All language subtitles for Patatipatata

Both sides had assumed that the war would be
over in one swift, decisive clash. Bull Run

had been neither and was instead humiliating.
The amateurish ineptitude of both the soldiers

and officers involved was as shocking as the 4700
casualties. It finally began to dawn on everyone

that this war would be far more difficult than
anticipated, and a far more dedicated war effort

was needed. Both armies began to reorganize and
professionalize, preparing for the battles to

come. With Richmond and Washington D.C. only 108
miles apart, both sides believed that the Eastern

theatre would decide the war. In 1862, the Union
had a clear strategic advantage but would miss its

best chance to win the war quickly, thanks to one
general’s dithering indecisiveness. In this latest

video in our series on the American Civil War, we
will focus on the Eastern campaign and missteps

made by the Union that ensured the conflict would
drag out into the bloodiest in American history.

The Confederate Army

Despite his victory at Bull Run, General Joseph
Johnston, commander of the Department of Virginia,

had grave concerns about the Confederate military.
He’d been the prewar army’s Quartermaster General

and was acutely aware of the Confederacy’s
deficiencies versus the North’s industrial

capacity . About 20% of the regular army’s
officers had defected alongside their states,

and the Confederacy’s soldiers were eager to
fight. However, their ability was severely

limited. All Confederate soldiers were supposed
to carry Lee-Enfield rifled muskets and wear the

same equipment and uniforms as the pre-war
US Army, except in cadet gray. In reality,

the rebels were never able to produce enough
uniforms or import enough weapons to meet that

standard. Instead, they used a hodge-podge of
dyed state militia uniforms and equipment. The

1841 Harpers Ferry rifled musket was the
most common weapon. Rations were often

late and lacking. The only military
resource in great supply was morale.

Despite his best efforts, Johnston had no
solution. There was no centralized command

structure, as the states wanted some control over
Confederate forces in their territories. Having

seceded as “sovereign and independent republics”
, they expected to be treated accordingly.

Therefore, the Confederate military was divided
into mostly independent military districts,

each expected to defend its assigned states and
draw supplies from them . Johnston was limited

in the resources Virginia would volunteer, with
the Confederate government giving minimal help.

The Confederate Government
Jefferson Davis was an experienced legislator,

but that experience was limited to defending
slavery and the Southern status quo. He had

no experience governing. He refused to delegate
and habitually micromanaged, severely hampering

governmental effectiveness. Throughout the war,
Davis’ constant interference caused ten cabinet

resignations. It also ruined his relationship with
Johnston, as the two quarrelled over everything,

and Davis frequently gave orders to individual
unit commanders, destroying Johnston’s chain of

command. The cabinet was filled with unqualified
functionaries chosen to protect their home

state’s interests. For example, Treasury Secretary
Christopher Memminger knew nothing about banking,

but South Carolina wanted to control that
department through him. Davis’ only consistently

competent advisor was Judah Benjamin .
From civil servants up to Davis himself,

the men in government were undistinguished at best
and incompetent and brainless political flunkies

at worst. Davis’ government was so inept that
it never even established a war strategy beyond

“defend the Confederacy.”
The Cotton Embargo

These facts might explain why Davis’s first
economic policy aided the Union. On April 19th,

US President Abraham Lincoln declared southern
ports blockaded and closed. While the Navy wasn’t

actually able to enforce the blockade, southern
trade still fell as European merchants shied

away from dealing in contraband. The cotton
trade remained the South’s primary industry,

supplying 77% of Britain’s and 90% of France’s
cotton needs. Southerners universally believed

in the power of King Cotton and wanted
to use it. Therefore, in October,

Davis announced a complete cotton embargo. The
plan was to shut down Europe’s textile industry,

forcing them to intervene and end the Federal
blockade, hopefully alongside diplomatic

recognition and military support. However, many
European manufacturers had been stockpiling

cotton for this eventuality, and the economic
disruption was insufficient to force European

intervention. However, it severely limited
Confederate arms imports, to Johnston’s chagrin.

