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The concept of Blitz Greek is that the
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enemy cannot gain a fresh foothold
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somewhere and offer major resistance.
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It calls for certain elements above all
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large armored units that can act
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operationally with air support.
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You also need the right leadership
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culture.
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Militarily, the focus is usually on the
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enemy's capital. To win the war, you
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have to take it.
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It was of course important to the
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Germans to capture Warsaw with as few of
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their own casualties as possible, but
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they did so relatively quickly because
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the Po's willingness to defend and their
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morale had already been broken.
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>> During the war in Poland, Hitler had
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already told his military leaders of his
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decision to attack France.
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The Germans planned to go through
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Belgium and act as bait, so to speak,
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for the Allies, but the actual
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destructive thrust was to take place
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further south through the Arden. It was
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a huge gamble, and the Germans were
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lucky that the French failed tactically
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and operationally.
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Somehow, Hitler seemed to have cornered
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success,
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and Germany's military leaders also
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bathed in the charisma which he now
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exuded.
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In the first world war, Germany had
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fought for four years without taking
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Paris. Now, this had been achieved
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within a few weeks. Naturally, this was
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a phenomenal achievement that could not
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only be exploited propagandistically. It
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also made a massive impression on the
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German people.
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Actually,
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the Blitzgri operations and the whole
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myth surrounding them showed how quickly
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battles or campaigns could be won and
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individual countries and armies
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defeated. But it was not a concept for
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winning an entire war.
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On May 10th, 1940, German paratroops
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were dropped in Belgium and the
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Netherlands to seize strategically
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important airfields and bridges.
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In the Netherlands, at least, this swift
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operation was designed to prevent the
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Allies from intervening and to split
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their defensive forces.
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The invaders were successful almost
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everywhere, although sometimes they
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incurred serious losses.
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One of the first targets was the Belgian
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fort of Eban Emmael, not far from
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Leazge.
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Een Mel was a fort with a fairly
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impressive location on the river Muz.
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Although it was heavily fortified and
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defended by a large contingent of
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Belgian troops, Eban Mel was captured in
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Blitzgreek style. In other words, on a
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lower tactical level by German
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paratroops flown in by glider who thus
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helped secure the bridges over the M.
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>> Engineers crossed the river in dingies.
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The main German attack was directed at
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the Albert Canal M River Line, the
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anchor of which was Fort Ibeno, a modern
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and seemingly impregnable fortress. The
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Germans had secretly built a replica of
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the mighty fortress in Czechoslovakia
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and had rehearsed the attack until they
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knew every detail of the fort's
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construction and its every weakness.
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When the real attack came, it was
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foolproof. Parachute troops, dive
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bombers, flamethrowers, specially
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trained engineer battalions, all working
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together as a well-trained team.
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They knew exactly where to cross the
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river.
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Dive bombers supported the attackers as
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they tried to storm the fort.
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Although the commander of the fort had
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been alerted, the complex was not battle
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ready. There was a shortage of
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ammunition and the fort's artillery
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couldn't be used.
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Neuralgic points had to be neutralized.
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Airborne troops of course were perfect
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for operational tasks like seizing
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bridges and knocking out enemy command
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posts.
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A fortress like Ibel, which had to be
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neutralized, was prepared for
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everything, but not an airborne assault.
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The Belgians had no defense against
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that. They assumed that they would see
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the enemy approaching and be able to
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fight the Germans at a distance.
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>> The fort had practically no
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anti-aircraft defenses.
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Other units moved up to support the
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attack.
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The Germans knew that the block house
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roof wasn't mined and stormed it.
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Using powerful shaped charges, they blew
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up the steel shields around the
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underground gun turrets. The 1100
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defenders are said to have been
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practically blinded. They couldn't see
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the enemy coming in who blazed their way
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with flamethrowers.
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You will notice that this assault
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engineer knows exactly where to put his
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high explosive charge in order to
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destroy the block house.
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>> The plan worked. The explosions killed
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large numbers of Belgian soldiers.
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The surviving defenders holed up behind
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barricades and waited. Tactically, this
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was a mistake because it allowed the
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Germans to set off more explosive
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charges.
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>> Fortnale withtood the Nazi attack
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exactly 2 days.
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>> Meanwhile, the actual attack in the
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south was going to plan.
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Gderian's armored cores had crossed
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Luxembourg in 3 hours, reached the
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Belgian border, and immediately launched
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a mobile assault.
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The first tank division was even able to
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cross the sour on May 10th and advance
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into neutral Belgium.
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Nazi propaganda cameras filmed the first
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tanks heading towards the Arden.
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The sickle cut developed more and more
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into a single shock troop operation.
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A combination of speed and surprise
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tactics.
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The success of the plan depended
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ultimately on the surprise effect on the
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French defenders being caught unawares
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because they had not expected the attack
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and certainly not by such a huge enemy
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force. As the first operations got
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underway, it also became clear that the
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French defenders regarded them as a
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diversionary maneuver. They didn't
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believe this was actually the main focus
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of the German assault.
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The French were still hoping that the
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Majino line would be the place where the
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Germans could be repulsed. If the French
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had to shift their forces to combat the
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first operations of the sickle cut, it
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would play havoc with their entire
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defensive planning.
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Hines Gderion, the head of the rapid
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forces at Army High Command, had
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promised his troops that for the first 3
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days they wouldn't get any sleep.
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To stay awake, they were given a supply
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of a stimulant called pervatin. But most
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of the men had to wait outside Buong
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because all the bridges had been
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destroyed before the Germans arrived.
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>> What do you need to get tanks moving?
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Obviously, you'd say you need the
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appropriate infrastructure, but you also
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need engineers to secure bridges over
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the rivers. The French didn't just
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retreat. They also blew up bridges and
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planted minefields which then had to be
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cleared. So without engineers, tanks can
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advance no faster than they can without
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infantry moving up to occupy the cleared
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areas behind them. These fast units were
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indeed a spearhead, but they could only
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penetrate as deeply as the wooden shaft
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behind the spearhead permitted.
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General Gudderion allowed himself to be
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filmed at an army bridge being built
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across the river Semoir. The Belgian and
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French defenders had managed to blow up
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the last bridge just before the first
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German tanks arrived.
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But then, thinking they were about to
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sustain fierce attacks, they had pulled
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out of Buong unnecessarily.
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In Belgium, the Netherlands, and
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Northern France, people fled from the
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approaching Germans.
