Original subtitles

Chancellorsville had been Robert E. Lee’s masterstroke, but heavy casualties and the

death of Stonewall Jackson reduced a great victory into a pyrrhic one. Worse, his supply situation

was collapsing, and he was under pressure to help the deteriorating situation out west. It was clear

that the Confederacy was losing the war. Thus, Lee concluded that another northern invasion was the

South’s best, and perhaps final, chance to win the war. This decision would embark the Confederacy’s

most iconic general on a path towards perhaps the most iconic engagement ever fought on American

soil: the Battle of Gettysburg. Post-Chancellorsville Clarity

Joseph Hooker’s Army of the Potomac returned to its encampments near Fredericksburg by May 10th,

and the Army of Northern Virginia reoccupied their fortifications almost as if Chancellorsville

hadn’t happened. Both armies required rest, reorganization and replenishment, but only one

would finish rebuilding before the next campaign began. Even before Chancellorsville, Secretary

of War Edwin Stanton and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck had hated Hooker’s haughty personality and

wanted him replaced. However, Hooker’s dispatches let him shift the blame for the defeat. Both John

Sedgwick and George Stoneman had clearly failed to carry out their orders, for which Stoneman was

dismissed from cavalry command, while 11th Corps’ commander O.O. Howard hadn’t heeded Hooker’s

warning about Jackson’s flank attack. President Lincoln acknowledged that Hooker’s subordinates

had failed him and allowed him to retain command. In exchange, Lincoln demanded Hooker attack again,

which he refused. The Army of the Potomac was normally 120,000 men strong but only had 75,000

ready for duty . It suffered 20,000 casualties during the Chancellorsville campaign, and

35,000 enlistments had expired, with the troops returning home. At the current replenishment rate,

it would only be back to 90,000 by June. Recruiting was done by the states, and many

were having trouble filling their quotas. Generous monetary bonuses kept the volunteers coming,

with additional incentives offered to reenlist veterans, but they weren't coming fast enough.

Many states resorted to calling up militia regiments, but they only served for a few

months before heading home . In response, Lincoln authorized the recruitment of African-American

soldiers, starting with the 54th Massachusetts, and Congress enabled states to begin drafting

soldiers via the Enrollment Act. However, these were long-term solutions, and in the short term,

Hooker’s army would remain understrength. Lee’s Decision

Meanwhile, Lee was conflicted. On the one hand, Chancellorsville had convinced him that his army

was invincible. On the other, the Confederacy was in crisis. While both sides’ draft laws allowed

men to hire substitutes or pay to avoid serving, the Confederacy included numerous exemptions

for the planter class. Consequently, the already limited food supply collapsed as poor farmers were

hauled off to fight. Their wives were now leading bread riots across Southern cities , and desertion

was rising. The non-slaveholding majority were questioning fighting for the privileged few’s

interests when they wouldn’t fight themselves. Worse, the Western theatre was collapsing. Ulysses

S. Grant had crossed the Mississippi and was bearing down on Vicksburg, while Nathaniel Banks

marched on Port Hudson. If either fortress fell, the Red and Mississippi Rivers would be lost,

and with them, Texas’ critical supplies of horses and beef. Joseph Johnston and Jefferson

Davis thus asked Lee to send reinforcements west to save the situation. Lee refused,

as he didn’t believe he could intervene in time. The Yankees only needed to take one

fortress to close both rivers to the Confederacy. The limited Confederate rail network was already

severely overtaxed, and the most direct route to Mississippi was exposed to Federal raids.

Reinforcements had to travel a more circuitous route, followed by a long march to reach either

city, almost certainly arriving too late. Instead, Lee would reinvade the North. An

invasion might draw away Federal troops from Mississippi, and more pressingly,

looting Northern supplies was the only option to feed his army. There was nothing left in

the South. Additionally, moving the war out of Virginia for the summer would allow the farmers

to get a crop sown and harvested, alleviating the food problem. It would also provide some time to

fix damaged infrastructure. Moreover, Lee was convinced that an invasion of the North was a

war-winning strategy. Lord Palmerston was still open to recognizing the Confederacy, but he needed

a decisive victory to overcome British public opinion. Additionally, Lee believed that Northern

morale was nearing collapse. Both sides read the other’s newspapers, but for unknown reasons,

Lee only received anti-war Copperhead papers, which wildly exaggerated Northern war-weariness,

material shortages and desire for peace. Consequently, Lee incorrectly believed that

the Union war effort was as close to collapse as the Confederacy’s. Therefore, a victory on

Northern soil would finally win international recognition and force the war to end.

