All language subtitles for American Civil War in the Border States - Rise of Grant DOCUMENTARY [English] [DownloadYoutubeSubtitles.com]

In 1861, most people believed that the war would
be won in the Eastern Theater. However, Abraham

Lincoln was terrified it would be lost in the
Western Theater. If Missouri or Kentucky joined

the Confederacy, the Union’s strategic position
would be compromised and potentially indefensible.

Fortunately, the boldness of the Western theater’s
Union officers and the overconfident ineptitude

of the secessionists prevented either state
from seceding and set the Union on the path

to victory. Welcome to our latest video on
the American Civil War, in which the battles

of the western theatre continue and the fates
of Missouri and Kentucky hang in the balance.

The Border States
Only the states of the Deep South, whose economies

were entirely dependent on the slavery-driven
cotton trade, plus Texas, seceded from the

Union prior to Fort Sumter. While most Upper South
states held votes on secession, their more mixed

economies, internal divisions, and stronger ties
to free states diluted the slaveholders' fears

enough to defeat secession. These states seceded
after President Lincoln called for volunteers,

either because public opinion shifted
towards secession as happened in Tennessee,

or because secessionists manipulated the vote as
in Virginia. The northernmost slaveholding states,

known as Border States, remained in the Union
despite local secession efforts and Confederate

lobbying. Delaware was the second state to hold a
secession vote, but it was rejected unanimously.

Its Governor Burton stated that as Delaware
was the first state to enter the Union, it

would be the last to leave. Meanwhile, Lincoln’s
post-Baltimore Riot crackdown destroyed Maryland’s

secessionists. Missouri and Kentucky were far more
delicate. Both were among the most populated and

wealthy states with strongly mixed loyalties.
They’d been initially settled as slave states,

but waves of immigration and changing
economics caused slavery’s importance

to decline, especially in Missouri. Their
loyalties were almost perfectly split.

The Missouri Crisis
As the secession crisis began,

Missouri's outgoing governor Robert Stewart
advocated neutrality, remaining in the Union

but refusing to materially aid either side and
committing state troops to repel any invasion.

Incoming governor Claiborne Jackson claimed he’d
reaffirm Stewart’s policy. However, his inaugural

address on January 3, 1861, made clear that his
sympathies lay with the Confederacy. Shortly after

taking office, he and the pro-Southern legislature
further revealed their secessionist inclinations

by calling for a Constitutional Convention
to “reconsider” Missouri’s relationship with

the Federal government, a clear euphemism
for secession. However, on March 19th, the

Convention voted 89-1 against secession. Despite
Missouri furnishing most of the pro-slavery

Border Ruffians and Bushwackers during Bleeding
Kansas, the public strongly favored neutrality

and had overwhelmingly elected Unionists
to the convention. Shocked and frustrated,

Jackson and his allies were undeterred, opening
covert diplomatic channels to Jefferson Davis.

Jackson’s public and forceful rejection of
Lincoln’s call for troops signaled Missouri’s

secessionists to take action. On April 20th, a
pro-secession mob seized 1000 small arms from the

Liberty Arsenal as Jackson prepared to coup the
state into the Confederacy. The only obstacle was

the St. Louis Arsenal. Its thick walls and Federal
garrison made it perilous to take it by storm or

subversion. Therefore, Jackson petitioned Davis
for heavy artillery to breach the walls, which

Davis granted. While Jackson couldn’t simply take
control of the state militia, he could call up

part of it for training. On May 1st, he assembled
the most pro-secession units for “maneuvers” about

4.5 miles from the Arsenal at the imaginatively
named Camp Jackson. They hoped to either

intimidate the Union garrison into evacuating
or drive them out once the cannons arrived.

The Lyon of the West
Opposing Jackson was

Captain Nathaniel Lyon. Lyon had developed
a reputation for ruthless brutality fighting

Indians in California and a burning hatred of
slavery while stationed in Kansas. Lyon’s friend,

Congressman Francis Blair, arranged his
company’s transfer to St. Louis in March

so Lyon could protect the Arsenal not
only from Jackson but from Department

of the West commander Brigadier General William
Harney. Harney was a proven incompetent who was

only a general thanks to his friends in the
Southern political elite. These friends had

also protected him during multiple court martials
and civil trials. Blair and Lyon believed that if

Harney didn’t join the secessionists,
he’d bungle Missouri into their hands.

