Original subtitles

two levels to cover the new structure.

Extensive fishing gear was added, including a stern ramp, gantry tower,

trawl systems.

After almost two years, in May 1989, it relaunched as Alaska Ranger and joined

Alaska's growing fleet of factory trawlers. Many trawlers in Alaska were

converted supply ships.

Even though they were designed and built for the relatively calmer and warmer

waters of the Gulf, The oil industry had a surplus of vessels and changes in

rules governing fishing vessels made them an affordable option.

Fishing company Alaska's factory trawlers and about 20 others in the

and the Aleutian Islands were part of the Amendment 80 fleet which started in

1982. Amendment 80 is a fishing program that controls quotas, conservation and

sustainability.

The program licensed a group of trawler processors built before 1990 to manage

their quotas as a cooperative rather than per vessel. It was aimed at older

vessels which were designed for specific catchers rather than new trawlers with

larger flexible processing facilities.

This allowed older trawlers to keep working instead of being replaced

their age, fatigue and modification.

Factory trawlers can process, package, freeze and store their catch, which

allows them to operate in the far reaches of the Bering Sea, some distance

search and rescue support.

Ships working in these areas can encounter sea ice, not heavy polar ice,

they still need reinforced hull sections.

During Ranger's conversion to a factory trawler, the yard installed thick plate

metal that extended about 1 .2 meters below the factory deck to the waterline.

The owners, fishing company Alaska, assumed that this ice strengthening

certified the Alaska Ranger for icy waters.

During the conversion, the stern behind the trawl deck was built up to launch

gear and haul fish on board.

The gear used on board Alaska Ranger has four steel trawl doors which act like

wings to spread the net wide and heavy weights to hold the bottom of the net

open in mid -water.

The stern gear suffered regular impact from the doors, weights, nets and catch

hauled up the stern ramp, often slamming into both sides of the ramp.

So, wear plates were welded over both sides of the ramp to reduce damage.

those plates welded over existing metal left small gaps between the ship's

structure and the new plates at the very back of the vessel which is called the

stern void or the outer transom the stern void is a sealed space that

buoyancy for the vessel it's inspected from the outside and from the inside to

confirm its integrity in 1991 alaska ranger added quartz nozzles to boost

efficiency A cord nozzle is a duct around the propeller that improves

at slow speed and shields the edges of the propeller blades.

Alaska Ranger used two conventional spade rudders, one behind each

operated from the wheelhouse by an electro -hydraulic system.

Each rudder stock sat in a watertight trunk running from the bottom hole

below the rudder room.

The base of each rudder trunk was welded to the hull.

Ranger used hydraulic controllable pitch propellers. The normal propellers you

automatically think of have a fixed pitch.

The vessel reverses direction through a gearbox that changes the direction the

propeller spins.

Controllable pitch propellers adjust the angle of each blade.

so water is pushed one way or the other as the propeller blade changes angles.

Positive pitch moves the ship forward, negative pitch moves it in reverse,

the propeller shaft spins in the same direction.

Alaska Ranger's controller pitch propeller used an electro -hydraulic

system operated from the bridge.

Originally, each propeller had one electric pump and one pump driven

mechanically by its engine.

The electric pump was the primary and the mechanical pump was the backup.

Mechanical pumps were damaged in late 1989 and were replaced with electric

pumps. Repairing the originals was costly and the parts weren't available.

From then on, each propeller ran with two electric pumps.

But if the electrical power was lost, the propellers automatically shifted to

their natural state, which is full reverse or negative pitch.

Normally, ships like this have redundancies that operate on different

mechanical or electrical.

Fishing company Alaska was fully aware of the configuration and its drawbacks.

In 1988, during sea trials, Alaska Ranger went astern for 15 seconds after

hydraulic pumps were shut off.

while the vessel was moving ahead.

In May 1996, while docked with engines running, a power loss sent the

controllable pitch propellers from zero to negative pitch. The ship moved astern

and struck Alaska Warrior which was moored behind Ranger. In 2003, the same

thing happened again.

