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NARRATOR: Thirty-five thousand feet
above the Bering Sea...
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{\an8}MIKE FAGAN: Anchorage, Northwest 85.
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00:00:06,773 --> 00:00:09,960
{\an8}Confirm that you are aware that
we have declared an emergency.
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00:00:10,043 --> 00:00:12,630
NARRATOR: A Boeing 747
is in serious trouble.
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There's too much traffic.
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We're calling this one a red emergency.
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Red emergency is preparing for the worst.
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00:00:19,186 --> 00:00:21,951
NARRATOR: The crew can
barely control the plane.
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00:00:22,356 --> 00:00:24,508
JOHN DOHERTY: It was
a very confusing situation.
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It was something that they had
never done in training.
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00:00:28,362 --> 00:00:30,047
NARRATOR: They need
all the help they can get
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to have any hope of bringing
the plane and its 386 passengers
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safely to the ground.
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JOHN HANSON: If there's
ever gonna be a time
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that you fly a perfect approach,
it's gotta be this one.
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PILOT: May day. May day.
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{\an8}NARRATOR: Northwest Airlines Flight 85
is making its way over the Bering Sea.
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{\an8}It's after 5:00 p.m.
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{\an8}Dinner service has ended,
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{\an8}and passengers are settling in
for a long flight.
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{\an8}The massive Boeing 747-400
has just flown over Alaska,
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{\an8}and is now almost halfway through
a 13.5-hour journey
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from Detroit to Japan's Narita Airport.
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GEIB: Hello, gentlemen.
HANSON: Frank?
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GEIB: How are things?
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Thirty-five thousand feet, smooth air...
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NARRATOR: Captain John Hanson
is a career pilot.
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He's also a flight instructor
for the Boeing 747.
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Six-and-a-half hours into the flight,
he's about to hand over the controls.
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On long journeys, it's common
to have two flight crews.
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{\an8}The trip was long enough
that we put on a full augmented crew.
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We had two captains and two copilots.
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NARRATOR: They fly in shifts
to prevent fatigue.
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Why don't you guys give me a ding
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about 20 minutes before
you want me back up here, okay?
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Mike Fagan, a Vietnam Vet
with 25 years flying experience
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is the fresh first officer.
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{\an8}Everything was normal,
and we didn't expect to have any problems.
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{\an8}We'd flown this flight many, many times.
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Frank, I'm taking the lasagna.
You get option B.
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Does option B include starving?
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NARRATOR: He is joined
by Captain Frank Geib,
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who has over 11,000 hours of flying
under his belt.
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Pilots refer to this aircraft
as "The Queen of the Skies."
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It's equipped with a private cabin
for the flight crew.
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Here, Captain Hanson and
his first officer David Smith
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will have a five-hour rest break
before returning to the flight deck.
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Dave Smith had worked with me,
and we were going to read for a while,
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perhaps nap in the bunk,
and wake up for descent to Tokyo.
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You sure you're not hungry?
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Trust me, I'm good.
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NARRATOR: Flight 85 is more than
six hours from landing at Narita.
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FAGAN: The aircraft took
a dramatic roll to the left,
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that went from 35
through 40 degrees of bank.
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- NARRATOR: For no apparent reason...
- What happened?
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...the pilots have lost control
of their plane.
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- (OBJECTS CLATTERING)
- (SCREAMING)
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{\an8}The airplane took a lurch
like nothing I had ever felt before,
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and I kind of had to catch myself.
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HANSON: It was a very sudden
yawing movement.
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It's the type of thing
you only feel in a simulator
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when they're doing extreme things.
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NARRATOR: Captain Geib has only
moments to react.
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Did we lose an engine?
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Do we still have engines?
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We still have all engines. That's not it.
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00:04:26,266 --> 00:04:30,037
NARRATOR: The lives of 386 passengers
hang in the balance.
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HANSON: The airplane was
kind of shaking,
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and I knew the autopilot
had been disconnected.
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It was quite obvious
that something was abnormal.
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NARRATOR: In a matter of seconds, Captain
Geib has disconnected the autopilot,
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pulled back on the control column
and leveled the wings.
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But something is still seriously wrong.
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Frank, have you got it?
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Yeah, I think I've got it.
76
00:05:02,035 --> 00:05:05,523
If it's not the engines,
then we have a problem with the rudder.
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00:05:05,606 --> 00:05:07,591
NARRATOR: The pilots have
leveled the plane,
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but they are still having difficulty
controlling it.
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(BEEPING)
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The warning system
confirms Geib's suspicion.
81
00:05:15,516 --> 00:05:16,869
GEIB: Yaw damper lower.
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00:05:17,851 --> 00:05:20,440
NARRATOR: A malfunction
of the rudder system.
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00:05:20,854 --> 00:05:22,990
The rudder controls the plane's yaw,
84
00:05:23,123 --> 00:05:26,426
its movements from left to right,
as it flies.
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00:05:26,860 --> 00:05:29,508
It directs airflow
to keep it flying straight.
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00:05:31,231 --> 00:05:33,267
Less than a year earlier
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American Airlines Flight 587
lost control of its rudder system
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and crashed into a neighborhood
in Queens, New York,
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killing everyone on board.
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FAGAN: We were very well aware of that,
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and there had been
quite a study done on that.
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00:05:49,183 --> 00:05:53,353
We had actually just reviewed
that event in flight planning.
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00:05:56,590 --> 00:06:00,120
NARRATOR: This plane is in danger
of suffering the same fate.
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00:06:01,161 --> 00:06:05,899
Because of its size, the 747 has
both an upper and lower rudder.
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00:06:06,033 --> 00:06:07,935
They normally move in unison.
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00:06:08,569 --> 00:06:09,981
For some unknown reason,
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the lower rudder has deflected
17 degrees to the left.
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00:06:14,308 --> 00:06:15,943
And it's stuck there.
99
00:06:17,277 --> 00:06:20,866
The captain tries to keep the plane
flying level and straight.
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00:06:22,349 --> 00:06:25,319
He uses foot pedals
to control the upper rudder,
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and the control column
to move the ailerons.
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00:06:30,724 --> 00:06:34,372
But he knows it's a stopgap measure
that may not work for long.
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I've got the airplane and the radios.
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You get the COM
and see if there's a procedure for this.
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00:06:41,435 --> 00:06:43,621
NARRATOR: The COM,
or Cockpit Operating Manual,
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00:06:43,704 --> 00:06:47,007
provides a list of procedures
for emergency situations.
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00:06:48,075 --> 00:06:50,995
It says not to remove any pressure
from the hydraulics. That's all.
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That's not very helpful.
109
00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:55,582
Is there anything else?
Are any other systems failing?
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Not so far.
111
00:07:02,222 --> 00:07:04,642
NARRATOR: Hydraulics control
several vital components,
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including the failed rudder.
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00:07:06,560 --> 00:07:09,196
More failures could spell disaster.
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00:07:09,329 --> 00:07:11,365
How far to Narita?
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00:07:11,498 --> 00:07:14,368
About six hours.
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NARRATOR: Flying that far without
full control of the plane is a huge risk.
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00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:22,142
P3. Get them back. (GRUNTS)
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HANSON: When you're in the bunk,
you're used to hearing the P3
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only at times
when it's time for a shift change.
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00:07:29,516 --> 00:07:31,585
When you hear it at an odd time,
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00:07:31,752 --> 00:07:35,639
it means, "Come back, because something
out of the ordinary has happened."
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00:07:35,722 --> 00:07:37,958
Anchorage is two hours behind us.
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00:07:38,926 --> 00:07:42,396
Call them and declare an emergency.
We're turning around.
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00:07:44,331 --> 00:07:46,667
Anchorage, this is Northwest 85.
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00:07:47,968 --> 00:07:50,521
NARRATOR: But even contacting Anchorage
is a problem.
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00:07:50,604 --> 00:07:53,307
Anchorage, this is Northwest 85.
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00:07:53,440 --> 00:07:56,827
NARRATOR: Air traffic control centers
have a limited range.
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{\an8}In the middle of the sea,
between the two continents,
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00:07:59,980 --> 00:08:02,149
the plane is in a dead zone.
130
00:08:02,649 --> 00:08:05,238
No one in Anchorage
knows they're in trouble.
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00:08:06,987 --> 00:08:10,407
In the cabin, passengers don't know
the scale of the problem.
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00:08:10,490 --> 00:08:12,943
Many passengers assume
it was only turbulence
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00:08:13,026 --> 00:08:14,761
that caused the sudden jolt.
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00:08:15,929 --> 00:08:17,798
See if you can reach 19.
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00:08:17,931 --> 00:08:20,518
NARRATOR: The pilots
attempt to contact another flight
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00:08:20,601 --> 00:08:22,013
that's closer to Alaska.
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00:08:22,102 --> 00:08:25,005
Northwest 19, this is Northwest 85.
138
00:08:25,138 --> 00:08:27,080
NARRATOR: But the signal is weak.
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00:08:29,409 --> 00:08:32,312
Northwest 19, this is Northwest 85.
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00:08:33,146 --> 00:08:35,232
NORTHWEST PILOT: This is Northwest 19.
Go ahead.
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00:08:35,315 --> 00:08:36,834
FAGAN: We have an emergency onboard.