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And the refugee choked roads didn't get
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that way by accident. The Nazis
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methodically bombed little towns and
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villages, otherwise devoid of any
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military value, not so much to kill as
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to drive the inhabitants out onto the
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highways.
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Then by expert machine gun, the Nazis
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would herd them along in terrorstricken
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flight to hopelessly entangle the
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advancing Allied armies.
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>> An estimated 8 to 10 million people on
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the roads led to massive congestion.
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>> Refugees used as a weapon of war, a new
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low in inhumanity.
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It is not clear how many civilians were
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killed in German air strikes.
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The German bombers brought chaos and
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destruction just to divert attention
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from the actual war plan.
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The German spearheads finally reached
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the forests of the southern Arden.
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They were supposed to have negotiated
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the difficult terrain already, but the
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army had been delayed through having to
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build Bailey bridges.
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This was not how Eric von Manstein, the
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innovator of the sickle cut, had
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envvisaged the operation.
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The Munchstein plan was much better than
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what actually happened because Hitler
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and Halder had simply diverted virtually
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all the armored units through the Arden.
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And that in fact was madness because
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they spent several days stuck in what
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turned out to be the biggest traffic jam
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in history.
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40,000 motorized vehicles and tanks were
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waiting behind the spearheads. By now,
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von Mannstein's tank corps was also
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caught up in the 250 km long jam.
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So, the general didn't arrive at the
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Western Front until May 16th, where he
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was then assigned defensive tasks. His
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superiors had got their way with Hitler.
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>> The Munchstein,
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The Munchstein plan foresaw two main
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areas of attack. one through Belgium in
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order as Mstein said to overrun the
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enemy and not but Halder actually did
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just bind it. Mstein really wanted army
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group B to force the enemy back to the
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sum. The second main thrust was to come
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via the Arden but not in three surges
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with huge jams but in one thrust which
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if possible would take just one day with
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armored units. The third error involved
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something that was also in Mstein's plan
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but was not acted on.
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He had realized right from the start
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that his flank would constantly be
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threatened from the south. So to rule
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out this threat in Mstein's plan,
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armored units were to thrust south to
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nip any French counteroffensive in the
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bud. Those were his three main points.
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But actually none of them were
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implemented. His plan was completely
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diluted. All that remained in the end
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was this sickle cut with a massive
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armored thrust.
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Getting an army through a low mountain
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range is an absolute nightmare for any
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logistics expert.
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It involves using numerous minor roads
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instead of driving across an open plane
278
00:13:43,440 --> 00:13:48,200
where the units could develop their full
279
00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:48,200
potential.
280
00:13:50,399 --> 00:13:53,760
Instead, they were put in a situation
281
00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,920
which logistically was highly
282
00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:57,600
vulnerable. This was something the
283
00:13:55,920 --> 00:14:00,320
military on both sides just couldn't
284
00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:02,000
imagine. But that is precisely why it
285
00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:04,880
worked.
286
00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:07,760
On May 12th, 1940, advanced units
287
00:14:04,880 --> 00:14:10,000
reached the French border.
288
00:14:07,760 --> 00:14:14,000
It then took them 4 hours to knock out a
289
00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:17,680
frontier bunker camouflaged as a house.
290
00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:20,560
Now, Saddan was only a few kilome away.
291
00:14:17,680 --> 00:14:22,399
In 1870 in the suburb of Flowing, the
292
00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:25,800
French cavalry had been destroyed by
293
00:14:22,399 --> 00:14:25,800
Prussian artillery.
294
00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:31,360
>> How did the Germans get through the
295
00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:33,279
Arden so quickly? Because of a mistake
296
00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:35,920
by the Allies. They had just not
297
00:14:33,279 --> 00:14:37,519
prepared any real defense of the Arden.
298
00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:39,360
There were two or three places where the
299
00:14:37,519 --> 00:14:41,440
French or mainly the Belgian light
300
00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:43,519
infantry units failed to receive the
301
00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:45,680
order to retreat. Although these forces
302
00:14:43,519 --> 00:14:47,680
were weak, they offered resistance and
303
00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:49,920
in some cases held up the Germans for
304
00:14:47,680 --> 00:14:51,839
half a day. So you can see what might
305
00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:54,240
have happened if the allies had had the
306
00:14:51,839 --> 00:14:56,320
right defensive concept for the Arden.
307
00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:58,000
But they didn't because right to the end
308
00:14:56,320 --> 00:15:00,000
they did not think it was possible to
309
00:14:58,000 --> 00:15:01,920
advance through the Arden with large
310
00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:03,839
units. When German armor suddenly
311
00:15:01,920 --> 00:15:05,760
appeared at Saddan, the French were
312
00:15:03,839 --> 00:15:09,320
totally surprised. Their best troops
313
00:15:05,760 --> 00:15:09,320
were stationed elsewhere.
314
00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:13,920
Gderian's armored spearheads had
315
00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:17,360
achieved the improbable.
316
00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:18,959
After 160 km, on the afternoon of the
317
00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:20,959
third day, they could see the muse
318
00:15:18,959 --> 00:15:22,959
heights at Sidon.
319
00:15:20,959 --> 00:15:24,959
Up to now, in order to keep deceiving
320
00:15:22,959 --> 00:15:27,440
the enemy, the German air force had
321
00:15:24,959 --> 00:15:32,199
stayed right out of the sickle cut. But
322
00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:32,199
now, Gudderion called for air support.
323
00:15:33,360 --> 00:15:37,680
Within a few hours, more than 12,200
324
00:15:35,279 --> 00:15:39,680
bombers entered the frey. It was the
325
00:15:37,680 --> 00:15:43,560
most massive air raid by the German air
326
00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:43,560
force in World War II.
327
00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:48,160
>> The French had only second and third
328
00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:49,759
rate units stationed at Sedon. Even
329
00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:51,759
though it wasn't true, when they heard
330
00:15:49,759 --> 00:15:53,759
that German tanks had crossed the M,
331
00:15:51,759 --> 00:15:56,160
they panicked. But the big problem was
332
00:15:53,759 --> 00:16:00,600
that French strategy was geared entirely
333
00:15:56,160 --> 00:16:00,600
to sending the best troops to Belgium.
334
00:16:05,199 --> 00:16:09,199
One after another, four strongly
335
00:16:07,360 --> 00:16:10,880
fortified positions were destroyed by
336
00:16:09,199 --> 00:16:13,880
storm troops who crossed the river in
337
00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:13,880
dingies.
