All language subtitles for Battle of Shiloh 1862 - American Civil War DOCUMENTARY [English] [DownloadYoutubeSubtitles.com]

In Hebrew, Shiloh is a word that can
mean a tranquil or peaceful place,

which is a bitter irony considering that the
Shiloh Church would witness the first great

bloodletting of the American Civil War.
The Confederacy was reeling after losing

the Border States and Middle Tennessee in early
1862. However, its western armies were far from

beaten and launched a series of counteroffensives
during 1862, successfully stalling the Union’s

advance. However, their gains were fleeting,
and by the end of the year, the Union had fully

regained the initiative. In our latest video
on the war that divided the American nation,

we will explore the dramatic confrontations at
the Battles of Shiloh, Corinth and Stone’s River.

Johnston’s Dilemma
General Albert Johnston

of the Confederate Department of Mississippi
was under considerable pressure following the

loss of Forts Henry and Donelson from not only
Union forces but also Confederate politicians.

Tasked with defending territory many times greater
than Joseph Johnston’s Department of Virginia with

far fewer soldiers and resources, he’d made hard
but unpopular decisions. Evacuating Kentucky and

Middle Tennessee was strategically necessary
but economically and politically disastrous.

Nashville was a major rail hub, gunpowder
factory, and food producer, and it was

also Tennessee’s capital. Its loss crippled the
Confederacy’s logistics and economy while severely

undermining its legitimacy. Governor Isham Harris
understood and agreed with Johnston’s decision,

and Jefferson Davis defended him, but many other
politicians denounced him as a coward. Johnston

didn’t publicly respond. He knew only a victory
would silence his critics, but his prospects were

dismal. He had about 30,000 troops available to
defend Corinth, Mississippi. The crossroad of two

major rail lines , Corinth controlled all the
supply lines to western Tennessee. If it fell,

Memphis would have to be abandoned. Worse,
it would render all other rail lines west of

Chattanooga worthless and open Mississippi
to invasion, and the Federals knew this.

Halleck’s Maneuvering
Meanwhile, department of Missouri commander Major

General Henry Halleck was busy using Brigadier
General Ulysses Grant’s victory at Fort Donelson.

He immediately recognized Grant as both an
important asset and a threat to his own ambitions.

Grant had considerable field command skills but
lacked political acumen or ambition. Halleck had

never actually led troops but had considerable
political acumen and ambition. Knowing that

Lincoln only valued the former while Grant didn’t
understand political maneuvering, Halleck moved to

advance his career while keeping Grant at heel.
Halleck recommended Grant and several other

subordinates for promotion while arguing that
he should command all western armies as the

most senior general outside Washington. However,
Lincoln only promoted Grant. Shortly thereafter,

Grant went to Nashville to confer with Department
of the Ohio commander Don Carlos Buell about

attacking Corinth. By the most technically narrow
and strict definition, this was abandoning his

military district (a marginally court-martialiable
offense at worst), so Halleck used the excuse

to suspend Grant’s command. Halleck was just
asserting dominance and quickly restored Grant,

but he also protected Grant. Rivals had dredged up
Grant’s past alcoholism and were accusing him of

misconduct, including drunkenness and looting.
Halleck lied to the press that the suspension

was for an investigation, which turned up
nothing, and the accusations went away.

Grant never learned Halleck’s real intentions, as
expected, and actually thanked him for the help.

Meanwhile, Halleck’s department continued winning
victories. Samuel Curtis secured southwestern

Missouri while John Pope cleared the southeast.
Following Pope besieging New Madrid and Curtis’

triumph at Pea Ridge , Halleck again asked
for western command. While his involvement

was only on the logistical and administrative
side, Halleck’s department was the only one

actually doing anything. This ability to find
fighting men and keep them fighting was enough for

Lincoln to agree to give Halleck command of all
Federal troops from Kansas to Ohio on March 11th.