The Union Prepares
On the other side,

Lincoln had less experience than Davis, but he
was also aware of his deficiencies and had built a

highly talented cabinet to compensate. Commanding
General of the Army Winfield Scott always knew the

war would be long and planned accordingly. On May
21st, Scott recommended expanding the blockade,

completely sealing off the Southern coast. 80,000
new, professional army soldiers would isolate and

then seize rebel strongholds along the Mississippi
River. Surrounded and split, the rebellion would

be squeezed to death as his forces moved inland.
The press derisively called it the Anaconda Plan,

criticism President Abraham Lincoln echoed.
They expected a short, decisive war.

Once Bull Run proved Scott correct, Lincoln
adapted. Scott was too old and fat to command

troops, and a new field general was needed . Major
General George McClellan’s success in western

Virginia had demonstrated the ability that earned
him admission to West Point at the age of 15,

so Scott summoned him to Washington. Lauded in the
press as “the young Napoleon,” McClellan arrived

on July 26 to roaring crowds, hopeful that he
would save the Union. Before giving him army

command, Scott asked McClellan to propose his own
plan to defeat the rebellion. Vindicating Scott,

McClellan reproposed Scott’s plan with more
details. In addition to the blockade and push down

the Mississippi, McClellan added thrusts into the
Confederacy through Virginia, the Carolina coast,

Tennessee, and the Red River . Critical to the
plan was bringing overwhelming force against the

rebels at all points simultaneously.
Building the Army of the Potomac

While building and equipping such a force required
tremendous logistics, McClellan was confident of

success. As chief engineer, then vice-president of
the Illinois Central Railroad, he’d developed into

a logistical genius and set to work reforming
the army with Lincoln’s support. He organized

supply centers, convinced his railway colleagues
to prioritize military shipments, and rapidly

expanded arms manufacture. Constant drills, better
food, and training improved morale. By August,

the loose formations that had panicked at Bull
Run were transformed into the formidable Army of

the Potomac. Additionally, the whole military
was reorganized. The new Federal army would

be composed of three-year volunteers. Strategy
would be dictated from Washington, but each army

commander had operational freedom. Each military
district would be centrally supplied and uniformly

equipped to prewar army standards with the latest
model Springfield rifled musket or equivalent .

Accepting his limited usefulness, Scott retired
on November 1st, handing his job to McClellan.

Six Months Idle on the Potomac
Lincoln was skeptical that one man could lead

the main army while administering the entire war
effort, but McClellan confidently told him, “I can

do it all.” Indeed, he’d successfully reorganized
and streamlined the United States military’s

command structure, recruitment, and supply chain
by December. However, organizing was all McClellan

was doing. Other than occasional patrols verifying
that Johnston was still entrenched around

Centerville, his army was completely idle. This
made Lincoln increasingly anxious. The Army of

the Potomac alone cost $600,000 a day to maintain.
Worse, the inactivity and general poor performance

of Federal forces during 1861 prompted Congress
to begin investigating army failures and probing

Lincoln’s administration while demanding action.
McClellan’s reports were just demands for more

resources and “trust the process.” The stress and
uncertainty sent Lincoln into a depressive spiral.

McClellan justified himself, firstly, by saying
that his strategic plan called for a massive,

simultaneous offensive on all fronts, and most
of those fronts weren’t ready to attack. The navy

couldn’t support the planned amphibious operations
yet, and Western generals Henry Halleck and Don

Carlos Buell weren’t ready to move. The only
option was to wait. Secondly, he was convinced

that he was severely overmatched. His intelligence
chief was Allan Pinkerton , a longtime friend.

While his agents were adept at spycatching and
infiltrating the Confederate government, as both

were standard detective work, they were utterly
useless at gathering military intelligence.

