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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,436 --> 00:00:04,855 NARRATOR: Thirty-five thousand feet above the Bering Sea... 2 00:00:04,938 --> 00:00:06,690 {\an8}MIKE FAGAN: Anchorage, Northwest 85. 3 00:00:06,773 --> 00:00:09,960 {\an8}Confirm that you are aware that we have declared an emergency. 4 00:00:10,043 --> 00:00:12,630 NARRATOR: A Boeing 747 is in serious trouble. 5 00:00:12,713 --> 00:00:14,031 There's too much traffic. 6 00:00:14,114 --> 00:00:15,599 We're calling this one a red emergency. 7 00:00:15,682 --> 00:00:18,452 Red emergency is preparing for the worst. 8 00:00:19,186 --> 00:00:21,951 NARRATOR: The crew can barely control the plane. 9 00:00:22,356 --> 00:00:24,508 JOHN DOHERTY: It was a very confusing situation. 10 00:00:24,591 --> 00:00:27,709 It was something that they had never done in training. 11 00:00:28,362 --> 00:00:30,047 NARRATOR: They need all the help they can get 12 00:00:30,130 --> 00:00:34,201 to have any hope of bringing the plane and its 386 passengers 13 00:00:34,334 --> 00:00:36,236 safely to the ground. 14 00:00:37,171 --> 00:00:38,889 JOHN HANSON: If there's ever gonna be a time 15 00:00:38,972 --> 00:00:42,208 that you fly a perfect approach, it's gotta be this one. 16 00:00:45,112 --> 00:00:46,747 PILOT: May day. May day. 17 00:01:07,734 --> 00:01:12,739 {\an8}NARRATOR: Northwest Airlines Flight 85 is making its way over the Bering Sea. 18 00:01:13,740 --> 00:01:15,375 {\an8}It's after 5:00 p.m. 19 00:01:16,443 --> 00:01:17,895 {\an8}Dinner service has ended, 20 00:01:17,978 --> 00:01:20,802 {\an8}and passengers are settling in for a long flight. 21 00:01:22,783 --> 00:01:27,187 {\an8}The massive Boeing 747-400 has just flown over Alaska, 22 00:01:27,321 --> 00:01:30,824 {\an8}and is now almost halfway through a 13.5-hour journey 23 00:01:30,958 --> 00:01:33,594 from Detroit to Japan's Narita Airport. 24 00:01:33,727 --> 00:01:35,713 GEIB: Hello, gentlemen. HANSON: Frank? 25 00:01:35,796 --> 00:01:37,531 GEIB: How are things? 26 00:01:37,664 --> 00:01:39,483 Thirty-five thousand feet, smooth air... 27 00:01:39,566 --> 00:01:42,803 NARRATOR: Captain John Hanson is a career pilot. 28 00:01:42,936 --> 00:01:46,106 He's also a flight instructor for the Boeing 747. 29 00:01:47,641 --> 00:01:52,179 Six-and-a-half hours into the flight, he's about to hand over the controls. 30 00:01:54,014 --> 00:01:57,518 On long journeys, it's common to have two flight crews. 31 00:01:59,219 --> 00:02:03,724 {\an8}The trip was long enough that we put on a full augmented crew. 32 00:02:03,891 --> 00:02:06,293 We had two captains and two copilots. 33 00:02:06,426 --> 00:02:09,496 NARRATOR: They fly in shifts to prevent fatigue. 34 00:02:09,630 --> 00:02:10,915 Why don't you guys give me a ding 35 00:02:10,998 --> 00:02:13,551 about 20 minutes before you want me back up here, okay? 36 00:02:13,634 --> 00:02:17,905 Mike Fagan, a Vietnam Vet with 25 years flying experience 37 00:02:18,038 --> 00:02:19,840 is the fresh first officer. 38 00:02:20,741 --> 00:02:24,161 {\an8}Everything was normal, and we didn't expect to have any problems. 39 00:02:24,244 --> 00:02:26,597 {\an8}We'd flown this flight many, many times. 40 00:02:26,980 --> 00:02:29,745 Frank, I'm taking the lasagna. You get option B. 41 00:02:30,217 --> 00:02:32,041 Does option B include starving? 42 00:02:32,419 --> 00:02:34,705 NARRATOR: He is joined by Captain Frank Geib, 43 00:02:34,788 --> 00:02:37,730 who has over 11,000 hours of flying under his belt. 44 00:02:42,229 --> 00:02:45,641 Pilots refer to this aircraft as "The Queen of the Skies." 45 00:02:45,766 --> 00:02:48,943 It's equipped with a private cabin for the flight crew. 46 00:02:50,671 --> 00:02:54,107 Here, Captain Hanson and his first officer David Smith 47 00:02:54,241 --> 00:02:58,241 will have a five-hour rest break before returning to the flight deck. 48 00:02:59,146 --> 00:03:04,418 Dave Smith had worked with me, and we were going to read for a while, 49 00:03:04,551 --> 00:03:08,589 perhaps nap in the bunk, and wake up for descent to Tokyo. 50 00:03:14,194 --> 00:03:15,646 You sure you're not hungry? 51 00:03:15,729 --> 00:03:17,164 Trust me, I'm good. 52 00:03:18,899 --> 00:03:22,723 NARRATOR: Flight 85 is more than six hours from landing at Narita. 53 00:03:31,044 --> 00:03:33,931 FAGAN: The aircraft took a dramatic roll to the left, 54 00:03:34,014 --> 00:03:36,917 that went from 35 through 40 degrees of bank. 55 00:03:41,054 --> 00:03:42,807 - NARRATOR: For no apparent reason... - What happened? 56 00:03:42,890 --> 00:03:45,596 ...the pilots have lost control of their plane. 57 00:03:47,227 --> 00:03:50,330 - (OBJECTS CLATTERING) - (SCREAMING) 58 00:03:54,234 --> 00:03:59,072 {\an8}The airplane took a lurch like nothing I had ever felt before, 59 00:03:59,206 --> 00:04:02,176 and I kind of had to catch myself. 60 00:04:04,344 --> 00:04:08,482 HANSON: It was a very sudden yawing movement. 61 00:04:08,615 --> 00:04:11,202 It's the type of thing you only feel in a simulator 62 00:04:11,285 --> 00:04:13,620 when they're doing extreme things. 63 00:04:16,356 --> 00:04:19,180 NARRATOR: Captain Geib has only moments to react. 64 00:04:19,960 --> 00:04:21,528 Did we lose an engine? 65 00:04:22,062 --> 00:04:23,764 Do we still have engines? 66 00:04:23,897 --> 00:04:26,183 We still have all engines. That's not it. 67 00:04:26,266 --> 00:04:30,037 NARRATOR: The lives of 386 passengers hang in the balance. 68 00:04:32,239 --> 00:04:34,358 HANSON: The airplane was kind of shaking, 69 00:04:34,441 --> 00:04:37,811 and I knew the autopilot had been disconnected. 70 00:04:37,945 --> 00:04:41,014 It was quite obvious that something was abnormal. 71 00:04:42,950 --> 00:04:46,437 NARRATOR: In a matter of seconds, Captain Geib has disconnected the autopilot, 72 00:04:46,520 --> 00:04:49,890 pulled back on the control column and leveled the wings. 73 00:04:51,191 --> 00:04:53,827 But something is still seriously wrong. 74 00:04:57,564 --> 00:04:58,916 Frank, have you got it? 75 00:04:58,999 --> 00:05:00,529 Yeah, I think I've got it. 76 00:05:02,035 --> 00:05:05,523 If it's not the engines, then we have a problem with the rudder. 77 00:05:05,606 --> 00:05:07,591 NARRATOR: The pilots have leveled the plane, 78 00:05:07,674 --> 00:05:10,674 but they are still having difficulty controlling it. 79 00:05:10,878 --> 00:05:12,179 (BEEPING) 80 00:05:12,312 --> 00:05:15,349 The warning system confirms Geib's suspicion. 81 00:05:15,516 --> 00:05:16,869 GEIB: Yaw damper lower. 82 00:05:17,851 --> 00:05:20,440 NARRATOR: A malfunction of the rudder system. 83 00:05:20,854 --> 00:05:22,990 The rudder controls the plane's yaw, 84 00:05:23,123 --> 00:05:26,426 its movements from left to right, as it flies. 85 00:05:26,860 --> 00:05:29,508 It directs airflow to keep it flying straight. 86 00:05:31,231 --> 00:05:33,267 Less than a year earlier 87 00:05:33,400 --> 00:05:37,171 American Airlines Flight 587 lost control of its rudder system 88 00:05:37,304 --> 00:05:40,541 and crashed into a neighborhood in Queens, New York, 89 00:05:40,674 --> 00:05:43,010 killing everyone on board. 90 00:05:43,343 --> 00:05:45,229 FAGAN: We were very well aware of that, 91 00:05:45,312 --> 00:05:49,049 and there had been quite a study done on that. 92 00:05:49,183 --> 00:05:53,353 We had actually just reviewed that event in flight planning. 93 00:05:56,590 --> 00:06:00,120 NARRATOR: This plane is in danger of suffering the same fate. 94 00:06:01,161 --> 00:06:05,899 Because of its size, the 747 has both an upper and lower rudder. 95 00:06:06,033 --> 00:06:07,935 They normally move in unison. 96 00:06:08,569 --> 00:06:09,981 For some unknown reason, 97 00:06:10,103 --> 00:06:13,574 the lower rudder has deflected 17 degrees to the left. 98 00:06:14,308 --> 00:06:15,943 And it's stuck there. 99 00:06:17,277 --> 00:06:20,866 The captain tries to keep the plane flying level and straight. 100 00:06:22,349 --> 00:06:25,319 He uses foot pedals to control the upper rudder, 101 00:06:25,452 --> 00:06:28,155 and the control column to move the ailerons. 