First, Lee had to reorganize his army. New conscripts brought his strength up to 75,000,

but Stonewall Jackson was irreplaceable, and his command had to be split into two new corps.

Jackson’s subordinates Richard Ewell and AP Hill would command the 2nd and new 3rd corps,

respectively, alongside James Longstreet’s 1st corps. Unfortunately, both men were used

to Jackson’s highly detailed and specific orders and struggled to adjust to Lee’s vague directives.

Worse, Lee didn’t actually speak English but a dialect called Southern Gentleman , which

replaced entire paragraphs of dialogue with meaningful pauses, glances, and aristocratic

bearing. Longstreet and Jackson understood this dialect and “heard” the details and intentions

Lee left unsaid, but Hill and Ewell didn’t. Consequently, they frequently misunderstood

Lee’s orders. Lee had to reach Pennsylvania this time, so he planned to move faster and in greater

secrecy than during the Maryland Campaign. The army would quietly slip away from Fredericksburg

before clearing and then moving up the Shenandoah Valley to hide the march. From there, they would

spread out into Pennsylvania, acquiring supplies. Once the Union army engaged, his forces would

rapidly reconcentrate to win the decisive battle. The Campaign Begins - June 1863 - Brandy Station

Ewell began slipping away on June 3rd. The next day, Federal sentries reported movement in the

rebel camp. Hooker cancelled everyone’s leave and ordered the army to prepare for action on June

5th. Sedgwick launched a reconnaissance-in-force that night, which found weakened but still

formidable Confederate defences and withdrew with prisoners for the Bureau of Military Information.

Their interrogation yielded little intelligence beyond confirming parts of the army were moving.

On June 6th, John Buford reported Confederate cavalry in Culpeper County. The BMI confirmed

that J.E.B. Stuart was concentrating his forces while Lee appeared to be moving

southwest toward Richmond. Fearing a major raid, Hooker dispatched the cavalry corps,

now under Alfred Pleasonton and riding in two wings with infantry support, to confront

Stuart. At 04:30 on June 9th, Buford crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly’s Ford, surprising and

scattering rebel vedettes in the dense fog. He’d stumbled on Stuart’s camp, which was alerted by

the gunfire. The nearest brigade lurched out of bed onto unsaddled horses to engage, delaying

Buford long enough for Stuart’s horse artillery to position itself on knolls and open fire .

As the Confederates began drawing up around the guns, the 6th Pennsylvania charged them

near St. James Church, only to be driven off with heavy casualties. Buford’s men dismounted

and attempted to turn the Confederate flank with carbine fire, only for the rebels to unexpectedly

withdraw. Gregg’s division had arrived from Kelly’s Ford, threatening the rebel flank

on Fleetwood Hill. Stuart hurriedly redeployed , moved in reinforcements,

and repelled Gregg’s attack. A cycle of charges and countercharges, supported by artillery, ensued

until the Federals withdrew near sunset. While tactically a Confederate victory, Brandy Station

was the first time Federal cavalry had matched the Confederates in skill and determination.

This disturbed Stuart, as his trooper’s elan was their only advantage. Previously,

the Federals had only won cavalry engagements through overwhelming numbers or surprise.

Seeing them finally match the Confederate's skill destroyed his men’s confidence, which Stuart would

do anything to revive. Lee’s Advance

With more reports coming in of Confederates moving west, Hooker proposed moving on Richmond’s

weakened defences, but Lincoln refused. Instead, Hooker was ordered to find and destroy Lee’s

army. Lincoln was now convinced that Hooker taking Richmond was equivalent to Howe taking

Philadelphia rather than Napoleon taking Vienna and, therefore, strategically irrelevant. However,

Hooker still didn’t know where Lee was, as Pleasonton couldn’t get past Stuart.

On June 14th, word reached Hooker that Ewell had attacked the Winchester garrison , who’d ignored

warnings from Halleck to withdraw at the first sign of Confederates. Lee was clearly moving

into the Shenandoah Valley, but his objective was still unknown. Still, he had to respond,

and Hooker ordered the army to march for Manassas Junction, which held the crossroads to… wherever

Lee was heading. Stuart’s cavalry screen continued blocking Pleasonton’s attempts to uncover Lee’s

movements, and Ewell began crossing the Potomac near Williamsport on June 15th, deliberately

avoiding Harpers Ferry’s garrison. Ewell quickly moved onto Hagerstown while Longstreet and Hill

crossed near Sharpsburg on the 17th, with all generals sending out foraging parties as they

advanced. Lee gave strict orders not to loot but to pay for all supplies with Confederate money or

army promissory notes, which were worthless and less than worthless, respectively. Many

northerners complained that it felt worse than being robbed. Lee entered Pennsylvania on June

22nd, and the alarm was raised. Stuart’s Ride

Meanwhile, Hooker was still near Manassas Junction, uninformed about Lee’s movements.

