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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,143 --> 00:00:02,977 A private charter jet 2 00:00:02,977 --> 00:00:04,187 is flying 15 passengers 3 00:00:04,187 --> 00:00:06,981 to Aspen, Colorado for a party. 4 00:00:06,981 --> 00:00:10,610 This flight really captured the public attention 5 00:00:10,610 --> 00:00:13,196 because of the people onboard. 6 00:00:13,196 --> 00:00:15,365 Poor weather makes the landing a challenge 7 00:00:15,365 --> 00:00:17,533 for the experienced pilots. 8 00:00:17,533 --> 00:00:19,994 Can you see out there at all yet? 9 00:00:19,994 --> 00:00:21,371 No. 10 00:00:21,371 --> 00:00:23,873 Aspen is considered one of the most dangerous 11 00:00:23,873 --> 00:00:25,917 airports in the country. 12 00:00:26,417 --> 00:00:27,919 As the plane nears the runway, 13 00:00:27,919 --> 00:00:31,047 the controller watches as disaster unfolds. 14 00:00:33,424 --> 00:00:34,884 What are they doing? 15 00:00:37,345 --> 00:00:38,888 Investigators examine 16 00:00:38,888 --> 00:00:41,391 the Gulfstream's wreckage for answers. 17 00:00:42,975 --> 00:00:44,268 I don't see any issues here. 18 00:00:44,936 --> 00:00:48,064 When they learn about the passengers' behavior... 19 00:00:48,898 --> 00:00:52,777 We're running out of fuel here for the birthday boy! 20 00:00:52,777 --> 00:00:55,947 ...the moving parts of this mystery fall into place. 21 00:00:55,947 --> 00:00:58,241 That clearly had to put some pressure on the pilots to say, 22 00:00:58,241 --> 00:01:00,076 alright, this is not looking good. 23 00:01:02,203 --> 00:01:03,371 Mayday, mayday. 24 00:01:06,541 --> 00:01:08,668 Pull up. 25 00:01:24,267 --> 00:01:28,146 {\an8}The sun has just set over the Colorado mountains. 26 00:01:28,146 --> 00:01:31,274 {\an8}Avjet November 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 27 00:01:31,274 --> 00:01:33,943 {\an8}is nearing the end of its journey to Aspen. 28 00:01:34,610 --> 00:01:36,779 {\an8}Well, there's the edge of the night there. 29 00:01:38,197 --> 00:01:39,365 Yeah. 30 00:01:40,074 --> 00:01:43,911 Captain Robert Frisbie has almost 10,000 flying hours 31 00:01:43,911 --> 00:01:45,830 to his credit. 32 00:01:46,372 --> 00:01:48,624 What time is official sunset? 33 00:01:49,792 --> 00:01:51,836 He and First Officer Peter Kowalczyk 34 00:01:51,836 --> 00:01:55,131 have been flying together for close to five months. 35 00:01:56,257 --> 00:01:57,759 6:28. 36 00:01:59,135 --> 00:02:02,972 Both pilots have been with Avjet for less than a year. 37 00:02:04,265 --> 00:02:05,725 {\an8}The small charter airline 38 00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,561 {\an8}is based out of Burbank, California. 39 00:02:10,188 --> 00:02:13,066 Avjet catered to high rollers, 40 00:02:13,066 --> 00:02:16,277 business people, people who could afford to charter a jet, 41 00:02:16,277 --> 00:02:19,906 people who had to get there in a hurry, but do it in style. 42 00:02:21,157 --> 00:02:25,119 We're running out of fuel here for the birthday boy! 43 00:02:25,953 --> 00:02:28,956 A Miami financier chartered this flight 44 00:02:28,956 --> 00:02:30,333 for 14 of his friends 45 00:02:30,333 --> 00:02:34,420 to attend a birthday party at an exclusive venue in Aspen. 46 00:02:35,672 --> 00:02:39,467 This was a group of friends who seemed to have had 47 00:02:39,467 --> 00:02:42,387 tremendous early achievements and accomplishments, 48 00:02:42,387 --> 00:02:44,639 and they were really going to go places. 49 00:02:47,058 --> 00:02:49,936 So, forty-eight hundred pounds one-twenty-six? 50 00:02:49,936 --> 00:02:51,437 Wait. It was 50. 51 00:02:51,437 --> 00:02:55,024 You know what, I adjusted it, because the fuel was way off. 52 00:02:56,067 --> 00:02:59,362 The pilots are flying a Gulfstream III. 53 00:03:01,447 --> 00:03:05,284 The Gulfstream is a luxurious plane 54 00:03:05,284 --> 00:03:07,078 that, you know people see in the movies 55 00:03:07,078 --> 00:03:10,123 and people think high rollers and movie stars fly in, 56 00:03:10,123 --> 00:03:11,457 but it's a workhorse plane. 57 00:03:11,457 --> 00:03:14,127 It actually has a good reputation. 58 00:03:15,253 --> 00:03:18,881 It's a 90-minute flight from Los Angeles to Aspen. 59 00:03:22,427 --> 00:03:25,513 Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha, Aspen, 60 00:03:25,513 --> 00:03:28,725 reduce speed to two one zero or slower. 61 00:03:29,642 --> 00:03:31,769 The controller slows down the Gulfstream 62 00:03:31,769 --> 00:03:33,730 to maintain a safe distance 63 00:03:33,730 --> 00:03:36,482 from the other planes heading into Aspen. 64 00:03:37,984 --> 00:03:41,237 Two one zero or slower three Golf Alpha. 65 00:03:44,824 --> 00:03:46,784 17 minutes from landing, 66 00:03:46,784 --> 00:03:50,037 the pilots begin their descent. 67 00:03:50,830 --> 00:03:53,249 Aspen Pitkin County Airport, 68 00:03:53,249 --> 00:03:55,084 also known as Sardy Field, 69 00:03:55,084 --> 00:03:58,129 is about three miles northwest of Aspen. 70 00:03:58,129 --> 00:04:01,549 Landing on its single runway is a challenge. 71 00:04:02,967 --> 00:04:06,095 {\an8}Aspen is considered one of the most dangerous 72 00:04:06,095 --> 00:04:08,347 {\an8}airports in the country. 73 00:04:08,347 --> 00:04:11,309 The runway is not long 74 00:04:11,309 --> 00:04:16,939 and it is in close proximity to high terrain on all sides. 75 00:04:18,900 --> 00:04:21,694 Hey, do you remember that crazy guy in the Lear 76 00:04:21,694 --> 00:04:23,988 when we were in Aspen last time? 77 00:04:23,988 --> 00:04:27,325 He was, "I can see the airport," but he couldn't see it. 78 00:04:29,952 --> 00:04:31,371 Okay, set you up on the approach? 79 00:04:31,371 --> 00:04:32,789 Okay. 80 00:04:32,789 --> 00:04:35,083 The landing is made even more difficult 81 00:04:35,083 --> 00:04:38,628 with the final stage needing to be carried out visually. 82 00:04:39,879 --> 00:04:41,839 As the plane nears Aspen, 83 00:04:41,839 --> 00:04:44,717 a beacon guides it to the airport, 84 00:04:44,717 --> 00:04:48,429 but it doesn't lead it directly to the runway. 85 00:04:48,429 --> 00:04:50,223 Once the airport is in sight, 86 00:04:50,223 --> 00:04:53,476 the pilots must line up with the runway visually. 87 00:04:54,102 --> 00:04:56,479 Because of the high terrain and close proximity 88 00:04:56,479 --> 00:04:58,564 to the final approach course, 89 00:04:58,564 --> 00:05:01,401 the minimum altitude is a couple thousand feet 90 00:05:01,401 --> 00:05:03,111 above the ground, and we must be visual 91 00:05:03,111 --> 00:05:08,366 by that time to safely continue our descent down to a landing. 92 00:05:09,325 --> 00:05:13,663 And tonight, the weather isn't making landing any easier. 93 00:05:15,289 --> 00:05:17,667 If at any time it's snowing, 94 00:05:17,667 --> 00:05:21,671 it's very hard to acquire that visual reference 95 00:05:21,671 --> 00:05:24,966 to safely descend further to a landing. 96 00:05:27,802 --> 00:05:30,680 Residential noise restrictions around the airport 97 00:05:30,680 --> 00:05:32,932 leave the pilots only nine minutes 98 00:05:32,932 --> 00:05:36,519 until the landing curfew at 6:58. 99 00:05:36,519 --> 00:05:38,813 The crew is cutting it close. 