338
00:16:16,240 --> 00:16:20,000
With the opposite embankment secured,
339
00:16:18,320 --> 00:16:23,639
the Germans could begin building a
340
00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:23,639
pontoon bridge.
341
00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:31,959
The French artillery desperately tried
342
00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:31,959
to prevent sections being brought up.
343
00:16:42,880 --> 00:16:47,519
By now, French high command ought to
344
00:16:45,519 --> 00:16:49,040
have realized that this is where the
345
00:16:47,519 --> 00:16:52,000
Germans were launching their main
346
00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:53,759
thrust.
347
00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:56,399
Yet, they still failed to assess the
348
00:16:53,759 --> 00:16:58,560
situation realistically. Above all,
349
00:16:56,399 --> 00:17:01,880
French military intelligence had been
350
00:16:58,560 --> 00:17:01,880
found wanting.
351
00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:08,480
Only a few days into the campaign, a
352
00:17:05,600 --> 00:17:10,319
decisive battle took place at Sedon. At
353
00:17:08,480 --> 00:17:12,720
the very town where the Germans had
354
00:17:10,319 --> 00:17:15,199
already defeated the French in 1870,
355
00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:17,360
Gdderian's tank corps captured the river
356
00:17:15,199 --> 00:17:21,079
crossing points and inflicted a major
357
00:17:17,360 --> 00:17:21,079
defeat on the French.
358
00:17:22,799 --> 00:17:28,319
>> On the morning of May 14th, the first
359
00:17:25,039 --> 00:17:30,640
tanks drove over the pontoon bridge. The
360
00:17:28,319 --> 00:17:33,440
same day, more than 800 followed, along
361
00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:37,160
with a further 21,000 vehicles and
362
00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:37,160
60,000 troops.
363
00:17:37,520 --> 00:17:44,200
A textile factory provided sufficient
364
00:17:39,760 --> 00:17:44,200
protection from French air strikes.
365
00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:55,919
German transport aircraft taking off for
366
00:17:53,679 --> 00:17:58,559
Rotterdam, one of the cornerstones of
367
00:17:55,919 --> 00:18:00,400
Fortress Holland.
368
00:17:58,559 --> 00:18:02,559
The aim was to drop troops behind the
369
00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:04,400
lines and capture strategically
370
00:18:02,559 --> 00:18:06,320
important positions in the North Sea
371
00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,640
port.
372
00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:11,200
Dutch neutrality was also of little
373
00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:12,799
interest to the Nazis.
374
00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:17,640
Like the Belgians, the Dutch, they
375
00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:17,640
claimed, had favored Germany's enemies.
376
00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:24,720
The German paratroopers faced an elite
377
00:18:21,840 --> 00:18:27,200
unit of Dutch Marines who put up fierce
378
00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:29,679
resistance.
379
00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:31,840
On May 14th, an attempt was made to
380
00:18:29,679 --> 00:18:35,160
force the city's mayor to surrender, but
381
00:18:31,840 --> 00:18:35,160
he refused.
382
00:18:38,559 --> 00:18:42,240
>> With the airborne operation at
383
00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:44,559
Rotterdam, Holland was just a huge
384
00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:46,880
diversionary maneuver to strengthen the
385
00:18:44,559 --> 00:18:49,200
allies belief that the German attack was
386
00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:53,320
taking place in the north and that that
387
00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:53,320
is where they would send their reserves.
388
00:18:53,679 --> 00:18:57,880
German bombers attack Rotterdam.
389
00:19:03,520 --> 00:19:07,200
>> Although the Dutch were now willing to
390
00:19:04,960 --> 00:19:09,520
capitulate, the city was subjected to a
391
00:19:07,200 --> 00:19:11,200
terror attack.
392
00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:13,679
The Germans claimed it was no longer
393
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:16,679
possible to call off the air raid.
394
00:19:13,679 --> 00:19:16,679
transporter.
395
00:19:19,360 --> 00:19:24,080
>> The port and the old town were bombarded
396
00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:25,840
for 20 minutes.
397
00:19:24,080 --> 00:19:30,120
There were no defenses because the Dutch
398
00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:30,120
air force had already been destroyed.
399
00:19:37,440 --> 00:19:41,400
Rotterdam was ablaze.
400
00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:48,360
800 people lost their lives.
401
00:19:51,360 --> 00:19:56,039
The world was stunned by such brutality.
402
00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:07,280
The defenders of Rotterdam surrendered
403
00:20:05,039 --> 00:20:09,039
to the Germans.
404
00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:11,520
The following day, the Dutch chief of
405
00:20:09,039 --> 00:20:13,919
staff said that the one-sided conflict
406
00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:17,200
had to stop and announced the general
407
00:20:13,919 --> 00:20:18,880
capitulation of the Netherlands.
408
00:20:17,200 --> 00:20:22,760
The Dutch royal family and the
409
00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:22,760
government fled to London.
410
00:20:24,400 --> 00:20:28,480
In the early hours of May 14th, an hour
411
00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:30,480
and a half after crossing the Muse,
412
00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:31,840
German tanks attacking at Blitz Creek
413
00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:35,960
speed had already reached a
414
00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:35,960
strategically important rise.
415
00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:46,120
French units arrived too late and were
416
00:20:42,159 --> 00:20:46,120
destroyed south of Sudan.
417
00:20:48,080 --> 00:20:52,559
>> Gudderian's tank core had achieved its
418
00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:54,960
first major victory and was now pushing
419
00:20:52,559 --> 00:20:57,600
the French further and further back. One
420
00:20:54,960 --> 00:20:59,919
domino after another was now tumbling.
421
00:20:57,600 --> 00:21:02,720
What's more, Gudderion did not listen to
422
00:20:59,919 --> 00:21:04,880
his superior G von Runet, who was chief
423
00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:07,520
of staff of the army group. After the
424
00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:09,679
victory at Saddon, Vonstead had said,
425
00:21:07,520 --> 00:21:11,679
"Now hold still for a while." But
426
00:21:09,679 --> 00:21:13,840
Gudderion sensed the opportunity that
427
00:21:11,679 --> 00:21:16,240
was opening up and continued to thrust
428
00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:18,640
further west. This always put him one
429
00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:20,320
step ahead of the French.
430
00:21:18,640 --> 00:21:21,919
A French breakthrough could have had a
431
00:21:20,320 --> 00:21:24,000
devastating effect on the totally
432
00:21:21,919 --> 00:21:27,880
exhausted Germans in the bridge heads,
433
00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:27,880
which were still not secure.