Harney quickly justified the paranoia.
Harney thwarted Lyons' efforts to strengthen

the Arsenal's defenses, fearing it would
provoke secessionist violence. Therefore,

Blair was intrigued first to get Lyon
appointed commander of the Arsenal,

then get Harney recalled to Washington. Once
command defaulted to Lyon, he swiftly moved to

covertly arm the Wide Awakes, a Republican youth
organization. On April 23rd, the War Department

formally ordered Lyon to take command, raise
volunteers, and evacuate the weapons stockpile

to Illinois. Lyon swiftly and covertly enlisted
his paramilitaries and armed other militias.

The Camp Jackson Affair
Jackson hadn’t fooled anyone about his plans,

and Lyon was determined to strike first. Learning
of increased activity in Camp Jackson the night

of May 8th, Lyon disguised himself and snuck
in the following morning. There, he discovered

the Confederate artillery that had arrived the
night before, plus rifles stolen from Liberty.

Camp chatter indicated that Jackson intended to
attack soon. Therefore, Lyon moved before dawn

on May 10th and surrounded Camp Jackson with 6000
regular soldiers and volunteers. The 669 militia

surrendered without a fight. After securing
the weapons and cannons, Lyon decided to march

the prisoners back to the Arsenal through the
streets of St. Louis as a show of force. However,

an angry mob gathered and started hurling insults
and rocks at the column. What precisely happened

is disputed, but the soldiers opened fire, killing
28. Rioting ensued, and martial law was declared.

The War Begins
In response, Jackson’s legislative

allies formed the Missouri State Guard, commanded
by former governor Sterling Price. Officially,

the State Guard was supposed to oppose both
Union and Confederate forces. However, Price was

already coordinating with Arkansas Confederates
to occupy southern Missouri. Harney returned and,

on May 21st, negotiated a truce which amounted to
restricting Federal authority to St. Louis. This

immediately led to Unionists being driven from
their homes, who began forming their own Home

Guard militia. Blair convinced Lincoln to replace
Harney with Lyon on May 30th in retaliation.

Price, Jackson, and now Brigadier General Lyon
met on June 11th, ostensibly to discuss the truce.

Instead, Jackson made clear that he intended
to ignore Federal authority and disarm the Home

Guard while allowing anti-Unionist activity to
continue. Lyon berated Jackson before declaring,

“This means war!” Lyon gave Jackson and Price
precisely one hour to depart by rail before

loading his troops onto steamships bound for
the capital of Jefferson City. Jackson and the

legislature immediately fled southward while Price
tried to concentrate the State Guard. Lyon seized

Jefferson City on June 15th before following
Jackson. On the 17th, he attacked and scattered

State Guard units near Boonville, forcing
Price to abandon northern and central Missouri.

Battle of Wilson’s Creek
Lyon spent June and July securing

central Missouri and gathering reinforcements near
Springfield, particularly German immigrants eager

to serve under Colonel Franz Sigel . A series of
skirmishes pushed Price into southwest Missouri,

where Confederate troops under Benjamin McCulloch
reinforced him. The two marched to attack Lyon

while bickering over who commanded whom,
but again, Lyon struck first. The rebel

vanguard was repulsed near Dug Springs , but
Lyon discovered he was outnumbered 12000 to

6000 and fell back on Springfield.
Price wanted to immediately attack,

but McCulloch refused due to ammunition shortages
and lack of faith in Price’s abilities. After

Price threatened to attack alone, McCulloch agreed
to attack at dawn on August 10th, but heavy rain

on August 9th made him cancel. However, Lyon’s
volunteers’ 90-day enlistments were nearly up,

and he hoped a surprise attack would do sufficient
damage to prevent a rebel pursuit once he had to

retreat to St. Louis for reinforcements. Leaving a
garrison in Springfield, Lyon would take the main

body and attack the rebel camp along Wilson’s
Creek from the north while Sigel’s 1200 troops

flanked from the south after a night march.
At dawn, Lyon overran the surprised rebel camp.

