All language subtitles for [English (auto-generated)] The Blitzkrieg Myth _ Part 3_ Paris is German _ Free Documentary History [DownSub.com]

af Afrikaans
ak Akan
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bem Bemba
bn Bengali
bh Bihari
bs Bosnian
br Breton
bg Bulgarian
km Cambodian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
chr Cherokee
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian Download
cs Czech
da Danish
nl Dutch
en English
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
ee Ewe
fo Faroese
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gaa Ga
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
el Greek
gn Guarani
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ia Interlingua
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
rw Kinyarwanda
rn Kirundi
kg Kongo
ko Korean
kri Krio (Sierra Leone)
ku Kurdish
ckb Kurdish (Soranî)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Laothian
la Latin
lv Latvian
ln Lingala
lt Lithuanian
loz Lozi
lg Luganda
ach Luo
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mfe Mauritian Creole
mo Moldavian
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
sr-ME Montenegrin
ne Nepali
pcm Nigerian Pidgin
nso Northern Sotho
no Norwegian
nn Norwegian (Nynorsk)
oc Occitan
or Oriya
om Oromo
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt-BR Portuguese (Brazil)
pt Portuguese (Portugal)
pa Punjabi
qu Quechua
ro Romanian
rm Romansh
nyn Runyakitara
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
sh Serbo-Croatian
st Sesotho
tn Setswana
crs Seychellois Creole
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhalese
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish
es-419 Spanish (Latin American)
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
tt Tatar
te Telugu
th Thai
ti Tigrinya
to Tonga
lua Tshiluba
tum Tumbuka
tr Turkish
tk Turkmen
tw Twi
ug Uighur
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese
cy Welsh
wo Wolof
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:03,679 --> 00:00:07,200 The concept of Blitz Greek is that the 2 00:00:05,440 --> 00:00:11,200 enemy cannot gain a fresh foothold 3 00:00:07,200 --> 00:00:13,040 somewhere and offer major resistance. 4 00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:14,480 It calls for certain elements above all 5 00:00:13,040 --> 00:00:17,760 large armored units that can act 6 00:00:14,480 --> 00:00:19,199 operationally with air support. 7 00:00:17,760 --> 00:00:22,199 You also need the right leadership 8 00:00:19,199 --> 00:00:22,199 culture. 9 00:00:22,960 --> 00:00:27,519 Militarily, the focus is usually on the 10 00:00:25,279 --> 00:00:30,880 enemy's capital. To win the war, you 11 00:00:27,519 --> 00:00:32,320 have to take it. 12 00:00:30,880 --> 00:00:34,399 It was of course important to the 13 00:00:32,320 --> 00:00:36,320 Germans to capture Warsaw with as few of 14 00:00:34,399 --> 00:00:38,000 their own casualties as possible, but 15 00:00:36,320 --> 00:00:40,000 they did so relatively quickly because 16 00:00:38,000 --> 00:00:43,440 the Po's willingness to defend and their 17 00:00:40,000 --> 00:00:45,600 morale had already been broken. 18 00:00:43,440 --> 00:00:47,440 >> During the war in Poland, Hitler had 19 00:00:45,600 --> 00:00:51,320 already told his military leaders of his 20 00:00:47,440 --> 00:00:51,320 decision to attack France. 21 00:00:53,199 --> 00:00:56,320 The Germans planned to go through 22 00:00:54,559 --> 00:00:58,000 Belgium and act as bait, so to speak, 23 00:00:56,320 --> 00:00:59,760 for the Allies, but the actual 24 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:02,320 destructive thrust was to take place 25 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:04,000 further south through the Arden. It was 26 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:06,000 a huge gamble, and the Germans were 27 00:01:04,000 --> 00:01:09,400 lucky that the French failed tactically 28 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:09,400 and operationally. 29 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:16,280 Somehow, Hitler seemed to have cornered 30 00:01:13,280 --> 00:01:16,280 success, 31 00:01:16,320 --> 00:01:19,680 and Germany's military leaders also 32 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:22,400 bathed in the charisma which he now 33 00:01:19,680 --> 00:01:22,400 exuded. 34 00:01:24,000 --> 00:01:28,000 In the first world war, Germany had 35 00:01:25,920 --> 00:01:29,920 fought for four years without taking 36 00:01:28,000 --> 00:01:32,400 Paris. Now, this had been achieved 37 00:01:29,920 --> 00:01:34,240 within a few weeks. Naturally, this was 38 00:01:32,400 --> 00:01:36,720 a phenomenal achievement that could not 39 00:01:34,240 --> 00:01:38,320 only be exploited propagandistically. It 40 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:41,119 also made a massive impression on the 41 00:01:38,320 --> 00:01:42,720 German people. 42 00:01:41,119 --> 00:01:44,479 Actually, 43 00:01:42,720 --> 00:01:46,479 the Blitzgri operations and the whole 44 00:01:44,479 --> 00:01:48,640 myth surrounding them showed how quickly 45 00:01:46,479 --> 00:01:50,159 battles or campaigns could be won and 46 00:01:48,640 --> 00:01:52,320 individual countries and armies 47 00:01:50,159 --> 00:01:56,280 defeated. But it was not a concept for 48 00:01:52,320 --> 00:01:56,280 winning an entire war. 49 00:02:09,280 --> 00:02:13,920 On May 10th, 1940, German paratroops 50 00:02:12,640 --> 00:02:16,000 were dropped in Belgium and the 51 00:02:13,920 --> 00:02:20,200 Netherlands to seize strategically 52 00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:20,200 important airfields and bridges. 53 00:02:20,800 --> 00:02:24,720 In the Netherlands, at least, this swift 54 00:02:22,879 --> 00:02:27,120 operation was designed to prevent the 55 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:30,400 Allies from intervening and to split 56 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:32,239 their defensive forces. 57 00:02:30,400 --> 00:02:33,920 The invaders were successful almost 58 00:02:32,239 --> 00:02:37,959 everywhere, although sometimes they 59 00:02:33,920 --> 00:02:37,959 incurred serious losses. 60 00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:48,400 One of the first targets was the Belgian 61 00:02:45,680 --> 00:02:50,560 fort of Eban Emmael, not far from 62 00:02:48,400 --> 00:02:53,040 Leazge. 63 00:02:50,560 --> 00:02:55,440 Een Mel was a fort with a fairly 64 00:02:53,040 --> 00:02:57,360 impressive location on the river Muz. 65 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:59,200 Although it was heavily fortified and 66 00:02:57,360 --> 00:03:02,640 defended by a large contingent of 67 00:02:59,200 --> 00:03:05,280 Belgian troops, Eban Mel was captured in 68 00:03:02,640 --> 00:03:07,360 Blitzgreek style. In other words, on a 69 00:03:05,280 --> 00:03:10,000 lower tactical level by German 70 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:14,159 paratroops flown in by glider who thus 71 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:18,159 helped secure the bridges over the M. 72 00:03:14,159 --> 00:03:20,080 >> Engineers crossed the river in dingies. 73 00:03:18,159 --> 00:03:22,319 The main German attack was directed at 74 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:25,040 the Albert Canal M River Line, the 75 00:03:22,319 --> 00:03:28,000 anchor of which was Fort Ibeno, a modern 76 00:03:25,040 --> 00:03:30,000 and seemingly impregnable fortress. The 77 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:32,159 Germans had secretly built a replica of 78 00:03:30,000 --> 00:03:34,080 the mighty fortress in Czechoslovakia 79 00:03:32,159 --> 00:03:35,840 and had rehearsed the attack until they 80 00:03:34,080 --> 00:03:38,480 knew every detail of the fort's 81 00:03:35,840 --> 00:03:40,239 construction and its every weakness. 82 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:43,440 When the real attack came, it was 83 00:03:40,239 --> 00:03:46,799 foolproof. Parachute troops, dive 84 00:03:43,440 --> 00:03:49,440 bombers, flamethrowers, specially 85 00:03:46,799 --> 00:03:53,959 trained engineer battalions, all working 86 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:53,959 together as a well-trained team. 87 00:03:56,560 --> 00:04:01,360 They knew exactly where to cross the 88 00:03:58,640 --> 00:04:03,599 river. 89 00:04:01,360 --> 00:04:07,640 Dive bombers supported the attackers as 90 00:04:03,599 --> 00:04:07,640 they tried to storm the fort. 91 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:15,040 Although the commander of the fort had 92 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:17,040 been alerted, the complex was not battle 93 00:04:15,040 --> 00:04:18,880 ready. There was a shortage of 94 00:04:17,040 --> 00:04:22,359 ammunition and the fort's artillery 95 00:04:18,880 --> 00:04:22,359 couldn't be used. 96 00:04:22,800 --> 00:04:27,440 Neuralgic points had to be neutralized. 