The ship backed into another vessel after the propellers shifted from

reverse because the chief engineer hadn't engaged the electric hydraulic

before starting the main generators. In a situation like that where the ship

starts moving backwards, I think my natural instinct would be to push the

throttle forward which would make the situation worse.

It's counter -intuitive.

Alaska Ranger needed multiple stern repairs over its life.

A fractured weld in the starboard aft ballast tank was repaired in 1996.

In December 2001 damage was found on both sides of the transom which needed

reinforcement and the stern ramp was leaking.

The repetitive action of raising and lowering the trawl doors in the fishing

gear caused fractures in the outer transom plating. Over the years it

deteriorated and by September 2004 water flowed freely between the port and

starboard ballast tanks.

In December 2004, the centerline bulkhead was repaired.

It was re -welded in January 2005 and again in October 2005.

At the same time, the shipyard added a doubler plate to the outer transom. A

doubler plate is an additional steel plate welded over a weak spot, like

patching a rusted car panel.

But doubler plates can focus stress in an area that's already weak.

They can trap moisture and hide the condition of the original metal

A photo taken in 2005 during repairs showed water leaking from the stern

where the plates were welded.

In April 2007 leaks were found but not the cause or the exact location.

Major work with the new doubler plates and repairs on both sides of the outer

transom was logged in November 2005 and again in November 2007.

As part of the head and gut fleet, Alaska Ranger had a major exemption.

Over 60 ships in the fleet were exempt from U .S. Coast Guard inspection until

2006 when the Alternate Compliance and Safety Agreement was introduced.

This program aimed to bring older ships up to the same standards as the current

regulations for their class of vessel.

In March 2007, the Coast Guard issued new guidance for commercial fishing

vessels, splitting them into three categories.

Fishing vessel, fish tender and fish processing vessel.

The new guidance required updated compliance and certification.

In January 2008, the Coast Guard reported only seven vessels were fully

compliant. The Seattle Coast Guard office ran the program for the head and

feet, and only one inspector did most of the exam, which meant the Coast Guard

didn't know the state of most of the vessels.

At the end of February 2008, they issued a 30 -day blanket extension for

applicants who hadn't met requirements and asked owners to report any

outstanding work.

Alaska Ranger's records show planned maintenance to bring the vessel up to

current standards and communication with the inspector.

But there were still questions about the state of the aft ballast tank, which

couldn't be properly inspected from the inside or the outside of the vessel.

In November 2007, Alaska Ranger, Alaska Jurist and Alaska Warrior went into

dry dock at Yamanishi Shipyard in Japan for repairs, factory modifications and

the Coast Guard's dry dock and internal structural exam.

The Marine officer who inspected the off -port tank on Ranger said access was

poor. He called it a maze and inspection holes were so small all he could do was

shine a flashlight through to check for obvious signs of decay.

The outer transom, where plates of metal were added, created a void between the

original hull metal and the new plates.

Fishing company Alaska installed the outer transom to shield the stern from

trawl gear damage, but it wasn't designed for internal inspection or

from corrosion.

The shipyard coated the internal rudder room surfaces and attached sacrificial

anodes to the exposed areas of the hull, but the framing and some placing

between the aft transom and the hull underneath were left unprotected.

Alaska Ranger was examined by two Coast Guard examiners from Seattle and two

based in Japan.

They used ultrasonic hull gauging to measure the thickness of the metal.

but they had no data on the original plate thickness for comparison, so they

averaged readings to estimate the thickness.

They didn't take readings of the stern wear plates and inner plates of the

voids, nor the interior or exterior plates of the stern ramps, even though

drawings showed interior stern plates were accessible from the aft ballast

tanks. The exam specifications required gauging the thickness of internal areas

of the fore and aft tanks.

But the lead inspector said there's no reason to take shots on the stern

there's a wear plate back there. He skipped the inspection of the area with

least access and where most of the maintenance had accumulated.

There were other repairs to the stern.

Maintenance logs recorded other doublers, corroded weld seams and

the main frame.