The Importance of Corinth
Halleck believed that Corinth was as vital to

the Confederacy as Richmond, and scouting reports
indicated that Johnston’s army was underequipped,

understrength, and demoralized. Therefore,
Grant and Buell would link up at Pittsburg

Landing. Halleck would then bring reinforcements
and lead the combined, overwhelming force to

Corinth as quickly as possible. The reports were
wrong about the last point. The retreat from

Kentucky had been demoralizing, but Johnston
and his second-in-command, PGT Beauregard,

successfully restored morale while working on
the other deficiencies. 15,000 men under Braxton

Bragg were pulled from the coastal defenses to
bolster the Army of Mississippi. Earl van Dorn

and the Trans-Mississippi army were supposed
to join them, but it was still reassembling

after Pea Ridge. By early April, it was clear
to Johnston that even if van Dorn made it,

the Federals would greatly outnumber him,
and his men still had outdated equipment.

Therefore, Beauregard advocated attacking
first. According to Nathan Forest’s cavalry,

Buell still hadn’t reached Grant, and
his camp wasn’t fortified. If they

marched their 45,000 men quickly, they could
surprise and overwhelm the 40,000 Federals

at Pittsburg Landing before Buell arrived.
In Beauregard’s romantically inclined mind,

a successful attack would let them
drive the Federals all the way back

to Bowling Green. Johnston was skeptical,
but it was better than the other options.

Battle of Shiloh
Grant hadn’t fortified

his camps because he always focused on what
he would do to the Confederates, not what

they could do to him. Grant's orders were to not
let the men get comfortable in camp and maintain

offensive spirit through drill. Five divisions
were sent to Pittsburg Landing on March 11th,

while the sixth guarded the supply depot at
Crump’s Landing. The green divisions under

William Sherman and Benjamin Prentiss camped in
rougher conditions around Shiloh Church to help

the raw recruits acclimate to army life. Grant
himself headquartered in Savannah, Tennessee,

for its telegraph lines. Grant expected Buell
to arrive by late March, but Buell didn’t even

begin marching from Nashville until then. Neither
he nor Grant felt the need to hurry the march.

The Confederates marched out of Corinth on April
3rd, intending to attack on April 4th. The 20-mile

march would have been easy for experienced
troops, but Johnston’s men and officers were

green. Consequently, the march was confused,
inefficient, and slow. Consequently, it wasn’t

completed until dusk on April 5th. Beauregard
lamented that Buell had to have arrived by then,

surprise was lost, and the attack should be
called off. Johnston refused, stating that

he’d “fight if were they a million”. The reality
was that retreating after such a march would cause

mass desertion and lead to all the general
officers being dismissed at best. However,

the Federals weren’t aware of Johnston’s advance
despite pickets reporting rebel activity. Forest’s

cavalry had raided the area recently, and Grant’s
division commanders assumed he was back. Grant

only alerted Lew Wallace , believing that Forest
would attack Crump’s Landing. In fairness, Forest

was back but was only scouting ahead of Johnston’s
advance. That night, Grant wired Halleck that

he didn’t expect an attack, while Sherman and
Prentiss told their men there was nothing to fear.

First Day
However, Colonel Everett Peabody was worried.

The woods were too noisy yet also too quiet ,
and pickets were sighting rebel scouts. Something

wasn’t right. Thus, he sent out five companies to
patrol the Shiloh woodland at 01:00 and put the

rest of his brigade on alert. At 05:00, Peabody’s
patrol ran into Confederate pickets in Fraley’s

cotton field. The ensuing skirmish forced Johnston
to order a general attack at 05:30. Fatefully,

Johnston ordered Beauregard to remain at
headquarters to direct reinforcements and supplies

while he rode forward to direct the battle. By
then, Peabody had raised the alarm. Prentiss

furiously thought Peabody had provoked a battle
against orders until the rebel’s organization and

determination made him realize that Peabody
had actually disrupted a major attack.

William Hardee’s corps reached Sherman’s
camp at 07:00 while Bragg’s corps made

contact with Prentiss at 07:30, having taken
two hours to get organized and fight through

Peabody’s brigade . Sherman didn’t believe he was
under attack until bullets grazed him and killed

his orderly. Finally realizing the situation,
he rapidly organized his division to resist.

The other three Union divisions shook themselves
awake and moved to support Sherman and Prentiss.