97 00:04:25,520 --> 00:04:30,160 Airborne troops of course were perfect 98 00:04:27,440 --> 00:04:32,160 for operational tasks like seizing 99 00:04:30,160 --> 00:04:34,479 bridges and knocking out enemy command 100 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:37,120 posts. 101 00:04:34,479 --> 00:04:38,960 A fortress like Ibel, which had to be 102 00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:43,840 neutralized, was prepared for 103 00:04:38,960 --> 00:04:45,840 everything, but not an airborne assault. 104 00:04:43,840 --> 00:04:48,320 The Belgians had no defense against 105 00:04:45,840 --> 00:04:50,080 that. They assumed that they would see 106 00:04:48,320 --> 00:04:53,919 the enemy approaching and be able to 107 00:04:50,080 --> 00:04:55,280 fight the Germans at a distance. 108 00:04:53,919 --> 00:04:59,160 >> The fort had practically no 109 00:04:55,280 --> 00:04:59,160 anti-aircraft defenses. 110 00:04:59,600 --> 00:05:04,320 Other units moved up to support the 111 00:05:01,360 --> 00:05:04,320 attack. 112 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:14,000 The Germans knew that the block house 113 00:05:10,560 --> 00:05:16,160 roof wasn't mined and stormed it. 114 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:17,680 Using powerful shaped charges, they blew 115 00:05:16,160 --> 00:05:20,320 up the steel shields around the 116 00:05:17,680 --> 00:05:22,000 underground gun turrets. The 1100 117 00:05:20,320 --> 00:05:24,160 defenders are said to have been 118 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:26,080 practically blinded. They couldn't see 119 00:05:24,160 --> 00:05:29,320 the enemy coming in who blazed their way 120 00:05:26,080 --> 00:05:29,320 with flamethrowers. 121 00:05:34,479 --> 00:05:38,720 You will notice that this assault 122 00:05:36,160 --> 00:05:40,560 engineer knows exactly where to put his 123 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:43,440 high explosive charge in order to 124 00:05:40,560 --> 00:05:45,919 destroy the block house. 125 00:05:43,440 --> 00:05:49,120 >> The plan worked. The explosions killed 126 00:05:45,919 --> 00:05:51,520 large numbers of Belgian soldiers. 127 00:05:49,120 --> 00:05:54,400 The surviving defenders holed up behind 128 00:05:51,520 --> 00:05:56,400 barricades and waited. Tactically, this 129 00:05:54,400 --> 00:05:58,560 was a mistake because it allowed the 130 00:05:56,400 --> 00:05:59,280 Germans to set off more explosive 131 00:05:58,560 --> 00:06:01,919 charges. 132 00:05:59,280 --> 00:06:04,479 >> Fortnale withtood the Nazi attack 133 00:06:01,919 --> 00:06:06,160 exactly 2 days. 134 00:06:04,479 --> 00:06:08,720 >> Meanwhile, the actual attack in the 135 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:10,720 south was going to plan. 136 00:06:08,720 --> 00:06:13,039 Gderian's armored cores had crossed 137 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:15,280 Luxembourg in 3 hours, reached the 138 00:06:13,039 --> 00:06:17,840 Belgian border, and immediately launched 139 00:06:15,280 --> 00:06:20,240 a mobile assault. 140 00:06:17,840 --> 00:06:23,120 The first tank division was even able to 141 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:26,840 cross the sour on May 10th and advance 142 00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:26,840 into neutral Belgium. 143 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:58,360 Nazi propaganda cameras filmed the first 144 00:06:54,160 --> 00:06:58,360 tanks heading towards the Arden. 145 00:06:58,479 --> 00:07:04,400 The sickle cut developed more and more 146 00:07:00,880 --> 00:07:06,240 into a single shock troop operation. 147 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:09,240 A combination of speed and surprise 148 00:07:06,240 --> 00:07:09,240 tactics. 149 00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:15,120 The success of the plan depended 150 00:07:12,800 --> 00:07:17,759 ultimately on the surprise effect on the 151 00:07:15,120 --> 00:07:20,000 French defenders being caught unawares 152 00:07:17,759 --> 00:07:22,639 because they had not expected the attack 153 00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:25,120 and certainly not by such a huge enemy 154 00:07:22,639 --> 00:07:27,360 force. As the first operations got 155 00:07:25,120 --> 00:07:29,919 underway, it also became clear that the 156 00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:32,000 French defenders regarded them as a 157 00:07:29,919 --> 00:07:33,680 diversionary maneuver. They didn't 158 00:07:32,000 --> 00:07:36,960 believe this was actually the main focus 159 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:38,560 of the German assault. 160 00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:40,720 The French were still hoping that the 161 00:07:38,560 --> 00:07:43,039 Majino line would be the place where the 162 00:07:40,720 --> 00:07:44,880 Germans could be repulsed. If the French 163 00:07:43,039 --> 00:07:47,280 had to shift their forces to combat the 164 00:07:44,880 --> 00:07:49,039 first operations of the sickle cut, it 165 00:07:47,280 --> 00:07:52,520 would play havoc with their entire 166 00:07:49,039 --> 00:07:52,520 defensive planning. 167 00:08:19,680 --> 00:08:24,479 Hines Gderion, the head of the rapid 168 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:26,319 forces at Army High Command, had 169 00:08:24,479 --> 00:08:30,240 promised his troops that for the first 3 170 00:08:26,319 --> 00:08:30,240 days they wouldn't get any sleep. 171 00:08:30,479 --> 00:08:35,279 To stay awake, they were given a supply 172 00:08:32,640 --> 00:08:37,440 of a stimulant called pervatin. But most 173 00:08:35,279 --> 00:08:38,800 of the men had to wait outside Buong 174 00:08:37,440 --> 00:08:43,159 because all the bridges had been 175 00:08:38,800 --> 00:08:43,159 destroyed before the Germans arrived. 176 00:08:44,159 --> 00:08:47,680 >> What do you need to get tanks moving? 177 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:50,160 Obviously, you'd say you need the 178 00:08:47,680 --> 00:08:52,000 appropriate infrastructure, but you also 179 00:08:50,160 --> 00:08:54,000 need engineers to secure bridges over 180 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:56,480 the rivers. The French didn't just 181 00:08:54,000 --> 00:08:58,800 retreat. They also blew up bridges and 182 00:08:56,480 --> 00:09:01,600 planted minefields which then had to be 183 00:08:58,800 --> 00:09:03,519 cleared. So without engineers, tanks can 184 00:09:01,600 --> 00:09:06,160 advance no faster than they can without 185 00:09:03,519 --> 00:09:09,120 infantry moving up to occupy the cleared 186 00:09:06,160 --> 00:09:11,680 areas behind them. These fast units were 187 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:13,920 indeed a spearhead, but they could only 188 00:09:11,680 --> 00:09:17,959 penetrate as deeply as the wooden shaft 189 00:09:13,920 --> 00:09:17,959 behind the spearhead permitted. 190 00:09:19,360 --> 00:09:23,600 General Gudderion allowed himself to be 191 00:09:21,360 --> 00:09:26,320 filmed at an army bridge being built 192 00:09:23,600 --> 00:09:28,480 across the river Semoir. The Belgian and 193 00:09:26,320 --> 00:09:30,240 French defenders had managed to blow up 194 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:33,040 the last bridge just before the first 195 00:09:30,240 --> 00:09:35,040 German tanks arrived. 196 00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:37,600 But then, thinking they were about to 197 00:09:35,040 --> 00:09:41,640 sustain fierce attacks, they had pulled 198 00:09:37,600 --> 00:09:41,640 out of Buong unnecessarily. 199 00:09:45,120 --> 00:09:48,800 In Belgium, the Netherlands, and 200 00:09:46,720 --> 00:09:52,360 Northern France, people fled from the 201 00:09:48,800 --> 00:09:52,360 approaching Germans. 202 00:09:58,320 --> 00:10:03,440 And the refugee choked roads didn't get 203 00:10:00,560 --> 00:10:05,519 that way by accident. The Nazis 204 00:10:03,440 --> 00:10:08,080 methodically bombed little towns and 205 00:10:05,519 --> 00:10:11,760 villages, otherwise devoid of any 206 00:10:08,080 --> 00:10:13,839 military value, not so much to kill as 207 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:16,320 to drive the inhabitants out onto the 208 00:10:13,839 --> 00:10:19,360 highways. 