The centerline bulkhead, which separates the right from the left ballast tank,

kept coming up in reports and in March 2008 it was still on the company's work

list. I've had a few surveys done on small yachts and the inspectors were

knowledgeable and thorough.

But there's always a point where they draw a line.

They can't cut open inaccessible hatch spaces, so they do their best to make an

educated assessment.

On Friday the 21st of March 2008, Alaska Ranger sails into Dutch Harbor with 45

crew and two fishery observers.

Ice, moving south, pushes the vessel off the Yellowfin Sol fishing ground, so

the trip is cut short.

In port, the crew switch from bottom trawl gear to mid -water gear to target

mackerel. They take on fuel and restock stores, but to save time, they don't

offload the fish caught between the 19th and 22nd of March.

The ship carries crew from three organizations, which is common for

vessels like this.

Fishing Company Alaska supply 40 crew members, including two deck officers,

three engineering officers, two cooks, one steward, and 32 factory workers.

Five crew members are Japanese nationals employed by North Pacific Resources.

a U .S. arm of Anyo Fisheries, which have an exclusive deal to buy all the

catches from Fishing Company Alaska.

Their fishmasters are on board to make sure the right species are targeted.

They have a huge influence on operations, often leading to

Fishing Company Alaska vessels between U .S. and Japanese crews.

Factory crews rotate three teams that work 12 -hour shifts with six hours off.

Two groups on duty while the factory runs around the clock.

Conditions are harsh and experience ranges from years to just days.

One factory worker joins in Dutch Harbour right before sailing.

I've sailed in rough weather, not in this region, but I wouldn't want to work

a fishing ship like this. I like to think I'd be okay with the sailing, but

can't imagine working below deck gutting fish all day. It's brutal work.

Some factory workers also serve as bosun or deckhand, working on deck during

fishing and in the factory as needed.

The Japanese chief engineer manages refrigeration, hydraulics and factory

systems. The other Japanese technicians help with fishing and maintenance.

The season runs from the 20th of January to October, with target species

changing throughout the year.

Sea ice typically forms in the North Bering Sea as late as November when

seawater reaches about minus 1 .7 degrees Celsius until around June.

Seawater freezes at minus 1 .8 degrees Celsius.

Fishing Company Alaska's operations manager believes the hull is ice

with its reinforced steel above and below the waterline, and so they sail in

seasons when the ship will encounter sea ice.

Fishing Company Alaska operated seven Alaska vessels at the time.

Patriot, Spirit, Pioneer, Warrior, Victory, Jurist and Ranger. 65 -year

Captain Jacobson holds multiple licenses.

He's worked for Fishing Company Alaska since 1985.

He was mate on four Fishing Company Alaska ships and became master of Alaska

Ranger in March 2008.

The mate, Silvera, is 50 and also holds a master's license.

He served as master or mate on all seven fishing company Alaska vessels. He

joined Alaska Ranger as mate in March 2008.

From 2007, 65 -year -old chief engineer Cook served on Alaska Patriot and Alaska

Victory. He moved to Alaska Ranger in January 2008 and supervises two

engineers on rotating ships.

Fishmaster Kono Sun sailed on Alaska Ranger from 2005 as the Japanese company

ANYO's representative.

Two NOAA observers boarded the vessel between the 4th and the 19th of March to

monitor operations and collect catch data which is used to manage over 40 US

fisheries. Alaska Ranger carries 55 immersion suits with strobe lights.

three 20 -person inflatable life rafts with strobes and an EPIRB, which is an

emergency beacon that transmits location to emergency responders from any

position over the surface of the globe.

Monthly safety drills focus mainly on mustering and putting on survival suits.

An emergency squad conducts other drills less frequently.

abandoned ship, firefighting, man overboard recovery, dewatering or damage

control, sending distress calls and reporting failed alarms.

The emergency squad includes a factory manager, a factory lead, three factory

workers, a deckhand and a bosun. The master, mate and one assistant engineer

also hold damage control or safety credentials.