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Can you relay to Anchorage?
143
00:08:39,453 --> 00:08:41,395
NORTHWEST PILOT: Roger. Stand by.
144
00:08:41,889 --> 00:08:44,424
Okay. Let's turn this around.
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00:08:46,159 --> 00:08:49,229
NARRATOR: The plane goes
into a very wide right turn.
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{\an8}NORTHWEST PILOT: Anchorage Control,
this is Northwest 19.
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00:08:57,704 --> 00:08:59,406
Northwest 19, go ahead.
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00:08:59,540 --> 00:09:02,743
Northwest 85 is requesting
an emergency landing.
149
00:09:02,876 --> 00:09:04,895
W hat is the nature of the emergency?
150
00:09:04,978 --> 00:09:06,847
Hardover left rudder.
151
00:09:09,016 --> 00:09:12,103
NARRATOR: The rudder is crucial
for turning the plane around.
152
00:09:12,186 --> 00:09:14,892
Without it, the captain
is forced to improvise.
153
00:09:16,190 --> 00:09:18,725
We had no idea what the problem was,
154
00:09:18,859 --> 00:09:21,695
so Frank was very cautious
on using the rudder,
155
00:09:21,828 --> 00:09:25,282
which means that he had to use
full aileron to control the aircraft,
156
00:09:25,365 --> 00:09:27,451
but in the meantime,
the aircraft is in a slip,
157
00:09:27,534 --> 00:09:31,505
and a slip is when the aircraft
is not in a coordinated turn.
158
00:09:31,638 --> 00:09:33,190
The tail is off in one direction,
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00:09:33,273 --> 00:09:34,992
the nose is pointed
in the other direction.
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00:09:35,075 --> 00:09:37,261
In other words, it's a slip
that goes like this.
161
00:09:37,344 --> 00:09:40,331
NARRATOR: Like a racecar driver
skidding through a turn,
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00:09:40,414 --> 00:09:43,283
Captain Geib is close to losing control.
163
00:09:45,552 --> 00:09:46,887
HANSON: Let's move it.
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00:09:49,923 --> 00:09:51,091
What's happening?
165
00:09:51,225 --> 00:09:54,962
We've declared an emergency,
and we're headed back to Anchorage.
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Indications?
167
00:09:56,864 --> 00:10:01,401
The lower rudder is hardover
17 degrees to the left.
168
00:10:02,269 --> 00:10:05,172
We don't know why,
and it's not responding.
169
00:10:05,305 --> 00:10:07,482
We don't know what else is wrong yet.
170
00:10:08,342 --> 00:10:10,694
HANSON: It took both hands
to fly the airplane.
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00:10:10,777 --> 00:10:14,748
We didn't know at that point
whether the rudder was coming apart.
172
00:10:14,882 --> 00:10:17,951
All we knew was
it was definitely a rudder problem.
173
00:10:18,819 --> 00:10:20,971
NARRATOR: This has never happened before.
174
00:10:21,054 --> 00:10:24,157
The pilots haven't been trained
for this malfunction.
175
00:10:24,625 --> 00:10:26,508
There's no procedure in the COM.
176
00:10:28,228 --> 00:10:30,664
NARRATOR: And the manual is of no use.
177
00:10:35,369 --> 00:10:37,288
Well, we're gonna have to make one up.
178
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NARRATOR: Thirty-five thousand feet
over the Bering Sea
179
00:10:40,274 --> 00:10:43,610
and an hour and 40 minutes away
from the nearest airport,
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00:10:43,744 --> 00:10:48,715
the pilots of this massive 747
are in uncharted territory.
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00:10:52,452 --> 00:10:55,789
NARRATOR: For the 386 passengers
on Flight 85,
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00:10:55,923 --> 00:10:59,092
the anxiety over the sudden dive
has subsided.
183
00:10:59,526 --> 00:11:02,880
No one in the cabin is aware
of the potentially fatal drama
184
00:11:02,963 --> 00:11:04,787
still unfolding in the cockpit.
185
00:11:08,435 --> 00:11:10,721
Without full control
of the plane's rudder,
186
00:11:10,804 --> 00:11:15,342
the crew needs to fly
another 1,300 kilometers to Anchorage.
187
00:11:17,110 --> 00:11:20,164
{\an8}Frank was the junior captain,
I was the senior captain,
188
00:11:20,247 --> 00:11:24,218
and when I saw him battling the controls,
189
00:11:24,351 --> 00:11:27,287
I decided that I was gonna take over.
190
00:11:27,421 --> 00:11:28,773
Frank, you've done a hell of a job,
191
00:11:28,856 --> 00:11:30,307
but I think I'd better take over now.
192
00:11:30,390 --> 00:11:32,877
If anybody's gonna ding this thing up,
it's gonna be me.
193
00:11:32,960 --> 00:11:34,828
I have no problem with that.
194
00:11:34,962 --> 00:11:36,663
- Okay.
- GEIB: Okay, Mike,
195
00:11:36,797 --> 00:11:39,416
you're gonna have to take control
while we switch over.
196
00:11:39,499 --> 00:11:40,934
Are you ready?
197
00:11:43,170 --> 00:11:44,238
I'm ready.
198
00:11:44,371 --> 00:11:47,258
NARRATOR: First Officer Fagan
must now hold the yoke steady
199
00:11:47,341 --> 00:11:50,224
as Captain Geib relinquishes
control of the plane.
200
00:11:50,844 --> 00:11:52,112
I have control.
201
00:11:53,514 --> 00:11:58,220
NARRATOR: Any mishandling of the controls
could send the plane into a fatal spin.
202
00:12:02,256 --> 00:12:04,191
The same delicate balancing act
203
00:12:04,324 --> 00:12:07,148
transfers control of the plane
to Captain Hanson.
204
00:12:07,694 --> 00:12:10,147
I was pretty appalled
at how much force it took
205
00:12:10,230 --> 00:12:13,634
to fly this big, beautiful airplane.
206
00:12:14,067 --> 00:12:20,240
If the airplane is flying, even lousy,
it's flying, and that's the bottom line.
207
00:12:20,374 --> 00:12:24,678
And it's headed towards Anchorage,
so we're good to go for a while.
208
00:12:24,811 --> 00:12:27,481
Now we could begin to devote some thought
209
00:12:27,614 --> 00:12:30,083
to other things that had to be done.
210
00:12:30,217 --> 00:12:33,921
NARRATOR: The crew has no idea
how badly the rudder is damaged.
211
00:12:34,054 --> 00:12:36,857
It could be seconds
from tearing off altogether.
212
00:12:43,463 --> 00:12:45,082
HANSON: I can't tell
whether the damn rudder
213
00:12:45,165 --> 00:12:47,048
is trying to leave the airplane.
214
00:12:47,534 --> 00:12:49,476
FAGAN: What do we tell the cabin?
215
00:12:50,637 --> 00:12:54,541
We decided the passengers
really should know.
216
00:12:54,675 --> 00:12:59,112
So we wanted to liaison with the cabin,
and Frank offered to do that.
217
00:12:59,246 --> 00:13:01,114
I'll go back and tell them.
218
00:13:01,248 --> 00:13:02,633
The more they know, the better.
219
00:13:02,716 --> 00:13:03,851
HANSON: I agree.
220
00:13:03,984 --> 00:13:06,984
I think we should tell them
exactly what's going on.
221
00:13:12,526 --> 00:13:13,527
Kathy?
222
00:13:14,528 --> 00:13:16,747
We don't know if things
are gonna get better or worse.
223
00:13:16,830 --> 00:13:18,532
Every single crewmember knew
224
00:13:18,665 --> 00:13:21,519
{\an8}that something major
had happened to that aircraft.
225
00:13:21,602 --> 00:13:23,053
We've turned back to Anchorage,
226
00:13:23,136 --> 00:13:24,822
and we're gonna make an emergency landing.
227
00:13:24,905 --> 00:13:28,759
The captain didn't try to hide anything,
didn't try to pull any punches.
228
00:13:28,842 --> 00:13:32,079
He just flat out said how things were,
229
00:13:32,212 --> 00:13:35,549
and that it could possibly
be a very rough landing.
230
00:13:35,682 --> 00:13:39,086
Kathy, we're calling this one
a red emergency.
231
00:13:39,219 --> 00:13:42,789
BRECKLIN: Red emergency is of course
preparing for the worst.
232
00:13:42,923 --> 00:13:48,228
There may be a crash landing.
There may be damage to the aircraft.
233
00:13:48,362 --> 00:13:52,833
There may be injury and/or death
to the passengers, and/or yourself.
234
00:13:52,966 --> 00:13:55,966
Hello, ladies and gentlemen.
I'm Captain Frank Geib.
235
00:13:56,970 --> 00:13:59,090
We are dealing with
a malfunction at the moment,
236
00:13:59,173 --> 00:14:02,393
and our crew is dealing with
the situation as best we can.
237
00:14:02,476 --> 00:14:04,845
We need everybody to remain calm,
238
00:14:04,978 --> 00:14:09,349
and please give your flight attendants
your complete attention.
239
00:14:09,483 --> 00:14:13,554
I cannot stress how important
your complete cooperation will be
240
00:14:13,687 --> 00:14:16,073
in order for us to
make it to the ground safely.