209 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:21,519 Then by expert machine gun, the Nazis 210 00:10:19,360 --> 00:10:23,839 would herd them along in terrorstricken 211 00:10:21,519 --> 00:10:27,800 flight to hopelessly entangle the 212 00:10:23,839 --> 00:10:27,800 advancing Allied armies. 213 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:37,040 >> An estimated 8 to 10 million people on 214 00:10:33,519 --> 00:10:40,959 the roads led to massive congestion. 215 00:10:37,040 --> 00:10:44,519 >> Refugees used as a weapon of war, a new 216 00:10:40,959 --> 00:10:44,519 low in inhumanity. 217 00:10:54,160 --> 00:11:00,519 It is not clear how many civilians were 218 00:10:56,320 --> 00:11:00,519 killed in German air strikes. 219 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:07,519 The German bombers brought chaos and 220 00:11:05,279 --> 00:11:11,560 destruction just to divert attention 221 00:11:07,519 --> 00:11:11,560 from the actual war plan. 222 00:11:15,839 --> 00:11:20,800 The German spearheads finally reached 223 00:11:17,760 --> 00:11:22,320 the forests of the southern Arden. 224 00:11:20,800 --> 00:11:24,640 They were supposed to have negotiated 225 00:11:22,320 --> 00:11:26,320 the difficult terrain already, but the 226 00:11:24,640 --> 00:11:28,640 army had been delayed through having to 227 00:11:26,320 --> 00:11:30,959 build Bailey bridges. 228 00:11:28,640 --> 00:11:32,800 This was not how Eric von Manstein, the 229 00:11:30,959 --> 00:11:36,519 innovator of the sickle cut, had 230 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:36,519 envvisaged the operation. 231 00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:43,519 The Munchstein plan was much better than 232 00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:46,240 what actually happened because Hitler 233 00:11:43,519 --> 00:11:49,120 and Halder had simply diverted virtually 234 00:11:46,240 --> 00:11:51,440 all the armored units through the Arden. 235 00:11:49,120 --> 00:11:53,519 And that in fact was madness because 236 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:55,519 they spent several days stuck in what 237 00:11:53,519 --> 00:11:58,240 turned out to be the biggest traffic jam 238 00:11:55,519 --> 00:12:01,360 in history. 239 00:11:58,240 --> 00:12:04,079 40,000 motorized vehicles and tanks were 240 00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:05,839 waiting behind the spearheads. By now, 241 00:12:04,079 --> 00:12:09,760 von Mannstein's tank corps was also 242 00:12:05,839 --> 00:12:11,519 caught up in the 250 km long jam. 243 00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:14,160 So, the general didn't arrive at the 244 00:12:11,519 --> 00:12:16,800 Western Front until May 16th, where he 245 00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:20,480 was then assigned defensive tasks. His 246 00:12:16,800 --> 00:12:23,720 superiors had got their way with Hitler. 247 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:23,720 >> The Munchstein, 248 00:12:24,480 --> 00:12:30,399 The Munchstein plan foresaw two main 249 00:12:26,959 --> 00:12:33,040 areas of attack. one through Belgium in 250 00:12:30,399 --> 00:12:36,240 order as Mstein said to overrun the 251 00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:39,040 enemy and not but Halder actually did 252 00:12:36,240 --> 00:12:41,760 just bind it. Mstein really wanted army 253 00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:44,160 group B to force the enemy back to the 254 00:12:41,760 --> 00:12:46,880 sum. The second main thrust was to come 255 00:12:44,160 --> 00:12:50,000 via the Arden but not in three surges 256 00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:52,720 with huge jams but in one thrust which 257 00:12:50,000 --> 00:12:55,440 if possible would take just one day with 258 00:12:52,720 --> 00:12:58,000 armored units. The third error involved 259 00:12:55,440 --> 00:13:01,440 something that was also in Mstein's plan 260 00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:03,200 but was not acted on. 261 00:13:01,440 --> 00:13:05,200 He had realized right from the start 262 00:13:03,200 --> 00:13:07,600 that his flank would constantly be 263 00:13:05,200 --> 00:13:09,920 threatened from the south. So to rule 264 00:13:07,600 --> 00:13:12,480 out this threat in Mstein's plan, 265 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:14,639 armored units were to thrust south to 266 00:13:12,480 --> 00:13:17,519 nip any French counteroffensive in the 267 00:13:14,639 --> 00:13:18,800 bud. Those were his three main points. 268 00:13:17,519 --> 00:13:21,279 But actually none of them were 269 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:23,680 implemented. His plan was completely 270 00:13:21,279 --> 00:13:25,920 diluted. All that remained in the end 271 00:13:23,680 --> 00:13:29,399 was this sickle cut with a massive 272 00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:29,399 armored thrust. 273 00:13:31,279 --> 00:13:34,880 Getting an army through a low mountain 274 00:13:32,880 --> 00:13:38,440 range is an absolute nightmare for any 275 00:13:34,880 --> 00:13:38,440 logistics expert. 276 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:43,440 It involves using numerous minor roads 277 00:13:41,680 --> 00:13:45,200 instead of driving across an open plane 278 00:13:43,440 --> 00:13:48,200 where the units could develop their full 279 00:13:45,200 --> 00:13:48,200 potential. 280 00:13:50,399 --> 00:13:53,760 Instead, they were put in a situation 281 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,920 which logistically was highly 282 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:57,600 vulnerable. This was something the 283 00:13:55,920 --> 00:14:00,320 military on both sides just couldn't 284 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:02,000 imagine. But that is precisely why it 285 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:04,880 worked. 286 00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:07,760 On May 12th, 1940, advanced units 287 00:14:04,880 --> 00:14:10,000 reached the French border. 288 00:14:07,760 --> 00:14:14,000 It then took them 4 hours to knock out a 289 00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:17,680 frontier bunker camouflaged as a house. 290 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:20,560 Now, Saddan was only a few kilome away. 291 00:14:17,680 --> 00:14:22,399 In 1870 in the suburb of Flowing, the 292 00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:25,800 French cavalry had been destroyed by 293 00:14:22,399 --> 00:14:25,800 Prussian artillery. 294 00:14:27,760 --> 00:14:31,360 >> How did the Germans get through the 295 00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:33,279 Arden so quickly? Because of a mistake 296 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:35,920 by the Allies. They had just not 297 00:14:33,279 --> 00:14:37,519 prepared any real defense of the Arden. 298 00:14:35,920 --> 00:14:39,360 There were two or three places where the 299 00:14:37,519 --> 00:14:41,440 French or mainly the Belgian light 300 00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:43,519 infantry units failed to receive the 301 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:45,680 order to retreat. Although these forces 302 00:14:43,519 --> 00:14:47,680 were weak, they offered resistance and 303 00:14:45,680 --> 00:14:49,920 in some cases held up the Germans for 304 00:14:47,680 --> 00:14:51,839 half a day. So you can see what might 305 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:54,240 have happened if the allies had had the 306 00:14:51,839 --> 00:14:56,320 right defensive concept for the Arden. 307 00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:58,000 But they didn't because right to the end 308 00:14:56,320 --> 00:15:00,000 they did not think it was possible to 309 00:14:58,000 --> 00:15:01,920 advance through the Arden with large 310 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:03,839 units. When German armor suddenly 311 00:15:01,920 --> 00:15:05,760 appeared at Saddan, the French were 312 00:15:03,839 --> 00:15:09,320 totally surprised. Their best troops 313 00:15:05,760 --> 00:15:09,320 were stationed elsewhere. 314 00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:13,920 Gderian's armored spearheads had 315 00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:17,360 achieved the improbable. 316 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:18,959 After 160 km, on the afternoon of the 317 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:20,959 third day, they could see the muse 318 00:15:18,959 --> 00:15:22,959 heights at Sidon. 