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(narrator): A private
charter jet
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00:00:02,702 --> 00:00:03,803
is flying 15 passengers
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00:00:03,870 --> 00:00:06,673
to Aspen, Colorado for a party.
4
00:00:06,740 --> 00:00:10,310
- This flight really captured
the public attention
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00:00:10,377 --> 00:00:12,879
because of the people
onboard.
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00:00:12,946 --> 00:00:15,048
- Poor weather makes
the landing a challenge
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00:00:15,115 --> 00:00:17,183
for the experienced pilots.
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00:00:17,250 --> 00:00:19,652
- Can you see out there
at all yet?
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00:00:19,719 --> 00:00:21,021
- No.
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00:00:21,087 --> 00:00:23,523
- Aspen is considered
one of the most dangerous
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00:00:23,590 --> 00:00:25,558
airports in the country.
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00:00:26,059 --> 00:00:27,594
- As the plane nears the runway,
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00:00:27,660 --> 00:00:30,697
the controller watches
as disaster unfolds.
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00:00:30,764 --> 00:00:31,631
(grunting)
15
00:00:31,698 --> 00:00:33,099
(passengers screaming)
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00:00:33,166 --> 00:00:34,567
- What are they doing?
17
00:00:35,802 --> 00:00:37,037
(crash)
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- Investigators examine
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00:00:38,605 --> 00:00:41,040
the Gulfstream's wreckage
for answers.
20
00:00:42,642 --> 00:00:43,943
- I don't see any issues here.
21
00:00:44,611 --> 00:00:47,747
- When they learn about
the passengers' behavior...
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00:00:48,581 --> 00:00:52,452
- We're running out of fuel here
for the birthday boy!
23
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- ...the moving parts of this
mystery fall into place.
24
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- That clearly had to put some
pressure on the pilots to say,
25
00:00:57,991 --> 00:00:59,726
alright, this is not
looking good.
26
00:01:01,861 --> 00:01:03,063
(man on radio): Mayday, mayday.
27
00:01:03,129 --> 00:01:05,031
(theme music)
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(automated voice): Pull up.
29
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(indistinct radio chatter)
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(narrator): The sun has just
set over the Colorado mountains.
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Avjet November 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
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is nearing the end
of its journey to Aspen.
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- Well, there's the edge
of the night there.
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- Yeah.
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00:01:39,732 --> 00:01:43,570
- Captain Robert Frisbie
has almost 10,000 flying hours
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00:01:43,636 --> 00:01:45,472
to his credit.
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- What time is official sunset?
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- He and First Officer
Peter Kowalczyk
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have been flying together
for close to five months.
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- 6:28.
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- Both pilots have been with
Avjet for less than a year.
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The small charter airline
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00:02:05,458 --> 00:02:08,194
is based out of
Burbank, California.
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00:02:09,863 --> 00:02:12,732
- Avjet catered to high rollers,
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00:02:12,799 --> 00:02:15,935
business people, people who
could afford to charter a jet,
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people who had to get there
in a hurry, but do it in style.
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00:02:20,773 --> 00:02:24,811
- We're running out of fuel here
for the birthday boy!
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- A Miami financier
chartered this flight
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for 14 of his friends
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to attend a birthday party
at an exclusive venue in Aspen.
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00:02:35,321 --> 00:02:39,125
- This was a group of friends
who seemed to have had
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00:02:39,192 --> 00:02:42,061
tremendous early achievements
and accomplishments,
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00:02:42,128 --> 00:02:44,297
and they were really
going to go places.
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00:02:46,733 --> 00:02:49,602
- So, forty-eight hundred pounds
one-twenty-six?
55
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- Wait. It was 50.
56
00:02:51,137 --> 00:02:54,707
- You know what, I adjusted it,
because the fuel was way off.
57
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- The pilots are flying
a Gulfstream III.
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00:02:59,078 --> 00:03:01,114
(engines roaring)
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00:03:01,181 --> 00:03:04,951
- The Gulfstream
is a luxurious plane
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that, you know people see
in the movies
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00:03:06,819 --> 00:03:09,822
and people think high rollers
and movie stars fly in,
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but it's a workhorse plane.
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It actually has
a good reputation.
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- It's a 90-minute flight
from Los Angeles to Aspen.
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- Gulfstream 3-0-3
Golf Alpha, Aspen,
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00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:28,408
reduce speed to
two one zero or slower.
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- The controller slows down
the Gulfstream
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to maintain a safe distance
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00:03:33,446 --> 00:03:36,149
from the other planes
heading into Aspen.
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00:03:37,617 --> 00:03:40,920
- Two one zero or slower
three Golf Alpha.
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- 17 minutes from landing,
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the pilots begin their descent.
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Aspen Pitkin County Airport,
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also known as Sardy Field,
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00:03:54,867 --> 00:03:57,804
is about three miles northwest
of Aspen.
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00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:01,207
Landing on its single
runway is a challenge.
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00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:05,745
- Aspen is considered
one of the most dangerous
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airports in the country.
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The runway is not long
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00:04:11,050 --> 00:04:16,589
and it is in close proximity
to high terrain on all sides.
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00:04:18,558 --> 00:04:21,327
- Hey, do you remember
that crazy guy in the Lear
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00:04:21,394 --> 00:04:23,663
when we were in Aspen
last time?
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00:04:23,730 --> 00:04:27,000
He was, "I can see the airport,"
but he couldn't see it.
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00:04:27,066 --> 00:04:28,701
(laughing)
85
00:04:29,636 --> 00:04:31,037
Okay, set you up
on the approach?
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- Okay.
87
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(narrator): The landing
is made even more difficult
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with the final stage needing
to be carried out visually.
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As the plane nears Aspen,
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00:04:41,581 --> 00:04:44,384
a beacon guides it
to the airport,
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00:04:44,450 --> 00:04:48,087
but it doesn't lead it
directly to the runway.
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00:04:48,154 --> 00:04:49,889
Once the airport is in sight,
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00:04:49,956 --> 00:04:53,126
the pilots must line up
with the runway visually.
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00:04:53,726 --> 00:04:56,162
- Because of the high terrain
and close proximity
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00:04:56,229 --> 00:04:58,231
to the final approach course,
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00:04:58,298 --> 00:05:01,100
the minimum altitude
is a couple thousand feet
97
00:05:01,167 --> 00:05:02,835
above the ground,
and we must be visual
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00:05:02,902 --> 00:05:08,041
by that time to safely continue
our descent down to a landing.
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00:05:08,975 --> 00:05:13,346
- And tonight, the weather
isn't making landing any easier.
100
00:05:14,981 --> 00:05:17,317
- If at any time it's snowing,
101
00:05:17,383 --> 00:05:21,321
it's very hard to acquire
that visual reference
102
00:05:21,387 --> 00:05:24,624
to safely descend further
to a landing.
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00:05:27,427 --> 00:05:30,363
- Residential noise restrictions
around the airport
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leave the pilots
only nine minutes
105
00:05:32,632 --> 00:05:36,202
until the landing curfew
at 6:58.
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00:05:36,269 --> 00:05:38,471
The crew is cutting it close.
107
00:05:39,872 --> 00:05:42,775
- Can you see
out there at all yet?
108
00:05:42,842 --> 00:05:44,444
- Uh...
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00:05:45,812 --> 00:05:47,046
No.
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00:05:49,082 --> 00:05:53,553
- Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
heading zero five zero.
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00:05:53,619 --> 00:05:54,921
(Frisbie over radio):
Heading zero five zero,
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00:05:54,987 --> 00:05:56,789
three Golf Alpha.
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(engines roaring)
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00:05:57,990 --> 00:05:59,726
(narrator): As the pilots
prepare to line up
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00:05:59,792 --> 00:06:03,229
with the runway, passengers
get ready for landing.
116
00:06:03,296 --> 00:06:05,465
(indistinct chatter)
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00:06:11,404 --> 00:06:13,539
- Okay, synchronizers off.
118
00:06:13,606 --> 00:06:16,976
- There is just enough fuel
for one landing attempt.
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00:06:17,043 --> 00:06:20,847
After that, the pilots will have
to divert to another airport.
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00:06:20,913 --> 00:06:22,648
- Okay, it's off.
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00:06:24,684 --> 00:06:26,619
- Hydraulic pressure's good.
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00:06:27,387 --> 00:06:29,522
- Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
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00:06:29,589 --> 00:06:31,090
turn heading one four zero,
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00:06:31,157 --> 00:06:32,592
intercept final
approach course,
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00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:35,495
maintain one six thousand.
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00:06:35,561 --> 00:06:37,196
- Eight minutes
from the airport,
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00:06:37,263 --> 00:06:39,165
the Controller
gives the crew clearance
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00:06:39,232 --> 00:06:41,267
to commence the approach.
