hired the captain 693 00:40:54,618 --> 00:40:56,496 because of his extensive experience 694 00:40:56,579 --> 00:40:58,581 in the Hawker aircraft, 695 00:40:58,664 --> 00:41:02,042 as well as flights that he had personally taken 696 00:41:02,126 --> 00:41:04,628 with the captain prior to his employment. 697 00:41:06,464 --> 00:41:09,800 The First Officer was hired based on a recommendation 698 00:41:09,884 --> 00:41:11,427 from another pilot, 699 00:41:11,510 --> 00:41:14,981 as well as one flight that he had taken with him personally. 700 00:41:15,931 --> 00:41:18,990 He said they didn't contact their previous employers. 701 00:41:20,895 --> 00:41:22,313 NANCE: It is very, very important 702 00:41:22,396 --> 00:41:24,982 in hiring a pilot to do what the law says, 703 00:41:25,065 --> 00:41:26,526 do what the regulations say, 704 00:41:26,609 --> 00:41:29,737 contact the previous employers and have an opportunity to know 705 00:41:29,820 --> 00:41:32,031 if this individual has some bad habits 706 00:41:32,114 --> 00:41:34,879 that you certainly don't want in your operation. 707 00:41:35,659 --> 00:41:38,307 SILVA: ExecuFlight did give them CRM training. 708 00:41:39,538 --> 00:41:42,542 LAWRENCE: Basically, Cockpit Resource Management training 709 00:41:42,625 --> 00:41:45,920 is teaching pilots to work as a team 710 00:41:46,462 --> 00:41:49,465 and using all their available tools together 711 00:41:49,548 --> 00:41:51,800 so they are operating as one. 712 00:41:53,344 --> 00:41:54,554 NARRATOR: But when the investigators 713 00:41:54,637 --> 00:41:58,015 examine the airline's CRM training program, 714 00:41:58,098 --> 00:41:59,683 they are underwhelmed. 715 00:42:01,060 --> 00:42:03,237 SILVA: Not much of a training manual. 716 00:42:04,647 --> 00:42:06,065 LAWRENCE: The regulations required 717 00:42:06,148 --> 00:42:09,610 ExecuFlight to have cockpit resource management training, 718 00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:10,611 and they did. 719 00:42:10,694 --> 00:42:14,406 What we found was their training was insufficient, 720 00:42:14,490 --> 00:42:18,118 and their evaluation of the crew was not proper. 721 00:42:19,954 --> 00:42:22,602 SILVA: This was an accident waiting to happen. 722 00:42:37,972 --> 00:42:40,267 CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no, no! 723 00:42:44,436 --> 00:42:49,567 NARRATOR: The NTSB concludes that the probable cause of the crash 724 00:42:49,650 --> 00:42:52,356 was the crew’s mismanagement of their approach, 725 00:42:52,861 --> 00:42:55,155 deviation from operating procedures, 726 00:42:56,448 --> 00:43:00,077 and ExecuFlight’s lax hiring and training practices. 727 00:43:01,912 --> 00:43:06,041 SILLIMAN: We determined that ExecuFlight did not enforce 728 00:43:06,125 --> 00:43:09,587 and did not make sure that the pilots were following 729 00:43:09,670 --> 00:43:11,435 standard operating procedures. 730 00:43:14,842 --> 00:43:18,846 NARRATOR: In their report, the NTSB makes several recommendations 731 00:43:18,929 --> 00:43:21,307 for private operators like ExecuFlight. 732 00:43:23,017 --> 00:43:25,019 They include better training for pilots 733 00:43:25,102 --> 00:43:28,102 on non-precision approaches like the one into Akron, 734 00:43:29,690 --> 00:43:32,359 and the installation of flight data recorders 735 00:43:32,443 --> 00:43:33,945 that could also be used to monitor 736 00:43:34,028 --> 00:43:35,793 the progress of their flights. 737 00:43:37,197 --> 00:43:39,909 SILLIMAN: The NTSB recommendations really comes down 738 00:43:39,992 --> 00:43:42,620 to what kind of scrutiny you have on your pilots. 739 00:43:42,703 --> 00:43:44,288 {\an8}Do you know what's going on in your cockpit? 740 00:43:44,371 --> 00:43:46,666 {\an8}Do you know what your pilots are doing? 741 00:43:47,708 --> 00:43:49,885 {\an8}NANCE: Standard Operating Procedures, 742 00:43:50,002 --> 00:43:51,962 {\an8}these are incredibly important. 743 00:43:52,046 --> 00:43:53,839 {\an8}It's like we say: Airspeed is life. 744 00:43:53,922 --> 00:43:57,217 {\an8}Well, adherence to Standard Operating Procedures is life. 745 00:43:58,385 --> 00:44:00,596 {\an8}And if you begin to remove that structure, 746 00:44:00,679 --> 00:44:04,475 {\an8}you go back in time and you lose the benefit of all the lessons 747 00:44:04,558 --> 00:44:07,735 {\an8}that we have paid so dearly for in the past by crashes. 748 00:44:07,895 --> 00:44:10,689 {\an8}Captioned by Point.360 63521

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