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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:01,801 --> 00:00:02,635   (narrator): A private             charter jet                   2 00:00:02,702 --> 00:00:03,803  is flying 15 passengers         3 00:00:03,870 --> 00:00:06,673 to Aspen, Colorado for a party.  4 00:00:06,740 --> 00:00:10,310   - This flight really captured    the public attention           5 00:00:10,377 --> 00:00:12,879   because of the people          onboard.                         6 00:00:12,946 --> 00:00:15,048    - Poor weather makes           the landing a challenge         7 00:00:15,115 --> 00:00:17,183    for the experienced pilots.   8 00:00:17,250 --> 00:00:19,652  - Can you see out there            at all yet?                   9 00:00:19,719 --> 00:00:21,021   - No.                          10 00:00:21,087 --> 00:00:23,523   - Aspen is considered          one of the most dangerous        11 00:00:23,590 --> 00:00:25,558 airports in the country.         12 00:00:26,059 --> 00:00:27,594 - As the plane nears the runway, 13 00:00:27,660 --> 00:00:30,697   the controller watches            as disaster unfolds.          14 00:00:30,764 --> 00:00:31,631    (grunting)                    15 00:00:31,698 --> 00:00:33,099  (passengers screaming)          16 00:00:33,166 --> 00:00:34,567  - What are they doing?          17 00:00:35,802 --> 00:00:37,037  (crash)                         18 00:00:37,103 --> 00:00:38,538  - Investigators examine         19 00:00:38,605 --> 00:00:41,040     the Gulfstream's wreckage       for answers.                  20 00:00:42,642 --> 00:00:43,943  - I don't see any issues here.  21 00:00:44,611 --> 00:00:47,747  - When they learn about            the passengers' behavior...   22 00:00:48,581 --> 00:00:52,452 - We're running out of fuel here   for the birthday boy!          23 00:00:52,519 --> 00:00:55,588   - ...the moving parts of this   mystery fall into place.        24 00:00:55,655 --> 00:00:57,924  - That clearly had to put some   pressure on the pilots to say,  25 00:00:57,991 --> 00:00:59,726   alright, this is not             looking good.                  26 00:01:01,861 --> 00:01:03,063 (man on radio): Mayday, mayday.  27 00:01:03,129 --> 00:01:05,031   (theme music)                  28 00:01:06,232 --> 00:01:08,301    (automated voice): Pull up.   29 00:01:08,902 --> 00:01:11,538    (indistinct radio chatter)    30 00:01:23,983 --> 00:01:27,821    (narrator): The sun has just  set over the Colorado mountains. 31 00:01:27,887 --> 00:01:30,924 Avjet November 3-0-3 Golf Alpha  32 00:01:30,990 --> 00:01:33,626     is nearing the end            of its journey to Aspen.        33 00:01:34,294 --> 00:01:36,429 - Well, there's the edge            of the night there.           34 00:01:37,864 --> 00:01:39,032  - Yeah.                         35 00:01:39,732 --> 00:01:43,570  - Captain Robert Frisbie          has almost 10,000 flying hours 36 00:01:43,636 --> 00:01:45,472   to his credit.                 37 00:01:46,005 --> 00:01:48,274  - What time is official sunset? 38 00:01:49,442 --> 00:01:51,544   - He and First Officer          Peter Kowalczyk                 39 00:01:51,611 --> 00:01:54,814     have been flying together        for close to five months.    40 00:01:55,982 --> 00:01:57,417  - 6:28.                         41 00:01:58,852 --> 00:02:02,655    - Both pilots have been with     Avjet for less than a year.   42 00:02:03,990 --> 00:02:05,391     The small charter airline    43 00:02:05,458 --> 00:02:08,194  is based out of                    Burbank, California.          44 00:02:09,863 --> 00:02:12,732 - Avjet catered to high rollers, 45 00:02:12,799 --> 00:02:15,935    business people, people who    could afford to charter a jet,  46 00:02:16,002 --> 00:02:19,539    people who had to get there    in a hurry, but do it in style. 47 00:02:20,773 --> 00:02:24,811 - We're running out of fuel here   for the birthday boy!          48 00:02:25,645 --> 00:02:28,615    - A Miami financier             chartered this flight          49 00:02:28,681 --> 00:02:29,983   for 14 of his friends          50 00:02:30,049 --> 00:02:34,087     to attend a birthday party   at an exclusive venue in Aspen.  51 00:02:35,321 --> 00:02:39,125   - This was a group of friends   who seemed to have had          52 00:02:39,192 --> 00:02:42,061   tremendous early achievements    and accomplishments,           53 00:02:42,128 --> 00:02:44,297   and they were really              going to go places.           54 00:02:46,733 --> 00:02:49,602 - So, forty-eight hundred pounds  one-twenty-six?                 55 00:02:49,669 --> 00:02:51,070    - Wait. It was 50.            56 00:02:51,137 --> 00:02:54,707  - You know what, I adjusted it,   because the fuel was way off.  57 00:02:55,742 --> 00:02:59,012  - The pilots are flying             a Gulfstream III.            58 00:02:59,078 --> 00:03:01,114 (engines roaring)                59 00:03:01,181 --> 00:03:04,951 - The Gulfstream                   is a luxurious plane           60 00:03:05,018 --> 00:03:06,753 that, you know people see          in the movies                  61 00:03:06,819 --> 00:03:09,822   and people think high rollers   and movie stars fly in,         62 00:03:09,889 --> 00:03:11,157    but it's a workhorse plane.   63 00:03:11,224 --> 00:03:13,760  It actually has                    a good reputation.            64 00:03:14,928 --> 00:03:18,565     - It's a 90-minute flight        from Los Angeles to Aspen.   65 00:03:22,101 --> 00:03:25,205    - Gulfstream 3-0-3               Golf Alpha, Aspen,            66 00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:28,408  reduce speed to                  two one zero or slower.         67 00:03:29,309 --> 00:03:31,477    - The controller slows down     the Gulfstream                 68 00:03:31,544 --> 00:03:33,379    to maintain a safe distance   69 00:03:33,446 --> 00:03:36,149   from the other planes             heading into Aspen.           70 00:03:37,617 --> 00:03:40,920 - Two one zero or slower         three Golf Alpha.                71 00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:46,492     - 17 minutes from landing,   72 00:03:46,559 --> 00:03:49,696 the pilots begin their descent.  73 00:03:50,496 --> 00:03:52,966    Aspen Pitkin County Airport,  74 00:03:53,032 --> 00:03:54,801     also known as Sardy Field,   75 00:03:54,867 --> 00:03:57,804   is about three miles northwest     of Aspen.                    76 00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:01,207   Landing on its single            runway is a challenge.         77 00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:05,745   - Aspen is considered          one of the most dangerous        78 00:04:05,812 --> 00:04:08,014 airports in the country.         79 00:04:08,081 --> 00:04:10,984  The runway is not long          80 00:04:11,050 --> 00:04:16,589   and it is in close proximity     to high terrain on all sides.  81 00:04:18,558 --> 00:04:21,327  - Hey, do you remember             that crazy guy in the Lear    82 00:04:21,394 --> 00:04:23,663   when we were in Aspen             last time?                    83 00:04:23,730 --> 00:04:27,000 He was, "I can see the airport,"  but he couldn't see it.         84 00:04:27,066 --> 00:04:28,701    (laughing)                    85 00:04:29,636 --> 00:04:31,037 Okay, set you up                 on the approach?                 86 00:04:31,104 --> 00:04:32,438  - Okay.                         87 00:04:32,505 --> 00:04:34,741  (narrator): The landing            is made even more difficult   88 00:04:34,807 --> 00:04:38,311    with the final stage needing     to be carried out visually.   89 00:04:39,545 --> 00:04:41,514     As the plane nears Aspen,    90 00:04:41,581 --> 00:04:44,384     a beacon guides it            to the airport,                 91 00:04:44,450 --> 00:04:48,087   but it doesn't lead it          directly to the runway.         92 00:04:48,154 --> 00:04:49,889   Once the airport is in sight,  93 00:04:49,956 --> 00:04:53,126  the pilots must line up             with the runway visually.    94 00:04:53,726 --> 00:04:56,162   - Because of the high terrain     and close proximity           95 00:04:56,229 --> 00:04:58,231   to the final approach course,  96 00:04:58,298 --> 00:05:01,100   the minimum altitude           is a couple thousand feet        97 00:05:01,167 --> 00:05:02,835 above the ground,                  and we must be visual          98 00:05:02,902 --> 00:05:08,041  by that time to safely continue  our descent down to a landing.  99 00:05:08,975 --> 00:05:13,346     - And tonight, the weather   isn't making landing any easier. 100 00:05:14,981 --> 00:05:17,317  - If at any time it's snowing,  101 00:05:17,383 --> 00:05:21,321 it's very hard to acquire          that visual reference          102 00:05:21,387 --> 00:05:24,624 to safely descend further          to a landing.                  103 00:05:27,427 --> 00:05:30,363 - Residential noise restrictions     around the airport           104 00:05:30,430 --> 00:05:32,565  leave the pilots                    only nine minutes            105 00:05:32,632 --> 00:05:36,202  until the landing curfew         at 6:58.                        106 00:05:36,269 --> 00:05:38,471   The crew is cutting it close.  107 00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:42,775   - Can you see                    out there at all yet?          108 00:05:42,842 --> 00:05:44,444  - Uh...                         109 00:05:45,812 --> 00:05:47,046    No.                           110 00:05:49,082 --> 00:05:53,553  - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,   heading zero five zero.         111 00:05:53,619 --> 00:05:54,921   (Frisbie over radio):           Heading zero five zero,         112 00:05:54,987 --> 00:05:56,789     three Golf Alpha.            