100 00:05:40,231 --> 00:05:43,109 Can you see out there at all yet? 101 00:05:43,109 --> 00:05:44,777 Uh... 102 00:05:46,154 --> 00:05:47,363 No. 103 00:05:49,407 --> 00:05:53,870 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, heading zero five zero. 104 00:05:53,870 --> 00:05:55,246 Heading zero five zero, 105 00:05:55,246 --> 00:05:57,123 three Golf Alpha. 106 00:05:58,249 --> 00:06:00,043 As the pilots prepare to line up 107 00:06:00,043 --> 00:06:03,546 with the runway, passengers get ready for landing. 108 00:06:11,721 --> 00:06:13,890 Okay, synchronizers off. 109 00:06:13,890 --> 00:06:17,310 There is just enough fuel for one landing attempt. 110 00:06:17,310 --> 00:06:21,189 After that, the pilots will have to divert to another airport. 111 00:06:21,189 --> 00:06:22,982 Okay, it's off. 112 00:06:24,984 --> 00:06:26,986 Hydraulic pressure's good. 113 00:06:27,695 --> 00:06:29,822 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, 114 00:06:29,822 --> 00:06:31,449 turn heading one four zero, 115 00:06:31,449 --> 00:06:32,909 intercept final approach course, 116 00:06:32,909 --> 00:06:35,787 maintain one six thousand. 117 00:06:35,787 --> 00:06:37,538 Eight minutes from the airport, 118 00:06:37,538 --> 00:06:39,499 the Controller gives the crew clearance 119 00:06:39,499 --> 00:06:41,584 to commence the approach. 120 00:06:41,584 --> 00:06:44,003 One four zero, one six thousand... 121 00:06:44,003 --> 00:06:45,672 ...intercept final approach course, 122 00:06:45,672 --> 00:06:47,423 three Golf Alpha. 123 00:06:50,635 --> 00:06:52,345 One six thousand. 124 00:06:56,224 --> 00:06:59,143 As the pilots get their final intercept 125 00:06:59,143 --> 00:07:00,770 to the airport... 126 00:07:02,271 --> 00:07:05,733 Challenger seven Juliet alpha, you have the airport in sight? 127 00:07:05,733 --> 00:07:08,653 ...another aircraft also on approach to Aspen, 128 00:07:08,653 --> 00:07:10,405 updates the controller. 129 00:07:10,405 --> 00:07:13,741 Ah, that's a negative. Going around. 130 00:07:15,243 --> 00:07:17,495 Those pilots abort their landing, 131 00:07:17,495 --> 00:07:20,373 because they can't see the runway. 132 00:07:21,958 --> 00:07:25,461 Attention all aircraft, last aircraft went missed. 133 00:07:26,587 --> 00:07:28,881 - What? - He went missed. 134 00:07:28,881 --> 00:07:30,925 He went missed? 135 00:07:30,925 --> 00:07:32,677 Damn. 136 00:07:32,677 --> 00:07:34,303 That's not good. 137 00:07:35,221 --> 00:07:37,515 If you can't successfully land the aircraft, 138 00:07:37,515 --> 00:07:40,393 then a missed approach is a procedure 139 00:07:40,393 --> 00:07:44,939 that pilots will execute to return to a safe altitude. 140 00:07:45,773 --> 00:07:48,693 As the Gulfstream gets closer to the airport, 141 00:07:48,693 --> 00:07:50,820 the weather deteriorates. 142 00:07:59,287 --> 00:08:02,331 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, five miles from Red Table, 143 00:08:02,331 --> 00:08:05,626 cross Red Table at or above one four thousand, 144 00:08:05,626 --> 00:08:08,087 clear V-O-R-D-M-E Charlie approach. 145 00:08:09,922 --> 00:08:11,549 The Controller clears the pilots 146 00:08:11,549 --> 00:08:15,470 to begin the final approach 11 miles from the airport. 147 00:08:18,306 --> 00:08:20,892 You have to be configured properly at the right altitude, 148 00:08:20,892 --> 00:08:23,895 at the right speed, otherwise you are expected 149 00:08:23,895 --> 00:08:26,147 to execute a missed approach. 150 00:08:27,148 --> 00:08:28,775 Red Table at one four thousand, 151 00:08:28,775 --> 00:08:30,526 cleared for V O R approach, 152 00:08:30,526 --> 00:08:33,363 Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha. 153 00:08:34,864 --> 00:08:36,532 Here we go. 154 00:08:37,784 --> 00:08:40,369 As the pilots get closer to the airport, 155 00:08:40,369 --> 00:08:44,165 they're counting on the weather to improve for their landing. 156 00:08:44,957 --> 00:08:47,168 Descending to one four thousand. 157 00:08:48,753 --> 00:08:50,797 Problems can escalate very quickly 158 00:08:50,797 --> 00:08:52,590 when flying into Aspen. 159 00:08:52,590 --> 00:08:57,053 There's really no room to recover without breaking off 160 00:08:57,053 --> 00:08:59,472 that approach or trying it again. 161 00:09:00,848 --> 00:09:04,143 Landing flaps. 162 00:09:04,143 --> 00:09:06,187 Just over two minutes from landing, 163 00:09:06,187 --> 00:09:08,981 instruments have successfully guided the pilots 164 00:09:08,981 --> 00:09:11,109 to the airport. Now it's up to them 165 00:09:11,109 --> 00:09:13,236 to identify the runway. 166 00:09:14,737 --> 00:09:17,031 You see the runway? 167 00:09:21,202 --> 00:09:24,163 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, you have the runway in sight? 168 00:09:26,999 --> 00:09:29,127 - Oh. Affirmative. - Yeah, now we do. 169 00:09:29,127 --> 00:09:31,921 Yeah, runway in sight, three Golf Alpha. 170 00:09:31,921 --> 00:09:35,299 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha visual, roger. 171 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:37,427 One thousand. 172 00:09:37,427 --> 00:09:38,845 One thousand to go. 173 00:09:39,804 --> 00:09:42,765 The pilots are now less than a minute from landing. 174 00:09:52,191 --> 00:09:53,693 Two hundred. 175 00:09:53,693 --> 00:09:57,405 At the last moment, they realise something is wrong. 176 00:09:57,405 --> 00:10:00,783 No, oh! No. No. No. No! 177 00:10:15,673 --> 00:10:17,967 Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 178 00:10:17,967 --> 00:10:21,304 crashes just short of the runway at Aspen. 179 00:10:22,930 --> 00:10:24,223 Aircraft identification 180 00:10:24,223 --> 00:10:26,893 Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha, 181 00:10:26,893 --> 00:10:29,312 aircraft location, it was north of the runway 182 00:10:29,312 --> 00:10:31,898 approximately... the Shale Bluffs area. 183 00:10:34,442 --> 00:10:37,028 Emergency vehicles rush to the scene 184 00:10:37,028 --> 00:10:39,197 in the hope that there are survivors of the crash 185 00:10:39,197 --> 00:10:42,450 of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha. 186 00:10:51,376 --> 00:10:54,337 But all 18 people onboard are dead. 187 00:10:54,337 --> 00:10:57,548 All 15 passengers, the two pilots, 188 00:10:57,548 --> 00:10:59,926 and the flight attendant. 189 00:11:06,933 --> 00:11:10,061 This flight really captured the media 190 00:11:10,061 --> 00:11:13,523 and the public attention because of the people onboard. 191 00:11:14,232 --> 00:11:18,486 There were a lot of very young, talented people. 192 00:11:23,366 --> 00:11:26,160 Put everything from the tail section over there. 193 00:11:28,121 --> 00:11:31,624 By the following day, investigators are on site. 194 00:11:33,668 --> 00:11:37,213 Thousands of passengers fly charter airplanes 195 00:11:37,213 --> 00:11:41,676 every year, encompassing 2.5 million flight hours 196 00:11:41,676 --> 00:11:43,970 annually, so trying to understand 197 00:11:43,970 --> 00:11:47,432 why this accident occurred was significant. 198 00:11:52,103 --> 00:11:53,646 Let me see that. 199 00:11:53,646 --> 00:11:56,023 Within hours, the plane's cockpit 200 00:11:56,023 --> 00:11:58,234 voice recorder, or CVR, 201 00:11:58,234 --> 00:12:00,945 is retrieved from the wreckage. 202 00:12:00,945 --> 00:12:03,740 Let's get the data pulled from that ASAP. 203 00:12:03,740 --> 00:12:06,367 What about a flight data recorder? 