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00:06:41,334 --> 00:06:43,669
- One four zero,
one six thousand...
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00:06:43,736 --> 00:06:45,304
...intercept final
approach course,
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00:06:45,371 --> 00:06:47,073
three Golf Alpha.
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00:06:50,343 --> 00:06:51,978
One six thousand.
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00:06:55,882 --> 00:06:58,818
(narrator): As the pilots get
their final intercept
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00:06:58,885 --> 00:07:00,420
to the airport...
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00:07:01,921 --> 00:07:05,458
- Challenger seven Juliet alpha,
you have the airport in sight?
136
00:07:05,525 --> 00:07:08,294
- ...another aircraft
also on approach to Aspen,
137
00:07:08,361 --> 00:07:10,062
updates the controller.
138
00:07:10,129 --> 00:07:13,399
(Challenger pilot): Ah, that's
a negative. Going around.
139
00:07:14,901 --> 00:07:17,203
(narrator): Those pilots
abort their landing,
140
00:07:17,270 --> 00:07:20,039
because they can't
see the runway.
141
00:07:21,641 --> 00:07:25,144
- Attention all aircraft,
last aircraft went missed.
142
00:07:26,279 --> 00:07:28,514
- What?
- He went missed.
143
00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,650
- He went missed?
144
00:07:30,716 --> 00:07:32,351
Damn.
145
00:07:32,418 --> 00:07:33,986
That's not good.
146
00:07:34,887 --> 00:07:37,190
- If you can't successfully
land the aircraft,
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00:07:37,256 --> 00:07:40,026
then a missed approach
is a procedure
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00:07:40,092 --> 00:07:44,597
that pilots will execute
to return to a safe altitude.
149
00:07:45,431 --> 00:07:48,367
- As the Gulfstream gets closer
to the airport,
150
00:07:48,434 --> 00:07:50,470
the weather deteriorates.
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00:07:52,672 --> 00:07:54,974
(indistinct chatter)
152
00:07:58,978 --> 00:08:01,981
- Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
five miles from Red Table,
153
00:08:02,048 --> 00:08:05,284
cross Red Table at or above
one four thousand,
154
00:08:05,351 --> 00:08:07,720
clear V-O-R-D-M-E
Charlie approach.
155
00:08:09,589 --> 00:08:11,224
- The Controller
clears the pilots
156
00:08:11,290 --> 00:08:15,127
to begin the final approach
11 miles from the airport.
157
00:08:17,930 --> 00:08:20,600
- You have to be configured
properly at the right altitude,
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00:08:20,666 --> 00:08:23,603
at the right speed,
otherwise you are expected
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00:08:23,669 --> 00:08:25,805
to execute a missed approach.
160
00:08:26,873 --> 00:08:28,441
- Red Table
at one four thousand,
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00:08:28,508 --> 00:08:30,243
cleared for V O R approach,
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00:08:30,309 --> 00:08:33,045
Gulfstream 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.
163
00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,182
- Here we go.
164
00:08:37,450 --> 00:08:40,019
- As the pilots get
closer to the airport,
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00:08:40,086 --> 00:08:43,823
they're counting on the weather
to improve for their landing.
166
00:08:44,657 --> 00:08:46,826
- Descending to one
four thousand.
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00:08:48,427 --> 00:08:50,463
- Problems can escalate
very quickly
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00:08:50,530 --> 00:08:52,231
when flying into Aspen.
169
00:08:52,298 --> 00:08:56,702
There's really no room
to recover without breaking off
170
00:08:56,769 --> 00:08:59,138
that approach
or trying it again.
171
00:09:00,506 --> 00:09:02,041
- Landing flaps.
172
00:09:02,108 --> 00:09:03,809
- Landing flaps.
173
00:09:03,876 --> 00:09:05,912
- Just over two minutes
from landing,
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00:09:05,978 --> 00:09:08,648
instruments have successfully
guided the pilots
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00:09:08,714 --> 00:09:10,750
to the airport.
Now it's up to them
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00:09:10,816 --> 00:09:12,885
to identify the runway.
177
00:09:14,387 --> 00:09:16,689
- You see the runway?
178
00:09:20,860 --> 00:09:23,796
- Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
you have the runway in sight?
179
00:09:26,666 --> 00:09:28,801
- Oh. Affirmative.
- Yeah, now we do.
180
00:09:28,868 --> 00:09:31,604
- Yeah, runway in sight,
three Golf Alpha.
181
00:09:31,671 --> 00:09:34,941
(controller): Gulfstream
three Golf Alpha visual, roger.
182
00:09:35,441 --> 00:09:37,076
(automated voice): One thousand.
183
00:09:37,143 --> 00:09:38,544
- One thousand to go.
184
00:09:39,512 --> 00:09:42,448
(narrator): The pilots are now
less than a minute from landing.
185
00:09:42,515 --> 00:09:44,850
(beeping)
186
00:09:45,451 --> 00:09:47,853
(indistinct chatter)
187
00:09:51,857 --> 00:09:53,359
(automated voice): Two hundred.
188
00:09:53,426 --> 00:09:57,029
(narrator): At the last moment,
they realise something is wrong.
189
00:09:57,096 --> 00:10:00,433
(engine revving)
- No, oh! No. No. No. No!
190
00:10:00,499 --> 00:10:03,869
(passengers screaming)
191
00:10:06,172 --> 00:10:09,041
(tense music)
192
00:10:10,443 --> 00:10:12,778
(grunting)
193
00:10:15,348 --> 00:10:17,683
- Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
194
00:10:17,750 --> 00:10:20,953
crashes just short
of the runway at Aspen.
195
00:10:22,588 --> 00:10:23,889
- Aircraft identification
196
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,592
Gulfstream 3-0-3
Golf Alpha,
197
00:10:26,659 --> 00:10:28,995
aircraft location,
it was north of the runway
198
00:10:29,061 --> 00:10:31,597
approximately...
the Shale Bluffs area.
199
00:10:31,664 --> 00:10:34,133
(sirens wailing)
200
00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:36,702
(narrator): Emergency vehicles
rush to the scene
201
00:10:36,769 --> 00:10:38,904
in the hope that there are
survivors of the crash
202
00:10:38,971 --> 00:10:42,141
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha.
203
00:10:42,208 --> 00:10:45,578
(tense music)
204
00:10:51,050 --> 00:10:54,053
But all 18 people onboard
are dead.
205
00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,256
All 15 passengers,
the two pilots,
206
00:10:57,323 --> 00:10:59,592
and the flight attendant.
207
00:11:06,599 --> 00:11:09,702
- This flight really captured
the media
208
00:11:09,769 --> 00:11:13,205
and the public attention
because of the people onboard.
209
00:11:13,906 --> 00:11:18,177
There were a lot of very young,
talented people.
210
00:11:23,049 --> 00:11:25,818
- Put everything from
the tail section over there.
211
00:11:27,787 --> 00:11:31,290
- By the following day,
investigators are on site.
212
00:11:33,392 --> 00:11:36,862
- Thousands of passengers
fly charter airplanes
213
00:11:36,929 --> 00:11:41,333
every year, encompassing
2.5 million flight hours
214
00:11:41,400 --> 00:11:43,669
annually,
so trying to understand
215
00:11:43,736 --> 00:11:47,073
why this accident occurred
was significant.
216
00:11:51,777 --> 00:11:53,345
- Let me see that.
217
00:11:53,412 --> 00:11:55,748
(narrator): Within hours,
the plane's cockpit
218
00:11:55,815 --> 00:11:57,883
voice recorder, or CVR,
219
00:11:57,950 --> 00:12:00,619
is retrieved from the wreckage.
220
00:12:00,686 --> 00:12:03,422
- Let's get the data pulled
from that ASAP.
221
00:12:03,489 --> 00:12:06,025
What about a flight
data recorder?
222
00:12:10,996 --> 00:12:13,099
Looks like there wasn't one.
223
00:12:13,699 --> 00:12:15,067
Okay.
224
00:12:16,836 --> 00:12:20,239
- Because the airplane
was manufactured in 1980
225
00:12:20,306 --> 00:12:22,441
and registered in 1981,
226
00:12:22,508 --> 00:12:25,544
it was not required
to have an FDR.
227
00:12:25,978 --> 00:12:28,380
- While the CVR is sent
for analysis,
228
00:12:28,447 --> 00:12:30,716
Investigators from
the National Transportation
229
00:12:30,783 --> 00:12:33,052
Safety Board wonder
why the pilots
230
00:12:33,119 --> 00:12:35,287
weren't able to land safely.
231
00:12:35,354 --> 00:12:39,391
- The plane crashed 24-hundred
feet from the runway.