Stuart had thwarted Pleasonton’s latest attempts to find Lee the previous day before disappearing

himself . Hooker ordered Pleasonton to scour the countryside for rebels while gradually shifting

the army north as a precaution . Stuart received verbal orders from Lee on June 22nd to defend the

right flank. However, Lee’s vagueness gave Stuart enough interpretation room to go adventuring . To

that end, he would reassert Confederate cavalry dominance and ride around the Army of the Potomac

again to rebuild his trooper’s confidence. Taking his best brigades while the rest screened Lee,

Stuart departed on June 25th, intending to circle the Federal army, frighten Washington DC,

and then rejoin Lee before he was missed. However, word of Lee in Pennsylvania finally

reached Hooker the same day, and he ordered his men north in earnest to catch Lee. While

Stuart successfully made it around Hooker, capturing supplies and damaging infrastructure,

he found his route back to Lee blocked by Union soldiers. Worse, Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry

division, particularly George Custer’s Michigan brigade, caught his scent and pursued. Stuart

realized that he’d have to ride far harder and further north than planned to regroup with Lee.

Hooker Runs His Mouth, Gets Replaced The Army of the Potomac marched rapidly with

Buford in the lead, followed by John Reynolds’ 1st Corps, with Frederick as the rendezvous point.

Halleck tried to tempt Lee back to Virginia with a raid on Richmond’s outskirts , but it wasn’t

threatening enough. Meanwhile, Hooker was fighting with Halleck about reinforcements and impetuously

wired Lincoln that if the Harpers Ferry garrison wasn’t assigned to him, he’d immediately resign.

Lincoln accepted on June 27th. The first choice to replace Hooker was Reynolds, widely regarded as

the best general in the army. He declined, and at the recommendation of the other senior generals,

command passed to George Meade on June 28th as the army reached Frederick. While his men fearfully

called him Old Snapping Turtle behind his back, Meade’s troops had always fought better than other

units. Everyone hoped that Meade could similarly motivate the army to defend his home state.

All Roads Lead to Gettysburg That night, Longstreet’s personal spy,

Henry Harrison, warned him that the Federals were quickly closing. Longstreet rushed to inform Lee,

who was furious that Stuart hadn’t warned him. His army was spread from Chambersburg to the

outskirts of Harrisburg, skirmishing with militia, holding towns to ransom,

“purchasing” supplies, and kidnapping hundreds of free African-Americans into slavery. He

immediately issued orders to concentrate at Cashtown. Henry Heath’s division from Hill’s

Corps was first to arrive on June 29th, but he heard that there were supplies, including shoes,

in the nearby town of Gettysburg, the crossroad of every road in southern Pennsylvania .

Meanwhile, Meade settled into command. On June 30th, he made headquarters in Taneytown before

issuing orders to advance towards Gettysburg, the natural place to concentrate an army. He also

began preparing positions along Big Pipe Creek as a fallback position. Heath ordered Pettigrew’s

brigade to Gettysburg to investigate the supply rumours. As Pettigrew arrived, Buford arrived on

high ground south of town. Pettigrew reported the Federals to Heath after finding nothing of

value in Gettysburg. Both generals thought it was just militia, but a reconnaissance-in-force would

be launched to be certain. Buford knew that infantry moving in enemy territory without

cavalry screens meant the main body was close, and the high ground south of Gettysburg was a

perfect defensive position. Knowing the hills must be denied to the rebels, Buford prepared

a delaying action north of Gettysburg, then alerted Reynolds, who alerted Meade,

before preparing a quick march to support Buford. Dawn of the First Day - 72 Hours Remain

At 07:30 on July 1st, Heath made contact with Buford’s vedettes astride Chambersburg Pike

. Pushing through, Heath’s infantry encountered Gamble’s dismounted brigade in cover along Herr’s

Ridge. Despite being outnumbered 2750 to 7600, the trooper’s breech-loading Sharps carbines

allowed them to repel the initial probe through weight-of-fire. However, the rebels reformed and

made a more determined push. By 10:20, Heath had pushed Gamble back to McPherson’s Ridge, where

