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Zulu
On the first day of May 1945,
a 63-year-old naval officer sat in a
makeshift headquarters in northern
Germany and read a telegram that would
make him the most powerful man in what
remained of the Third Reich. Grand
Admiral Carl Donuts, the commander of
the German Navy, had just been named as
Adolf Hitler's successor. The telegram
informed him that he was now the
president of the Reich and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces.
What it did not tell him was that Hitler
was already dead, having taken his own
life the previous afternoon in a Berlin
bunker surrounded by Soviet forces.
For the next 23 days, Donuts would lead
a collapsing nation, issue orders that
affected millions of lives, and face
decisions that no military training
could have prepared him for. His tenure
is often reduced to a footnote in
histories of the Second World War,
overshadowed by the drama of Hitler's
final hours and the celebrations of
Allied victory.
But those 23 days contain their own
desperate struggles, calculated gambits,
and human tragedies.
They reveal what happens when a
professional military man inherits an
ideological catastrophe and attempts to
manage its ending. This is the story of
what donuts actually ordered during his
brief reign and why those orders
mattered far more than most people
realize.
To understand why Hitler chose donuts,
we need to understand what had happened
in the final weeks of April 1945.
The Reich was fragmenting. Soviet forces
had encircled Berlin. American and
British troops were pushing deep into
western Germany. and Hitler isolated in
his underground bunker beneath the Reich
Chancellery had just learned of two
devastating betrayals.
First came Herman Guring, the Reich's
Marshall, long designated as Hitler's
successor, sent a telegram from Bavaria
on April 23rd suggesting that he should
assume leadership since Hitler was
trapped in Berlin. Hitler interpreted
this as an attempted coup and stripped
Guring of all his offices.
Then came Heinrich Himmler. On April
28th, Hitler learned through a BBC
broadcast that the SS chief had been
secretly negotiating surrender terms
with the Western Allies through a
Swedish intermediary.
For Hitler, this was the ultimate
treachery from the man who had commanded
his most loyal forces.
In his final testament dictated in the
early hours of April 29th, Hitler needed
a successor who had not betrayed him.
Carl Donuts fit that requirement. The
Grand Admiral had remained focused on
naval operations, had never involved
himself in the political intrigues that
consumed so many Nazi leaders, and had
consistently shown what Hitler
considered unwavering loyalty.
Donuts also commanded the only German
military branch still conducting
organized operations across multiple
theaters.
The telegram arrived at Donuts's
headquarters in Plone in the northern
state of Schleswick Holstein late on
April 30th. It was signed by Martin
Borman, Hitler's private secretary, and
it informed Donuts of his appointment
while deliberately omitting news of
Hitler's death.
Borman was still hoping to escape Berlin
and wanted to preserve his own political
position in whatever government emerged.
Dunit initially believed Hitler was
still alive. His first message back to
the bunker pledged his loyalty and
promised to do everything possible to
relieve Berlin and continue the fight.
It was not until the following evening,
May 1st, that a second telegram arrived
confirming that Hitler had died the
previous afternoon. Only then did Donuts
fully understand that he was not merely
acting as a deputy, but was now the sole
leader of the German state. His first
act was to form a government. This might
seem absurd given the circumstances, but
Donuts understood that he needed the
appearance of legitimate authority to
issue orders that would be obeyed. He
appointed Count Lutzwaren Vonrosk, who
had served as finance minister since
1932, as the leading minister and
foreign affairs head. He retained
several existing ministers and military
commanders, creating a cabinet that
could theoretically function. But donuts
had no interest in governing in any
traditional sense.
Within hours of confirming Hitler's
death, he had identified his single
overriding objective, saving as many
German soldiers and civilians as
possible from Soviet captivity.
Everything else was secondary. His
entire 23 days in power would be
organized around this goal. This
priority was not irrational. German
forces and civilians in the east faced a
genuine humanitarian catastrophe.
The Soviet advance had been accompanied
by widespread violence against the
civilian population.