232
00:12:40,226 --> 00:12:42,194
- When an aircraft crashes
short of a runway,
233
00:12:42,261 --> 00:12:45,164
especially a sophisticated
airplane like a Gulfstream Jet,
234
00:12:45,231 --> 00:12:47,032
a number of questions
arise here:
235
00:12:47,099 --> 00:12:49,268
How did they get there?
What possible factors
236
00:12:49,335 --> 00:12:52,204
could the crew have?
Was there some sort of a failure
237
00:12:52,271 --> 00:12:53,939
in the aircraft?
238
00:12:56,242 --> 00:12:58,377
- Take a look at this.
239
00:12:58,444 --> 00:13:00,079
What do you think caused that?
240
00:13:00,146 --> 00:13:03,783
- There's a deep ground scar
at the crash site.
241
00:13:06,552 --> 00:13:07,987
- That would do it.
242
00:13:08,053 --> 00:13:10,222
- Investigators conclude
that it was formed
243
00:13:10,289 --> 00:13:12,992
when the left wing
hit the ground.
244
00:13:14,126 --> 00:13:16,195
- When an airplane
comes through trees
245
00:13:16,262 --> 00:13:20,232
or vegetation
as it approaches the ground,
246
00:13:20,299 --> 00:13:21,801
it cuts off branches.
247
00:13:21,867 --> 00:13:23,702
And we can look
at those branches
248
00:13:23,769 --> 00:13:25,104
and the angles that are made
249
00:13:25,171 --> 00:13:27,973
to understand
the airplane's attitude
250
00:13:28,040 --> 00:13:32,945
as it came into the ground
and its descent profile.
251
00:13:33,646 --> 00:13:36,982
- Left wing struck the trees
at about...
252
00:13:39,285 --> 00:13:41,020
49 degrees.
253
00:13:42,788 --> 00:13:45,124
- That's a hell of a bank.
254
00:13:45,191 --> 00:13:47,526
(engines roaring)
255
00:13:48,994 --> 00:13:51,864
- There is no operationally
relevant reason
256
00:13:51,931 --> 00:13:54,300
for an airplane to be
banked at 49 degrees
257
00:13:54,366 --> 00:13:58,370
that close to the airport
or that close to the ground.
258
00:13:59,104 --> 00:14:01,507
- Maybe they lost control
of the plane?
259
00:14:03,509 --> 00:14:06,879
- When we see an aircraft
in an abnormal attitude,
260
00:14:06,946 --> 00:14:08,881
uh, we've got to look at,
did something happen
261
00:14:08,948 --> 00:14:11,383
where the pilots
couldn't keep it level?
262
00:14:11,450 --> 00:14:15,888
- The plane's position gives
investigators a promising lead.
263
00:14:16,388 --> 00:14:17,990
- Engine failure?
264
00:14:19,558 --> 00:14:22,328
- The loss of thrust
resulting from an engine failure
265
00:14:22,394 --> 00:14:23,963
on one side
266
00:14:24,029 --> 00:14:25,431
can yaw the airplane,
267
00:14:25,497 --> 00:14:27,166
and if not appropriately managed
268
00:14:27,233 --> 00:14:30,736
by the pilots
in a timely fashion,
269
00:14:30,803 --> 00:14:33,239
can lead to a loss of control.
270
00:14:34,039 --> 00:14:36,308
- Aside from the impact damage,
271
00:14:36,375 --> 00:14:39,411
there's no sign of fire
to the exterior.
272
00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:42,314
- The team studies
the engines' compressor blades
273
00:14:42,381 --> 00:14:44,884
to determine if the engines
were functioning
274
00:14:44,950 --> 00:14:47,086
when the plane hit the ground.
275
00:14:48,454 --> 00:14:51,223
When the Gulfstream III's
engines are working,
276
00:14:51,290 --> 00:14:54,727
the compressor blades spin
in a clockwise direction.
277
00:14:54,793 --> 00:14:56,762
If the engines
were still functioning
278
00:14:56,829 --> 00:14:58,130
when the plane crashed,
279
00:14:58,197 --> 00:15:00,699
these blades would be bent
counterclockwise,
280
00:15:00,766 --> 00:15:02,868
or in the opposite direction.
281
00:15:07,306 --> 00:15:10,409
- No, these are all bent
counterclockwise, so...
282
00:15:10,476 --> 00:15:12,077
it wasn't engine failure.
283
00:15:13,545 --> 00:15:15,481
- Our examination of the engines
284
00:15:15,547 --> 00:15:18,684
showed that there was no
pre-existing damage,
285
00:15:18,751 --> 00:15:21,387
no evidence
of an in-flight fire,
286
00:15:21,453 --> 00:15:23,956
and also showed that
they were operating normally
287
00:15:24,023 --> 00:15:27,192
and at high power
at the time of the impact.
288
00:15:28,193 --> 00:15:30,729
- Let's take a look
at the rudder.
289
00:15:30,796 --> 00:15:33,065
- An airplane operating
at a low airspeed
290
00:15:33,132 --> 00:15:37,202
while the rudder moves
to an extreme limit
291
00:15:37,269 --> 00:15:39,538
could introduce a rolling moment
292
00:15:39,605 --> 00:15:43,442
or also stall one of the wings,
293
00:15:43,509 --> 00:15:46,712
which would further exacerbate
the rolling moment.
294
00:15:47,346 --> 00:15:49,882
- Investigators examine
the actuator
295
00:15:49,949 --> 00:15:52,685
that controls
the rudder's movement.
296
00:15:52,751 --> 00:15:54,920
- The piston
is completely intact.
297
00:15:56,188 --> 00:15:58,190
No sign of any damage.
298
00:16:01,126 --> 00:16:04,697
- There was no pre-existing
conditions or failures
299
00:16:04,763 --> 00:16:06,765
that would have explained
the accident.
300
00:16:06,832 --> 00:16:08,801
The airplane
was functioning normally.
301
00:16:09,335 --> 00:16:12,805
- If mechanical failure
didn't cause the roll,
302
00:16:12,871 --> 00:16:15,207
what went wrong on approach?
303
00:16:16,175 --> 00:16:19,044
- Determining the airplane's
flight path helps us understand
304
00:16:19,111 --> 00:16:22,348
how that airplane
got to the accident site.
305
00:16:22,414 --> 00:16:23,949
What was it doing?
306
00:16:24,016 --> 00:16:26,618
Where was it flying?
How fast was it going?
307
00:16:26,685 --> 00:16:28,287
(keyboard clacking)
308
00:16:28,354 --> 00:16:30,255
- Have a look
at this radar data.
309
00:16:32,591 --> 00:16:34,426
- With no flight data recorder,
310
00:16:34,493 --> 00:16:37,896
investigators turn
to Aspen's radar information
311
00:16:37,963 --> 00:16:41,533
to reconstruct the Gulfstream's
descent profile.
312
00:16:43,769 --> 00:16:45,604
- Using the radar position
and time,
313
00:16:45,671 --> 00:16:48,207
so the altitude
and position of the aircraft,
314
00:16:48,273 --> 00:16:51,276
the performance engineers
can extract the speed
315
00:16:51,343 --> 00:16:53,779
of the aircraft,
how fast is it descending,
316
00:16:53,846 --> 00:16:56,648
and is that appropriate
for the approach
317
00:16:56,715 --> 00:16:59,051
that they're trying to do?
318
00:17:00,052 --> 00:17:01,587
- Here's what we've got.
319
00:17:03,188 --> 00:17:06,225
This is the approach
they should have flown.
320
00:17:06,291 --> 00:17:09,094
- Investigators examine
the path the pilots
321
00:17:09,161 --> 00:17:11,730
were required to follow
into Aspen.
322
00:17:13,532 --> 00:17:16,969
- Due to the rising terrain
away from the airport,
323
00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,505
Aspen at this time
had a step-down approach
324
00:17:19,571 --> 00:17:23,308
which from a profile,
looks like stairs.
325
00:17:23,375 --> 00:17:26,045
The pilots will step down
to an altitude
326
00:17:26,111 --> 00:17:28,947
based on the terrain
availability.
327
00:17:29,581 --> 00:17:32,317
- Pilots cannot descend
below that altitude
328
00:17:32,384 --> 00:17:36,055
until they reach another
fix or another distance.
329
00:17:37,256 --> 00:17:38,757
- And...
330
00:17:40,626 --> 00:17:43,462
here's the descent
the pilots actually flew.
331
00:17:43,529 --> 00:17:46,365
- The radar data shows
the Avjet flight
332
00:17:46,432 --> 00:17:50,102
deviated from the published
descent profile.
333
00:17:51,203 --> 00:17:54,873
- Four miles out, they dropped
300 feet below the minimum,
334
00:17:54,940 --> 00:17:56,642
and a mile later,
335
00:17:56,708 --> 00:17:59,812
they dropped 900 hundred feet
below the minimum altitude.