113 00:05:56,856 --> 00:05:57,924 (engines roaring)                114 00:05:57,990 --> 00:05:59,726     (narrator): As the pilots        prepare to line up           115 00:05:59,792 --> 00:06:03,229    with the runway, passengers     get ready for landing.         116 00:06:03,296 --> 00:06:05,465   (indistinct chatter)           117 00:06:11,404 --> 00:06:13,539    - Okay, synchronizers off.    118 00:06:13,606 --> 00:06:16,976    - There is just enough fuel    for one landing attempt.        119 00:06:17,043 --> 00:06:20,847 After that, the pilots will have   to divert to another airport.  120 00:06:20,913 --> 00:06:22,648 - Okay, it's off.                121 00:06:24,684 --> 00:06:26,619   - Hydraulic pressure's good.   122 00:06:27,387 --> 00:06:29,522  - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,  123 00:06:29,589 --> 00:06:31,090    turn heading one four zero,   124 00:06:31,157 --> 00:06:32,592  intercept final                 approach course,                 125 00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:35,495    maintain one six thousand.    126 00:06:35,561 --> 00:06:37,196  - Eight minutes                     from the airport,            127 00:06:37,263 --> 00:06:39,165   the Controller                  gives the crew clearance        128 00:06:39,232 --> 00:06:41,267     to commence the approach.    129 00:06:41,334 --> 00:06:43,669  - One four zero,                   one six thousand...           130 00:06:43,736 --> 00:06:45,304    ...intercept final            approach course,                 131 00:06:45,371 --> 00:06:47,073 three Golf Alpha.                132 00:06:50,343 --> 00:06:51,978 One six thousand.                133 00:06:55,882 --> 00:06:58,818   (narrator): As the pilots get    their final intercept          134 00:06:58,885 --> 00:07:00,420     to the airport...            135 00:07:01,921 --> 00:07:05,458 - Challenger seven Juliet alpha,  you have the airport in sight?  136 00:07:05,525 --> 00:07:08,294   - ...another aircraft              also on approach to Aspen,   137 00:07:08,361 --> 00:07:10,062  updates the controller.         138 00:07:10,129 --> 00:07:13,399   (Challenger pilot): Ah, that's     a negative. Going around.    139 00:07:14,901 --> 00:07:17,203  (narrator): Those pilots           abort their landing,          140 00:07:17,270 --> 00:07:20,039     because they can't            see the runway.                 141 00:07:21,641 --> 00:07:25,144 - Attention all aircraft,           last aircraft went missed.    142 00:07:26,279 --> 00:07:28,514  - What?                         - He went missed.                143 00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,650 - He went missed?                144 00:07:30,716 --> 00:07:32,351   Damn.                          145 00:07:32,418 --> 00:07:33,986 That's not good.                 146 00:07:34,887 --> 00:07:37,190    - If you can't successfully      land the aircraft,            147 00:07:37,256 --> 00:07:40,026  then a missed approach           is a procedure                  148 00:07:40,092 --> 00:07:44,597 that pilots will execute           to return to a safe altitude.  149 00:07:45,431 --> 00:07:48,367 - As the Gulfstream gets closer   to the airport,                 150 00:07:48,434 --> 00:07:50,470     the weather deteriorates.    151 00:07:52,672 --> 00:07:54,974   (indistinct chatter)           152 00:07:58,978 --> 00:08:01,981  - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,     five miles from Red Table,    153 00:08:02,048 --> 00:08:05,284    cross Red Table at or above      one four thousand,            154 00:08:05,351 --> 00:08:07,720 clear V-O-R-D-M-E                Charlie approach.                155 00:08:09,589 --> 00:08:11,224  - The Controller                    clears the pilots            156 00:08:11,290 --> 00:08:15,127    to begin the final approach       11 miles from the airport.   157 00:08:17,930 --> 00:08:20,600    - You have to be configured    properly at the right altitude, 158 00:08:20,666 --> 00:08:23,603    at the right speed,              otherwise you are expected    159 00:08:23,669 --> 00:08:25,805   to execute a missed approach.  160 00:08:26,873 --> 00:08:28,441    - Red Table                     at one four thousand,          161 00:08:28,508 --> 00:08:30,243    cleared for V O R approach,   162 00:08:30,309 --> 00:08:33,045   Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.   163 00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,182   - Here we go.                  164 00:08:37,450 --> 00:08:40,019    - As the pilots get             closer to the airport,         165 00:08:40,086 --> 00:08:43,823 they're counting on the weather    to improve for their landing.  166 00:08:44,657 --> 00:08:46,826    - Descending to one            four thousand.                  167 00:08:48,427 --> 00:08:50,463  - Problems can escalate           very quickly                   168 00:08:50,530 --> 00:08:52,231  when flying into Aspen.         169 00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:56,702  There's really no room           to recover without breaking off 170 00:08:56,769 --> 00:08:59,138   that approach                     or trying it again.           171 00:09:00,506 --> 00:09:02,041 - Landing flaps.                 172 00:09:02,108 --> 00:09:03,809 - Landing flaps.                 173 00:09:03,876 --> 00:09:05,912  - Just over two minutes           from landing,                  174 00:09:05,978 --> 00:09:08,648   instruments have successfully      guided the pilots            175 00:09:08,714 --> 00:09:10,750  to the airport.                    Now it's up to them           176 00:09:10,816 --> 00:09:12,885  to identify the runway.         177 00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:16,689   - You see the runway?          178 00:09:20,860 --> 00:09:23,796  - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,    you have the runway in sight?  179 00:09:26,666 --> 00:09:28,801    - Oh. Affirmative.               - Yeah, now we do.            180 00:09:28,868 --> 00:09:31,604 - Yeah, runway in sight,         three Golf Alpha.                181 00:09:31,671 --> 00:09:34,941  (controller): Gulfstream        three Golf Alpha visual, roger.  182 00:09:35,441 --> 00:09:37,076 (automated voice): One thousand. 183 00:09:37,143 --> 00:09:38,544   - One thousand to go.          184 00:09:39,512 --> 00:09:42,448   (narrator): The pilots are now less than a minute from landing. 185 00:09:42,515 --> 00:09:44,850 (beeping)                        186 00:09:45,451 --> 00:09:47,853   (indistinct chatter)           187 00:09:51,857 --> 00:09:53,359 (automated voice): Two hundred.  188 00:09:53,426 --> 00:09:57,029 (narrator): At the last moment,  they realise something is wrong. 189 00:09:57,096 --> 00:10:00,433 (engine revving)                 - No, oh! No. No. No. No!        190 00:10:00,499 --> 00:10:03,869  (passengers screaming)          191 00:10:06,172 --> 00:10:09,041   (tense music)                  192 00:10:10,443 --> 00:10:12,778    (grunting)                    193 00:10:15,348 --> 00:10:17,683  - Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha        194 00:10:17,750 --> 00:10:20,953     crashes just short            of the runway at Aspen.         195 00:10:22,588 --> 00:10:23,889 - Aircraft identification        196 00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,592 Gulfstream 3-0-3                    Golf Alpha,                   197 00:10:26,659 --> 00:10:28,995    aircraft location,               it was north of the runway    198 00:10:29,061 --> 00:10:31,597 approximately...                  the Shale Bluffs area.          199 00:10:31,664 --> 00:10:34,133 (sirens wailing)                 200 00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:36,702   (narrator): Emergency vehicles     rush to the scene            201 00:10:36,769 --> 00:10:38,904     in the hope that there are     survivors of the crash         202 00:10:38,971 --> 00:10:42,141     of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.   203 00:10:42,208 --> 00:10:45,578   (tense music)                  204 00:10:51,050 --> 00:10:54,053     But all 18 people onboard        are dead.                    205 00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,256     All 15 passengers,            the two pilots,                 206 00:10:57,323 --> 00:10:59,592     and the flight attendant.    207 00:11:06,599 --> 00:11:09,702   - This flight really captured  the media                        208 00:11:09,769 --> 00:11:13,205 and the public attention          because of the people onboard.  209 00:11:13,906 --> 00:11:18,177  There were a lot of very young, talented people.                 210 00:11:23,049 --> 00:11:25,818   - Put everything from            the tail section over there.   211 00:11:27,787 --> 00:11:31,290  - By the following day,             investigators are on site.   212 00:11:33,392 --> 00:11:36,862 - Thousands of passengers          fly charter airplanes          213 00:11:36,929 --> 00:11:41,333 every year, encompassing         2.5 million flight hours         214 00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:43,669 annually,                         so trying to understand         215 00:11:43,736 --> 00:11:47,073    why this accident occurred    was significant.                 