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NARRATOR: A business jet shuttling
passengers to Akron, Ohio...
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00:00:05,672 --> 00:00:08,084
CAPTAIN OSCAR CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no!
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00:00:09,217 --> 00:00:11,011
NARRATOR: ...slams into a residential
neighborhood
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less than two miles from the runway.
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911 Call: We have a plane into a house.
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Heavy fire.
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NARRATOR: There are no survivors.
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00:00:22,689 --> 00:00:26,401
Investigators search
the wreckage but find few clues.
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00:00:27,068 --> 00:00:28,445
JIM SILLIMAN: The aircraft was burned down
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to almost nothing on the hill.
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00:00:33,867 --> 00:00:37,704
NARRATOR: But a close examination
of radar data provides a lead.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
They’re cleared to descend
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and then they wait a full two minutes.
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Why?
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SILLIMAN: We really wondered what is
the situation in the cockpit at that time?
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PASSENGER: Hey, you guys know
where you’re going?
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FIRST OFFICER RENATO MARCHESE:
There's going to be some weather,
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so I'd love to have you up
here for the flight.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Whoa. Did you hear that?
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PILOT (off screen): Mayday! Mayday!
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Pull up!
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(indistinct radio chatter)
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♪♪
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{\an8}NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 is climbing
towards cruising altitude
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{\an8}over the US Midwest.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Let's keep climbing
with 1,500 feet per minute.
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Roger.
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NARRATOR: On board are seven executives
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from a Florida-based
property management company.
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PASSENGER (off screen): Sorry.
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NARRATOR: They’ve chartered
the luxury jet from ExecuFlight,
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a private carrier
based in Fort Lauderdale.
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Donnie Shackleford is a former captain
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who flew with ExecuFlight.
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DONNIE SHACKLEFORD: ExecuFlight caters to
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the people of south Florida
for business purposes.
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{\an8}Also to entrepreneurs, athletes
and even entertainers.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: 17,000 feet.
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Roger.
17,000 feet. Leveling off.
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NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 is flying
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a short 35-minute flight northeast
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from Dayton to Akron, Ohio.
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First Officer Renato Marchese is the pilot
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flying the twin engine Hawker 700.
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He’s logged more than 4,000 hours
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flying various private jets.
47
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Captain Oscar Chavez is
originally from Colombia
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and has logged over 6,000 hours
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flying private jets and cargo planes.
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SHACKLEFORD: The captain had flown
with me as a first officer.
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He was a good pilot.
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Oscar and Renato both seemed
to enjoy flying a great deal.
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It was a passion for both of them.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Hey guys.
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We’ve just reached our cruising altitude.
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You know the drill.
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We’ll be landing in Akron in half an hour.
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PASSENGER: Anyone else want a drink?
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SHACKLEFORD: The Hawker 700 passenger
experience was more than comfortable.
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They had a good galley.
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Had plenty of headroom.
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The interiors were updated.
It was a very nice airplane.
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PASSENGER: Cheers.
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CONTROLLER: Zipline 15-26,
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descend to 13-thousand.
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NARRATOR: Zipline
is ExecuFlight’s call sign.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Descending to 13,000 feet.
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Thank you. Zipline 15-26.
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I’m gonna check the weather.
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AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT:
Automated weather observation,
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wind two niner zero at zero seven,
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overcast 1,800,
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temperature zero niner Celsius.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: All right.
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We have overcast weather.
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NARRATOR: The crew prepares for possible
bad weather in Akron.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Okay. Let's see.
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Akron, right.
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Heading?
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Two-forty-nine.
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NARRATOR: Flight 1526 continues
its descent.
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Akron airport is less than
20 minutes away.
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PASSENGER: I'm gonna go check
to see where we're at.
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Hey, you guys know where you’re going?
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: You bet.
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Look, it says right here on the chart.
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: I'd love to have
you up here the whole time,
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but there's going to be some weather,
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so we can't be distracted.
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SHACKLEFORD: It's not like the airlines
where you have a closed door.
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There's an open door.
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I mean they can walk up to
the cockpit and ask questions.
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NARRATOR: As flight 1526 descends
to 9,000 feet...
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AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT:
Akron visibility one and a half
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mist, sky condition overcast
six hundred broken.
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00:05:49,974 --> 00:05:53,895
NARRATOR: ... the crew learns the weather
in Akron is getting worse.
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AUTOMATED WEATHER REPORT:
Temperature one one Celsius.
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NARRATOR: They need to know if it's
still possible to land there.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ:
One and a half mile visibility.
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE:
What visibility does this approach want?
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: One and a quarter miles.
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All right, so we have visibility.
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00:06:16,042 --> 00:06:19,807
NARRATOR: Six minutes from Akron,
the crew has a new distraction.
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A flight instructor is
teaching a student pilot
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how to land in bad weather
on the same runway
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assigned to Flight 1526.
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CONTROLLER (off screen): Zipline 1526,
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we do have another aircraft
that’s inbound to the airport
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that is slower than you.
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Fly heading 3-6-0.
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Reduce speed one seven zero.
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Descend and maintain 3000.
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NARRATOR: The crew is asked
to alter their course,
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delay their descent
and maintain their altitude
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at 3,000 feet.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ:
Speed is one seven zero and 360.
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Zipline 1526.
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CONTROLLER: Zipline 1526,
the Piper is on the ground.
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You are cleared for localizer
two-five approach.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (on radio):
Cleared for localizer two-five. Thank you.
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Zipline 1526.
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NARRATOR: The Piper radios Flight 1526
with a weather update.
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PIPER INSTRUCTOR (on radio): Hey guys,
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00:07:38,541 --> 00:07:40,460
we just landed on the localizer,
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and broke out right at minimums.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Appreciate it.
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DAVID LAWRENCE: They said,
"we broke out right at minimums,"
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{\an8}which means you're at the minimum
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{\an8}visibility necessary for the approach.
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00:07:56,934 --> 00:08:00,354
NARRATOR: Flight 1526 is now
four miles from the runway
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00:08:00,438 --> 00:08:02,440
as it starts its final approach.
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00:08:04,775 --> 00:08:08,893
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Can you check
if I've got everything? Ignition?
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Everything is all set.
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Standby.
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00:08:17,497 --> 00:08:19,624
NARRATOR: Two and a half miles
from the airport,
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the pilots are still searching
for the runway.
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Finally, the plane
breaks through the clouds.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Ground.
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Keep going.
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00:08:40,728 --> 00:08:43,606
(plane roaring)
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00:08:44,815 --> 00:08:46,400
Okay, okay! Level out now!
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FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: I got it.
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GPWS: Pull up. Pull up. Pull up.
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PASSENGER: Hey, what's going on?
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GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
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CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no,
no, no, no!
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(screams)
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(sirens wailing)
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911 CALL: We have a plane into a house.
150
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Heavy fire. We have a lot of wires down.
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NARRATOR: ExecuFlight 1526 has crashed
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into a two-story residential building.
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Everyone onboard is dead.
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The NTSB must now determine
what caused this fatal accident.
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ExecuFlight 1526 plunged into
a residential neighborhood
156
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in Akron, Ohio.
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00:10:17,033 --> 00:10:18,952
Incredibly, none of the residents
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were home during the crash.
159
00:10:21,329 --> 00:10:23,372
But the neighborhood is on edge.
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MAN: You just don't think a plane would
drop in a residential area like this.
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This is crazy.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It looks like
the left wing hit first.