434
00:21:30,799 --> 00:21:35,280
The tank divisions did not wait for the
435
00:21:32,559 --> 00:21:38,679
infantry following behind. Instead, they
436
00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:38,679
advanced independently.
437
00:21:39,360 --> 00:21:43,120
And they could only do that because they
438
00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:44,799
had the appropriate mindset, a
439
00:21:43,120 --> 00:21:47,039
leadership culture that had been planned
440
00:21:44,799 --> 00:21:49,120
in such a way that men thought for
441
00:21:47,039 --> 00:21:50,720
themselves.
442
00:21:49,120 --> 00:21:52,559
And because their tanks were already
443
00:21:50,720 --> 00:21:54,960
equipped with radios relatively early
444
00:21:52,559 --> 00:21:57,840
on, this was certainly a tactical
445
00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:59,360
advantage.
446
00:21:57,840 --> 00:22:01,280
Thus, they were fighting against French
447
00:21:59,360 --> 00:22:03,600
tank units that were tied far more
448
00:22:01,280 --> 00:22:05,120
closely to the infantry and because they
449
00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:08,120
had also lost their leaders were
450
00:22:05,120 --> 00:22:08,120
isolated.
451
00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:12,400
>> The French surrendered to a superior
452
00:22:10,159 --> 00:22:14,080
force. So, Gudderian's armored units
453
00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:17,880
were quickly able to extend the Sidon
454
00:22:14,080 --> 00:22:17,880
bridge head further south.
455
00:22:23,760 --> 00:22:27,840
The French tanks were actually superior
456
00:22:25,679 --> 00:22:30,320
to what the Germans had, but they were
457
00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:32,559
more ponderous and because they also
458
00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:35,559
consumed more fuel, they had a shorter
459
00:22:32,559 --> 00:22:35,559
range.
460
00:22:36,559 --> 00:22:40,480
The French certainly did not lose the
461
00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:43,360
war in 1940 because their material was
462
00:22:40,480 --> 00:22:45,919
inferior, because their army was worse,
463
00:22:43,360 --> 00:22:47,520
too small or poorly equipped. That was
464
00:22:45,919 --> 00:22:49,360
certainly not the case with regard to
465
00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:53,720
men and material. The French army in
466
00:22:49,360 --> 00:22:53,720
1940 was totally up to date.
467
00:22:55,600 --> 00:23:00,679
It lost the war perhaps because of a
468
00:22:57,360 --> 00:23:00,679
lack of resolve.
469
00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:04,159
It also lost because its military
470
00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:08,280
leadership procedures were slower at all
471
00:23:04,159 --> 00:23:08,280
levels than on the German side.
472
00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:14,000
Um,
473
00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:16,640
and also because the French had no way
474
00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:21,320
of combating this new approach to war.
475
00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:21,320
They had their own plan for waging war.
476
00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:27,240
The problem was that the Germans didn't
477
00:23:23,679 --> 00:23:27,240
abide by it.
478
00:23:27,840 --> 00:23:31,360
They succeeded in forcing a type of
479
00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:35,640
warfare on the French in which the
480
00:23:31,360 --> 00:23:35,640
Germans saw themselves as superior.
481
00:23:35,919 --> 00:23:40,720
So although the French had the extremely
482
00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:42,880
strong Majino line and a large air force
483
00:23:40,720 --> 00:23:45,280
as well as large mechanized and partly
484
00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:46,720
mechanized units, if they couldn't be
485
00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:50,760
brought into play at some point, the
486
00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,760
French would run out of time
487
00:23:51,039 --> 00:23:54,799
because by then the Germans would have
488
00:23:52,720 --> 00:23:59,240
attained their objectives and it would
489
00:23:54,799 --> 00:23:59,240
no longer be possible to stop them.
490
00:24:03,440 --> 00:24:07,840
The French air force tried desperately
491
00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:10,080
to contain the German infantry that was
492
00:24:07,840 --> 00:24:14,039
moving up and thus to cut off the
493
00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:14,039
swiftly advancing tanks.
494
00:24:21,919 --> 00:24:27,600
But these were just pin pricks. They had
495
00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:31,840
no decisive effect. Nevertheless, the
496
00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:34,400
Germans suffered losses.
497
00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:37,279
In the end, the Blitzkrieg in France
498
00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:40,080
resulted in between 30 and 40,000 German
499
00:24:37,279 --> 00:24:43,080
casualties. The exact figures are not
500
00:24:40,080 --> 00:24:43,080
known.
501
00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:17,520
Time and again, the engineer battalions
502
00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:19,279
performed superb work.
503
00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:23,080
But even so, supplies could only be
504
00:25:19,279 --> 00:25:23,080
brought up with great effort.
505
00:25:25,279 --> 00:25:30,039
Now, no one could stop the tanks.
506
00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:35,840
With their tank units, the Germans
507
00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:39,240
created a main thrust which the French
508
00:25:35,840 --> 00:25:39,240
could not stop.
509
00:25:40,640 --> 00:25:47,080
One or two critical situations resulted
510
00:25:42,720 --> 00:25:47,080
tactically in defeat or delay.
511
00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:55,799
But basically German tanks surged
512
00:25:51,919 --> 00:25:55,799
through to the Channel Coast.
513
00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:06,880
Efficient organization was of decisive
514
00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:09,279
importance throughout the entire
515
00:26:06,880 --> 00:26:12,159
advance. Transport battalions brought
516
00:26:09,279 --> 00:26:16,600
fuel, ammunition, and food by truck to
517
00:26:12,159 --> 00:26:16,600
the rapidly advancing tank divisions.
518
00:26:17,679 --> 00:26:23,960
At brief intermediate stops, tank crews
519
00:26:19,919 --> 00:26:23,960
were handed jerry cans.
520
00:26:31,919 --> 00:26:36,000
These pictures were taken by a Nazi
521
00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:39,320
propaganda team, but they show what
522
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,320
actually happened.
523
00:26:40,080 --> 00:26:44,159
To save time, sometimes the jerry cans
524
00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:47,159
were even handed to tanks still on the
525
00:26:44,159 --> 00:26:47,159
move.
526
00:26:58,880 --> 00:27:03,440
Once armored units had started moving,
527
00:27:01,279 --> 00:27:05,279
this logistical organization was of
528
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:08,279
decisive importance to the rapid
529
00:27:05,279 --> 00:27:08,279
advance.