Shortly thereafter, Sigel’s artillery scattered
Confederate cavalry guarding the camp’s rear,

and he advanced across the Creek. However,
McCulloch’s artillery halted Lyon’s advance long

enough for Price’s infantry to form up. Lyon’s
position became known as Bloody Hill as Price

ordered first frontal, then flanking attacks,
which failed due to lack of ammunition. Meanwhile,

Sigel had lost contact with Lyon and his men
were exhausted, so he paused past Sharp’s farm

to reorient and rest. This gave McCulloch time
to organize a counterattack, led by the 3rd

Louisiana, who wore the same grey uniforms as the
1st Iowa Volunteers, one of Lyon’s units. This

misidentification allowed them to march unmolested
to Sigel’s line and fire point blank into the

flank, immediately routing Sigel’s brigade.
Lyon had been wounded twice while personally

directing his troops. With Sigel routed, the
full Confederate force turned on him. Heavily

outnumbered, the Federal forces continued to
repel attacks until Lyon was shot through the

heart while preparing a counterattack. Major
Sturgis took command, repelled another attack,

then ordered a retreat to Rolla before being
overwhelmed. The Union suffered 1,317 casualties

to 1,232 Confederate. Price wanted to immediately
pursue it, but it was impossible because of the

scattered cavalry and exhausted infantry. After
days of arguing, McCulloch decided that his supply

situation and conflicts with Price were too severe
to remain, and he returned to Arkansas while Price

lethargically marched northward, ironically
fulfilling the late Lyon’s strategic goal.

Kentucky Gets Drafted
Across the Mississippi in Kentucky,

the birthstate of both Abraham Lincoln and
Jefferson Davis held strong ties to both the

North and South. Consequently, Kentucky Governor
Beriah Magoffin and the General Assembly declared

neutrality on May 20th and, unlike Jackson,
actually meant it. Magoffin repeatedly refused

to send help to either side, offered to mediate
the conflict, and interfered in both sides’

recruitment efforts. Initially, both Lincoln and
Davis respected Kentucky’s neutrality. The former

was terrified that Kentucky’s secession would
make the North’s strategic position untenable

and instantly lose them the war. The latter was
influenced by Tennessee Governor Isham Harris,

whose northern border was indefensible. If
federal gunboats entered the Tennessee or

Cumberland Rivers, all of northern Tennessee,
including Nashville, would be too isolated to

defend. Kentucky was his only shield, but
only as long as it stayed non-hostile.

Neutrality Falters
However, neutrality couldn’t last.

Union recruiting camps were set up across the
border in Ohio and Indiana. The Confederates built

Forts Henry and Donelson across the border on the
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers while stationing

troops yards from the border in the Cumberland
Gap. Attempts to reorganize the state military

to enforce neutrality just led to a secessionist
State Guard and unionist Home Guard forming.

Peace survived the summer, but the August 5th
legislative election returned veto-proof Unionist

majorities in both houses. Public sentiment had
shifted strongly against secession, though it

wasn’t pro-war. Immediately thereafter, a Union
recruiting station opened in central Tennessee

and Confederate volunteers began massing near
Guthrie. All that was missing was a final push.

Fremont’s Folly, Polk’s Stupidity
That push came from Major General

John Frémont , who superseded Lyon as department
commander on July 25th. Frémont was a military

explorer, vocal abolitionist, and failed
presidential candidate who struggled to

control the chaos in Missouri. On August 30th,
he declared martial law throughout the state to

enforce order. Tucked into the declaration was a
clause emancipating rebel-held slaves. The uproar

in Kentucky was so great that Lincoln feared it
would drive the state to secede and repudiated

the declaration. In response, Frémont ordered
the Union commander in Cairo , Brigadier General

Ulysses S. Grant, to prepare to occupy Columbus .
However, the Confederacy acted first.

Former Episcopalian bishop turned
Major General Leonidas Polk had

convinced himself that Columbus needed
to be occupied and fortified immediately,

a decision helped by Columbus being the
center of Kentucky secessionism. Seeing

increased Union activity in Cairo and probably
unaware of Frémont’s plans, Polk occupied

Columbus on September 4th and began building a
fortress he called Gibraltar of the West on the

Mississippi river. Grant informed Frémont and
occupied Paducah bloodlessly on September 6th.