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NARRATOR: When NTSB investigators
arrive on scene,
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they notice a large gouge
leading to the crash site.
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{\an8}LAWRENCE: One of the first things
I noticed as I was walking up
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{\an8}was a large gouge in the front yard
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in front of one of the townhomes.
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00:11:06,499 --> 00:11:09,460
It obviously told me that
there was a control problem
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with this airplane on the approach.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Flaps at 45.
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NARRATOR: Investigators closely examine
the wreckage
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00:11:25,685 --> 00:11:28,156
to determine how the plane was configured.
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00:11:29,855 --> 00:11:32,734
LAWRENCE: One of the things
that we did learn very early on
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was that the flaps
were at a forty-five degree,
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or full configuration, for this landing.
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We knew they were trying to land.
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
So they’re configured to land,
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and then they crash less than two miles
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from the runway.
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Why? Let’s take a look at the engines.
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NARRATOR: Did the engines fail as
the plane approached the airport?
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NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
It’s in pretty bad shape.
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{\an8}SILLIMAN: One of the things that we were
looking for with the engines
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{\an8}at the accident site
was if they were operating.
185
00:12:22,366 --> 00:12:24,577
We really wanted to see if there was dirt,
186
00:12:24,660 --> 00:12:27,660
concrete bits, that type
of thing inside the engine.
187
00:12:28,956 --> 00:12:30,208
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Looks like, uh,
188
00:12:30,291 --> 00:12:33,544
building insulation, and soil.
189
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Okay.
190
00:12:36,088 --> 00:12:37,632
SILLIMAN: Those gave us indications
191
00:12:37,715 --> 00:12:40,539
that at impact these things
were producing power.
192
00:12:42,928 --> 00:12:45,306
NARRATOR: The NTSB is no further ahead
193
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in solving the mystery of Flight 1526.
194
00:12:51,979 --> 00:12:54,509
A team is dispatched
to Air Traffic Control,
195
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hoping the controller
can provide some insight.
196
00:13:01,614 --> 00:13:03,203
CONTROLLER: No Mayday call.
197
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Nothing unusual.
198
00:13:08,496 --> 00:13:12,625
Oh well, they were delayed by
a Piper that was ahead of them.
199
00:13:12,708 --> 00:13:16,587
I instructed them to change
heading, reduce speed,
200
00:13:16,670 --> 00:13:20,674
and maintain 3,000 until cleared,
201
00:13:20,758 --> 00:13:25,679
which I did at, uh, 14:49:22
when they were five miles out.
202
00:13:28,015 --> 00:13:30,559
Zipline 1526, the Piper is on the ground,
203
00:13:30,643 --> 00:13:33,408
you are cleared for localizer
two five approach.
204
00:13:34,563 --> 00:13:36,857
The Piper didn’t affect their landing.
205
00:13:39,735 --> 00:13:40,945
NARRATOR: The Piper was on the ground
206
00:13:41,028 --> 00:13:43,656
when the business jet
was still about five miles
207
00:13:43,739 --> 00:13:45,366
from the airport,
208
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ample distance for a safe landing.
209
00:13:55,042 --> 00:13:56,085
At the crash site,
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investigators comb through
the wreckage for more clues.
211
00:14:02,383 --> 00:14:03,593
LAWRENCE: What I needed to know
212
00:14:03,676 --> 00:14:07,304
was was there anything
in the accident wreckage
213
00:14:07,388 --> 00:14:10,516
that was recoverable
from an operational standpoint?
214
00:14:12,268 --> 00:14:15,980
The material that
the pilots use, the cockpit,
215
00:14:16,063 --> 00:14:19,593
things that could be documented,
that's what I wanted to see.
216
00:14:23,863 --> 00:14:26,158
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Hey, check this out.
217
00:14:27,825 --> 00:14:29,076
LAWRENCE: We found manuals
218
00:14:29,159 --> 00:14:31,807
that the pilots were required
to have onboard.
219
00:14:33,247 --> 00:14:35,718
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Yeah. This is something.
220
00:14:36,750 --> 00:14:38,294
Grab an evidence bag.
221
00:14:39,461 --> 00:14:41,255
LAWRENCE:
It was damaged, and it was burnt,
222
00:14:41,338 --> 00:14:43,162
but we were able to examine it.
223
00:14:49,680 --> 00:14:53,975
NARRATOR: Investigators then make
their most significant discovery so far.
224
00:14:58,522 --> 00:15:02,193
LAWRENCE: We found the angle of attack
indicator in the cockpit wreckage.
225
00:15:02,276 --> 00:15:04,779
That's important because
at a certain angle of attack
226
00:15:04,862 --> 00:15:06,447
the wing will stall.
227
00:15:09,783 --> 00:15:12,489
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Now, what angle were you at?
228
00:15:14,538 --> 00:15:17,166
LAWRENCE: It was damaged extensively.
229
00:15:17,249 --> 00:15:20,249
But I could see that the needle
was in the red band.
230
00:15:24,632 --> 00:15:25,758
{\an8}JOHN NANCE: When the angle of attack
231
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{\an8}indicates it's in the red, you're stalled.
232
00:15:28,427 --> 00:15:31,138
In other words,
this wing was no longer flying.
233
00:15:31,889 --> 00:15:33,390
It's as simple as that.
234
00:15:34,808 --> 00:15:37,478
NARRATOR: Investigators determine
that the plane stalled
235
00:15:37,561 --> 00:15:39,267
as it approached the airport.
236
00:15:41,607 --> 00:15:43,359
Now they must understand why.
237
00:15:44,818 --> 00:15:46,946
GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
238
00:15:53,702 --> 00:15:56,938
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: That’s great.
Get that to Washington.
239
00:15:57,247 --> 00:16:01,365
NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder
from ExecuFlight 1526 is recovered
240
00:16:01,877 --> 00:16:04,838
and sent to NTSB headquarters
for analysis.
241
00:16:06,632 --> 00:16:09,719
LAWRENCE: When we found out the aircraft
did have a cockpit voice recorder,
242
00:16:09,802 --> 00:16:12,054
the first thing we were
very interested in doing
243
00:16:12,137 --> 00:16:14,515
{\an8}is making sure it got back to our labs.
244
00:16:15,641 --> 00:16:18,053
I didn't know if we had good information.
245
00:16:20,104 --> 00:16:23,190
NARRATOR: The CVR is doubly important
in this case
246
00:16:23,524 --> 00:16:25,568
since the Hawker 700 wasn't equipped
247
00:16:25,651 --> 00:16:27,299
with a Flight Data Recorder.
248
00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:30,489
{\an8}NANCE: Flight data recorders
are incredibly important
249
00:16:30,572 --> 00:16:33,200
{\an8}because they give us a no question look
250
00:16:33,283 --> 00:16:35,244
at precisely what the flight dynamics
251
00:16:35,327 --> 00:16:36,954
were all the way to impact.
252
00:16:39,915 --> 00:16:42,293
LAWRENCE: These investigations
are like a jigsaw puzzle,
253
00:16:42,376 --> 00:16:44,420
and with a flight data recorder,
254
00:16:44,503 --> 00:16:45,963
the pieces of the puzzle are much bigger
255
00:16:46,046 --> 00:16:47,635
and easier to put together.
256
00:16:48,507 --> 00:16:49,926
By not having a flight data recorder,
257
00:16:50,009 --> 00:16:53,303
it didn't give us a whole lot
of information early on
258
00:16:53,387 --> 00:16:54,972
in the investigation.
