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Despite holding an overwhelming material and
manpower advantage, George McClellan’s delusional
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timidity let Robert E. Lee scare him away from
Richmond. While McClellan cowered in Harrison’s
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Landing, Lee began to look north. A new threat
had emerged, but with it a new opportunity. Lee
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knew that the South couldn’t win a long war, as
its material deficiencies were already becoming
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a problem. Therefore, he began to contemplate
an offensive to win the war outright. Welcome
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to our latest episode on the American Civil
War, in which the South’s boldest general
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will go on the offensive.
Lincoln Makes a New Army
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Having gloriously fled an inferior foe for the
safety of the James River, McClellan spent July
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refusing to move from Harrison’s Landing. He
insisted that Lee had at least 200,000 soldiers,
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but that he could retake the offensive and drive
on Richmond again if all Union forces in the East
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and West were immediately sent to reinforce him.
However, President Lincoln and the cabinet were
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thoroughly disenchanted with McClellan. Their
intelligence said Lee hadn’t fielded more than
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90,000 soldiers during the Peninsula Campaign,
and couldn’t have more than 80,000 now. The only
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thing preventing McClellan’s 100,000 troops from
taking Richmond was their general’s delusions.
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Therefore, Lincoln brought in Henry Halleck,
a less talented but more realistic general,
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from the western theater to take over as
General-in-Chief. Recognizing that the
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units Jackson had humiliated during the Valley
Campaign were aimlessly licking their wounds in
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northern Virginia and could make another drive on
Richmond, Halleck and Lincoln tapped Major General
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John Pope to form a new army. Pope had won several
victories in the western theater through audacity,
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and they hoped he would bring that spirit east.
Pope’s Republican ties and calls for a harder
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war against the Confederates didn't hurt either.
What did hurt was Pope himself. He was a braggart
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and as diplomatic as a brick to the face.
His corps commanders were all senior to him,
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which they found insulting, and his 45,000
men were demoralized. Pope’s response upon
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taking command was to deliver a grandiose speech
touting his achievements in the west, extolling
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the aggressive spirit of the western armies, and
that he expected to only ever see the backs of his
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enemies. Instead of inspiring the army, Pope’s
bravado insulted everyone. Several subordinates
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resigned rather than serve with him . The new
Army of Virginia never believed in its commander.
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Lee Reorganizes his Army
On the other side, the Army of Northern Virginia
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was in poor condition despite high morale. The
Confederacy couldn’t keep its military supplied,
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much less reinforced. Lee’s ammunition stocks were
full, but only through looting Union supplies,
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and he struggled to replace the 20,000
casualties from the Seven Days Battles.
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The Confederacy’s manpower had dried up, while
men still flocked to Union recruiting stations.
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The Confederate Congress had adopted America’s
first conscription law in April, but enforcing it
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was proving difficult. He had about 80,000 men in
his department, but garrisoning Richmond and other
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positions while protecting supply lines meant he
only had about 55,000 available for action. Worse,
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while Union troops were regularly issued new
uniforms, weapons, and shoes, his troops had
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to wait their turn each time increasingly rare
shipments arrived from the few Southern factories.
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Lee realized that he had to win the
war quickly to avoid defeat. However,
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his Army needed reorganization. He’d failed
to land a decisive blow during the Seven Days
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primarily due to poor coordination caused by
decentralized command. Directly issuing orders
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to division commanders had led to confusion,
overmanagement, and miscommunication. To solve
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this, the army’s 11 divisions were consolidated
into 7. Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet,
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his best officers, were made Lieutenant
Generals to command each wing of the army,
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with JEB Stuart commanding the cavalry. Lee also
changed his command style. Rather than prepare
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specific battle plans, his lieutenants would
be assigned objectives and a desired end state,
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then given discretion to achieve their objectives.
Northern Virginia Campaign
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Lee couldn’t deal with both McClellan and Pope
should they unite their commands. However,
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Lee knew McClellan wasn’t a threat and spotted an
opportunity. Pope’s orders were to move towards
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Gordonville and cut the Virginia Central
Railroad, securing both Washington’s flank
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and the Shenandoah Valley while making life as
difficult for Confederate sympathizers as possible
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before linking up with McClellan. Pope was due
significant reinforcements , but his advance would
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be isolated and therefore exposed. Lee planned
to use this isolation to trap and destroy Pope,
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hoping to produce a Saratoga-esque victory and win
the Confederacy European recognition. The first
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step was to protect the Virginia Central, a major
lifeline for Richmond and, by extension, the army.
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To this end, Jackson was sent to Gordonville
with 14,000 troops, successfully thwarting
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efforts by Union cavalry to cut the line on July
19th and 22nd. On July 26th, paroled prisoners
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alerted him that increased Union naval traffic
meant Pope’s reinforcements were arriving. This
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convinced him to dispatch AP Hill with 12,000 men
to reinforce Jackson while stepping up artillery
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bombardments and diversions against McClellan.