Magoffin immediately protested to both
governments, while Harris and Department commander

General Albert Johnston protested to Richmond.
Davis had promised Magoffin and Harris only days

before that the Confederacy would never violate
Kentucky’s neutrality. However, Davis accepted

Polk’s claims that “the necessity justified
the action”, to Johnston’s horror. Instead of

defending a narrow line along Tennessee's western
border, he now had to hold a line from Columbus,

through Bowling Green to the Cumberland Gap. If
the Federals found any gap in that line, Kentucky

and, with it Nashville, were indefensible.
Polk’s impetuousness was a strategic disaster,

especially once the pro-Union Assembly overrode
Magoffin’s vetoes and welcomed Union intervention.

The Confederate States That Weren’t
Meanwhile, Price had failed to retake

Missouri. Despite being unopposed thanks to
chaos and inefficiency in Frémont’s headquarters,

Price’s northern march was lethargic at best. His
only real success was capturing Lexington after a

weeklong siege. In July, the Constitutional
Convention reconvened in Jefferson City and

declared itself Missouri’s government, as
Jackson’s government had effectively vacated

their posts. While the legislature had reconvened
in Neosho, it was powerless, and many legislators

were abandoning Jackson. Worse, Frémont
finally advanced out of St. Louis on September

26 with overwhelming numbers, and Price rapidly
retreated south, abandoning all his summer gains.

Shortly before fleeing Missouri, Jackson’s
government voted for secession on October 28th

despite not having that power and likely lacking a
quorum, which was necessary for legal legitimacy.

However, Davis ignored the legal questions and
added Missouri’s star to the Confederate flag.

Meanwhile, pro-secession Kentucky politicians met
in Bowling Green and declared Kentucky’s secession

and themselves as its government on November
18th. The move was so clearly illegitimate

that Johnston didn’t acknowledge them until Davis
ordered him to so the Confederate flag could add a

thirteenth star. Both Border States’ populations
largely ignored the secession declarations,

but in truth, their fate would be decided by
military force in their southern neighbors.

Capture of Fort Henry
Johnston was increasingly convinced that

Kentucky was already lost, as Don Carlos Buell’s
growing army in Lexington alone outnumbered

his department. Worse, his subordinates were
liabilities. Polk only reluctantly followed orders

and quarrelled about everything but couldn’t
be removed due to his political connections.

Several of Davis’ other political generals lost
battles to Colonel James Garfield and Brigadier

George Thomas in eastern Kentucky. Confederate
Kentucky was already crumbling. In the Union camp,

Lincoln removed Frémont from department command
and replaced him with Henry Halleck in October.

Officially, Frémont was removed for severe
financial mismanagement indistinguishable

from rampant corruption. Unofficially, Frémont
needed punishing to placate pro-slavery Unionists.

Halleck was an able administrator and scholar
who quickly fixed Frémont’s mess. However,

per orders from General-in-Chief George
McClellan, he held off on offensive action

until all commands were ready. However, Grant
and Flag Officer Andrew Foote of the Western

Gunboat Flotilla convinced him that Fort Henry was
vulnerable and were allowed to attack in February.

The plan was for Grant’s two divisions to surround
Fort Henry while Foote covered them. However,

it had been constructed in the Tennessee River’s
floodplain and was half underwater when Foote

arrived with four City-class ironclads and
three timberclad gunboats on February 6th.

Most of the garrison retreated to nearby Fort
Donelson, leaving a token force to man the guns

who surrendered after a 75-minute bombardment.
Grant occupied the fort a few hours later. When

word reached Johnston, he knew Kentucky was lost.
With Federals behind and in front of him, he’d be

trapped in Bowling Green if either advanced.
Therefore, he ordered a retreat to Nashville

before the trap closed. Fort Donelson was heavily
reinforced. If it fell, Nashville was also lost.