241
00:14:16,156 --> 00:14:21,195
The passengers, for the most part,
were fairly calm.
242
00:14:21,328 --> 00:14:24,048
I promise I'll update you
with any new information
243
00:14:24,131 --> 00:14:26,133
as it becomes available.
244
00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:28,152
Thank you very much for your attention,
245
00:14:28,235 --> 00:14:29,820
and I'll talk to you later.
246
00:14:29,903 --> 00:14:34,675
After a few minutes, you could hear
some people crying a little bit.
247
00:14:34,808 --> 00:14:38,645
You could see people looking around.
You could see fear.
248
00:14:43,450 --> 00:14:46,450
HANSON: We need to talk to SOC.
We need suggestions.
249
00:14:46,753 --> 00:14:48,589
We can reach them on HF.
250
00:14:49,056 --> 00:14:51,609
NARRATOR: The Systems Operations Center
in Minnesota
251
00:14:51,692 --> 00:14:53,393
may be able to help.
252
00:14:53,527 --> 00:14:57,114
But to reach that far, the pilots
must use high frequency radio,
253
00:14:57,197 --> 00:14:59,633
which has a weak, intermittent signal.
254
00:15:00,100 --> 00:15:03,237
HF radio is like when you were a kid,
255
00:15:03,370 --> 00:15:04,922
and your best friend lived next door,
256
00:15:05,005 --> 00:15:06,924
and you talked to him
between your bedrooms
257
00:15:07,007 --> 00:15:09,460
with two Campbell soup cans,
with a string between them.
258
00:15:09,543 --> 00:15:12,263
About that level of sound quality.
It's just awful.
259
00:15:12,346 --> 00:15:14,876
And ask them
to wake up John Doherty for us.
260
00:15:18,819 --> 00:15:21,702
{\an8}DOHERTY:
I was at home the night of the, uh, call,
261
00:15:21,855 --> 00:15:24,925
{\an8}just relaxing after a day in the office,
262
00:15:25,058 --> 00:15:27,160
{\an8}uh, enjoying a movie,
263
00:15:27,294 --> 00:15:29,413
{\an8}- but I was on call.
- (pager buzzing)
264
00:15:29,496 --> 00:15:31,849
{\an8}- (phone ringing)
- And those pagers would go off,
265
00:15:31,932 --> 00:15:33,467
{\an8}and sure enough, it did.
266
00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:35,853
NARRATOR: John Doherty
has worked with Captain Hanson
267
00:15:35,936 --> 00:15:37,070
for several years.
268
00:15:37,204 --> 00:15:40,174
DOHERTY:
I knew John very well, so I had a,
269
00:15:40,307 --> 00:15:44,378
a face, a person, a pilot,
I knew very well in my mind's eye.
270
00:15:45,379 --> 00:15:46,864
HANSON:
I knew John Doherty
271
00:15:46,947 --> 00:15:50,317
had a better knowledge of the 747-400
272
00:15:50,450 --> 00:15:53,987
than anybody at Northwest.
273
00:15:54,121 --> 00:15:56,416
NARRATOR:
But Captain Hanson has no idea
274
00:15:56,523 --> 00:15:58,542
when his friend's help might arrive,
275
00:15:58,625 --> 00:16:02,563
and keeping the huge aircraft
flying level at 35 thousand feet
276
00:16:02,696 --> 00:16:04,548
is becoming increasingly difficult.
277
00:16:04,631 --> 00:16:06,450
HANSON:
The control wheel was shaking,
278
00:16:06,533 --> 00:16:08,769
'cause the whole airplane was shaking.
279
00:16:08,902 --> 00:16:11,589
NARRATOR: He decides
to descend to a lower altitude,
280
00:16:11,672 --> 00:16:14,074
where denser air will provide more lift.
281
00:16:14,842 --> 00:16:16,490
HANSON:
You ready to do this?
282
00:16:17,411 --> 00:16:18,512
FAGAN:
All set.
283
00:16:18,645 --> 00:16:20,564
NARRATOR:
But with a crippled plane,
284
00:16:20,647 --> 00:16:24,318
this normally routine procedure
will be another risky maneuver.
285
00:16:25,085 --> 00:16:27,721
HANSON:
Okay. Let's go.
286
00:16:27,855 --> 00:16:29,740
DOHERTY:
You want to do it very carefully,
287
00:16:29,823 --> 00:16:31,342
so they're handling the controls
288
00:16:31,425 --> 00:16:34,228
under this really unusual circumstance
289
00:16:34,361 --> 00:16:37,998
as carefully and gently
and as delicately as they can.
290
00:16:38,131 --> 00:16:39,433
FAGAN:
How's it feel?
291
00:16:41,568 --> 00:16:43,053
HANSON:
About the same. Not great.
292
00:16:43,136 --> 00:16:44,855
HANSON:
We had to be very careful
293
00:16:44,938 --> 00:16:46,468
how we flew this airplane.
294
00:16:46,573 --> 00:16:48,092
The tail might be coming apart.
295
00:16:48,175 --> 00:16:51,211
The rudder might be
just barely hanging on,
296
00:16:51,345 --> 00:16:53,680
or it could be a hydraulic problem.
297
00:16:56,116 --> 00:16:57,518
FAGAN:
28 thousand.
298
00:16:57,651 --> 00:16:59,670
NARRATOR: They make it down
to twenty-eight thousand feet
299
00:16:59,753 --> 00:17:01,105
without further incident.
300
00:17:01,188 --> 00:17:03,090
HANSON:
I think I got this here.
301
00:17:03,223 --> 00:17:04,458
Okay.
302
00:17:04,591 --> 00:17:07,278
NARRATOR: But the force required
to fly the damaged aircraft
303
00:17:07,361 --> 00:17:09,396
has taken its toll on the captain.
304
00:17:10,163 --> 00:17:11,331
FAGAN:
John.
305
00:17:11,765 --> 00:17:14,285
HANSON:
Yeah, my leg's starting to cramp up.
306
00:17:14,368 --> 00:17:17,016
I'm having a tough time
holding this together.
307
00:17:17,337 --> 00:17:20,240
HANSON:
The physical effort that was required
308
00:17:20,374 --> 00:17:23,777
was considerable.
We were pushing so hard
309
00:17:23,911 --> 00:17:25,696
with our leg on that rudder pedal
310
00:17:25,779 --> 00:17:28,485
that we could only do it
for about ten minutes.
311
00:17:29,183 --> 00:17:31,068
HANSON:
You're gonna have to take it.
312
00:17:31,151 --> 00:17:32,352
Are you ready?
313
00:17:32,486 --> 00:17:33,654
FAGAN:
I'm ready.
314
00:17:34,388 --> 00:17:35,656
HANSON:
All right.
315
00:17:35,789 --> 00:17:37,357
Nice and easy.
316
00:17:42,529 --> 00:17:45,999
HANSON: And then
Mike would come in as I released.
317
00:17:46,133 --> 00:17:47,918
FAGAN:
It wanted to go back the other way.
318
00:17:48,001 --> 00:17:51,422
{\an8}In other words, you had to
make it go where you wanted it to go,
319
00:17:51,505 --> 00:17:53,424
and you have to use the cross controls,
320
00:17:53,507 --> 00:17:55,793
so you're using the muscles
in your shoulder
321
00:17:55,876 --> 00:17:58,545
and in your back,
and we would lock our legs.
322
00:18:00,414 --> 00:18:02,133
JOHN HANSON<
And then when I would release,
323
00:18:02,216 --> 00:18:04,751
I'd kind of get limbered up again.
324
00:18:05,819 --> 00:18:08,205
NARRATOR: Still more than an hour
away from Anchorage,
325
00:18:08,288 --> 00:18:11,792
the flight attendants prepare
the cabin for a RED emergency.
326
00:18:13,727 --> 00:18:15,412
BRECKLIN:
We did what we were trained to do.
327
00:18:15,495 --> 00:18:17,364
It just kicked in,
328
00:18:17,497 --> 00:18:18,649
and you would make sure that
329
00:18:18,732 --> 00:18:20,968
everything on the counter is put away,
330
00:18:21,068 --> 00:18:23,170
make sure all the crew bags are,
331
00:18:23,303 --> 00:18:25,539
are stowed and where they should be.
332
00:18:28,342 --> 00:18:33,046
Everyone to a person cooperated
with what we asked them to do.
333
00:18:33,180 --> 00:18:36,049
I remember coming to a family of three,
334
00:18:36,183 --> 00:18:38,585
and they asked me if I was afraid.
335
00:18:39,319 --> 00:18:40,754
And I hate to admit it,
336
00:18:40,888 --> 00:18:42,807
but I did briefly consider lying,
337
00:18:42,890 --> 00:18:45,209
but then I decided
that wasn't what I should do.
338
00:18:45,292 --> 00:18:46,944
BRECKLIN:
Yeah, I'm afraid, too,
339
00:18:47,027 --> 00:18:48,896
but we have the best pilots.
340
00:18:52,466 --> 00:18:55,290
SOC: Flight 85,
we have John Doherty on the line.
341
00:18:56,136 --> 00:18:58,222
NARRATOR:
Operations has finally been able to
342
00:18:58,305 --> 00:19:00,574
connect the pilots with John Doherty.