Millions of Germans were already fleeing
westward in chaotic conditions. German
soldiers who surrendered to the Red Army
faced imprisonment in Soviet labor camps
where mortality rates would prove
devastatingly high. In contrast,
surrender to American or British forces
offered far better prospects for
survival and eventual release.
Donuts's strategy was therefore simple
in concept, but enormously complex in
execution. He would continue military
resistance against the Soviets as long
as possible while seeking immediate
surrender in the West.
Every day that German forces held the
Eastern front was another day for
refugees and soldiers to flee westward.
Every local surrender to British or
American commanders was another group of
Germans who would escape Soviet
captivity. This was not a strategy that
the Western Allies were prepared to
accept. The Americans and British were
committed to unconditional surrender and
to their alliance with the Soviet Union.
They had agreed at Yaltta that Germany
must surrender simultaneously to all
Allied powers. Any separate peace with
the West would be a betrayal of Stalin.
Donuts knew this. His gamble was that
local Allied commanders faced with the
practical reality of Germans desperately
surrendering to them would accept these
surreners even if their political
leaders disapproved.
And for a few crucial days, that gamble
worked. The mechanism that made Donuts's
strategy possible was already in
operation when he took power. Operation
Hannibal, the naval evacuation of German
civilians and military personnel from
the Baltic coast, had been running since
January 1945.
Donuts had actually initiated this
operation himself in his capacity as
naval commander, and he now ensured its
continuation and expansion.
The scale of Operation Hannibal is
difficult to comprehend.
Between January and May 1945, the German
Navy evacuated somewhere between 800,000
and over 2 million people across the
Baltic Sea, depending on which
historical estimates you accept. This
makes it the largest naval evacuation in
human history, dwarfing the famous
rescue at Dunkirk, which saved
approximately 338,000
troops. The evacuation was conducted
under appalling conditions. Soviet
submarines and aircraft attacked the
refugee ships. In one single incident on
January 30th, 1945,
the Soviet submarine S13 torpedoed the
passenger liner Wilhelm Gustaf, killing
an estimated 9,000 people in the
deadliest maritime disaster in history.
Other ships met similar fates. Yet, the
evacuation continued because the
alternative was worse. Under Donuts's
leadership as furer, the final phase of
Operation Hannibal reached its desperate
climax. He ordered every available
vessel, from major warships to small
fishing boats, pressed into evacuation
duty. Naval personnel, who might
otherwise have been assigned to combat
operations, were diverted to rescue
missions. The German Navy's final
significant act was not fighting, but
saving lives. On May 2nd, Donuts made
his first major diplomatic move. He sent
Admiral Hans Gayorg Fonfriedberg, the
new commander of the German Navy, to
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's
headquarters at Lunberg Heath.
Fredberg's instructions were to
negotiate the surrender of all German
forces in northern Germany, including
those retreating from the east.
Montgomery was willing to accept the
surrender of combat forces facing him,
but he refused to accept the surrender
of troops still fighting the Soviets.
This was consistent with Allied policy.
Friedberg reported back to Donuts, who
authorized him to accept Montgomery's
terms.
On May 4th at 6:18 in the evening,
Fredberg signed an instrument of
surrender covering German forces in the
Netherlands, northwestern Germany, and
Denmark. This partial surrender
immediately accomplished part of
Donuts's objective. German forces in
these areas could now stop fighting and
be processed as prisoners of war by the
British rather than potentially being
transferred to Soviet custody. It also
freed up naval resources for continued
evacuation operations in the Baltic.
But Donuts wanted more. He sent
Freedberg onward to General Dwight
Eisenhower's headquarters at Rimes to
negotiate a broader western surrender.
Here, the German delegation encountered
much harder resistance. Eisenhower's
chief of staff, General Walter Beetle
Smith, made clear that only
unconditional surrender to all Allied
powers simultaneously would be accepted.
Partial surrenders or deals that
excluded the Soviets were not on the
table.
Friedberg reported back to Donuts in
despair. The Grand Admiral then sent
General Alfred Yodel, the chief of
operations for the German armed forces
to Rams with instructions to negotiate
whatever delays he could manage.
