Original subtitles

Despite holding an overwhelming material and manpower advantage, George McClellan’s delusional

timidity let Robert E. Lee scare him away from Richmond. While McClellan cowered in Harrison’s

Landing, Lee began to look north. A new threat had emerged, but with it a new opportunity. Lee

knew that the South couldn’t win a long war, as its material deficiencies were already becoming

a problem. Therefore, he began to contemplate an offensive to win the war outright. Welcome

to our latest episode on the American Civil War, in which the South’s boldest general

will go on the offensive. Lincoln Makes a New Army

Having gloriously fled an inferior foe for the safety of the James River, McClellan spent July

refusing to move from Harrison’s Landing. He insisted that Lee had at least 200,000 soldiers,

but that he could retake the offensive and drive on Richmond again if all Union forces in the East

and West were immediately sent to reinforce him. However, President Lincoln and the cabinet were

thoroughly disenchanted with McClellan. Their intelligence said Lee hadn’t fielded more than

90,000 soldiers during the Peninsula Campaign, and couldn’t have more than 80,000 now. The only

thing preventing McClellan’s 100,000 troops from taking Richmond was their general’s delusions.

Therefore, Lincoln brought in Henry Halleck, a less talented but more realistic general,

from the western theater to take over as General-in-Chief. Recognizing that the

units Jackson had humiliated during the Valley Campaign were aimlessly licking their wounds in

northern Virginia and could make another drive on Richmond, Halleck and Lincoln tapped Major General

John Pope to form a new army. Pope had won several victories in the western theater through audacity,

and they hoped he would bring that spirit east. Pope’s Republican ties and calls for a harder

war against the Confederates didn't hurt either. What did hurt was Pope himself. He was a braggart

and as diplomatic as a brick to the face. His corps commanders were all senior to him,

which they found insulting, and his 45,000 men were demoralized. Pope’s response upon

taking command was to deliver a grandiose speech touting his achievements in the west, extolling

the aggressive spirit of the western armies, and that he expected to only ever see the backs of his

enemies. Instead of inspiring the army, Pope’s bravado insulted everyone. Several subordinates

resigned rather than serve with him . The new Army of Virginia never believed in its commander.

Lee Reorganizes his Army On the other side, the Army of Northern Virginia

was in poor condition despite high morale. The Confederacy couldn’t keep its military supplied,

much less reinforced. Lee’s ammunition stocks were full, but only through looting Union supplies,

and he struggled to replace the 20,000 casualties from the Seven Days Battles.

The Confederacy’s manpower had dried up, while men still flocked to Union recruiting stations.

The Confederate Congress had adopted America’s first conscription law in April, but enforcing it

was proving difficult. He had about 80,000 men in his department, but garrisoning Richmond and other

positions while protecting supply lines meant he only had about 55,000 available for action. Worse,

while Union troops were regularly issued new uniforms, weapons, and shoes, his troops had

to wait their turn each time increasingly rare shipments arrived from the few Southern factories.

Lee realized that he had to win the war quickly to avoid defeat. However,

his Army needed reorganization. He’d failed to land a decisive blow during the Seven Days

primarily due to poor coordination caused by decentralized command. Directly issuing orders

to division commanders had led to confusion, overmanagement, and miscommunication. To solve

this, the army’s 11 divisions were consolidated into 7. Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet,

his best officers, were made Lieutenant Generals to command each wing of the army,

with JEB Stuart commanding the cavalry. Lee also changed his command style. Rather than prepare

specific battle plans, his lieutenants would be assigned objectives and a desired end state,

then given discretion to achieve their objectives. Northern Virginia Campaign

Lee couldn’t deal with both McClellan and Pope should they unite their commands. However,

Lee knew McClellan wasn’t a threat and spotted an opportunity. Pope’s orders were to move towards

Gordonville and cut the Virginia Central Railroad, securing both Washington’s flank

and the Shenandoah Valley while making life as difficult for Confederate sympathizers as possible

before linking up with McClellan. Pope was due significant reinforcements , but his advance would

be isolated and therefore exposed. Lee planned to use this isolation to trap and destroy Pope,

hoping to produce a Saratoga-esque victory and win the Confederacy European recognition. The first

step was to protect the Virginia Central, a major lifeline for Richmond and, by extension, the army.