319 00:15:20,959 --> 00:15:24,959 Up to now, in order to keep deceiving 320 00:15:22,959 --> 00:15:27,440 the enemy, the German air force had 321 00:15:24,959 --> 00:15:32,199 stayed right out of the sickle cut. But 322 00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:32,199 now, Gudderion called for air support. 323 00:15:33,360 --> 00:15:37,680 Within a few hours, more than 12,200 324 00:15:35,279 --> 00:15:39,680 bombers entered the frey. It was the 325 00:15:37,680 --> 00:15:43,560 most massive air raid by the German air 326 00:15:39,680 --> 00:15:43,560 force in World War II. 327 00:15:44,160 --> 00:15:48,160 >> The French had only second and third 328 00:15:46,000 --> 00:15:49,759 rate units stationed at Sedon. Even 329 00:15:48,160 --> 00:15:51,759 though it wasn't true, when they heard 330 00:15:49,759 --> 00:15:53,759 that German tanks had crossed the M, 331 00:15:51,759 --> 00:15:56,160 they panicked. But the big problem was 332 00:15:53,759 --> 00:16:00,600 that French strategy was geared entirely 333 00:15:56,160 --> 00:16:00,600 to sending the best troops to Belgium. 334 00:16:05,199 --> 00:16:09,199 One after another, four strongly 335 00:16:07,360 --> 00:16:10,880 fortified positions were destroyed by 336 00:16:09,199 --> 00:16:13,880 storm troops who crossed the river in 337 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:13,880 dingies. 338 00:16:16,240 --> 00:16:20,000 With the opposite embankment secured, 339 00:16:18,320 --> 00:16:23,639 the Germans could begin building a 340 00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:23,639 pontoon bridge. 341 00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:31,959 The French artillery desperately tried 342 00:16:27,440 --> 00:16:31,959 to prevent sections being brought up. 343 00:16:42,880 --> 00:16:47,519 By now, French high command ought to 344 00:16:45,519 --> 00:16:49,040 have realized that this is where the 345 00:16:47,519 --> 00:16:52,000 Germans were launching their main 346 00:16:49,040 --> 00:16:53,759 thrust. 347 00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:56,399 Yet, they still failed to assess the 348 00:16:53,759 --> 00:16:58,560 situation realistically. Above all, 349 00:16:56,399 --> 00:17:01,880 French military intelligence had been 350 00:16:58,560 --> 00:17:01,880 found wanting. 351 00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:08,480 Only a few days into the campaign, a 352 00:17:05,600 --> 00:17:10,319 decisive battle took place at Sedon. At 353 00:17:08,480 --> 00:17:12,720 the very town where the Germans had 354 00:17:10,319 --> 00:17:15,199 already defeated the French in 1870, 355 00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:17,360 Gdderian's tank corps captured the river 356 00:17:15,199 --> 00:17:21,079 crossing points and inflicted a major 357 00:17:17,360 --> 00:17:21,079 defeat on the French. 358 00:17:22,799 --> 00:17:28,319 >> On the morning of May 14th, the first 359 00:17:25,039 --> 00:17:30,640 tanks drove over the pontoon bridge. The 360 00:17:28,319 --> 00:17:33,440 same day, more than 800 followed, along 361 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:37,160 with a further 21,000 vehicles and 362 00:17:33,440 --> 00:17:37,160 60,000 troops. 363 00:17:37,520 --> 00:17:44,200 A textile factory provided sufficient 364 00:17:39,760 --> 00:17:44,200 protection from French air strikes. 365 00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:55,919 German transport aircraft taking off for 366 00:17:53,679 --> 00:17:58,559 Rotterdam, one of the cornerstones of 367 00:17:55,919 --> 00:18:00,400 Fortress Holland. 368 00:17:58,559 --> 00:18:02,559 The aim was to drop troops behind the 369 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:04,400 lines and capture strategically 370 00:18:02,559 --> 00:18:06,320 important positions in the North Sea 371 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:08,640 port. 372 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:11,200 Dutch neutrality was also of little 373 00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:12,799 interest to the Nazis. 374 00:18:11,200 --> 00:18:17,640 Like the Belgians, the Dutch, they 375 00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:17,640 claimed, had favored Germany's enemies. 376 00:18:18,880 --> 00:18:24,720 The German paratroopers faced an elite 377 00:18:21,840 --> 00:18:27,200 unit of Dutch Marines who put up fierce 378 00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:29,679 resistance. 379 00:18:27,200 --> 00:18:31,840 On May 14th, an attempt was made to 380 00:18:29,679 --> 00:18:35,160 force the city's mayor to surrender, but 381 00:18:31,840 --> 00:18:35,160 he refused. 382 00:18:38,559 --> 00:18:42,240 >> With the airborne operation at 383 00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:44,559 Rotterdam, Holland was just a huge 384 00:18:42,240 --> 00:18:46,880 diversionary maneuver to strengthen the 385 00:18:44,559 --> 00:18:49,200 allies belief that the German attack was 386 00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:53,320 taking place in the north and that that 387 00:18:49,200 --> 00:18:53,320 is where they would send their reserves. 388 00:18:53,679 --> 00:18:57,880 German bombers attack Rotterdam. 389 00:19:03,520 --> 00:19:07,200 >> Although the Dutch were now willing to 390 00:19:04,960 --> 00:19:09,520 capitulate, the city was subjected to a 391 00:19:07,200 --> 00:19:11,200 terror attack. 392 00:19:09,520 --> 00:19:13,679 The Germans claimed it was no longer 393 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:16,679 possible to call off the air raid. 394 00:19:13,679 --> 00:19:16,679 transporter. 395 00:19:19,360 --> 00:19:24,080 >> The port and the old town were bombarded 396 00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:25,840 for 20 minutes. 397 00:19:24,080 --> 00:19:30,120 There were no defenses because the Dutch 398 00:19:25,840 --> 00:19:30,120 air force had already been destroyed. 399 00:19:37,440 --> 00:19:41,400 Rotterdam was ablaze. 400 00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:48,360 800 people lost their lives. 401 00:19:51,360 --> 00:19:56,039 The world was stunned by such brutality. 402 00:20:03,200 --> 00:20:07,280 The defenders of Rotterdam surrendered 403 00:20:05,039 --> 00:20:09,039 to the Germans. 404 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:11,520 The following day, the Dutch chief of 405 00:20:09,039 --> 00:20:13,919 staff said that the one-sided conflict 406 00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:17,200 had to stop and announced the general 407 00:20:13,919 --> 00:20:18,880 capitulation of the Netherlands. 408 00:20:17,200 --> 00:20:22,760 The Dutch royal family and the 409 00:20:18,880 --> 00:20:22,760 government fled to London. 410 00:20:24,400 --> 00:20:28,480 In the early hours of May 14th, an hour 411 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:30,480 and a half after crossing the Muse, 412 00:20:28,480 --> 00:20:31,840 German tanks attacking at Blitz Creek 413 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:35,960 speed had already reached a 414 00:20:31,840 --> 00:20:35,960 strategically important rise. 415 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:46,120 French units arrived too late and were 416 00:20:42,159 --> 00:20:46,120 destroyed south of Sudan. 417 00:20:48,080 --> 00:20:52,559 >> Gudderian's tank core had achieved its 418 00:20:50,320 --> 00:20:54,960 first major victory and was now pushing 419 00:20:52,559 --> 00:20:57,600 the French further and further back. One 420 00:20:54,960 --> 00:20:59,919 domino after another was now tumbling. 421 00:20:57,600 --> 00:21:02,720 What's more, Gudderion did not listen to 422 00:20:59,919 --> 00:21:04,880 his superior G von Runet, who was chief 423 00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:07,520 of staff of the army group. After the 424 00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:09,679 victory at Saddon, Vonstead had said, 425 00:21:07,520 --> 00:21:11,679 "Now hold still for a while." But 426 00:21:09,679 --> 00:21:13,840 Gudderion sensed the opportunity that 427 00:21:11,679 --> 00:21:16,240 was opening up and continued to thrust 428 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:18,640 further west. This always put him one 429 00:21:16,240 --> 00:21:20,320 step ahead of the French. 430 00:21:18,640 --> 00:21:21,919 A French breakthrough could have had a 431 00:21:20,320 --> 00:21:24,000 devastating effect on the totally 432 00:21:21,919 --> 00:21:27,880 exhausted Germans in the bridge heads, 433 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:27,880 which were still not secure. 434 00:21:30,799 --> 00:21:35,280 The tank divisions did not wait for the 435 00:21:32,559 --> 00:21:38,679 infantry following behind. Instead, they 436 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:38,679 advanced independently. 