Every additional day of delay meant more
refugees crossing to the west, more
soldiers escaping Soviet encirclement.
Yodel arrived at Rimes on May 6th, and
spent hours trying to convince
Eisenhower staff to accept staggered
surreners or extended timelines.
Eisenhower communicating through Bedell
Smith refused to negotiate. He gave
Yodel an ultimatum. Sign the
unconditional surrender document by
midnight or Eisenhower would close
Allied lines to all German soldiers and
civilians attempting to surrender from
the east. This threat struck directly at
Donuts's core objective. If Allied lines
closed, the entire evacuation effort
would collapse. Refugees and soldiers
fleeing westward would have nowhere to
go. Donuts authorized Yodel to sign. At
2:41 in the morning on May 7th, 1945,
Yodel signed the instrument of
unconditional surrender at Eisenhower's
headquarters in Reigns. The surrender
was to take effect at 11:01 in the
evening on May 8th, Central European
time. This 45-hour delay before the
surrender took effect was a final
concession that Jodel had managed to
extract, giving German forces additional
time to move westward. The Soviets were
furious. They had not been adequately
represented at the reign signing and
considered it a western attempt to
minimize their role in Germany's defeat.
Stalin demanded a second formal
surrender ceremony in Berlin in Soviet
controlled territory with proper Soviet
participation.
The Western Allies agreed.
On May 8th, shortly before midnight,
Field Marshal Wilhelm Kitle signed a
second instrument of surrender at Soviet
headquarters in Carl's Horst, a suburb
of Berlin. This ceremony, not the RAM
signing, is the one that the Soviet
Union and later Russia commemorated as
victory day.
But the surrender documents, whether
signed at Rams or Berlin, did not
immediately stop the fighting or the
evacuations.
Donuts interpreted the terms as narrowly
as possible. He ordered German forces in
the east to continue resisting the
Soviets while enabling as many troops
and civilians as possible to reach
Western lines before the final deadline.
In the final hours before the surrender
took effect, German units on the eastern
front conducted a fighting retreat
westward. Naval vessels continued
pulling refugees from Baltic ports.
Soldiers threw down their weapons and
ran toward American and British
positions.
The German army group center trapped in
Czechoslovakia attempted a mass breakout
toward the Americans. The numbers
involved were staggering.
In the days immediately before and after
the surrender, hundreds of thousands of
German soldiers crossed from Soviet
controlled territory into Western Allied
custody. Many of these surreners were
technically violations of the surrender
terms, which required German forces to
surrender in place to whatever Allied
forces were closest. But Western
commanders on the ground, faced with
desperate men and refugees often
accepted them anyway. Not everyone
escaped. Approximately 3 million German
soldiers were captured by the Soviets,
and many of them would spend years in
Soviet labor camps. Hundreds of
thousands would never return home. The
humanitarian catastrophe that Donuts had
feared became reality for millions of
Germans. Yet his strategy had also
undeniably saved lives. The evacuation
operations, the delayed surrenders, and
the fighting retreat from the east
allowed several million Germans to reach
Western custody instead of Soviet
captivity.
The exact numbers are debated by
historians, but no serious scholar
denies that Donuts's orders during those
final weeks made a substantial
difference in how many people survived
the war's end.
After the surrender, Donuts and his
government entered a strange twilight
existence. The Flynnburgg government, as
it became known, continued to operate
from the Naval Academy at Murwick near
the Danish border for another two weeks.
This seems bizarre in retrospect.
Germany had surrendered unconditionally.
The war was over.
Yet the Allies allowed Donuts'
administration to continue functioning.
The reasons were practical rather than
political. The Allied powers needed some
mechanism for communicating with the
remnants of the German military and
civil administration.
Orders needed to be transmitted to
German units that were still in the
field. Prisoners of war needed to be
processed. The machinery of occupation
was not yet ready to assume all
governmental functions. Donuts's
government provided a useful
intermediary.