Battle of Fort Donelson
Grant intended to move against

Donelson immediately in case Halleck recalled
him, but heavy rains submerged Henry and made

the roads impassable. Instead, Foote launched
a raid down the Tennessee while Grant waited

for reinforcements and better weather. Fort
Donelson sat above the Cumberland on cliffs

and was protected by about 16,000 infantry and 700
cavalry. However, the senior officer was Brigadier

General John Floyd, whose only military experience
was as James Buchanan’s Secretary of War. Having

no idea what he was doing, Floyd largely
deferred to Brigadier General Gideon Pillow,

who had demonstrated military mediocrity
in Mexico. The only competent officers were

the junior Brigadier General Simon Bolivar
Buckner and cavalry Colonel Nathan Forest.

Grant finally started moving on February 12th
with 15,000 men. Forest detected the march and

warned Floyd. The Confederates were spread in a
wide ring of trenches outside the fort as Grant

arrived. Grant placed his largest division to
block Pillow’s troops in Dover while his other

division faced the fort. Some light skirmishing
broke out on the 13th, and Foote tested the

defenses with one ship. Grant was waiting for
Foote and additional reinforcements to arrive,

while Floyd didn’t know what to do and
didn’t know what advice to listen to.

On February 14th, Foote arrived with 10,000
reinforcements, bringing Grants’ strength to

25,000. Floyd finally called a war council
at 11:00 and concluded that Fort Donelson

wasn’t defensible. Pillow was ordered to prepare a
breakout before evacuating to Nashville. However,

the attack faltered when Pillow lost his nerve
once Grant counterattacked. Sensing the rebels’

fear, Grant asked Foote to attack, hoping to
repeat Fort Henry. Foote engaged at 15:00,

but his gunboats' decks were unarmored and
helpless against plunging fire from the fort,

and a wounded Foote retreated at 16:30.
That night, Grant decided to prepare a proper

siege while Buckner advised another breakout
attempt. Freezing rain kept Grant’s troops awake,

so the dawn attack didn’t surprise them.
However, Grant had left to confer with Foote,

thinking another breakout was impossible
and hadn’t designated a second-in-command.

A flank attack by Forest’s troopers combined with
a frontal attack by Pillow’s infantry pushed back

the Union flank along Lick Creek. However,
confusion reigned in the Confederate camp,

and the attacks were uncoordinated as the
generals argued amongst themselves. Still,

by 12:30, the escape route was open. Grant learned
of the situation around 12:00 after asking Foote

to launch a long-range bombardment to confuse the
Confederates and encourage his men. He arrived

on the scene shortly after Confederate attacks
petered out. Correctly surmising that they were

preparing to retreat, he reorganized his troops
to counterattack, only for Pillow to withdraw

back to his starting positions. He believed
that his men needed rest and resupply before

attempting the escape, to Floyd and Buckner’s
horror. This enabled Grant’s counterattack to

regain all the lost ground and pin them more
tightly into the fort, preventing escape.

During the night, the Confederates concluded
that their position was hopeless. Fearing Federal

retribution, Floyd passed command to Pillow,
who passed command to Buckner. Pillow escaped

during the night on a rowboat while Floyd loaded
his staff and Virginia regiments onto the last

steamer and fled to Nashville while Buckner agreed
to surrender the remaining 13,000 troops. However,

Forest and his cavalry escaped through a
gap in the Union lines. Buckner and Grant

were West Point friends, and Buckner hoped that
would yield generous surrender terms. However,

Grant would only offer unconditional surrender,
which Buckner begrudgingly accepted. Fort Donelson

was the first major Union land victory, and the
nation was euphoric. Grant was hailed as a hero

for demanding unconditional surrender, just
like his first initials. Lincoln took notice

and promoted him to Major General. Johnston
evacuated Nashville for Corinth, Mississippi.

Missouri Falls to the Union
Meanwhile, overwhelming Federal

numbers in Missouri forced Price to withdraw
towards Arkansas continually. In December,

Halleck tasked Brigadier Samuel Curtis’ Army
of the Southwest with finishing him off. Price

retreated into Arkansas to avoid being trapped
in Springfield in February , leaving a handful of

scattered State Guard and Bushwacker companies
as the only Confederate presence in Missouri.