259
00:16:56,807 --> 00:16:59,685
NARRATOR: While investigators wait
for the voice recording,
260
00:16:59,768 --> 00:17:01,312
they work with what they have:
261
00:17:01,395 --> 00:17:03,925
the documents found
in the cockpit wreckage.
262
00:17:06,316 --> 00:17:08,444
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The weight and balance.
263
00:17:08,527 --> 00:17:10,362
Will you look at that?
264
00:17:12,114 --> 00:17:14,992
LAWRENCE:
We found that the weight and balance
265
00:17:15,075 --> 00:17:17,828
didn't account for
the auxiliary power unit.
266
00:17:17,911 --> 00:17:20,330
It's a, uh, little jet engine in the back
267
00:17:20,414 --> 00:17:23,532
that helps power the aircraft
when it's on the ground.
268
00:17:24,793 --> 00:17:27,029
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So they had no APU.
269
00:17:30,174 --> 00:17:32,259
NARRATOR: The team wonders
how this compares
270
00:17:32,342 --> 00:17:34,813
to what they discovered at the crash site.
271
00:17:37,723 --> 00:17:39,488
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Hello, APU.
272
00:17:42,561 --> 00:17:45,314
LAWRENCE: We saw that the APU was onboard
273
00:17:45,397 --> 00:17:47,456
‘cause we found it in the wreckage.
274
00:17:48,442 --> 00:17:52,947
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It looks like they were
carrying more weight than they thought.
275
00:17:53,030 --> 00:17:55,574
NARRATOR: Investigators believe
they’ve found an error
276
00:17:55,657 --> 00:17:58,246
in the plane’s
documented weight and balance.
277
00:17:59,995 --> 00:18:01,956
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Were they too heavy?
278
00:18:02,039 --> 00:18:04,510
I wonder how much
this plane truly weighed.
279
00:18:06,710 --> 00:18:08,838
NARRATOR: The pilots made
their calculations
280
00:18:08,921 --> 00:18:10,923
without accounting for an APU,
281
00:18:11,965 --> 00:18:13,965
but there clearly was one onboard.
282
00:18:15,969 --> 00:18:17,263
{\an8}SILLIMAN: We certainly had a concern
283
00:18:17,346 --> 00:18:18,764
{\an8}about whether or not the airplane
284
00:18:18,847 --> 00:18:20,847
{\an8}was within its weight and balance.
285
00:18:22,017 --> 00:18:25,271
NARRATOR: The NTSB calculates
the actual weight of the plane
286
00:18:25,354 --> 00:18:27,147
during its final flight.
287
00:18:28,732 --> 00:18:32,111
NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2:
The APU weighs 300 pounds.
288
00:18:34,404 --> 00:18:37,324
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
And according to the aircraft refueler,
289
00:18:37,407 --> 00:18:40,994
they were loaded with 8160 pounds of fuel,
290
00:18:41,078 --> 00:18:43,622
but they only wrote down 7700.
291
00:18:45,791 --> 00:18:48,127
So how much in total were they over by?
292
00:18:50,796 --> 00:18:53,465
Ah, they were only 286 pounds overweight.
293
00:18:55,592 --> 00:18:58,679
NARRATOR: The plane’s actual weight
was slightly more
294
00:18:58,762 --> 00:19:00,527
than what the pilots recorded.
295
00:19:03,183 --> 00:19:04,393
LAWRENCE: It wouldn't have really made
296
00:19:04,476 --> 00:19:06,888
a performance difference on the aircraft.
297
00:19:07,521 --> 00:19:10,149
NARRATOR: The weight of the APU
and the additional fuel
298
00:19:10,232 --> 00:19:13,291
was not enough to affect
the balance of the airplane.
299
00:19:14,528 --> 00:19:17,281
LAWRENCE: But it did tell us
that this crew and this company
300
00:19:17,364 --> 00:19:20,129
wasn't following
their procedures appropriately.
301
00:19:20,534 --> 00:19:24,064
Somebody wasn't watching what
they were supposed to be doing.
302
00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:27,458
NARRATOR:
Investigators need to look elsewhere
303
00:19:27,541 --> 00:19:30,669
to explain why Flight 1526 stalled.
304
00:19:32,296 --> 00:19:35,841
SILLIMAN: We knew that there was not
a flight data recorder on this airplane,
305
00:19:35,924 --> 00:19:37,384
so that's frustrating because
306
00:19:37,467 --> 00:19:40,554
we don't have the precise
details about the airspeed,
307
00:19:40,637 --> 00:19:43,285
the altitude and the attitude
of the aircraft.
308
00:19:44,558 --> 00:19:45,810
NARRATOR: To solve the case,
309
00:19:45,893 --> 00:19:49,396
the NTSB begins compiling
what data they do have,
310
00:19:50,105 --> 00:19:52,482
the radar data from air traffic control.
311
00:19:55,235 --> 00:19:58,118
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Show me what you've got so far.
312
00:19:59,531 --> 00:20:01,075
SILLIMAN: A turning point
in our investigation came
313
00:20:01,158 --> 00:20:04,787
when our engineer was able
to recreate our aircraft performance
314
00:20:04,870 --> 00:20:06,455
from the radar data.
315
00:20:12,002 --> 00:20:16,548
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay. They're 150 knots
316
00:20:16,632 --> 00:20:18,759
four minutes before the crash.
317
00:20:21,053 --> 00:20:22,095
Keep going.
318
00:20:24,306 --> 00:20:25,558
SILLIMAN: Our aircraft performance expert
319
00:20:25,641 --> 00:20:29,144
was able to estimate
the airspeed of the airplane,
320
00:20:29,228 --> 00:20:31,188
the angle of attack, the attitude,
321
00:20:31,271 --> 00:20:33,523
the altitude and rate of descent.
322
00:20:37,527 --> 00:20:39,405
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
As the plane approached the airport,
323
00:20:39,488 --> 00:20:41,657
you expect the airspeed to decrease.
324
00:20:42,741 --> 00:20:45,869
It drops from 300 down to 150.
325
00:20:45,953 --> 00:20:47,329
Everything normal.
326
00:20:49,164 --> 00:20:52,753
NARRATOR: Investigators find nothing
unusual about the flight,
327
00:20:53,627 --> 00:20:56,255
until they focus on the last two minutes.
328
00:20:57,005 --> 00:20:58,257
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Look here.
329
00:20:58,340 --> 00:21:01,009
The speed drops to 130 knots
330
00:21:01,093 --> 00:21:03,887
and then it keeps dropping to 98 knots.
331
00:21:03,971 --> 00:21:06,223
No wonder they stalled.
332
00:21:08,183 --> 00:21:09,643
SILLIMAN: The thing that really stood out
333
00:21:09,726 --> 00:21:12,229
was the excessive rate
of descent at the very end
334
00:21:12,312 --> 00:21:13,730
was at 98 knots,
335
00:21:13,814 --> 00:21:15,873
which was gonna stall the airplane.
336
00:21:18,860 --> 00:21:20,821
NANCE: Airspeed is life.
337
00:21:20,904 --> 00:21:22,364
This is one of the most important points
338
00:21:22,447 --> 00:21:24,783
in flying any airplane but especially,
339
00:21:24,866 --> 00:21:25,866
especially a jet.
340
00:21:27,577 --> 00:21:31,582
NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: Maybe they were
trying to stay clear of the Piper?