343
00:19:01,842 --> 00:19:03,360
HANSON:
John, have you been briefed on this?
344
00:19:03,443 --> 00:19:05,429
You know what's happening up here?
345
00:19:05,512 --> 00:19:08,299
DOHERTY: Yes,
I understand you have a control problem.
346
00:19:08,382 --> 00:19:09,816
HANSON:
EICAS is showing
347
00:19:09,950 --> 00:19:11,833
we have a hardover lower rudder.
348
00:19:11,919 --> 00:19:13,104
DOHERTY:
They were facing,
349
00:19:13,187 --> 00:19:15,355
really, a very confusing situation.
350
00:19:15,489 --> 00:19:19,092
They knew they were confronted
with something unique.
351
00:19:19,226 --> 00:19:21,745
It was something that they had
never done in training,
352
00:19:21,828 --> 00:19:23,881
something they'd never seen in training,
353
00:19:23,964 --> 00:19:27,634
nothing we'd ever talked about
in ground schools.
354
00:19:27,768 --> 00:19:29,019
HANSON:
The COM is not telling us much.
355
00:19:29,102 --> 00:19:32,239
We're about... We're an hour
out of Anchorage.
356
00:19:32,372 --> 00:19:33,640
What do you think?
357
00:19:34,908 --> 00:19:38,111
DOHERTY:
Well, don't remove any power
358
00:19:38,245 --> 00:19:41,114
from the hydraulics,
but other than that...
359
00:19:41,248 --> 00:19:44,117
DOHERTY:
And I knew from listening to John
360
00:19:44,251 --> 00:19:45,736
that what we had in the books
361
00:19:45,819 --> 00:19:48,622
wasn't going to be a help to him.
362
00:19:48,755 --> 00:19:51,375
There are going to be some
circumstances where a pilot is,
363
00:19:51,458 --> 00:19:54,929
is going to have to figure out
what to do on his or her own.
364
00:19:56,430 --> 00:19:57,681
NARRATOR:
Thirty minutes pass
365
00:19:57,764 --> 00:19:59,933
before Northwest 85 is in range
366
00:20:00,067 --> 00:20:02,891
to talk to the Anchorage
Control Center directly.
367
00:20:03,103 --> 00:20:05,456
ATC: Uh, Northwest 85,
we have you on the radar.
368
00:20:05,539 --> 00:20:07,474
FAGAN:
Anchorage, Northwest 85.
369
00:20:07,608 --> 00:20:10,528
Confirm that you are aware that
we have declared an emergency,
370
00:20:10,611 --> 00:20:13,030
that you have
emergency equipment standing by.
371
00:20:13,113 --> 00:20:14,681
We will request runway.
372
00:20:19,086 --> 00:20:21,839
NARRATOR: The plane must fly
over the Aleutian mountain range
373
00:20:21,922 --> 00:20:24,334
to reach Anchorage International Airport.
374
00:20:25,726 --> 00:20:29,062
The airport itself
is also surrounded by mountains.
375
00:20:30,163 --> 00:20:32,850
HANSON: We said, okay,
six right is the runway we want,
376
00:20:32,933 --> 00:20:34,685
'cause it'll give us a twenty mile final,
377
00:20:34,768 --> 00:20:38,505
and it's a great runway with an
ILS approach, and it's long.
378
00:20:38,639 --> 00:20:40,157
HANSON:
Okay, six right, it is.
379
00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:41,992
Let's make sure we get it
right the first time.
380
00:20:42,075 --> 00:20:44,228
HANSON: And as far as
the missed approach is concerned,
381
00:20:44,311 --> 00:20:45,712
we're not gonna do one.
382
00:20:45,846 --> 00:20:48,232
We're just gonna do it
right the first time,
383
00:20:48,315 --> 00:20:50,021
and put it right on the spot.
384
00:20:51,318 --> 00:20:53,554
NARRATOR:
There is no margin for error.
385
00:20:53,820 --> 00:20:56,356
The pilots know they have only one shot.
386
00:20:57,958 --> 00:20:59,782
HANSON:
What do you think, Mike?
387
00:21:00,727 --> 00:21:02,346
FAGAN:
Maybe we should start configuring
388
00:21:02,429 --> 00:21:04,798
for a landing early.
Lower our altitude.
389
00:21:06,500 --> 00:21:08,919
NARRATOR: They're still
40 minutes away from Anchorage,
390
00:21:09,002 --> 00:21:12,239
but the pilots decide
to configure for a landing.
391
00:21:13,207 --> 00:21:16,502
They want to see how it will affect
their crippled plane.
392
00:21:17,144 --> 00:21:18,579
If something goes wrong,
393
00:21:18,712 --> 00:21:21,114
this may give them more room to recover.
394
00:21:21,248 --> 00:21:23,000
HANSON:
Okay, we can take it over Cook Inlet,
395
00:21:23,083 --> 00:21:26,620
lower to 14,000,
and then see what happens.
396
00:21:26,753 --> 00:21:28,272
HANSON:
Fourteen thousand feet
397
00:21:28,355 --> 00:21:30,508
is a real nice intermediate altitude.
398
00:21:30,591 --> 00:21:34,595
It's good, thick air,
and it's high enough yet
399
00:21:34,728 --> 00:21:37,798
that if something got worse
and control deteriorated,
400
00:21:37,931 --> 00:21:40,000
you'd have room for a recovery.
401
00:21:40,667 --> 00:21:42,119
FAGAN:
This is Northwest 85.
402
00:21:42,202 --> 00:21:45,405
We would like to descend
to 14,000 over Cook Inlet.
403
00:21:45,806 --> 00:21:47,042
ATC:
We can't do that.
404
00:21:47,174 --> 00:21:49,260
Lots of air traffic in that airspace.
405
00:21:49,343 --> 00:21:51,228
NARRATOR:
The airspace over Cook Inlet
406
00:21:51,311 --> 00:21:54,481
is the busiest corridor
in this part of the continent.
407
00:21:54,615 --> 00:21:56,867
If they lose control of the plane again,
408
00:21:56,950 --> 00:21:59,362
they could collide with another aircraft.
409
00:22:00,888 --> 00:22:03,156
HANSON:
This is an emergency aircraft.
410
00:22:03,290 --> 00:22:05,526
This is the safest course of action.
411
00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:09,925
ATC: Okay, we'll clear
everyone out of your way.
412
00:22:10,998 --> 00:22:12,249
NARRATOR:
The jumbo jet
413
00:22:12,332 --> 00:22:15,102
slowly descends to 14,000 feet.
414
00:22:17,204 --> 00:22:20,641
HANSON:
Okay, flap five.
415
00:22:22,309 --> 00:22:23,410
Flap five.
416
00:22:23,544 --> 00:22:24,728
NARRATOR:
As he adds flaps,
417
00:22:24,811 --> 00:22:28,815
Captain Hanson can only hope
the plane maintains stable flight.
418
00:22:30,551 --> 00:22:32,819
Next comes an even bigger test.
419
00:22:32,953 --> 00:22:34,121
HANSON:
Gear down.
420
00:22:36,557 --> 00:22:37,658
FAGAN:
Gear down.
421
00:22:37,791 --> 00:22:39,710
NARRATOR:
Lowering the massive landing gear
422
00:22:39,793 --> 00:22:42,162
will increase drag and reduce airspeed.
423
00:22:43,830 --> 00:22:45,749
The plane handles the new configuration
424
00:22:45,832 --> 00:22:47,501
without any problems,
425
00:22:48,502 --> 00:22:51,444
but there are new worries
about the damaged rudder.
426
00:22:53,540 --> 00:22:54,942
FAGAN:
You feeling that?
427
00:22:55,075 --> 00:22:56,577
HANSON:
Oh, yeah.
428
00:22:58,245 --> 00:23:01,132
FAGAN: The rudder is tied
to airspeed and altitude.
429
00:23:01,215 --> 00:23:03,601
The lower you get,
the further the rudder goes out.
430
00:23:03,684 --> 00:23:06,386
So then it required
more rudder, more aileron,
431
00:23:07,087 --> 00:23:10,023
and that was, uh, physically exhausting.
432
00:23:11,425 --> 00:23:13,944
HANSON:
Mike, my leg's starting to cramp up.
433
00:23:14,027 --> 00:23:15,329
Are you ready?
434
00:23:16,063 --> 00:23:17,264
FAGAN:
I'm ready.
435
00:23:23,637 --> 00:23:25,423
NARRATOR:
John Doherty is still on the line
436
00:23:25,506 --> 00:23:28,475
to the crew.
He offers a suggestion.
437
00:23:28,609 --> 00:23:30,294
DOHERTY:
Have you considered adding 20 knots
438
00:23:30,377 --> 00:23:31,730
to your approach speed?
439
00:23:32,312 --> 00:23:33,731
HANSON:
No, we hadn't thought about that.
440
00:23:33,814 --> 00:23:34,982
We'll do it.
441
00:23:35,115 --> 00:23:36,550
NARRATOR:
The extra speed
442
00:23:36,683 --> 00:23:39,154
may help make the plane more controllable.
443
00:23:43,991 --> 00:23:45,092
(intercom dings)
444
00:23:47,461 --> 00:23:49,403
GEIB:
Hello, ladies and gentlemen.