204 00:12:11,289 --> 00:12:13,458 Looks like there wasn't one. 205 00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:15,376 Okay. 206 00:12:17,128 --> 00:12:20,548 Because the airplane was manufactured in 1980 207 00:12:20,548 --> 00:12:22,759 and registered in 1981, 208 00:12:22,759 --> 00:12:25,887 it was not required to have an FDR. 209 00:12:26,304 --> 00:12:28,681 While the CVR is sent for analysis, 210 00:12:28,681 --> 00:12:31,059 Investigators from the National Transportation 211 00:12:31,059 --> 00:12:33,353 Safety Board wonder why the pilots 212 00:12:33,353 --> 00:12:35,646 weren't able to land safely. 213 00:12:35,646 --> 00:12:39,734 The plane crashed 24-hundred feet from the runway. 214 00:12:40,568 --> 00:12:42,487 When an aircraft crashes short of a runway, 215 00:12:42,487 --> 00:12:45,490 especially a sophisticated airplane like a Gulfstream Jet, 216 00:12:45,490 --> 00:12:47,367 a number of questions arise here: 217 00:12:47,367 --> 00:12:49,577 How did they get there? What possible factors 218 00:12:49,577 --> 00:12:52,538 could the crew have? Was there some sort of a failure 219 00:12:52,538 --> 00:12:54,248 in the aircraft? 220 00:12:56,584 --> 00:12:58,711 Take a look at this. 221 00:12:58,711 --> 00:13:00,380 What do you think caused that? 222 00:13:00,380 --> 00:13:04,092 There's a deep ground scar at the crash site. 223 00:13:06,886 --> 00:13:08,304 That would do it. 224 00:13:08,304 --> 00:13:10,556 Investigators conclude that it was formed 225 00:13:10,556 --> 00:13:13,351 when the left wing hit the ground. 226 00:13:14,435 --> 00:13:16,521 When an airplane comes through trees 227 00:13:16,521 --> 00:13:20,525 or vegetation as it approaches the ground, 228 00:13:20,525 --> 00:13:22,110 it cuts off branches. 229 00:13:22,110 --> 00:13:24,028 And we can look at those branches 230 00:13:24,028 --> 00:13:25,446 and the angles that are made 231 00:13:25,446 --> 00:13:28,282 to understand the airplane's attitude 232 00:13:28,282 --> 00:13:33,287 as it came into the ground and its descent profile. 233 00:13:33,997 --> 00:13:37,291 Left wing struck the trees at about... 234 00:13:39,627 --> 00:13:41,379 49 degrees. 235 00:13:43,089 --> 00:13:45,466 That's a hell of a bank. 236 00:13:49,303 --> 00:13:52,223 There is no operationally relevant reason 237 00:13:52,223 --> 00:13:54,642 for an airplane to be banked at 49 degrees 238 00:13:54,642 --> 00:13:58,688 that close to the airport or that close to the ground. 239 00:13:59,439 --> 00:14:01,816 Maybe they lost control of the plane? 240 00:14:03,818 --> 00:14:07,196 When we see an aircraft in an abnormal attitude, 241 00:14:07,196 --> 00:14:09,198 uh, we've got to look at, did something happen 242 00:14:09,198 --> 00:14:11,659 where the pilots couldn't keep it level? 243 00:14:11,659 --> 00:14:16,247 The plane's position gives investigators a promising lead. 244 00:14:16,706 --> 00:14:18,332 Engine failure? 245 00:14:19,876 --> 00:14:22,670 The loss of thrust resulting from an engine failure 246 00:14:22,670 --> 00:14:24,255 on one side 247 00:14:24,255 --> 00:14:25,715 can yaw the airplane, 248 00:14:25,715 --> 00:14:27,467 and if not appropriately managed 249 00:14:27,467 --> 00:14:31,054 by the pilots in a timely fashion, 250 00:14:31,054 --> 00:14:33,598 can lead to a loss of control. 251 00:14:34,349 --> 00:14:36,601 Aside from the impact damage, 252 00:14:36,601 --> 00:14:39,771 there's no sign of fire to the exterior. 253 00:14:39,771 --> 00:14:42,648 The team studies the engines' compressor blades 254 00:14:42,648 --> 00:14:45,193 to determine if the engines were functioning 255 00:14:45,193 --> 00:14:47,445 when the plane hit the ground. 256 00:14:48,780 --> 00:14:51,574 When the Gulfstream III's engines are working, 257 00:14:51,574 --> 00:14:55,036 the compressor blades spin in a clockwise direction. 258 00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:57,038 If the engines were still functioning 259 00:14:57,038 --> 00:14:58,456 when the plane crashed, 260 00:14:58,456 --> 00:15:01,042 these blades would be bent counterclockwise, 261 00:15:01,042 --> 00:15:03,211 or in the opposite direction. 262 00:15:07,632 --> 00:15:10,718 No, these are all bent counterclockwise, so... 263 00:15:10,718 --> 00:15:12,387 it wasn't engine failure. 264 00:15:13,846 --> 00:15:15,807 Our examination of the engines 265 00:15:15,807 --> 00:15:18,976 showed that there was no pre-existing damage, 266 00:15:18,976 --> 00:15:21,729 no evidence of an in-flight fire, 267 00:15:21,729 --> 00:15:24,315 and also showed that they were operating normally 268 00:15:24,315 --> 00:15:27,527 and at high power at the time of the impact. 269 00:15:28,486 --> 00:15:31,030 Let's take a look at the rudder. 270 00:15:31,030 --> 00:15:33,408 An airplane operating at a low airspeed 271 00:15:33,408 --> 00:15:37,537 while the rudder moves to an extreme limit 272 00:15:37,537 --> 00:15:39,831 could introduce a rolling moment 273 00:15:39,831 --> 00:15:43,751 or also stall one of the wings, 274 00:15:43,751 --> 00:15:47,004 which would further exacerbate the rolling moment. 275 00:15:47,672 --> 00:15:50,216 Investigators examine the actuator 276 00:15:50,216 --> 00:15:53,010 that controls the rudder's movement. 277 00:15:53,010 --> 00:15:55,263 The piston is completely intact. 278 00:15:56,514 --> 00:15:58,516 No sign of any damage. 279 00:16:01,477 --> 00:16:05,023 There was no pre-existing conditions or failures 280 00:16:05,023 --> 00:16:07,066 that would have explained the accident. 281 00:16:07,066 --> 00:16:09,110 The airplane was functioning normally. 282 00:16:09,694 --> 00:16:13,156 If mechanical failure didn't cause the roll, 283 00:16:13,156 --> 00:16:15,491 what went wrong on approach? 284 00:16:16,492 --> 00:16:19,370 Determining the airplane's flight path helps us understand 285 00:16:19,370 --> 00:16:22,665 how that airplane got to the accident site. 286 00:16:22,665 --> 00:16:24,292 What was it doing? 287 00:16:24,292 --> 00:16:26,919 Where was it flying? How fast was it going? 288 00:16:28,588 --> 00:16:30,590 Have a look at this radar data. 289 00:16:32,925 --> 00:16:34,761 With no flight data recorder, 290 00:16:34,761 --> 00:16:38,181 investigators turn to Aspen's radar information 291 00:16:38,181 --> 00:16:41,893 to reconstruct the Gulfstream's descent profile. 292 00:16:44,062 --> 00:16:45,938 Using the radar position and time, 293 00:16:45,938 --> 00:16:48,524 so the altitude and position of the aircraft, 294 00:16:48,524 --> 00:16:51,611 the performance engineers can extract the speed 295 00:16:51,611 --> 00:16:54,072 of the aircraft, how fast is it descending, 296 00:16:54,072 --> 00:16:56,991 and is that appropriate for the approach 297 00:16:56,991 --> 00:16:59,410 that they're trying to do? 298 00:17:00,411 --> 00:17:01,913 Here's what we've got. 299 00:17:03,498 --> 00:17:06,542 This is the approach they should have flown. 300 00:17:06,542 --> 00:17:09,420 Investigators examine the path the pilots 301 00:17:09,420 --> 00:17:12,090 were required to follow into Aspen. 302 00:17:13,883 --> 00:17:17,303 {\an8}Due to the rising terrain away from the airport, 303 00:17:17,303 --> 00:17:19,806 {\an8}Aspen at this time had a step-down approach 304 00:17:19,806 --> 00:17:23,601 {\an8}which from a profile, looks like stairs. 