There's no dedicated safety budget or written training program, but the Coast

Guard examiners say Fishing Company Alaska crews are professional and

cooperative on safety.

And one examiner says Fishing Company Alaska always shows concern for safety.

In recreational sailing, safety training is often optional. In many parts of the

world, you can buy a boat and start sailing without any formal

safety training.

In the commercial sector, safety is regulated.

Shortly after midday on Saturday the 22nd of March 2008, Alaska Ranger leaves

Dutch Harbor for Petrel Bank about 500 nautical miles due west to fish for

mackerel. At 1236, the wind is from the northwest at 15 knots with gusts up to

27 knots, and visibility is about 1 .75 nautical miles with light blowing snow.

The air temperature is about minus 4 degrees Celsius and the water is between

and 2 degrees Celsius.

The National Weather Service forecast shows deteriorating weather conditions

with gale and freezing spray warnings.

Winds building to 40 knots with gusts to 55 knots, sea swell up to 4 meters,

more snow and heavy freezing spray through Saturday night into Sunday the

Fishing Company Alaska's operations manager says the transit to patrol bank

takes about two and a half days.

Crew usually rest on routes and watch movies when they're not sleeping.

At 1900, the night engineer relieves the day engineer and the mates relieve the

captain on deck.

At around 2 o 'clock in the morning on Sunday the 23rd of March, the mate is on

watch and the transit has been uneventful. He takes a satellite call

mate on the Alaska Spirit, which is about 100 nautical miles behind them,

heading to patrol back.

They chat for about 25 minutes with no mention of any concerns.

In line with the forecast, the weather has worsened with average waves near 2

meters and occasional waves up to 5 meters.

Below deck, the situation is not calm.

At 0200, around the same time the mate takes the call from Alaska Spirits, the

night engineer sees a bilge alarm for high water in the rudder room and goes

check. To get to the rudder room, he has to pass through the engine room, then

the auxiliary machinery space and into the rudder room at the tail end of the

ship. He opens the watertight door to the auxiliary machinery space.

and sees a wall of water pouring in. The rudder room is behind the auxiliary

machinery space and the ramp room is above the rudder room.

It's not clear if the water is coming from the ramp room or the rudder room.

He shuts the door and hammers the dogs until the seals stop leaking.

He calls the wheelhouse from the hydraulics room to report major flooding

tells the mates to sound the general alarm. Then he calls the chief engineer.

At 02 .30 the mate sounds the alarm and most of the crew muster in the

wheelhouse while the emergency squad starts damage control.

The night engineer begins turning on bilge and ballast pumps to dewater the

rudder room, auxiliary machinery space and engine room. He then heads up to the

ramp room.

At the aft end of the ship on the factory deck both watertight doors to

room are open. It's almost knee deep in water.

The emergency squad brings in a portable emergency pump from the workshop but

before they can get it started the knife engineer and the Japanese chief

engineer tell them to muster at the wheelhouse and get ready to abandon

The two engineers go into the ramp room which is flooding steadily and try to

find the source of the flooding water.

They hear transformers popping as water reaches the electrical panels.

The engineers shut one of the ramp rooms' two watertight doors and another

between the workshop and ladder well to avoid the risk of electrocution. The

Japanese chief engineer reports to the fishmaster who sends him and a Japanese

technician back to the engine room several times to check the level of

They can see water rising quickly in the engine room bilge even though the

bulkhead hatches are sealed.

At 02 .36, the stern or the back of the ship is riding low in the water but

isn't yet under.

The ranger's mate calls Alaska Spirits again and calmly says, come this way,

we're taking water in the rudder room.

He asks Spirits' mate to contact the Coast Guard, the fishing company Alaska

offers in Dutch Harbor, and any other fleet he can reach.

Spirits' mate makes several calls over a satellite phone.

Alaska Ranger.

is over 100 nautical miles west of Dutch Harbor and more than 50 nautical miles

from the nearest land.

Spirit is almost 100 nautical miles behind, but Alaska Warrior is closer at

nautical miles on the same track as Ranger.