To this end, Jackson was sent to Gordonville with 14,000 troops, successfully thwarting

efforts by Union cavalry to cut the line on July 19th and 22nd. On July 26th, paroled prisoners

alerted him that increased Union naval traffic meant Pope’s reinforcements were arriving. This

convinced him to dispatch AP Hill with 12,000 men to reinforce Jackson while stepping up artillery

bombardments and diversions against McClellan. This caused McClellan to scream for reinforcements

again. Halleck finally put him in his place, responding that the fact Lee hadn’t already

crushed the Army of the Potomac proved that McClellan’s assessment was wrong. Furthermore,

if McClellan actually was as outnumbered as he claimed, all the reinforcements in the Union would

accomplish nothing. Lee could easily intercept and destroy them piecemeal. Finally, he was uselessly

sitting around in the Virginia bottomlands in July . His army’s hospitals were already filled with

yellow fever and malaria patients, and it wasn’t the height of mosquito season yet. Therefore,

unless he advanced by August 4th, McClellan was ordered to evacuate Virginia and return

to Washington DC before moving to support Pope’s advance. Stung by the rebuke, McClellan petulantly

didn’t follow his orders until August 14th. Battle of Cedar Mountain

Pope didn’t wait for McClellan and, on July 29th, ordered his vanguard to march for Cedar

Mountain and establish a base to raid the Virginia Central Railway. Confederate cavalry

alerted Jackson to the move, and he advanced on Culpeper Court House, intending to defeat

Pope’s corps in detail as he’d done in Shenandoah. However, the July heat slowed his advance. Worse,

Jackson never told his division commanders their objective or to hurry their march. Consequently,

Union cavalry discovered Jackson’s position and warned Pope, who ordered his leading corps’

commander, Nathaniel Banks, to move to defensive positions and await reinforcements. Banks had

been repeatedly victimized by Jackson during the Valley campaign and knew that giving Jackson the

initiative was suicidal. Despite being outnumbered 2-1, Banks refused his orders and moved forward

to ambush Jackson, looking for revenge. At noon on August 9th, Jackson’s vanguard

under Jubal Early discovered Federal artillery and cavalry on a ridge above the Cedar Run crossings.

Early pulled back and deployed on the right of the field while additional forces moved up

the road to form the left flank. The 98-degree Fahrenheit heat made their movements sluggish,

and there were still gaps in the line when an artillery duel commenced at 15:30. Federal fire

made Confederate disorganization worse until the leftmost division’s general was mortally wounded,

and whose replacement had never been told the battle plan. At that moment,

Banks’ infantry moved from cover behind the ridge and charged the Confederate line. Early’s

troops were pushed back but held together, but the left disintegrated as Union troops

charged through gaps in its line and began to attack artillery in the rear. At that moment,

Jackson arrived with reinforcements and rallied his fleeing Valley veterans. He swiftly organized

an overwhelming counterattack that shattered Banks’ corps. Only nightfall and approaching

reinforcements stopped Jackson’s pursuit. Clara Barton, founder of the American Red Cross,

would tend to battlefield wounded for the first time after this battle.

Jackson Sets a Trap Jackson held position, expecting additional Union

attacks. However, Halleck had ordered Pope to await reinforcements from McClellan near Culpeper.

On August 12, Jackson fell back on Gordonsville. Lee dispatched Longstreet north on the 13th and,

after seeing McClellan leaving the Peninsula, brought the remaining troops to Gordonsville,

reuniting the army. He planned a turning movement against Pope, using Stuart’s cavalry to destroy

railway bridges and isolate him before crushing the army. However, Federal cavalry captured

a dispatch rider carrying the plan and alerted Pope, who withdrew to the Rappahannock . Stuart,

in turn, captured Union dispatches, showing that Pope had already been reinforced to 77,000 men,

which would be expanded to 130,000 by September. Lee needed to strike swiftly, but the flooding

Rappahannock limited operations to ineffective skirmishes near the crossings. Finally, on August

25th, Lee opted for an audacious plan proposed by Jackson. He and Stuart would flank Pope’s

right using the Blue Ridge Mountains to hide his movement and cut Pope’s communication line,

the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. This would force Pope to move, during which Jackson could pin him

while Lee and Longstreet flanked and crushed the army. Dividing the army in the face of superior

numbers flew in the face of all military logic and doctrine, but Lee trusted Jackson. Jackson

began the march that night. After slipping through Thoroughfare Gap unnoticed, he cut the

railroad at Briscoe Station before continuing onto Manassas Junction, Pope’s supply base, destroying

everything his men couldn’t eat or carry off. Next, they pushed across Bull Run Bridge,

routing the defenders before reaching the First Bull Run battlefield . Pope ordered Joseph Hooker

to intercept Jackson, but Hooker was blocked by Richard Ewell at Kettle Creek Run. That night,

Jackson secretly entrenched behind an unfinished railbed near Stony Ridge to await developments.