336
00:17:59,878 --> 00:18:02,047
- And they stayed that way.
337
00:18:02,114 --> 00:18:04,450
They flew in very low.
338
00:18:06,051 --> 00:18:08,620
- If you go below
a minimum altitude
339
00:18:08,687 --> 00:18:13,258
before you are allowed to,
then you no longer can guarantee
340
00:18:13,325 --> 00:18:15,694
the safety of that aircraft.
341
00:18:21,867 --> 00:18:23,902
- Why would they do that?
342
00:18:24,870 --> 00:18:27,773
- Because the pilots did not fly
this approach to standards,
343
00:18:27,840 --> 00:18:31,477
we wanted to look into
their backgrounds and training
344
00:18:31,543 --> 00:18:34,012
to better understand
why the accident
345
00:18:34,079 --> 00:18:36,048
may have occurred.
346
00:18:39,885 --> 00:18:44,223
(narrator): Why did the pilots
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
347
00:18:44,289 --> 00:18:48,093
not follow the prescribed
approach procedure into Aspen?
348
00:18:50,329 --> 00:18:52,731
- The captain passed
his last proficiency check.
349
00:18:52,798 --> 00:18:56,068
- So did the first officer.
Just a couple months ago.
350
00:18:57,669 --> 00:19:00,706
- Investigators learn
that all Avjet pilots
351
00:19:00,772 --> 00:19:02,074
are trained to land
352
00:19:02,141 --> 00:19:04,776
in mountainous terrain
like Aspen.
353
00:19:05,444 --> 00:19:08,747
- And they both flew into Aspen
together twice before
354
00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:10,215
without incident.
355
00:19:11,016 --> 00:19:13,118
- No accidents,
356
00:19:13,185 --> 00:19:15,087
no reprimands...
357
00:19:16,221 --> 00:19:18,790
Even the Captain's
driving record is spotless.
358
00:19:20,826 --> 00:19:22,494
- So looking into the background
of this flight crew,
359
00:19:22,561 --> 00:19:24,363
we really didn't see anything
that stood out.
360
00:19:24,429 --> 00:19:26,598
They were both well qualified,
well trained
361
00:19:26,665 --> 00:19:28,867
and experienced
to fly this airplane
362
00:19:28,934 --> 00:19:30,869
and make this trip.
363
00:19:30,936 --> 00:19:32,271
- And they both got
plenty of sleep
364
00:19:32,337 --> 00:19:35,440
before the flight,
so fatigue isn't an issue.
365
00:19:36,208 --> 00:19:38,210
In fact, I don't
see any issues here.
366
00:19:41,013 --> 00:19:42,881
- This doesn't make any sense.
367
00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:48,620
Why would two well-trained
pilots fly so recklessly
368
00:19:48,687 --> 00:19:50,255
below the limits?
369
00:19:52,791 --> 00:19:54,826
- No matter whether
you're a charter pilot,
370
00:19:54,893 --> 00:19:56,929
or an airline pilot,
or even just
371
00:19:56,995 --> 00:19:59,064
a personal general
aviation pilot,
372
00:19:59,131 --> 00:20:00,566
you know, our number one job
is safety.
373
00:20:00,632 --> 00:20:03,335
Uh, regulations are there
for a reason.
374
00:20:03,402 --> 00:20:05,971
What is it that could lead
a good flight crew
375
00:20:06,038 --> 00:20:09,474
to go beyond
those safety limits?
376
00:20:11,343 --> 00:20:15,414
- Okay. So we know the pilots
landed at Aspen twice before
377
00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:18,517
without incident.
What was different this time?
378
00:20:20,586 --> 00:20:23,522
- Maybe they were trying
to get eyes on the runway?
379
00:20:24,823 --> 00:20:26,425
- Pull up the weather.
380
00:20:28,827 --> 00:20:31,163
(tense music)
381
00:20:35,467 --> 00:20:39,304
- It was important to understand
exactly what was going on
382
00:20:39,371 --> 00:20:42,574
with the weather, in terms
of the layers of clouds,
383
00:20:42,641 --> 00:20:45,043
whether they were
solid or broken,
384
00:20:45,110 --> 00:20:47,012
to understand
385
00:20:47,079 --> 00:20:49,514
what capability these pilots
may have had
386
00:20:49,581 --> 00:20:52,718
to see objects on the ground.
387
00:20:53,352 --> 00:20:57,556
- The crash was at 7:02 PM.
Back it up to about 6:30 PM.
388
00:20:57,623 --> 00:20:59,758
(beeping)
389
00:20:59,825 --> 00:21:01,994
- They would've been flying
in and out of some pretty heavy
390
00:21:02,060 --> 00:21:04,429
cloud here. So...
391
00:21:04,496 --> 00:21:07,299
maybe they didn't have
a clear line on the runway.
392
00:21:07,366 --> 00:21:09,534
- Okay, but these
are seasoned pilots.
393
00:21:09,601 --> 00:21:11,336
They should know
if you don't see the runway...
394
00:21:11,403 --> 00:21:13,472
- You don't try to land on it.
- And yet, they did
395
00:21:13,538 --> 00:21:15,340
try to land on it.
- And they missed by almost
396
00:21:15,407 --> 00:21:19,444
half a mile. So,
did they see the runway or not?
397
00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:23,515
- We should talk
to the controller.
398
00:21:26,351 --> 00:21:28,987
- An air traffic controller
can tell you
399
00:21:29,054 --> 00:21:31,023
what the visibility is,
400
00:21:31,089 --> 00:21:32,357
what the weather
conditions were,
401
00:21:32,424 --> 00:21:34,026
what other airplanes were doing
402
00:21:34,092 --> 00:21:37,129
in terms of coming
into the airport
403
00:21:37,195 --> 00:21:39,131
and provide eyewitness testimony
404
00:21:39,197 --> 00:21:40,999
about the time of the accident.
405
00:21:41,066 --> 00:21:42,934
But they also can help us
understand
406
00:21:43,001 --> 00:21:45,804
communications that they had
with the airplane.
407
00:21:48,874 --> 00:21:51,276
- So did they give you
any indication at all
408
00:21:51,343 --> 00:21:53,311
that they were having trouble
seeing the runway?
409
00:21:53,378 --> 00:21:55,714
- No. Quite the opposite.
410
00:21:55,781 --> 00:21:57,449
I asked them
if they could see the runway,
411
00:21:57,516 --> 00:21:59,451
and they confirmed
that they did.
412
00:22:00,018 --> 00:22:02,954
Gulfstream three Golf Alpha,
you have the runway in sight?
413
00:22:03,588 --> 00:22:06,425
(Frisbie): Yeah. Runway
in sight, three Golf Alpha.
414
00:22:06,491 --> 00:22:09,361
- Gulfstream three Golf Alpha
visual, roger.
415
00:22:10,829 --> 00:22:12,631
- Hm.
416
00:22:13,265 --> 00:22:15,967
- I made extra sure to confirm
417
00:22:16,034 --> 00:22:18,136
because I couldn't see them.
418
00:22:18,203 --> 00:22:20,405
The weather was so bad.
419
00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:22,974
- Did you have any reason
to doubt the pilots?
420
00:22:23,909 --> 00:22:27,412
- Not at the time, but...
421
00:22:27,479 --> 00:22:29,381
here's what's so odd.
422
00:22:29,448 --> 00:22:31,483
They confirmed they had visual,
but when they came out
423
00:22:31,550 --> 00:22:35,520
of the clouds, they were headed
to the right of the airport.
424
00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:43,028
(engines roaring)
425
00:22:44,996 --> 00:22:46,631
What are they doing?
426
00:22:54,539 --> 00:22:55,574
I don't think they realized
427
00:22:55,640 --> 00:22:57,109
they weren't headed
for the runway
428
00:22:57,175 --> 00:22:58,910
until the last second.
429
00:23:01,446 --> 00:23:03,315
- When we put
those pieces together, you know,
430
00:23:03,382 --> 00:23:05,083
that the pilots did report
on the radio
431
00:23:05,150 --> 00:23:06,385
they had the runway
in sight,
432
00:23:06,451 --> 00:23:08,320
we had to ask ourselves:
Did they really?
433
00:23:08,387 --> 00:23:09,755
Did they really see the runway?
434
00:23:09,821 --> 00:23:14,326
Um, might they have engaged
in a little wishful thinking?
435
00:23:16,128 --> 00:23:19,865
- This leaves investigators
with a troubling question.
436
00:23:22,534 --> 00:23:24,436
- They couldn't see the runway,
437
00:23:24,503 --> 00:23:26,972
why did they go ahead
with the landing?
438
00:23:27,038 --> 00:23:29,574
- Maybe they were under
some kind of pressure?