341
00:21:31,665 --> 00:21:32,833
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: I doubt it.
342
00:21:32,916 --> 00:21:35,461
The controller told them
the runway was clear
343
00:21:35,544 --> 00:21:37,462
three minutes before it stalled.
344
00:21:39,214 --> 00:21:43,385
NARRATOR: The airspeed data leaves
investigators with more questions.
345
00:21:44,177 --> 00:21:47,119
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Let's look at the altitude data.
346
00:21:48,932 --> 00:21:51,727
NARRATOR: The team reviews
the plane’s descent profile
347
00:21:51,810 --> 00:21:54,105
for the period leading up to the crash.
348
00:21:56,273 --> 00:21:59,568
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: The early part
of the descent looks pretty normal.
349
00:21:59,651 --> 00:22:02,321
They're doing a dive-and-drive approach.
350
00:22:02,404 --> 00:22:06,241
They level off at 9000, 5000, 4000.
351
00:22:07,451 --> 00:22:11,371
Look at that. That's odd.
Can you blow that up?
352
00:22:14,624 --> 00:22:17,095
NARRATOR:
They make an important discovery.
353
00:22:19,338 --> 00:22:20,297
NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Look.
354
00:22:20,380 --> 00:22:23,842
They hold at 3000 feet
for an entire two minutes.
355
00:22:23,925 --> 00:22:25,218
That's way too long.
356
00:22:26,011 --> 00:22:28,055
And then they plunge steeply.
357
00:22:31,224 --> 00:22:34,401
Bring up the final approach
they were supposed to take.
358
00:22:41,443 --> 00:22:42,944
It's not even close.
359
00:22:44,863 --> 00:22:46,532
LAWRENCE: On normal approaches,
360
00:22:46,615 --> 00:22:49,493
the glide path allows
the airplane to descend
361
00:22:49,576 --> 00:22:52,997
on a gentle three-degree path
all the way down to the runway.
362
00:22:53,080 --> 00:22:54,456
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
It looks like they started
363
00:22:54,539 --> 00:22:56,304
their final approach too late.
364
00:22:57,626 --> 00:23:00,754
NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: And then
have to race to catch up.
365
00:23:00,837 --> 00:23:04,049
NARRATOR: The data shows that
after delaying their approach,
366
00:23:04,132 --> 00:23:06,510
the pilots descended very steeply
367
00:23:06,593 --> 00:23:08,470
and at twice the normal rate.
368
00:23:09,221 --> 00:23:12,516
LAWRENCE: Once they started diving
the airplane down to 2,000 feet a minute
369
00:23:12,599 --> 00:23:14,059
to get to that lower altitude,
370
00:23:14,142 --> 00:23:16,103
that approach was unstable,
371
00:23:16,186 --> 00:23:17,687
and at that point in time
372
00:23:17,771 --> 00:23:20,007
they should have executed a go around.
373
00:23:21,066 --> 00:23:23,402
NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2:
The controller told us
374
00:23:23,485 --> 00:23:26,074
they acknowledged
his instruction to descend.
375
00:23:27,656 --> 00:23:28,949
CONTROLLER: Zipline 15-26,
376
00:23:29,032 --> 00:23:30,367
the Piper is on the ground.
377
00:23:30,450 --> 00:23:32,828
You are cleared for localizer
two five approach.
378
00:23:32,911 --> 00:23:34,455
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ:
Cleared for localizer two five.
379
00:23:34,538 --> 00:23:35,664
Thank you.
380
00:23:36,748 --> 00:23:39,043
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
They're cleared to descend
381
00:23:39,126 --> 00:23:41,837
and then they wait a full two minutes.
382
00:23:43,463 --> 00:23:44,798
Why?
383
00:23:47,843 --> 00:23:52,432
SILLIMAN: We really wondered what is
the situation in the cockpit at that time?
384
00:23:58,353 --> 00:24:01,940
NARRATOR: NTSB Investigators turn to
the cockpit voice recorder
385
00:24:02,023 --> 00:24:04,943
from Flight 1526 to understand
386
00:24:05,026 --> 00:24:08,321
why the pilots delayed
their final descent into Akron.
387
00:24:09,614 --> 00:24:13,732
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Take it from
the first instruction about that Piper.
388
00:24:16,371 --> 00:24:17,664
CONTROLLER (on radio): Zipline 1526,
389
00:24:17,747 --> 00:24:19,666
we do have an aircraft
inbound to the airport
390
00:24:19,749 --> 00:24:21,251
that is slower than you.
391
00:24:21,334 --> 00:24:23,378
Fly heading 3-6-0.
392
00:24:23,462 --> 00:24:25,547
Reduce speed one-seven-zero.
393
00:24:25,630 --> 00:24:27,591
Descend and maintain 3000.
394
00:24:27,674 --> 00:24:29,134
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen): Down to 3000,
395
00:24:29,217 --> 00:24:32,179
one seven zero is the speed and 360.
396
00:24:32,721 --> 00:24:36,725
Zipline 1526. Down to 3000.
397
00:24:37,142 --> 00:24:39,186
He wants 170 knots.
398
00:24:39,269 --> 00:24:42,681
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Okay,
I'll have to drag everything.
399
00:24:46,485 --> 00:24:48,320
LAWRENCE:
Somebody lowered the landing gear
400
00:24:48,403 --> 00:24:49,947
{\an8}to start slowing the airplane up
401
00:24:50,030 --> 00:24:53,492
{\an8}and creating drag to hopefully
get a little bit more spacing
402
00:24:53,575 --> 00:24:55,693
between them and the other airplane.
403
00:24:57,162 --> 00:24:59,039
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Did you hear what he said?
404
00:24:59,122 --> 00:25:00,499
There’s another plane on the approach.
405
00:25:00,582 --> 00:25:01,708
He's slower than us.
406
00:25:01,791 --> 00:25:04,144
We don't know if he's on the ground yet.
407
00:25:06,421 --> 00:25:07,881
LAWRENCE: The captain was very concerned
408
00:25:07,964 --> 00:25:10,884
about the spacing between them
and the training flight
409
00:25:10,967 --> 00:25:13,386
and was saying that to the co-pilot.
410
00:25:15,889 --> 00:25:17,015
(airplane engines slow)
411
00:25:17,098 --> 00:25:19,268
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Did you hear that?
412
00:25:19,351 --> 00:25:23,469
NARRATOR: Investigators hear the sound
of the engine thrust decreasing.
413
00:25:23,855 --> 00:25:26,620
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Let's see the airspeed again.
414
00:25:30,779 --> 00:25:33,823
The airspeed drops from 170
415
00:25:33,907 --> 00:25:35,825
down to 140.
416
00:25:36,368 --> 00:25:38,957
That is way slower
than he needs to be going.
417
00:25:43,792 --> 00:25:46,087
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Look, you’re going 140.
418
00:25:46,711 --> 00:25:49,381
CONTROLLER (on radio): Zipline 1526,
the Piper is on the ground.
419
00:25:49,464 --> 00:25:51,925
You are cleared for localizer
two-five approach.
420
00:25:52,008 --> 00:25:53,385
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ:
Cleared for localizer two-five.
421
00:25:53,468 --> 00:25:54,886
Thank you.
422
00:25:56,263 --> 00:25:59,808
NARRATOR: Flight 1526 is now at 3,000 feet
423
00:25:59,891 --> 00:26:02,774
and positioned to fly
straight into Akron airport.