Devin’s brigade joined the fight. Heath still would have pushed through if not for Reynolds’

timely arrival. As his men replaced Buford’s exhausted troopers, Reynolds was killed by a

random bullet, and Abner Doubleday took command. The Union right was pushed back before it got into

position, but the left and center held as the Iron Brigade’s reserve regiment counterattacked along a

railroad cut, routing a Confederate brigade . Fighting paused at 11:30. Lee’d given orders

to avoid a general engagement before the army concentrated, but since Heath had accidentally

caused one, the rest of Hills’ corps moved to support him. Meanwhile, the 11th Corps arrived

as Doubleday redeployed along McPherson’s and Seminary Ridge. As the senior officer, Howard took

command and requested all available reinforcements move swiftly to Gettysburg. He was about to face

two-thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia alone. Afternoon

Ewell was obliviously approaching via the Carlisle and Harrisburg Roads. He simply intended to use

the crossroads to reach Cashtown, but he had no idea that the battle was joined until the Federal

infantry blocked his way. With Lee’s orders to avoid battle now moot, Ewell prepared to attack.

Rodes’ division moved into position and attacked Oak Ridge at 14:00 . However, the lead brigade

didn’t do any reconnaissance before marching into the teeth of the defences, where they suffered

devastating casualties. Lee arrived around 14:30. Accepting that battle couldn’t be avoided,

he ordered all commands to attack . Hill’s troops pushed the 1st Corps back to Seminary Ridge with

heavy casualties all around. Meanwhile, Early’s division had arrived down the Harrisburg Road.

The 11th Corps was overstretched, and its flank was exposed. Deploying his troops in a wider,

deeper line than the entire Union position, Early first assaulted the salient on Barlow’s Knoll

before shattering the 11th Corps’ left flank, forcing it into a panicked retreat by 16:00.

Meanwhile, the 1st Corps artillery was devastating the continued Confederate

attacks with concentrated double-canister fire. However, as more Confederates arrived,

the position became untenable, and the left was flanked by superior numbers. With the

11th Corps routing, the 1st Corps began retreating through Gettysburg at 16:30.

The Critical Moment The defenders retreated

to Cemetery and Culp’s Hills, where 2nd Corps’ commander Winfield Scott had assumed command,

placing his corps on Cemetery Ridge and 12th Corps’ vanguard on Culp’s Hill. The survivors were

ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill and start digging in. The high ground had to be held at all costs.

Lee also realized the value of high ground. Accordingly, he ordered Ewell to "carry the hill

occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the

arrival of the other divisions of the army." Ewell looked at the steep slopes and deploying Federals,

looked at his exhausted soldiers, and concluded an attack wasn’t practicable . Lee meant,

“Take that hill immediately. You won’t be blamed for failure,” but this was lost in

translation from Southern Gentleman to English. This critical decision dictated the rest of the

Battle of Gettysburg. That Night

After dark, Hill and Ewell’s corps finished arriving in Gettysburg alongside Longstreet’s

vanguard. During the council of war, Lee lamented that Stuart’s absence had left

him without reconnaissance on Union strength and positions. Stuart had just gotten around

Custer’s pursuit near Carlisle that afternoon and was looking for Lee. Longstreet argued that

the Federal position was too strong to attack. Instead, they should disengage and force Meade

to attack them on favourable ground. However, all the other generals refused. Leaving the

battlefield meant admitting defeat, which could shatter morale. Worse, Meade could ambush them on

the road. They’d stay and fight tomorrow. Across the field, the 12th, 3rd, and 5th

Corps had all arrived, but the 6th Corps was still in Maryland and wouldn’t start arriving

until late tomorrow. Meade arrived after midnight. Unable to survey the battlefield,

he asked Hancock about the position, who declared it the best natural defensive position in the

world. The army’s chief engineer, Gouverneur Warren, agreed. The Army of the Potomac would make

its stand along a fishhook of hills and ridges stretching from Culp’s Hill to Little Round Top.