439
00:23:31,009 --> 00:23:33,745
- We needed to know
the purpose of this flight,
440
00:23:33,812 --> 00:23:36,548
its schedule
and the pilots' activities
441
00:23:36,615 --> 00:23:38,683
before they departed for Aspen.
442
00:23:38,750 --> 00:23:42,421
Looking into what happened
before the flight took off
443
00:23:42,487 --> 00:23:45,023
from L.A. can help us
gain insight
444
00:23:45,090 --> 00:23:49,428
into what might have been
going on during the flight.
445
00:23:54,366 --> 00:23:55,867
- So sorry to keep you waiting.
446
00:23:55,934 --> 00:23:57,302
- No problem at all.
447
00:23:57,969 --> 00:23:59,838
(narrator): To understand
why the pilots
448
00:23:59,905 --> 00:24:02,874
were so intent upon
landing in Aspen,
449
00:24:02,941 --> 00:24:06,511
NTSB investigators
speak to the Avjet coordinator
450
00:24:06,578 --> 00:24:10,115
who managed flight 3-0-3
Golf Alpha.
451
00:24:10,649 --> 00:24:13,418
- The charter coordinators
communicated with the pilots
452
00:24:13,485 --> 00:24:17,556
moments before the flight
departed Los Angeles.
453
00:24:17,622 --> 00:24:19,558
They would have insights into
454
00:24:19,624 --> 00:24:22,394
what was concerning the pilots,
455
00:24:22,461 --> 00:24:24,696
what they were trying
to accomplish,
456
00:24:24,763 --> 00:24:27,866
and some of the decisions
being made.
457
00:24:28,567 --> 00:24:31,536
- Did you talk to the captain
on the day of the flight?
458
00:24:31,603 --> 00:24:34,239
- Oh, yes. And there were some
problems right from the start.
459
00:24:34,306 --> 00:24:36,241
- Really? How so?
460
00:24:36,308 --> 00:24:38,677
- Well, the flight was supposed
to leave at 4:30.
461
00:24:38,743 --> 00:24:41,046
At 4:15, he called to say
the passengers
462
00:24:41,112 --> 00:24:42,848
still hadn't shown up.
463
00:24:45,217 --> 00:24:47,486
- Well if the passengers
don't show up soon,
464
00:24:47,552 --> 00:24:49,988
with the long taxi
out to the runway,
465
00:24:50,055 --> 00:24:52,123
we won't make it
to Aspen in time.
466
00:24:52,190 --> 00:24:53,925
- So what are you suggesting?
467
00:24:53,992 --> 00:24:55,827
- Well, we may need to divert.
468
00:24:57,696 --> 00:25:00,765
- The captain was worried
that because of the 7 PM
469
00:25:00,832 --> 00:25:02,234
noise curfew at Aspen,
470
00:25:02,300 --> 00:25:04,135
he might have to go
to Rifle instead,
471
00:25:04,202 --> 00:25:06,371
which is about 60 miles away.
472
00:25:06,438 --> 00:25:08,206
- So he knew about
the noise curfew
473
00:25:08,273 --> 00:25:10,075
and he had a plan to divert
if he needed.
474
00:25:10,141 --> 00:25:11,710
- Absolutely.
475
00:25:13,712 --> 00:25:16,648
- They knew that Rifle Colorado
Airport was nearby.
476
00:25:16,715 --> 00:25:18,450
They had planned
for alternatives even before
477
00:25:18,517 --> 00:25:21,653
they left, which is exactly
what a crew should be doing.
478
00:25:23,121 --> 00:25:25,290
- When did the passengers board?
479
00:25:25,357 --> 00:25:28,059
- They didn't start boarding
till around 4:30.
480
00:25:29,361 --> 00:25:30,929
- Then what happened?
481
00:25:30,996 --> 00:25:33,331
- About 10 minutes later,
I got a phone call
482
00:25:33,398 --> 00:25:35,367
from the client's
personal assistant.
483
00:25:35,433 --> 00:25:38,436
And he told me
the client was very upset.
484
00:25:39,905 --> 00:25:41,072
- Hm.
485
00:25:41,139 --> 00:25:43,208
(assistant): What's this
about diverting to Rifle?
486
00:25:43,275 --> 00:25:44,809
- What do you mean?
487
00:25:46,011 --> 00:25:47,612
- Once the passengers boarded,
488
00:25:47,679 --> 00:25:52,817
there was a call by
the charter customer's assistant
489
00:25:52,884 --> 00:25:56,521
expressing concern
490
00:25:56,588 --> 00:25:59,624
that the crew
had told the passengers
491
00:25:59,691 --> 00:26:02,427
that they might have to go
to another airport.
492
00:26:02,494 --> 00:26:04,563
- Welcome. Welcome.
Given the delay in boarding,
493
00:26:04,629 --> 00:26:07,065
it looks like we may have
to divert to Rifle.
494
00:26:12,504 --> 00:26:15,040
- So the client had
his assistant call me.
495
00:26:16,241 --> 00:26:19,010
(assistant): So my boss
wants you to tell the pilot
496
00:26:19,077 --> 00:26:22,614
to, well, keep his mouth shut
around the passengers.
497
00:26:22,681 --> 00:26:26,585
And if he has anything to say,
save it until he gets there,
498
00:26:26,651 --> 00:26:28,620
and then they can talk it over.
499
00:26:28,687 --> 00:26:31,056
- Understood. There is nothing
to worry about.
500
00:26:31,122 --> 00:26:32,424
I'll take care of it.
501
00:26:32,490 --> 00:26:34,726
Thank you very much
for letting me know.
502
00:26:36,428 --> 00:26:37,762
(sighs)
503
00:26:37,829 --> 00:26:40,231
So, of course,
safety comes first,
504
00:26:40,298 --> 00:26:43,335
but we wanted to keep
the client happy.
505
00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:45,303
- And did this make it back
to the captain?
506
00:26:45,370 --> 00:26:47,138
- Yes, I called him right away.
507
00:26:48,707 --> 00:26:50,008
- The client's very upset.
508
00:26:50,075 --> 00:26:52,477
He doesn't want you speaking
to the passengers anymore,
509
00:26:52,544 --> 00:26:53,845
only to him.
510
00:26:53,912 --> 00:26:57,349
- Understood, okay.
Don't mention diverting.
511
00:26:57,415 --> 00:26:58,917
- Thank you so much.
512
00:26:58,984 --> 00:27:00,085
- Yup.
513
00:27:03,722 --> 00:27:07,158
- He was worried that he was
going to disappoint our boss,
514
00:27:07,225 --> 00:27:10,462
maybe even get into trouble
for upsetting the client.
515
00:27:10,528 --> 00:27:12,998
But he wouldn't
get into trouble.
516
00:27:13,832 --> 00:27:16,601
- In a charter operation,
the needs of your passengers
517
00:27:16,668 --> 00:27:19,471
are front and center.
You're fully aware of them.
518
00:27:19,537 --> 00:27:22,974
And in a situation
where a group of people
519
00:27:23,041 --> 00:27:24,476
are going to a dinner
520
00:27:24,542 --> 00:27:27,579
and that's the only reason
they're taking this trip,
521
00:27:27,646 --> 00:27:29,814
if they can't satisfy
that timeline,
522
00:27:29,881 --> 00:27:33,318
then there was no point
of being on that aircraft.
523
00:27:33,752 --> 00:27:37,589
(narrator): The Captain was told
not to upset the passengers.
524
00:27:37,656 --> 00:27:39,891
Did that instruction
affect his decision
525
00:27:39,958 --> 00:27:42,494
about diverting
his plane to Rifle?
526
00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:45,196
- And so this was all
before they took off?
527
00:27:45,263 --> 00:27:47,232
- Yes.
- And was that the last time
528
00:27:47,298 --> 00:27:49,000
you spoke to the captain?
- No.
529
00:27:49,067 --> 00:27:51,236
He called me again
en route to Aspen.
530
00:27:51,302 --> 00:27:52,971
- And what time was that?
531
00:27:54,372 --> 00:27:55,774
- 6:30.
532
00:27:57,542 --> 00:28:00,945
- We'll be landing at Aspen
in about 20, 25 minutes,
533
00:28:01,012 --> 00:28:02,747
but we'll have to spend
the night there.
534
00:28:02,814 --> 00:28:05,016
- No problem,
I can book you rooms.
535
00:28:05,083 --> 00:28:08,853
Hey, how are the passengers?
Are they still upset?
536
00:28:09,587 --> 00:28:10,689
- I don't think so.
537
00:28:10,755 --> 00:28:13,124
- What about the client?
538
00:28:13,191 --> 00:28:14,659
- I had a talk with the client.
539
00:28:14,726 --> 00:28:17,128
It's just really important
to him that we make it to Aspen.