305 00:17:23,601 --> 00:17:26,396 The pilots will step down to an altitude 306 00:17:26,396 --> 00:17:29,273 based on the terrain availability. 307 00:17:29,857 --> 00:17:32,610 Pilots cannot descend below that altitude 308 00:17:32,610 --> 00:17:36,364 until they reach another fix or another distance. 309 00:17:37,573 --> 00:17:39,117 And... 310 00:17:40,910 --> 00:17:43,788 here's the descent the pilots actually flew. 311 00:17:43,788 --> 00:17:46,666 The radar data shows the Avjet flight 312 00:17:46,666 --> 00:17:50,420 deviated from the published descent profile. 313 00:17:51,546 --> 00:17:55,216 Four miles out, they dropped 300 feet below the minimum, 314 00:17:55,216 --> 00:17:56,968 and a mile later, 315 00:17:56,968 --> 00:18:00,138 they dropped 900 hundred feet below the minimum altitude. 316 00:18:00,138 --> 00:18:02,390 And they stayed that way. 317 00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:04,809 They flew in very low. 318 00:18:06,394 --> 00:18:08,938 If you go below a minimum altitude 319 00:18:08,938 --> 00:18:13,609 before you are allowed to, then you no longer can guarantee 320 00:18:13,609 --> 00:18:16,029 the safety of that aircraft. 321 00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:24,245 Why would they do that? 322 00:18:25,204 --> 00:18:28,082 Because the pilots did not fly this approach to standards, 323 00:18:28,082 --> 00:18:31,794 we wanted to look into their backgrounds and training 324 00:18:31,794 --> 00:18:34,339 to better understand why the accident 325 00:18:34,339 --> 00:18:36,382 may have occurred. 326 00:18:40,261 --> 00:18:44,557 Why did the pilots of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 327 00:18:44,557 --> 00:18:48,436 not follow the prescribed approach procedure into Aspen? 328 00:18:50,646 --> 00:18:53,066 The captain passed his last proficiency check. 329 00:18:53,066 --> 00:18:56,402 So did the first officer. Just a couple months ago. 330 00:18:57,987 --> 00:19:01,032 Investigators learn that all Avjet pilots 331 00:19:01,032 --> 00:19:02,408 are trained to land 332 00:19:02,408 --> 00:19:05,078 in mountainous terrain like Aspen. 333 00:19:05,745 --> 00:19:09,082 And they both flew into Aspen together twice before 334 00:19:09,082 --> 00:19:10,583 without incident. 335 00:19:11,334 --> 00:19:13,461 No accidents, 336 00:19:13,461 --> 00:19:15,421 no reprimands... 337 00:19:16,547 --> 00:19:19,133 Even the Captain's driving record is spotless. 338 00:19:21,177 --> 00:19:22,845 So looking into the background of this flight crew, 339 00:19:22,845 --> 00:19:24,680 we really didn't see anything that stood out. 340 00:19:24,680 --> 00:19:26,891 They were both well qualified, well trained 341 00:19:26,891 --> 00:19:29,185 and experienced to fly this airplane 342 00:19:29,185 --> 00:19:31,187 and make this trip. 343 00:19:31,187 --> 00:19:32,605 And they both got plenty of sleep 344 00:19:32,605 --> 00:19:35,733 before the flight, so fatigue isn't an issue. 345 00:19:36,484 --> 00:19:38,528 In fact, I don't see any issues here. 346 00:19:41,322 --> 00:19:43,199 This doesn't make any sense. 347 00:19:45,952 --> 00:19:48,955 Why would two well-trained pilots fly so recklessly 348 00:19:48,955 --> 00:19:50,623 below the limits? 349 00:19:53,126 --> 00:19:55,169 No matter whether you're a charter pilot, 350 00:19:55,169 --> 00:19:57,213 or an airline pilot, or even just 351 00:19:57,213 --> 00:19:59,382 a personal general aviation pilot, 352 00:19:59,382 --> 00:20:00,883 you know, our number one job is safety. 353 00:20:00,883 --> 00:20:03,636 Uh, regulations are there for a reason. 354 00:20:03,636 --> 00:20:06,305 What is it that could lead a good flight crew 355 00:20:06,305 --> 00:20:09,809 to go beyond those safety limits? 356 00:20:11,686 --> 00:20:15,732 Okay. So we know the pilots landed at Aspen twice before 357 00:20:15,732 --> 00:20:18,860 without incident. What was different this time? 358 00:20:20,903 --> 00:20:23,865 Maybe they were trying to get eyes on the runway? 359 00:20:25,158 --> 00:20:26,743 Pull up the weather. 360 00:20:35,793 --> 00:20:39,630 It was important to understand exactly what was going on 361 00:20:39,630 --> 00:20:42,884 with the weather, in terms of the layers of clouds, 362 00:20:42,884 --> 00:20:45,386 whether they were solid or broken, 363 00:20:45,386 --> 00:20:47,347 to understand 364 00:20:47,347 --> 00:20:49,807 what capability these pilots may have had 365 00:20:49,807 --> 00:20:53,061 to see objects on the ground. 366 00:20:53,686 --> 00:20:57,857 The crash was at 7:02 PM. Back it up to about 6:30 PM. 367 00:21:00,068 --> 00:21:02,361 They would've been flying in and out of some pretty heavy 368 00:21:02,361 --> 00:21:04,739 cloud here. So... 369 00:21:04,739 --> 00:21:07,617 maybe they didn't have a clear line on the runway. 370 00:21:07,617 --> 00:21:09,869 Okay, but these are seasoned pilots. 371 00:21:09,869 --> 00:21:11,662 They should know if you don't see the runway... 372 00:21:11,662 --> 00:21:13,790 - You don't try to land on it. - And yet, they did 373 00:21:13,790 --> 00:21:15,667 try to land on it. - And they missed by almost 374 00:21:15,667 --> 00:21:19,796 half a mile. So, did they see the runway or not? 375 00:21:21,798 --> 00:21:23,883 We should talk to the controller. 376 00:21:26,636 --> 00:21:29,347 An air traffic controller can tell you 377 00:21:29,347 --> 00:21:31,349 what the visibility is, 378 00:21:31,349 --> 00:21:32,684 what the weather conditions were, 379 00:21:32,684 --> 00:21:34,394 what other airplanes were doing 380 00:21:34,394 --> 00:21:37,480 in terms of coming into the airport 381 00:21:37,480 --> 00:21:39,482 and provide eyewitness testimony 382 00:21:39,482 --> 00:21:41,317 about the time of the accident. 383 00:21:41,317 --> 00:21:43,319 But they also can help us understand 384 00:21:43,319 --> 00:21:46,155 communications that they had with the airplane. 385 00:21:49,200 --> 00:21:51,577 So did they give you any indication at all 386 00:21:51,577 --> 00:21:53,621 that they were having trouble seeing the runway? 387 00:21:53,621 --> 00:21:56,082 No. Quite the opposite. 388 00:21:56,082 --> 00:21:57,792 I asked them if they could see the runway, 389 00:21:57,792 --> 00:21:59,752 and they confirmed that they did. 390 00:22:00,336 --> 00:22:03,297 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha, you have the runway in sight? 391 00:22:03,923 --> 00:22:06,759 Yeah. Runway in sight, three Golf Alpha. 392 00:22:06,759 --> 00:22:09,679 Gulfstream three Golf Alpha visual, roger. 393 00:22:11,180 --> 00:22:12,974 Hm. 394 00:22:13,599 --> 00:22:16,269 I made extra sure to confirm 395 00:22:16,269 --> 00:22:18,479 because I couldn't see them. 396 00:22:18,479 --> 00:22:20,690 The weather was so bad. 397 00:22:20,690 --> 00:22:23,317 Did you have any reason to doubt the pilots? 398 00:22:24,193 --> 00:22:27,739 Not at the time, but... 399 00:22:27,739 --> 00:22:29,699 here's what's so odd. 400 00:22:29,699 --> 00:22:31,826 They confirmed they had visual, but when they came out 401 00:22:31,826 --> 00:22:35,872 of the clouds, they were headed to the right of the airport. 402 00:22:45,340 --> 00:22:46,966 What are they doing? 403 00:22:54,849 --> 00:22:55,892 I don't think they realized 404 00:22:55,892 --> 00:22:57,435 they weren't headed for the runway 405 00:22:57,435 --> 00:22:59,228 until the last second. 