102 00:06:30,724 --> 00:06:34,372 But he knows it's a stopgap measure that may not work for long. 103 00:06:35,529 --> 00:06:37,448 I've got the airplane and the radios. 104 00:06:37,531 --> 00:06:40,767 You get the COM and see if there's a procedure for this. 105 00:06:41,435 --> 00:06:43,621 NARRATOR: The COM, or Cockpit Operating Manual, 106 00:06:43,704 --> 00:06:47,007 provides a list of procedures for emergency situations. 107 00:06:48,075 --> 00:06:50,995 It says not to remove any pressure from the hydraulics. That's all. 108 00:06:51,078 --> 00:06:52,196 That's not very helpful. 109 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:55,582 Is there anything else? Are any other systems failing? 110 00:07:00,420 --> 00:07:01,655 Not so far. 111 00:07:02,222 --> 00:07:04,642 NARRATOR: Hydraulics control several vital components, 112 00:07:04,725 --> 00:07:06,426 including the failed rudder. 113 00:07:06,560 --> 00:07:09,196 More failures could spell disaster. 114 00:07:09,329 --> 00:07:11,365 How far to Narita? 115 00:07:11,498 --> 00:07:14,368 About six hours. 116 00:07:15,102 --> 00:07:19,506 NARRATOR: Flying that far without full control of the plane is a huge risk. 117 00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:22,142 P3. Get them back. (GRUNTS) 118 00:07:22,276 --> 00:07:24,829 HANSON: When you're in the bunk, you're used to hearing the P3 119 00:07:24,912 --> 00:07:28,315 only at times when it's time for a shift change. 120 00:07:29,516 --> 00:07:31,585 When you hear it at an odd time, 121 00:07:31,752 --> 00:07:35,639 it means, "Come back, because something out of the ordinary has happened." 122 00:07:35,722 --> 00:07:37,958 Anchorage is two hours behind us. 123 00:07:38,926 --> 00:07:42,396 Call them and declare an emergency. We're turning around. 124 00:07:44,331 --> 00:07:46,667 Anchorage, this is Northwest 85. 125 00:07:47,968 --> 00:07:50,521 NARRATOR: But even contacting Anchorage is a problem. 126 00:07:50,604 --> 00:07:53,307 Anchorage, this is Northwest 85. 127 00:07:53,440 --> 00:07:56,827 NARRATOR: Air traffic control centers have a limited range. 128 00:07:56,910 --> 00:07:59,897 {\an8}In the middle of the sea, between the two continents, 129 00:07:59,980 --> 00:08:02,149 the plane is in a dead zone. 130 00:08:02,649 --> 00:08:05,238 No one in Anchorage knows they're in trouble. 131 00:08:06,987 --> 00:08:10,407 In the cabin, passengers don't know the scale of the problem. 132 00:08:10,490 --> 00:08:12,943 Many passengers assume it was only turbulence 133 00:08:13,026 --> 00:08:14,761 that caused the sudden jolt. 134 00:08:15,929 --> 00:08:17,798 See if you can reach 19. 135 00:08:17,931 --> 00:08:20,518 NARRATOR: The pilots attempt to contact another flight 136 00:08:20,601 --> 00:08:22,013 that's closer to Alaska. 137 00:08:22,102 --> 00:08:25,005 Northwest 19, this is Northwest 85. 138 00:08:25,138 --> 00:08:27,080 NARRATOR: But the signal is weak. 139 00:08:29,409 --> 00:08:32,312 Northwest 19, this is Northwest 85. 140 00:08:33,146 --> 00:08:35,232 NORTHWEST PILOT: This is Northwest 19. Go ahead. 141 00:08:35,315 --> 00:08:36,834 FAGAN: We have an emergency onboard. 142 00:08:36,917 --> 00:08:38,506 Can you relay to Anchorage? 143 00:08:39,453 --> 00:08:41,395 NORTHWEST PILOT: Roger. Stand by. 144 00:08:41,889 --> 00:08:44,424 Okay. Let's turn this around. 145 00:08:46,159 --> 00:08:49,229 NARRATOR: The plane goes into a very wide right turn. 146 00:08:54,735 --> 00:08:57,621 {\an8}NORTHWEST PILOT: Anchorage Control, this is Northwest 19. 147 00:08:57,704 --> 00:08:59,406 Northwest 19, go ahead. 148 00:08:59,540 --> 00:09:02,743 Northwest 85 is requesting an emergency landing. 149 00:09:02,876 --> 00:09:04,895 W hat is the nature of the emergency? 150 00:09:04,978 --> 00:09:06,847 Hardover left rudder. 151 00:09:09,016 --> 00:09:12,103 NARRATOR: The rudder is crucial for turning the plane around. 152 00:09:12,186 --> 00:09:14,892 Without it, the captain is forced to improvise. 153 00:09:16,190 --> 00:09:18,725 We had no idea what the problem was, 154 00:09:18,859 --> 00:09:21,695 so Frank was very cautious on using the rudder, 155 00:09:21,828 --> 00:09:25,282 which means that he had to use full aileron to control the aircraft, 156 00:09:25,365 --> 00:09:27,451 but in the meantime, the aircraft is in a slip, 157 00:09:27,534 --> 00:09:31,505 and a slip is when the aircraft is not in a coordinated turn. 158 00:09:31,638 --> 00:09:33,190 The tail is off in one direction, 159 00:09:33,273 --> 00:09:34,992 the nose is pointed in the other direction. 160 00:09:35,075 --> 00:09:37,261 In other words, it's a slip that goes like this. 161 00:09:37,344 --> 00:09:40,331 NARRATOR: Like a racecar driver skidding through a turn, 162 00:09:40,414 --> 00:09:43,283 Captain Geib is close to losing control. 163 00:09:45,552 --> 00:09:46,887 HANSON: Let's move it. 164 00:09:49,923 --> 00:09:51,091 What's happening? 165 00:09:51,225 --> 00:09:54,962 We've declared an emergency, and we're headed back to Anchorage. 166 00:09:55,596 --> 00:09:56,730 Indications? 167 00:09:56,864 --> 00:10:01,401 The lower rudder is hardover 17 degrees to the left. 168 00:10:02,269 --> 00:10:05,172 We don't know why, and it's not responding. 169 00:10:05,305 --> 00:10:07,482 We don't know what else is wrong yet. 170 00:10:08,342 --> 00:10:10,694 HANSON: It took both hands to fly the airplane. 171 00:10:10,777 --> 00:10:14,748 We didn't know at that point whether the rudder was coming apart. 172 00:10:14,882 --> 00:10:17,951 All we knew was it was definitely a rudder problem. 173 00:10:18,819 --> 00:10:20,971 NARRATOR: This has never happened before. 174 00:10:21,054 --> 00:10:24,157 The pilots haven't been trained for this malfunction. 175 00:10:24,625 --> 00:10:26,508 There's no procedure in the COM. 176 00:10:28,228 --> 00:10:30,664 NARRATOR: And the manual is of no use. 177 00:10:35,369 --> 00:10:37,288 Well, we're gonna have to make one up. 178 00:10:37,371 --> 00:10:40,191 NARRATOR: Thirty-five thousand feet over the Bering Sea 179 00:10:40,274 --> 00:10:43,610 and an hour and 40 minutes away from the nearest airport, 180 00:10:43,744 --> 00:10:48,715 the pilots of this massive 747 are in uncharted territory. 181 00:10:52,452 --> 00:10:55,789 NARRATOR: For the 386 passengers on Flight 85, 182 00:10:55,923 --> 00:10:59,092 the anxiety over the sudden dive has subsided. 183 00:10:59,526 --> 00:11:02,880 No one in the cabin is aware of the potentially fatal drama 184 00:11:02,963 --> 00:11:04,787 still unfolding in the cockpit. 185 00:11:08,435 --> 00:11:10,721 Without full control of the plane's rudder, 186 00:11:10,804 --> 00:11:15,342 the crew needs to fly another 1,300 kilometers to Anchorage. 187 00:11:17,110 --> 00:11:20,164 {\an8}Frank was the junior captain, I was the senior captain, 188 00:11:20,247 --> 00:11:24,218 and when I saw him battling the controls, 189 00:11:24,351 --> 00:11:27,287 I decided that I was gonna take over. 190 00:11:27,421 --> 00:11:28,773 Frank, you've done a hell of a job, 191 00:11:28,856 --> 00:11:30,307 but I think I'd better take over now. 192 00:11:30,390 --> 00:11:32,877 If anybody's gonna ding this thing up, it's gonna be me. 193 00:11:32,960 --> 00:11:34,828 I have no problem with that. 194 00:11:34,962 --> 00:11:36,663 - Okay. - GEIB: Okay, Mike, 195 00:11:36,797 --> 00:11:39,416 you're gonna have to take control while we switch over. 196 00:11:39,499 --> 00:11:40,934 Are you ready? 197 00:11:43,170 --> 00:11:44,238 I'm ready. 198 00:11:44,371 --> 00:11:47,258 NARRATOR: First Officer Fagan must now hold the yoke steady 199 00:11:47,341 --> 00:11:50,224 as Captain Geib relinquishes control of the plane. 200 00:11:50,844 --> 00:11:52,112 I have control. 201 00:11:53,514 --> 00:11:58,220 NARRATOR: Any mishandling of the controls could send the plane into a fatal spin. 202 00:12:02,256 --> 00:12:04,191 The same delicate balancing act 203 00:12:04,324 --> 00:12:07,148 transfers control of the plane to Captain Hanson. 204 00:12:07,694 --> 00:12:10,147 I was pretty appalled at how much force it took 205 00:12:10,230 --> 00:12:13,634 to fly this big, beautiful airplane. 