445
00:23:49,930 --> 00:23:52,232
We're in for a bit of a rough landing.
446
00:23:52,366 --> 00:23:55,308
When we touch down,
there is gonna be quite a jolt.
447
00:23:56,837 --> 00:23:59,190
We'll tell you when to brace for impact.
448
00:24:02,309 --> 00:24:04,528
NARRATOR:
As Northwest Airlines Flight 85
449
00:24:04,611 --> 00:24:05,946
approaches Anchorage,
450
00:24:06,079 --> 00:24:07,548
the pilots and Doherty
451
00:24:07,681 --> 00:24:10,505
continue planning for
an uncertain landing ahead.
452
00:24:11,351 --> 00:24:13,204
DOHERTY:
We discussed how are things gonna be
453
00:24:13,287 --> 00:24:15,773
as we fly the approach,
what flight control,
454
00:24:15,856 --> 00:24:18,075
what management issues
in terms of flight paths
455
00:24:18,158 --> 00:24:19,443
are we gonna encounter there,
456
00:24:19,526 --> 00:24:21,679
and then how are we gonna
manage directional control
457
00:24:21,762 --> 00:24:23,080
during the landing rollout,
458
00:24:23,163 --> 00:24:26,163
uh, what stopping issues
we're gonna have and so on.
459
00:24:26,700 --> 00:24:29,420
NARRATOR: The decisions they face
in the next few moments
460
00:24:29,503 --> 00:24:32,268
will make the difference
between life and death.
461
00:24:34,041 --> 00:24:35,960
HANSON:
Okay, we can't do this anymore.
462
00:24:36,043 --> 00:24:39,513
Let's use the engines.
Dave, get on the levers.
463
00:24:39,646 --> 00:24:41,764
One and two up, three and four down.
464
00:24:41,949 --> 00:24:43,734
NARRATOR:
Just minutes from touchdown,
465
00:24:43,817 --> 00:24:46,420
the pilots increase power
to the left engines
466
00:24:46,553 --> 00:24:48,553
while reducing power to the right.
467
00:24:49,590 --> 00:24:52,355
This uneven thrust
should help keep it straight,
468
00:24:53,594 --> 00:24:55,495
but there is a danger.
469
00:24:55,629 --> 00:24:58,899
No one knows how badly
damaged the rudder is.
470
00:24:59,032 --> 00:25:02,169
If it tears off while
the engine thrust is uneven,
471
00:25:02,302 --> 00:25:04,705
the pilots will lose all control.
472
00:25:05,439 --> 00:25:07,207
(sirens blaring)
473
00:25:07,341 --> 00:25:10,694
NARRATOR: On the ground,
they are preparing for the worst.
474
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:20,571
HANSON:
I'd give a thousand dollars
475
00:25:20,654 --> 00:25:22,537
for a rearview mirror right now.
476
00:25:28,061 --> 00:25:30,697
John, what do you think?
477
00:25:31,164 --> 00:25:34,568
NARRATOR: Doherty has been
scouring charts and manuals.
478
00:25:34,701 --> 00:25:37,221
He reminds the crew
of another problem to consider.
479
00:25:37,304 --> 00:25:38,472
DOHERTY:
On landing,
480
00:25:38,605 --> 00:25:40,691
don't forget the rudder's
attached to the nose steering.
481
00:25:40,774 --> 00:25:42,059
HANSON:
And when that happens, Mike,
482
00:25:42,142 --> 00:25:43,294
I'll take the tiller and the brakes.
483
00:25:43,377 --> 00:25:44,578
You take the yoke.
484
00:25:45,245 --> 00:25:46,864
NARRATOR:
Once the nose touches down,
485
00:25:46,947 --> 00:25:50,000
the damaged rudder may cause them
to lose control of the plane,
486
00:25:50,083 --> 00:25:52,586
at more than 300 kilometers an hour.
487
00:25:58,759 --> 00:26:01,112
HANSON:
I flew the approach all the way down,
488
00:26:01,195 --> 00:26:04,498
and I thought if there's
ever gonna be a time
489
00:26:04,631 --> 00:26:08,268
that you fly a perfect approach,
it's gotta be this one.
490
00:26:12,005 --> 00:26:13,624
DOHERTY:
I became extraneous at that time,
491
00:26:13,707 --> 00:26:16,043
so, somewhere along around seven,
492
00:26:16,176 --> 00:26:18,062
eight thousand feet on the way down,
493
00:26:18,145 --> 00:26:20,414
uh, I signed off with the crew.
494
00:26:20,547 --> 00:26:22,466
DOHERTY: I'll talk to you
when you're on the ground.
495
00:26:22,549 --> 00:26:24,017
FAGAN:
We'll talk soon.
496
00:26:26,253 --> 00:26:27,938
DOHERTY:
You know, I gave John
497
00:26:28,021 --> 00:26:30,610
whatever blessing
I could give at the moment,
498
00:26:30,724 --> 00:26:33,344
probably understated
in typical pilot fashion,
499
00:26:33,427 --> 00:26:37,130
and I was off the line and just
waiting to hear what happened.
500
00:26:42,069 --> 00:26:44,121
NARRATOR:
Between the frigid waters of Cook Inlet
501
00:26:44,204 --> 00:26:46,263
and the towering Alaskan mountains,
502
00:26:46,874 --> 00:26:48,392
Anchorage International Airport
503
00:26:48,475 --> 00:26:51,512
awaits the arrival of a stricken 747.
504
00:26:52,412 --> 00:26:54,942
ATC:
Northwest 85, we have you on our radar.
505
00:26:59,419 --> 00:27:02,243
NARRATOR:
The passengers and crew of Northwest 85
506
00:27:02,356 --> 00:27:05,062
are now moments away
from an emergency landing.
507
00:27:09,496 --> 00:27:12,399
BRECKLIN:
As I was putting my own seatbelt on,
508
00:27:12,533 --> 00:27:17,004
{\an8}I remember thinking to myself,
is this all there is?
509
00:27:17,771 --> 00:27:19,439
{\an8}As in, am I done here?
510
00:27:19,573 --> 00:27:22,309
Am I gonna be alive when this is over?
511
00:27:22,442 --> 00:27:26,446
And I thought about my kids
and my husband and my home.
512
00:27:28,815 --> 00:27:31,151
ATC:
Northwest 85, cleared to land.
513
00:27:31,285 --> 00:27:33,353
Emergency equipment standing by.
514
00:27:34,121 --> 00:27:35,606
FAGAN:
Roger, cleared to land.
515
00:27:35,689 --> 00:27:37,641
NARRATOR:
The crew still has no idea
516
00:27:37,724 --> 00:27:40,666
what will happen when the plane
touches the ground.
517
00:27:40,827 --> 00:27:43,347
{\an8}DOHERTY: There were close to
400 passengers on that airplane,
518
00:27:43,430 --> 00:27:45,399
{\an8}and a crew of eighteen,
519
00:27:45,532 --> 00:27:48,719
{\an8}and, uh, some of them
people that I knew personally, like John,
520
00:27:48,802 --> 00:27:50,454
and the other pilots in the crew,
521
00:27:50,537 --> 00:27:52,472
so waiting was hard.
522
00:27:55,809 --> 00:27:57,809
HANSON:
Okay, everyone. Here we go.
523
00:28:00,514 --> 00:28:01,748
(intercom dings)
524
00:28:02,349 --> 00:28:03,601
GEIB:
Touchdown in five.
525
00:28:03,684 --> 00:28:04,918
Prepare for impact.
526
00:28:05,819 --> 00:28:07,588
BRECKLIN:
Brace! Brace! Brace!
527
00:28:18,098 --> 00:28:19,650
- HANSON: You got it?
- FAGAN: I got it!
528
00:28:19,733 --> 00:28:21,735
NARRATOR:
As planned, on touchdown,
529
00:28:21,869 --> 00:28:24,388
First Officer Fagan
takes the control column.
530
00:28:24,471 --> 00:28:27,648
Captain Hanson guides the front
wheels with the tiller.
531
00:28:27,741 --> 00:28:29,476
The timing is critical.
532
00:28:29,610 --> 00:28:33,213
One false step, and the plane
could shoot off the runway.
533
00:28:42,990 --> 00:28:44,458
HANSON:
We got it.
534
00:28:50,030 --> 00:28:52,833
Good job, Mike. Good job guys.
535
00:28:54,301 --> 00:28:56,303
So what do we do for an encore?
536
00:28:56,436 --> 00:28:57,604
FAGAN:
Not that.
537
00:28:57,738 --> 00:28:58,956
HANSON:
Everyone in the cockpit
538
00:28:59,039 --> 00:29:01,241
{\an8}was finally able to exhale,
539
00:29:01,375 --> 00:29:04,878
{\an8}and we just went, "Aah."
540
00:29:05,012 --> 00:29:06,847
(sighing)
541
00:29:13,820 --> 00:29:16,056
BRECKLIN:
Once we were given the signal
542
00:29:16,156 --> 00:29:17,691
that it was okay...
543
00:29:17,824 --> 00:29:20,177
BRECKLIN: Please remain
seated until the seatbelt light is off.
544
00:29:20,260 --> 00:29:21,712
BRECKLIN:
I knew that I had to get up
545
00:29:21,795 --> 00:29:23,363
and go to that entry door,
546
00:29:23,497 --> 00:29:26,133
and get these people out of this airplane.