During these two weeks, Donuts continued
issuing orders, though his authority was
now entirely dependent on Allied
tolerance.
He worked to ensure the orderly
demobilization of German forces and
their surrender to the appropriate
Allied commands. He attempted to
maintain civil order in areas still
under nominal German control. He
communicated with German commanders to
prevent any unauthorized resistance that
might provoke Allied retaliation against
the civilian population.
Donuts also made one decision during
this period that would prove
controversial among historians.
He kept the Reich government formally in
existence and refused to officially
dissolve the Nazi party. His reasoning
was that only a functioning German
government could negotiate with the
Allies and advocate for German
interests. Dissolving the government
would leave Germans entirely without
representation.
This reasoning ignored the reality that
unconditional surrender meant exactly
what it said. The Allies had no
intention of negotiating with any German
government, and Donuts's continued
existence as nominal head of state gave
him no actual bargaining power. His
decision to maintain governmental forms
was either naive or an attempt to
preserve some shred of legitimacy that
might be useful later. The Allies grew
increasingly uncomfortable with the
Flynnburg arrangement. The Soviets
protested that allowing a German
government to function, even in this
limited capacity, violated the terms of
unconditional surrender.
The Western Allies began to agree.
Press coverage of the Flynnburg
government was embarrassing with
reporters noting the absurdity of Nazi
ministers still holding office while
Allied soldiers patrolled German
streets. On May 23rd, the Allies decided
to end the charade.
Acting on behalf of the Supreme Allied
commander, a British team arrested
Donuts Yodel Schwarren vonic and other
members of the Flynnburg government. The
arrest took place aboard the passenger
ship Patria, which had been serving as
the government's floating headquarters.
Dunit reportedly remained calm and
dignified throughout the process,
requesting only that he be allowed to
pack a bag before being taken into
custody. The manner of the arrest itself
contained a small irony. The British
officer in charge, Brigadier Non Church,
read out a prepared statement declaring
that the acting German government was
dissolved, that the individuals present
were prisoners, and that they would be
held accountable for their actions.
Donuts listened impassively. He had
spent 23 days trying to manage an
impossible situation, and now that
management was no longer his
responsibility. With Donuts's arrest,
the German state effectively ceased to
exist. The Allied powers assumed supreme
authority over Germany through the
Declaration of Berlin on June 5th,
establishing the Allied Control Council
as the governing body for occupied
Germany. There would be no German
government again until the establishment
of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic in 1949.
But Donuts's story was not over. He was
held as a prisoner and eventually became
one of the defendants at the
International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.
The charges against him focused
primarily on his conduct of submarine
warfare, particularly the controversial
orders regarding the rescue of survivors
from torpedoed ships.
The most damaging evidence against
Dunuts was the so-called Laconia Order
of September 1942,
which prohibited Yubot commanders from
attempting to rescue survivors of ships
they had sunk. This order had been
issued after the Laconia incident when a
Yubot attempting to rescue survivors was
attacked by Allied aircraft, endangering
the submarine and the survivors alike.
Donuts argued that the order was a
legitimate military response to
impossible circumstances.
The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted Donuts
of war crimes and crimes against peace,
but notably did not convict him of
crimes against humanity.
His sentence of 10 years imprisonment
was the lightest given to any major
defendant who was convicted. Part of the
reason for this relatively lenient
treatment was testimony from American
Admiral Chester Nimttz, who acknowledged
that the United States had conducted
unrestricted submarine warfare against
Japan using similar methods to those
employed by German yubot.
Donut served his full sentence at
Spandow prison in Berlin, being released
on October 1st, 1956.
He spent his remaining years in a small
village in northern Germany, writing his
memoirs and occasionally giving
interviews. He never expressed remorse
for his service to the Nazi regime,
though he distanced himself from its
ideological aspects, insisting that he
had been a professional military officer
carrying out his duties. He died on
December 24th, 1980 at the age of 89.
His funeral was attended by hundreds of
former Yubot veterans and became a
source of controversy when some
attendees wore old military decorations
and gave traditional naval honors.