206 00:12:14,067 --> 00:12:20,240 If the airplane is flying, even lousy, it's flying, and that's the bottom line. 207 00:12:20,374 --> 00:12:24,678 And it's headed towards Anchorage, so we're good to go for a while. 208 00:12:24,811 --> 00:12:27,481 Now we could begin to devote some thought 209 00:12:27,614 --> 00:12:30,083 to other things that had to be done. 210 00:12:30,217 --> 00:12:33,921 NARRATOR: The crew has no idea how badly the rudder is damaged. 211 00:12:34,054 --> 00:12:36,857 It could be seconds from tearing off altogether. 212 00:12:43,463 --> 00:12:45,082 HANSON: I can't tell whether the damn rudder 213 00:12:45,165 --> 00:12:47,048 is trying to leave the airplane. 214 00:12:47,534 --> 00:12:49,476 FAGAN: What do we tell the cabin? 215 00:12:50,637 --> 00:12:54,541 We decided the passengers really should know. 216 00:12:54,675 --> 00:12:59,112 So we wanted to liaison with the cabin, and Frank offered to do that. 217 00:12:59,246 --> 00:13:01,114 I'll go back and tell them. 218 00:13:01,248 --> 00:13:02,633 The more they know, the better. 219 00:13:02,716 --> 00:13:03,851 HANSON: I agree. 220 00:13:03,984 --> 00:13:06,984 I think we should tell them exactly what's going on. 221 00:13:12,526 --> 00:13:13,527 Kathy? 222 00:13:14,528 --> 00:13:16,747 We don't know if things are gonna get better or worse. 223 00:13:16,830 --> 00:13:18,532 Every single crewmember knew 224 00:13:18,665 --> 00:13:21,519 {\an8}that something major had happened to that aircraft. 225 00:13:21,602 --> 00:13:23,053 We've turned back to Anchorage, 226 00:13:23,136 --> 00:13:24,822 and we're gonna make an emergency landing. 227 00:13:24,905 --> 00:13:28,759 The captain didn't try to hide anything, didn't try to pull any punches. 228 00:13:28,842 --> 00:13:32,079 He just flat out said how things were, 229 00:13:32,212 --> 00:13:35,549 and that it could possibly be a very rough landing. 230 00:13:35,682 --> 00:13:39,086 Kathy, we're calling this one a red emergency. 231 00:13:39,219 --> 00:13:42,789 BRECKLIN: Red emergency is of course preparing for the worst. 232 00:13:42,923 --> 00:13:48,228 There may be a crash landing. There may be damage to the aircraft. 233 00:13:48,362 --> 00:13:52,833 There may be injury and/or death to the passengers, and/or yourself. 234 00:13:52,966 --> 00:13:55,966 Hello, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Captain Frank Geib. 235 00:13:56,970 --> 00:13:59,090 We are dealing with a malfunction at the moment, 236 00:13:59,173 --> 00:14:02,393 and our crew is dealing with the situation as best we can. 237 00:14:02,476 --> 00:14:04,845 We need everybody to remain calm, 238 00:14:04,978 --> 00:14:09,349 and please give your flight attendants your complete attention. 239 00:14:09,483 --> 00:14:13,554 I cannot stress how important your complete cooperation will be 240 00:14:13,687 --> 00:14:16,073 in order for us to make it to the ground safely. 241 00:14:16,156 --> 00:14:21,195 The passengers, for the most part, were fairly calm. 242 00:14:21,328 --> 00:14:24,048 I promise I'll update you with any new information 243 00:14:24,131 --> 00:14:26,133 as it becomes available. 244 00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:28,152 Thank you very much for your attention, 245 00:14:28,235 --> 00:14:29,820 and I'll talk to you later. 246 00:14:29,903 --> 00:14:34,675 After a few minutes, you could hear some people crying a little bit. 247 00:14:34,808 --> 00:14:38,645 You could see people looking around. You could see fear. 248 00:14:43,450 --> 00:14:46,450 HANSON: We need to talk to SOC. We need suggestions. 249 00:14:46,753 --> 00:14:48,589 We can reach them on HF. 250 00:14:49,056 --> 00:14:51,609 NARRATOR: The Systems Operations Center in Minnesota 251 00:14:51,692 --> 00:14:53,393 may be able to help. 252 00:14:53,527 --> 00:14:57,114 But to reach that far, the pilots must use high frequency radio, 253 00:14:57,197 --> 00:14:59,633 which has a weak, intermittent signal. 254 00:15:00,100 --> 00:15:03,237 HF radio is like when you were a kid, 255 00:15:03,370 --> 00:15:04,922 and your best friend lived next door, 256 00:15:05,005 --> 00:15:06,924 and you talked to him between your bedrooms 257 00:15:07,007 --> 00:15:09,460 with two Campbell soup cans, with a string between them. 258 00:15:09,543 --> 00:15:12,263 About that level of sound quality. It's just awful. 259 00:15:12,346 --> 00:15:14,876 And ask them to wake up John Doherty for us. 260 00:15:18,819 --> 00:15:21,702 {\an8}DOHERTY: I was at home the night of the, uh, call, 261 00:15:21,855 --> 00:15:24,925 {\an8}just relaxing after a day in the office, 262 00:15:25,058 --> 00:15:27,160 {\an8}uh, enjoying a movie, 263 00:15:27,294 --> 00:15:29,413 {\an8}- but I was on call. - (pager buzzing) 264 00:15:29,496 --> 00:15:31,849 {\an8}- (phone ringing) - And those pagers would go off, 265 00:15:31,932 --> 00:15:33,467 {\an8}and sure enough, it did. 266 00:15:33,600 --> 00:15:35,853 NARRATOR: John Doherty has worked with Captain Hanson 267 00:15:35,936 --> 00:15:37,070 for several years. 268 00:15:37,204 --> 00:15:40,174 DOHERTY: I knew John very well, so I had a, 269 00:15:40,307 --> 00:15:44,378 a face, a person, a pilot, I knew very well in my mind's eye. 270 00:15:45,379 --> 00:15:46,864 HANSON: I knew John Doherty 271 00:15:46,947 --> 00:15:50,317 had a better knowledge of the 747-400 272 00:15:50,450 --> 00:15:53,987 than anybody at Northwest. 273 00:15:54,121 --> 00:15:56,416 NARRATOR: But Captain Hanson has no idea 274 00:15:56,523 --> 00:15:58,542 when his friend's help might arrive, 275 00:15:58,625 --> 00:16:02,563 and keeping the huge aircraft flying level at 35 thousand feet 276 00:16:02,696 --> 00:16:04,548 is becoming increasingly difficult. 277 00:16:04,631 --> 00:16:06,450 HANSON: The control wheel was shaking, 278 00:16:06,533 --> 00:16:08,769 'cause the whole airplane was shaking. 279 00:16:08,902 --> 00:16:11,589 NARRATOR: He decides to descend to a lower altitude, 280 00:16:11,672 --> 00:16:14,074 where denser air will provide more lift. 281 00:16:14,842 --> 00:16:16,490 HANSON: You ready to do this? 282 00:16:17,411 --> 00:16:18,512 FAGAN: All set. 283 00:16:18,645 --> 00:16:20,564 NARRATOR: But with a crippled plane, 284 00:16:20,647 --> 00:16:24,318 this normally routine procedure will be another risky maneuver. 285 00:16:25,085 --> 00:16:27,721 HANSON: Okay. Let's go. 286 00:16:27,855 --> 00:16:29,740 DOHERTY: You want to do it very carefully, 287 00:16:29,823 --> 00:16:31,342 so they're handling the controls 288 00:16:31,425 --> 00:16:34,228 under this really unusual circumstance 289 00:16:34,361 --> 00:16:37,998 as carefully and gently and as delicately as they can. 290 00:16:38,131 --> 00:16:39,433 FAGAN: How's it feel? 291 00:16:41,568 --> 00:16:43,053 HANSON: About the same. Not great. 292 00:16:43,136 --> 00:16:44,855 HANSON: We had to be very careful 293 00:16:44,938 --> 00:16:46,468 how we flew this airplane. 294 00:16:46,573 --> 00:16:48,092 The tail might be coming apart. 295 00:16:48,175 --> 00:16:51,211 The rudder might be just barely hanging on, 296 00:16:51,345 --> 00:16:53,680 or it could be a hydraulic problem. 297 00:16:56,116 --> 00:16:57,518 FAGAN: 28 thousand. 298 00:16:57,651 --> 00:16:59,670 NARRATOR: They make it down to twenty-eight thousand feet 299 00:16:59,753 --> 00:17:01,105 without further incident. 300 00:17:01,188 --> 00:17:03,090 HANSON: I think I got this here. 301 00:17:03,223 --> 00:17:04,458 Okay. 302 00:17:04,591 --> 00:17:07,278 NARRATOR: But the force required to fly the damaged aircraft 303 00:17:07,361 --> 00:17:09,396 has taken its toll on the captain. 304 00:17:10,163 --> 00:17:11,331 FAGAN: John. 305 00:17:11,765 --> 00:17:14,285 HANSON: Yeah, my leg's starting to cramp up. 306 00:17:14,368 --> 00:17:17,016 I'm having a tough time holding this together. 307 00:17:17,337 --> 00:17:20,240 HANSON: The physical effort that was required 308 00:17:20,374 --> 00:17:23,777 was considerable. We were pushing so hard 309 00:17:23,911 --> 00:17:25,696 with our leg on that rudder pedal 310 00:17:25,779 --> 00:17:28,485 that we could only do it for about ten minutes. 