437 00:21:39,360 --> 00:21:43,120 And they could only do that because they 438 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:44,799 had the appropriate mindset, a 439 00:21:43,120 --> 00:21:47,039 leadership culture that had been planned 440 00:21:44,799 --> 00:21:49,120 in such a way that men thought for 441 00:21:47,039 --> 00:21:50,720 themselves. 442 00:21:49,120 --> 00:21:52,559 And because their tanks were already 443 00:21:50,720 --> 00:21:54,960 equipped with radios relatively early 444 00:21:52,559 --> 00:21:57,840 on, this was certainly a tactical 445 00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:59,360 advantage. 446 00:21:57,840 --> 00:22:01,280 Thus, they were fighting against French 447 00:21:59,360 --> 00:22:03,600 tank units that were tied far more 448 00:22:01,280 --> 00:22:05,120 closely to the infantry and because they 449 00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:08,120 had also lost their leaders were 450 00:22:05,120 --> 00:22:08,120 isolated. 451 00:22:08,320 --> 00:22:12,400 >> The French surrendered to a superior 452 00:22:10,159 --> 00:22:14,080 force. So, Gudderian's armored units 453 00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:17,880 were quickly able to extend the Sidon 454 00:22:14,080 --> 00:22:17,880 bridge head further south. 455 00:22:23,760 --> 00:22:27,840 The French tanks were actually superior 456 00:22:25,679 --> 00:22:30,320 to what the Germans had, but they were 457 00:22:27,840 --> 00:22:32,559 more ponderous and because they also 458 00:22:30,320 --> 00:22:35,559 consumed more fuel, they had a shorter 459 00:22:32,559 --> 00:22:35,559 range. 460 00:22:36,559 --> 00:22:40,480 The French certainly did not lose the 461 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:43,360 war in 1940 because their material was 462 00:22:40,480 --> 00:22:45,919 inferior, because their army was worse, 463 00:22:43,360 --> 00:22:47,520 too small or poorly equipped. That was 464 00:22:45,919 --> 00:22:49,360 certainly not the case with regard to 465 00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:53,720 men and material. The French army in 466 00:22:49,360 --> 00:22:53,720 1940 was totally up to date. 467 00:22:55,600 --> 00:23:00,679 It lost the war perhaps because of a 468 00:22:57,360 --> 00:23:00,679 lack of resolve. 469 00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:04,159 It also lost because its military 470 00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:08,280 leadership procedures were slower at all 471 00:23:04,159 --> 00:23:08,280 levels than on the German side. 472 00:23:09,440 --> 00:23:14,000 Um, 473 00:23:12,240 --> 00:23:16,640 and also because the French had no way 474 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:21,320 of combating this new approach to war. 475 00:23:16,640 --> 00:23:21,320 They had their own plan for waging war. 476 00:23:21,840 --> 00:23:27,240 The problem was that the Germans didn't 477 00:23:23,679 --> 00:23:27,240 abide by it. 478 00:23:27,840 --> 00:23:31,360 They succeeded in forcing a type of 479 00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:35,640 warfare on the French in which the 480 00:23:31,360 --> 00:23:35,640 Germans saw themselves as superior. 481 00:23:35,919 --> 00:23:40,720 So although the French had the extremely 482 00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:42,880 strong Majino line and a large air force 483 00:23:40,720 --> 00:23:45,280 as well as large mechanized and partly 484 00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:46,720 mechanized units, if they couldn't be 485 00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:50,760 brought into play at some point, the 486 00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,760 French would run out of time 487 00:23:51,039 --> 00:23:54,799 because by then the Germans would have 488 00:23:52,720 --> 00:23:59,240 attained their objectives and it would 489 00:23:54,799 --> 00:23:59,240 no longer be possible to stop them. 490 00:24:03,440 --> 00:24:07,840 The French air force tried desperately 491 00:24:05,440 --> 00:24:10,080 to contain the German infantry that was 492 00:24:07,840 --> 00:24:14,039 moving up and thus to cut off the 493 00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:14,039 swiftly advancing tanks. 494 00:24:21,919 --> 00:24:27,600 But these were just pin pricks. They had 495 00:24:24,320 --> 00:24:31,840 no decisive effect. Nevertheless, the 496 00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:34,400 Germans suffered losses. 497 00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:37,279 In the end, the Blitzkrieg in France 498 00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:40,080 resulted in between 30 and 40,000 German 499 00:24:37,279 --> 00:24:43,080 casualties. The exact figures are not 500 00:24:40,080 --> 00:24:43,080 known. 501 00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:17,520 Time and again, the engineer battalions 502 00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:19,279 performed superb work. 503 00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:23,080 But even so, supplies could only be 504 00:25:19,279 --> 00:25:23,080 brought up with great effort. 505 00:25:25,279 --> 00:25:30,039 Now, no one could stop the tanks. 506 00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:35,840 With their tank units, the Germans 507 00:25:34,080 --> 00:25:39,240 created a main thrust which the French 508 00:25:35,840 --> 00:25:39,240 could not stop. 509 00:25:40,640 --> 00:25:47,080 One or two critical situations resulted 510 00:25:42,720 --> 00:25:47,080 tactically in defeat or delay. 511 00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:55,799 But basically German tanks surged 512 00:25:51,919 --> 00:25:55,799 through to the Channel Coast. 513 00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:06,880 Efficient organization was of decisive 514 00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:09,279 importance throughout the entire 515 00:26:06,880 --> 00:26:12,159 advance. Transport battalions brought 516 00:26:09,279 --> 00:26:16,600 fuel, ammunition, and food by truck to 517 00:26:12,159 --> 00:26:16,600 the rapidly advancing tank divisions. 518 00:26:17,679 --> 00:26:23,960 At brief intermediate stops, tank crews 519 00:26:19,919 --> 00:26:23,960 were handed jerry cans. 520 00:26:31,919 --> 00:26:36,000 These pictures were taken by a Nazi 521 00:26:33,760 --> 00:26:39,320 propaganda team, but they show what 522 00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,320 actually happened. 523 00:26:40,080 --> 00:26:44,159 To save time, sometimes the jerry cans 524 00:26:42,400 --> 00:26:47,159 were even handed to tanks still on the 525 00:26:44,159 --> 00:26:47,159 move. 526 00:26:58,880 --> 00:27:03,440 Once armored units had started moving, 527 00:27:01,279 --> 00:27:05,279 this logistical organization was of 528 00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:08,279 decisive importance to the rapid 529 00:27:05,279 --> 00:27:08,279 advance. 530 00:27:08,799 --> 00:27:15,080 Yet such was the speed of the thrust 531 00:27:10,799 --> 00:27:15,080 that even that was not enough. 532 00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:21,120 In the end, the Germans had no 533 00:27:18,480 --> 00:27:23,520 ammunition left. One battle report even 534 00:27:21,120 --> 00:27:25,600 states, "We had two choices. Either to 535 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:27,919 retreat and face destruction or to 536 00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:30,080 attack as if we were still strong." And 537 00:27:27,919 --> 00:27:32,240 that is precisely what they did. With 538 00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:34,240 virtually no ammunition, they mounted a 539 00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:35,919 successful assault. The French thought, 540 00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:38,400 "Oh my god, the Germans are going to 541 00:27:35,919 --> 00:27:40,960 overrun us." So they retreated. It was a 542 00:27:38,400 --> 00:27:42,960 total risk. 543 00:27:40,960 --> 00:27:47,480 A British Expeditionary Corps had been 544 00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:47,480 stationed in France ever since 1939. 545 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:53,520 It consisted of more than 200,000 troops 546 00:27:50,559 --> 00:27:57,840 and over 600 tanks. But they supported 547 00:27:53,520 --> 00:28:01,960 the French forces mainly in the north. 