Dawn of the Second Day - 48 Hours Remain At dawn on July 2nd, Lee assumed that the Army

of the Potomac only occupied Cemetery Ridge, Cemetery Hill, and Culp’s Hill . Therefore,

an echelon attack up Emmitsburg Road would roll up the unsupported Union flank. Lee ordered

Longstreet to lead the attack, with Ewell redeploying from the left to right flank to

support him. Hill was incapacitated by illness, and his corps depleted from the first day,

so it would remain in reserve. Both generals objected. Ewell didn’t want to abandon ground

his men had died for, while Longstreet didn’t want to attack at all. If he had to attack, then it had

to wait. Only elements from two of his divisions had arrived, with the trailing brigades due early

afternoon. So, Lee compromised. Ewell would remain on the Union right while Longstreet attacked the

left once Hood and McLaws’ divisions assembled. Across the field, Meade’s dawn reconnaissance

proved Hancock correct. The corps was deployed on high ground with interlocking

fields of fire supported by interior lines hidden by the ridge. Wherever Lee attacked,

he’d be met by at least two corps. If he started breaking through, Meade could rush reinforcements

from anywhere to swiftly repel the attack. Sickles Ruins Everything

This deployment was ruined by Daniel Sickles. He resented Meade being promoted instead of himself.

Moreover, he was deeply bitter about Hooker ordering him to abandon Hazel Grove during

Chancellorsville and that a peach orchard along the Emmitsburg Road sat on higher ground than

he occupied. Determined to not only show up Meade but prevent another Chancellorsville,

he moved the 3rd Corps forward from Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top without orders to positions

along the Emmitsburg Road around noon . Meade didn’t discover this insubordination

until Sickles failed to arrive at the afternoon staff meeting. Finding him shortly after 15:00,

a furious Meade tore into Sickles for having moved into a salient outside artillery support

and committing himself to holding a line too long for a single corps. Worse, it was too

late to correct the mistake, as Confederates were spotted preparing to attack. Instead,

Meade wheeled off to prepare a relief force. Longstreet was finally ready to attack at 16:00

after a long march to hide his movements but was surprised by Sickles’ advanced position.

Hood argued for flanking Sickles and taking Little Round Top, but Longstreet said there wasn’t time

to redeploy before Lee’s patience expired. After a 30-minute artillery barrage, Hood’s attack began.

Devil’s Den Hood ordered his men to take the heights.

However, he didn’t specify which heights before being wounded by artillery fire. Consequently,

the attack was uncoordinated. Some regiments began marching for 3rd Corps’ left flank,

while others marched for Round Top. The 2nd US Sharpshooters initiated contact from the base

of Round Top and a boulder field called Devil’s Den while the Confederates assaulted the entire

line. The defenders repelled two assaults against both Devil’s Den and nearby Rose Wood. However,

Confederate numbers let them flank the defences via Plum Run Valley. The fighting was so fierce

that the valley was renamed the Valley of Death, and the field was named Slaughter Pen. However,

the pressure was too great for the defenders, who began fleeing north.

Little Round Top Meanwhile, a disaster was

averted at Little Round Top. Sickles’ advance had left only a Signal Corp post on the hill,

whose barren top oversaw the entire battlefield . Meade dispatched Warren to evaluate the situation,

and after reaching the summit, he saw the glint of bayonets heading his way. He immediately sent

out riders to find troops to hold the hill. Strong Vincent’s brigade from the 5th Corps was the first

to respond, arriving just as the Confederates gave up chasing the sharpshooters up Round

Top and moved to take the more strategic hill . Though exhausted, the Confederates still launched

a powerful assault on Vincent’s right, which was repulsed. The attack began shifting left

as the Confederates looked for the flank held by the 20th Maine. Knowing there was

nothing to his left but a few sharpshooters , Colonel Chamberlain first stretched his line,

then bent it 90º, holding off multiple attacks from three regiments who kept trying to flank

him. Upon running out of ammunition, Chamberlain ordered a bayonet charge, his bent left swinging

down like a door. The Confederates routed, and many were captured. However, the right flank

nearly broke under heavy pressure, and Vincent was mortally wounded. Reinforcements ultimately drove

off the rebels around 18:00. The Wheatfield

Across the field, McLaws finally attacked at 17:00. Moving in echelon formation, McLaws

continued Hood’s attack on Rose Wood, finally breaking through the defences and extending

to the Peach Orchard. The hardpressed 3rd Corps fought fanatically but were overwhelmed and began

breaking. Sickles’s right leg was shattered by cannon fire and later amputated . However,

as the Confederate right broke through Stony Ridge and entered The Wheatfield,

Federal reinforcements arrived. Meade had redeployed the 5th Corps along with one

division from the 2nd Corps and two from the 12th Corps to rescue the 3rd. The counterattack pushed

McLaws out of The Wheatfield. Once his left flank finished breaking the Peach Orchard line

after sustaining heavy casualties, McLaws again attacked and retook the Wheatfield. A flanking

assault from Little Round Top pushed him out again as casualties piled up in the Valley of Death. The

Wheatfield would change hands twice more before the Confederates conceded the fight at 20:00.