216 00:11:51,777 --> 00:11:53,345    - Let me see that.            217 00:11:53,412 --> 00:11:55,748     (narrator): Within hours,       the plane's cockpit           218 00:11:55,815 --> 00:11:57,883  voice recorder, or CVR,         219 00:11:57,950 --> 00:12:00,619 is retrieved from the wreckage.  220 00:12:00,686 --> 00:12:03,422    - Let's get the data pulled    from that ASAP.                 221 00:12:03,489 --> 00:12:06,025    What about a flight            data recorder?                  222 00:12:10,996 --> 00:12:13,099   Looks like there wasn't one.   223 00:12:13,699 --> 00:12:15,067   Okay.                          224 00:12:16,836 --> 00:12:20,239  - Because the airplane          was manufactured in 1980         225 00:12:20,306 --> 00:12:22,441  and registered in 1981,         226 00:12:22,508 --> 00:12:25,544    it was not required            to have an FDR.                 227 00:12:25,978 --> 00:12:28,380  - While the CVR is sent           for analysis,                  228 00:12:28,447 --> 00:12:30,716     Investigators from              the National Transportation   229 00:12:30,783 --> 00:12:33,052    Safety Board wonder             why the pilots                 230 00:12:33,119 --> 00:12:35,287    weren't able to land safely.  231 00:12:35,354 --> 00:12:39,391  - The plane crashed 24-hundred    feet from the runway.          232 00:12:40,226 --> 00:12:42,194    - When an aircraft crashes       short of a runway,            233 00:12:42,261 --> 00:12:45,164    especially a sophisticated     airplane like a Gulfstream Jet, 234 00:12:45,231 --> 00:12:47,032   a number of questions             arise here:                   235 00:12:47,099 --> 00:12:49,268  How did they get there?           What possible factors          236 00:12:49,335 --> 00:12:52,204   could the crew have?           Was there some sort of a failure 237 00:12:52,271 --> 00:12:53,939 in the aircraft?                 238 00:12:56,242 --> 00:12:58,377  - Take a look at this.          239 00:12:58,444 --> 00:13:00,079  What do you think caused that?  240 00:13:00,146 --> 00:13:03,783    - There's a deep ground scar      at the crash site.           241 00:13:06,552 --> 00:13:07,987    - That would do it.           242 00:13:08,053 --> 00:13:10,222  - Investigators conclude            that it was formed           243 00:13:10,289 --> 00:13:12,992     when the left wing            hit the ground.                 244 00:13:14,126 --> 00:13:16,195    - When an airplane               comes through trees           245 00:13:16,262 --> 00:13:20,232   or vegetation                    as it approaches the ground,   246 00:13:20,299 --> 00:13:21,801   it cuts off branches.          247 00:13:21,867 --> 00:13:23,702  And we can look                 at those branches                248 00:13:23,769 --> 00:13:25,104   and the angles that are made   249 00:13:25,171 --> 00:13:27,973   to understand                   the airplane's attitude         250 00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:32,945    as it came into the ground    and its descent profile.         251 00:13:33,646 --> 00:13:36,982   - Left wing struck the trees      at about...                   252 00:13:39,285 --> 00:13:41,020    49 degrees.                   253 00:13:42,788 --> 00:13:45,124    - That's a hell of a bank.    254 00:13:45,191 --> 00:13:47,526 (engines roaring)                255 00:13:48,994 --> 00:13:51,864    - There is no operationally    relevant reason                 256 00:13:51,931 --> 00:13:54,300   for an airplane to be            banked at 49 degrees           257 00:13:54,366 --> 00:13:58,370 that close to the airport          or that close to the ground.   258 00:13:59,104 --> 00:14:01,507 - Maybe they lost control          of the plane?                  259 00:14:03,509 --> 00:14:06,879 - When we see an aircraft        in an abnormal attitude,         260 00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:08,881 uh, we've got to look at,          did something happen           261 00:14:08,948 --> 00:14:11,383 where the pilots                  couldn't keep it level?         262 00:14:11,450 --> 00:14:15,888    - The plane's position gives  investigators a promising lead.  263 00:14:16,388 --> 00:14:17,990 - Engine failure?                264 00:14:19,558 --> 00:14:22,328   - The loss of thrust           resulting from an engine failure 265 00:14:22,394 --> 00:14:23,963    on one side                   266 00:14:24,029 --> 00:14:25,431   can yaw the airplane,          267 00:14:25,497 --> 00:14:27,166 and if not appropriately managed 268 00:14:27,233 --> 00:14:30,736   by the pilots                    in a timely fashion,           269 00:14:30,803 --> 00:14:33,239  can lead to a loss of control.  270 00:14:34,039 --> 00:14:36,308  - Aside from the impact damage, 271 00:14:36,375 --> 00:14:39,411  there's no sign of fire         to the exterior.                 272 00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:42,314     - The team studies             the engines' compressor blades 273 00:14:42,381 --> 00:14:44,884    to determine if the engines    were functioning                274 00:14:44,950 --> 00:14:47,086   when the plane hit the ground. 275 00:14:48,454 --> 00:14:51,223     When the Gulfstream III's       engines are working,          276 00:14:51,290 --> 00:14:54,727     the compressor blades spin       in a clockwise direction.    277 00:14:54,793 --> 00:14:56,762   If the engines                   were still functioning         278 00:14:56,829 --> 00:14:58,130  when the plane crashed,         279 00:14:58,197 --> 00:15:00,699     these blades would be bent       counterclockwise,            280 00:15:00,766 --> 00:15:02,868   or in the opposite direction.  281 00:15:07,306 --> 00:15:10,409 - No, these are all bent          counterclockwise, so...         282 00:15:10,476 --> 00:15:12,077 it wasn't engine failure.        283 00:15:13,545 --> 00:15:15,481 - Our examination of the engines 284 00:15:15,547 --> 00:15:18,684 showed that there was no           pre-existing damage,           285 00:15:18,751 --> 00:15:21,387    no evidence                     of an in-flight fire,          286 00:15:21,453 --> 00:15:23,956   and also showed that             they were operating normally   287 00:15:24,023 --> 00:15:27,192 and at high power                   at the time of the impact.    288 00:15:28,193 --> 00:15:30,729    - Let's take a look            at the rudder.                  289 00:15:30,796 --> 00:15:33,065  - An airplane operating         at a low airspeed                290 00:15:33,132 --> 00:15:37,202  while the rudder moves             to an extreme limit           291 00:15:37,269 --> 00:15:39,538 could introduce a rolling moment 292 00:15:39,605 --> 00:15:43,442  or also stall one of the wings, 293 00:15:43,509 --> 00:15:46,712  which would further exacerbate     the rolling moment.           294 00:15:47,346 --> 00:15:49,882  - Investigators examine            the actuator                  295 00:15:49,949 --> 00:15:52,685   that controls                    the rudder's movement.         296 00:15:52,751 --> 00:15:54,920   - The piston                     is completely intact.          297 00:15:56,188 --> 00:15:58,190  No sign of any damage.          298 00:16:01,126 --> 00:16:04,697    - There was no pre-existing    conditions or failures          299 00:16:04,763 --> 00:16:06,765 that would have explained          the accident.                  300 00:16:06,832 --> 00:16:08,801   The airplane                   was functioning normally.        301 00:16:09,335 --> 00:16:12,805  - If mechanical failure           didn't cause the roll,         302 00:16:12,871 --> 00:16:15,207    what went wrong on approach?  303 00:16:16,175 --> 00:16:19,044   - Determining the airplane's    flight path helps us understand 304 00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:22,348 how that airplane                got to the accident site.        305 00:16:22,414 --> 00:16:23,949    What was it doing?            306 00:16:24,016 --> 00:16:26,618   Where was it flying?            How fast was it going?          307 00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:28,287    (keyboard clacking)           308 00:16:28,354 --> 00:16:30,255   - Have a look                     at this radar data.           309 00:16:32,591 --> 00:16:34,426 - With no flight data recorder,  310 00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:37,896     investigators turn              to Aspen's radar information  311 00:16:37,963 --> 00:16:41,533 to reconstruct the Gulfstream's   descent profile.                312 00:16:43,769 --> 00:16:45,604    - Using the radar position    and time,                        313 00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,207  so the altitude                   and position of the aircraft,  314 00:16:48,273 --> 00:16:51,276 the performance engineers          can extract the speed          315 00:16:51,343 --> 00:16:53,779 of the aircraft,                    how fast is it descending,    316 00:16:53,846 --> 00:16:56,648  and is that appropriate         for the approach                 317 00:16:56,715 --> 00:16:59,051    that they're trying to do?    318 00:17:00,052 --> 00:17:01,587 - Here's what we've got.         319 00:17:03,188 --> 00:17:06,225   This is the approach            they should have flown.         320 00:17:06,291 --> 00:17:09,094  - Investigators examine            the path the pilots           321 00:17:09,161 --> 00:17:11,730  were required to follow            into Aspen.                   