This caused McClellan to scream for reinforcements
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again. Halleck finally put him in his place,
responding that the fact Lee hadn’t already
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crushed the Army of the Potomac proved that
McClellan’s assessment was wrong. Furthermore,
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if McClellan actually was as outnumbered as he
claimed, all the reinforcements in the Union would
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accomplish nothing. Lee could easily intercept and
destroy them piecemeal. Finally, he was uselessly
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sitting around in the Virginia bottomlands in July
. His army’s hospitals were already filled with
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yellow fever and malaria patients, and it wasn’t
the height of mosquito season yet. Therefore,
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unless he advanced by August 4th, McClellan
was ordered to evacuate Virginia and return
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to Washington DC before moving to support Pope’s
advance. Stung by the rebuke, McClellan petulantly
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didn’t follow his orders until August 14th.
Battle of Cedar Mountain
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Pope didn’t wait for McClellan and, on July
29th, ordered his vanguard to march for Cedar
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Mountain and establish a base to raid the
Virginia Central Railway. Confederate cavalry
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alerted Jackson to the move, and he advanced
on Culpeper Court House, intending to defeat
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Pope’s corps in detail as he’d done in Shenandoah.
However, the July heat slowed his advance. Worse,
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Jackson never told his division commanders their
objective or to hurry their march. Consequently,
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Union cavalry discovered Jackson’s position
and warned Pope, who ordered his leading corps’
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commander, Nathaniel Banks, to move to defensive
positions and await reinforcements. Banks had
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been repeatedly victimized by Jackson during the
Valley campaign and knew that giving Jackson the
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initiative was suicidal. Despite being outnumbered
2-1, Banks refused his orders and moved forward
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to ambush Jackson, looking for revenge.
At noon on August 9th, Jackson’s vanguard
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under Jubal Early discovered Federal artillery and
cavalry on a ridge above the Cedar Run crossings.
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Early pulled back and deployed on the right
of the field while additional forces moved up
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the road to form the left flank. The 98-degree
Fahrenheit heat made their movements sluggish,
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and there were still gaps in the line when an
artillery duel commenced at 15:30. Federal fire
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made Confederate disorganization worse until the
leftmost division’s general was mortally wounded,
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and whose replacement had never been
told the battle plan. At that moment,
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Banks’ infantry moved from cover behind the
ridge and charged the Confederate line. Early’s
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troops were pushed back but held together,
but the left disintegrated as Union troops
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charged through gaps in its line and began to
attack artillery in the rear. At that moment,
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Jackson arrived with reinforcements and rallied
his fleeing Valley veterans. He swiftly organized
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an overwhelming counterattack that shattered
Banks’ corps. Only nightfall and approaching
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reinforcements stopped Jackson’s pursuit. Clara
Barton, founder of the American Red Cross,
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would tend to battlefield wounded
for the first time after this battle.
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Jackson Sets a Trap
Jackson held position, expecting additional Union
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attacks. However, Halleck had ordered Pope to
await reinforcements from McClellan near Culpeper.
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On August 12, Jackson fell back on Gordonsville.
Lee dispatched Longstreet north on the 13th and,
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after seeing McClellan leaving the Peninsula,
brought the remaining troops to Gordonsville,
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reuniting the army. He planned a turning movement
against Pope, using Stuart’s cavalry to destroy
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railway bridges and isolate him before crushing
the army. However, Federal cavalry captured
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a dispatch rider carrying the plan and alerted
Pope, who withdrew to the Rappahannock . Stuart,
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in turn, captured Union dispatches, showing that
Pope had already been reinforced to 77,000 men,
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which would be expanded to 130,000 by September.
Lee needed to strike swiftly, but the flooding
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Rappahannock limited operations to ineffective
skirmishes near the crossings. Finally, on August
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25th, Lee opted for an audacious plan proposed
by Jackson. He and Stuart would flank Pope’s
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right using the Blue Ridge Mountains to hide
his movement and cut Pope’s communication line,
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the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. This would force
Pope to move, during which Jackson could pin him
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while Lee and Longstreet flanked and crushed the
army. Dividing the army in the face of superior
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numbers flew in the face of all military logic
and doctrine, but Lee trusted Jackson. Jackson
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began the march that night. After slipping
through Thoroughfare Gap unnoticed, he cut the
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railroad at Briscoe Station before continuing onto
Manassas Junction, Pope’s supply base, destroying
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everything his men couldn’t eat or carry off.
Next, they pushed across Bull Run Bridge,
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routing the defenders before reaching the First
Bull Run battlefield . Pope ordered Joseph Hooker
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to intercept Jackson, but Hooker was blocked by
Richard Ewell at Kettle Creek Run. That night,
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Jackson secretly entrenched behind an unfinished
railbed near Stony Ridge to await developments.