548 00:27:57,840 --> 00:28:01,960 There was not much they could do. 549 00:28:04,080 --> 00:28:07,240 the British. 550 00:28:08,960 --> 00:28:13,120 The British army was very small. 551 00:28:10,960 --> 00:28:14,960 Consequently, so was the expeditionary 552 00:28:13,120 --> 00:28:17,279 force which fought in northern France 553 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:19,679 and Belgium. The British were extremely 554 00:28:17,279 --> 00:28:21,679 cautious because they were concerned. If 555 00:28:19,679 --> 00:28:23,919 we send too many elite or well-trained 556 00:28:21,679 --> 00:28:26,000 troops to France and things go wrong, 557 00:28:23,919 --> 00:28:29,720 we'll have weakened our own army to an 558 00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:29,720 unacceptable degree. 559 00:28:33,600 --> 00:28:37,679 The British Expeditionary Force in 560 00:28:35,279 --> 00:28:40,679 France in 1940 was certainly a military 561 00:28:37,679 --> 00:28:40,679 component. 562 00:28:41,120 --> 00:28:46,799 First and foremost, however, it was a 563 00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:48,559 strategic and diplomatic commitment. 564 00:28:46,799 --> 00:28:50,320 By sending troops to the continent, the 565 00:28:48,559 --> 00:28:54,600 British were underlining their intention 566 00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:54,600 to continue fighting the war. 567 00:28:56,320 --> 00:28:59,919 But in 1940, their troops had to be 568 00:28:58,159 --> 00:29:01,440 rescued from the continent of Europe 569 00:28:59,919 --> 00:29:04,440 because of the defeat suffered at 570 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:04,440 Dunkirk. 571 00:29:06,399 --> 00:29:11,760 On May 17th, Winston Churchill traveled 572 00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:13,360 to Paris. He could not believe that the 573 00:29:11,760 --> 00:29:16,080 Germans were storming towards the 574 00:29:13,360 --> 00:29:17,919 channel with so few tanks. 575 00:29:16,080 --> 00:29:20,080 On asking where the French reserves 576 00:29:17,919 --> 00:29:23,600 were, he received the Kurt reply that 577 00:29:20,080 --> 00:29:25,440 there were none left. 578 00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:27,919 But the German advance was certainly not 579 00:29:25,440 --> 00:29:29,919 the shorefire success Nazi propaganda 580 00:29:27,919 --> 00:29:33,600 was implying because there was often 581 00:29:29,919 --> 00:29:35,440 fierce resistance at a local level. 582 00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:37,919 But counter measures were unorganized 583 00:29:35,440 --> 00:29:41,200 and improvised. The opposite in fact of 584 00:29:37,919 --> 00:29:43,760 what the French had actually planned. 585 00:29:41,200 --> 00:29:47,440 On May 21st, the German spearhead 586 00:29:43,760 --> 00:29:50,960 reached the channel port of Abyville. 587 00:29:47,440 --> 00:29:53,360 Protecting their flank along the SA, the 588 00:29:50,960 --> 00:29:56,399 Germans fanned out to the north and 589 00:29:53,360 --> 00:29:58,799 east. This was to be the perfect battle 590 00:29:56,399 --> 00:30:01,840 of annihilation. 591 00:29:58,799 --> 00:30:04,159 >> On May 24th, 1940, Hitler left his 592 00:30:01,840 --> 00:30:05,840 headquarters in the Eiffel. Together 593 00:30:04,159 --> 00:30:07,679 with his entourage, he headed for the 594 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:10,480 part of France that had already been 595 00:30:07,679 --> 00:30:12,720 occupied. Field marshal Herman Guring 596 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:15,039 assured the Furer that the time had now 597 00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:16,799 come for his dive bombers to finish off 598 00:30:15,039 --> 00:30:19,840 the encircled enemy on the Channel 599 00:30:16,799 --> 00:30:22,080 Coast. This final triumph was to fall to 600 00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:24,880 the German air force, not the 601 00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:28,080 Conservative Army. In the afternoon, the 602 00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:30,399 tanks were halted. But on arrival at the 603 00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:32,640 headquarters of Ger Fon Runstead, the 604 00:30:30,399 --> 00:30:37,080 commander of Army Group A, this order 605 00:30:32,640 --> 00:30:37,080 came as a total surprise to Hitler. 606 00:30:38,399 --> 00:30:42,880 The order to stop before Dunkirk is the 607 00:30:40,640 --> 00:30:44,960 biggest myth of the battle of France. 608 00:30:42,880 --> 00:30:47,279 All the generals claimed later that it 609 00:30:44,960 --> 00:30:49,919 had come from Hitler that he had halted 610 00:30:47,279 --> 00:30:52,320 the tank units and as a result had given 611 00:30:49,919 --> 00:30:54,559 the British time to pull back. But that 612 00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:57,039 is completely wrong. First of all, the 613 00:30:54,559 --> 00:30:59,760 order to halt did not come from Hitler. 614 00:30:57,039 --> 00:31:01,679 It came from Colonel General Fonv who 615 00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:03,520 was convinced that the armored units 616 00:31:01,679 --> 00:31:05,279 urgently needed a break. They were 617 00:31:03,520 --> 00:31:07,600 exhausted. There were problems in 618 00:31:05,279 --> 00:31:09,919 providing supplies. The infantry first 619 00:31:07,600 --> 00:31:11,760 needed to be brought up and every day a 620 00:31:09,919 --> 00:31:14,720 French counterattack from the south was 621 00:31:11,760 --> 00:31:16,640 expected. So Runstead said it would be 622 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:19,039 best if the armored units were halted 623 00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:22,000 for a while. So Hitler was not even 624 00:31:19,039 --> 00:31:24,159 involved. He came and visited Runstead 625 00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:26,480 who then outlined the situation and 626 00:31:24,159 --> 00:31:28,880 Hitler merely expressed his approval. 627 00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:31,440 That's exactly how I see it, he said. So 628 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:33,760 do it. Lots of generals were up in arms 629 00:31:31,440 --> 00:31:36,000 about it, but not all of them. We need 630 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:37,840 to take a close look at all those who 631 00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:40,000 after the war claimed to have been 632 00:31:37,840 --> 00:31:44,159 against it because many of them actually 633 00:31:40,000 --> 00:31:46,640 said, "Yes, that makes sense." 634 00:31:44,159 --> 00:31:48,799 >> Meanwhile, on the Channel Coast, the 635 00:31:46,640 --> 00:31:51,279 Vermacht had captured one town after 636 00:31:48,799 --> 00:31:53,840 another. Once again, the defenders left 637 00:31:51,279 --> 00:31:55,760 the battle zone in a hurry and retreated 638 00:31:53,840 --> 00:31:58,399 north. 639 00:31:55,760 --> 00:31:59,919 On May 26th, the order to halt was 640 00:31:58,399 --> 00:32:01,679 rescended, 641 00:31:59,919 --> 00:32:03,679 but the British and the French had been 642 00:32:01,679 --> 00:32:08,120 given enough time to establish a 643 00:32:03,679 --> 00:32:08,120 defensive ring around Dunkirk. 644 00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:16,960 On May 28th, the Belgian army, 645 00:32:13,600 --> 00:32:20,240 compressed into a small space and weary 646 00:32:16,960 --> 00:32:22,000 of battle, laid down its arms that left 647 00:32:20,240 --> 00:32:25,279 the desperate French and British 648 00:32:22,000 --> 00:32:28,480 defenders with their backs to the sea at 649 00:32:25,279 --> 00:32:30,559 the small channel port of Dunkirk. 650 00:32:28,480 --> 00:32:33,440 >> Nearly 340,000 651 00:32:30,559 --> 00:32:35,519 Allied troops retreated to Dunkirk. They 652 00:32:33,440 --> 00:32:39,960 hoped that warships would come and take 653 00:32:35,519 --> 00:32:39,960 them back across the channel to Britain. 654 00:32:42,320 --> 00:32:47,600 Most of the British expeditionary forces 655 00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:49,840 had retreated to Dunkirk in the hope of 656 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:52,159 being evacuated and the British 657 00:32:49,840 --> 00:32:53,679 government and the British military did 658 00:32:52,159 --> 00:32:55,840 everything in their power to achieve 659 00:32:53,679 --> 00:32:58,159 this. They got together as much 660 00:32:55,840 --> 00:33:00,320 transport capacity as they could in 661 00:32:58,159 --> 00:33:03,320 order to pick up soldiers and bring them 662 00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:03,320 home. 663 00:33:05,200 --> 00:33:09,919 Anything that was somehow seaorthy was 664 00:33:07,120 --> 00:33:12,000 used. pleasure streamers, fishing smacks 665 00:33:09,919 --> 00:33:14,399 and so on. The British people were 666 00:33:12,000 --> 00:33:17,880 called on, fishermen were called on to 667 00:33:14,399 --> 00:33:17,880 sail to Dunkerk. 