322 00:17:13,532 --> 00:17:16,969    - Due to the rising terrain    away from the airport,          323 00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,505    Aspen at this time            had a step-down approach         324 00:17:19,571 --> 00:17:23,308   which from a profile,             looks like stairs.            325 00:17:23,375 --> 00:17:26,045 The pilots will step down         to an altitude                  326 00:17:26,111 --> 00:17:28,947   based on the terrain             availability.                  327 00:17:29,581 --> 00:17:32,317  - Pilots cannot descend            below that altitude           328 00:17:32,384 --> 00:17:36,055 until they reach another         fix or another distance.         329 00:17:37,256 --> 00:17:38,757 - And...                         330 00:17:40,626 --> 00:17:43,462    here's the descent            the pilots actually flew.        331 00:17:43,529 --> 00:17:46,365   - The radar data shows          the Avjet flight                332 00:17:46,432 --> 00:17:50,102    deviated from the published    descent profile.                333 00:17:51,203 --> 00:17:54,873  - Four miles out, they dropped     300 feet below the minimum,   334 00:17:54,940 --> 00:17:56,642 and a mile later,                335 00:17:56,708 --> 00:17:59,812   they dropped 900 hundred feet     below the minimum altitude.   336 00:17:59,878 --> 00:18:02,047    - And they stayed that way.   337 00:18:02,114 --> 00:18:04,450  They flew in very low.          338 00:18:06,051 --> 00:18:08,620 - If you go below                   a minimum altitude            339 00:18:08,687 --> 00:18:13,258    before you are allowed to,    then you no longer can guarantee 340 00:18:13,325 --> 00:18:15,694   the safety of that aircraft.   341 00:18:21,867 --> 00:18:23,902 - Why would they do that?        342 00:18:24,870 --> 00:18:27,773 - Because the pilots did not fly    this approach to standards,   343 00:18:27,840 --> 00:18:31,477  we wanted to look into           their backgrounds and training  344 00:18:31,543 --> 00:18:34,012   to better understand           why the accident                 345 00:18:34,079 --> 00:18:36,048    may have occurred.            346 00:18:39,885 --> 00:18:44,223   (narrator): Why did the pilots     of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha    347 00:18:44,289 --> 00:18:48,093     not follow the prescribed      approach procedure into Aspen? 348 00:18:50,329 --> 00:18:52,731   - The captain passed              his last proficiency check.   349 00:18:52,798 --> 00:18:56,068    - So did the first officer.   Just a couple months ago.        350 00:18:57,669 --> 00:19:00,706   - Investigators learn            that all Avjet pilots          351 00:19:00,772 --> 00:19:02,074    are trained to land           352 00:19:02,141 --> 00:19:04,776   in mountainous terrain            like Aspen.                   353 00:19:05,444 --> 00:19:08,747  - And they both flew into Aspen   together twice before          354 00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:10,215 without incident.                355 00:19:11,016 --> 00:19:13,118  - No accidents,                 356 00:19:13,185 --> 00:19:15,087 no reprimands...                 357 00:19:16,221 --> 00:19:18,790    Even the Captain's               driving record is spotless.   358 00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:22,494 - So looking into the background   of this flight crew,           359 00:19:22,561 --> 00:19:24,363   we really didn't see anything   that stood out.                 360 00:19:24,429 --> 00:19:26,598  They were both well qualified,    well trained                   361 00:19:26,665 --> 00:19:28,867  and experienced                   to fly this airplane           362 00:19:28,934 --> 00:19:30,869    and make this trip.           363 00:19:30,936 --> 00:19:32,271    - And they both got            plenty of sleep                 364 00:19:32,337 --> 00:19:35,440    before the flight,               so fatigue isn't an issue.    365 00:19:36,208 --> 00:19:38,210 In fact, I don't                   see any issues here.           366 00:19:41,013 --> 00:19:42,881  - This doesn't make any sense.  367 00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:48,620    Why would two well-trained    pilots fly so recklessly         368 00:19:48,687 --> 00:19:50,255 below the limits?                369 00:19:52,791 --> 00:19:54,826    - No matter whether            you're a charter pilot,         370 00:19:54,893 --> 00:19:56,929   or an airline pilot,             or even just                   371 00:19:56,995 --> 00:19:59,064    a personal general             aviation pilot,                 372 00:19:59,131 --> 00:20:00,566   you know, our number one job      is safety.                    373 00:20:00,632 --> 00:20:03,335 Uh, regulations are there          for a reason.                  374 00:20:03,402 --> 00:20:05,971    What is it that could lead       a good flight crew            375 00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:09,474   to go beyond                     those safety limits?           376 00:20:11,343 --> 00:20:15,414   - Okay. So we know the pilots    landed at Aspen twice before   377 00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:18,517 without incident.                  What was different this time?  378 00:20:20,586 --> 00:20:23,522 - Maybe they were trying            to get eyes on the runway?    379 00:20:24,823 --> 00:20:26,425  - Pull up the weather.          380 00:20:28,827 --> 00:20:31,163   (tense music)                  381 00:20:35,467 --> 00:20:39,304 - It was important to understand exactly what was going on        382 00:20:39,371 --> 00:20:42,574    with the weather, in terms    of the layers of clouds,         383 00:20:42,641 --> 00:20:45,043 whether they were                solid or broken,                 384 00:20:45,110 --> 00:20:47,012   to understand                  385 00:20:47,079 --> 00:20:49,514   what capability these pilots     may have had                   386 00:20:49,581 --> 00:20:52,718   to see objects on the ground.  387 00:20:53,352 --> 00:20:57,556    - The crash was at 7:02 PM.     Back it up to about 6:30 PM.   388 00:20:57,623 --> 00:20:59,758 (beeping)                        389 00:20:59,825 --> 00:21:01,994    - They would've been flying    in and out of some pretty heavy 390 00:21:02,060 --> 00:21:04,429 cloud here. So...                391 00:21:04,496 --> 00:21:07,299  maybe they didn't have             a clear line on the runway.   392 00:21:07,366 --> 00:21:09,534 - Okay, but these                  are seasoned pilots.           393 00:21:09,601 --> 00:21:11,336 They should know                  if you don't see the runway...  394 00:21:11,403 --> 00:21:13,472  - You don't try to land on it.     - And yet, they did           395 00:21:13,538 --> 00:21:15,340    try to land on it.               - And they missed by almost   396 00:21:15,407 --> 00:21:19,444 half a mile. So,                  did they see the runway or not? 397 00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:23,515 - We should talk                    to the controller.            398 00:21:26,351 --> 00:21:28,987    - An air traffic controller     can tell you                   399 00:21:29,054 --> 00:21:31,023  what the visibility is,         400 00:21:31,089 --> 00:21:32,357 what the weather                 conditions were,                 401 00:21:32,424 --> 00:21:34,026  what other airplanes were doing 402 00:21:34,092 --> 00:21:37,129    in terms of coming            into the airport                 403 00:21:37,195 --> 00:21:39,131 and provide eyewitness testimony 404 00:21:39,197 --> 00:21:40,999  about the time of the accident. 405 00:21:41,066 --> 00:21:42,934 But they also can help us           understand                    406 00:21:43,001 --> 00:21:45,804   communications that they had      with the airplane.            407 00:21:48,874 --> 00:21:51,276  - So did they give you            any indication at all          408 00:21:51,343 --> 00:21:53,311   that they were having trouble     seeing the runway?            409 00:21:53,378 --> 00:21:55,714 - No. Quite the opposite.        410 00:21:55,781 --> 00:21:57,449   I asked them                     if they could see the runway,  411 00:21:57,516 --> 00:21:59,451    and they confirmed             that they did.                  412 00:22:00,018 --> 00:22:02,954   Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,     you have the runway in sight?  413 00:22:03,588 --> 00:22:06,425  (Frisbie): Yeah. Runway            in sight, three Golf Alpha.   414 00:22:06,491 --> 00:22:09,361   - Gulfstream three Golf Alpha   visual, roger.                  415 00:22:10,829 --> 00:22:12,631   - Hm.                          416 00:22:13,265 --> 00:22:15,967  - I made extra sure to confirm  417 00:22:16,034 --> 00:22:18,136   because I couldn't see them.   418 00:22:18,203 --> 00:22:20,405  The weather was so bad.         419 00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:22,974 - Did you have any reason          to doubt the pilots?           420 00:22:23,909 --> 00:22:27,412 - Not at the time, but...        421 00:22:27,479 --> 00:22:29,381   here's what's so odd.          422 00:22:29,448 --> 00:22:31,483  They confirmed they had visual,  but when they came out          423 00:22:31,550 --> 00:22:35,520  of the clouds, they were headed   to the right of the airport.   424 00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:43,028 (engines roaring)                425 00:22:44,996 --> 00:22:46,631   What are they doing?           