They constantly misidentified fortifications
and overestimated enemy numbers. Johnston’s

70,000 soldiers behind simple breastworks were
reported to McClellan as 170,000 behind strong

fortifications, which he then passed onto Lincoln
as 200,000 soldiers and impregnable fortifications

to justify recruiting more soldiers. However,
the real problem was McClellan’s personality.

Meticulous to the point of perfectionism, he
refused to take any risk until all possible

preparations had been made. However, preparing
became a never-ending cycle, and McClellan was

hopelessly lost in endlessly perfecting his army.
Lincoln Kicks McClellan Into Motion

McClellan finally outlined plans to his innermost
circle for an amphibious landing at Urbanna to

outflank Johnston and seize Richmond on January
11. Lincoln, on the verge of a nervous breakdown,

wasn’t told and, on January 27, ordered all Union
armies to begin offensive action before George

Washington’s birthday on February 22nd. When
McClellan didn’t respond, Lincoln ordered him

to advance against Johnston immediately. McClellan
responded with a 22-page memo detailing how that

was impossible and that his Urbanna plan was
better, the first time Lincoln learned it existed.

Relieved, Lincoln relented. However, by March
8th, McClellan still hadn’t moved. Consequently,

Lincoln called McClellan’s subordinates to the
White House to learn if the plan was real and

if they were confident in it. They answered
yes to both, but Lincoln also learned that

McClellan had never named commanders for the
army’s corps despite obsessively constructing

them, so Lincoln appointed them himself.
McClellan finally prepared to depart on March 9th,

only to learn that Johnston had sniffed out
the Urbanna plan and withdrawn behind the

Rappahannok . Consequently, Northern newspapers
discovered that most of the Centerville defences

were fake . McClellan had been duped, wasting
a valuable opportunity, especially since many

Confederate enlistments had run out in February .
Humiliated, McClellan decided to target the James

Peninsula instead and sailed for Fort Monroe
on March 17th. Meanwhile, another army was sent

to the Shenandoah Valley with 50,000 troops on
standby in Alexandria to deploy as needed. Lincoln

relieved McClellan as General of the Armies on
March 11 so he could focus on the campaign .

The Peninsula Campaign (Finally)
McClellan’s plan was to sprint behind Johnston,

take Richmond, and then attack Johnston’s rear.
However, he sabotaged himself. McClellan refused

to leave Fort Monroe until all his 121,500
soldiers arrived, giving Johnston ample time

to redeploy while dispatching Stonewall Jackson
to Shenandoah Valley. McClellan finally crawled

forward on April 4, meeting the first Confederate
line at Lee’s Mill the next day. Confederate

Major General John Magruder spread his 11,000
troops thinly while marching them in circles,

tricking McClellan into believing he faced 100,000
rebels. McClellan halted and prepared to besiege

Yorktown. Magruder let McClellan believe the
lie until May 3, when he withdrew during the

night. Johnston planned a Fabian withdrawal up
the Peninsula before ambushing McClellan once he

got strung out. On the 5th, his rearguard fought
a successful delaying action outside Williamsburg.

On the 7th, a Federal attempt to intercept the
retreat via amphibious assault was contained at

Eltham’s Landing. The scuttling of ironclad CSS
Virginia opened the James River, and Lincoln,

visiting Fort Monroe to observe the campaign,
ordered a naval attack on Richmond, but it was

turned back by batteries on Drewry’s Bluff .
On May 17th, Johnston’s men retreated into

Richmond’s defences . McClellan had moved
so slowly that he’d never strung out

as Johnston expected. However, McClellan was now
convinced he was outnumbered 2-1 when, in reality,

he outnumbered Johnston 5-3. Again, he settled
into siege lines straddling the Chickahominy while

screaming for all available reinforcements to be
sent to him. The 5th Corps cleared Confederate

detachments from Hanover Court House to open the
road for the 1st Corp to rejoin the army. However,

it had been diverted to counter Jackson,
now running wild in Shenandoah Valley.