At 02 .42, Spirit calls Warrior about the situation and Warrior heads for

at 10 knots, about three and a half hours away.

At 02 .46, Alaska Ranger sends its first mayday, and Coast Guard Station Kodiak

answers immediately.

The crew give their exact coordinates and stay on the air while the Coast

pass the case to the Rescue Coordination Center Juneau at 02 .54.

They tell the crew to manually activate their EPIRB, which is their emergency

beacon. At 02 .58, the Coast Guard starts five -minute check -ins while the

Command Center launches two aircraft and diverts the Coast Guard Cutter Monroe

with its HH -65 Dolphin helicopter.

Onboard Ranger, most crew muster at the wheelhouse and don emergency suits while

the emergency squad engages in damage control.

Headcount isn't easy to record with thick gloves on the emergency suits, and

muster sheet is out of date.

but the factory leader still accounts for everyone.

Because of noise and smoke, the captain moves the muster to the weather deck,

and the chief cook rotates small groups inside to warm up.

The stern keeps dropping lower in the water until waves wash over the transom

and sweep nets and gear off the trawl deck.

The daytime engineer hears the chief engineer report a lost rudder and that

need to abandon ship.

At 0310, almost an hour after the first sign of trouble, the bridge tells the

Coast Guard they've lost a rudder. With the main engines still running, the

night engineer and captain go to assess the flooding in the engine room.

The captain doesn't want to be dead in the water.

The ship's electrical power fails at around 0330.

Emergency lights come on, and the main engines keep turning.

but the vessel starts driving astern under its own power.

As the electric fails, the controllable pitch propeller defaults to its natural

negative pitch state and reverses the direction of travel.

The seas build to almost 8 meters, and the ship takes a hard, sudden, starboard

lift to the right of the vessel, which keeps getting worse.

The captain and night engineer don their suits, and at 0402, the Alaska Ranger

tells the Coast Guard they'll abandon soon.

A C -130 launches from Kodiak almost 700 nautical miles away and an MH -60

Jayhawk helicopter launches from St. Paul about 200 nautical miles away.

The Coast Guard Cutter Monroe sails at 30 knots from about 110 nautical miles

out with its HH -65 helicopter to launch when it comes into range.

Each helicopter carries a pilot, co -pilot, flight mechanic and rescue

The Alaska Warrior is closer than Monroe and is expected first on speed.

The starboard lift continues to deepen, so the crew deploys the three life

rafts. But because the ship is driving backwards, the life raft drifts forward

past the bow. The chief cook tears the palms of his immersion suit gloves,

trying to pull a life raft alongside.

At 0416, the bridge tells the Coast Guard that the crew will stay on board.

Their life rafts are lost.

As the ship drives backwards, more water is forced through the stern which

accelerates their problems.

Less than 10 minutes later, two people go overboard as the starboard lift hits

45 degrees.

Air temperature is about minus 9 degrees Celsius with 26 knot winds and heavy

snow. Wind chill brings the temperature down to minus 30 degrees Celsius with

the sea almost freezing and waves up to 8 meters high.

At 04 .23, people start jumping into the water.

Seven minutes later, the Jayhawk helicopter from St. Paul comes into

range. The captain at the helm reports a 45 -degree lift, a rollover is

imminent, and that only seven crew are still on board.

40 people are in the water.

The Jayhawk establishes communication with Alaska Warrior about 11 nautical

miles east and closing, but still an hour away.

When the Jayhawk arrived at 5 past 5, almost three hours after the start of

incident, it can't find the ship.

Alaska Ranger sinks in 1 ,800 meters of water.

The helicopter flies towards bright strobes they think are life rafts, but

dozens of smaller strobes from people in their immersion suits.

They make contact with the life raft by handheld VHS.

Some of Ranger's crew have made it safely into a life raft and are okay, so

helicopter prioritizes people in the water.

The rescue swimmer deploys and they hoist two people together, then six,

another pair, then three more, reaching 13 survivors which maxes out their

capacity. With no rescue vessel on scene, they recover the swimmer and fly

Alaska Warrior to lower the survivors.