Cemetery Ridge Further up the line, Lee added Hill’s

freshest division to the assault. Anderson’s division struck the remaining 3rd Corps division

holding the Peach Orchard line, crushing it and ending the 3rd Corps as a fighting unit. Anderson

and McLaws continued the assault toward Cemetery Ridge, where gaps had been left after defenders

redeployed to The Wheatfield. Fortunately, the long march left the rebels disorganized

and required them to pause at Plum Run, giving Hancock and Meade time to find reinforcements.

The first counterattack came from Willard’s brigade against McLaws’ right,

shattering Barksdale’s brigade and mortally wounding the general. Wilcox’s brigade would

have pushed through a gap but for the 1st Minnesota launching a suicidal bayonet charge,

which succeeded in halting Wilcox at the cost of all but 47 of the regiment’s men. Several

units claimed to make the crest of the hill before being thrown off by counterattacks and the rebels

pulled back by 19:00. On the Right

There is confusion among modern historians about what Ewell was supposed to be doing during

Longstreet’s assault. Lee later claimed that Ewell was supposed to demonstrate and then attack once

he heard Longstreet’s cannon fire. Ewell responded that he was only supposed to attack if a suitable

opportunity appeared and never heard Longstreet’s guns anyway. Regardless, he had been ineffectively

probing and bombarding Union positions on Cemetery and Culp’s Hill since 16:00. Around 18:00,

his troops discovered the defences had been weakened to defend the left flank,

and Ewell ordered a general attack at 19:00. Despite being lightly held, the Federal

breastworks were formidable and backed with artillery. The attack on Culp’s Hill captured

abandoned rifle pits on the slope but halted as darkness arrived. Early pushed through a gap,

making it to the Baltimore Pike on East Cemetery Hill before incoming Federal reinforcements and

nightfall forced him to retreat. Fighting on Culp’s Hill continued as some returning

units stumbled on the rebels in the dark while others intentionally launched night attacks.

The Councils of War The guns finally fell silent around 22:30.

Stuart finally shook his pursuers and rejoined Lee that afternoon. After being thoroughly dressed

down for leaving the army blind, he was ordered to support Ewell, who was to bring up more troops

and renew the attack on the heights the next day. Longstreet continued arguing to disengage, but Lee

wouldn’t hear it. Pickett’s division had finally arrived, so a full-strength Longstreet was to

attack again at dawn, simultaneously with Ewell. Meanwhile, Meade’s war council advised staying

put. Their defences had been held, and the 6th Corps’s arrival closed any holes remaining after

the days’ battles. The 12th Corps returned to Culp’s Hill to drive off the rebels, and Meade

warned the 2nd Corps to dig in, particularly Gibbon’s division. Lee had attacked both

flanks today, and if he was following Napoleonic doctrine, Gibbon’s position at the exact centre

would be next. The BMI now had prisoners from every Confederate unit but Pickett’s division.

Whatever happened next would be led by him. Dawn of the Final Day - 24 Hours Remain

Despite Lee’s intentions, Pickett’s division wasn’t on the battlefield ready to attack

when dawn broke . Worse, at dawn, the 12th Corps’ artillery opened up in preparation

for retaking the hill. The bombardment prompted the Confederates to attack first. Lee tried to

cancel the attack to preserve his plan, but Ewell tersely responded, “Too late to recall.” Ewell’s

attempts to further reinforce the hill were halted by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill,

and three waves of attacks failed against Union breastworks. Ewell ordered a retreat around 11:00.

Planning the Charge Therefore, Lee changed his

plan . The Federals had to be close to breaking after two days of hammering from his invincible

army. They were pouring reinforcements onto Culp’s Hill to drive off Ewell. His subordinates had

reported making it to the top of the ridge yesterday. He had George Pickett’s fresh,

all-Virginian division ready. If he sent a purposeful attack at the depleted center,

it would surely shatter, especially if spearheaded by Virginians and led by Longstreet, his warhorse.