547
00:29:26,266 --> 00:29:28,268
We did what we were trained to do.
548
00:29:28,402 --> 00:29:30,344
- We did a great job.
- (clapping)
549
00:29:31,371 --> 00:29:34,371
NARRATOR:
Controllers can see what the pilots can't.
550
00:29:34,908 --> 00:29:37,294
ATC:
That's quite the rudder you got there.
551
00:29:37,377 --> 00:29:38,963
Must have been a hell of a ride.
552
00:29:39,046 --> 00:29:40,380
(laughing)
553
00:29:40,514 --> 00:29:42,809
FAGAN:
Oh, yeah. It was a real joy ride.
554
00:29:47,154 --> 00:29:48,372
NARRATOR:
Almost two hours
555
00:29:48,455 --> 00:29:51,658
after the emergency began at 35,000 feet,
556
00:29:51,792 --> 00:29:54,294
all 404 people on board
557
00:29:54,428 --> 00:29:56,129
are safely on the ground.
558
00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:01,802
(phone ringing)
559
00:30:03,103 --> 00:30:04,622
DOHERTY:
Well, when I heard the crew was safe,
560
00:30:04,705 --> 00:30:06,924
of course it was an incredible
sense of relief.
561
00:30:07,007 --> 00:30:09,827
These guys had been tested
and they'd done a fabulous job,
562
00:30:09,910 --> 00:30:12,312
so, it was, it was really joyful.
563
00:30:12,446 --> 00:30:15,883
I mean, the sense of grace,
accomplishment,
564
00:30:16,016 --> 00:30:19,820
joy, um, satisfaction.
565
00:30:19,953 --> 00:30:21,688
It was all good.
566
00:30:23,190 --> 00:30:26,310
NARRATOR: The pilots have
narrowly avoided a fatal crash,
567
00:30:26,393 --> 00:30:29,570
but what caused them
to lose control in the first place
568
00:30:29,663 --> 00:30:32,663
is a question that desperately
needs to be answered.
569
00:30:34,668 --> 00:30:36,937
Northwest is just one of many airlines
570
00:30:37,070 --> 00:30:39,873
flying the 747-400 every day.
571
00:30:42,075 --> 00:30:44,228
Thousands of passengers around the world
572
00:30:44,311 --> 00:30:46,246
now face a potential risk.
573
00:30:50,350 --> 00:30:54,821
Carolyn Deforge of the NTSB
will oversee the investigation.
574
00:30:54,955 --> 00:30:57,408
CAROLYN DEFORGE:
It appeared to be a very dramatic event,
575
00:30:57,491 --> 00:31:00,627
{\an8}and, um, it definitely seemed like
576
00:31:00,761 --> 00:31:02,480
{\an8}something we needed to follow up on,
577
00:31:02,563 --> 00:31:04,975
{\an8}and try and understand what had happened.
578
00:31:07,534 --> 00:31:09,453
NARRATOR:
Investigators immediately discover
579
00:31:09,536 --> 00:31:11,055
a trail of hydraulic fluid
580
00:31:11,138 --> 00:31:13,057
leaking from the back of the plane.
581
00:31:13,140 --> 00:31:14,592
DEFORGE:
It was very surprising to us
582
00:31:14,675 --> 00:31:17,428
when we found out what type
of failure had occurred,
583
00:31:17,511 --> 00:31:20,214
and that the effects it had had
584
00:31:20,347 --> 00:31:22,850
on the aircraft's controllability.
585
00:31:22,983 --> 00:31:24,835
NARRATOR:
The pilot's foot pedals
586
00:31:24,918 --> 00:31:26,137
are linked to the rudder
587
00:31:26,220 --> 00:31:29,423
through a hydraulic power
control module, or PCM.
588
00:31:30,557 --> 00:31:32,276
When the pilot presses on the pedals,
589
00:31:32,359 --> 00:31:35,028
the PCM changes the hydraulic pressure,
590
00:31:35,762 --> 00:31:38,065
and that's what moves the rudder.
591
00:31:38,198 --> 00:31:41,316
DEFORGE: They opened up
the access panels in the tail,
592
00:31:42,102 --> 00:31:44,271
and they noticed that the end cap
593
00:31:44,404 --> 00:31:46,874
on the control module had separated.
594
00:31:47,875 --> 00:31:50,644
The end cap is a circular piece
595
00:31:50,777 --> 00:31:53,030
about two and a half inches in diameter,
596
00:31:53,113 --> 00:31:55,015
and it had completely fractured
597
00:31:55,148 --> 00:31:57,168
all of the way around its diameter,
598
00:31:57,251 --> 00:31:58,663
and had then fallen off.
599
00:32:00,087 --> 00:32:02,089
NARRATOR:
With the PCM broken,
600
00:32:02,222 --> 00:32:05,325
the pilots had no way
to control the lower rudder.
601
00:32:05,459 --> 00:32:08,128
The failure of this
one piece of engineering
602
00:32:08,262 --> 00:32:10,831
nearly brought down the entire plane.
603
00:32:11,698 --> 00:32:13,110
The power control module
604
00:32:13,233 --> 00:32:16,116
is shipped to the NTSB
headquarters in Washington.
605
00:32:17,571 --> 00:32:20,874
Close examination reveals
exactly how the failed part
606
00:32:21,008 --> 00:32:22,543
caused the rudder to jam.
607
00:32:23,644 --> 00:32:25,229
DEFORGE:
When the end cap came off,
608
00:32:25,312 --> 00:32:27,781
it allowed a piston inside the module
609
00:32:27,915 --> 00:32:32,052
to move further than
its design limit was intended,
610
00:32:32,186 --> 00:32:35,556
and that is what resulted
in the rudder hardover.
611
00:32:39,026 --> 00:32:41,011
NARRATOR:
By why the module's end cap
612
00:32:41,094 --> 00:32:42,379
failed in the first place
613
00:32:42,462 --> 00:32:43,864
is still a mystery.
614
00:32:45,165 --> 00:32:46,784
DEFORGE:
It was certainly something
615
00:32:46,867 --> 00:32:50,103
that was not anticipated by the designers,
616
00:32:50,237 --> 00:32:52,739
and when we examined the hardware,
617
00:32:52,873 --> 00:32:56,243
um, it was definitely beyond the scope
618
00:32:56,376 --> 00:32:59,246
of what you normally
encounter as an engineer
619
00:32:59,379 --> 00:33:01,298
when you're doing a failure investigation.
620
00:33:01,381 --> 00:33:04,034
Normally you see something
that's an internal failure,
621
00:33:04,117 --> 00:33:07,654
not an actual mechanical failure
of the housing itself.
622
00:33:07,788 --> 00:33:09,840
NARRATOR:
Sylvie Dionne is a metallurgist
623
00:33:09,923 --> 00:33:12,626
specializing in airplane components.
624
00:33:12,759 --> 00:33:15,880
{\an8}SYLVIE DIONNE: The manifold
material was an aluminum alloy,
625
00:33:15,963 --> 00:33:18,048
{\an8}which means that it's actually
aluminum metal
626
00:33:18,131 --> 00:33:20,084
that's mixed in with a bit of copper,
627
00:33:20,167 --> 00:33:21,935
with magnesium, with zinc.
628
00:33:22,069 --> 00:33:24,422
And the purpose of adding
these other elements
629
00:33:24,505 --> 00:33:26,039
is to make it stronger.
630
00:33:26,673 --> 00:33:28,259
NARRATOR:
The aluminum alloy
631
00:33:28,342 --> 00:33:31,044
used to make this part
is extremely resilient.
632
00:33:31,178 --> 00:33:33,447
It should never break apart like this.
633
00:33:35,682 --> 00:33:37,802
DIONNE:
Doing failure analyses like this
634
00:33:37,885 --> 00:33:41,021
on failed parts is a bit like,
uh, being a detective,
635
00:33:41,889 --> 00:33:43,772
because you're looking for clues
636
00:33:43,857 --> 00:33:45,743
as to what caused the occurrence,
637
00:33:45,826 --> 00:33:47,768
what caused the material to fail.
638
00:33:49,897 --> 00:33:51,649
NARRATOR:
The size and shape of the crack
639
00:33:51,732 --> 00:33:55,027
tells investigators that
the module wore out over time...
640
00:33:55,969 --> 00:33:57,971
what's called metal fatigue.
641
00:33:58,105 --> 00:34:01,282
However, this is almost
impossible for them to believe.
642
00:34:05,012 --> 00:34:08,749
A Boeing 747-400 is built for long hauls,
643
00:34:08,882 --> 00:34:10,784
12 to 15 hour flights,
644
00:34:10,918 --> 00:34:13,554
and its parts are built to last decades.
645
00:34:15,155 --> 00:34:17,675
DOHERTY: My understanding
was the mean time before failure
646
00:34:17,758 --> 00:34:20,678
for this item was something
like thirty thousand years,
647
00:34:20,761 --> 00:34:22,279
which is basically saying,
648
00:34:22,362 --> 00:34:25,382
well, we don't think
this part was ever going to fail.
649
00:34:25,465 --> 00:34:28,735
NARRATOR:
The 747-400 is in high demand.