406 00:23:01,773 --> 00:23:03,649 When we put those pieces together, you know, 407 00:23:03,649 --> 00:23:05,401 that the pilots did report on the radio 408 00:23:05,401 --> 00:23:06,736 they had the runway in sight, 409 00:23:06,736 --> 00:23:08,654 we had to ask ourselves: Did they really? 410 00:23:08,654 --> 00:23:10,073 Did they really see the runway? 411 00:23:10,073 --> 00:23:14,660 Um, might they have engaged in a little wishful thinking? 412 00:23:16,496 --> 00:23:20,208 This leaves investigators with a troubling question. 413 00:23:22,877 --> 00:23:24,754 They couldn't see the runway, 414 00:23:24,754 --> 00:23:27,298 why did they go ahead with the landing? 415 00:23:27,298 --> 00:23:29,926 Maybe they were under some kind of pressure? 416 00:23:31,344 --> 00:23:34,097 We needed to know the purpose of this flight, 417 00:23:34,097 --> 00:23:36,849 its schedule and the pilots' activities 418 00:23:36,849 --> 00:23:39,018 before they departed for Aspen. 419 00:23:39,018 --> 00:23:42,772 Looking into what happened before the flight took off 420 00:23:42,772 --> 00:23:45,358 from L.A. can help us gain insight 421 00:23:45,358 --> 00:23:49,779 into what might have been going on during the flight. 422 00:23:54,701 --> 00:23:56,202 So sorry to keep you waiting. 423 00:23:56,202 --> 00:23:57,578 No problem at all. 424 00:23:58,246 --> 00:24:00,164 To understand why the pilots 425 00:24:00,164 --> 00:24:03,209 were so intent upon landing in Aspen, 426 00:24:03,209 --> 00:24:06,838 NTSB investigators speak to the Avjet coordinator 427 00:24:06,838 --> 00:24:10,425 who managed flight 3-0-3 Golf Alpha. 428 00:24:10,925 --> 00:24:13,720 The charter coordinators communicated with the pilots 429 00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:17,890 moments before the flight departed Los Angeles. 430 00:24:17,890 --> 00:24:19,851 They would have insights into 431 00:24:19,851 --> 00:24:22,729 what was concerning the pilots, 432 00:24:22,729 --> 00:24:24,981 what they were trying to accomplish, 433 00:24:24,981 --> 00:24:28,151 and some of the decisions being made. 434 00:24:28,860 --> 00:24:31,863 Did you talk to the captain on the day of the flight? 435 00:24:31,863 --> 00:24:34,574 Oh, yes. And there were some problems right from the start. 436 00:24:34,574 --> 00:24:36,534 Really? How so? 437 00:24:36,534 --> 00:24:38,995 Well, the flight was supposed to leave at 4:30. 438 00:24:38,995 --> 00:24:41,372 At 4:15, he called to say the passengers 439 00:24:41,372 --> 00:24:43,207 still hadn't shown up. 440 00:24:45,501 --> 00:24:47,837 Well if the passengers don't show up soon, 441 00:24:47,837 --> 00:24:50,298 with the long taxi out to the runway, 442 00:24:50,298 --> 00:24:52,425 we won't make it to Aspen in time. 443 00:24:52,425 --> 00:24:54,260 So what are you suggesting? 444 00:24:54,260 --> 00:24:56,137 Well, we may need to divert. 445 00:24:57,972 --> 00:25:01,059 The captain was worried that because of the 7 PM 446 00:25:01,059 --> 00:25:02,518 noise curfew at Aspen, 447 00:25:02,518 --> 00:25:04,437 he might have to go to Rifle instead, 448 00:25:04,437 --> 00:25:06,731 which is about 60 miles away. 449 00:25:06,731 --> 00:25:08,566 So he knew about the noise curfew 450 00:25:08,566 --> 00:25:10,401 and he had a plan to divert if he needed. 451 00:25:10,401 --> 00:25:12,070 Absolutely. 452 00:25:14,030 --> 00:25:16,991 They knew that Rifle Colorado Airport was nearby. 453 00:25:16,991 --> 00:25:18,785 They had planned for alternatives even before 454 00:25:18,785 --> 00:25:21,996 they left, which is exactly what a crew should be doing. 455 00:25:23,456 --> 00:25:25,583 When did the passengers board? 456 00:25:25,583 --> 00:25:28,419 They didn't start boarding till around 4:30. 457 00:25:29,670 --> 00:25:31,255 Then what happened? 458 00:25:31,255 --> 00:25:33,633 About 10 minutes later, I got a phone call 459 00:25:33,633 --> 00:25:35,676 from the client's personal assistant. 460 00:25:35,676 --> 00:25:38,763 And he told me the client was very upset. 461 00:25:40,223 --> 00:25:41,432 Hm. 462 00:25:41,432 --> 00:25:43,559 What's this about diverting to Rifle? 463 00:25:43,559 --> 00:25:45,144 What do you mean? 464 00:25:46,312 --> 00:25:47,939 Once the passengers boarded, 465 00:25:47,939 --> 00:25:53,111 there was a call by the charter customer's assistant 466 00:25:53,111 --> 00:25:56,864 expressing concern 467 00:25:56,864 --> 00:25:59,909 that the crew had told the passengers 468 00:25:59,909 --> 00:26:02,745 that they might have to go to another airport. 469 00:26:02,745 --> 00:26:04,914 Welcome. Welcome. Given the delay in boarding, 470 00:26:04,914 --> 00:26:07,375 it looks like we may have to divert to Rifle. 471 00:26:12,839 --> 00:26:15,383 So the client had his assistant call me. 472 00:26:16,551 --> 00:26:19,345 So my boss wants you to tell the pilot 473 00:26:19,345 --> 00:26:22,974 to, well, keep his mouth shut around the passengers. 474 00:26:22,974 --> 00:26:26,936 And if he has anything to say, save it until he gets there, 475 00:26:26,936 --> 00:26:28,938 and then they can talk it over. 476 00:26:28,938 --> 00:26:31,399 Understood. There is nothing to worry about. 477 00:26:31,399 --> 00:26:32,734 I'll take care of it. 478 00:26:32,734 --> 00:26:35,069 Thank you very much for letting me know. 479 00:26:38,114 --> 00:26:40,575 So, of course, safety comes first, 480 00:26:40,575 --> 00:26:43,661 but we wanted to keep the client happy. 481 00:26:43,661 --> 00:26:45,621 And did this make it back to the captain? 482 00:26:45,621 --> 00:26:47,498 Yes, I called him right away. 483 00:26:49,042 --> 00:26:50,334 The client's very upset. 484 00:26:50,334 --> 00:26:52,795 He doesn't want you speaking to the passengers anymore, 485 00:26:52,795 --> 00:26:54,172 only to him. 486 00:26:54,172 --> 00:26:57,633 Understood, okay. Don't mention diverting. 487 00:26:57,633 --> 00:26:59,260 Thank you so much. 488 00:26:59,260 --> 00:27:00,428 Yup. 489 00:27:04,057 --> 00:27:07,518 He was worried that he was going to disappoint our boss, 490 00:27:07,518 --> 00:27:10,772 maybe even get into trouble for upsetting the client. 491 00:27:10,772 --> 00:27:13,316 But he wouldn't get into trouble. 492 00:27:14,150 --> 00:27:16,903 In a charter operation, the needs of your passengers 493 00:27:16,903 --> 00:27:19,781 are front and center. You're fully aware of them. 494 00:27:19,781 --> 00:27:23,284 And in a situation where a group of people 495 00:27:23,284 --> 00:27:24,786 are going to a dinner 496 00:27:24,786 --> 00:27:27,914 and that's the only reason they're taking this trip, 497 00:27:27,914 --> 00:27:30,124 if they can't satisfy that timeline, 498 00:27:30,124 --> 00:27:33,628 then there was no point of being on that aircraft. 499 00:27:34,045 --> 00:27:37,882 The Captain was told not to upset the passengers. 500 00:27:37,882 --> 00:27:40,218 Did that instruction affect his decision 501 00:27:40,218 --> 00:27:42,845 about diverting his plane to Rifle? 502 00:27:42,845 --> 00:27:45,515 And so this was all before they took off? 503 00:27:45,515 --> 00:27:47,558 - Yes. - And was that the last time 504 00:27:47,558 --> 00:27:49,352 you spoke to the captain? - No. 505 00:27:49,352 --> 00:27:51,562 He called me again en route to Aspen. 506 00:27:51,562 --> 00:27:53,314 And what time was that? 507 00:27:54,649 --> 00:27:56,109 6:30. 