311 00:17:29,183 --> 00:17:31,068 HANSON: You're gonna have to take it. 312 00:17:31,151 --> 00:17:32,352 Are you ready? 313 00:17:32,486 --> 00:17:33,654 FAGAN: I'm ready. 314 00:17:34,388 --> 00:17:35,656 HANSON: All right. 315 00:17:35,789 --> 00:17:37,357 Nice and easy. 316 00:17:42,529 --> 00:17:45,999 HANSON: And then Mike would come in as I released. 317 00:17:46,133 --> 00:17:47,918 FAGAN: It wanted to go back the other way. 318 00:17:48,001 --> 00:17:51,422 {\an8}In other words, you had to make it go where you wanted it to go, 319 00:17:51,505 --> 00:17:53,424 and you have to use the cross controls, 320 00:17:53,507 --> 00:17:55,793 so you're using the muscles in your shoulder 321 00:17:55,876 --> 00:17:58,545 and in your back, and we would lock our legs. 322 00:18:00,414 --> 00:18:02,133 JOHN HANSON< And then when I would release, 323 00:18:02,216 --> 00:18:04,751 I'd kind of get limbered up again. 324 00:18:05,819 --> 00:18:08,205 NARRATOR: Still more than an hour away from Anchorage, 325 00:18:08,288 --> 00:18:11,792 the flight attendants prepare the cabin for a RED emergency. 326 00:18:13,727 --> 00:18:15,412 BRECKLIN: We did what we were trained to do. 327 00:18:15,495 --> 00:18:17,364 It just kicked in, 328 00:18:17,497 --> 00:18:18,649 and you would make sure that 329 00:18:18,732 --> 00:18:20,968 everything on the counter is put away, 330 00:18:21,068 --> 00:18:23,170 make sure all the crew bags are, 331 00:18:23,303 --> 00:18:25,539 are stowed and where they should be. 332 00:18:28,342 --> 00:18:33,046 Everyone to a person cooperated with what we asked them to do. 333 00:18:33,180 --> 00:18:36,049 I remember coming to a family of three, 334 00:18:36,183 --> 00:18:38,585 and they asked me if I was afraid. 335 00:18:39,319 --> 00:18:40,754 And I hate to admit it, 336 00:18:40,888 --> 00:18:42,807 but I did briefly consider lying, 337 00:18:42,890 --> 00:18:45,209 but then I decided that wasn't what I should do. 338 00:18:45,292 --> 00:18:46,944 BRECKLIN: Yeah, I'm afraid, too, 339 00:18:47,027 --> 00:18:48,896 but we have the best pilots. 340 00:18:52,466 --> 00:18:55,290 SOC: Flight 85, we have John Doherty on the line. 341 00:18:56,136 --> 00:18:58,222 NARRATOR: Operations has finally been able to 342 00:18:58,305 --> 00:19:00,574 connect the pilots with John Doherty. 343 00:19:01,842 --> 00:19:03,360 HANSON: John, have you been briefed on this? 344 00:19:03,443 --> 00:19:05,429 You know what's happening up here? 345 00:19:05,512 --> 00:19:08,299 DOHERTY: Yes, I understand you have a control problem. 346 00:19:08,382 --> 00:19:09,816 HANSON: EICAS is showing 347 00:19:09,950 --> 00:19:11,833 we have a hardover lower rudder. 348 00:19:11,919 --> 00:19:13,104 DOHERTY: They were facing, 349 00:19:13,187 --> 00:19:15,355 really, a very confusing situation. 350 00:19:15,489 --> 00:19:19,092 They knew they were confronted with something unique. 351 00:19:19,226 --> 00:19:21,745 It was something that they had never done in training, 352 00:19:21,828 --> 00:19:23,881 something they'd never seen in training, 353 00:19:23,964 --> 00:19:27,634 nothing we'd ever talked about in ground schools. 354 00:19:27,768 --> 00:19:29,019 HANSON: The COM is not telling us much. 355 00:19:29,102 --> 00:19:32,239 We're about... We're an hour out of Anchorage. 356 00:19:32,372 --> 00:19:33,640 What do you think? 357 00:19:34,908 --> 00:19:38,111 DOHERTY: Well, don't remove any power 358 00:19:38,245 --> 00:19:41,114 from the hydraulics, but other than that... 359 00:19:41,248 --> 00:19:44,117 DOHERTY: And I knew from listening to John 360 00:19:44,251 --> 00:19:45,736 that what we had in the books 361 00:19:45,819 --> 00:19:48,622 wasn't going to be a help to him. 362 00:19:48,755 --> 00:19:51,375 There are going to be some circumstances where a pilot is, 363 00:19:51,458 --> 00:19:54,929 is going to have to figure out what to do on his or her own. 364 00:19:56,430 --> 00:19:57,681 NARRATOR: Thirty minutes pass 365 00:19:57,764 --> 00:19:59,933 before Northwest 85 is in range 366 00:20:00,067 --> 00:20:02,891 to talk to the Anchorage Control Center directly. 367 00:20:03,103 --> 00:20:05,456 ATC: Uh, Northwest 85, we have you on the radar. 368 00:20:05,539 --> 00:20:07,474 FAGAN: Anchorage, Northwest 85. 369 00:20:07,608 --> 00:20:10,528 Confirm that you are aware that we have declared an emergency, 370 00:20:10,611 --> 00:20:13,030 that you have emergency equipment standing by. 371 00:20:13,113 --> 00:20:14,681 We will request runway. 372 00:20:19,086 --> 00:20:21,839 NARRATOR: The plane must fly over the Aleutian mountain range 373 00:20:21,922 --> 00:20:24,334 to reach Anchorage International Airport. 374 00:20:25,726 --> 00:20:29,062 The airport itself is also surrounded by mountains. 375 00:20:30,163 --> 00:20:32,850 HANSON: We said, okay, six right is the runway we want, 376 00:20:32,933 --> 00:20:34,685 'cause it'll give us a twenty mile final, 377 00:20:34,768 --> 00:20:38,505 and it's a great runway with an ILS approach, and it's long. 378 00:20:38,639 --> 00:20:40,157 HANSON: Okay, six right, it is. 379 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:41,992 Let's make sure we get it right the first time. 380 00:20:42,075 --> 00:20:44,228 HANSON: And as far as the missed approach is concerned, 381 00:20:44,311 --> 00:20:45,712 we're not gonna do one. 382 00:20:45,846 --> 00:20:48,232 We're just gonna do it right the first time, 383 00:20:48,315 --> 00:20:50,021 and put it right on the spot. 384 00:20:51,318 --> 00:20:53,554 NARRATOR: There is no margin for error. 385 00:20:53,820 --> 00:20:56,356 The pilots know they have only one shot. 386 00:20:57,958 --> 00:20:59,782 HANSON: What do you think, Mike? 387 00:21:00,727 --> 00:21:02,346 FAGAN: Maybe we should start configuring 388 00:21:02,429 --> 00:21:04,798 for a landing early. Lower our altitude. 389 00:21:06,500 --> 00:21:08,919 NARRATOR: They're still 40 minutes away from Anchorage, 390 00:21:09,002 --> 00:21:12,239 but the pilots decide to configure for a landing. 391 00:21:13,207 --> 00:21:16,502 They want to see how it will affect their crippled plane. 392 00:21:17,144 --> 00:21:18,579 If something goes wrong, 393 00:21:18,712 --> 00:21:21,114 this may give them more room to recover. 394 00:21:21,248 --> 00:21:23,000 HANSON: Okay, we can take it over Cook Inlet, 395 00:21:23,083 --> 00:21:26,620 lower to 14,000, and then see what happens. 396 00:21:26,753 --> 00:21:28,272 HANSON: Fourteen thousand feet 397 00:21:28,355 --> 00:21:30,508 is a real nice intermediate altitude. 398 00:21:30,591 --> 00:21:34,595 It's good, thick air, and it's high enough yet 399 00:21:34,728 --> 00:21:37,798 that if something got worse and control deteriorated, 400 00:21:37,931 --> 00:21:40,000 you'd have room for a recovery. 401 00:21:40,667 --> 00:21:42,119 FAGAN: This is Northwest 85. 402 00:21:42,202 --> 00:21:45,405 We would like to descend to 14,000 over Cook Inlet. 403 00:21:45,806 --> 00:21:47,042 ATC: We can't do that. 404 00:21:47,174 --> 00:21:49,260 Lots of air traffic in that airspace. 405 00:21:49,343 --> 00:21:51,228 NARRATOR: The airspace over Cook Inlet 406 00:21:51,311 --> 00:21:54,481 is the busiest corridor in this part of the continent. 407 00:21:54,615 --> 00:21:56,867 If they lose control of the plane again, 408 00:21:56,950 --> 00:21:59,362 they could collide with another aircraft. 409 00:22:00,888 --> 00:22:03,156 HANSON: This is an emergency aircraft. 410 00:22:03,290 --> 00:22:05,526 This is the safest course of action. 411 00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:09,925 ATC: Okay, we'll clear everyone out of your way. 412 00:22:10,998 --> 00:22:12,249 NARRATOR: The jumbo jet 413 00:22:12,332 --> 00:22:15,102 slowly descends to 14,000 feet. 414 00:22:17,204 --> 00:22:20,641 HANSON: Okay, flap five. 415 00:22:22,309 --> 00:22:23,410 Flap five. 416 00:22:23,544 --> 00:22:24,728 NARRATOR: As he adds flaps, 417 00:22:24,811 --> 00:22:28,815 Captain Hanson can only hope the plane maintains stable flight. 