530
00:27:08,799 --> 00:27:15,080
Yet such was the speed of the thrust
531
00:27:10,799 --> 00:27:15,080
that even that was not enough.
532
00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:21,120
In the end, the Germans had no
533
00:27:18,480 --> 00:27:23,520
ammunition left. One battle report even
534
00:27:21,120 --> 00:27:25,600
states, "We had two choices. Either to
535
00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:27,919
retreat and face destruction or to
536
00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:30,080
attack as if we were still strong." And
537
00:27:27,919 --> 00:27:32,240
that is precisely what they did. With
538
00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:34,240
virtually no ammunition, they mounted a
539
00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:35,919
successful assault. The French thought,
540
00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:38,400
"Oh my god, the Germans are going to
541
00:27:35,919 --> 00:27:40,960
overrun us." So they retreated. It was a
542
00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:42,960
total risk.
543
00:27:40,960 --> 00:27:47,480
A British Expeditionary Corps had been
544
00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:47,480
stationed in France ever since 1939.
545
00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:53,520
It consisted of more than 200,000 troops
546
00:27:50,559 --> 00:27:57,840
and over 600 tanks. But they supported
547
00:27:53,520 --> 00:28:01,960
the French forces mainly in the north.
548
00:27:57,840 --> 00:28:01,960
There was not much they could do.
549
00:28:04,080 --> 00:28:07,240
the British.
550
00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:13,120
The British army was very small.
551
00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:14,960
Consequently, so was the expeditionary
552
00:28:13,120 --> 00:28:17,279
force which fought in northern France
553
00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:19,679
and Belgium. The British were extremely
554
00:28:17,279 --> 00:28:21,679
cautious because they were concerned. If
555
00:28:19,679 --> 00:28:23,919
we send too many elite or well-trained
556
00:28:21,679 --> 00:28:26,000
troops to France and things go wrong,
557
00:28:23,919 --> 00:28:29,720
we'll have weakened our own army to an
558
00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:29,720
unacceptable degree.
559
00:28:33,600 --> 00:28:37,679
The British Expeditionary Force in
560
00:28:35,279 --> 00:28:40,679
France in 1940 was certainly a military
561
00:28:37,679 --> 00:28:40,679
component.
562
00:28:41,120 --> 00:28:46,799
First and foremost, however, it was a
563
00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:48,559
strategic and diplomatic commitment.
564
00:28:46,799 --> 00:28:50,320
By sending troops to the continent, the
565
00:28:48,559 --> 00:28:54,600
British were underlining their intention
566
00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:54,600
to continue fighting the war.
567
00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:59,919
But in 1940, their troops had to be
568
00:28:58,159 --> 00:29:01,440
rescued from the continent of Europe
569
00:28:59,919 --> 00:29:04,440
because of the defeat suffered at
570
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:04,440
Dunkirk.
571
00:29:06,399 --> 00:29:11,760
On May 17th, Winston Churchill traveled
572
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:13,360
to Paris. He could not believe that the
573
00:29:11,760 --> 00:29:16,080
Germans were storming towards the
574
00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:17,919
channel with so few tanks.
575
00:29:16,080 --> 00:29:20,080
On asking where the French reserves
576
00:29:17,919 --> 00:29:23,600
were, he received the Kurt reply that
577
00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:25,440
there were none left.
578
00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:27,919
But the German advance was certainly not
579
00:29:25,440 --> 00:29:29,919
the shorefire success Nazi propaganda
580
00:29:27,919 --> 00:29:33,600
was implying because there was often
581
00:29:29,919 --> 00:29:35,440
fierce resistance at a local level.
582
00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:37,919
But counter measures were unorganized
583
00:29:35,440 --> 00:29:41,200
and improvised. The opposite in fact of
584
00:29:37,919 --> 00:29:43,760
what the French had actually planned.
585
00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:47,440
On May 21st, the German spearhead
586
00:29:43,760 --> 00:29:50,960
reached the channel port of Abyville.
587
00:29:47,440 --> 00:29:53,360
Protecting their flank along the SA, the
588
00:29:50,960 --> 00:29:56,399
Germans fanned out to the north and
589
00:29:53,360 --> 00:29:58,799
east. This was to be the perfect battle
590
00:29:56,399 --> 00:30:01,840
of annihilation.
591
00:29:58,799 --> 00:30:04,159
>> On May 24th, 1940, Hitler left his
592
00:30:01,840 --> 00:30:05,840
headquarters in the Eiffel. Together
593
00:30:04,159 --> 00:30:07,679
with his entourage, he headed for the
594
00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:10,480
part of France that had already been
595
00:30:07,679 --> 00:30:12,720
occupied. Field marshal Herman Guring
596
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:15,039
assured the Furer that the time had now
597
00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:16,799
come for his dive bombers to finish off
598
00:30:15,039 --> 00:30:19,840
the encircled enemy on the Channel
599
00:30:16,799 --> 00:30:22,080
Coast. This final triumph was to fall to
600
00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:24,880
the German air force, not the
601
00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:28,080
Conservative Army. In the afternoon, the
602
00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:30,399
tanks were halted. But on arrival at the
603
00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:32,640
headquarters of Ger Fon Runstead, the
604
00:30:30,399 --> 00:30:37,080
commander of Army Group A, this order
605
00:30:32,640 --> 00:30:37,080
came as a total surprise to Hitler.
606
00:30:38,399 --> 00:30:42,880
The order to stop before Dunkirk is the
607
00:30:40,640 --> 00:30:44,960
biggest myth of the battle of France.
608
00:30:42,880 --> 00:30:47,279
All the generals claimed later that it
609
00:30:44,960 --> 00:30:49,919
had come from Hitler that he had halted
610
00:30:47,279 --> 00:30:52,320
the tank units and as a result had given
611
00:30:49,919 --> 00:30:54,559
the British time to pull back. But that
612
00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:57,039
is completely wrong. First of all, the
613
00:30:54,559 --> 00:30:59,760
order to halt did not come from Hitler.