540
00:28:17,195 --> 00:28:19,798
Apparently, he's dropping
a substantial amount of money
541
00:28:19,864 --> 00:28:21,533
on dinner.
542
00:28:22,767 --> 00:28:24,636
- The client didn't want
to go to Rifle.
543
00:28:24,703 --> 00:28:26,538
Rifle was more than
60 miles away;
544
00:28:26,604 --> 00:28:28,873
it would have taken them
too long to get there.
545
00:28:28,940 --> 00:28:30,542
- I see.
546
00:28:32,110 --> 00:28:34,379
Okay, well,
547
00:28:34,446 --> 00:28:36,414
thank you very much
for your time.
548
00:28:36,481 --> 00:28:37,882
- Happy to help.
549
00:28:39,417 --> 00:28:41,386
- Although the pilots
would be aware
550
00:28:41,453 --> 00:28:44,155
of the needs
of their passengers,
551
00:28:44,222 --> 00:28:46,658
at no point can that supersede
552
00:28:46,725 --> 00:28:49,194
the professionalism
of that crew.
553
00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:51,529
Your primary and only real job
554
00:28:51,596 --> 00:28:53,865
is the safety
of that aircraft.
555
00:28:54,866 --> 00:28:57,802
- You know, it seems they were
under a lot of pressure
556
00:28:57,869 --> 00:29:00,405
to land not only
before the flight began,
557
00:29:00,472 --> 00:29:03,007
but even during the flight.
558
00:29:04,175 --> 00:29:06,344
- The crash happened
more than half an hour
559
00:29:06,411 --> 00:29:08,379
after that last call
from the plane.
560
00:29:09,380 --> 00:29:12,383
(narrator): Did commercial
pressure influence the pilots
561
00:29:12,450 --> 00:29:16,821
to make a risky decision that
cost the lives of 18 people?
562
00:29:16,888 --> 00:29:18,857
- You know, this comes up
all the time.
563
00:29:18,923 --> 00:29:23,528
Charter pilots
often voice on chat rooms
564
00:29:23,595 --> 00:29:24,996
and complaint lines
565
00:29:25,063 --> 00:29:27,599
that they are pressured
to keep people happy
566
00:29:27,665 --> 00:29:29,400
and do really difficult things
567
00:29:29,467 --> 00:29:32,103
just to satisfy
a demanding customer.
568
00:29:32,170 --> 00:29:33,838
And it's dangerous.
569
00:29:35,774 --> 00:29:38,476
- They still had time
to correct the situation.
570
00:29:38,543 --> 00:29:42,113
So what happened
in these final 30 minutes?
571
00:29:47,685 --> 00:29:49,487
- It's here.
572
00:29:49,554 --> 00:29:51,256
(narrator): NTSB investigators
573
00:29:51,322 --> 00:29:54,025
turn to the cockpit
voice recorder of Avjet
574
00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:55,994
3-0-3 Golf Alpha
575
00:29:56,060 --> 00:29:57,595
to understand why the pilots
576
00:29:57,662 --> 00:30:00,265
chose to land instead
of diverting.
577
00:30:01,666 --> 00:30:03,301
- We could learn
about the crew's decision making
578
00:30:03,368 --> 00:30:05,837
and what they were doing
from their conversations
579
00:30:05,904 --> 00:30:08,840
with each other, um, you know,
how they were planning
580
00:30:08,907 --> 00:30:11,643
and using the information
that was coming in
581
00:30:11,709 --> 00:30:13,244
as they approached Aspen.
582
00:30:14,345 --> 00:30:15,647
- You know what,
let's pick it up
583
00:30:15,713 --> 00:30:17,949
before they begin
their final descent.
584
00:30:27,926 --> 00:30:29,694
(first officer): Hey, do you
remember that crazy guy
585
00:30:29,761 --> 00:30:32,997
in the Lear when we were
in Aspen last time?
586
00:30:33,064 --> 00:30:35,700
He was, "I can see the airport"
but he couldn't see it?
587
00:30:35,767 --> 00:30:38,136
(laughing in recording)
588
00:30:38,203 --> 00:30:39,804
- Pause that.
589
00:30:41,539 --> 00:30:45,343
So 14 minutes
before the crash,
590
00:30:45,410 --> 00:30:47,745
they're ridiculing another pilot
who tried to land
591
00:30:47,812 --> 00:30:50,548
without the runway in sight.
592
00:30:50,615 --> 00:30:53,251
Why did they do the same thing?
593
00:30:53,318 --> 00:30:56,988
- At that point,
they were still in the mode of,
594
00:30:57,055 --> 00:30:58,389
we're gonna do this right,
595
00:30:58,456 --> 00:31:00,258
and even sort of made a joke
596
00:31:00,325 --> 00:31:03,027
about this one guy
that didn't do it right.
597
00:31:06,698 --> 00:31:08,032
- Okay.
598
00:31:10,802 --> 00:31:12,804
- Okay, we'll shoot it
from here.
599
00:31:12,871 --> 00:31:15,106
I mean, we're here,
but we only get to do it once.
600
00:31:15,173 --> 00:31:18,443
- Alright. Once,
and then we go to Rifle, right?
601
00:31:18,509 --> 00:31:21,446
- Yeah, it's too late
in the evening to come around.
602
00:31:25,884 --> 00:31:28,219
- So right there,
they're talking about
603
00:31:28,286 --> 00:31:29,787
doing a missed approach.
604
00:31:30,355 --> 00:31:33,725
- That was at 6:50,
so two minutes later.
605
00:31:34,859 --> 00:31:36,494
(narrator): 12 minutes
from the airport,
606
00:31:36,561 --> 00:31:38,529
the pilots confirmed
their plan
607
00:31:38,596 --> 00:31:40,899
to divert if they needed to.
608
00:31:41,799 --> 00:31:43,935
- As the crew
was approaching Aspen,
609
00:31:44,002 --> 00:31:46,738
they were getting the idea
that the weather was getting
610
00:31:46,804 --> 00:31:48,773
more difficult to get in,
and they were having
611
00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:50,308
a conversation about this.
612
00:31:50,375 --> 00:31:52,710
They mentioned again,
"Well we might only have
613
00:31:52,777 --> 00:31:54,579
one shot at this,
and we have to go to Rifle".
614
00:31:54,646 --> 00:31:57,448
They were really saying
the right things.
615
00:32:00,385 --> 00:32:01,953
(controller): Attention
all aircraft.
616
00:32:02,020 --> 00:32:03,821
Last aircraft went missed.
617
00:32:05,556 --> 00:32:07,825
- What?
- He went missed.
618
00:32:07,892 --> 00:32:09,594
(first officer): He went missed?
619
00:32:09,661 --> 00:32:12,964
Damn. That's not good.
620
00:32:15,800 --> 00:32:17,502
- Nine minutes from crashing.
621
00:32:18,536 --> 00:32:21,873
- They know the plane
in front of them couldn't land.
622
00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:24,309
And they know
it's a bad sign for them.
623
00:32:25,877 --> 00:32:27,979
- That clearly had to put
some pressure on them
624
00:32:28,046 --> 00:32:31,282
to say, alright, this is uh,
this is not looking good.
625
00:32:32,317 --> 00:32:35,320
- It should have those pilots
starting to get into
626
00:32:35,386 --> 00:32:37,655
the mindset of executing
the missed approach
627
00:32:37,722 --> 00:32:39,190
rather than landing
the aircraft.
628
00:32:39,557 --> 00:32:42,860
- So they know they shouldn't
attempt the landing either.
629
00:32:42,927 --> 00:32:44,729
- Up until now,
they've been doing everything
630
00:32:44,796 --> 00:32:46,998
right by the book.
- Yeah.
631
00:32:47,065 --> 00:32:49,434
I wonder what changed.
632
00:32:50,268 --> 00:32:53,304
- Investigators discover
something unusual
633
00:32:53,371 --> 00:32:55,573
in the CVR transcripts.
634
00:32:55,640 --> 00:32:57,008
- Huh.
635
00:32:59,277 --> 00:33:00,545
It looks like
the flight attendant
636
00:33:00,611 --> 00:33:02,447
brought someone
into the cockpit.
637
00:33:04,849 --> 00:33:06,985
- About eight minutes
before the accident,
638
00:33:07,051 --> 00:33:10,922
somebody came into the cockpit,
one of the passengers.
639
00:33:11,689 --> 00:33:13,458
- Thank you very much.
640
00:33:14,058 --> 00:33:16,394
(indistinct chatter)
641
00:33:20,565 --> 00:33:22,500
- Do you think it's the client?
642
00:33:25,303 --> 00:33:26,604
- It's possible.