Lee’s plan was characteristically audacious. Longstreet’s corps would assemble with Pickett

in the lead behind Seminary Ridge while Stuart moved around the Union right flank. Following

a mass artillery barrage, both would charge the Union center somewhere near where Cemetery Hill

became Cemetery Ridge , splitting the army in half. Longstreet was stunned, horrified,

and strongly objected. McLaws and Hood’s divisions were spent and too far south to

get into position to attack. Even if they could, he didn’t believe that Lee’s plan

could be achieved by less than 30,000 troops and begged Lee to reconsider. Lee was adamant about

attacking with Longstreet's 15,000 but agreed not to make McLaws and Hood redeploy. Instead,

two divisions from Hill’s corps were added to the attack force which Pickett would lead under

Longstreet’s reluctant command. Stuart Stymied

Stuart was informed of his role in the attack around 10:00 and began moving once he was certain

Ewell was retreating. At 11:00, he reached Cress’s Ridge and signaled Lee by firing four cannons.

This was a mistake. Union cavalry had been watching for Stuart to attempt a flanking move,

and upon hearing the cannons, they moved to investigate. Skirmishers from McIntosh’s brigade

made first contact, stalling Stuart. A Confederate charge at 13:00 scattered the skirmishers after

Union artillery knocked out Stuart’s guns. As the Confederates rode forward, a cry rang out, “Come

on, you wolverines!” Custer personally led the 7th Michigan to charge Stuart’s lead brigade, breaking

it after a fierce melee. Stuart counterattacked, and Custer fell back in disarray. Stuart prepared

another charge, but Custer again roared, “Come on, you wolverines!” and led the 1st Michigan

in a countercharge. Stuart realized that his mission had failed. Even if he could push through,

he’d never make it to the Union rear in time. Therefore, he withdrew.

Pickett’s Charge Lee intended to supplement Pickett

with Hill’s least engaged divisions. However, poor communication meant that Heath and Pender’s

heavily depleted divisions were assigned to the charge , despite the fact that both generals were

incapacitated by wounds. It took all morning to assemble all 13,000 men and position every

battery in the army for the bombardment. At 13:00, the largest artillery barrage of the war

began. Between 150 and 170 Confederate guns opened fire on Cemetery Ridge. A similar number of Union

guns responded. The bombardment was completely ineffective. Most Confederate guns overshot,

damaging Meade’s headquarters , supply wagons, and the extensive reserve Meade had prepared

but missing the actual defenders. Union gunners couldn’t effectively

counter-battery due to thick gunsmoke and dense trees , but they weren’t trying to.

It was obvious an attack was coming, and they were saving ammunition to repel it. The Union

guns purposefully slowed and then stopped firing one by one, tricking the Confederates

into thinking they were silenced. Longstreet tried to get anyone else to order the attack,

finally giving in and doing it himself at 14:00 as Confederate gunners ran out of ammunition.

The Confederates marched deliberately and steadily forward, with Trimble and Pettigrew on the left

and Pickett on the right. Anderson’s brigades failed to advance for reasons unknown. Federal

guns immediately opened up. The three columns were supposed to gradually merge

together for a concentrated strike, but the fields concealed uneven ground interspersed

with fences, ruining cohesion. Worse, Federal artillery fire tore huge gaps in their lines.

Union pickets in the fields opened fire and then were bewildered as the Confederates

marched past them . Orders were not to stop before reaching the ridge, but many soldiers dissented.

Thousands hid in depressions in the fields and along the sunken Emmitsburg Road. Union

defenders entrenched behind a series of stone walls, as the rebels were at Fredericksburg,

and opened fire at 400 yards. As the column advanced and its line narrowed, Federal units

advanced off the ridge to fire enfilade volleys. Pettigrew and Trimble faltered and stopped just

past Emmitsburg Road. Anderson’s brigades finally advanced, but artillery quickly turned them back.

However, Pickett’s division continued on towards a turn in the stone wall and Alonzo Cushing’s

battery. Hancock was wounded as he directed fire on the column, and two of Pickett’s

brigade commanders fell. However, Lewis Armistead placed his hat atop his sword and led his men to

charge the defences along the Angle. Several Union regiments withdrew, letting Armistead and 250 men

take Cushing’s guns. However, additional regiments arrived and poured fire from three sides. No

soldier who followed Armistead over the wall returned to Confederate lines. Pickett’s Charge

cost 8,000 Confederates casualties to 1,500 Union and ended at 15:00 as survivors trickled back to

Seminary Ridge. Thousands more would surrender once Union troops found their hiding places.