426 00:22:54,539 --> 00:22:55,574    I don't think they realized   427 00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:57,109    they weren't headed            for the runway                  428 00:22:57,175 --> 00:22:58,910  until the last second.          429 00:23:01,446 --> 00:23:03,315   - When we put                  those pieces together, you know, 430 00:23:03,382 --> 00:23:05,083    that the pilots did report      on the radio                   431 00:23:05,150 --> 00:23:06,385    they had the runway           in sight,                        432 00:23:06,451 --> 00:23:08,320 we had to ask ourselves:         Did they really?                 433 00:23:08,387 --> 00:23:09,755  Did they really see the runway? 434 00:23:09,821 --> 00:23:14,326    Um, might they have engaged     in a little wishful thinking?  435 00:23:16,128 --> 00:23:19,865    - This leaves investigators       with a troubling question.   436 00:23:22,534 --> 00:23:24,436  - They couldn't see the runway, 437 00:23:24,503 --> 00:23:26,972   why did they go ahead          with the landing?                438 00:23:27,038 --> 00:23:29,574  - Maybe they were under          some kind of pressure?          439 00:23:31,009 --> 00:23:33,745    - We needed to know              the purpose of this flight,   440 00:23:33,812 --> 00:23:36,548   its schedule                      and the pilots' activities    441 00:23:36,615 --> 00:23:38,683  before they departed for Aspen. 442 00:23:38,750 --> 00:23:42,421    Looking into what happened       before the flight took off    443 00:23:42,487 --> 00:23:45,023   from L.A. can help us            gain insight                   444 00:23:45,090 --> 00:23:49,428 into what might have been           going on during the flight.   445 00:23:54,366 --> 00:23:55,867  - So sorry to keep you waiting. 446 00:23:55,934 --> 00:23:57,302   - No problem at all.           447 00:23:57,969 --> 00:23:59,838     (narrator): To understand      why the pilots                 448 00:23:59,905 --> 00:24:02,874    were so intent upon               landing in Aspen,            449 00:24:02,941 --> 00:24:06,511     NTSB investigators             speak to the Avjet coordinator 450 00:24:06,578 --> 00:24:10,115  who managed flight 3-0-3           Golf Alpha.                   451 00:24:10,649 --> 00:24:13,418    - The charter coordinators      communicated with the pilots   452 00:24:13,485 --> 00:24:17,556 moments before the flight          departed Los Angeles.          453 00:24:17,622 --> 00:24:19,558   They would have insights into  454 00:24:19,624 --> 00:24:22,394  what was concerning the pilots, 455 00:24:22,461 --> 00:24:24,696   what they were trying           to accomplish,                  456 00:24:24,763 --> 00:24:27,866 and some of the decisions           being made.                   457 00:24:28,567 --> 00:24:31,536   - Did you talk to the captain  on the day of the flight?        458 00:24:31,603 --> 00:24:34,239  - Oh, yes. And there were some   problems right from the start.  459 00:24:34,306 --> 00:24:36,241 - Really? How so?                460 00:24:36,308 --> 00:24:38,677  - Well, the flight was supposed to leave at 4:30.                461 00:24:38,743 --> 00:24:41,046 At 4:15, he called to say         the passengers                  462 00:24:41,112 --> 00:24:42,848  still hadn't shown up.          463 00:24:45,217 --> 00:24:47,486 - Well if the passengers            don't show up soon,           464 00:24:47,552 --> 00:24:49,988    with the long taxi               out to the runway,            465 00:24:50,055 --> 00:24:52,123 we won't make it                 to Aspen in time.                466 00:24:52,190 --> 00:24:53,925   - So what are you suggesting?  467 00:24:53,992 --> 00:24:55,827  - Well, we may need to divert.  468 00:24:57,696 --> 00:25:00,765 - The captain was worried        that because of the 7 PM         469 00:25:00,832 --> 00:25:02,234  noise curfew at Aspen,          470 00:25:02,300 --> 00:25:04,135    he might have to go           to Rifle instead,                471 00:25:04,202 --> 00:25:06,371   which is about 60 miles away.  472 00:25:06,438 --> 00:25:08,206    - So he knew about            the noise curfew                 473 00:25:08,273 --> 00:25:10,075    and he had a plan to divert     if he needed.                  474 00:25:10,141 --> 00:25:11,710   - Absolutely.                  475 00:25:13,712 --> 00:25:16,648  - They knew that Rifle Colorado    Airport was nearby.           476 00:25:16,715 --> 00:25:18,450 They had planned                   for alternatives even before   477 00:25:18,517 --> 00:25:21,653    they left, which is exactly     what a crew should be doing.   478 00:25:23,121 --> 00:25:25,290 - When did the passengers board? 479 00:25:25,357 --> 00:25:28,059   - They didn't start boarding   till around 4:30.                480 00:25:29,361 --> 00:25:30,929   - Then what happened?          481 00:25:30,996 --> 00:25:33,331 - About 10 minutes later,           I got a phone call            482 00:25:33,398 --> 00:25:35,367 from the client's                   personal assistant.           483 00:25:35,433 --> 00:25:38,436  And he told me                     the client was very upset.    484 00:25:39,905 --> 00:25:41,072   - Hm.                          485 00:25:41,139 --> 00:25:43,208  (assistant): What's this            about diverting to Rifle?    486 00:25:43,275 --> 00:25:44,809    - What do you mean?           487 00:25:46,011 --> 00:25:47,612  - Once the passengers boarded,  488 00:25:47,679 --> 00:25:52,817    there was a call by           the charter customer's assistant 489 00:25:52,884 --> 00:25:56,521    expressing concern            490 00:25:56,588 --> 00:25:59,624   that the crew                   had told the passengers         491 00:25:59,691 --> 00:26:02,427    that they might have to go       to another airport.           492 00:26:02,494 --> 00:26:04,563    - Welcome. Welcome.             Given the delay in boarding,   493 00:26:04,629 --> 00:26:07,065 it looks like we may have           to divert to Rifle.           494 00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:15,040    - So the client had            his assistant call me.          495 00:26:16,241 --> 00:26:19,010  (assistant): So my boss            wants you to tell the pilot   496 00:26:19,077 --> 00:26:22,614   to, well, keep his mouth shut    around the passengers.         497 00:26:22,681 --> 00:26:26,585   And if he has anything to say,    save it until he gets there,  498 00:26:26,651 --> 00:26:28,620 and then they can talk it over.  499 00:26:28,687 --> 00:26:31,056  - Understood. There is nothing   to worry about.                 500 00:26:31,122 --> 00:26:32,424   I'll take care of it.          501 00:26:32,490 --> 00:26:34,726    Thank you very much             for letting me know.           502 00:26:36,428 --> 00:26:37,762  (sighs)                         503 00:26:37,829 --> 00:26:40,231  So, of course,                     safety comes first,           504 00:26:40,298 --> 00:26:43,335   but we wanted to keep          the client happy.                505 00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:45,303    - And did this make it back    to the captain?                 506 00:26:45,370 --> 00:26:47,138  - Yes, I called him right away. 507 00:26:48,707 --> 00:26:50,008    - The client's very upset.    508 00:26:50,075 --> 00:26:52,477   He doesn't want you speaking      to the passengers anymore,    509 00:26:52,544 --> 00:26:53,845   only to him.                   510 00:26:53,912 --> 00:26:57,349    - Understood, okay.           Don't mention diverting.         511 00:26:57,415 --> 00:26:58,917   - Thank you so much.           512 00:26:58,984 --> 00:27:00,085  - Yup.                          513 00:27:03,722 --> 00:27:07,158   - He was worried that he was     going to disappoint our boss,  514 00:27:07,225 --> 00:27:10,462    maybe even get into trouble   for upsetting the client.        515 00:27:10,528 --> 00:27:12,998  But he wouldn't                 get into trouble.                516 00:27:13,832 --> 00:27:16,601 - In a charter operation,          the needs of your passengers   517 00:27:16,668 --> 00:27:19,471   are front and center.             You're fully aware of them.   518 00:27:19,537 --> 00:27:22,974    And in a situation             where a group of people         519 00:27:23,041 --> 00:27:24,476   are going to a dinner          520 00:27:24,542 --> 00:27:27,579    and that's the only reason    they're taking this trip,        521 00:27:27,646 --> 00:27:29,814   if they can't satisfy           that timeline,                  522 00:27:29,881 --> 00:27:33,318  then there was no point            of being on that aircraft.    523 00:27:33,752 --> 00:27:37,589 (narrator): The Captain was told    not to upset the passengers.  524 00:27:37,656 --> 00:27:39,891    Did that instruction             affect his decision           525 00:27:39,958 --> 00:27:42,494  about diverting                    his plane to Rifle?           526 00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:45,196   - And so this was all            before they took off?          527 00:27:45,263 --> 00:27:47,232  - Yes.                            - And was that the last time   528 00:27:47,298 --> 00:27:49,000 you spoke to the captain?          - No.                          529 00:27:49,067 --> 00:27:51,236    He called me again               en route to Aspen.            530 00:27:51,302 --> 00:27:52,971 - And what time was that?        531 00:27:54,372 --> 00:27:55,774  - 6:30.                         