668 00:33:17,919 --> 00:33:22,480 There was very little communication and 669 00:33:19,760 --> 00:33:25,039 cooperation. It was a chaotic operation, 670 00:33:22,480 --> 00:33:26,720 if you like. 671 00:33:25,039 --> 00:33:30,320 >> High overhead, British fighter planes 672 00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:33,200 fought the Loop Waffer to a standstill. 673 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:34,799 >> Herman Guring couldn't keep his promise. 674 00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:37,799 His air force could not stop the 675 00:33:34,799 --> 00:33:37,799 evacuation. 676 00:33:40,159 --> 00:33:45,279 While below, small Allied side units 677 00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:48,720 held the Germans back long enough for 678 00:33:45,279 --> 00:33:50,480 the miracle of Dunkirk to take place. 679 00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:52,880 >> While the battle to crush the pocket was 680 00:33:50,480 --> 00:33:55,600 raging all around them, in Dunkirk, 681 00:33:52,880 --> 00:33:59,919 338,682 682 00:33:55,600 --> 00:34:02,799 soldiers, 247,000 of them British and 683 00:33:59,919 --> 00:34:07,760 123,000 French, managed to escape in a 684 00:34:02,799 --> 00:34:07,760 mly fleet of 861 vessels. 685 00:34:15,119 --> 00:34:19,280 Dunkerk was not only of major 686 00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:21,359 psychological and symbolic importance to 687 00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:23,839 the further course of the war. The 688 00:34:21,359 --> 00:34:26,159 miracle of Dunkirk meant that the core 689 00:34:23,839 --> 00:34:27,839 of the British army was preserved. In 690 00:34:26,159 --> 00:34:29,599 other words, the British could continue 691 00:34:27,839 --> 00:34:32,320 to build up their army against the 692 00:34:29,599 --> 00:34:34,720 possibility of a German invasion. And in 693 00:34:32,320 --> 00:34:36,960 the years that followed, without this 694 00:34:34,720 --> 00:34:38,720 nucleus of troops, Britain would not 695 00:34:36,960 --> 00:34:41,720 have been able to expand its armed 696 00:34:38,720 --> 00:34:41,720 forces. 697 00:34:44,159 --> 00:34:48,639 The soldiers saw themselves as losers, 698 00:34:46,399 --> 00:34:51,520 but back home they were received as 699 00:34:48,639 --> 00:34:53,359 heroes. 700 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:56,919 Winston Churchill insisted on visiting 701 00:34:53,359 --> 00:34:56,919 the troops personally. 702 00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:03,280 Churchill was convinced that he would 703 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:05,520 have to lead his country through the war 704 00:35:03,280 --> 00:35:08,720 to the bitter end and he was willing to 705 00:35:05,520 --> 00:35:11,119 do so. His famous speech, we shall fight 706 00:35:08,720 --> 00:35:13,440 on the beaches, we shall fight in the 707 00:35:11,119 --> 00:35:17,880 fields and in the streets, was just the 708 00:35:13,440 --> 00:35:17,880 motivation the British public needed. 709 00:35:18,720 --> 00:35:23,760 A few days later, a German soldier 710 00:35:21,200 --> 00:35:25,920 filmed the deserted beach at Dunkirk. 711 00:35:23,760 --> 00:35:28,240 Evidence of the German air attacks was 712 00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:30,560 visible everywhere. The Allies had had 713 00:35:28,240 --> 00:35:34,880 to leave behind all their equipment, 714 00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:39,280 63,000 vehicles, 20,000 motorcycles, 715 00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:42,920 475 tanks and armored cars, and 2,400 716 00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:42,920 artillery pieces. 717 00:35:43,839 --> 00:35:48,400 The French suffered heavy losses, but 718 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:51,040 they still managed to evacuate over 719 00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:53,359 100,000 soldiers to the ports of 720 00:35:51,040 --> 00:35:57,640 Sherborg and Breast to join up with 721 00:35:53,359 --> 00:35:57,640 troops still fighting on the mainland. 722 00:35:57,760 --> 00:36:01,040 >> It was an operational error that allowed 723 00:35:59,520 --> 00:36:02,800 the Allies something no one on the 724 00:36:01,040 --> 00:36:04,640 German side had thought possible, the 725 00:36:02,800 --> 00:36:07,040 miraculous evacuation of most of the 726 00:36:04,640 --> 00:36:08,960 British Expeditionary Force. 88,000 727 00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:10,720 troops were still taken prisoner, most 728 00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:12,320 of them French, but most of the British 729 00:36:10,720 --> 00:36:14,480 force had made it back across the 730 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:17,760 channel. No one on the German side had 731 00:36:14,480 --> 00:36:19,040 expected this. Hitler certainly hadn't. 732 00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:21,200 But there was no sign of any 733 00:36:19,040 --> 00:36:25,599 disappointment when he landed at an 734 00:36:21,200 --> 00:36:27,599 airfield near Camry on June 2nd, 1940. 735 00:36:25,599 --> 00:36:29,359 German soldiers wounded in battle were 736 00:36:27,599 --> 00:36:31,040 quickly flown in to serve as the 737 00:36:29,359 --> 00:36:33,760 backdrop to an appearance by their 738 00:36:31,040 --> 00:36:36,560 commander-in-chief. 739 00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:39,200 Joseph Gerbles wrote in his diary, "The 740 00:36:36,560 --> 00:36:41,280 Furer towers high above us all. He is 741 00:36:39,200 --> 00:36:43,440 one of history's geniuses. What a 742 00:36:41,280 --> 00:36:46,079 wonderful time this is. It will be 743 00:36:43,440 --> 00:36:49,359 followed by a period of great calm, one 744 00:36:46,079 --> 00:36:52,920 we all long for, the Furer, perhaps more 745 00:36:49,359 --> 00:36:52,920 than any of us. 746 00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:58,400 Naturally, the success in France 747 00:36:56,560 --> 00:37:01,800 bolstered Hitler's standing with his 748 00:36:58,400 --> 00:37:01,800 military leaders. 749 00:37:02,160 --> 00:37:06,960 propaganda coined by the propaganda 750 00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:11,000 machine. The term greatest commander of 751 00:37:06,960 --> 00:37:11,000 all time was indeed ironic 752 00:37:13,760 --> 00:37:17,119 because at the time there was indeed 753 00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:19,359 hardly anyone in the German military 754 00:37:17,119 --> 00:37:21,520 leadership who was not convinced that 755 00:37:19,359 --> 00:37:24,520 Hitler was still a guarantee of military 756 00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:24,520 success. 757 00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:33,680 On July 13th, the French government, 758 00:37:31,359 --> 00:37:38,040 which had fled to Bordeaux, declared 759 00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:38,040 Paris an open city. 760 00:37:38,240 --> 00:37:45,160 The next day, Nazi propaganda celebrated 761 00:37:40,880 --> 00:37:45,160 the seizure of the French capital. 762 00:37:47,520 --> 00:37:54,040 For the cameras, a Nazi flag was hoisted 763 00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:54,040 on the Eiffel Tower. 