643
00:33:28,206 --> 00:33:30,475
- Having somebody else
up on the flight deck
644
00:33:30,541 --> 00:33:32,543
as you're conducting an approach
645
00:33:32,610 --> 00:33:36,647
into a mountainous area at night
646
00:33:36,714 --> 00:33:40,184
in poor weather
is not a good idea.
647
00:33:43,321 --> 00:33:46,057
- Did the presence
of a passenger in the cockpit
648
00:33:46,124 --> 00:33:48,359
play a role in the crash?
649
00:33:50,561 --> 00:33:52,497
(tense music)
650
00:33:56,100 --> 00:33:58,169
(Frisbie): The weather's
gone down.
651
00:33:59,504 --> 00:34:00,838
They're not making it in.
652
00:34:00,905 --> 00:34:02,974
(narrator): As the crew
got closer to Aspen,
653
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:04,342
the weather worsened,
654
00:34:04,409 --> 00:34:08,046
making it more dangerous
for planes to try to land.
655
00:34:08,713 --> 00:34:09,981
- Oh, really.
656
00:34:10,681 --> 00:34:12,316
- "Oh, really"?
657
00:34:14,619 --> 00:34:16,421
- The only conversation
that should be going on
658
00:34:16,487 --> 00:34:20,091
is between the crew
about aspects of the flight.
659
00:34:20,158 --> 00:34:21,893
If you're having someone
up there questioning
660
00:34:21,959 --> 00:34:23,928
their decision making,
questioning, you know,
661
00:34:23,995 --> 00:34:25,396
the weather and the operation,
662
00:34:25,463 --> 00:34:28,533
um, it's just such a distraction
and a pressure to them.
663
00:34:30,168 --> 00:34:32,236
- As the pilots approach
the airport,
664
00:34:32,303 --> 00:34:34,572
the situation intensified.
665
00:34:36,107 --> 00:34:38,709
- Challenger nine eight Romeo,
you're number one.
666
00:34:39,310 --> 00:34:40,778
(Challenger pilot):
Nine eight Romeo,
667
00:34:40,845 --> 00:34:43,114
negative visual on the missed.
668
00:34:43,181 --> 00:34:45,616
(narrator): They learn that
the plane ahead of Avjet
669
00:34:45,683 --> 00:34:47,151
3-0-3 Golf Alpha
670
00:34:47,218 --> 00:34:49,153
also missed their approach
671
00:34:49,220 --> 00:34:51,322
because they couldn't see
the runway.
672
00:34:52,190 --> 00:34:54,158
- It's too dangerous to land
on that runway
673
00:34:54,225 --> 00:34:56,761
under these conditions.
674
00:34:56,828 --> 00:34:58,362
- So, what happened?
675
00:35:03,968 --> 00:35:05,503
- Are we cleared to land?
676
00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:07,371
- No, not yet.
677
00:35:07,438 --> 00:35:08,439
He just missed,
678
00:35:08,506 --> 00:35:10,942
the guy in front of us
didn't make it either.
679
00:35:11,008 --> 00:35:12,510
- Oh, really.
680
00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:17,682
- Okay, so it sounds like
this guy
681
00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,617
is sending the pilots a message.
682
00:35:19,684 --> 00:35:21,385
- Exactly.
683
00:35:23,121 --> 00:35:25,056
- "Oh, really," may not
sound like much,
684
00:35:25,123 --> 00:35:28,092
but after all those other
things that had occurred,
685
00:35:28,159 --> 00:35:31,195
I think, "Oh, really"
was a warning shot.
686
00:35:31,262 --> 00:35:33,264
Get this thing in Aspen.
687
00:35:34,365 --> 00:35:37,001
- But the pilots still had
one more chance
688
00:35:37,068 --> 00:35:38,803
to implement their back-up plan
689
00:35:38,870 --> 00:35:41,072
to divert to another airport.
690
00:35:44,375 --> 00:35:45,576
- Where's it at?
691
00:35:47,411 --> 00:35:50,314
- So obviously, they still
can't see the runway.
692
00:35:53,251 --> 00:35:55,620
- To the right.
- To the right.
693
00:36:01,425 --> 00:36:04,095
- So, instead of executing
a missed approach,
694
00:36:04,161 --> 00:36:05,329
they're still looking
for the runway,
695
00:36:05,396 --> 00:36:07,565
which is actually to their left.
696
00:36:08,499 --> 00:36:10,568
- There was a river valley
and some roads nearby.
697
00:36:10,635 --> 00:36:12,970
Might they have seen something
they thought was the runway,
698
00:36:13,037 --> 00:36:15,339
you know, some lights
of the village or whatnot.
699
00:36:15,406 --> 00:36:16,908
Then they believed
they saw the runway,
700
00:36:16,974 --> 00:36:18,576
but that wasn't correct.
701
00:36:19,377 --> 00:36:21,078
- They just keep flying
lower and lower
702
00:36:21,145 --> 00:36:23,080
looking for the airport.
703
00:36:24,448 --> 00:36:26,651
They were just under
way too much pressure
704
00:36:26,717 --> 00:36:28,486
to make good decisions.
705
00:36:31,155 --> 00:36:32,924
- They had the night curfew.
706
00:36:32,990 --> 00:36:34,225
They had a, the time pressure,
707
00:36:34,292 --> 00:36:36,260
uh, pressure from
the client as well,
708
00:36:36,327 --> 00:36:39,030
um, and then with the weather
coming in and out
709
00:36:39,096 --> 00:36:41,332
as they stepped down,
710
00:36:41,399 --> 00:36:44,168
they'd catch glimpses
now and then of the ground.
711
00:36:45,036 --> 00:36:46,904
(automated voice): Five hundred.
712
00:36:46,971 --> 00:36:48,272
(first officer): Ref plus five.
713
00:36:48,339 --> 00:36:50,441
(automated voice): Sink rate.
Sink rate.
714
00:36:52,510 --> 00:36:54,712
(narrator): 22 seconds
after crossing
715
00:36:54,779 --> 00:36:56,314
the missed approach point,
716
00:36:56,380 --> 00:37:00,618
Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
hits the ground.
717
00:37:00,685 --> 00:37:02,587
(grunting)
718
00:37:02,653 --> 00:37:04,555
(passengers screaming)
719
00:37:10,494 --> 00:37:12,096
(engines roaring)
720
00:37:12,163 --> 00:37:15,066
(grunting)
721
00:37:24,709 --> 00:37:27,078
- So...
722
00:37:27,144 --> 00:37:29,847
in Los Angeles,
they were ready to divert.
723
00:37:31,716 --> 00:37:34,819
Then they get chewed out
for talking about diverting,
724
00:37:34,885 --> 00:37:37,989
and the client tells them
how important the dinner is.
725
00:37:38,055 --> 00:37:39,323
Topping it all off,
726
00:37:39,390 --> 00:37:41,025
the passenger enters
the cockpit.
727
00:37:41,092 --> 00:37:42,593
- So, by the time
they get to Aspen...
728
00:37:42,660 --> 00:37:45,396
- They were bound and determined
to land.
729
00:37:48,366 --> 00:37:52,303
- Sadly, they turned into
the pilots they were ridiculing.
730
00:37:53,304 --> 00:37:56,307
- All indications
731
00:37:56,374 --> 00:37:58,542
from our investigation
732
00:37:58,609 --> 00:38:01,412
show that these two pilots
were good pilots.
733
00:38:01,479 --> 00:38:05,716
Once the crew descended
without the runway in sight...
734
00:38:07,318 --> 00:38:09,353
the accident was inevitable.
735
00:38:11,355 --> 00:38:14,759
- They just kept pushing,
and step by step,
736
00:38:14,825 --> 00:38:17,128
it got worse and worse until
737
00:38:17,194 --> 00:38:19,030
they descended too low.
738
00:38:19,096 --> 00:38:20,831
(narrator): Despite
the pressures
739
00:38:20,898 --> 00:38:22,767
the pilots were under to land,
740
00:38:22,833 --> 00:38:24,502
there was one more safeguard
741
00:38:24,568 --> 00:38:26,837
that could have prevented
this tragedy.
742
00:38:26,904 --> 00:38:28,673
- You're not gonna believe this.
743
00:38:29,707 --> 00:38:32,243
(intriguing music)
744
00:38:38,516 --> 00:38:42,153
rator): Investigators
of Avjet 3-0-3 Golf Alpha
745
00:38:42,219 --> 00:38:43,754
examine a safety notice
746
00:38:43,821 --> 00:38:47,391
for Aspen Airport that might
have prevented the crash.
747
00:38:47,892 --> 00:38:49,794
- A NOTAM.
748
00:38:50,394 --> 00:38:53,798
- NOTAM is an official
Notice to Airmen.