418 00:22:30,551 --> 00:22:32,819 Next comes an even bigger test. 419 00:22:32,953 --> 00:22:34,121 HANSON: Gear down. 420 00:22:36,557 --> 00:22:37,658 FAGAN: Gear down. 421 00:22:37,791 --> 00:22:39,710 NARRATOR: Lowering the massive landing gear 422 00:22:39,793 --> 00:22:42,162 will increase drag and reduce airspeed. 423 00:22:43,830 --> 00:22:45,749 The plane handles the new configuration 424 00:22:45,832 --> 00:22:47,501 without any problems, 425 00:22:48,502 --> 00:22:51,444 but there are new worries about the damaged rudder. 426 00:22:53,540 --> 00:22:54,942 FAGAN: You feeling that? 427 00:22:55,075 --> 00:22:56,577 HANSON: Oh, yeah. 428 00:22:58,245 --> 00:23:01,132 FAGAN: The rudder is tied to airspeed and altitude. 429 00:23:01,215 --> 00:23:03,601 The lower you get, the further the rudder goes out. 430 00:23:03,684 --> 00:23:06,386 So then it required more rudder, more aileron, 431 00:23:07,087 --> 00:23:10,023 and that was, uh, physically exhausting. 432 00:23:11,425 --> 00:23:13,944 HANSON: Mike, my leg's starting to cramp up. 433 00:23:14,027 --> 00:23:15,329 Are you ready? 434 00:23:16,063 --> 00:23:17,264 FAGAN: I'm ready. 435 00:23:23,637 --> 00:23:25,423 NARRATOR: John Doherty is still on the line 436 00:23:25,506 --> 00:23:28,475 to the crew. He offers a suggestion. 437 00:23:28,609 --> 00:23:30,294 DOHERTY: Have you considered adding 20 knots 438 00:23:30,377 --> 00:23:31,730 to your approach speed? 439 00:23:32,312 --> 00:23:33,731 HANSON: No, we hadn't thought about that. 440 00:23:33,814 --> 00:23:34,982 We'll do it. 441 00:23:35,115 --> 00:23:36,550 NARRATOR: The extra speed 442 00:23:36,683 --> 00:23:39,154 may help make the plane more controllable. 443 00:23:43,991 --> 00:23:45,092 (intercom dings) 444 00:23:47,461 --> 00:23:49,403 GEIB: Hello, ladies and gentlemen. 445 00:23:49,930 --> 00:23:52,232 We're in for a bit of a rough landing. 446 00:23:52,366 --> 00:23:55,308 When we touch down, there is gonna be quite a jolt. 447 00:23:56,837 --> 00:23:59,190 We'll tell you when to brace for impact. 448 00:24:02,309 --> 00:24:04,528 NARRATOR: As Northwest Airlines Flight 85 449 00:24:04,611 --> 00:24:05,946 approaches Anchorage, 450 00:24:06,079 --> 00:24:07,548 the pilots and Doherty 451 00:24:07,681 --> 00:24:10,505 continue planning for an uncertain landing ahead. 452 00:24:11,351 --> 00:24:13,204 DOHERTY: We discussed how are things gonna be 453 00:24:13,287 --> 00:24:15,773 as we fly the approach, what flight control, 454 00:24:15,856 --> 00:24:18,075 what management issues in terms of flight paths 455 00:24:18,158 --> 00:24:19,443 are we gonna encounter there, 456 00:24:19,526 --> 00:24:21,679 and then how are we gonna manage directional control 457 00:24:21,762 --> 00:24:23,080 during the landing rollout, 458 00:24:23,163 --> 00:24:26,163 uh, what stopping issues we're gonna have and so on. 459 00:24:26,700 --> 00:24:29,420 NARRATOR: The decisions they face in the next few moments 460 00:24:29,503 --> 00:24:32,268 will make the difference between life and death. 461 00:24:34,041 --> 00:24:35,960 HANSON: Okay, we can't do this anymore. 462 00:24:36,043 --> 00:24:39,513 Let's use the engines. Dave, get on the levers. 463 00:24:39,646 --> 00:24:41,764 One and two up, three and four down. 464 00:24:41,949 --> 00:24:43,734 NARRATOR: Just minutes from touchdown, 465 00:24:43,817 --> 00:24:46,420 the pilots increase power to the left engines 466 00:24:46,553 --> 00:24:48,553 while reducing power to the right. 467 00:24:49,590 --> 00:24:52,355 This uneven thrust should help keep it straight, 468 00:24:53,594 --> 00:24:55,495 but there is a danger. 469 00:24:55,629 --> 00:24:58,899 No one knows how badly damaged the rudder is. 470 00:24:59,032 --> 00:25:02,169 If it tears off while the engine thrust is uneven, 471 00:25:02,302 --> 00:25:04,705 the pilots will lose all control. 472 00:25:05,439 --> 00:25:07,207 (sirens blaring) 473 00:25:07,341 --> 00:25:10,694 NARRATOR: On the ground, they are preparing for the worst. 474 00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:20,571 HANSON: I'd give a thousand dollars 475 00:25:20,654 --> 00:25:22,537 for a rearview mirror right now. 476 00:25:28,061 --> 00:25:30,697 John, what do you think? 477 00:25:31,164 --> 00:25:34,568 NARRATOR: Doherty has been scouring charts and manuals. 478 00:25:34,701 --> 00:25:37,221 He reminds the crew of another problem to consider. 479 00:25:37,304 --> 00:25:38,472 DOHERTY: On landing, 480 00:25:38,605 --> 00:25:40,691 don't forget the rudder's attached to the nose steering. 481 00:25:40,774 --> 00:25:42,059 HANSON: And when that happens, Mike, 482 00:25:42,142 --> 00:25:43,294 I'll take the tiller and the brakes. 483 00:25:43,377 --> 00:25:44,578 You take the yoke. 484 00:25:45,245 --> 00:25:46,864 NARRATOR: Once the nose touches down, 485 00:25:46,947 --> 00:25:50,000 the damaged rudder may cause them to lose control of the plane, 486 00:25:50,083 --> 00:25:52,586 at more than 300 kilometers an hour. 487 00:25:58,759 --> 00:26:01,112 HANSON: I flew the approach all the way down, 488 00:26:01,195 --> 00:26:04,498 and I thought if there's ever gonna be a time 489 00:26:04,631 --> 00:26:08,268 that you fly a perfect approach, it's gotta be this one. 490 00:26:12,005 --> 00:26:13,624 DOHERTY: I became extraneous at that time, 491 00:26:13,707 --> 00:26:16,043 so, somewhere along around seven, 492 00:26:16,176 --> 00:26:18,062 eight thousand feet on the way down, 493 00:26:18,145 --> 00:26:20,414 uh, I signed off with the crew. 494 00:26:20,547 --> 00:26:22,466 DOHERTY: I'll talk to you when you're on the ground. 495 00:26:22,549 --> 00:26:24,017 FAGAN: We'll talk soon. 496 00:26:26,253 --> 00:26:27,938 DOHERTY: You know, I gave John 497 00:26:28,021 --> 00:26:30,610 whatever blessing I could give at the moment, 498 00:26:30,724 --> 00:26:33,344 probably understated in typical pilot fashion, 499 00:26:33,427 --> 00:26:37,130 and I was off the line and just waiting to hear what happened. 500 00:26:42,069 --> 00:26:44,121 NARRATOR: Between the frigid waters of Cook Inlet 501 00:26:44,204 --> 00:26:46,263 and the towering Alaskan mountains, 502 00:26:46,874 --> 00:26:48,392 Anchorage International Airport 503 00:26:48,475 --> 00:26:51,512 awaits the arrival of a stricken 747. 504 00:26:52,412 --> 00:26:54,942 ATC: Northwest 85, we have you on our radar. 505 00:26:59,419 --> 00:27:02,243 NARRATOR: The passengers and crew of Northwest 85 506 00:27:02,356 --> 00:27:05,062 are now moments away from an emergency landing. 507 00:27:09,496 --> 00:27:12,399 BRECKLIN: As I was putting my own seatbelt on, 508 00:27:12,533 --> 00:27:17,004 {\an8}I remember thinking to myself, is this all there is? 509 00:27:17,771 --> 00:27:19,439 {\an8}As in, am I done here? 510 00:27:19,573 --> 00:27:22,309 Am I gonna be alive when this is over? 511 00:27:22,442 --> 00:27:26,446 And I thought about my kids and my husband and my home. 512 00:27:28,815 --> 00:27:31,151 ATC: Northwest 85, cleared to land. 513 00:27:31,285 --> 00:27:33,353 Emergency equipment standing by. 514 00:27:34,121 --> 00:27:35,606 FAGAN: Roger, cleared to land. 515 00:27:35,689 --> 00:27:37,641 NARRATOR: The crew still has no idea 516 00:27:37,724 --> 00:27:40,666 what will happen when the plane touches the ground. 517 00:27:40,827 --> 00:27:43,347 {\an8}DOHERTY: There were close to 400 passengers on that airplane, 518 00:27:43,430 --> 00:27:45,399 {\an8}and a crew of eighteen, 519 00:27:45,532 --> 00:27:48,719 {\an8}and, uh, some of them people that I knew personally, like John, 520 00:27:48,802 --> 00:27:50,454 and the other pilots in the crew, 521 00:27:50,537 --> 00:27:52,472 so waiting was hard. 522 00:27:55,809 --> 00:27:57,809 HANSON: Okay, everyone. Here we go. 523 00:28:00,514 --> 00:28:01,748 (intercom dings) 524 00:28:02,349 --> 00:28:03,601 GEIB: Touchdown in five. 525 00:28:03,684 --> 00:28:04,918 Prepare for impact. 526 00:28:05,819 --> 00:28:07,588 BRECKLIN: Brace! Brace! Brace! 527 00:28:18,098 --> 00:28:19,650 - HANSON: You got it? - FAGAN: I got it! 528 00:28:19,733 --> 00:28:21,735 NARRATOR: As planned, on touchdown, 529 00:28:21,869 --> 00:28:24,388 First Officer Fagan takes the control column. 