764 00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,560 >> On June 14th, the Germans occupied 765 00:37:56,720 --> 00:38:00,480 Paris. This was a highly prestigious 766 00:37:58,560 --> 00:38:02,240 victory primarily because the French had 767 00:38:00,480 --> 00:38:04,320 not fought for their capital. They had 768 00:38:02,240 --> 00:38:06,640 declared Paris an open city, practically 769 00:38:04,320 --> 00:38:08,560 without a battle. Reports also confirm 770 00:38:06,640 --> 00:38:10,320 that the Parisians were relieved because 771 00:38:08,560 --> 00:38:12,400 they did not want fighting to take place 772 00:38:10,320 --> 00:38:14,320 in their city. All in all though, it was 773 00:38:12,400 --> 00:38:16,960 a serious blow to French morale for the 774 00:38:14,320 --> 00:38:18,800 capital to be in enemy hands. It was 775 00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:22,160 also clear that the battle for France 776 00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:24,240 was now over. 777 00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:26,240 >> By and large, the Battle of France had 778 00:38:24,240 --> 00:38:27,839 gone successfully, although in many 779 00:38:26,240 --> 00:38:30,400 places the Germans had enjoyed 780 00:38:27,839 --> 00:38:32,320 operational good fortune. And it should 781 00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:34,800 not be forgotten that the French had 782 00:38:32,320 --> 00:38:37,359 defended themselves well or that both 783 00:38:34,800 --> 00:38:39,040 sides had suffered horrific losses. I 784 00:38:37,359 --> 00:38:41,680 think it was of great benefit to the 785 00:38:39,040 --> 00:38:44,400 German var that a change of government 786 00:38:41,680 --> 00:38:46,640 then took place in France. This at least 787 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:48,160 created political room for maneuver. 788 00:38:46,640 --> 00:38:50,240 There was no need to conquer the whole 789 00:38:48,160 --> 00:38:52,480 of France because after the Polish 790 00:38:50,240 --> 00:38:56,920 campaign and the battle of France, the 791 00:38:52,480 --> 00:38:56,920 German vmach was somewhat bruised. 792 00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:03,440 While a pro-German government headed by 793 00:39:00,480 --> 00:39:05,920 first world war marshal Philip Petar was 794 00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:09,359 taking up office in the northeast of the 795 00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:11,280 country. Fighting still continued, 796 00:39:09,359 --> 00:39:13,280 but it was pointless. One garrison after 797 00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:15,839 another had to capitulate. Here for 798 00:39:13,280 --> 00:39:19,400 example in the small town of Tul on the 799 00:39:15,839 --> 00:39:19,400 Moselle River. 800 00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:30,920 84year-old Marshall Petar had no choice 801 00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:30,920 but to ask Hitler for a ceasefire. 802 00:39:32,720 --> 00:39:36,400 The battle of France showed that with 803 00:39:34,320 --> 00:39:38,640 the Blitz Creek approach, the Germans 804 00:39:36,400 --> 00:39:41,280 could avoid a lengthy war by ending a 805 00:39:38,640 --> 00:39:43,680 conflict in the short term. But it also 806 00:39:41,280 --> 00:39:47,520 showed that this was not the blueprint 807 00:39:43,680 --> 00:39:50,960 for waging a speedy war. 808 00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:52,880 It was a blueprint for doing so. 809 00:39:50,960 --> 00:39:55,040 So this didn't mean that it would prove 810 00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:58,240 just as successful somewhere else under 811 00:39:55,040 --> 00:40:00,480 different topographical conditions 812 00:39:58,240 --> 00:40:02,880 with different people in charge and with 813 00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:05,880 different adversaries who also behave 814 00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:05,880 differently 815 00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:13,280 in Compa north of Paris. A special 816 00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:15,520 ceremony was being prepared. It was at 817 00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:17,839 this very location in 1918 that the 818 00:40:15,520 --> 00:40:19,520 Germans had had to accept defeat which 819 00:40:17,839 --> 00:40:21,119 ended ultimately with the Treaty of 820 00:40:19,520 --> 00:40:22,320 Versailles. 821 00:40:21,119 --> 00:40:24,800 >> For Hitler, 822 00:40:22,320 --> 00:40:27,440 >> naturally for Hitler, Compenne on June 823 00:40:24,800 --> 00:40:29,520 22nd was the fulfillment of a lifetime's 824 00:40:27,440 --> 00:40:32,000 dream. Right from the start, he had seen 825 00:40:29,520 --> 00:40:33,839 it as part of his political program to 826 00:40:32,000 --> 00:40:36,400 revise the shameful dictate of 827 00:40:33,839 --> 00:40:38,720 Versailles, symbolized, of course, by 828 00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:41,040 Marshall Faulk's saloon car, where the 829 00:40:38,720 --> 00:40:44,240 German armistice delegation had had to 830 00:40:41,040 --> 00:40:46,640 sign the armistice in 1918. To expune 831 00:40:44,240 --> 00:40:48,880 this symbolically and practically from 832 00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:51,040 the pages of history, Hitler had the 833 00:40:48,880 --> 00:40:53,440 railway carriage brought to exactly the 834 00:40:51,040 --> 00:40:55,680 same site. The French then had to accept 835 00:40:53,440 --> 00:40:57,760 the conditions of the new armistice. 836 00:40:55,680 --> 00:41:00,240 This was staged in style because for 837 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:02,960 Hitler, as for many Germans, this was 838 00:41:00,240 --> 00:41:06,240 redressing, indeed erasing the disgrace 839 00:41:02,960 --> 00:41:07,839 of 1918. 840 00:41:06,240 --> 00:41:09,599 >> Many of the German troops wanted a 841 00:41:07,839 --> 00:41:12,160 victory parade like the one held in 842 00:41:09,599 --> 00:41:15,880 Warsaw. But Hitler decided against such 843 00:41:12,160 --> 00:41:15,880 demonstrative humiliation. 844 00:41:18,640 --> 00:41:23,839 >> Hitler in Paris. 845 00:41:21,760 --> 00:41:25,839 It is still not quite clear why Hitler 846 00:41:23,839 --> 00:41:29,400 himself did not take the salute at a big 847 00:41:25,839 --> 00:41:29,400 parade in Paris. 848 00:41:30,079 --> 00:41:34,400 A lot of it has to do with Hitler 849 00:41:31,680 --> 00:41:36,880 himself. He still attached massive 850 00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:39,119 importance to coming to Paris himself 851 00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:41,280 very early in the morning and visiting 852 00:41:39,119 --> 00:41:44,280 highly symbolic places like Napoleon's 853 00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:44,280 tomb. 854 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:49,119 In this respect, standing as a military 855 00:41:46,560 --> 00:41:51,520 leader at the tomb of Napoleon and being 856 00:41:49,119 --> 00:41:54,880 able to drive through Paris, he became 857 00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:56,480 part of a military tradition. 858 00:41:54,880 --> 00:41:58,880 As a soldier in France in the First 859 00:41:56,480 --> 00:42:01,599 World War, Hitler had never seen Paris. 860 00:41:58,880 --> 00:42:04,160 So for him also as a soldier, there was 861 00:42:01,599 --> 00:42:06,079 of course the ultimate satisfaction of 862 00:42:04,160 --> 00:42:09,960 finally being able to bring the First 863 00:42:06,079 --> 00:42:09,960 World War to an end. 864 00:42:12,720 --> 00:42:18,040 The armistice conditions were tantamount 865 00:42:14,800 --> 00:42:18,040 to capitulation. 866 00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:24,319 Nazi Germany occupied 60% of French 867 00:42:22,079 --> 00:42:27,839 territory on the European continent, 868 00:42:24,319 --> 00:42:29,599 including the capital. 869 00:42:27,839 --> 00:42:33,599 The rest was administered by the puppet 870 00:42:29,599 --> 00:42:35,200 government of Marshall Peter in Vichi. 871 00:42:33,599 --> 00:42:37,359 Blitzkrie. 872 00:42:35,200 --> 00:42:39,760 The Blitz Greek campaigns and the entire 873 00:42:37,359 --> 00:42:42,319 myth surrounding them shows how quickly 874 00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:44,000 battles or campaigns can be won and 875 00:42:42,319 --> 00:42:46,319 individual countries and armies 876 00:42:44,000 --> 00:42:48,319 defeated. 877 00:42:46,319 --> 00:42:50,480 But it is not a concept for winning a 878 00:42:48,319 --> 00:42:52,640 war. And that is actually the 879 00:42:50,480 --> 00:42:54,400 contradiction in the whole blitz Greek 880 00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:56,480 myth. Everything might have gone 881 00:42:54,400 --> 00:43:00,800 successfully from a military point of 882 00:42:56,480 --> 00:43:02,480 view, but it did not help politically. 883 00:43:00,800 --> 00:43:04,400 boyfriend. 884 00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:06,400 >> Hitler did not plan to rest on his 885 00:43:04,400 --> 00:43:08,480 laurels. 886 00:43:06,400 --> 00:43:11,200 He planned other blitzkrieg assaults on 887 00:43:08,480 --> 00:43:13,200 Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It 888 00:43:11,200 --> 00:43:16,520 was the systematic path to the downfall 889 00:43:13,200 --> 00:43:16,520 of a psychopath.61725

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.