Curtis almost caught Price in a series of
skirmishes along the Wire Road before Price

reached the Boston Mountains , but stretched
supply lines compelled Curtis to rest his

10,500 soldiers along Little Sugar Creek.
Price linked back up with McCulloch near

Fayetteville, and they immediately resumed
their bickering. To stop them, Davis created

the Trans-Mississippi Department, placing Earl van
Dorn in charge. Van Dorn arrived in late February,

taking command of 15,000 Confederate and
State Guard troops, plus 800 mostly Cherokee

Indian Cavalry. The tribes of the Indian
Territory had little love for the Federals,

and many were slaveholders, making them allies
of the Confederacy. Van Dorn decided to attack

and trap the outnumbered Curtis. Audaciously, he
planned to swing around Curtis and cut his supply

and communication lines before attacking his
rear. Speed was key to the operation, so Van Dorn

separated from his supply train and ordered his
soldiers to carry only 40 rounds of ammunition,

three days' rations, and a blanket. The forced
march began in freezing rain on March 4th.

Battle of Pea Ridge
Curtis learned of Van

Dorn’s advance on March 5th. His divisions were
out foraging when orders came to reconcentrate.

About 400 men were too far west to return, and
Sigel returned from Bentonville so slowly that

he and his rearguard should have been captured
March 6th, but the Confederate cavalry took the

wrong road and missed their chance . Curtis placed
his four divisions on the bluffs north of Little

Sugar Creek, expecting Van Dorn to attack from
the south. Additionally, trees were felled along

the Bentonville Detour as a precaution. This
was fortunate, as the Detour along Pea’s Ridge

plateau was Van Dorn’s route to Curtis’ rear at
Elkhorn Tavern. The obstructions plus exhaustion

prevented him from reaching Elkhorn by daylight
on March 7th. To speed up the march, he split the

army. He and Price would continue on the Detour
while McCulloch used Ford Road to reach Elkhorn.

Federal patrols noticed Confederates on the
Detour but didn’t know if it was the main body.

Curtis dispatched Dodge’s brigade to Elkhorn and
Osterhaus’ brigade to Leetown to reconnoiter.

First contact came at 09:30, when Price’s
vanguard encountered Union scouts north of

Elkhorn. The rest of Carr’s division hurried to
support Dodge, but rather than use his numerical

advantage, Van Dorn waited to deploy in a line
fully. Carr sent his advance brigade forward,

and the counterattack temporarily halted Price’s
advance. However, Price’s superior numbers let

him outflank Carr, who blocked the effort with his
remaining brigades but was steadily pushed back.

At 11:30, Osterhaus discovered McCulloch’s
troops nearing his position. His cavalry

company immediately attacked to stall McCulloch,
and Osterhaus warned Curtis, who dispatched

Colonel Jefferson C. Davis’s division. The Federal
cavalry was scattered by 3000 Confederate cavalry,

and the Cherokee overran several infantry
companies before being routed by artillery

fire. McCulloch was killed by a Union sharpshooter
as he led the infantry attack. His replacement was

killed shortly thereafter, and his replacement
was captured as the attack faltered amid the

command confusion. Davis arrived and halted the
attack, which caused the confused Confederates

to collapse at 15:30. Some units retreated
east to link up with Van Dorn and Price,

others retreated the way they came, and a few were
left behind and kept fighting until nightfall.

Van Dorn learned about the fighting in Leetown
around 14:00. Realizing that the rendezvous

wouldn’t happen, he ordered more aggressive
attacks on Carr’s division. Curtis and his second

division arrived and helped Carr halt Price in
Ruddick’s Field at 18:30. During the night, parts

of McCulloch’s division linked up with Van Dorn.
The supply train was supposed to arrive, too,

having traveled by another road, but it went to
the wrong location. Nearly out of ammunition and

food, Van Dorn hoped that Curtis would retreat in
the morning, letting him claim victory. Instead,

Curtis concentrated his forces south of Elkhorn
and attacked with Sigel’s unengaged division

leading. The Confederates were in headlong retreat
by 11:00. Curtis reported 1,384 casualties,

while Van Dorn suffered around 2,000, while
claiming he wasn’t defeated but “failed in

his intentions.” Regardless, he was ordered to
abandon both Missouri and northern Arkansas and

cross the Mississippi to help defend Corinth. Many
of Price’s State Guard deserted, and no serious

effort was made to retake Missouri until 1864.
The Border States had been secured for the Union.

In our next video in this series, the Confederacy
will try to retake the initiative in the Western

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