532 00:27:57,542 --> 00:28:00,945    - We'll be landing at Aspen   in about 20, 25 minutes,         533 00:28:01,012 --> 00:28:02,747  but we'll have to spend         the night there.                 534 00:28:02,814 --> 00:28:05,016   - No problem,                    I can book you rooms.          535 00:28:05,083 --> 00:28:08,853   Hey, how are the passengers?     Are they still upset?          536 00:28:09,587 --> 00:28:10,689    - I don't think so.           537 00:28:10,755 --> 00:28:13,124 - What about the client?         538 00:28:13,191 --> 00:28:14,659  - I had a talk with the client. 539 00:28:14,726 --> 00:28:17,128    It's just really important    to him that we make it to Aspen. 540 00:28:17,195 --> 00:28:19,798 Apparently, he's dropping          a substantial amount of money  541 00:28:19,864 --> 00:28:21,533    on dinner.                    542 00:28:22,767 --> 00:28:24,636 - The client didn't want          to go to Rifle.                 543 00:28:24,703 --> 00:28:26,538    Rifle was more than            60 miles away;                  544 00:28:26,604 --> 00:28:28,873 it would have taken them          too long to get there.          545 00:28:28,940 --> 00:28:30,542 - I see.                         546 00:28:32,110 --> 00:28:34,379    Okay, well,                   547 00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:36,414    thank you very much            for your time.                  548 00:28:36,481 --> 00:28:37,882 - Happy to help.                 549 00:28:39,417 --> 00:28:41,386   - Although the pilots           would be aware                  550 00:28:41,453 --> 00:28:44,155   of the needs                     of their passengers,           551 00:28:44,222 --> 00:28:46,658  at no point can that supersede  552 00:28:46,725 --> 00:28:49,194    the professionalism             of that crew.                  553 00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:51,529  Your primary and only real job  554 00:28:51,596 --> 00:28:53,865   is the safety                  of that aircraft.                555 00:28:54,866 --> 00:28:57,802  - You know, it seems they were   under a lot of pressure         556 00:28:57,869 --> 00:29:00,405 to land not only                 before the flight began,         557 00:29:00,472 --> 00:29:03,007    but even during the flight.   558 00:29:04,175 --> 00:29:06,344   - The crash happened            more than half an hour          559 00:29:06,411 --> 00:29:08,379   after that last call            from the plane.                 560 00:29:09,380 --> 00:29:12,383     (narrator): Did commercial     pressure influence the pilots  561 00:29:12,450 --> 00:29:16,821   to make a risky decision that     cost the lives of 18 people?  562 00:29:16,888 --> 00:29:18,857 - You know, this comes up          all the time.                  563 00:29:18,923 --> 00:29:23,528  Charter pilots                  often voice on chat rooms        564 00:29:23,595 --> 00:29:24,996    and complaint lines           565 00:29:25,063 --> 00:29:27,599  that they are pressured           to keep people happy           566 00:29:27,665 --> 00:29:29,400  and do really difficult things  567 00:29:29,467 --> 00:29:32,103  just to satisfy                   a demanding customer.          568 00:29:32,170 --> 00:29:33,838    And it's dangerous.           569 00:29:35,774 --> 00:29:38,476   - They still had time          to correct the situation.        570 00:29:38,543 --> 00:29:42,113 So what happened                    in these final 30 minutes?    571 00:29:47,685 --> 00:29:49,487   - It's here.                   572 00:29:49,554 --> 00:29:51,256   (narrator): NTSB investigators 573 00:29:51,322 --> 00:29:54,025    turn to the cockpit            voice recorder of Avjet         574 00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:55,994  3-0-3 Golf Alpha                575 00:29:56,060 --> 00:29:57,595    to understand why the pilots  576 00:29:57,662 --> 00:30:00,265   chose to land instead            of diverting.                  577 00:30:01,666 --> 00:30:03,301 - We could learn                 about the crew's decision making 578 00:30:03,368 --> 00:30:05,837 and what they were doing         from their conversations         579 00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:08,840  with each other, um, you know,   how they were planning          580 00:30:08,907 --> 00:30:11,643 and using the information           that was coming in            581 00:30:11,709 --> 00:30:13,244 as they approached Aspen.        582 00:30:14,345 --> 00:30:15,647 - You know what,                 let's pick it up                 583 00:30:15,713 --> 00:30:17,949 before they begin                  their final descent.           584 00:30:27,926 --> 00:30:29,694    (first officer): Hey, do you   remember that crazy guy         585 00:30:29,761 --> 00:30:32,997  in the Lear when we were           in Aspen last time?           586 00:30:33,064 --> 00:30:35,700 He was, "I can see the airport"   but he couldn't see it?         587 00:30:35,767 --> 00:30:38,136  (laughing in recording)         588 00:30:38,203 --> 00:30:39,804   - Pause that.                  589 00:30:41,539 --> 00:30:45,343   So 14 minutes                  before the crash,                590 00:30:45,410 --> 00:30:47,745 they're ridiculing another pilot who tried to land                591 00:30:47,812 --> 00:30:50,548   without the runway in sight.   592 00:30:50,615 --> 00:30:53,251  Why did they do the same thing? 593 00:30:53,318 --> 00:30:56,988 - At that point,                  they were still in the mode of, 594 00:30:57,055 --> 00:30:58,389    we're gonna do this right,    595 00:30:58,456 --> 00:31:00,258   and even sort of made a joke   596 00:31:00,325 --> 00:31:03,027    about this one guy            that didn't do it right.         597 00:31:06,698 --> 00:31:08,032  - Okay.                         598 00:31:10,802 --> 00:31:12,804  - Okay, we'll shoot it             from here.                    599 00:31:12,871 --> 00:31:15,106    I mean, we're here,            but we only get to do it once.  600 00:31:15,173 --> 00:31:18,443 - Alright. Once,                  and then we go to Rifle, right? 601 00:31:18,509 --> 00:31:21,446   - Yeah, it's too late           in the evening to come around.  602 00:31:25,884 --> 00:31:28,219 - So right there,                  they're talking about          603 00:31:28,286 --> 00:31:29,787 doing a missed approach.         604 00:31:30,355 --> 00:31:33,725    - That was at 6:50,             so two minutes later.          605 00:31:34,859 --> 00:31:36,494   (narrator): 12 minutes             from the airport,            606 00:31:36,561 --> 00:31:38,529    the pilots confirmed              their plan                   607 00:31:38,596 --> 00:31:40,899    to divert if they needed to.  608 00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:43,935   - As the crew                   was approaching Aspen,          609 00:31:44,002 --> 00:31:46,738    they were getting the idea      that the weather was getting   610 00:31:46,804 --> 00:31:48,773 more difficult to get in,          and they were having           611 00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:50,308    a conversation about this.    612 00:31:50,375 --> 00:31:52,710   They mentioned again,          "Well we might only have         613 00:31:52,777 --> 00:31:54,579 one shot at this,                  and we have to go to Rifle".   614 00:31:54,646 --> 00:31:57,448  They were really saying         the right things.                615 00:32:00,385 --> 00:32:01,953  (controller): Attention           all aircraft.                  616 00:32:02,020 --> 00:32:03,821     Last aircraft went missed.   617 00:32:05,556 --> 00:32:07,825  - What?                         - He went missed.                618 00:32:07,892 --> 00:32:09,594 (first officer): He went missed? 619 00:32:09,661 --> 00:32:12,964   Damn. That's not good.         620 00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:17,502   - Nine minutes from crashing.  621 00:32:18,536 --> 00:32:21,873   - They know the plane           in front of them couldn't land. 622 00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:24,309   And they know                  it's a bad sign for them.        623 00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:27,979 - That clearly had to put          some pressure on them          624 00:32:28,046 --> 00:32:31,282   to say, alright, this is uh,   this is not looking good.        625 00:32:32,317 --> 00:32:35,320   - It should have those pilots    starting to get into           626 00:32:35,386 --> 00:32:37,655 the mindset of executing            the missed approach           627 00:32:37,722 --> 00:32:39,190    rather than landing             the aircraft.                  628 00:32:39,557 --> 00:32:42,860   - So they know they shouldn't     attempt the landing either.   629 00:32:42,927 --> 00:32:44,729  - Up until now,                   they've been doing everything  630 00:32:44,796 --> 00:32:46,998    right by the book.             - Yeah.                         631 00:32:47,065 --> 00:32:49,434  I wonder what changed.          632 00:32:50,268 --> 00:32:53,304  - Investigators discover            something unusual            633 00:32:53,371 --> 00:32:55,573  in the CVR transcripts.         634 00:32:55,640 --> 00:32:57,008  - Huh.                          635 00:32:59,277 --> 00:33:00,545   It looks like                    the flight attendant           636 00:33:00,611 --> 00:33:02,447  brought someone                 into the cockpit.                637 00:33:04,849 --> 00:33:06,985   - About eight minutes            before the accident,           638 00:33:07,051 --> 00:33:10,922  somebody came into the cockpit,  one of the passengers.          