In response, Beauregard ordered Leonidas
Polk and John Breckinridge to the attack’s

flanks , widening the line to envelop the Union
flanks. Back in Savannah, Grant was sitting down

for breakfast as Buell’s lead division arrived
across the river when the sounds of battle drifted

downriver. On crutches after a riding accident,
Grant limped into action, ordering Buell’s men

to keep marching along the east bank and cross
at Pittsburg Landing. Grant then hobbled aboard

a southbound steamer, stopping at Crump’s
Landing to order Wallace to get marching.

Pittsburg Landing was in chaos when Grant
arrived around 09:00. While as a whole his

army was fighting fiercely, thousands of green
recruits had panicked and run at the first sight

of the enemy. Even veteran units had fled after
being overwhelmed or running out of ammunition.

Reorganizing the cowering men into new units,
Grant began building a new line on the ridge

south of Pittsburg Landing. Sherman was leading
the defense on the left flank but was gradually

pushed back past Shiloh Church and then Crossroads
. Similarly, Prentiss fell back until he and 4500

troops reached an abandoned, sunken wagon road
around 11:00 and resolved to make a stand.

Meanwhile, the Confederates had their share
of chaos. The dense woods, brushfires,

and gunsmoke ruined unit cohesion, and thousands
of green Confederates were fleeing, just like the

Federals. Johnston tirelessly rode up and down
the line, encouraging faltering units while

Beauregard rounded up stragglers and sent them
back into battle. The Federals on the left and

right were pushed back past Prentiss’ position,
remembered as Hornet’s Nest. Grant ordered him to

hold at all costs, and Prentiss complied.
Johnston spent two hours unsuccessfully

assaulting Hornet’s Nest as the Union flanks
began collapsing. At 14:00, he was hit in the

thigh while riding ahead of Breckinridge’s troops.
It appeared a minor wound until Johnston slumped

and nearly fell from his saddle. His popliteal
artery had been severed, and Albert Johnston

bled to death at 14:30. Davis later lamented that
this was the moment the Confederacy lost the west.

The Gunboats USS Tyler and Lexington arrived and
bombarded the Confederates to cover retreating

Union troops. Only Prentiss held his ground,
and Beauregard sent 18,000 soldiers to end

him. However, the attacks were uncoordinated
and piecemeal, allowing Prentiss to hold out

until 62 cannons were concentrated against
him, blowing apart the natural cover. A

final assault forced Prentiss and 2200 troops to
surrender at 17:30 as the rest escaped. At 18:00,

Beauregard halted the attack. His troops were
too exhausted and disorganized to make the final

push against Grant's breastworks on the ridge,
though he expected to finish the job tomorrow.

Second Day
During the night, Lew Wallace and two of Buell’s

divisions finally arrived. Wallace had gotten so
lost on poorly marked roads that a two-hour march

took all day. Grant’s men rested and reorganized
while Beauregard slept in Sherman’s tent,

though his troops didn’t as heavy rain arrived
while the warships Tyler and Lexington fired

into their positions all night. Some officers
advocated retreating, but Grant refused. The

army was reconcentrated and reinforced. They would
attack at dawn. Forest discovered this during the

night but failed to find and warn Beauregard.
Dismissed by other Confederate generals, Forest

disgustedly predicted, “We’ll be whipped like
Hell.” He was right. At 05:00, Grant and Buell’s

45,000 troops attacked along the whole line.
Beauregard only had 20,000 effectives left and

was steadily pushed back to his starting position.
At 14:00, the Confederates began withdrawing and

abandoned the field by 15:30. Grant’s infantry
was exhausted, and he didn’t have the cavalry

to pursue. However, Sherman unsuccessfully
attacked Forest’s rearguard the next day.

Aftermath
Both armies suffered

around 10,000 killed or wounded, with another
2885 Federals and 959 Confederates captured

or missing. Only 12,000 were killed
or wounded across all major battles

during the first year combined. Both
sides were shocked by the casualties,

and firestorms of criticism were leveled against
Grant and Beauregard, though the upcoming year’s

battles would make such numbers mundane.
Both generals ignored the press and focused

on the battles to come. Lincoln defended Grant,
saying, “I cannot spare this man. He fights.”

Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing and took
command of both armies on April 11th. Grant wanted

to move immediately, but Halleck demurred. The
supply lines were too stretched for his liking,

and he wanted to bring Grant’s army
back up to strength. Additionally,

he’d ordered Pope to join them after Island
Number 10 fell on April 7th. While waiting,

Halleck removed Grant from army command to serve
as his second-in-command, a meaningless position,

while George Thomas temporarily commanded the
Army of the Tennessee. While primarily done

to prevent Grant from outshining him, Halleck
also knew the press would stop attacking Grant

if they couldn’t see him. It worked, and by
June, Grant was back in national good graces.

Siege of Corinth
Beauregard fell back to Corinth and

linked up with van Dorn . A master siege engineer,
Beauregard swiftly turned Corinth into a fortress.

However, he realized this was a mistake shortly
thereafter. Corinth’s water supply was limited,

and what Beauregard’s 65,000 men weren’t
drinking up was being fouled by waste.

Typhus and dysentery were rampant. Worse, the
Federals refused to assault his fortifications,

rendering them worthless. Instead, Halleck’s
120,000 men crawled forward starting April

29th. Refusing to allow another Shiloh, each army
advanced less than a mile per day before stopping

to fortify their position. Beauregard repeatedly
probed the advancing juggernaut to either find a

weakness or provoke an actual attack, but nothing
worked. Pope repeatedly tried to take the bait,

but Halleck had Grant restrain him. Instead, the
Federals just fortified their way forward until

Corinth was in artillery range on May 29th.
Beaurgard had to evacuate. His sick lists

were longer than the Shiloh casualty list, and
there was no hope of relief. To prevent Halleck’s

attack, he issued rations to several units and
ordered them to prepare to launch an assault. As

expected, deserters fled to Union lines with
the news. As trains began taking sick troops

out of Corinth, bound for Tupelo , he had the men
cheer as if reinforcements were arriving. The ruse

successfully convinced Halleck to halt earlier
and build stronger fortifications than normal.

By morning, Beauregard had escaped Corinth,
letting Halleck claim the pestilent thirst trap.

Halleck Goes East
Grant wanted Halleck

to move against Vicksburg immediately, but it was
impossible. A wet spring had turned into drought,

and there wasn’t enough drinking water for the
army. River levels fell too low for steamships,

leaving only badly damaged railways for supply
lines. Therefore, Halleck dispersed the army

to rebuild damaged rail lines, pacify the
conquered territory, find enough water,

and just get out of disease-ridden Corinth.
Additionally, Lincoln was hounding him to

send an army to eastern Tennessee. A Unionist
hotbed under Confederate occupation, Lincoln had

romantic notions of using a reunified Tennessee
to tempt other rebel states to rejoin the Union.

Halleck knew that wouldn’t work, but Chattanooga
was an important strategic target. Therefore,

he ordered Buell to take the city while Grant was
restored to army command to take Vicksburg. In

July, Halleck and Pope were called east. Grant
and Buell were independent commanders again,

and William Rosecrans took over Pope’s
command, which was now part of Grant’s army.

Heartland Campaign
Buell spent June and July

crawling along the railines toward Chattanooga,
barely marching 90 miles. Much of this was his

own fault. Like McClellan, he hated battles,
believed in a limited war for limited ends,

and always moved with excessive caution. However,
Forest was ruthlessly destroying the rail lines,

and he could only move as quickly as
repair crews worked, which got worse

when John Morgan’s Kentucky cavalry began
raiding the supply lines from Nashville.

Meanwhile, in Tupelo, Beauregard was relieved of
command after leaving the army to recover from

Corinth. Davis replaced him with Bragg, who began
planning a new offensive with van Dorn. Department

of East Tennessee commander Edmund Kirby Smith
was constantly asking Bragg to reinforce him,

then invade Kentucky. Morgan and the Confederate
shadow government claimed that Kentucky was eager

to join the Confederacy. More importantly, Smith
and Bragg could loot Union supply dumps. After

much consideration, Bragg agreed and moved
his army via a 776-mile railroad detour

to Chattanooga . Van Dorn would keep Grant
pinned down and retake Corinth if possible.