Back on Seminary Ridge, Lee simply hung his head and said, “It’s all my fault.” He never explained

his thinking beyond telling Jefferson Davis not to blame the soldiers for Lee asking too much of

them. Pickett was distraught, openly blamed Lee for the disaster, and held the grudge for the

rest of his life. His after-action report was so accusatory that Lee had it burned. However,

morale remained high, and some units offered to reform and charge again, which Lee morosely

refused. As Pickett’s Charge failed, Kilpatrick decided to diminish the victory. He’d been

ordered to patrol the left flank and keep watch on Longstreet’s corps. However, Kilpatrick wanted

to fight and ordered reckless charges against the fortified infantry, which earned him the nickname

Killcavalry. By 17:00, all the guns fell silent. Aftermath

The Battle of Gettysburg was the largest and deadliest battle ever fought in the

Western Hemisphere, with over 150,000 men engaging during three days of battle. Meade

reported 23,049 casualties, about one-fourth of his army. Lee’s reports are increasingly

terse and vague about casualties from this point onward. Historians agree he’d suffered

between 23,000-28,000 casualties, over third of his army. The North celebrated Meade’s heroic

victory. News that Vicksburg had fallen added to the euphoria . Over in Europe, Lord Palmerston

quietly took recognition off the table. The Confederacy had no chance at outright victory

now. Halleck and Lincoln congratulated Meade before ordering him to attack and destroy Lee.

However, Meade’s army was in worse condition than the casualty reports indicated. It had rapidly

marched for a week and then spent three days fighting in a sweltering summer heatwave . The

water sources that weren’t fouled by blood were being drunk dry by the influx of 150,000 thousand

soldiers and at least that many animals to a township of 2500. While no statistics were kept,

war diaries and officers' reports suggest that half of each army became heat-casualties at

some point during the battle. Additionally, it was foolish to move off the heights to

attack a still dangerous enemy. All the terrain advantages that won the battle would be reversed,

and Meade refused to risk another Fredericksburg. Additionally, a torrential rainstorm arrived.

Both armies spent a soggy Independence Day rescuing their wounded and exchanging prisoners.

Lee Escapes Lee knew his invasion

had failed and began preparing to retreat during his nightly war council on July 3rd. Longstreet

and Ewell pulled back to Seminary Ridge and built breastworks, anticipating that Meade would attack.

When he didn’t, Lee began slipping away on the night of July 4th, starting with the thousands

of supply wagons taken during the invasion. Meade couldn’t move his infantry until he knew

what Lee was doing. To that end, the cavalry was dispatched on July 4th to harass Lee and

report on his retreat. Pleasonton had some of his divisions skirmish with Stuart while dispatching

others to watch the roads south. Kilpatrick partially redeemed himself by recapturing several

hundred wagons in Monterey Pass the same day. Lee fully departed Gettysburg before dawn on

July 5th, which Meade discovered midmorning. However, he didn’t know where Lee was heading

and remained in place until July 7th, when the infantry moved south in three columns. Meanwhile,

the cavalry continually clashed with Stuart and the Confederate rearguard,

capturing thousands of prisoners. Lee was heading for the previously built pontoon

bridges at Falling Waters between Hagerstown and Williamsport. However, the bridges were

destroyed by high waters worsened by heavy rains on July 7, just as the army started arriving. Lee

prepared fortifications to hold out until he could cross again. The defences were finished

just hours before Meade’s infantry began arriving on July 12th. Seeing the extensive fortifications

and still haunted by Fredericksburg, Meade refused to attack without proper artillery

preparation. He positioned the army for a July 14th attack when the artillery was ready.

Lee was counting on Meade recklessly attacking him, which Halleck and Lincoln were screaming at

him to do. Realizing that he was instead preparing to bombard him into surrender, Lee ordered his

engineers to get a bridge up NOW! This was done by nightfall July 13th, with water levels falling

enough to ford as well. By morning, Lee was across the Potomac, though Meade continued pursuing him

until the inconclusive Battle of Manassas Gap on July 23rd. Lincoln was deeply frustrated,

but historians debate whether a more aggressive pursuit would have destroyed Lee or Meade’s army.

End of the Campaign Both armies spent the rest

of the summer licking their wounds. Meade would advance again in September but halted after he had

to dispatch troops for the Chattanooga Campaign. Lee took the opportunity to launch a turning move

on Meade’s right flank, but Meade proved too cagey for Lee’s trap. Instead, the two fought a

war of maneuver while failing to bring each other to battle at an advantage . While Meade

successfully pushed Lee behind the Rapidan, he was forced to retreat to winter quarters in December,

following a failed river crossing , to await the arrival of a new General-in-Chief. This brings an

end to the deadliest military engagement that ever took place on American soil. In our next

episode on the American Civil War, we will part from the land war and take a brief interlude to

discuss the naval theatre, so make sure you are subscribed and pressed the bell button.

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