The Battle of Seven Pines
Richmond could not withstand a siege. However,

Johnston realized that McClellan, bedridden with
malaria, was more interested in establishing

supply bases than advancing. He’d left one
third of his army south of the Chickahominy

in exposed positions, and Johnston intended to
capitalize. AP Hill and Magruder’s divisions would

launch diversions on the north bank while James
Longstreet led 51,000 men to attack the 30,000

Federals on the south bank from three directions,
overwhelming and destroying them. However,

Davis’ earlier meddling bore fruit. Longstreet
either misunderstood his verbal orders or changed

them without telling Johnston. Other written
orders were either lost or vague, and many

officers didn’t know or ignored that Longstreet
was in command of the operation. Consequently,

the plan fell apart before it began.
The attack began at 08:00 on May 31st,

but Longstreet took the wrong road , delaying
his attack for hours. The assault force was

waiting for Longstreet to initiate the battle,
and so they just stood around waiting. At 13:00,

an impatient DH Hill finally attacked the Union’s
far left flank near Fair Oaks Station alone.

Acoustic shadows meant neither commanding general
heard the battle commence. This initial wave of

10,000 rebels smashed through Union skirmishers
only to be halted at the breastworks. Brigadier

General Silas Casey sent out desperate pleas
for reinforcements, but they were slow to

arrive and Casey’s division was overwhelmed
as more rebels joined the attack piecemeal.

By 14:30 the Union troops fell back to redoubts
near Seven Pines. McClellan had still received

no reports of action. Johnston was out
looking for the attack force , but thanks

to the acoustic shadows he still heard nothing.
Here, the battle stabilized as individual Union

officers marched to the sound of guns, directed
by balloon observations. It wasn’t until 16:00

that Johnston learned what was happening after
Longstreet asked permission to join the battle

he was supposed to be leading. Despite the
additional Confederate pressure, overwhelming

Union numbers began to tell, and a counterattack
began, during which Johnston received a bullet

wound in the arm and shrapnel to the chest while
riding forward to organize the chaos. McClellan

never took control of the battle. The battle
petered out as night fell. During the night,

individual Union regiments attempted night attacks
only to find that many Confederate units had

left their positions. Fighting resumed the next
morning along the line but accomplished nothing,

and the Confederates retreated by noon, having
suffered 6100 casualties and inflicted 5400.

Lee Takes Command & the Battle of Oak Grove
After Seven Pines, McClellan abandoned any

remaining offensive pretense. Seeing his beloved
soldiers become casualties completely gutted him.

He refused to move until his siege guns,
delayed by heavy spring rain, arrived,

and he could bombard the rebels out of Richmond.
Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee, Davis’ military advisor,

took command from the incapacitated Johnston.
Realizing McClellan’s intentions, Lee used the

reprieve to recall Jackson from the Valley, plan
his response, and reorganize Johnston’s Department

of Virginia into the Army of Northern Virginia. He
couldn’t directly counter McClellan’s siege guns,

so he’d use boldness instead. First Johnston
and now Lee had realized that McClellan’s

public bravado was hollow. Thus, while
they might not be able to fight him away,

they could certainly intimidate him away from
Richmond. Needing more information, Lee dispatched

cavalry under Jeb Stuart to reconnoitre the
Federal right. Stuart rode 100 miles in 3

days , completely circling the Union army and
reporting that following Seven Pines, the Union

army had redeployed south of the Chickahominey.
Only the 5th Corp remained above it, and it and

the supply line to White House Landing on the
right flank were exposed. Therefore, Lee gambled

that McClellan wouldn’t attack again, and he could
destroy the exposed Union right by concentrating

most of his army against one Union corp. He
planned for Jackson’s Valley veterans to seize

White House Landing while Magruder’s division
demonstrated on the Union left. The rest of the

army would overwhelm the exposed Union troops.
The attack was scheduled for June 26th. However,

McClellan realized the risk and abandoned
White House Landing for Harrison Landing.