749
00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:57,401
- That's a notice put out
by the FAA
750
00:38:57,468 --> 00:38:59,737
to tell pilots about
some abnormality
751
00:38:59,804 --> 00:39:01,372
in the airspace system.
752
00:39:01,439 --> 00:39:03,474
An approach procedure
has been changed,
753
00:39:03,541 --> 00:39:06,544
a navigation aide is out,
um, all sorts of things.
754
00:39:08,245 --> 00:39:11,649
- Two days before the crash,
a NOTAM was issued
755
00:39:11,716 --> 00:39:14,218
with a warning about
landing at Aspen.
756
00:39:15,119 --> 00:39:17,188
- As far as I can tell, it says,
757
00:39:17,254 --> 00:39:20,257
"Circling NA,
not authorized, at night."
758
00:39:20,324 --> 00:39:21,826
- So, in other words,
759
00:39:21,892 --> 00:39:23,961
they should never have been
flying into Aspen at night
760
00:39:24,028 --> 00:39:25,629
in the first place.
761
00:39:25,696 --> 00:39:30,701
- It said that circling
not authorized at night.
762
00:39:30,768 --> 00:39:32,970
This approach is only
a circling approach,
763
00:39:33,037 --> 00:39:35,773
even if you elect to land
straight in.
764
00:39:35,840 --> 00:39:37,274
It actually had the effect
765
00:39:37,341 --> 00:39:40,845
of making that approach
not authorized at night.
766
00:39:42,513 --> 00:39:45,449
- The crash was at 7:02 PM.
What time was nightfall?
767
00:39:45,516 --> 00:39:49,887
- Nightfall was officially
at 6:55.
768
00:39:50,855 --> 00:39:53,290
- Well, that's seven minutes
before the crash.
769
00:39:53,357 --> 00:39:55,559
Why didn't they follow
the NOTAM?
770
00:39:58,095 --> 00:40:00,431
- Investigators examine
the Gulfstream's
771
00:40:00,498 --> 00:40:02,266
briefing records to see
772
00:40:02,333 --> 00:40:04,869
if it included
the most recent notice.
773
00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:09,173
- It looks the first officer
did receive the NOTAM
774
00:40:09,240 --> 00:40:11,175
over the phone
before the flight.
775
00:40:11,909 --> 00:40:14,779
- So who knows if
he passed it on to the Captain.
776
00:40:16,313 --> 00:40:17,882
- NOTAM's are hard to read,
777
00:40:17,948 --> 00:40:20,684
there's a lot of um,
extraneous information in them.
778
00:40:20,751 --> 00:40:23,988
They tell you about everything
from a burned-out lightbulb
779
00:40:24,054 --> 00:40:25,923
on a tower fifteen miles away,
780
00:40:25,990 --> 00:40:29,026
to the runway is closed,
and everything in between.
781
00:40:29,093 --> 00:40:31,796
- And what about the controller?
782
00:40:35,266 --> 00:40:38,235
- NOTAM's are also distributed
to ATC facilities.
783
00:40:38,302 --> 00:40:39,370
They need to know about
784
00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,806
things that affect
the airspace as well.
785
00:40:45,142 --> 00:40:48,345
- It never got passed on
to Aspen ATC.
786
00:40:53,717 --> 00:40:55,586
- The reason the tower
didn't get the NOTAM
787
00:40:55,653 --> 00:40:58,823
is it was supposed to get
sent by, believe it or not, fax,
788
00:40:58,889 --> 00:41:00,691
and for whatever reason,
789
00:41:00,758 --> 00:41:03,127
it didn't get sent
to the ATC facilities
790
00:41:03,194 --> 00:41:05,463
that needed to know.
791
00:41:05,529 --> 00:41:08,399
- Had the Controller received
the NOTAM,
792
00:41:08,466 --> 00:41:11,335
it might have
prevented the crash.
793
00:41:11,402 --> 00:41:14,371
In the final analysis,
investigators conclude
794
00:41:14,438 --> 00:41:16,340
the probable cause
of the accident
795
00:41:16,407 --> 00:41:19,310
was the flight crew's
operation of the airplane
796
00:41:19,376 --> 00:41:21,612
below the minimum
descent altitude
797
00:41:21,679 --> 00:41:25,449
without an appropriate visual
reference to the runway.
798
00:41:26,484 --> 00:41:28,085
- This accident happened
799
00:41:28,152 --> 00:41:30,421
because the captain
did not go around,
800
00:41:30,488 --> 00:41:32,790
did not conduct
a missed approach.
801
00:41:33,924 --> 00:41:35,626
Had he done that,
802
00:41:35,693 --> 00:41:37,728
they would have gone
to Rifle.
803
00:41:37,795 --> 00:41:39,997
And the passengers may have
been frustrated,
804
00:41:40,064 --> 00:41:41,732
may have been angry.
There might have been a big
805
00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:44,835
conversation, but they
would have been alive.
806
00:41:48,439 --> 00:41:51,408
- Investigators also believe
external pressures
807
00:41:51,475 --> 00:41:54,478
played a role in the pilots'
decision-making.
808
00:41:56,480 --> 00:41:58,015
- We call it "get there-itus".
809
00:41:58,082 --> 00:41:59,550
We were close
to the destination,
810
00:41:59,617 --> 00:42:03,420
almost there and the pressure
on people to make the decision.
811
00:42:03,487 --> 00:42:05,689
Nothing broke,
nothing really failed,
812
00:42:05,756 --> 00:42:07,391
other than just
the decision-making,
813
00:42:07,458 --> 00:42:10,761
under pressures of
"get there-itus".
814
00:42:13,564 --> 00:42:15,733
- As a result of this accident,
815
00:42:15,799 --> 00:42:18,135
Avjet restricts flying
into Aspen
816
00:42:18,202 --> 00:42:20,371
between sunset and sunrise.
817
00:42:20,437 --> 00:42:23,407
The FAA also revises
its specifications
818
00:42:23,474 --> 00:42:24,708
for flying into Aspen,
819
00:42:24,775 --> 00:42:27,711
with a minimum visibility
of five miles
820
00:42:27,778 --> 00:42:30,748
and a cloud ceiling of at least
44-hundred feet
821
00:42:30,814 --> 00:42:33,784
above ground now required
for landing.
822
00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:38,489
- You see the runway?
823
00:42:38,556 --> 00:42:41,959
- This is to ensure pilots
always have a clear view
824
00:42:42,026 --> 00:42:44,395
of the runway before landing.
825
00:42:44,895 --> 00:42:46,196
- Thank you very much.
826
00:42:46,263 --> 00:42:47,731
- Avjet also takes steps
827
00:42:47,798 --> 00:42:50,434
to prevent unnecessary
distractions in the cockpit
828
00:42:50,501 --> 00:42:52,236
during the flight.
829
00:42:52,937 --> 00:42:55,873
- After the accident,
the company issued a bulletin
830
00:42:55,940 --> 00:42:59,076
changing their rules
that no passengers
831
00:42:59,143 --> 00:43:01,579
were allowed in the cockpit.
832
00:43:01,946 --> 00:43:05,549
- Okay, guys.
Let's finish up tomorrow.
833
00:43:06,917 --> 00:43:09,987
- Well, the NTSB has also made
a number of recommendations
834
00:43:10,054 --> 00:43:12,222
on improving the NOTAM system,
835
00:43:12,289 --> 00:43:15,125
making things a little bit more
graphical and easy to use
836
00:43:15,192 --> 00:43:16,493
so that people can sort them out
837
00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:18,862
rather than just
reading a list.
838
00:43:19,730 --> 00:43:21,699
- The lessons serve as a warning
839
00:43:21,765 --> 00:43:25,469
to all other pilots
who interact with passengers.
840
00:43:26,437 --> 00:43:28,672
- I think the message
of this flight
841
00:43:28,739 --> 00:43:32,409
is there is no
dinner date engagement,
842
00:43:32,476 --> 00:43:35,045
or birthday party
that is more important
843
00:43:35,112 --> 00:43:38,382
than the lives
of your passengers on the plane.
844
00:43:38,449 --> 00:43:40,818
And the pilot has to be
tough enough
845
00:43:40,884 --> 00:43:42,553
to stand up to that,
846
00:43:42,620 --> 00:43:44,989
because the passengers
just don't know.
847
00:43:45,055 --> 00:43:46,924
They're not pilots,
and they do not know
848
00:43:46,991 --> 00:43:51,395
that their behavior
is endangering their very lives.
849
00:43:51,462 --> 00:43:53,564
But it did help change the law
850
00:43:53,631 --> 00:43:55,799
and change how the FAA operates
851
00:43:55,866 --> 00:43:59,470
in many aspects.
And for that, we're thankful.
852
00:44:05,576 --> 00:44:08,746
(theme music)
853
00:44:27,331 --> 00:44:29,700
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