530 00:28:24,471 --> 00:28:27,648 Captain Hanson guides the front wheels with the tiller. 531 00:28:27,741 --> 00:28:29,476 The timing is critical. 532 00:28:29,610 --> 00:28:33,213 One false step, and the plane could shoot off the runway. 533 00:28:42,990 --> 00:28:44,458 HANSON: We got it. 534 00:28:50,030 --> 00:28:52,833 Good job, Mike. Good job guys. 535 00:28:54,301 --> 00:28:56,303 So what do we do for an encore? 536 00:28:56,436 --> 00:28:57,604 FAGAN: Not that. 537 00:28:57,738 --> 00:28:58,956 HANSON: Everyone in the cockpit 538 00:28:59,039 --> 00:29:01,241 {\an8}was finally able to exhale, 539 00:29:01,375 --> 00:29:04,878 {\an8}and we just went, "Aah." 540 00:29:05,012 --> 00:29:06,847 (sighing) 541 00:29:13,820 --> 00:29:16,056 BRECKLIN: Once we were given the signal 542 00:29:16,156 --> 00:29:17,691 that it was okay... 543 00:29:17,824 --> 00:29:20,177 BRECKLIN: Please remain seated until the seatbelt light is off. 544 00:29:20,260 --> 00:29:21,712 BRECKLIN: I knew that I had to get up 545 00:29:21,795 --> 00:29:23,363 and go to that entry door, 546 00:29:23,497 --> 00:29:26,133 and get these people out of this airplane. 547 00:29:26,266 --> 00:29:28,268 We did what we were trained to do. 548 00:29:28,402 --> 00:29:30,344 - We did a great job. - (clapping) 549 00:29:31,371 --> 00:29:34,371 NARRATOR: Controllers can see what the pilots can't. 550 00:29:34,908 --> 00:29:37,294 ATC: That's quite the rudder you got there. 551 00:29:37,377 --> 00:29:38,963 Must have been a hell of a ride. 552 00:29:39,046 --> 00:29:40,380 (laughing) 553 00:29:40,514 --> 00:29:42,809 FAGAN: Oh, yeah. It was a real joy ride. 554 00:29:47,154 --> 00:29:48,372 NARRATOR: Almost two hours 555 00:29:48,455 --> 00:29:51,658 after the emergency began at 35,000 feet, 556 00:29:51,792 --> 00:29:54,294 all 404 people on board 557 00:29:54,428 --> 00:29:56,129 are safely on the ground. 558 00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:01,802 (phone ringing) 559 00:30:03,103 --> 00:30:04,622 DOHERTY: Well, when I heard the crew was safe, 560 00:30:04,705 --> 00:30:06,924 of course it was an incredible sense of relief. 561 00:30:07,007 --> 00:30:09,827 These guys had been tested and they'd done a fabulous job, 562 00:30:09,910 --> 00:30:12,312 so, it was, it was really joyful. 563 00:30:12,446 --> 00:30:15,883 I mean, the sense of grace, accomplishment, 564 00:30:16,016 --> 00:30:19,820 joy, um, satisfaction. 565 00:30:19,953 --> 00:30:21,688 It was all good. 566 00:30:23,190 --> 00:30:26,310 NARRATOR: The pilots have narrowly avoided a fatal crash, 567 00:30:26,393 --> 00:30:29,570 but what caused them to lose control in the first place 568 00:30:29,663 --> 00:30:32,663 is a question that desperately needs to be answered. 569 00:30:34,668 --> 00:30:36,937 Northwest is just one of many airlines 570 00:30:37,070 --> 00:30:39,873 flying the 747-400 every day. 571 00:30:42,075 --> 00:30:44,228 Thousands of passengers around the world 572 00:30:44,311 --> 00:30:46,246 now face a potential risk. 573 00:30:50,350 --> 00:30:54,821 Carolyn Deforge of the NTSB will oversee the investigation. 574 00:30:54,955 --> 00:30:57,408 CAROLYN DEFORGE: It appeared to be a very dramatic event, 575 00:30:57,491 --> 00:31:00,627 {\an8}and, um, it definitely seemed like 576 00:31:00,761 --> 00:31:02,480 {\an8}something we needed to follow up on, 577 00:31:02,563 --> 00:31:04,975 {\an8}and try and understand what had happened. 578 00:31:07,534 --> 00:31:09,453 NARRATOR: Investigators immediately discover 579 00:31:09,536 --> 00:31:11,055 a trail of hydraulic fluid 580 00:31:11,138 --> 00:31:13,057 leaking from the back of the plane. 581 00:31:13,140 --> 00:31:14,592 DEFORGE: It was very surprising to us 582 00:31:14,675 --> 00:31:17,428 when we found out what type of failure had occurred, 583 00:31:17,511 --> 00:31:20,214 and that the effects it had had 584 00:31:20,347 --> 00:31:22,850 on the aircraft's controllability. 585 00:31:22,983 --> 00:31:24,835 NARRATOR: The pilot's foot pedals 586 00:31:24,918 --> 00:31:26,137 are linked to the rudder 587 00:31:26,220 --> 00:31:29,423 through a hydraulic power control module, or PCM. 588 00:31:30,557 --> 00:31:32,276 When the pilot presses on the pedals, 589 00:31:32,359 --> 00:31:35,028 the PCM changes the hydraulic pressure, 590 00:31:35,762 --> 00:31:38,065 and that's what moves the rudder. 591 00:31:38,198 --> 00:31:41,316 DEFORGE: They opened up the access panels in the tail, 592 00:31:42,102 --> 00:31:44,271 and they noticed that the end cap 593 00:31:44,404 --> 00:31:46,874 on the control module had separated. 594 00:31:47,875 --> 00:31:50,644 The end cap is a circular piece 595 00:31:50,777 --> 00:31:53,030 about two and a half inches in diameter, 596 00:31:53,113 --> 00:31:55,015 and it had completely fractured 597 00:31:55,148 --> 00:31:57,168 all of the way around its diameter, 598 00:31:57,251 --> 00:31:58,663 and had then fallen off. 599 00:32:00,087 --> 00:32:02,089 NARRATOR: With the PCM broken, 600 00:32:02,222 --> 00:32:05,325 the pilots had no way to control the lower rudder. 601 00:32:05,459 --> 00:32:08,128 The failure of this one piece of engineering 602 00:32:08,262 --> 00:32:10,831 nearly brought down the entire plane. 603 00:32:11,698 --> 00:32:13,110 The power control module 604 00:32:13,233 --> 00:32:16,116 is shipped to the NTSB headquarters in Washington. 605 00:32:17,571 --> 00:32:20,874 Close examination reveals exactly how the failed part 606 00:32:21,008 --> 00:32:22,543 caused the rudder to jam. 607 00:32:23,644 --> 00:32:25,229 DEFORGE: When the end cap came off, 608 00:32:25,312 --> 00:32:27,781 it allowed a piston inside the module 609 00:32:27,915 --> 00:32:32,052 to move further than its design limit was intended, 610 00:32:32,186 --> 00:32:35,556 and that is what resulted in the rudder hardover. 611 00:32:39,026 --> 00:32:41,011 NARRATOR: By why the module's end cap 612 00:32:41,094 --> 00:32:42,379 failed in the first place 613 00:32:42,462 --> 00:32:43,864 is still a mystery. 614 00:32:45,165 --> 00:32:46,784 DEFORGE: It was certainly something 615 00:32:46,867 --> 00:32:50,103 that was not anticipated by the designers, 616 00:32:50,237 --> 00:32:52,739 and when we examined the hardware, 617 00:32:52,873 --> 00:32:56,243 um, it was definitely beyond the scope 618 00:32:56,376 --> 00:32:59,246 of what you normally encounter as an engineer 619 00:32:59,379 --> 00:33:01,298 when you're doing a failure investigation. 620 00:33:01,381 --> 00:33:04,034 Normally you see something that's an internal failure, 621 00:33:04,117 --> 00:33:07,654 not an actual mechanical failure of the housing itself. 622 00:33:07,788 --> 00:33:09,840 NARRATOR: Sylvie Dionne is a metallurgist 623 00:33:09,923 --> 00:33:12,626 specializing in airplane components. 624 00:33:12,759 --> 00:33:15,880 {\an8}SYLVIE DIONNE: The manifold material was an aluminum alloy, 625 00:33:15,963 --> 00:33:18,048 {\an8}which means that it's actually aluminum metal 626 00:33:18,131 --> 00:33:20,084 that's mixed in with a bit of copper, 627 00:33:20,167 --> 00:33:21,935 with magnesium, with zinc. 628 00:33:22,069 --> 00:33:24,422 And the purpose of adding these other elements 629 00:33:24,505 --> 00:33:26,039 is to make it stronger. 630 00:33:26,673 --> 00:33:28,259 NARRATOR: The aluminum alloy 631 00:33:28,342 --> 00:33:31,044 used to make this part is extremely resilient. 632 00:33:31,178 --> 00:33:33,447 It should never break apart like this. 633 00:33:35,682 --> 00:33:37,802 DIONNE: Doing failure analyses like this 634 00:33:37,885 --> 00:33:41,021 on failed parts is a bit like, uh, being a detective, 635 00:33:41,889 --> 00:33:43,772 because you're looking for clues 636 00:33:43,857 --> 00:33:45,743 as to what caused the occurrence, 637 00:33:45,826 --> 00:33:47,768 what caused the material to fail. 638 00:33:49,897 --> 00:33:51,649 NARRATOR: The size and shape of the crack 639 00:33:51,732 --> 00:33:55,027 tells investigators that the module wore out over time... 640 00:33:55,969 --> 00:33:57,971 what's called metal fatigue. 641 00:33:58,105 --> 00:34:01,282 However, this is almost impossible for them to believe. 