Second Battle of Bull Run By August 28th, Pope had lost

track of Jackson and seemingly forgot that Lee was still out there. After his cavalry failed to

locate Jackson, infantry columns were dispatched to search. Realizing that Pope was setting himself

up for a crushing flank attack, Jackson attacked a column near Brawner’s Farm at 18:30 to keep Pope

from wandering away. The attack went poorly and Jackson was pushed back after suffering as many

casualties as he inflicted. However the strategic goal was achieved. Wrongly believing Jackson was

retreating from Centerville when the infantry had caught up to him, Pope ordered his army to turn,

surround, and capture the isolated Jackson. However, Jackson wasn’t in the positions Pope

thought he was , and his own troops weren’t where he thought they were . Worse, he still

believed against evidence that Longstreet was in Gordonville. In reality, Longsteet

had pushed through the cavalry screen guarding Thoroughfare Gap and was preparing to close the

trap. It’s not clear why Pope didn’t know this. At dawn on the 29th, Jackson dispatched Stuart to

guide Longsteet’s forces into position to ambush Pope. While he waited, Jackson noticed Federal

troops preparing to attack, and redistributed his forces to hold the railbed until Longstreet

was ready. John Buford’s cavalry discovered Longstreet’s movement at 08:15, but Pope wasn’t

told until 19:00. Meanwhile, Pope was discovering that his complicated attack wasn’t happening

thanks to his misinformed and confusingly written orders. The green 1st Corps was in position, but

only by pure coincidence. The rest of his forces either hadn’t received orders, or were trying to

make sense of the impossible movements they’d been assigned. Rather than adjust, he berated

his officers and ordered them to get in position without clarifying what positions and where.

1st Corps still attacked as ordered , but since Jackson wasn’t where Pope thought,

its intended flanking attack became a series of bloody and ineffective frontal charges against

prepared positions. However, General Sigel believed his objective was just holding Jackson

in place and continued his attack. Pope arrived at 13:00 to discover that planned reinforcements

hadn’t arrived and Sigel wasn’t fighting the battle Pope wanted. He decided to bring up fresh

troops and assault Jackson’s center. He also thought he ordered Fitz John Porter and Irvin

McDowell to attack the right, but in reality his message confusingly suggested they either

advance on Gainesville or hold position. Perplexed and discovering unexpected rebels to his front,

Porter halted the column. This was actually fortunate for the Union. Longstreet was in

position to close the trap by 12:00, just waiting for Pope to fully commit against Jackson. However,

Stuart spotted Porter near Dawkins’ Branch and warned Longstreet that his nemesis from

the Peninsula could turn his flank. As a result, Longstreet held the attack, convincing Lee to wait

for a better opportunity. Union forces continued to hammer Jackson until nightfall, pushing back

his left flank. This withdrawal reinforced Pope’s belief that Jackson was retreating,

and Buford’s late-arriving report made him believe that Longstreet was coming late to

relieve Jackson. Needing to “finish” Jackson before that happened, Porter was finally

explicitly ordered to attack Jackson’s right once the rest of the army engaged the left and center.

During the night, Longsteet’s final division arrived and, in confusion, moved too close to

the Federal position. Realizing the mistake on the dawn of August 30th, they withdrew,

which reinforced Pope’s delusion that Jackson was retreating. Refusing to let him go and against the

advice of his generals, Pope ordered more attacks . Jackson was nearly overwhelmed as his men ran

out of ammunition as Porter advanced to “finish the job”. This was what Lee had waited for,

and Longstreet’s troops attacked. However, the Union army’s loose formation accidentally saved

it. Two brigades were near Longstreet’s position awaiting orders. These units raised the alarm and

bought enough time for Porter and McDowell to turn and meet the attack. As word spread,

individual commanders began moving to defensive positions independently of Pope, who still

believed he only faced Jackson. Longstreet surged forward, and Jackson joined the attack at 18:00,

but the Federal positions on Henry Hill held. Stuart attempted to swing around the flank for a

rear attack but was driven back by Buford. During the night, Pope withdrew to Centerville before

continuing to Washington. Jackson attempted to cut him off at Chantilly , but the rearguard held and

Pope successfully linked up with McClellan . One Campaign Ends, Another Begins

Lee had won a great victory, and his men knew it. They’d convincingly beaten a superior army,

inflicting 14,500 casualties at the price of 7,300. From this victory came the Elan and morale

that made the Army of Northern Virginia legendary. However, it wasn’t the victory Lee needed. Pope

was humiliated and his army crippled, but it had escaped intact. This was a major tactical victory,

but it wasn’t a Saratoga-level strategic victory. He needed something more. Though Pope’s army was

safely within Washington’s defenses, Pope was besieged. He court-martialed Porter

as a scapegoat, but it was clear his arrogance and ineptitude disqualified him from frontline

command. Instead, he was reassigned to fight the Dakota War . This derailed Lincoln’s plan to rid

himself of McClellan (with plausible deniability) by folding his army into Pope’s. Instead,

McClellan would reabsorb the Army of Virginia. His cabinet objected to giving McClellan another

chance, but as Lincoln explained, “We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army

who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he.