508 00:27:57,860 --> 00:28:01,239 We'll be landing at Aspen in about 20, 25 minutes, 509 00:28:01,239 --> 00:28:03,032 but we'll have to spend the night there. 510 00:28:03,032 --> 00:28:05,326 No problem, I can book you rooms. 511 00:28:05,326 --> 00:28:09,163 Hey, how are the passengers? Are they still upset? 512 00:28:09,914 --> 00:28:10,998 I don't think so. 513 00:28:10,998 --> 00:28:13,418 What about the client? 514 00:28:13,418 --> 00:28:14,961 I had a talk with the client. 515 00:28:14,961 --> 00:28:17,422 It's just really important to him that we make it to Aspen. 516 00:28:17,422 --> 00:28:20,133 Apparently, he's dropping a substantial amount of money 517 00:28:20,133 --> 00:28:21,843 on dinner. 518 00:28:23,094 --> 00:28:24,929 The client didn't want to go to Rifle. 519 00:28:24,929 --> 00:28:26,889 Rifle was more than 60 miles away; 520 00:28:26,889 --> 00:28:29,183 it would have taken them too long to get there. 521 00:28:29,183 --> 00:28:30,852 I see. 522 00:28:32,437 --> 00:28:34,731 Okay, well, 523 00:28:34,731 --> 00:28:36,691 thank you very much for your time. 524 00:28:36,691 --> 00:28:38,192 Happy to help. 525 00:28:39,694 --> 00:28:41,696 Although the pilots would be aware 526 00:28:41,696 --> 00:28:44,490 of the needs of their passengers, 527 00:28:44,490 --> 00:28:46,951 at no point can that supersede 528 00:28:46,951 --> 00:28:49,495 the professionalism of that crew. 529 00:28:49,495 --> 00:28:51,831 Your primary and only real job 530 00:28:51,831 --> 00:28:54,208 is the safety of that aircraft. 531 00:28:55,209 --> 00:28:58,087 You know, it seems they were under a lot of pressure 532 00:28:58,087 --> 00:29:00,757 to land not only before the flight began, 533 00:29:00,757 --> 00:29:03,342 but even during the flight. 534 00:29:04,510 --> 00:29:06,679 The crash happened more than half an hour 535 00:29:06,679 --> 00:29:08,723 after that last call from the plane. 536 00:29:09,724 --> 00:29:12,727 Did commercial pressure influence the pilots 537 00:29:12,727 --> 00:29:17,148 to make a risky decision that cost the lives of 18 people? 538 00:29:17,148 --> 00:29:19,150 You know, this comes up all the time. 539 00:29:19,150 --> 00:29:23,863 Charter pilots often voice on chat rooms 540 00:29:23,863 --> 00:29:25,323 and complaint lines 541 00:29:25,323 --> 00:29:27,950 that they are pressured to keep people happy 542 00:29:27,950 --> 00:29:29,744 and do really difficult things 543 00:29:29,744 --> 00:29:32,455 just to satisfy a demanding customer. 544 00:29:32,455 --> 00:29:34,165 And it's dangerous. 545 00:29:36,084 --> 00:29:38,753 They still had time to correct the situation. 546 00:29:38,753 --> 00:29:42,423 So what happened in these final 30 minutes? 547 00:29:47,970 --> 00:29:49,806 It's here. 548 00:29:49,806 --> 00:29:51,516 NTSB investigators 549 00:29:51,516 --> 00:29:54,310 turn to the cockpit voice recorder of Avjet 550 00:29:54,310 --> 00:29:56,312 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 551 00:29:56,312 --> 00:29:57,897 to understand why the pilots 552 00:29:57,897 --> 00:30:00,566 chose to land instead of diverting. 553 00:30:01,943 --> 00:30:03,569 We could learn about the crew's decision making 554 00:30:03,569 --> 00:30:06,155 and what they were doing from their conversations 555 00:30:06,155 --> 00:30:09,158 with each other, um, you know, how they were planning 556 00:30:09,158 --> 00:30:11,953 and using the information that was coming in 557 00:30:11,953 --> 00:30:13,579 as they approached Aspen. 558 00:30:14,664 --> 00:30:15,998 You know what, let's pick it up 559 00:30:15,998 --> 00:30:18,251 before they begin their final descent. 560 00:30:28,219 --> 00:30:30,013 Hey, do you remember that crazy guy 561 00:30:30,013 --> 00:30:33,266 in the Lear when we were in Aspen last time? 562 00:30:33,266 --> 00:30:35,977 He was, "I can see the airport" but he couldn't see it? 563 00:30:38,438 --> 00:30:40,106 Pause that. 564 00:30:41,858 --> 00:30:45,695 So 14 minutes before the crash, 565 00:30:45,695 --> 00:30:48,031 they're ridiculing another pilot who tried to land 566 00:30:48,031 --> 00:30:50,867 without the runway in sight. 567 00:30:50,867 --> 00:30:53,536 Why did they do the same thing? 568 00:30:53,536 --> 00:30:57,290 At that point, they were still in the mode of, 569 00:30:57,290 --> 00:30:58,708 we're gonna do this right, 570 00:30:58,708 --> 00:31:00,585 and even sort of made a joke 571 00:31:00,585 --> 00:31:03,338 about this one guy that didn't do it right. 572 00:31:06,966 --> 00:31:08,342 Okay. 573 00:31:11,095 --> 00:31:13,097 Okay, we'll shoot it from here. 574 00:31:13,097 --> 00:31:15,391 I mean, we're here, but we only get to do it once. 575 00:31:15,391 --> 00:31:18,728 Alright. Once, and then we go to Rifle, right? 576 00:31:18,728 --> 00:31:21,731 Yeah, it's too late in the evening to come around. 577 00:31:26,194 --> 00:31:28,488 So right there, they're talking about 578 00:31:28,488 --> 00:31:30,031 doing a missed approach. 579 00:31:30,615 --> 00:31:34,035 That was at 6:50, so two minutes later. 580 00:31:35,161 --> 00:31:36,746 12 minutes from the airport, 581 00:31:36,746 --> 00:31:38,790 the pilots confirmed their plan 582 00:31:38,790 --> 00:31:41,209 to divert if they needed to. 583 00:31:42,126 --> 00:31:44,253 As the crew was approaching Aspen, 584 00:31:44,253 --> 00:31:47,006 they were getting the idea that the weather was getting 585 00:31:47,006 --> 00:31:49,092 more difficult to get in, and they were having 586 00:31:49,092 --> 00:31:50,593 a conversation about this. 587 00:31:50,593 --> 00:31:53,012 They mentioned again, "Well we might only have 588 00:31:53,012 --> 00:31:54,889 one shot at this, and we have to go to Rifle". 589 00:31:54,889 --> 00:31:57,767 They were really saying the right things. 590 00:32:00,728 --> 00:32:02,271 Attention all aircraft. 591 00:32:02,271 --> 00:32:04,107 Last aircraft went missed. 592 00:32:05,858 --> 00:32:08,111 - What? - He went missed. 593 00:32:08,111 --> 00:32:09,904 He went missed? 594 00:32:09,904 --> 00:32:13,282 Damn. That's not good. 595 00:32:16,077 --> 00:32:17,787 Nine minutes from crashing. 596 00:32:18,830 --> 00:32:22,166 They know the plane in front of them couldn't land. 597 00:32:22,166 --> 00:32:24,627 And they know it's a bad sign for them. 598 00:32:26,170 --> 00:32:28,297 That clearly had to put some pressure on them 599 00:32:28,297 --> 00:32:31,592 {\an8}to say, alright, this is uh, this is not looking good. 600 00:32:32,635 --> 00:32:35,596 {\an8}It should have those pilots starting to get into 601 00:32:35,596 --> 00:32:37,974 {\an8}the mindset of executing the missed approach 602 00:32:37,974 --> 00:32:39,517 {\an8}rather than landing the aircraft. 603 00:32:39,892 --> 00:32:43,146 So they know they shouldn't attempt the landing either. 604 00:32:43,146 --> 00:32:45,023 Up until now, they've been doing everything 605 00:32:45,023 --> 00:32:47,316 right by the book. - Yeah. 606 00:32:47,316 --> 00:32:49,736 I wonder what changed. 607 00:32:50,570 --> 00:32:53,614 Investigators discover something unusual 608 00:32:53,614 --> 00:32:55,908 in the CVR transcripts. 609 00:32:55,908 --> 00:32:57,326 Huh. 610 00:32:59,579 --> 00:33:00,830 It looks like the flight attendant 611 00:33:00,830 --> 00:33:02,749 brought someone into the cockpit. 612 00:33:05,168 --> 00:33:07,253 About eight minutes before the accident, 613 00:33:07,253 --> 00:33:11,257 somebody came into the cockpit, one of the passengers. 