Van Dorn’s Gambit
To accomplish this,

van Dorn had about 30,000 troops from the
Trans-Mississippi army and the now-abandoned

Memphis garrison. Defeating Grant’s 55,000 men
in open battle was hopeless. Instead, he tried

to trick Grant into giving up Corinth through
constant feints and simultaneous raids against

multiple targets. Grant wasn’t fooled and tried to
flip the script on van Dorn by attacking isolated

units. Sterling Price would have been trapped and
destroyed in Iuka by Rosecrans and Edward Howard’s

corps on September 19th but for acoustic shadows
preventing Howard from engaging. Two weeks later,

van Dorn assaulted Rosecrans’ defenses around
Corinth . While he successfully breached the outer

defenses over two days of fighting through sheer
determination and gaps in the fortifications,

van Dorn never had the men to drive Rosecrans
off and retreated to Vicksburg by November.

The Kentucky Gamble
Bragg and Smith planned their

campaign on July 31st. Bragg’s Army of Mississippi
was too exhausted to advance immediately. Smith

would move north alone to clear the Cumberland Gap
before linking back up with an advancing Bragg,

who’d be in overall command as senior general.
The two forces would then move into Kentucky,

severing Buell’s supply lines and forcing him
into a decisive battle. Victory would deliver

Kentucky to the Confederacy. However, Smith had
no intention of letting the senior Bragg take all

the glory. He isolated, pinned, and bypassed the
Federal garrison in the Cumberland Gap on August

9th before informing Bragg the deal was off.
Therefore, he moved his 20,000 troops to Knoxville

before marching towards Lexington August 14th.
Bragg finally moved out of Chattanooga on August

27th with 34,000 troops. By pure coincidence,
this and Van Dorn’s operations coincided with

Lee’s Maryland campaign, making this the
largest Confederate offensive of the war.

Buell gladly gave up his plodding march
east to move north and protect Louisville .

Smith moved rapidly, capturing 4000 raw recruits
at Richmond on August 30th, before moving on to

Lexington and Frankfort, causing panic and
spurring mass recruitment in Cincinnati and

Louisville. Bragg captured another 4000 men at
Munfordville on September 17th. Buell arrived

at Louisville in early September. He was content
to let Bragg take central Kentucky until Halleck

threatened him with a possibly-not-metaphorical
guillotining if he didn’t engage and finally

advanced with 60,000 troops in early October.
Bragg couldn’t fight Buell alone and asked

Smith to link up at Bardstown. Instead, Smith
inaugurated a Confederate government in Frankfort

on October 4th, which Bragg attended,
leaving his army under Polk’s command.

Polk moved the army to Perryville against
orders, thinking that Buell was moving

right for him. It was actually a single division
feinting toward Frankfort, and coincidentally,

Buell’s main body marched to Perryville
too, looking for water. On October 8th,

the two armies clashed, but neither Buell nor
Bragg knew what was happening until it was too

late and what should have been a decisive battle
became a confused mess. Polk and Hardee’s corps

pushed back Buell’s left flank while the rest of
both armies failed to engage. In the aftermath,

Bragg decided to retreat. His subordinates
were insubordinate, Smith was uncooperative,

and Kentucky wasn’t as welcoming as he’d
been assured. He’d brought 20,000 muskets

to arm new recruits and had given out less than
2,000. Outnumbered by Buell and another army

marshalling in Cincinnati , Bragg ordered Kentucky
abandoned again, retreating to Murfreesboro .

Battle of Stones River

In the aftermath, Bragg and Smith’s armies
merged and were renamed the Army of Tennessee

on November 20th. Initially 46,000 strong, Bragg
was ordered to detach a division to help defend

Vicksburg on December 16th. Meanwhile, Bragg and
the senior generals openly blamed each other for

the invasion's failure and quarrelled constantly,
a problem Davis investigated personally but didn’t

resolve. Rosecrans replaced Buell for failing to
pursue Bragg, and the army was renamed the Army

of the Cumberland. Moving to Nashville, Rosecrans
was threatened with dismissal if he didn’t move

quickly to accomplish Lincoln’s cherished
liberation of east Tennessee. After spending

a month organizing and training his troops,
Rosecrans advanced on Bragg on December 26th.