On June 25th, McClellan finally advanced on
Oak Grove to secure positions for his siege

guns. At 08:00, three brigades moved towards the
high ground. While the center and left brigades

successfully pushed through the rebel defences,
Sickles’ brigade on the right fell behind,

opening a window for a successful counterattack
which temporarily halted the advance until

reinforcements arrived. McClellan, managing
the battle via telegraph from 3 miles away,

panicked and ordered a withdrawal at 10:30 so he
could rescue the situation in person. He arrived

at 12:00, realized that they’d been winning the
battle until he meddled, and sent his troops

forward again at 13:00. By nightfall, they’d
retaken their objectives. This was the closest the

Federal army came to taking Richmond until 1864.
Battle of Beaver Dam Creek & Gaines’s Mill

The next morning, Jackson was supposed to
initiate the attack on the Union right flank

near Mechanicsville, with AP and DH Hill
supporting him once he engaged. However,

that attack never came . During the Valley
Campaign, his soldiers had earned a reputation

as Foot Cavalry for their rapid advances and
maneuvers, allowing Jackson to execute one of the

greatest defeat-in-detail campaigns in military
history. However, they’d been force-marching

for nearly 5 months and were utterly exhausted.
Jackson was in equally poor shape. Consequently,

he moved too slowly and never engaged. Instead,
AP Hill grew impatient waiting for Jackson and

attacked toward Mechanicsville at 15:00. The
Union division in town quickly fell back to

prepared defenses behind Beaver Dam Creek
and easily repelled the attack with massed

artillery. Lee arrived, realized the situation,
and sent Longsteet and DH Hill forward to support

the attack. Union reinforcements stabilized the
front and darkness ended the fighting. Jackson

did eventually arrive as the fighting wound
down and made camp instead. Lee gained nothing

but 1484 casualties, inflicting just 361.
That night, Major General Fitz John Porter

realized that 5th Corp’s flank was exposed and
shifted to better positions along Boatswain’s

Swamp near Gaines’ Mill. Despite calls from his
generals to attack Magruder’s exposed position

with overwhelming force, which would have easily
broken through, McClellan refused. In his mind,

Magruder’s force alone outnumbered the Army of the
Potomac, which was in danger of being surrounded.

On June 27th, Lee again concentrated 57,000 men
against the 5th Corp, unaware it had redeployed.

The plan was essentially the same as the previous
day. While AP Hill and Longstreet attacked and

pinned the left flank, Jackson and DH Hill would
circle around Union’s exposed right flank and

attack from the rear. Again, Jackson was late.
DH Hill advanced to Old Cold Harbor at 13:00,

expecting to link up with Jackson but instead
found Union defences. Realizing that the flank

had moved, he fell back. Acoustic shadows kept
Lee ignorant of this development. Meanwhile AP

Hill’s advance across Beaver Dam Creek encountered
nothing but skirmishers until finding Porter’s

primary defences along Boatswain’s Swamp. The
swamp and Union reinforcements stifled the

attack. Meanwhile, McClellan became convinced
that the right was lost and began to prepare a

full retreat. Jackson’s lead division reached
the field at 15:30 and was ordered to support

Longstreet’s diversionary attack to rescue Hill,
which succeeded with heavy casualties. Despite

calls for a counterattack, McClellan refused to
move from defensive positions. Jackson himself

finally arrived at 19:00, having gotten lost on
the wrong road. After finally linking up with DH

Hill, and assaulted the Union left while
Longstreet and Hill again attacked the right,

first piecemeal, then in large waves. At
dusk, Porter’s line was broken, but he

retreated across the Chickahominy under cover
of night, burning all the bridges behind him.