424
00:26:04,354 --> 00:26:07,296
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: They
should start their descent.
425
00:26:08,483 --> 00:26:12,154
NARRATOR: Why did the pilots delay
their descent for two minutes,
426
00:26:12,237 --> 00:26:13,822
forcing them to catch up?
427
00:26:15,991 --> 00:26:17,659
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: You're going one-twenty.
428
00:26:17,742 --> 00:26:19,919
You can't keep decreasing your speed.
429
00:26:20,829 --> 00:26:23,916
LAWRENCE: Once the copilot received
the warning from the captain
430
00:26:23,999 --> 00:26:25,500
that they were too slow,
431
00:26:25,584 --> 00:26:28,820
the co-pilot should have
increased thrust significantly.
432
00:26:29,713 --> 00:26:32,713
NARRATOR: But instead,
the pilots get into a debate.
433
00:26:33,216 --> 00:26:35,552
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: No. One-twenty.
Where did you get one-twenty?
434
00:26:35,635 --> 00:26:37,221
It's more like one-twenty-five,
435
00:26:37,304 --> 00:26:38,764
which is the approach speed.
436
00:26:38,847 --> 00:26:40,516
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen):
But you've still got the flaps to go.
437
00:26:40,599 --> 00:26:41,725
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE:
And when they go down...
438
00:26:41,808 --> 00:26:42,935
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: This is what I'm saying.
439
00:26:43,018 --> 00:26:44,228
If you continue decreasing your speed...
440
00:26:44,311 --> 00:26:45,437
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: But why?
441
00:26:45,520 --> 00:26:47,356
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Because we're gonna stall!
I don't wanna stall!
442
00:26:47,439 --> 00:26:49,566
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: How do we...?
443
00:26:49,649 --> 00:26:51,826
NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Stop.
444
00:26:52,611 --> 00:26:55,280
They are so busy arguing about their speed
445
00:26:55,780 --> 00:26:58,133
that they forget to start their descent.
446
00:26:59,618 --> 00:27:01,828
SILLIMAN: There was about
two minutes of conversation
447
00:27:01,911 --> 00:27:03,622
concerning the airplane's speed.
448
00:27:03,705 --> 00:27:07,667
{\an8}The pilot and first officer
were actually arguing
449
00:27:07,751 --> 00:27:09,628
that it was getting too slow.
450
00:27:11,671 --> 00:27:14,258
NANCE: That delay of almost
two minutes was critical.
451
00:27:14,341 --> 00:27:15,675
{\an8}He's already too slow,
452
00:27:15,759 --> 00:27:18,845
{\an8}and he's overflown the altitude
he should be at,
453
00:27:18,928 --> 00:27:21,399
and now they've got to chase the approach.
454
00:27:21,681 --> 00:27:24,152
Now he's got to get
the airplane down fast.
455
00:27:25,143 --> 00:27:26,270
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Okay.
456
00:27:26,353 --> 00:27:29,883
NARRATOR: What investigators hear next
is even more shocking.
457
00:27:30,982 --> 00:27:34,152
PIPER INSTRUCTOR: Hey guys,
we just landed on the localizer
458
00:27:34,235 --> 00:27:36,118
and broke out right at minimums.
459
00:27:37,781 --> 00:27:39,741
SILLIMAN: They were notified
that the small airplane
460
00:27:39,824 --> 00:27:41,707
had landed safely on the runway.
461
00:27:44,996 --> 00:27:47,055
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Full flaps.
462
00:27:51,252 --> 00:27:53,429
NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Stop.
463
00:27:53,630 --> 00:27:56,336
Full flaps at that speed?
What was he thinking?
464
00:27:56,758 --> 00:27:58,758
Bring up the altitude graph again.
465
00:28:04,599 --> 00:28:05,851
NTSB INVESTIGATOR 2: Well hey,
466
00:28:05,934 --> 00:28:08,699
that's why the plane
starts to drop like a rock.
467
00:28:10,522 --> 00:28:14,776
NARRATOR: The team finally understands
why Flight 1526
468
00:28:14,859 --> 00:28:17,946
ended up in a 2,000 feet
per minute descent,
469
00:28:18,029 --> 00:28:20,115
twice the recommended rate.
470
00:28:22,158 --> 00:28:25,829
The First Officer was racing
to get the plane back on course.
471
00:28:26,746 --> 00:28:28,040
SILLIMAN: The airplane is too high,
472
00:28:28,123 --> 00:28:29,249
it's too slow,
473
00:28:29,332 --> 00:28:32,043
and with full flaps
rather than partial flaps.
474
00:28:32,711 --> 00:28:35,182
They really needed to get down in a hurry,
475
00:28:36,005 --> 00:28:37,966
and really that is
our turning point when we said
476
00:28:38,049 --> 00:28:41,761
this airplane is not configured
properly for the approach,
477
00:28:41,845 --> 00:28:44,389
and this puts the crew and passengers
478
00:28:44,472 --> 00:28:46,002
in really a lot of danger.
479
00:28:49,227 --> 00:28:53,875
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: He should have just
called a missed approach and tried again.
480
00:28:55,066 --> 00:28:57,110
NARRATOR: Investigators now need
to understand
481
00:28:57,193 --> 00:29:00,029
why the pilots continued
their dangerous descent.
482
00:29:01,948 --> 00:29:05,301
SILLIMAN: When we look at the errors
that the pilots made,
483
00:29:05,910 --> 00:29:08,997
we really had to wonder:
What was their background?
484
00:29:12,292 --> 00:29:15,587
NARRATOR: NTSB Investigator
Sathya Silva examines
485
00:29:15,670 --> 00:29:18,131
the pilots' personnel records to see
486
00:29:18,214 --> 00:29:21,567
if they explain their behavior
on the day of the accident.
487
00:29:23,052 --> 00:29:24,262
SATHYA SILVA: The First Officer had more
488
00:29:24,345 --> 00:29:26,056
than 4000 hours of flight time.
489
00:29:26,139 --> 00:29:29,100
He was the pilot in command
for 3200 hours,
490
00:29:30,143 --> 00:29:31,908
and he passed all his courses.
491
00:29:32,312 --> 00:29:33,772
NTSB INVESTIGATOR (off screen): Health?
492
00:29:33,855 --> 00:29:36,149
SILVA: He... yeah, he just turned 50.
493
00:29:36,816 --> 00:29:39,228
No sign of drug or alcohol in his system.
494
00:29:39,736 --> 00:29:42,238
But take a look at this.
495
00:29:44,115 --> 00:29:47,869
It looks like he pulled an all-nighter
two nights before the accident.
496
00:29:47,952 --> 00:29:49,600
Could he have been fatigued?
497
00:29:50,789 --> 00:29:51,915
LAWRENCE: For the first officer
498
00:29:51,998 --> 00:29:54,751
what we found was he did not have
499
00:29:54,834 --> 00:29:58,421
the rest several days earlier
that the regulations required.
500
00:29:59,881 --> 00:30:03,176
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Let's see what
the airline has to say.
501
00:30:03,468 --> 00:30:04,970
LAWRENCE: So we wanted to take a look
502
00:30:05,053 --> 00:30:08,431
and see if a chronic fatigue problem
503
00:30:08,515 --> 00:30:11,101
may have manifested itself
several days later,
504
00:30:11,184 --> 00:30:14,395
to hopefully explain why this crew
505
00:30:14,479 --> 00:30:15,647
and particularly the first officer
506
00:30:15,730 --> 00:30:17,378
was making so many mistakes.