642 00:34:05,012 --> 00:34:08,749 A Boeing 747-400 is built for long hauls, 643 00:34:08,882 --> 00:34:10,784 12 to 15 hour flights, 644 00:34:10,918 --> 00:34:13,554 and its parts are built to last decades. 645 00:34:15,155 --> 00:34:17,675 DOHERTY: My understanding was the mean time before failure 646 00:34:17,758 --> 00:34:20,678 for this item was something like thirty thousand years, 647 00:34:20,761 --> 00:34:22,279 which is basically saying, 648 00:34:22,362 --> 00:34:25,382 well, we don't think this part was ever going to fail. 649 00:34:25,465 --> 00:34:28,735 NARRATOR: The 747-400 is in high demand. 650 00:34:28,869 --> 00:34:32,840 More of these massive planes are being manufactured every year, 651 00:34:32,973 --> 00:34:36,343 with the same control module that failed on Flight 85. 652 00:34:37,744 --> 00:34:40,848 If this crucial system is wearing out prematurely, 653 00:34:42,216 --> 00:34:44,551 investigators need to figure out why, 654 00:34:44,685 --> 00:34:46,887 before it leads to a fatal disaster. 655 00:34:48,088 --> 00:34:51,491 DEFORGE: The fact that this had a purely fatigue failure, 656 00:34:51,625 --> 00:34:54,428 with no apparent origin to it, 657 00:34:54,561 --> 00:34:57,097 such as a deficiency or a defect, 658 00:34:57,231 --> 00:35:01,535 made us question the material properties of the housing itself. 659 00:35:02,503 --> 00:35:05,322 NARRATOR: Investigators send the unit back to the manufacturer 660 00:35:05,405 --> 00:35:07,523 for extensive metallurgical testing. 661 00:35:10,410 --> 00:35:13,080 DIONNE: Metals are made up of little crystals, 662 00:35:13,213 --> 00:35:15,616 which metallurgists call grains, 663 00:35:15,749 --> 00:35:18,552 and if the grains are too small or too large 664 00:35:18,685 --> 00:35:20,420 or not the correct shape, 665 00:35:20,554 --> 00:35:22,640 uh, the material may have a different strength, 666 00:35:22,723 --> 00:35:24,809 different ductility, different resistance 667 00:35:24,892 --> 00:35:26,660 to propagation of a crack. 668 00:35:28,695 --> 00:35:30,648 NARRATOR: A visual examination of the metal 669 00:35:30,731 --> 00:35:33,066 provides no insight into why it failed. 670 00:35:35,569 --> 00:35:37,888 DIONNE: One of the best techniques for revealing 671 00:35:37,971 --> 00:35:40,607 if a part contains cracks or surface defects 672 00:35:40,741 --> 00:35:43,210 is to use fluorescent dye inspection. 673 00:35:46,413 --> 00:35:49,583 The part is examined under UV light, 674 00:35:50,083 --> 00:35:52,986 and the defects will appear as bright lines, 675 00:35:53,120 --> 00:35:55,689 or bright dots that are very visible. 676 00:35:55,822 --> 00:35:57,374 NARRATOR: But the exhaustive tests 677 00:35:57,457 --> 00:36:00,494 reveal that the material itself was not to blame. 678 00:36:02,930 --> 00:36:06,066 Investigators still can't explain the failure. 679 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:08,352 DEFORGE: It was driving all of the group crazy. 680 00:36:08,435 --> 00:36:10,855 We were very frustrated when we realized that 681 00:36:10,938 --> 00:36:13,040 all of the paths we chased down 682 00:36:13,173 --> 00:36:17,044 didn't give you that "Aha! Eureka!" moment. 683 00:36:20,447 --> 00:36:21,966 NARRATOR: Investigators wonder 684 00:36:22,049 --> 00:36:23,834 if something in this plane's history 685 00:36:23,917 --> 00:36:27,094 could have caused the module to break down prematurely. 686 00:36:27,654 --> 00:36:29,890 What the records reveal is surprising. 687 00:36:31,225 --> 00:36:35,195 HANSON: Northwest was the launch customer for the 747-400, 688 00:36:35,929 --> 00:36:38,999 and this one was the first in the line of 400s 689 00:36:39,132 --> 00:36:40,501 that Northwest flew. 690 00:36:40,634 --> 00:36:46,673 It was the oldest production 747-400 in the world. 691 00:36:47,641 --> 00:36:49,026 NARRATOR: And that's not all. 692 00:36:49,109 --> 00:36:52,846 Records also show that this very 747-400 693 00:36:52,980 --> 00:36:54,392 was used as a test plane 694 00:36:54,481 --> 00:36:57,117 before it was even sold to the airline. 695 00:36:57,251 --> 00:36:58,785 Could rigorous testing 696 00:36:58,919 --> 00:37:02,390 have somehow led to the failure of the power control module? 697 00:37:03,790 --> 00:37:07,060 The plane had flown for 55,000 hours, 698 00:37:07,194 --> 00:37:10,130 and taken off more than 7,000 times. 699 00:37:10,864 --> 00:37:12,550 That's more takeoffs and landings 700 00:37:12,633 --> 00:37:15,869 than most 747s with that number of hours in the air. 701 00:37:17,571 --> 00:37:20,073 This discovery leads the investigation 702 00:37:20,207 --> 00:37:22,309 in an entirely new direction. 703 00:37:23,143 --> 00:37:24,795 DEFORGE: We were concerned that 704 00:37:24,878 --> 00:37:28,382 it had been exposed to more stress than we had expected, 705 00:37:28,515 --> 00:37:31,185 and that that may have caused it to fail. 706 00:37:31,318 --> 00:37:34,004 NARRATOR: Each time a plane takes off and lands, 707 00:37:34,087 --> 00:37:36,382 its systems are put through more stress 708 00:37:36,490 --> 00:37:39,079 than when it's simply flying through the air. 709 00:37:41,028 --> 00:37:43,848 DEFORGE: We were very concerned about those operators in Asia 710 00:37:43,931 --> 00:37:47,634 that use the 747-400 on short haul flights. 711 00:37:48,302 --> 00:37:51,238 NARRATOR: This module, however, is already broken. 712 00:37:51,371 --> 00:37:53,173 There's no way to test it. 713 00:37:53,307 --> 00:37:55,493 Checking all the units on the rest of the fleet 714 00:37:55,576 --> 00:37:57,544 is not a practical option. 715 00:37:57,678 --> 00:38:00,030 DEFORGE: You would have essentially had to have grounded the fleet 716 00:38:00,113 --> 00:38:01,715 to remove all of the units. 717 00:38:02,816 --> 00:38:04,268 NARRATOR: As a pre-emptive strike 718 00:38:04,351 --> 00:38:05,786 against future failure, 719 00:38:05,919 --> 00:38:07,888 the NTSB recommends that airlines 720 00:38:08,021 --> 00:38:10,669 test the power control module more vigorously, 721 00:38:10,791 --> 00:38:12,059 and more regularly. 722 00:38:14,761 --> 00:38:17,164 DEFORGE: We instituted a repetitive 723 00:38:17,297 --> 00:38:20,067 inspection cycle requirement. 724 00:38:20,701 --> 00:38:22,553 NARRATOR: But the root cause of the failure 725 00:38:22,636 --> 00:38:24,204 is never found. 726 00:38:27,508 --> 00:38:29,038 NARRATOR: Four years later, 727 00:38:29,142 --> 00:38:32,907 an Air France cargo plane is forced to make an emergency landing. 728 00:38:33,580 --> 00:38:37,851 Once again, the lower rudder has failed on the 747-400. 729 00:38:40,187 --> 00:38:44,458 The circumstances are strikingly similar to Northwest Flight 85. 730 00:38:44,591 --> 00:38:47,144 DEFORGE: The unit was sent to Parker Hannifin 731 00:38:47,227 --> 00:38:48,729 in California for repair, 732 00:38:48,862 --> 00:38:51,482 and when they opened the box and looked at it, 733 00:38:51,565 --> 00:38:53,017 their eyes got really big. 734 00:38:53,100 --> 00:38:55,786 They immediately quarantined it and called everyone 735 00:38:55,869 --> 00:38:57,588 and said, "Oh, my gosh. You're not gonna believe 736 00:38:57,671 --> 00:38:59,623 what just showed up on our doorstep." 737 00:38:59,706 --> 00:39:01,192 NARRATOR: If the Air France module 738 00:39:01,275 --> 00:39:02,793 shows signs of metal fatigue 739 00:39:02,876 --> 00:39:04,945 like the one on Flight 85, 740 00:39:05,078 --> 00:39:07,364 then investigators may be a step closer 741 00:39:07,447 --> 00:39:09,683 to explaining the mysterious failures. 742 00:39:09,816 --> 00:39:11,102 DEFORGE: We immediately focused in 743 00:39:11,185 --> 00:39:14,488 on the fracture surface again in the same area 744 00:39:14,621 --> 00:39:16,690 and did many of the checks that 745 00:39:16,823 --> 00:39:18,823 we had done the first time around. 746 00:39:19,293 --> 00:39:21,278 NARRATOR: But this case seems to be different. 747 00:39:21,361 --> 00:39:23,163 There is no sign of fatigue. 748 00:39:23,297 --> 00:39:26,233 Instead, they find a manufacturing defect. 749 00:39:26,366 --> 00:39:28,936 DEFORGE: We actually found a deficiency 750 00:39:29,069 --> 00:39:31,772 in the bottom of the threaded bore section. 