639 00:33:11,689 --> 00:33:13,458  - Thank you very much.          640 00:33:14,058 --> 00:33:16,394   (indistinct chatter)           641 00:33:20,565 --> 00:33:22,500  - Do you think it's the client? 642 00:33:25,303 --> 00:33:26,604 - It's possible.                 643 00:33:28,206 --> 00:33:30,475  - Having somebody else            up on the flight deck          644 00:33:30,541 --> 00:33:32,543 as you're conducting an approach 645 00:33:32,610 --> 00:33:36,647 into a mountainous area at night 646 00:33:36,714 --> 00:33:40,184  in poor weather                    is not a good idea.           647 00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:46,057     - Did the presence             of a passenger in the cockpit  648 00:33:46,124 --> 00:33:48,359     play a role in the crash?    649 00:33:50,561 --> 00:33:52,497   (tense music)                  650 00:33:56,100 --> 00:33:58,169  (Frisbie): The weather's            gone down.                   651 00:33:59,504 --> 00:34:00,838 They're not making it in.        652 00:34:00,905 --> 00:34:02,974  (narrator): As the crew            got closer to Aspen,          653 00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:04,342   the weather worsened,          654 00:34:04,409 --> 00:34:08,046  making it more dangerous            for planes to try to land.   655 00:34:08,713 --> 00:34:09,981   - Oh, really.                  656 00:34:10,681 --> 00:34:12,316  - "Oh, really"?                 657 00:34:14,619 --> 00:34:16,421  - The only conversation          that should be going on         658 00:34:16,487 --> 00:34:20,091    is between the crew             about aspects of the flight.   659 00:34:20,158 --> 00:34:21,893 If you're having someone           up there questioning           660 00:34:21,959 --> 00:34:23,928  their decision making,           questioning, you know,          661 00:34:23,995 --> 00:34:25,396  the weather and the operation,  662 00:34:25,463 --> 00:34:28,533 um, it's just such a distraction  and a pressure to them.         663 00:34:30,168 --> 00:34:32,236  - As the pilots approach           the airport,                  664 00:34:32,303 --> 00:34:34,572     the situation intensified.   665 00:34:36,107 --> 00:34:38,709  - Challenger nine eight Romeo,     you're number one.            666 00:34:39,310 --> 00:34:40,778    (Challenger pilot):               Nine eight Romeo,            667 00:34:40,845 --> 00:34:43,114   negative visual on the missed. 668 00:34:43,181 --> 00:34:45,616    (narrator): They learn that    the plane ahead of Avjet        669 00:34:45,683 --> 00:34:47,151  3-0-3 Golf Alpha                670 00:34:47,218 --> 00:34:49,153     also missed their approach   671 00:34:49,220 --> 00:34:51,322     because they couldn't see       the runway.                   672 00:34:52,190 --> 00:34:54,158   - It's too dangerous to land    on that runway                  673 00:34:54,225 --> 00:34:56,761  under these conditions.         674 00:34:56,828 --> 00:34:58,362   - So, what happened?           675 00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:05,503 - Are we cleared to land?        676 00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:07,371  - No, not yet.                  677 00:35:07,438 --> 00:35:08,439  He just missed,                 678 00:35:08,506 --> 00:35:10,942  the guy in front of us           didn't make it either.          679 00:35:11,008 --> 00:35:12,510   - Oh, really.                  680 00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:17,682 - Okay, so it sounds like        this guy                         681 00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,617 is sending the pilots a message. 682 00:35:19,684 --> 00:35:21,385    - Exactly.                    683 00:35:23,121 --> 00:35:25,056  - "Oh, really," may not         sound like much,                 684 00:35:25,123 --> 00:35:28,092 but after all those other        things that had occurred,        685 00:35:28,159 --> 00:35:31,195   I think, "Oh, really"             was a warning shot.           686 00:35:31,262 --> 00:35:33,264 Get this thing in Aspen.         687 00:35:34,365 --> 00:35:37,001     - But the pilots still had    one more chance                 688 00:35:37,068 --> 00:35:38,803 to implement their back-up plan  689 00:35:38,870 --> 00:35:41,072   to divert to another airport.  690 00:35:44,375 --> 00:35:45,576 - Where's it at?                 691 00:35:47,411 --> 00:35:50,314    - So obviously, they still      can't see the runway.          692 00:35:53,251 --> 00:35:55,620  - To the right.                  - To the right.                 693 00:36:01,425 --> 00:36:04,095    - So, instead of executing       a missed approach,            694 00:36:04,161 --> 00:36:05,329   they're still looking           for the runway,                 695 00:36:05,396 --> 00:36:07,565 which is actually to their left. 696 00:36:08,499 --> 00:36:10,568    - There was a river valley     and some roads nearby.          697 00:36:10,635 --> 00:36:12,970  Might they have seen something    they thought was the runway,   698 00:36:13,037 --> 00:36:15,339   you know, some lights             of the village or whatnot.    699 00:36:15,406 --> 00:36:16,908    Then they believed              they saw the runway,           700 00:36:16,974 --> 00:36:18,576 but that wasn't correct.         701 00:36:19,377 --> 00:36:21,078  - They just keep flying          lower and lower                 702 00:36:21,145 --> 00:36:23,080 looking for the airport.         703 00:36:24,448 --> 00:36:26,651   They were just under             way too much pressure          704 00:36:26,717 --> 00:36:28,486  to make good decisions.         705 00:36:31,155 --> 00:36:32,924   - They had the night curfew.   706 00:36:32,990 --> 00:36:34,225  They had a, the time pressure,  707 00:36:34,292 --> 00:36:36,260 uh, pressure from                   the client as well,           708 00:36:36,327 --> 00:36:39,030   um, and then with the weather  coming in and out                709 00:36:39,096 --> 00:36:41,332   as they stepped down,          710 00:36:41,399 --> 00:36:44,168   they'd catch glimpses             now and then of the ground.   711 00:36:45,036 --> 00:36:46,904 (automated voice): Five hundred. 712 00:36:46,971 --> 00:36:48,272 (first officer): Ref plus five.  713 00:36:48,339 --> 00:36:50,441   (automated voice): Sink rate.      Sink rate.                   714 00:36:52,510 --> 00:36:54,712   (narrator): 22 seconds           after crossing                 715 00:36:54,779 --> 00:36:56,314     the missed approach point,   716 00:36:56,380 --> 00:37:00,618   Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha          hits the ground.                717 00:37:00,685 --> 00:37:02,587    (grunting)                    718 00:37:02,653 --> 00:37:04,555  (passengers screaming)          719 00:37:10,494 --> 00:37:12,096 (engines roaring)                720 00:37:12,163 --> 00:37:15,066    (grunting)                    721 00:37:24,709 --> 00:37:27,078  - So...                         722 00:37:27,144 --> 00:37:29,847  in Los Angeles,                    they were ready to divert.    723 00:37:31,716 --> 00:37:34,819 Then they get chewed out           for talking about diverting,   724 00:37:34,885 --> 00:37:37,989 and the client tells them          how important the dinner is.   725 00:37:38,055 --> 00:37:39,323    Topping it all off,           726 00:37:39,390 --> 00:37:41,025   the passenger enters             the cockpit.                   727 00:37:41,092 --> 00:37:42,593 - So, by the time                  they get to Aspen...           728 00:37:42,660 --> 00:37:45,396 - They were bound and determined to land.                         729 00:37:48,366 --> 00:37:52,303 - Sadly, they turned into        the pilots they were ridiculing. 730 00:37:53,304 --> 00:37:56,307 - All indications                731 00:37:56,374 --> 00:37:58,542  from our investigation          732 00:37:58,609 --> 00:38:01,412    show that these two pilots    were good pilots.                733 00:38:01,479 --> 00:38:05,716  Once the crew descended          without the runway in sight...  734 00:38:07,318 --> 00:38:09,353   the accident was inevitable.   735 00:38:11,355 --> 00:38:14,759 - They just kept pushing,        and step by step,                736 00:38:14,825 --> 00:38:17,128   it got worse and worse until   737 00:38:17,194 --> 00:38:19,030  they descended too low.         738 00:38:19,096 --> 00:38:20,831    (narrator): Despite             the pressures                  739 00:38:20,898 --> 00:38:22,767   the pilots were under to land, 740 00:38:22,833 --> 00:38:24,502    there was one more safeguard  741 00:38:24,568 --> 00:38:26,837     that could have prevented      this tragedy.                  742 00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:28,673 - You're not gonna believe this. 743 00:38:29,707 --> 00:38:32,243    (intriguing music)            744 00:38:38,516 --> 00:38:42,153     rator): Investigators            of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha    745 00:38:42,219 --> 00:38:43,754  examine a safety notice         746 00:38:43,821 --> 00:38:47,391    for Aspen Airport that might      have prevented the crash.    747 00:38:47,892 --> 00:38:49,794    - A NOTAM.                    748 00:38:50,394 --> 00:38:53,798   - NOTAM is an official             Notice to Airmen.            