614 00:33:12,008 --> 00:33:13,760 Thank you very much. 615 00:33:20,850 --> 00:33:22,810 Do you think it's the client? 616 00:33:25,646 --> 00:33:26,939 It's possible. 617 00:33:28,483 --> 00:33:30,735 Having somebody else up on the flight deck 618 00:33:30,735 --> 00:33:32,862 as you're conducting an approach 619 00:33:32,862 --> 00:33:36,908 into a mountainous area at night 620 00:33:36,908 --> 00:33:40,495 in poor weather is not a good idea. 621 00:33:43,581 --> 00:33:46,376 Did the presence of a passenger in the cockpit 622 00:33:46,376 --> 00:33:48,669 play a role in the crash? 623 00:33:56,427 --> 00:33:58,471 The weather's gone down. 624 00:33:59,847 --> 00:34:01,099 They're not making it in. 625 00:34:01,099 --> 00:34:03,267 As the crew got closer to Aspen, 626 00:34:03,267 --> 00:34:04,644 the weather worsened, 627 00:34:04,644 --> 00:34:08,356 making it more dangerous for planes to try to land. 628 00:34:09,023 --> 00:34:10,316 Oh, really. 629 00:34:10,942 --> 00:34:12,652 "Oh, really"? 630 00:34:14,904 --> 00:34:16,739 The only conversation that should be going on 631 00:34:16,739 --> 00:34:20,410 is between the crew about aspects of the flight. 632 00:34:20,410 --> 00:34:22,161 If you're having someone up there questioning 633 00:34:22,161 --> 00:34:24,247 their decision making, questioning, you know, 634 00:34:24,247 --> 00:34:25,665 the weather and the operation, 635 00:34:25,665 --> 00:34:28,835 um, it's just such a distraction and a pressure to them. 636 00:34:30,503 --> 00:34:32,505 As the pilots approach the airport, 637 00:34:32,505 --> 00:34:34,882 the situation intensified. 638 00:34:36,426 --> 00:34:39,011 Challenger nine eight Romeo, you're number one. 639 00:34:39,595 --> 00:34:41,097 Nine eight Romeo, 640 00:34:41,097 --> 00:34:43,433 negative visual on the missed. 641 00:34:43,433 --> 00:34:45,935 They learn that the plane ahead of Avjet 642 00:34:45,935 --> 00:34:47,437 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 643 00:34:47,437 --> 00:34:49,439 also missed their approach 644 00:34:49,439 --> 00:34:51,607 because they couldn't see the runway. 645 00:34:52,483 --> 00:34:54,485 {\an8}It's too dangerous to land on that runway 646 00:34:54,485 --> 00:34:57,113 {\an8}under these conditions. 647 00:34:57,113 --> 00:34:58,698 So, what happened? 648 00:35:04,287 --> 00:35:05,830 Are we cleared to land? 649 00:35:05,830 --> 00:35:07,707 No, not yet. 650 00:35:07,707 --> 00:35:08,708 He just missed, 651 00:35:08,708 --> 00:35:11,252 the guy in front of us didn't make it either. 652 00:35:11,252 --> 00:35:12,795 Oh, really. 653 00:35:16,424 --> 00:35:17,967 Okay, so it sounds like this guy 654 00:35:17,967 --> 00:35:19,969 is sending the pilots a message. 655 00:35:19,969 --> 00:35:21,721 Exactly. 656 00:35:23,431 --> 00:35:25,350 "Oh, really," may not sound like much, 657 00:35:25,350 --> 00:35:28,394 but after all those other things that had occurred, 658 00:35:28,394 --> 00:35:31,481 I think, "Oh, really" was a warning shot. 659 00:35:31,481 --> 00:35:33,566 Get this thing in Aspen. 660 00:35:34,609 --> 00:35:37,320 But the pilots still had one more chance 661 00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:39,072 to implement their back-up plan 662 00:35:39,072 --> 00:35:41,407 to divert to another airport. 663 00:35:44,660 --> 00:35:45,912 Where's it at? 664 00:35:47,747 --> 00:35:50,625 So obviously, they still can't see the runway. 665 00:35:53,544 --> 00:35:55,922 - To the right. - To the right. 666 00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:04,389 So, instead of executing a missed approach, 667 00:36:04,389 --> 00:36:05,681 they're still looking for the runway, 668 00:36:05,681 --> 00:36:07,850 which is actually to their left. 669 00:36:08,810 --> 00:36:10,853 There was a river valley and some roads nearby. 670 00:36:10,853 --> 00:36:13,272 Might they have seen something they thought was the runway, 671 00:36:13,272 --> 00:36:15,650 you know, some lights of the village or whatnot. 672 00:36:15,650 --> 00:36:17,193 Then they believed they saw the runway, 673 00:36:17,193 --> 00:36:18,861 but that wasn't correct. 674 00:36:19,696 --> 00:36:21,364 They just keep flying lower and lower 675 00:36:21,364 --> 00:36:23,366 looking for the airport. 676 00:36:24,742 --> 00:36:26,953 They were just under way too much pressure 677 00:36:26,953 --> 00:36:28,788 to make good decisions. 678 00:36:31,457 --> 00:36:33,209 They had the night curfew. 679 00:36:33,209 --> 00:36:34,544 They had a, the time pressure, 680 00:36:34,544 --> 00:36:36,546 uh, pressure from the client as well, 681 00:36:36,546 --> 00:36:39,298 um, and then with the weather coming in and out 682 00:36:39,298 --> 00:36:41,634 as they stepped down, 683 00:36:41,634 --> 00:36:44,470 they'd catch glimpses now and then of the ground. 684 00:36:45,346 --> 00:36:47,223 Five hundred. 685 00:36:47,223 --> 00:36:48,558 Ref plus five. 686 00:36:48,558 --> 00:36:50,727 Sink rate. Sink rate. 687 00:36:52,854 --> 00:36:54,981 22 seconds after crossing 688 00:36:54,981 --> 00:36:56,607 the missed approach point, 689 00:36:56,607 --> 00:37:00,903 Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha hits the ground. 690 00:37:25,011 --> 00:37:27,388 So... 691 00:37:27,388 --> 00:37:30,183 in Los Angeles, they were ready to divert. 692 00:37:32,060 --> 00:37:35,104 Then they get chewed out for talking about diverting, 693 00:37:35,104 --> 00:37:38,274 and the client tells them how important the dinner is. 694 00:37:38,274 --> 00:37:39,609 Topping it all off, 695 00:37:39,609 --> 00:37:41,319 the passenger enters the cockpit. 696 00:37:41,319 --> 00:37:42,945 So, by the time they get to Aspen... 697 00:37:42,945 --> 00:37:45,698 They were bound and determined to land. 698 00:37:48,659 --> 00:37:52,622 Sadly, they turned into the pilots they were ridiculing. 699 00:37:53,623 --> 00:37:56,626 All indications 700 00:37:56,626 --> 00:37:58,878 from our investigation 701 00:37:58,878 --> 00:38:01,714 show that these two pilots were good pilots. 702 00:38:01,714 --> 00:38:06,052 Once the crew descended without the runway in sight... 703 00:38:07,595 --> 00:38:09,639 the accident was inevitable. 704 00:38:11,683 --> 00:38:15,061 They just kept pushing, and step by step, 705 00:38:15,061 --> 00:38:17,438 it got worse and worse until 706 00:38:17,438 --> 00:38:19,315 they descended too low. 707 00:38:19,315 --> 00:38:21,150 Despite the pressures 708 00:38:21,150 --> 00:38:23,027 the pilots were under to land, 709 00:38:23,027 --> 00:38:24,821 there was one more safeguard 710 00:38:24,821 --> 00:38:27,156 that could have prevented this tragedy. 711 00:38:27,156 --> 00:38:28,991 You're not gonna believe this. 712 00:38:38,876 --> 00:38:42,463 Investigators of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha 713 00:38:42,463 --> 00:38:44,048 examine a safety notice 714 00:38:44,048 --> 00:38:47,719 for Aspen Airport that might have prevented the crash. 715 00:38:48,136 --> 00:38:50,138 A NOTAM. 716 00:38:50,722 --> 00:38:54,142 NOTAM is an official Notice to Airmen. 717 00:38:55,393 --> 00:38:57,687 That's a notice put out by the FAA 718 00:38:57,687 --> 00:38:59,981 to tell pilots about some abnormality 719 00:38:59,981 --> 00:39:01,649 in the airspace system. 