If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight.” Testifying to McClellan’s

abilities, the army was reorganized and ready for its bloodiest test a week after Second Bull Run.

Maryland Campaign Following First Bull Run , Joseph Johnston

had contemplated but rejected an offensive against the North. Doing so would severely undermine

Confederate diplomacy, claiming they were acting in self-defence. More importantly, there was no

viable target. Washington was rapidly becoming the most fortified city in the world, which protected

Baltimore by proximity. Marching on Philadelphia was insanely risky, and no other reachable cities

would deal a knockout blow to Northern morale. Thus, he’d remained in Virginia. However,

Lee concluded by September 3rd that remaining in Virginia wasn’t viable. While Pope’s depredation

campaign had done significant damage to northern Virginia, it was nothing compared to the normal

damage armies caused on the campaign. From Shenandoah to the sea, Virginia was devastated

and couldn’t supply his army. Leaving Virginia was the only way to feed his increasingly barefoot

and hungry army, and the only viable justification for leaving was a northern invasion. Lee’s primary

goal was to reach Pennsylvania’s rich farmland and feed his troops. His secondary objective was to

cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, a major lifeline for both Washington and Baltimore.

Lee believed threatening a major city might cost the Republicans their Congressional majority that

November . After recalling part of the Richmond garrison to replenish his army to 55,000,

Lee informed Davis of his plans and started north, dispatching Jackson to

take Harpers Ferry to secure their supply route and hopefully capture extensive military stores.

Invasion of Maryland Lee’s vanguard crossed into Maryland

on September 4th. By pure coincidence, another invasion was underway in Kentucky led by Edmund

Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg. Jefferson Davis sent each general proclamations to distribute,

explaining that they weren’t a conquering force and were simply trying to aggressively

end the war. The action was superfluous, as each general had already done so. Lee added that he

was a liberator and invited Marylanders to join him. He received no takers. Western Maryland was

firmly antislavery, and most of the Chesapeake region slaveholders were in prison or had already

fled southward. Worse, around 10,000 soldiers fell out of the march. Several units refused to

cross the Potomac as they’d explicitly enlisted only to defend the South. Many suffered diarrhea

after eating unripe corn, and many others simply couldn’t continue after cutting their bare feet

on the stony northern roads. Meanwhile, first panic, then resolution spread through Maryland

and Pennsylvania as Lee approached. Both states called out their militia while cities prepared

to withstand sieges. Union Pursuit

McClellan was busily reincorporating Pope’s former army while trying to regain his former

job from Halleck when news of Lee’s movement reached Washington. Lincoln ordered a pursuit,

but again, McClellan claimed without evidence that Lee had 120,000 men that his 107,000

couldn’t hope to match. Knowing that Lee couldn’t possibly have more than 70,000,

Lincoln kicked McClellan into motion with 87,000 men on September 7th.

The reception frightened Marylanders gave the army boosted morale, but their

marching speed was glacial. McClellan finally reached Frederick early on September 13th,

where Corporal Barton Mitchell discovered Lee’s invasion plans wrapped around three cigars. Upon

receiving the intelligence, McClellan exclaimed, “Now I know what to do!” He then boastfully wired

Lincoln that he had Lee bagged and would send trophies before doing absolutely nothing with

the intelligence for 18 hours. South Mountain & Harpers Ferry

McClellan finally gave orders to advance on Lee through South Mountain that night. Lee

learned through unknown means that his plans were discovered, and McClellan was closing. Realizing

the danger, he urgently recalled Jackson and sent reinforcements to hold South Mountain until

Jackson arrived. They were insufficient, and Federal troops easily took Crampton’s Gap. The

defenders of Fox and Turner’s Gaps put up a strong fight, but superior numbers let the Federals push

through. Lee withdrew, the first time that had happened for the Army of the Potomac, boosting

morale. Rather than pursue the disorganized rebels, McClellan again halted to reorganize.