McClellan’s last nerve shattered. Magruder’s
reconnaissance-in-force on the 27th confirmed,

in only his mind, that he was surrounded and about
to be attacked on all sides by a superior force,

and he panicked. McClellan ordered a full retreat
to Harrison’s Landing and the safety of Union

gunboats, telegraphing Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton: “If I save this Army now I tell you

plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other
persons in Washington—you have done your best to

sacrifice this Army,” though the Signal Office
didn’t pass on the last part. Lee intended to

attack again to cut the Federal retreat, but
didn’t know where McClellan was headed until

close to nightfall. McClellan’s logistical genius
was in full effect as he maneuvered the baggage

train south through the chokepoints in White Oak
Swamp on the 28th. Once the supplies were clear,

McClellan left for Harrison’s Landing
without designating a second-in-command

and played no further part in the campaign
beyond sending Porter ahead to establish

a defensive position on Malvern Hill.
Battle of Savage’s Station & Glendale

The army regrouped around Savage’s Station, its
main supply base, while the corp commanders worked

out the retreat . Union morale plummeted once they
realized that the burning supplies meant they were

retreating and many wounded had to be left behind.
Meanwhile, Lee smelled blood, and was determined

to pursue and destroy the Federal army completely.
Jackson was to rebuild a Chickahominy bridge,

link up with Magruder, and launch a powerful
enough attack on the rear guard to make the

Federals turn and fight long enough for the rest
of his army to circle around and block the road.

Skirmishing began around 09:00, but tapered off
around 11:00 as Union forces pushed back the

Confederates and gradually withdrew. Jackson
thought he had to rebuild all the bridges,

and a garbled attack order came across as orders
to guard the crossings, so he didn’t engage.

Macgruder, hesitant and outnumbered, failed
to attack until 17:00. The fighting around

Savage’s Station devolved into an artillery duel
accompanying scattered attacks and counterattacks,

with the only notable occurrence being the
Land Merrimack, a Confederate armored train,

bombarding the Union position. The Union
withdrew to positions strung out between

White Oak Swamp and Glendale that night.
Lee realized this was his last chance to

destroy the Union army and again resolved
to attack with his whole army. AP Hill and

Longstreet would attack the Federal left to cut
off their escape while Jackson turned the right

in a double envelopment. However, Jackson
never made it across White Oak Swamp. On

the verge of mental and physical collapse
and finding the main bridge destroyed,

he milled about on the north side rather than find
an alternative route through the swamp. He finally

ordered an artillery bombardment at 14:00, then
fell asleep under a tree until 16:00. Longstreet

and Hill waited for Jackson’s attack until 16:00,
when Union artillery forced them to attack. They

successfully pierced the Union’s line but were
thrown back by brutal counterattacks. Again,

darkness ended the inconclusive, bloody fighting.
Battle of Malvern Hill and the End of the Campaign

During the night, the Federals completed their
retreat to Malvern Hill, where Porter had

cleared sightlines for the 250 cannons supporting
breastworks for the whole army by removing all

trees and vegetation between the forest and hill.
Lee wouldn’t let the Federals go, and planned one

last attack. An artillery barrage would suppress
the Union guns and provide a smoke screen for

the assault. Jackson was to attack Malvern Hill
down the Quaker Road while the rest of the army

followed, fanning out across the line as they
engaged. The exhausted and demoralized Federals

would simply be overwhelmed if they didn’t break.
However, the Union gunners anticipated Lee and

opened fire at 13:00. By 14:30, all Confederate
batteries were out of action. The assault columns

were delayed and separated from each other by
muddy roads and bad navigation, and weren’t

ready to attack until 15:30, well after the smoke
cleared. The attack went forward anyway in three

waves, but were bloodily repelled, with no unit
coming closer than 200 yards of the main works.

Malvern Hill wasn’t a tenable position due to
exposed supply lines, and McClellan ordered it

abandoned, with the entire army huddling
around Harrison’s Landing. The Peninsula

Campaign was over, and with it all confidence
in McClelland's abilities. In seven days,

Lee’s boldness had intimidated him into defeat,
inflicting 15,855 casualties at the price of

20,204. Morale soared in the Confederacy, and Lee
now sought to use that boost to move North and end

the war. In the next video in our series on the
American Civil War, Lee will press his advantage,

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