Bragg’s 38,000 troops were positioned along Stones
River west of Murfreesboro when Rosecrans’ 45,000

arrived on December 29th. After spending December
30th sizing each other up, both generals decided

to attack the opposing right flank with their
left on December 31st. Rosecrans set the attack

for 07:00 to let his men eat a hot breakfast, but
Bragg would attack at dawn. During the night, the

armies’ bands fought a musical battle that ended
in a simultaneous rendition of “Home! Sweet Home!”

December 31st
At 06:00, Hardee’s corps attacked

Alexander McCook’s underprepared right wing,
which briefly held before crumbling. At 07:00,

Thomas Crittenden’s left wing crossed the
river for its attack, only to be recalled

as Rosecrans responded to McCook’s collapse,
personally racing around the battlefield to

direct troops where they were needed while
growing increasingly blood-spattered as men

died around him. Polk launched the second wave of
attacks at 07:00, driving toward the Union center.

Fortunately for Rosecrans, Philip Sheridan had
anticipated an attack. His division had been

ready and in line since 04:00. As the attack
rolled forward, his men resisted fiercely in

a cedar forest remembered as The Slaughter Pen.
By 10:00, the Union’s right had been pushed back

nearly three miles and Sheridan was under attack
from three sides, finally withdrawing at 11:00.

Hardee pressed forward, but the rest of George
Thomas’ divisions were in place and the attack

broke against what locals called Round Forest
but history remembers as Hell’s Half-Acre.

Two blunders saved Rosecrans. On the rebel right,
Breckinridge had seen Crittenden’s men cross the

river to attack him, but not their retreat. As
such, he was prepared to receive the aborted

attack rather than advance himself. At 11:30, he
refused an order from Bragg to send reinforcements

to Hardee, before accepting one to attack to
his front, only to embarrassingly discover the

Federals were gone. Shortly afterward, he was
ordered to halt and turn to meet a different

attack. Bragg had received false intelligence
about a Federal force moving to turn his flank

down Lebanon Turnpike. By the time he learned
the truth, the Federal line had stabilized.

Breckinridge finally launched a limited attack on
the Federal left at 16:00, but it went nowhere and

fighting ended at 16:30. Bragg was certain he’d
won and that in the morning, Rosecrans would be

gone. However, in the Federal camp, Thomas argued
correctly that Bragg’s attack had actually forced

them into a better defensive position than they’d
started in. With his lines of communication and

supply as secure as they could be with Confederate
cavalry roaming around, Rosecrans dug in.

January 1-3
News Year's Day of 1863 was a

miserable one as freezing rain fell all day. Union
wounded being evacuated to Nashville reinforced

Bragg’s belief that Rosecrans would retreat, so he
did nothing. Rosecrans sent a division back across

the river to protect two crossings and occupy the
heights. Finally realizing that Rosecrans wasn’t

retreating, Bragg ordered Breckinridge to attack
the isolated division at 16:00 on January 2nd to

“encourage” a Federal retreat. It was a trap.
The front line fell back across McFadden Ford,

luring the Confederates into a 57-gun artillery
trap, routing them. The standoff continued into

January 3rd, when Federal reinforcements
arrived and Thomas pushed Confederate

sharpshooters out of their forward trenches.
Bragg finally accepted that Rosecrans wouldn’t

retreat. He only had 20,000 effectives left and
was warned that Rosecrans could be reinforced up

to 70,000 soon. Seeing no viable alternative,
Bragg retreated to Tullahoma at 22:00, having

inflicted 13,906 casualties and taking 11,739. The
Confederacy’s great western offensives were over.

Lincoln thanked Rosecrans for delivering a sorely
needed victory following the Fredericksburg

disaster. Join us next time as Grant launches his
legendary Vicksburg campaign. To ensure you don’t

miss that, make sure you are subscribed and have
pressed the bell button to see it. Please consider

liking, subscribing, commenting, and sharing
- it helps immensely. Our patrons and YouTube

members can watch more than 200+ exclusive
videos - join their ranks via the link in

the description or by pressing the join button
under the video to watch these weekly videos,

learn about our schedule, get early access
to our videos, access our private discord,

and much more. This is the Kings and Generals
channel, and we will catch you on the next one.