At 0604 they find Warrior doesn't have a safe open deck space so they redirect

to the Cutter Monroe further out but within range.

Monroe launches its Dolphin helicopter at 0555 leaving the flight deck clear

the deck is designed for the smaller HH65 not the larger HH60.

6 .20 the HC -130 search and rescue aircraft arrives overhead and starts

counting strobes. It coordinates the helicopters and guides Warrior to the

raft. At 6 .33 the smaller dolphin helicopter lowers its rescue swimmer

water. Hoist three survivors one by one, recovers the swimmer and moves to

another group. The group waves them toward another pair who need more urgent

help. The rescue swimmer finds the day engineer helping an unresponsive crew

member. He starts to put the unresponsive man in the rescue basket,

a combination of heavy weather, poor visibility and the urgency of low fuel,

flight mechanic starts to hoist before the victim is completely in the basket.

When it reaches the helicopter, the victim is still hanging halfway outside

basket. Water in his suit means he's too heavy to pull into the cabin. As the

mechanic turns to find a blade to cut and drain the seat, the man slips and

falls more than 12 meters back into the seat.

The rescue swimmers already moved about 65 meters towards the day engineer to

prep him for pickup and can't find the fallen crew member in the wave.

It's very easy to lose sight of another person in the water. There are times

where you don't see the boat for minutes because you're riding out of sync in

the trough or peak of the swell.

At 6 .44, the Jayhawk reaches the Qatar -Monroe and lowers 12 survivors one at a

time to the deck. They're taken to the mess deck for triage.

The Jayhawk reports 13 rescued over the radio, but deck crew count 12.

This mismatch isn't passed to the search and rescue coordinators in Monroe's

control center because the HH -60 can't land on Monroe's small helicopter deck.

After clearing survivors, the crew set up in -flight refueling. They pass a

hose with a special adapter up on the hoist.

The flight mechanic connects it to start the flow and sends the hose back down

after refueling. As the cutter nears the search area, it takes over on scene

command from rescue coordination sensors you know.

The smaller dolphin helicopter still on the scene of the accident is also low on

fuel. It drops a small life raft near three survivors.

leaves its rescue swimmer with people in the water and returns to Monroe.

At 7 .26, Alaska Warrior arrives.

Victims in the life raft can't climb the rescue ladder in the rough seas, so

Warrior uses a crane and a harness to lift all 10 people on board to safety.

The larger Jayhawk helicopter cuts its refueling short so Monroe can close the

distance to the Dolphin helicopter, which is critically low on fuel.

The Jayhawk has enough fuel to continue the rescue.

The Dolphin lands on Monroe with five survivors.

The Jayhawk reaches the scene around 0800 and Warrior recovers a second life

raft with 12 more survivors.

The Jayhawk picks up four more people, retrieves the Dolphin's rescue swimmer,

an unresponsive victim, and then confirms all three life rafts are empty.

They deploy a datum marker buoy to track drift and head towards Monroe.

At 09 .07, the Jayhawk arrives with four survivors.

It lowers the survivors and both swimmers to Monroe, but the mate is

unresponsive and can't be revived.

At 09 .55, the Dolphin takes off again with its swimmer. The Warrior recovers

three unresponsive victims, the Captain, the Chief Engineer, and the crew member

who fell from the helicopter.

None survived.

At 10 .12, the rescue center headcount shows 22 survivors on board Monroe.

With the Warriors 25, a total of 47 crew are accounted for, and the Coast Guard

command suspends the search.

At 11 .00, the Dolphin is recalled to Monroe, and the Jayhawk departs for St.

Paul. Monroe and Warriors steam together toward Dutch Harbor.

At 12 .15 in the afternoon the rescue coordination sensor realized one person

missing after matching survivor names from Monroe and Alaska Warrior.

The Japanese fish master is unaccounted for.

and Monroe actually has 21 survivors, not 22.