507
00:30:20,401 --> 00:30:21,820
SILVA: Thanks for coming in.
508
00:30:21,903 --> 00:30:23,727
SHACKLEFORD: Happy to help out.
509
00:30:24,239 --> 00:30:27,868
NARRATOR: Silva interviews ExecuFlight
captain Donnie Shackleford,
510
00:30:27,951 --> 00:30:30,162
who had flown with First Officer Marchese
511
00:30:30,245 --> 00:30:31,871
leading up to the crash.
512
00:30:33,206 --> 00:30:35,667
SILVA: Tell me about your last flight
513
00:30:35,750 --> 00:30:37,544
with the First Officer.
514
00:30:38,419 --> 00:30:40,714
SHACKLEFORD:
Uh, two days before the accident
515
00:30:40,797 --> 00:30:42,507
we flew into Fort Lauderdale.
516
00:30:49,556 --> 00:30:53,851
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: They want me
to fly to Mexico overnight, like now.
517
00:30:55,687 --> 00:30:57,864
{\an8}SHACKLEFORD: That would be fine to go
518
00:30:58,356 --> 00:31:00,400
{\an8}considering the duty time issue,
519
00:31:00,483 --> 00:31:03,486
{\an8}as long as they remained
overnight in Mexico.
520
00:31:06,406 --> 00:31:09,325
SILVA: So did he sleep
overnight in Mexico?
521
00:31:09,909 --> 00:31:11,494
SHACKLEFORD: Nope.
522
00:31:11,578 --> 00:31:13,637
Came right back to Fort Lauderdale.
523
00:31:15,456 --> 00:31:18,126
I talked to him the night
before the crash.
524
00:31:18,209 --> 00:31:21,209
He told me that he was worn out
from the other trip.
525
00:31:21,629 --> 00:31:25,133
Even though he was legal as far
as the number of hours between,
526
00:31:25,216 --> 00:31:26,634
he was not rested.
527
00:31:28,511 --> 00:31:30,847
He should not have been on that flight.
528
00:31:33,558 --> 00:31:35,018
{\an8}SILVA: The fact that the First Officer
529
00:31:35,101 --> 00:31:38,479
{\an8}had to fly an overnight flight
and not sleep when his body
530
00:31:38,563 --> 00:31:41,816
wanted to sleep resulted
in circadian disruption.
531
00:31:43,484 --> 00:31:46,073
NANCE: We know that human beings
have limits.
532
00:31:46,571 --> 00:31:48,907
If you’re not getting
the appropriate sleep over time,
533
00:31:48,990 --> 00:31:51,826
your attitude can go to heck
in a hand basket,
534
00:31:51,910 --> 00:31:53,616
and that can crash airplanes.
535
00:31:55,121 --> 00:31:57,791
NARRATOR: Because the First Officer
did have the required
536
00:31:57,874 --> 00:32:00,345
amount of sleep the night
before the crash,
537
00:32:00,710 --> 00:32:04,464
investigators can't definitively
point to sleep deprivation
538
00:32:04,547 --> 00:32:07,018
as the cause
of their poor decision making.
539
00:32:09,135 --> 00:32:10,595
There’s something about the flight
540
00:32:10,678 --> 00:32:12,208
that still troubles Silva.
541
00:32:14,140 --> 00:32:15,308
SILVA: How often would
542
00:32:15,391 --> 00:32:17,627
the First Officer be the pilot flying?
543
00:32:18,436 --> 00:32:21,495
SHACKLEFORD: Only if there were
no paying passengers.
544
00:32:21,731 --> 00:32:24,817
- SILVA: Why?
- SHACKLEFORD: Company policy.
545
00:32:25,610 --> 00:32:26,987
SILVA: The company did have
546
00:32:27,070 --> 00:32:28,989
a procedure to enable the first officers
547
00:32:29,072 --> 00:32:31,074
to get experience flying the aircraft,
548
00:32:31,157 --> 00:32:32,909
and those were in empty legs
549
00:32:32,992 --> 00:32:35,119
where passengers weren't on board.
550
00:32:36,871 --> 00:32:39,499
SHACKLEFORD:
Renato should not have been flying.
551
00:32:39,582 --> 00:32:41,112
It should have been Oscar.
552
00:32:43,169 --> 00:32:44,796
NARRATOR: Silva discovers that the captain
553
00:32:44,879 --> 00:32:47,548
violated standard operating procedures.
554
00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:49,926
LAWRENCE: What we don't know,
555
00:32:50,009 --> 00:32:53,096
and what is a little confusing,
is why in this case,
556
00:32:53,638 --> 00:32:56,057
when you had passengers in the back,
557
00:32:56,140 --> 00:32:58,768
you had weather
that was gonna be a factor,
558
00:32:58,851 --> 00:33:02,146
and an approach that was
gonna be relatively challenging,
559
00:33:04,273 --> 00:33:07,685
why this captain decided to
allow his first officer to fly.
560
00:33:15,076 --> 00:33:18,371
NARRATOR: The NTSB wants to know
why Captain Chavez
561
00:33:18,454 --> 00:33:19,872
broke company policy,
562
00:33:19,956 --> 00:33:22,375
allowing his first officer
to fly the plane
563
00:33:22,458 --> 00:33:24,043
with clients onboard.
564
00:33:25,211 --> 00:33:26,800
SILVA: Take a look at this.
565
00:33:28,214 --> 00:33:30,626
The Captain didn't get much sleep either.
566
00:33:31,009 --> 00:33:33,845
He got a full night's sleep
before the crash,
567
00:33:33,928 --> 00:33:35,472
but he didn't get a full eight hours
568
00:33:35,555 --> 00:33:37,890
for four nights before that.
569
00:33:39,142 --> 00:33:41,477
Maybe he was also fatigued.
570
00:33:41,561 --> 00:33:43,620
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: That's possible.
571
00:33:44,230 --> 00:33:47,442
{\an8}SILVA: As we looked further back
into his records,
572
00:33:47,525 --> 00:33:52,196
{\an8}it looks like the days prior
he actually only averaged
573
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:53,865
about six hours of sleep.
574
00:33:56,159 --> 00:33:59,204
NARRATOR: Investigators listen for
any indication of fatigue
575
00:33:59,287 --> 00:34:00,956
on the cockpit voice recorder.
576
00:34:01,039 --> 00:34:03,792
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Let's pick up where we left off,
577
00:34:03,875 --> 00:34:05,699
the start of the final descent.
578
00:34:08,838 --> 00:34:11,215
NARRATOR: Descending from 3,000 feet,
579
00:34:11,299 --> 00:34:13,652
the crew begins their landing checklist.
580
00:34:14,302 --> 00:34:17,639
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Can you check
if I've got everything? Ignition?
581
00:34:17,722 --> 00:34:19,057
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Everything is all set.
582
00:34:19,140 --> 00:34:24,520
Standby... Yaw damper...
autopilot... main air valves.
583
00:34:28,733 --> 00:34:30,694
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
He just stops in the middle
584
00:34:30,777 --> 00:34:32,248
of his landing checklist.
585
00:34:32,779 --> 00:34:35,074
SILVA: It's, it's like he's distracted.
586
00:34:37,116 --> 00:34:38,410
{\an8}LAWRENCE: There were checklists
587
00:34:38,493 --> 00:34:40,412
{\an8}that were supposed to be done
all the way through.