614
00:30:57,039 --> 00:31:01,679
It came from Colonel General Fonv who
615
00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:03,520
was convinced that the armored units
616
00:31:01,679 --> 00:31:05,279
urgently needed a break. They were
617
00:31:03,520 --> 00:31:07,600
exhausted. There were problems in
618
00:31:05,279 --> 00:31:09,919
providing supplies. The infantry first
619
00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:11,760
needed to be brought up and every day a
620
00:31:09,919 --> 00:31:14,720
French counterattack from the south was
621
00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:16,640
expected. So Runstead said it would be
622
00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:19,039
best if the armored units were halted
623
00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:22,000
for a while. So Hitler was not even
624
00:31:19,039 --> 00:31:24,159
involved. He came and visited Runstead
625
00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:26,480
who then outlined the situation and
626
00:31:24,159 --> 00:31:28,880
Hitler merely expressed his approval.
627
00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:31,440
That's exactly how I see it, he said. So
628
00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:33,760
do it. Lots of generals were up in arms
629
00:31:31,440 --> 00:31:36,000
about it, but not all of them. We need
630
00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:37,840
to take a close look at all those who
631
00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:40,000
after the war claimed to have been
632
00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:44,159
against it because many of them actually
633
00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:46,640
said, "Yes, that makes sense."
634
00:31:44,159 --> 00:31:48,799
>> Meanwhile, on the Channel Coast, the
635
00:31:46,640 --> 00:31:51,279
Vermacht had captured one town after
636
00:31:48,799 --> 00:31:53,840
another. Once again, the defenders left
637
00:31:51,279 --> 00:31:55,760
the battle zone in a hurry and retreated
638
00:31:53,840 --> 00:31:58,399
north.
639
00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:59,919
On May 26th, the order to halt was
640
00:31:58,399 --> 00:32:01,679
rescended,
641
00:31:59,919 --> 00:32:03,679
but the British and the French had been
642
00:32:01,679 --> 00:32:08,120
given enough time to establish a
643
00:32:03,679 --> 00:32:08,120
defensive ring around Dunkirk.
644
00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:16,960
On May 28th, the Belgian army,
645
00:32:13,600 --> 00:32:20,240
compressed into a small space and weary
646
00:32:16,960 --> 00:32:22,000
of battle, laid down its arms that left
647
00:32:20,240 --> 00:32:25,279
the desperate French and British
648
00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:28,480
defenders with their backs to the sea at
649
00:32:25,279 --> 00:32:30,559
the small channel port of Dunkirk.
650
00:32:28,480 --> 00:32:33,440
>> Nearly 340,000
651
00:32:30,559 --> 00:32:35,519
Allied troops retreated to Dunkirk. They
652
00:32:33,440 --> 00:32:39,960
hoped that warships would come and take
653
00:32:35,519 --> 00:32:39,960
them back across the channel to Britain.
654
00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:47,600
Most of the British expeditionary forces
655
00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:49,840
had retreated to Dunkirk in the hope of
656
00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:52,159
being evacuated and the British
657
00:32:49,840 --> 00:32:53,679
government and the British military did
658
00:32:52,159 --> 00:32:55,840
everything in their power to achieve
659
00:32:53,679 --> 00:32:58,159
this. They got together as much
660
00:32:55,840 --> 00:33:00,320
transport capacity as they could in
661
00:32:58,159 --> 00:33:03,320
order to pick up soldiers and bring them
662
00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:03,320
home.
663
00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:09,919
Anything that was somehow seaorthy was
664
00:33:07,120 --> 00:33:12,000
used. pleasure streamers, fishing smacks
665
00:33:09,919 --> 00:33:14,399
and so on. The British people were
666
00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:17,880
called on, fishermen were called on to
667
00:33:14,399 --> 00:33:17,880
sail to Dunkerk.
668
00:33:17,919 --> 00:33:22,480
There was very little communication and
669
00:33:19,760 --> 00:33:25,039
cooperation. It was a chaotic operation,
670
00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:26,720
if you like.
671
00:33:25,039 --> 00:33:30,320
>> High overhead, British fighter planes
672
00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:33,200
fought the Loop Waffer to a standstill.
673
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:34,799
>> Herman Guring couldn't keep his promise.
674
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:37,799
His air force could not stop the
675
00:33:34,799 --> 00:33:37,799
evacuation.
676
00:33:40,159 --> 00:33:45,279
While below, small Allied side units
677
00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:48,720
held the Germans back long enough for
678
00:33:45,279 --> 00:33:50,480
the miracle of Dunkirk to take place.
679
00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:52,880
>> While the battle to crush the pocket was
680
00:33:50,480 --> 00:33:55,600
raging all around them, in Dunkirk,
681
00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:59,919
338,682
682
00:33:55,600 --> 00:34:02,799
soldiers, 247,000 of them British and
683
00:33:59,919 --> 00:34:07,760
123,000 French, managed to escape in a
684
00:34:02,799 --> 00:34:07,760
mly fleet of 861 vessels.
685
00:34:15,119 --> 00:34:19,280
Dunkerk was not only of major
686
00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:21,359
psychological and symbolic importance to
687
00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:23,839
the further course of the war. The
688
00:34:21,359 --> 00:34:26,159
miracle of Dunkirk meant that the core
689
00:34:23,839 --> 00:34:27,839
of the British army was preserved. In
690
00:34:26,159 --> 00:34:29,599
other words, the British could continue
691
00:34:27,839 --> 00:34:32,320
to build up their army against the
692
00:34:29,599 --> 00:34:34,720
possibility of a German invasion. And in
693
00:34:32,320 --> 00:34:36,960
the years that followed, without this
694
00:34:34,720 --> 00:34:38,720
nucleus of troops, Britain would not
695
00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:41,720
have been able to expand its armed
696
00:34:38,720 --> 00:34:41,720
forces.
697
00:34:44,159 --> 00:34:48,639
The soldiers saw themselves as losers,
698
00:34:46,399 --> 00:34:51,520
but back home they were received as
699
00:34:48,639 --> 00:34:53,359
heroes.
700
00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:56,919
Winston Churchill insisted on visiting
701
00:34:53,359 --> 00:34:56,919
the troops personally.
702
00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:03,280
Churchill was convinced that he would
703
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:05,520
have to lead his country through the war
704
00:35:03,280 --> 00:35:08,720
to the bitter end and he was willing to
705
00:35:05,520 --> 00:35:11,119
do so. His famous speech, we shall fight
706
00:35:08,720 --> 00:35:13,440
on the beaches, we shall fight in the
707
00:35:11,119 --> 00:35:17,880
fields and in the streets, was just the
708
00:35:13,440 --> 00:35:17,880
motivation the British public needed.
709
00:35:18,720 --> 00:35:23,760
A few days later, a German soldier
710
00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:25,920
filmed the deserted beach at Dunkirk.