720 00:39:01,649 --> 00:39:03,776 An approach procedure has been changed, 721 00:39:03,776 --> 00:39:06,863 a navigation aide is out, um, all sorts of things. 722 00:39:08,573 --> 00:39:11,993 Two days before the crash, a NOTAM was issued 723 00:39:11,993 --> 00:39:14,537 with a warning about landing at Aspen. 724 00:39:15,455 --> 00:39:17,498 As far as I can tell, it says, 725 00:39:17,498 --> 00:39:20,585 "Circling NA, not authorized, at night." 726 00:39:20,585 --> 00:39:22,086 So, in other words, 727 00:39:22,086 --> 00:39:24,255 they should never have been flying into Aspen at night 728 00:39:24,255 --> 00:39:25,923 in the first place. 729 00:39:25,923 --> 00:39:31,012 It said that circling not authorized at night. 730 00:39:31,012 --> 00:39:33,264 This approach is only a circling approach, 731 00:39:33,264 --> 00:39:36,100 even if you elect to land straight in. 732 00:39:36,100 --> 00:39:37,560 It actually had the effect 733 00:39:37,560 --> 00:39:41,189 of making that approach not authorized at night. 734 00:39:42,774 --> 00:39:45,777 The crash was at 7:02 PM. What time was nightfall? 735 00:39:45,777 --> 00:39:50,198 Nightfall was officially at 6:55. 736 00:39:51,157 --> 00:39:53,618 Well, that's seven minutes before the crash. 737 00:39:53,618 --> 00:39:55,870 Why didn't they follow the NOTAM? 738 00:39:58,414 --> 00:40:00,708 Investigators examine the Gulfstream's 739 00:40:00,708 --> 00:40:02,543 briefing records to see 740 00:40:02,543 --> 00:40:05,213 if it included the most recent notice. 741 00:40:06,756 --> 00:40:09,467 It looks the first officer did receive the NOTAM 742 00:40:09,467 --> 00:40:11,469 over the phone before the flight. 743 00:40:12,220 --> 00:40:15,098 So who knows if he passed it on to the Captain. 744 00:40:16,641 --> 00:40:18,226 NOTAM's are hard to read, 745 00:40:18,226 --> 00:40:20,978 there's a lot of um, extraneous information in them. 746 00:40:20,978 --> 00:40:24,273 They tell you about everything from a burned-out lightbulb 747 00:40:24,273 --> 00:40:26,234 on a tower fifteen miles away, 748 00:40:26,234 --> 00:40:29,320 to the runway is closed, and everything in between. 749 00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:32,115 And what about the controller? 750 00:40:35,576 --> 00:40:38,538 NOTAM's are also distributed to ATC facilities. 751 00:40:38,538 --> 00:40:39,706 They need to know about 752 00:40:39,706 --> 00:40:42,125 things that affect the airspace as well. 753 00:40:45,420 --> 00:40:48,673 It never got passed on to Aspen ATC. 754 00:40:54,011 --> 00:40:55,847 The reason the tower didn't get the NOTAM 755 00:40:55,847 --> 00:40:59,100 is it was supposed to get sent by, believe it or not, fax, 756 00:40:59,100 --> 00:41:00,935 and for whatever reason, 757 00:41:00,935 --> 00:41:03,396 it didn't get sent to the ATC facilities 758 00:41:03,396 --> 00:41:05,815 that needed to know. 759 00:41:05,815 --> 00:41:08,693 Had the Controller received the NOTAM, 760 00:41:08,693 --> 00:41:11,612 it might have prevented the crash. 761 00:41:11,612 --> 00:41:14,657 In the final analysis, investigators conclude 762 00:41:14,657 --> 00:41:16,659 the probable cause of the accident 763 00:41:16,659 --> 00:41:19,579 was the flight crew's operation of the airplane 764 00:41:19,579 --> 00:41:21,914 below the minimum descent altitude 765 00:41:21,914 --> 00:41:25,793 without an appropriate visual reference to the runway. 766 00:41:26,794 --> 00:41:28,379 This accident happened 767 00:41:28,379 --> 00:41:30,715 because the captain did not go around, 768 00:41:30,715 --> 00:41:33,134 did not conduct a missed approach. 769 00:41:34,218 --> 00:41:35,928 Had he done that, 770 00:41:35,928 --> 00:41:38,056 they would have gone to Rifle. 771 00:41:38,056 --> 00:41:40,308 And the passengers may have been frustrated, 772 00:41:40,308 --> 00:41:42,018 may have been angry. There might have been a big 773 00:41:42,018 --> 00:41:45,146 conversation, but they would have been alive. 774 00:41:48,733 --> 00:41:51,694 Investigators also believe external pressures 775 00:41:51,694 --> 00:41:54,822 played a role in the pilots' decision-making. 776 00:41:56,783 --> 00:41:58,368 We call it "get there-itus". 777 00:41:58,368 --> 00:41:59,869 We were close to the destination, 778 00:41:59,869 --> 00:42:03,706 almost there and the pressure on people to make the decision. 779 00:42:03,706 --> 00:42:05,958 Nothing broke, nothing really failed, 780 00:42:05,958 --> 00:42:07,710 other than just the decision-making, 781 00:42:07,710 --> 00:42:11,089 under pressures of "get there-itus". 782 00:42:13,841 --> 00:42:16,052 As a result of this accident, 783 00:42:16,052 --> 00:42:18,429 Avjet restricts flying into Aspen 784 00:42:18,429 --> 00:42:20,681 between sunset and sunrise. 785 00:42:20,681 --> 00:42:23,685 The FAA also revises its specifications 786 00:42:23,685 --> 00:42:25,061 for flying into Aspen, 787 00:42:25,061 --> 00:42:27,980 with a minimum visibility of five miles 788 00:42:27,980 --> 00:42:31,067 and a cloud ceiling of at least 44-hundred feet 789 00:42:31,067 --> 00:42:34,112 above ground now required for landing. 790 00:42:36,864 --> 00:42:38,783 You see the runway? 791 00:42:38,783 --> 00:42:42,286 This is to ensure pilots always have a clear view 792 00:42:42,286 --> 00:42:44,706 of the runway before landing. 793 00:42:45,206 --> 00:42:46,499 Thank you very much. 794 00:42:46,499 --> 00:42:48,084 Avjet also takes steps 795 00:42:48,084 --> 00:42:50,753 to prevent unnecessary distractions in the cockpit 796 00:42:50,753 --> 00:42:52,588 during the flight. 797 00:42:53,256 --> 00:42:56,175 After the accident, the company issued a bulletin 798 00:42:56,175 --> 00:42:59,429 changing their rules that no passengers 799 00:42:59,429 --> 00:43:01,889 were allowed in the cockpit. 800 00:43:02,265 --> 00:43:05,893 Okay, guys. Let's finish up tomorrow. 801 00:43:07,228 --> 00:43:10,273 Well, the NTSB has also made a number of recommendations 802 00:43:10,273 --> 00:43:12,525 on improving the NOTAM system, 803 00:43:12,525 --> 00:43:15,445 making things a little bit more graphical and easy to use 804 00:43:15,445 --> 00:43:16,738 so that people can sort them out 805 00:43:16,738 --> 00:43:19,157 rather than just reading a list. 806 00:43:20,032 --> 00:43:21,993 The lessons serve as a warning 807 00:43:21,993 --> 00:43:25,788 to all other pilots who interact with passengers. 808 00:43:26,748 --> 00:43:29,000 I think the message of this flight 809 00:43:29,000 --> 00:43:32,712 is there is no dinner date engagement, 810 00:43:32,712 --> 00:43:35,339 or birthday party that is more important 811 00:43:35,339 --> 00:43:38,676 than the lives of your passengers on the plane. 812 00:43:38,676 --> 00:43:41,137 And the pilot has to be tough enough 813 00:43:41,137 --> 00:43:42,847 to stand up to that, 814 00:43:42,847 --> 00:43:45,266 because the passengers just don't know. 815 00:43:45,266 --> 00:43:47,226 They're not pilots, and they do not know 816 00:43:47,226 --> 00:43:51,689 that their behavior is endangering their very lives. 817 00:43:51,689 --> 00:43:53,858 But it did help change the law 818 00:43:53,858 --> 00:43:56,152 and change how the FAA operates 819 00:43:56,152 --> 00:43:59,781 in many aspects. And for that, we're thankful. 820 00:44:27,642 --> 00:44:30,019 Subtitling: difuze 64167

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