588
00:34:40,495 --> 00:34:42,997
{\an8}And we found on the cockpit voice recorder
589
00:34:43,081 --> 00:34:47,670
all of the checklists that they should
have complied with were never completed.
590
00:34:48,211 --> 00:34:50,547
NARRATOR: Instead of finishing
the checklist,
591
00:34:50,630 --> 00:34:54,050
the captain’s focus turns
to the plane’s erratic descent.
592
00:34:54,634 --> 00:34:57,137
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ (off screen):
You're diving. Don't dive.
593
00:34:57,220 --> 00:34:58,471
Two thousand feet per minute.
594
00:34:58,554 --> 00:35:00,890
- Buddy.
- FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Yeah.
595
00:35:00,973 --> 00:35:02,684
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Two thousand feet
per minute!
596
00:35:02,767 --> 00:35:06,062
Don't go two thousand feet
per minute! You with me there?
597
00:35:07,730 --> 00:35:09,983
LAWRENCE: The co-pilot was being coached
598
00:35:10,066 --> 00:35:13,528
so much by this captain
that at this point -
599
00:35:13,611 --> 00:35:15,947
this is the very serious portion
of the approach -
600
00:35:16,030 --> 00:35:19,033
you're gonna go down
into weather that's very low
601
00:35:19,742 --> 00:35:21,202
and very significant.
602
00:35:22,495 --> 00:35:24,731
The captain should have taken control.
603
00:35:27,083 --> 00:35:29,711
{\an8}NANCE: When it's time for the captain
to say, I got the airplane
604
00:35:29,794 --> 00:35:31,379
{\an8}‘cause you're not performing well enough,
605
00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,110
{\an8}there should be no question
and no hesitation.
606
00:35:36,342 --> 00:35:38,931
NTSB INVESTIGATOR:
Why wouldn't he take over?
607
00:35:40,555 --> 00:35:43,308
NARRATOR: Investigators hear more
than the effects of fatigue
608
00:35:43,391 --> 00:35:45,101
on the recording.
609
00:35:46,310 --> 00:35:49,147
LAWRENCE: By having the first officer fly,
610
00:35:49,230 --> 00:35:53,192
this captain then was dividing
his time being a captain
611
00:35:53,276 --> 00:35:54,982
and also being an instructor.
612
00:35:55,069 --> 00:35:59,198
We found he wasn't appropriately
managing the cockpit as a captain.
613
00:36:01,784 --> 00:36:04,329
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Don't go 2000 feet
per minute when you are 500 feet
614
00:36:04,412 --> 00:36:05,746
above the ground!
615
00:36:09,250 --> 00:36:12,309
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Bring up
the altitude graph again.
616
00:36:16,507 --> 00:36:19,051
They're less than 500 feet off the ground.
617
00:36:19,135 --> 00:36:21,846
That's below their minimum
descent altitude.
618
00:36:23,639 --> 00:36:28,019
LAWRENCE: It's critical that you do
not descend below that altitude
619
00:36:28,102 --> 00:36:33,107
until you have a visual view
of the airport or the runway.
620
00:36:36,527 --> 00:36:38,822
NARRATOR: But they continue to descend.
621
00:36:40,114 --> 00:36:41,467
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Ground.
622
00:36:42,325 --> 00:36:46,384
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: God. He, he can see
the ground, but not the runway.
623
00:36:46,871 --> 00:36:49,249
NANCE: They're coming down
from three thousand feet,
624
00:36:49,332 --> 00:36:51,251
and they've got to get to
the minimum descent altitude,
625
00:36:51,334 --> 00:36:53,920
which is only five hundred feet
above the ground.
626
00:36:54,003 --> 00:36:57,533
There's not much room to work with here
if you screw this up.
627
00:37:00,092 --> 00:37:01,511
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Keep going.
628
00:37:01,594 --> 00:37:06,057
NARRATOR: The CVR reveals that the Captain
violated a fundamental rule
629
00:37:06,140 --> 00:37:09,258
by continuing the descent
without the runway in sight.
630
00:37:10,686 --> 00:37:12,105
NANCE: If you don't see the field
631
00:37:12,188 --> 00:37:13,600
then you do a go-around.
632
00:37:15,107 --> 00:37:17,485
NARRATOR: Because the pilots were still
looking for the airport
633
00:37:17,568 --> 00:37:19,987
while descending below minimum altitude,
634
00:37:20,821 --> 00:37:23,699
neither of them noticed
their decaying airspeed.
635
00:37:24,992 --> 00:37:26,494
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: Okay level off now!
636
00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,401
FIRST OFFICER MARCHESE: Got it.
637
00:37:29,247 --> 00:37:30,957
GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
638
00:37:31,040 --> 00:37:33,877
NANCE: They'd been too slow
for the last little while
639
00:37:33,960 --> 00:37:37,297
and they don’t recognize even
with a stick shaker banging away
640
00:37:37,380 --> 00:37:39,715
that they are in an aerodynamic stall.
641
00:37:39,799 --> 00:37:41,801
GPWS: Pull up. Pull up.
642
00:37:41,884 --> 00:37:43,296
NANCE: That doomed them.
643
00:37:46,305 --> 00:37:49,423
NARRATOR: They weren’t able to recover
from the stall.
644
00:37:50,393 --> 00:37:52,688
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no, no!
645
00:38:09,453 --> 00:38:11,331
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: It was a perfect storm
646
00:38:11,414 --> 00:38:13,040
of their own making.
647
00:38:15,710 --> 00:38:18,588
NARRATOR: Investigators find enough
evidence on the voice recording
648
00:38:18,671 --> 00:38:21,466
to conclude that fatigue
was likely one component
649
00:38:21,549 --> 00:38:23,608
of the crew’s poor decision making.
650
00:38:24,969 --> 00:38:27,388
SILVA: We found that
the captain's behavior
651
00:38:27,471 --> 00:38:29,707
could have been attributed to fatigue.
652
00:38:31,809 --> 00:38:34,729
NARRATOR: But fatigue alone
doesn't explain the long list
653
00:38:34,812 --> 00:38:37,982
of botched procedures on Flight 1526.
654
00:38:39,191 --> 00:38:40,610
SILVA: They broke so many rules
655
00:38:40,693 --> 00:38:42,870
it makes you wonder who trained them.
656
00:38:44,238 --> 00:38:46,407
LAWRENCE: They weren't following
their procedures.
657
00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:49,201
They missed checklists and callouts.
658
00:38:50,411 --> 00:38:52,330
They got delayed on the approach.
659
00:38:52,413 --> 00:38:54,943
They were flying
in the wrong configuration.
660
00:38:56,208 --> 00:38:59,212
We decided to go back and take
a look at their training.
661
00:38:59,295 --> 00:39:02,798
What was it that led up to them
making these mistakes?
662
00:39:11,140 --> 00:39:13,642
NARRATOR: The NTSB orders up
the employment
663
00:39:13,726 --> 00:39:16,896
and training records
of the crew of Flight 1526
664
00:39:16,979 --> 00:39:18,564
for the last five years.
665
00:39:21,025 --> 00:39:23,202
SILVA: You're not gonna believe this.
666
00:39:25,321 --> 00:39:27,910
NARRATOR: They are shocked
by what they find.
667
00:39:28,491 --> 00:39:30,451
SILVA: The captain’s termination notice
668
00:39:30,534 --> 00:39:32,946
says that he was fired from his last job.