711
00:35:23,760 --> 00:35:28,240
Evidence of the German air attacks was
712
00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:30,560
visible everywhere. The Allies had had
713
00:35:28,240 --> 00:35:34,880
to leave behind all their equipment,
714
00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:39,280
63,000 vehicles, 20,000 motorcycles,
715
00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:42,920
475 tanks and armored cars, and 2,400
716
00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:42,920
artillery pieces.
717
00:35:43,839 --> 00:35:48,400
The French suffered heavy losses, but
718
00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:51,040
they still managed to evacuate over
719
00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:53,359
100,000 soldiers to the ports of
720
00:35:51,040 --> 00:35:57,640
Sherborg and Breast to join up with
721
00:35:53,359 --> 00:35:57,640
troops still fighting on the mainland.
722
00:35:57,760 --> 00:36:01,040
>> It was an operational error that allowed
723
00:35:59,520 --> 00:36:02,800
the Allies something no one on the
724
00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:04,640
German side had thought possible, the
725
00:36:02,800 --> 00:36:07,040
miraculous evacuation of most of the
726
00:36:04,640 --> 00:36:08,960
British Expeditionary Force. 88,000
727
00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:10,720
troops were still taken prisoner, most
728
00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:12,320
of them French, but most of the British
729
00:36:10,720 --> 00:36:14,480
force had made it back across the
730
00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:17,760
channel. No one on the German side had
731
00:36:14,480 --> 00:36:19,040
expected this. Hitler certainly hadn't.
732
00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:21,200
But there was no sign of any
733
00:36:19,040 --> 00:36:25,599
disappointment when he landed at an
734
00:36:21,200 --> 00:36:27,599
airfield near Camry on June 2nd, 1940.
735
00:36:25,599 --> 00:36:29,359
German soldiers wounded in battle were
736
00:36:27,599 --> 00:36:31,040
quickly flown in to serve as the
737
00:36:29,359 --> 00:36:33,760
backdrop to an appearance by their
738
00:36:31,040 --> 00:36:36,560
commander-in-chief.
739
00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:39,200
Joseph Gerbles wrote in his diary, "The
740
00:36:36,560 --> 00:36:41,280
Furer towers high above us all. He is
741
00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:43,440
one of history's geniuses. What a
742
00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:46,079
wonderful time this is. It will be
743
00:36:43,440 --> 00:36:49,359
followed by a period of great calm, one
744
00:36:46,079 --> 00:36:52,920
we all long for, the Furer, perhaps more
745
00:36:49,359 --> 00:36:52,920
than any of us.
746
00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:58,400
Naturally, the success in France
747
00:36:56,560 --> 00:37:01,800
bolstered Hitler's standing with his
748
00:36:58,400 --> 00:37:01,800
military leaders.
749
00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:06,960
propaganda coined by the propaganda
750
00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:11,000
machine. The term greatest commander of
751
00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:11,000
all time was indeed ironic
752
00:37:13,760 --> 00:37:17,119
because at the time there was indeed
753
00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:19,359
hardly anyone in the German military
754
00:37:17,119 --> 00:37:21,520
leadership who was not convinced that
755
00:37:19,359 --> 00:37:24,520
Hitler was still a guarantee of military
756
00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:24,520
success.
757
00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:33,680
On July 13th, the French government,
758
00:37:31,359 --> 00:37:38,040
which had fled to Bordeaux, declared
759
00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:38,040
Paris an open city.
760
00:37:38,240 --> 00:37:45,160
The next day, Nazi propaganda celebrated
761
00:37:40,880 --> 00:37:45,160
the seizure of the French capital.
762
00:37:47,520 --> 00:37:54,040
For the cameras, a Nazi flag was hoisted
763
00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:54,040
on the Eiffel Tower.
764
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,560
>> On June 14th, the Germans occupied
765
00:37:56,720 --> 00:38:00,480
Paris. This was a highly prestigious
766
00:37:58,560 --> 00:38:02,240
victory primarily because the French had
767
00:38:00,480 --> 00:38:04,320
not fought for their capital. They had
768
00:38:02,240 --> 00:38:06,640
declared Paris an open city, practically
769
00:38:04,320 --> 00:38:08,560
without a battle. Reports also confirm
770
00:38:06,640 --> 00:38:10,320
that the Parisians were relieved because
771
00:38:08,560 --> 00:38:12,400
they did not want fighting to take place
772
00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:14,320
in their city. All in all though, it was
773
00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:16,960
a serious blow to French morale for the
774
00:38:14,320 --> 00:38:18,800
capital to be in enemy hands. It was
775
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:22,160
also clear that the battle for France
776
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:24,240
was now over.
777
00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:26,240
>> By and large, the Battle of France had
778
00:38:24,240 --> 00:38:27,839
gone successfully, although in many
779
00:38:26,240 --> 00:38:30,400
places the Germans had enjoyed
780
00:38:27,839 --> 00:38:32,320
operational good fortune. And it should
781
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:34,800
not be forgotten that the French had
782
00:38:32,320 --> 00:38:37,359
defended themselves well or that both
783
00:38:34,800 --> 00:38:39,040
sides had suffered horrific losses. I
784
00:38:37,359 --> 00:38:41,680
think it was of great benefit to the
785
00:38:39,040 --> 00:38:44,400
German var that a change of government
786
00:38:41,680 --> 00:38:46,640
then took place in France. This at least
787
00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:48,160
created political room for maneuver.
788
00:38:46,640 --> 00:38:50,240
There was no need to conquer the whole
789
00:38:48,160 --> 00:38:52,480
of France because after the Polish
790
00:38:50,240 --> 00:38:56,920
campaign and the battle of France, the
791
00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:56,920
German vmach was somewhat bruised.
792
00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:03,440
While a pro-German government headed by
793
00:39:00,480 --> 00:39:05,920
first world war marshal Philip Petar was
794
00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:09,359
taking up office in the northeast of the
795
00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:11,280
country. Fighting still continued,
796
00:39:09,359 --> 00:39:13,280
but it was pointless. One garrison after
797
00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:15,839
another had to capitulate. Here for
798
00:39:13,280 --> 00:39:19,400
example in the small town of Tul on the
799
00:39:15,839 --> 00:39:19,400
Moselle River.
800
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:30,920
84year-old Marshall Petar had no choice
801
00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:30,920
but to ask Hitler for a ceasefire.