The German government had not authorized
any official military participation in
the ceremony.
What should we make of Donuts's 23 days
as Germany's leader? The question
resists easy answers. On one hand, his
actions during this period were focused
on a genuinely humanitarian objective.
He prioritized saving lives over
continuing a hopeless war for
ideological reasons. His orders enabled
millions of people to escape
circumstances that would have meant
death or decades of suffering. He
negotiated the surrender of German
forces in a manner that minimized
additional bloodshed.
On the other hand, Donuts was a willing
and capable servant of a criminal
regime. His yubot campaigns had killed
tens of thousands of Allied sailors and
merchant mariners. He had
enthusiastically supported Hitler and
praised the Nazi system in speeches and
orders throughout the war. His
humanitarian actions at the end cannot
be separated from his role in enabling
the regime that created the catastrophe
in the first place. The Western allies
who allowed his government to function
for 2 weeks after the surrender were
making a practical calculation, not a
moral endorsement. They needed someone
to transmit orders to German forces and
donuts was available.
Once that practical need ended, so did
their tolerance for his government.
Perhaps the most honest assessment is
that Donuts was neither a hero nor a
monster in those final 23 days, but a
military professional managing an
inherited catastrophe with the tools and
perspectives he possessed. His
priorities were consistent with his
background. He had spent his career
responsible for the men under his
command and he extended that sense of
responsibility to the German military
and civilian population as a whole. What
he could not do was step outside the
framework that had shaped him and
recognize the full moral dimensions of
what had happened. The 23 days of the
donuts government are worth remembering
because they illuminate how wars
actually end. not with neat conclusions,
but with desperate improvisations,
humanitarian emergencies, and painful
compromises.
The formal surreners at Rams and Berlin
were political and ceremonial
necessities.
The actual ending was messier. Millions
of people in motion, commanders making
independent decisions, and a nominal
head of state whose power depended
entirely on others willingness to
recognize it.
Donuts issued orders that were obeyed
because enough people in the chaos found
obedience useful. He negotiated with
enemies who tolerated his existence
because it served their purposes. He
managed a government that governed
almost nothing while claiming authority
over everything. And then he was
arrested, tried, imprisoned, and
eventually forgotten by most of the
world. His 23 days remind us that
history's turning points are often
occupied by figures who are neither
entirely in control nor entirely
helpless. Donuts could not prevent
Germany's defeat or the suffering that
followed. But within the narrow space
available to him, his choices mattered.
The evacuation ships that continued
sailing, the surrenders that brought
soldiers to Western custody, the orders
that prevented final stand resistance in
hopeless positions, these decisions
affected individual human lives in ways
that no grand strategy could have
achieved.
Whether those decisions redeem anything
about his earlier service, or whether
they are simply the final acts of a man
who had enabled catastrophe trying to
limit its consequences, is a question
that each viewer must answer for
themselves.
History provides the evidence.
The moral verdict remains open.
What is certain is that for 23 days in
May 1945,
Carl Donuts held a title that had
belonged to Adolf Hitler, commanded
forces that were surrendering across a
continent, and made decisions that
shaped the final chapter of the most
destructive war in human history. His
orders during those days saved lives.
His earlier orders had helped take them.
Both realities coexist in the historical
record. The Flynnburg government ended
quietly with a British brigadier reading
a statement aboard a passenger ship. The
Third Reich, which had promised to last
a thousand years, had survived its
founder by exactly 23 days. And the
naval officer, who had led it through
those final days, went to prison, then
to obscurity, leaving behind a legacy
that defies simple judgment.
That is what Donuts ordered in his 23
days as furer. Not the continuation of
Nazi ideology, but the management of its
collapse. Not victory, but the salvage
of what could be saved from total
defeat. Not glory, but survival. In the
end, perhaps that is the most telling
detail about those 23 days.
The final leader of Nazi Germany spent
his tenure not trying to win or even to
resist, but simply trying to ensure that
as many of his people as possible would
live to see what came after.
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