669
00:39:34,705 --> 00:39:37,458
NARRATOR: Investigators learn that
the Captain was dismissed
670
00:39:37,541 --> 00:39:40,012
because he failed to show up for training.
671
00:39:41,253 --> 00:39:42,714
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: Get this.
672
00:39:42,797 --> 00:39:44,632
The First Officer was terminated
673
00:39:44,715 --> 00:39:47,186
because his performance
was below standard.
674
00:39:48,969 --> 00:39:50,430
NARRATOR: The First Officer was let go
675
00:39:50,513 --> 00:39:53,043
because he struggled
during flight training.
676
00:39:54,308 --> 00:39:56,519
SILVA: Both these guys had training issues
677
00:39:56,602 --> 00:40:00,648
and were fired because of them,
and ExecuFlight knew about it.
678
00:40:03,025 --> 00:40:05,202
NANCE: The captain's prior employment
679
00:40:05,486 --> 00:40:08,781
was suspect in terms
of why was he dismissed.
680
00:40:09,698 --> 00:40:12,160
The first officer's hiring
in this particular case
681
00:40:12,243 --> 00:40:14,161
smacks of just warm body hiring,
682
00:40:14,245 --> 00:40:18,332
having somebody with at 98 degree
temperature put in the right seat
683
00:40:18,416 --> 00:40:21,358
and say, we've got a co-pilot
‘cause he's licensed.
684
00:40:22,169 --> 00:40:24,839
NTSB INVESTIGATOR: So, why did ExecuFlight
685
00:40:24,922 --> 00:40:26,549
hire these guys?
686
00:40:28,551 --> 00:40:32,388
SILVA: We start to wonder:
Did the company know
687
00:40:32,471 --> 00:40:33,848
about these deficiencies?
688
00:40:33,931 --> 00:40:35,990
If they did, did they address them?
689
00:40:37,810 --> 00:40:39,895
Okay, thanks again. Bye.
690
00:40:42,523 --> 00:40:44,692
I just got off the phone
with the president.
691
00:40:44,775 --> 00:40:48,128
He said he knew about their
history but hired them anyway.
692
00:40:51,449 --> 00:40:54,535
The President of ExecuFlight stated
that he had hired the captain
693
00:40:54,618 --> 00:40:56,496
because of his extensive experience
694
00:40:56,579 --> 00:40:58,581
in the Hawker aircraft,
695
00:40:58,664 --> 00:41:02,042
as well as flights that he had
personally taken
696
00:41:02,126 --> 00:41:04,628
with the captain prior to his employment.
697
00:41:06,464 --> 00:41:09,800
The First Officer was hired
based on a recommendation
698
00:41:09,884 --> 00:41:11,427
from another pilot,
699
00:41:11,510 --> 00:41:14,981
as well as one flight that he
had taken with him personally.
700
00:41:15,931 --> 00:41:18,990
He said they didn't contact
their previous employers.
701
00:41:20,895 --> 00:41:22,313
NANCE: It is very, very important
702
00:41:22,396 --> 00:41:24,982
in hiring a pilot to do what the law says,
703
00:41:25,065 --> 00:41:26,526
do what the regulations say,
704
00:41:26,609 --> 00:41:29,737
contact the previous employers
and have an opportunity to know
705
00:41:29,820 --> 00:41:32,031
if this individual has some bad habits
706
00:41:32,114 --> 00:41:34,879
that you certainly don't want
in your operation.
707
00:41:35,659 --> 00:41:38,307
SILVA: ExecuFlight did
give them CRM training.
708
00:41:39,538 --> 00:41:42,542
LAWRENCE: Basically, Cockpit Resource
Management training
709
00:41:42,625 --> 00:41:45,920
is teaching pilots to work as a team
710
00:41:46,462 --> 00:41:49,465
and using all their
available tools together
711
00:41:49,548 --> 00:41:51,800
so they are operating as one.
712
00:41:53,344 --> 00:41:54,554
NARRATOR: But when the investigators
713
00:41:54,637 --> 00:41:58,015
examine the airline's CRM
training program,
714
00:41:58,098 --> 00:41:59,683
they are underwhelmed.
715
00:42:01,060 --> 00:42:03,237
SILVA: Not much of a training manual.
716
00:42:04,647 --> 00:42:06,065
LAWRENCE: The regulations required
717
00:42:06,148 --> 00:42:09,610
ExecuFlight to have cockpit
resource management training,
718
00:42:09,693 --> 00:42:10,611
and they did.
719
00:42:10,694 --> 00:42:14,406
What we found was
their training was insufficient,
720
00:42:14,490 --> 00:42:18,118
and their evaluation
of the crew was not proper.
721
00:42:19,954 --> 00:42:22,602
SILVA: This was an accident
waiting to happen.
722
00:42:37,972 --> 00:42:40,267
CAPTAIN CHAVEZ: No, no, no, no, no, no!
723
00:42:44,436 --> 00:42:49,567
NARRATOR: The NTSB concludes that
the probable cause of the crash
724
00:42:49,650 --> 00:42:52,356
was the crew’s mismanagement
of their approach,
725
00:42:52,861 --> 00:42:55,155
deviation from operating procedures,
726
00:42:56,448 --> 00:43:00,077
and ExecuFlight’s lax hiring
and training practices.
727
00:43:01,912 --> 00:43:06,041
SILLIMAN: We determined that
ExecuFlight did not enforce
728
00:43:06,125 --> 00:43:09,587
and did not make sure
that the pilots were following
729
00:43:09,670 --> 00:43:11,435
standard operating procedures.
730
00:43:14,842 --> 00:43:18,846
NARRATOR: In their report, the NTSB makes
several recommendations
731
00:43:18,929 --> 00:43:21,307
for private operators like ExecuFlight.
732
00:43:23,017 --> 00:43:25,019
They include better training for pilots
733
00:43:25,102 --> 00:43:28,102
on non-precision approaches
like the one into Akron,
734
00:43:29,690 --> 00:43:32,359
and the installation
of flight data recorders
735
00:43:32,443 --> 00:43:33,945
that could also be used to monitor
736
00:43:34,028 --> 00:43:35,793
the progress of their flights.
737
00:43:37,197 --> 00:43:39,909
SILLIMAN: The NTSB recommendations
really comes down
738
00:43:39,992 --> 00:43:42,620
to what kind of scrutiny
you have on your pilots.
739
00:43:42,703 --> 00:43:44,288
{\an8}Do you know what's going on
in your cockpit?
740
00:43:44,371 --> 00:43:46,666
{\an8}Do you know what your pilots are doing?
741
00:43:47,708 --> 00:43:49,885
{\an8}NANCE: Standard Operating Procedures,
742
00:43:50,002 --> 00:43:51,962
{\an8}these are incredibly important.
743
00:43:52,046 --> 00:43:53,839
{\an8}It's like we say: Airspeed is life.
744
00:43:53,922 --> 00:43:57,217
{\an8}Well, adherence to Standard
Operating Procedures is life.
745
00:43:58,385 --> 00:44:00,596
{\an8}And if you begin to remove that structure,
746
00:44:00,679 --> 00:44:04,475
{\an8}you go back in time and you lose
the benefit of all the lessons
747
00:44:04,558 --> 00:44:07,735
{\an8}that we have paid so dearly
for in the past by crashes.
748
00:44:07,895 --> 00:44:10,689
{\an8}Captioned by Point.360
63521
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