650
00:34:28,869 --> 00:34:32,840
More of these massive planes
are being manufactured every year,
651
00:34:32,973 --> 00:34:36,343
with the same control module
that failed on Flight 85.
652
00:34:37,744 --> 00:34:40,848
If this crucial system
is wearing out prematurely,
653
00:34:42,216 --> 00:34:44,551
investigators need to figure out why,
654
00:34:44,685 --> 00:34:46,887
before it leads to a fatal disaster.
655
00:34:48,088 --> 00:34:51,491
DEFORGE: The fact that
this had a purely fatigue failure,
656
00:34:51,625 --> 00:34:54,428
with no apparent origin to it,
657
00:34:54,561 --> 00:34:57,097
such as a deficiency or a defect,
658
00:34:57,231 --> 00:35:01,535
made us question the material properties
of the housing itself.
659
00:35:02,503 --> 00:35:05,322
NARRATOR: Investigators send
the unit back to the manufacturer
660
00:35:05,405 --> 00:35:07,523
for extensive metallurgical testing.
661
00:35:10,410 --> 00:35:13,080
DIONNE:
Metals are made up of little crystals,
662
00:35:13,213 --> 00:35:15,616
which metallurgists call grains,
663
00:35:15,749 --> 00:35:18,552
and if the grains are
too small or too large
664
00:35:18,685 --> 00:35:20,420
or not the correct shape,
665
00:35:20,554 --> 00:35:22,640
uh, the material may have
a different strength,
666
00:35:22,723 --> 00:35:24,809
different ductility, different resistance
667
00:35:24,892 --> 00:35:26,660
to propagation of a crack.
668
00:35:28,695 --> 00:35:30,648
NARRATOR:
A visual examination of the metal
669
00:35:30,731 --> 00:35:33,066
provides no insight into why it failed.
670
00:35:35,569 --> 00:35:37,888
DIONNE:
One of the best techniques for revealing
671
00:35:37,971 --> 00:35:40,607
if a part contains
cracks or surface defects
672
00:35:40,741 --> 00:35:43,210
is to use fluorescent dye inspection.
673
00:35:46,413 --> 00:35:49,583
The part is examined under UV light,
674
00:35:50,083 --> 00:35:52,986
and the defects will appear
as bright lines,
675
00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:55,689
or bright dots that are very visible.
676
00:35:55,822 --> 00:35:57,374
NARRATOR:
But the exhaustive tests
677
00:35:57,457 --> 00:36:00,494
reveal that the material itself
was not to blame.
678
00:36:02,930 --> 00:36:06,066
Investigators still
can't explain the failure.
679
00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:08,352
DEFORGE:
It was driving all of the group crazy.
680
00:36:08,435 --> 00:36:10,855
We were very frustrated
when we realized that
681
00:36:10,938 --> 00:36:13,040
all of the paths we chased down
682
00:36:13,173 --> 00:36:17,044
didn't give you
that "Aha! Eureka!" moment.
683
00:36:20,447 --> 00:36:21,966
NARRATOR:
Investigators wonder
684
00:36:22,049 --> 00:36:23,834
if something in this plane's history
685
00:36:23,917 --> 00:36:27,094
could have caused the module
to break down prematurely.
686
00:36:27,654 --> 00:36:29,890
What the records reveal is surprising.
687
00:36:31,225 --> 00:36:35,195
HANSON: Northwest was the
launch customer for the 747-400,
688
00:36:35,929 --> 00:36:38,999
and this one was the first
in the line of 400s
689
00:36:39,132 --> 00:36:40,501
that Northwest flew.
690
00:36:40,634 --> 00:36:46,673
It was the oldest production
747-400 in the world.
691
00:36:47,641 --> 00:36:49,026
NARRATOR:
And that's not all.
692
00:36:49,109 --> 00:36:52,846
Records also show that this very 747-400
693
00:36:52,980 --> 00:36:54,392
was used as a test plane
694
00:36:54,481 --> 00:36:57,117
before it was even sold to the airline.
695
00:36:57,251 --> 00:36:58,785
Could rigorous testing
696
00:36:58,919 --> 00:37:02,390
have somehow led to the failure
of the power control module?
697
00:37:03,790 --> 00:37:07,060
The plane had flown for 55,000 hours,
698
00:37:07,194 --> 00:37:10,130
and taken off more than 7,000 times.
699
00:37:10,864 --> 00:37:12,550
That's more takeoffs and landings
700
00:37:12,633 --> 00:37:15,869
than most 747s with that number
of hours in the air.
701
00:37:17,571 --> 00:37:20,073
This discovery leads the investigation
702
00:37:20,207 --> 00:37:22,309
in an entirely new direction.
703
00:37:23,143 --> 00:37:24,795
DEFORGE:
We were concerned that
704
00:37:24,878 --> 00:37:28,382
it had been exposed to
more stress than we had expected,
705
00:37:28,515 --> 00:37:31,185
and that that may have caused it to fail.
706
00:37:31,318 --> 00:37:34,004
NARRATOR:
Each time a plane takes off and lands,
707
00:37:34,087 --> 00:37:36,382
its systems are put through more stress
708
00:37:36,490 --> 00:37:39,079
than when it's simply
flying through the air.
709
00:37:41,028 --> 00:37:43,848
DEFORGE: We were very concerned
about those operators in Asia
710
00:37:43,931 --> 00:37:47,634
that use the 747-400
on short haul flights.
711
00:37:48,302 --> 00:37:51,238
NARRATOR:
This module, however, is already broken.
712
00:37:51,371 --> 00:37:53,173
There's no way to test it.
713
00:37:53,307 --> 00:37:55,493
Checking all the units
on the rest of the fleet
714
00:37:55,576 --> 00:37:57,544
is not a practical option.
715
00:37:57,678 --> 00:38:00,030
DEFORGE: You would have
essentially had to have grounded the fleet
716
00:38:00,113 --> 00:38:01,715
to remove all of the units.
717
00:38:02,816 --> 00:38:04,268
NARRATOR:
As a pre-emptive strike
718
00:38:04,351 --> 00:38:05,786
against future failure,
719
00:38:05,919 --> 00:38:07,888
the NTSB recommends that airlines
720
00:38:08,021 --> 00:38:10,669
test the power control module
more vigorously,
721
00:38:10,791 --> 00:38:12,059
and more regularly.
722
00:38:14,761 --> 00:38:17,164
DEFORGE:
We instituted a repetitive
723
00:38:17,297 --> 00:38:20,067
inspection cycle requirement.
724
00:38:20,701 --> 00:38:22,553
NARRATOR:
But the root cause of the failure
725
00:38:22,636 --> 00:38:24,204
is never found.
726
00:38:27,508 --> 00:38:29,038
NARRATOR:
Four years later,
727
00:38:29,142 --> 00:38:32,907
an Air France cargo plane is forced
to make an emergency landing.
728
00:38:33,580 --> 00:38:37,851
Once again, the lower rudder
has failed on the 747-400.
729
00:38:40,187 --> 00:38:44,458
The circumstances are strikingly
similar to Northwest Flight 85.
730
00:38:44,591 --> 00:38:47,144
DEFORGE:
The unit was sent to Parker Hannifin
731
00:38:47,227 --> 00:38:48,729
in California for repair,
732
00:38:48,862 --> 00:38:51,482
and when they opened the box
and looked at it,
733
00:38:51,565 --> 00:38:53,017
their eyes got really big.
734
00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:55,786
They immediately quarantined it
and called everyone
735
00:38:55,869 --> 00:38:57,588
and said, "Oh, my gosh.
You're not gonna believe
736
00:38:57,671 --> 00:38:59,623
what just showed up
on our doorstep."
737
00:38:59,706 --> 00:39:01,192
NARRATOR:
If the Air France module
738
00:39:01,275 --> 00:39:02,793
shows signs of metal fatigue
739
00:39:02,876 --> 00:39:04,945
like the one on Flight 85,
740
00:39:05,078 --> 00:39:07,364
then investigators may be a step closer
741
00:39:07,447 --> 00:39:09,683
to explaining the mysterious failures.
742
00:39:09,816 --> 00:39:11,102
DEFORGE:
We immediately focused in
743
00:39:11,185 --> 00:39:14,488
on the fracture surface
again in the same area
744
00:39:14,621 --> 00:39:16,690
and did many of the checks that
745
00:39:16,823 --> 00:39:18,823
we had done the first time around.
746
00:39:19,293 --> 00:39:21,278
NARRATOR:
But this case seems to be different.
747
00:39:21,361 --> 00:39:23,163
There is no sign of fatigue.
748
00:39:23,297 --> 00:39:26,233
Instead, they find a manufacturing defect.
749
00:39:26,366 --> 00:39:28,936
DEFORGE:
We actually found a deficiency
750
00:39:29,069 --> 00:39:31,772
in the bottom
of the threaded bore section.
751
00:39:31,905 --> 00:39:35,742
We found a very sharp radius
at the bottom of the threads,
752
00:39:35,876 --> 00:39:38,465
which is where the crack
had propagated from.
753
00:39:39,479 --> 00:39:42,867
NARRATOR: While finding the cause
of this latest failure is significant,
754
00:39:42,950 --> 00:39:45,302
it has done nothing
to help explain the failure
755
00:39:45,385 --> 00:39:47,856
on the Northwest flight
four years earlier.