749 00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:57,401 - That's a notice put out           by the FAA                    750 00:38:57,468 --> 00:38:59,737   to tell pilots about           some abnormality                 751 00:38:59,804 --> 00:39:01,372  in the airspace system.         752 00:39:01,439 --> 00:39:03,474   An approach procedure          has been changed,                753 00:39:03,541 --> 00:39:06,544 a navigation aide is out,        um, all sorts of things.         754 00:39:08,245 --> 00:39:11,649    - Two days before the crash,      a NOTAM was issued           755 00:39:11,716 --> 00:39:14,218    with a warning about              landing at Aspen.            756 00:39:15,119 --> 00:39:17,188 - As far as I can tell, it says, 757 00:39:17,254 --> 00:39:20,257   "Circling NA,                     not authorized, at night."    758 00:39:20,324 --> 00:39:21,826   - So, in other words,          759 00:39:21,892 --> 00:39:23,961    they should never have been      flying into Aspen at night    760 00:39:24,028 --> 00:39:25,629    in the first place.           761 00:39:25,696 --> 00:39:30,701  - It said that circling         not authorized at night.         762 00:39:30,768 --> 00:39:32,970   This approach is only            a circling approach,           763 00:39:33,037 --> 00:39:35,773 even if you elect to land          straight in.                   764 00:39:35,840 --> 00:39:37,274    It actually had the effect    765 00:39:37,341 --> 00:39:40,845  of making that approach         not authorized at night.         766 00:39:42,513 --> 00:39:45,449    - The crash was at 7:02 PM.   What time was nightfall?         767 00:39:45,516 --> 00:39:49,887    - Nightfall was officially    at 6:55.                         768 00:39:50,855 --> 00:39:53,290   - Well, that's seven minutes   before the crash.                769 00:39:53,357 --> 00:39:55,559  Why didn't they follow             the NOTAM?                    770 00:39:58,095 --> 00:40:00,431  - Investigators examine          the Gulfstream's                771 00:40:00,498 --> 00:40:02,266  briefing records to see         772 00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:04,869   if it included                  the most recent notice.         773 00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:09,173   - It looks the first officer     did receive the NOTAM          774 00:40:09,240 --> 00:40:11,175  over the phone                     before the flight.            775 00:40:11,909 --> 00:40:14,779 - So who knows if                 he passed it on to the Captain. 776 00:40:16,313 --> 00:40:17,882    - NOTAM's are hard to read,   777 00:40:17,948 --> 00:40:20,684   there's a lot of um,            extraneous information in them. 778 00:40:20,751 --> 00:40:23,988  They tell you about everything     from a burned-out lightbulb   779 00:40:24,054 --> 00:40:25,923  on a tower fifteen miles away,  780 00:40:25,990 --> 00:40:29,026 to the runway is closed,            and everything in between.    781 00:40:29,093 --> 00:40:31,796 - And what about the controller? 782 00:40:35,266 --> 00:40:38,235  - NOTAM's are also distributed     to ATC facilities.            783 00:40:38,302 --> 00:40:39,370  They need to know about         784 00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,806    things that affect              the airspace as well.          785 00:40:45,142 --> 00:40:48,345 - It never got passed on           to Aspen ATC.                  786 00:40:53,717 --> 00:40:55,586  - The reason the tower            didn't get the NOTAM           787 00:40:55,653 --> 00:40:58,823 is it was supposed to get        sent by, believe it or not, fax, 788 00:40:58,889 --> 00:41:00,691 and for whatever reason,         789 00:41:00,758 --> 00:41:03,127    it didn't get sent              to the ATC facilities          790 00:41:03,194 --> 00:41:05,463   that needed to know.           791 00:41:05,529 --> 00:41:08,399   - Had the Controller received      the NOTAM,                   792 00:41:08,466 --> 00:41:11,335   it might have                     prevented the crash.          793 00:41:11,402 --> 00:41:14,371   In the final analysis,           investigators conclude         794 00:41:14,438 --> 00:41:16,340     the probable cause            of the accident                 795 00:41:16,407 --> 00:41:19,310   was the flight crew's              operation of the airplane    796 00:41:19,376 --> 00:41:21,612     below the minimum             descent altitude                797 00:41:21,679 --> 00:41:25,449   without an appropriate visual   reference to the runway.        798 00:41:26,484 --> 00:41:28,085 - This accident happened         799 00:41:28,152 --> 00:41:30,421    because the captain              did not go around,            800 00:41:30,488 --> 00:41:32,790  did not conduct                    a missed approach.            801 00:41:33,924 --> 00:41:35,626 Had he done that,                802 00:41:35,693 --> 00:41:37,728   they would have gone           to Rifle.                        803 00:41:37,795 --> 00:41:39,997    And the passengers may have   been frustrated,                 804 00:41:40,064 --> 00:41:41,732   may have been angry.              There might have been a big   805 00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:44,835  conversation, but they           would have been alive.          806 00:41:48,439 --> 00:41:51,408    - Investigators also believe      external pressures           807 00:41:51,475 --> 00:41:54,478    played a role in the pilots'   decision-making.                808 00:41:56,480 --> 00:41:58,015  - We call it "get there-itus".  809 00:41:58,082 --> 00:41:59,550   We were close                     to the destination,           810 00:41:59,617 --> 00:42:03,420   almost there and the pressure   on people to make the decision. 811 00:42:03,487 --> 00:42:05,689  Nothing broke,                   nothing really failed,          812 00:42:05,756 --> 00:42:07,391  other than just                   the decision-making,           813 00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:10,761    under pressures of            "get there-itus".                814 00:42:13,564 --> 00:42:15,733 - As a result of this accident,  815 00:42:15,799 --> 00:42:18,135   Avjet restricts flying             into Aspen                   816 00:42:18,202 --> 00:42:20,371    between sunset and sunrise.   817 00:42:20,437 --> 00:42:23,407    The FAA also revises              its specifications           818 00:42:23,474 --> 00:42:24,708   for flying into Aspen,         819 00:42:24,775 --> 00:42:27,711     with a minimum visibility      of five miles                  820 00:42:27,778 --> 00:42:30,748 and a cloud ceiling of at least   44-hundred feet                 821 00:42:30,814 --> 00:42:33,784     above ground now required       for landing.                  822 00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:38,489   - You see the runway?          823 00:42:38,556 --> 00:42:41,959     - This is to ensure pilots    always have a clear view        824 00:42:42,026 --> 00:42:44,395   of the runway before landing.  825 00:42:44,895 --> 00:42:46,196  - Thank you very much.          826 00:42:46,263 --> 00:42:47,731  - Avjet also takes steps        827 00:42:47,798 --> 00:42:50,434   to prevent unnecessary            distractions in the cockpit   828 00:42:50,501 --> 00:42:52,236     during the flight.           829 00:42:52,937 --> 00:42:55,873   - After the accident,            the company issued a bulletin  830 00:42:55,940 --> 00:42:59,076   changing their rules              that no passengers            831 00:42:59,143 --> 00:43:01,579   were allowed in the cockpit.   832 00:43:01,946 --> 00:43:05,549   - Okay, guys.                  Let's finish up tomorrow.        833 00:43:06,917 --> 00:43:09,987  - Well, the NTSB has also made     a number of recommendations   834 00:43:10,054 --> 00:43:12,222  on improving the NOTAM system,  835 00:43:12,289 --> 00:43:15,125  making things a little bit more graphical and easy to use        836 00:43:15,192 --> 00:43:16,493 so that people can sort them out 837 00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:18,862 rather than just                  reading a list.                 838 00:43:19,730 --> 00:43:21,699 - The lessons serve as a warning 839 00:43:21,765 --> 00:43:25,469    to all other pilots             who interact with passengers.  840 00:43:26,437 --> 00:43:28,672   - I think the message           of this flight                  841 00:43:28,739 --> 00:43:32,409  is there is no                   dinner date engagement,         842 00:43:32,476 --> 00:43:35,045 or birthday party                 that is more important          843 00:43:35,112 --> 00:43:38,382  than the lives                  of your passengers on the plane. 844 00:43:38,449 --> 00:43:40,818  And the pilot has to be           tough enough                   845 00:43:40,884 --> 00:43:42,553   to stand up to that,           846 00:43:42,620 --> 00:43:44,989  because the passengers          just don't know.                 847 00:43:45,055 --> 00:43:46,924    They're not pilots,             and they do not know           848 00:43:46,991 --> 00:43:51,395    that their behavior           is endangering their very lives. 849 00:43:51,462 --> 00:43:53,564  But it did help change the law  850 00:43:53,631 --> 00:43:55,799  and change how the FAA operates 851 00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:59,470 in many aspects.                   And for that, we're thankful.  852 00:44:05,576 --> 00:44:08,746   (theme music)                  853 00:44:27,331 --> 00:44:29,700    Subtitling: difuze            98333

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