802
00:39:32,720 --> 00:39:36,400
The battle of France showed that with
803
00:39:34,320 --> 00:39:38,640
the Blitz Creek approach, the Germans
804
00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:41,280
could avoid a lengthy war by ending a
805
00:39:38,640 --> 00:39:43,680
conflict in the short term. But it also
806
00:39:41,280 --> 00:39:47,520
showed that this was not the blueprint
807
00:39:43,680 --> 00:39:50,960
for waging a speedy war.
808
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:52,880
It was a blueprint for doing so.
809
00:39:50,960 --> 00:39:55,040
So this didn't mean that it would prove
810
00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:58,240
just as successful somewhere else under
811
00:39:55,040 --> 00:40:00,480
different topographical conditions
812
00:39:58,240 --> 00:40:02,880
with different people in charge and with
813
00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:05,880
different adversaries who also behave
814
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:05,880
differently
815
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:13,280
in Compa north of Paris. A special
816
00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:15,520
ceremony was being prepared. It was at
817
00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:17,839
this very location in 1918 that the
818
00:40:15,520 --> 00:40:19,520
Germans had had to accept defeat which
819
00:40:17,839 --> 00:40:21,119
ended ultimately with the Treaty of
820
00:40:19,520 --> 00:40:22,320
Versailles.
821
00:40:21,119 --> 00:40:24,800
>> For Hitler,
822
00:40:22,320 --> 00:40:27,440
>> naturally for Hitler, Compenne on June
823
00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:29,520
22nd was the fulfillment of a lifetime's
824
00:40:27,440 --> 00:40:32,000
dream. Right from the start, he had seen
825
00:40:29,520 --> 00:40:33,839
it as part of his political program to
826
00:40:32,000 --> 00:40:36,400
revise the shameful dictate of
827
00:40:33,839 --> 00:40:38,720
Versailles, symbolized, of course, by
828
00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:41,040
Marshall Faulk's saloon car, where the
829
00:40:38,720 --> 00:40:44,240
German armistice delegation had had to
830
00:40:41,040 --> 00:40:46,640
sign the armistice in 1918. To expune
831
00:40:44,240 --> 00:40:48,880
this symbolically and practically from
832
00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:51,040
the pages of history, Hitler had the
833
00:40:48,880 --> 00:40:53,440
railway carriage brought to exactly the
834
00:40:51,040 --> 00:40:55,680
same site. The French then had to accept
835
00:40:53,440 --> 00:40:57,760
the conditions of the new armistice.
836
00:40:55,680 --> 00:41:00,240
This was staged in style because for
837
00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:02,960
Hitler, as for many Germans, this was
838
00:41:00,240 --> 00:41:06,240
redressing, indeed erasing the disgrace
839
00:41:02,960 --> 00:41:07,839
of 1918.
840
00:41:06,240 --> 00:41:09,599
>> Many of the German troops wanted a
841
00:41:07,839 --> 00:41:12,160
victory parade like the one held in
842
00:41:09,599 --> 00:41:15,880
Warsaw. But Hitler decided against such
843
00:41:12,160 --> 00:41:15,880
demonstrative humiliation.
844
00:41:18,640 --> 00:41:23,839
>> Hitler in Paris.
845
00:41:21,760 --> 00:41:25,839
It is still not quite clear why Hitler
846
00:41:23,839 --> 00:41:29,400
himself did not take the salute at a big
847
00:41:25,839 --> 00:41:29,400
parade in Paris.
848
00:41:30,079 --> 00:41:34,400
A lot of it has to do with Hitler
849
00:41:31,680 --> 00:41:36,880
himself. He still attached massive
850
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:39,119
importance to coming to Paris himself
851
00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:41,280
very early in the morning and visiting
852
00:41:39,119 --> 00:41:44,280
highly symbolic places like Napoleon's
853
00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:44,280
tomb.
854
00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:49,119
In this respect, standing as a military
855
00:41:46,560 --> 00:41:51,520
leader at the tomb of Napoleon and being
856
00:41:49,119 --> 00:41:54,880
able to drive through Paris, he became
857
00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:56,480
part of a military tradition.
858
00:41:54,880 --> 00:41:58,880
As a soldier in France in the First
859
00:41:56,480 --> 00:42:01,599
World War, Hitler had never seen Paris.
860
00:41:58,880 --> 00:42:04,160
So for him also as a soldier, there was
861
00:42:01,599 --> 00:42:06,079
of course the ultimate satisfaction of
862
00:42:04,160 --> 00:42:09,960
finally being able to bring the First
863
00:42:06,079 --> 00:42:09,960
World War to an end.
864
00:42:12,720 --> 00:42:18,040
The armistice conditions were tantamount
865
00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:18,040
to capitulation.
866
00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:24,319
Nazi Germany occupied 60% of French
867
00:42:22,079 --> 00:42:27,839
territory on the European continent,
868
00:42:24,319 --> 00:42:29,599
including the capital.
869
00:42:27,839 --> 00:42:33,599
The rest was administered by the puppet
870
00:42:29,599 --> 00:42:35,200
government of Marshall Peter in Vichi.
871
00:42:33,599 --> 00:42:37,359
Blitzkrie.
872
00:42:35,200 --> 00:42:39,760
The Blitz Greek campaigns and the entire
873
00:42:37,359 --> 00:42:42,319
myth surrounding them shows how quickly
874
00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:44,000
battles or campaigns can be won and
875
00:42:42,319 --> 00:42:46,319
individual countries and armies
876
00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:48,319
defeated.
877
00:42:46,319 --> 00:42:50,480
But it is not a concept for winning a
878
00:42:48,319 --> 00:42:52,640
war. And that is actually the
879
00:42:50,480 --> 00:42:54,400
contradiction in the whole blitz Greek
880
00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:56,480
myth. Everything might have gone
881
00:42:54,400 --> 00:43:00,800
successfully from a military point of
882
00:42:56,480 --> 00:43:02,480
view, but it did not help politically.
883
00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:04,400
boyfriend.
884
00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:06,400
>> Hitler did not plan to rest on his
885
00:43:04,400 --> 00:43:08,480
laurels.
886
00:43:06,400 --> 00:43:11,200
He planned other blitzkrieg assaults on
887
00:43:08,480 --> 00:43:13,200
Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It
888
00:43:11,200 --> 00:43:16,520
was the systematic path to the downfall
889
00:43:13,200 --> 00:43:16,520
of a psychopath.61725
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