751 00:39:31,905 --> 00:39:35,742 We found a very sharp radius at the bottom of the threads, 752 00:39:35,876 --> 00:39:38,465 which is where the crack had propagated from. 753 00:39:39,479 --> 00:39:42,867 NARRATOR: While finding the cause of this latest failure is significant, 754 00:39:42,950 --> 00:39:45,302 it has done nothing to help explain the failure 755 00:39:45,385 --> 00:39:47,856 on the Northwest flight four years earlier. 756 00:39:48,388 --> 00:39:49,840 DIONNE: Was it overloading? 757 00:39:49,923 --> 00:39:52,926 Was it, um, a progressive failure? 758 00:39:53,060 --> 00:39:55,679 Was it exposed to something in the environment 759 00:39:55,762 --> 00:39:57,231 that caused it to fail? 760 00:39:57,364 --> 00:39:59,366 DEFORGE: Without knowing the why, 761 00:39:59,499 --> 00:40:02,620 you can't really take the appropriate corrective action, 762 00:40:02,703 --> 00:40:05,572 and as an investigator, that's frustrating. 763 00:40:06,507 --> 00:40:08,192 NARRATOR: For the second time, 764 00:40:08,275 --> 00:40:10,261 a part that was never meant to wear out 765 00:40:10,344 --> 00:40:12,913 has nearly brought down a 747. 766 00:40:13,947 --> 00:40:17,150 With one of the two near tragedies still unexplained, 767 00:40:17,284 --> 00:40:21,288 investigators desperately need to find a fail-safe measure 768 00:40:21,421 --> 00:40:23,892 that will protect passengers in the future. 769 00:40:26,193 --> 00:40:28,428 HANSON: Okay everyone, here we go! 770 00:40:28,562 --> 00:40:30,681 NARRATOR: Four years after Flight 85's 771 00:40:30,764 --> 00:40:33,767 heart-stopping emergency landing in Anchorage, 772 00:40:33,901 --> 00:40:37,704 the cause of the 747's rudder failure is still unknown. 773 00:40:39,573 --> 00:40:42,910 Now, the same part has failed on another flight. 774 00:40:43,043 --> 00:40:45,212 The next failure could be deadly. 775 00:40:47,381 --> 00:40:49,016 DEFORGE: We still don't know 776 00:40:49,149 --> 00:40:52,452 actually the root cause of the Northwest failure. 777 00:40:53,587 --> 00:40:55,255 But because of what we found 778 00:40:55,389 --> 00:40:57,408 with the second Air France failure, 779 00:40:57,491 --> 00:40:59,310 we needed to take corrective action 780 00:40:59,393 --> 00:41:02,262 to prevent similar failures from occurring. 781 00:41:02,396 --> 00:41:04,148 NARRATOR: Investigators recommend 782 00:41:04,231 --> 00:41:06,879 attaching special plugs to the control module. 783 00:41:07,601 --> 00:41:09,453 In the event of another failure, 784 00:41:09,536 --> 00:41:11,822 these new pieces will prevent the rudder 785 00:41:11,905 --> 00:41:14,341 from moving too far in either direction. 786 00:41:14,675 --> 00:41:16,160 DEFORGE: The changes that we've made 787 00:41:16,243 --> 00:41:19,279 to the control modules in the 747-400 fleet 788 00:41:19,413 --> 00:41:23,417 will prevent any future events of a rudder hardover. 789 00:41:24,918 --> 00:41:27,338 {\an8}NARRATOR: An air worthiness directive from the FAA 790 00:41:27,421 --> 00:41:30,624 {\an8}makes it mandatory for every 747-400 791 00:41:30,757 --> 00:41:32,993 to be fitted with this new technology, 792 00:41:33,994 --> 00:41:36,347 eliminating the risk of another failure. 793 00:41:39,967 --> 00:41:42,791 But still, there is another question to consider, 794 00:41:43,103 --> 00:41:46,339 one investigators seldom have the luxury to contemplate. 795 00:41:47,941 --> 00:41:50,777 With a catastrophic failure of the rudder system, 796 00:41:50,911 --> 00:41:53,714 why didn't Flight 85 crash? 797 00:41:53,847 --> 00:41:57,584 One reason: the very design of this 747. 798 00:41:57,718 --> 00:41:59,403 DOHERTY: Having a split rudder 799 00:41:59,486 --> 00:42:02,656 is definitely an unusual feature of this airplane, 800 00:42:02,789 --> 00:42:06,059 and in this case, it worked in their favor 801 00:42:06,193 --> 00:42:07,895 in the sense that 802 00:42:08,028 --> 00:42:10,030 if there had only been one rudder, 803 00:42:10,163 --> 00:42:12,016 and the actuator of that rudder had failed, 804 00:42:12,099 --> 00:42:14,935 then one hundred percent of the yaw control 805 00:42:15,068 --> 00:42:16,770 would have been deflected, 806 00:42:16,904 --> 00:42:19,306 which would have magnified the problem. 807 00:42:20,107 --> 00:42:23,677 NARRATOR: But technology alone did not save 404 lives. 808 00:42:26,980 --> 00:42:30,651 In 1985, China Airlines Flight 006 809 00:42:30,784 --> 00:42:32,586 also went into a sudden roll. 810 00:42:35,689 --> 00:42:38,258 But that flight plummeted nearly 30,000 feet 811 00:42:38,392 --> 00:42:41,040 before the pilots were able to regain control. 812 00:42:45,199 --> 00:42:48,035 How had Flight 85 escaped the same fate? 813 00:42:49,469 --> 00:42:51,989 FAGAN: If Frank hadn't reacted the way he had, 814 00:42:52,072 --> 00:42:54,975 we probably would not be here to tell the story. 815 00:42:57,344 --> 00:42:58,562 FAGAN: Frank, have you got it? 816 00:42:58,645 --> 00:43:00,197 GEIB: Yes, I think I've got it. 817 00:43:00,280 --> 00:43:03,167 NARRATOR: Captain Geib's actions in the first few seconds 818 00:43:03,250 --> 00:43:05,250 were critical to saving the plane, 819 00:43:06,753 --> 00:43:09,871 but what got it safely to the ground is another story. 820 00:43:10,924 --> 00:43:12,543 DOHERTY: Every pilot in that cockpit 821 00:43:12,626 --> 00:43:14,695 knew what was going on. 822 00:43:15,095 --> 00:43:17,081 Risks were being assessed, and so on. 823 00:43:17,164 --> 00:43:18,532 DOHERTY: On landing, 824 00:43:18,665 --> 00:43:20,918 don't forget the rudder's attached to the nose steering. 825 00:43:21,001 --> 00:43:22,386 HANSON: And when that happens, Mike, 826 00:43:22,469 --> 00:43:25,356 I'll take the tiller and the brakes and you take the yoke. 827 00:43:25,439 --> 00:43:27,158 HANSON: Cockpit resource management 828 00:43:27,241 --> 00:43:31,712 is really what enabled us to think this thing through 829 00:43:31,845 --> 00:43:33,798 and get the airplane on the ground. 830 00:43:33,881 --> 00:43:35,332 BRECKLIN: I am proud to say 831 00:43:35,415 --> 00:43:37,168 we were like a well-oiled machine. 832 00:43:37,251 --> 00:43:38,903 We all did what we were trained to do. 833 00:43:38,986 --> 00:43:40,871 GEIB: Touchdown in five. Prepare for impact. 834 00:43:40,954 --> 00:43:43,660 BRECKLIN: And not one single person fell apart. 835 00:43:44,091 --> 00:43:45,974 FAGAN: What do we tell the cabin? 836 00:43:46,627 --> 00:43:48,245 FAGAN: The guys that we had in the cockpit 837 00:43:48,328 --> 00:43:51,832 were just tremendous. Everybody communicated. 838 00:43:51,965 --> 00:43:53,584 GEIB: I'll go back and tell them. 839 00:43:53,667 --> 00:43:55,219 The more they know, the better. 840 00:43:55,302 --> 00:43:56,403 HANSON: I agree. 841 00:43:56,537 --> 00:43:58,155 I think we should tell them exactly what's going on. 842 00:43:58,238 --> 00:44:00,291 DEFORGE: I think this crew did a phenomenal job 843 00:44:00,374 --> 00:44:02,993 in getting this aircraft back on the ground safely. 844 00:44:03,076 --> 00:44:04,912 NARRATOR: In 2003, 845 00:44:05,045 --> 00:44:06,831 the Air Line Pilots Association 846 00:44:06,914 --> 00:44:09,816 awarded the crew of Northwest Airlines Flight 85 847 00:44:09,950 --> 00:44:12,119 with the Superior Airmanship Award. 848 00:44:12,252 --> 00:44:13,704 FAGAN: More important than the award 849 00:44:13,787 --> 00:44:15,722 was the fact that, um, 850 00:44:15,856 --> 00:44:18,292 we got the people on the ground safely. 851 00:44:18,425 --> 00:44:19,860 FAGAN: We got it. 852 00:44:22,796 --> 00:44:26,533 HANSON: In this day and age of automated cockpits, 853 00:44:26,667 --> 00:44:31,371 hand flying is in danger of becoming a lost art. 854 00:44:31,505 --> 00:44:34,675 We have to remember as pilots 855 00:44:34,808 --> 00:44:37,544 that we are there 856 00:44:37,678 --> 00:44:39,413 because of our flying skills. 857 00:44:39,546 --> 00:44:41,599 We had prepared so well for this thing 858 00:44:41,682 --> 00:44:43,506 that failure was not an option. 72936

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