They resume the search immediately with Monroe, another Hercules HC -130 and the

Dolphin HH -60.

Alaska Spirits, Alaska Victory and Alaska Juris later arrive to help search

while Alaska Warrior continues towards Dutch Harbor.

The Coast Guard calls off the search the following night at 2112 on Monday the

24th of March, but the fishing company Alaska Ships stay on scene to continue

their own search.

A total of 42 of the 47 crew were rescued with varying degrees of

Four were recovered deceased, the master, mate, chief engineer and a

worker. The fish master was never found and presumed dead.

With the ship resting in 1830 meters of water, investigators from the NTSB and

Coast Guard relied on testimony service records and company documents to piece

together the timeline of events.

Both the NCSB and Coast Guard said the exact point of flooding in the stern

would likely never be known but the testimony and maintenance history

comprehensive picture.

After water first entered the rudder room the crew told the Coast Guard

lost steering and likely a rudder. If a rudder stock dropped out it would leave

a hole about 22 centimeters wide, which is the inside diameter of the locking

ring at the top of the rudder trunk.

A 22 centimeter hole could flood the rudder room in under five minutes if the

pillar arm was clear and the stock had fallen away, which matches the night

engineer's account of hearing the alarm and seeing a wall of water. But losing

the rudder was just a symptom of a worn -out stern rather than a single cause.

Amendment 80 discouraged replacing old factory trawlers, allowing aging ships

keep working hard in the Bering Sea, pushing tired hulls past their prime.

When you add in earlier inspection exemptions, this created another hole in

Swiss cheese model that could have been closed years earlier.

But inspection exemptions didn't mean the vessel was never examined.

Alaska Ranger had multiple surveys and safety checks during its life.

The Marine Board agreed the flooding began in or near the rudder room, but

say it was unlikely the rudder was lost because it would have loosened gradually

over hours or days, creating noise and vibration that should have been noticed

during normal rounds.

No one reported hearing cracking, hammering or impact noises.

nor feeling vibration or steering issues before the flooding started.

Both investigations stopped short of identifying the exact point of flooding,

but the Coast Guard's analysis showed certain bulkheads and decks weren't

watertight. which would allow progressive flooding from one

another. Alaska Ranger would have survived if the flooding was contained

rudder room. Even flooding the ramp room, generator room, aft machinery

and workshop, the vessel could still have remained afloat. But once water

reached the engine room and overwhelmed the pump, the loss was inevitable.

Investigators concluded that progressive flooding through the stern caused the

sinking. But the NTSB added that the ship's uncontrolled movement astern

contributed to the number of deaths.

The controllable pitch propeller system's reverse failure caused the ship

astern or move backward when the electric hydraulic power was lost.

The Coast Guard noted that the only way to prevent astern motion after hydraulic

pressure loss was to shut the main engines down.

The pilot house had remote emergency engine shutdowns tested in January 2008

with the previous captain and knife engineer, but the current captain and

weren't there for that test.

They only joined the vessel between January and March.

Despite that test, both engineers later testified that they thought only the

engine room crew could stop the engine.

When the ship went astern during the sinking, the captain was caught off

By then, Entering the engine room wasn't safe, which meant the remote shutdowns

were the only option, but no one on board seemed to understand or trust

There were no warnings or written procedures explaining that the vessel

suddenly go astern if electrical power failed, nor any directions for how to

respond. The NTSB found that the ship wouldn't have gone astern if its

controllable pitch propellers still had the original mechanical hydraulic pulse.

Slowing or shutting down the main engines would have stopped the astern

likely slowed the flooding, and kept life rafts within reach.

There were a few other things that came up in the NCSB report.

Crew sometimes sleeping or drinking on the job despite Fish and Company

zero tolerance policy.

The toxicology report for the deceased captain, mate, and chief engineer showed

they were sober.

but the survivors weren't tested a 2006 vessel survey valued alaska ranger at

about 5 .5 million dollars with a replacement cost of roughly 15 million

no salvage or remote inspection of the wreck was ever carried out in 2006