Lee used the time to concentrate and coordinate his troops to make a stand near Sharpsburg.

Meanwhile, Jackson had surrounded 14,000 new Union recruits in Harpers Ferry,

first driving them off Maryland Heights on September 13 and then surrounding the town. As

it surrendered on September 15th, Jackson received word from Lee to march for Sharpsburg. Leaving AP

Hill to finish securing captured supplies and paroling prisoners, Jackson marched out and

reached Lee the next day. Battle of Antietam

McClellan finally reached Lee’s position early September 16th, finding him strung

out along the low ridge behind Antietam Creek. McClellan was still convinced that Lee had at

least 100,000 soldiers despite the captured plans clearly showing he’d started with 55,000 total.

Lee currently only had 18,000 troops to face McClellan’s entire army, but despite pressure,

McClellan refused to attack immediately. This allowed Longstreet to arrive from Hagerstown

and Jackson from Harpers Ferry, increasing Lee’s force to 37,000. After positioning his troops,

McClellan issued written orders to his corps commanders to advance the next day and then went

to bed. He never held a council of war or actually explained the battle plan. Based on what happened,

historians believe he intended an echelon attack, drawing Lee’s forces to the left

flank with heavy assaults before rolling up the right flank. However, McClellan wouldn’t

arrive on the battlefield until 13:00 and never realized nobody understood the plan.

At 05:30, Joseph Hooker’s 1st Corps advanced towards Dunker Church. An artillery duel began as

his men left the North Wood and entered Miller’s Cornfield, where they found Jackson’s concealed

rebels. A bloody, uncoordinated brawl ensued as units lost each other in the cornstalks and orders

went unheard over cannonfire. However, Hooker’s Iron Brigade pushed through the West Wood,

repelling counterattacks, and Jackson’s line neared collapse. Confederate reinforcements

arrived at 07:00 and drove Hooker back with a savage counterattack.

Just then, Joseph Mansfield’s 12th Corps arrived, attacking in deep columns to keep its raw recruits

from bolting. Mansfield was mortally wounded as his 2nd division broke through West Wood, chasing

off batteries near Dunker Church. Hooker was wounded trying to reestablish command. Sedgwick’s

division from Sumner’s 2nd Corps arrived to turn the rebel flank in East Wood, but by 09:45

the attack was driven off with heavy casualties. By this time, the rest of 2nd Corps was assaulting

Lee’s center, anchored along a sunken road beneath the ridge. Despite successfully holding off

multiple attacks, the constant pressure forced Lee to deploy his last reserves at 10:30. As Southern

officers fell the defense became confused, and Caldwell’s New York Brigade discovered a weak

point. Breaking through, they turned enfilade fire down the road remembered as Bloody Lane

to devastating effect. As Confederates fell back, Longstreet assembled a grand battery that slowed

the Union advance so a counterattack could halt it. Had McClellan put in the 5th and 6th Corps,

the line may have broken, but instead he arrived and halted the northern attacks at 13:00.

To the south, Ambrose Burnsides’ 9th Corps was supposed to demonstrate to draw Lee’s attention

from Hooker before crossing Antietam Creek to attack the Confederate right, but only once

explicitly ordered. Those orders didn’t arrive until 10:00. By that time his 12,500 troops

faced no more than 3,000 Confederates as Lee redeployed against the northern attacks. However,

not knowing his actual role and thinking he only had to cross the creek, Burnside took his time

and didn’t make it across until 13:00, taking far more casualties than the defenders. Here Burnside

stalled again for two hours to replenish his ammunition. His attack finally commenced at 15:00,

and the rebel line began to collapse and flee into Sharpsburg. However, at 15:30 AP

Hill arrived and attacked Burnside’s left, which crumbled. When Burnside requested reinforcements,

McClellan told him only one battery was available, rather than the two corps he was

keeping in reserve for the massive counterattack he expected from Lee’s imaginary reserves.

Fighting ceased at 17:30, but the Battle of Antietam had been the bloodiest single day

in American military history. McClellan had suffered 12,410 casualties, 25% of his army.

Lee suffered 10,316 casualties, 31% of his army. Clara Barton brought medical supplies

and spent weeks treating the wounded. That night Lee slipped back across the Potomac.

Other than a half-hearted attempt by Porter’s 5th Corps at Shepherdstown McClellan didn’t pursue,

despite explicit orders from the War Department. This was the final straw for Lincoln. Despite

holding every material and informational advantage a general could ask for, the best McClellan could

do was slightly push Lee back. McClellan was relieved of command on November 5th,

ending his military career. In our next video on the American Civil War, Lincoln will find

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