756
00:39:48,388 --> 00:39:49,840
DIONNE:
Was it overloading?
757
00:39:49,923 --> 00:39:52,926
Was it, um, a progressive failure?
758
00:39:53,060 --> 00:39:55,679
Was it exposed to something
in the environment
759
00:39:55,762 --> 00:39:57,231
that caused it to fail?
760
00:39:57,364 --> 00:39:59,366
DEFORGE:
Without knowing the why,
761
00:39:59,499 --> 00:40:02,620
you can't really take
the appropriate corrective action,
762
00:40:02,703 --> 00:40:05,572
and as an investigator,
that's frustrating.
763
00:40:06,507 --> 00:40:08,192
NARRATOR:
For the second time,
764
00:40:08,275 --> 00:40:10,261
a part that was never meant to wear out
765
00:40:10,344 --> 00:40:12,913
has nearly brought down a 747.
766
00:40:13,947 --> 00:40:17,150
With one of the two
near tragedies still unexplained,
767
00:40:17,284 --> 00:40:21,288
investigators desperately need
to find a fail-safe measure
768
00:40:21,421 --> 00:40:23,892
that will protect passengers
in the future.
769
00:40:26,193 --> 00:40:28,428
HANSON:
Okay everyone, here we go!
770
00:40:28,562 --> 00:40:30,681
NARRATOR:
Four years after Flight 85's
771
00:40:30,764 --> 00:40:33,767
heart-stopping emergency
landing in Anchorage,
772
00:40:33,901 --> 00:40:37,704
the cause of the 747's
rudder failure is still unknown.
773
00:40:39,573 --> 00:40:42,910
Now, the same part
has failed on another flight.
774
00:40:43,043 --> 00:40:45,212
The next failure could be deadly.
775
00:40:47,381 --> 00:40:49,016
DEFORGE:
We still don't know
776
00:40:49,149 --> 00:40:52,452
actually the root cause
of the Northwest failure.
777
00:40:53,587 --> 00:40:55,255
But because of what we found
778
00:40:55,389 --> 00:40:57,408
with the second Air France failure,
779
00:40:57,491 --> 00:40:59,310
we needed to take corrective action
780
00:40:59,393 --> 00:41:02,262
to prevent similar failures
from occurring.
781
00:41:02,396 --> 00:41:04,148
NARRATOR:
Investigators recommend
782
00:41:04,231 --> 00:41:06,879
attaching special plugs
to the control module.
783
00:41:07,601 --> 00:41:09,453
In the event of another failure,
784
00:41:09,536 --> 00:41:11,822
these new pieces will prevent the rudder
785
00:41:11,905 --> 00:41:14,341
from moving too far in either direction.
786
00:41:14,675 --> 00:41:16,160
DEFORGE:
The changes that we've made
787
00:41:16,243 --> 00:41:19,279
to the control modules
in the 747-400 fleet
788
00:41:19,413 --> 00:41:23,417
will prevent any future events
of a rudder hardover.
789
00:41:24,918 --> 00:41:27,338
{\an8}NARRATOR:
An air worthiness directive from the FAA
790
00:41:27,421 --> 00:41:30,624
{\an8}makes it mandatory for every 747-400
791
00:41:30,757 --> 00:41:32,993
to be fitted with this new technology,
792
00:41:33,994 --> 00:41:36,347
eliminating the risk of another failure.
793
00:41:39,967 --> 00:41:42,791
But still, there is
another question to consider,
794
00:41:43,103 --> 00:41:46,339
one investigators seldom have
the luxury to contemplate.
795
00:41:47,941 --> 00:41:50,777
With a catastrophic failure
of the rudder system,
796
00:41:50,911 --> 00:41:53,714
why didn't Flight 85 crash?
797
00:41:53,847 --> 00:41:57,584
One reason:
the very design of this 747.
798
00:41:57,718 --> 00:41:59,403
DOHERTY:
Having a split rudder
799
00:41:59,486 --> 00:42:02,656
is definitely an unusual feature
of this airplane,
800
00:42:02,789 --> 00:42:06,059
and in this case, it worked in their favor
801
00:42:06,193 --> 00:42:07,895
in the sense that
802
00:42:08,028 --> 00:42:10,030
if there had only been one rudder,
803
00:42:10,163 --> 00:42:12,016
and the actuator
of that rudder had failed,
804
00:42:12,099 --> 00:42:14,935
then one hundred percent
of the yaw control
805
00:42:15,068 --> 00:42:16,770
would have been deflected,
806
00:42:16,904 --> 00:42:19,306
which would have magnified the problem.
807
00:42:20,107 --> 00:42:23,677
NARRATOR: But technology alone
did not save 404 lives.
808
00:42:26,980 --> 00:42:30,651
In 1985, China Airlines Flight 006
809
00:42:30,784 --> 00:42:32,586
also went into a sudden roll.
810
00:42:35,689 --> 00:42:38,258
But that flight plummeted
nearly 30,000 feet
811
00:42:38,392 --> 00:42:41,040
before the pilots
were able to regain control.
812
00:42:45,199 --> 00:42:48,035
How had Flight 85 escaped the same fate?
813
00:42:49,469 --> 00:42:51,989
FAGAN:
If Frank hadn't reacted the way he had,
814
00:42:52,072 --> 00:42:54,975
we probably would not be here
to tell the story.
815
00:42:57,344 --> 00:42:58,562
FAGAN:
Frank, have you got it?
816
00:42:58,645 --> 00:43:00,197
GEIB:
Yes, I think I've got it.
817
00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:03,167
NARRATOR: Captain Geib's
actions in the first few seconds
818
00:43:03,250 --> 00:43:05,250
were critical to saving the plane,
819
00:43:06,753 --> 00:43:09,871
but what got it safely to
the ground is another story.
820
00:43:10,924 --> 00:43:12,543
DOHERTY:
Every pilot in that cockpit
821
00:43:12,626 --> 00:43:14,695
knew what was going on.
822
00:43:15,095 --> 00:43:17,081
Risks were being assessed, and so on.
823
00:43:17,164 --> 00:43:18,532
DOHERTY:
On landing,
824
00:43:18,665 --> 00:43:20,918
don't forget the rudder's
attached to the nose steering.
825
00:43:21,001 --> 00:43:22,386
HANSON:
And when that happens, Mike,
826
00:43:22,469 --> 00:43:25,356
I'll take the tiller and the
brakes and you take the yoke.
827
00:43:25,439 --> 00:43:27,158
HANSON:
Cockpit resource management
828
00:43:27,241 --> 00:43:31,712
is really what enabled us
to think this thing through
829
00:43:31,845 --> 00:43:33,798
and get the airplane on the ground.
830
00:43:33,881 --> 00:43:35,332
BRECKLIN:
I am proud to say
831
00:43:35,415 --> 00:43:37,168
we were like a well-oiled machine.
832
00:43:37,251 --> 00:43:38,903
We all did what we were trained to do.
833
00:43:38,986 --> 00:43:40,871
GEIB:
Touchdown in five. Prepare for impact.
834
00:43:40,954 --> 00:43:43,660
BRECKLIN:
And not one single person fell apart.
835
00:43:44,091 --> 00:43:45,974
FAGAN:
What do we tell the cabin?
836
00:43:46,627 --> 00:43:48,245
FAGAN:
The guys that we had in the cockpit
837
00:43:48,328 --> 00:43:51,832
were just tremendous.
Everybody communicated.
838
00:43:51,965 --> 00:43:53,584
GEIB:
I'll go back and tell them.
839
00:43:53,667 --> 00:43:55,219
The more they know, the better.
840
00:43:55,302 --> 00:43:56,403
HANSON:
I agree.
841
00:43:56,537 --> 00:43:58,155
I think we should tell them
exactly what's going on.
842
00:43:58,238 --> 00:44:00,291
DEFORGE:
I think this crew did a phenomenal job
843
00:44:00,374 --> 00:44:02,993
in getting this aircraft
back on the ground safely.
844
00:44:03,076 --> 00:44:04,912
NARRATOR:
In 2003,
845
00:44:05,045 --> 00:44:06,831
the Air Line Pilots Association
846
00:44:06,914 --> 00:44:09,816
awarded the crew
of Northwest Airlines Flight 85
847
00:44:09,950 --> 00:44:12,119
with the Superior Airmanship Award.
848
00:44:12,252 --> 00:44:13,704
FAGAN:
More important than the award
849
00:44:13,787 --> 00:44:15,722
was the fact that, um,
850
00:44:15,856 --> 00:44:18,292
we got the people on the ground safely.
851
00:44:18,425 --> 00:44:19,860
FAGAN:
We got it.
852
00:44:22,796 --> 00:44:26,533
HANSON: In this day
and age of automated cockpits,
853
00:44:26,667 --> 00:44:31,371
hand flying is in danger
of becoming a lost art.
854
00:44:31,505 --> 00:44:34,675
We have to remember as pilots
855
00:44:34,808 --> 00:44:37,544
that we are there
856
00:44:37,678 --> 00:44:39,413
because of our flying skills.
857
00:44:39,546 --> 00:44:41,599
We had prepared so well for this thing
858
00:44:41,682 --> 00:44:43,506
that failure was not an option.
72936
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