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Second Battle of Bull Run
By August 28th, Pope had lost
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track of Jackson and seemingly forgot that Lee
was still out there. After his cavalry failed to
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locate Jackson, infantry columns were dispatched
to search. Realizing that Pope was setting himself
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up for a crushing flank attack, Jackson attacked
a column near Brawner’s Farm at 18:30 to keep Pope
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from wandering away. The attack went poorly and
Jackson was pushed back after suffering as many
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casualties as he inflicted. However the strategic
goal was achieved. Wrongly believing Jackson was
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retreating from Centerville when the infantry had
caught up to him, Pope ordered his army to turn,
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surround, and capture the isolated Jackson.
However, Jackson wasn’t in the positions Pope
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thought he was , and his own troops weren’t
where he thought they were . Worse, he still
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believed against evidence that Longstreet
was in Gordonville. In reality, Longsteet
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had pushed through the cavalry screen guarding
Thoroughfare Gap and was preparing to close the
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trap. It’s not clear why Pope didn’t know this.
At dawn on the 29th, Jackson dispatched Stuart to
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guide Longsteet’s forces into position to ambush
Pope. While he waited, Jackson noticed Federal
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troops preparing to attack, and redistributed
his forces to hold the railbed until Longstreet
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was ready. John Buford’s cavalry discovered
Longstreet’s movement at 08:15, but Pope wasn’t
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told until 19:00. Meanwhile, Pope was discovering
that his complicated attack wasn’t happening
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thanks to his misinformed and confusingly written
orders. The green 1st Corps was in position, but
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only by pure coincidence. The rest of his forces
either hadn’t received orders, or were trying to
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make sense of the impossible movements they’d
been assigned. Rather than adjust, he berated
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his officers and ordered them to get in position
without clarifying what positions and where.
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1st Corps still attacked as ordered , but
since Jackson wasn’t where Pope thought,
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its intended flanking attack became a series of
bloody and ineffective frontal charges against
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prepared positions. However, General Sigel
believed his objective was just holding Jackson
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in place and continued his attack. Pope arrived
at 13:00 to discover that planned reinforcements
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hadn’t arrived and Sigel wasn’t fighting the
battle Pope wanted. He decided to bring up fresh
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troops and assault Jackson’s center. He also
thought he ordered Fitz John Porter and Irvin
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McDowell to attack the right, but in reality
his message confusingly suggested they either
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advance on Gainesville or hold position. Perplexed
and discovering unexpected rebels to his front,
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Porter halted the column. This was actually
fortunate for the Union. Longstreet was in
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position to close the trap by 12:00, just waiting
for Pope to fully commit against Jackson. However,
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Stuart spotted Porter near Dawkins’ Branch
and warned Longstreet that his nemesis from
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the Peninsula could turn his flank. As a result,
Longstreet held the attack, convincing Lee to wait
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for a better opportunity. Union forces continued
to hammer Jackson until nightfall, pushing back
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his left flank. This withdrawal reinforced
Pope’s belief that Jackson was retreating,
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and Buford’s late-arriving report made him
believe that Longstreet was coming late to
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relieve Jackson. Needing to “finish” Jackson
before that happened, Porter was finally
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explicitly ordered to attack Jackson’s right once
the rest of the army engaged the left and center.
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During the night, Longsteet’s final division
arrived and, in confusion, moved too close to
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the Federal position. Realizing the mistake
on the dawn of August 30th, they withdrew,
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which reinforced Pope’s delusion that Jackson was
retreating. Refusing to let him go and against the
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advice of his generals, Pope ordered more attacks
. Jackson was nearly overwhelmed as his men ran
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out of ammunition as Porter advanced to “finish
the job”. This was what Lee had waited for,
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and Longstreet’s troops attacked. However, the
Union army’s loose formation accidentally saved
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it. Two brigades were near Longstreet’s position
awaiting orders. These units raised the alarm and
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bought enough time for Porter and McDowell
to turn and meet the attack. As word spread,
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individual commanders began moving to defensive
positions independently of Pope, who still
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believed he only faced Jackson. Longstreet surged
forward, and Jackson joined the attack at 18:00,
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but the Federal positions on Henry Hill held.
Stuart attempted to swing around the flank for a
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rear attack but was driven back by Buford. During
the night, Pope withdrew to Centerville before
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continuing to Washington. Jackson attempted to cut
him off at Chantilly , but the rearguard held and
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Pope successfully linked up with McClellan .
One Campaign Ends, Another Begins
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Lee had won a great victory, and his men knew
it. They’d convincingly beaten a superior army,
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inflicting 14,500 casualties at the price of
7,300. From this victory came the Elan and morale
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that made the Army of Northern Virginia legendary.
However, it wasn’t the victory Lee needed. Pope
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was humiliated and his army crippled, but it had
escaped intact. This was a major tactical victory,
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but it wasn’t a Saratoga-level strategic victory.
He needed something more. Though Pope’s army was
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safely within Washington’s defenses, Pope
was besieged. He court-martialed Porter
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as a scapegoat, but it was clear his arrogance
and ineptitude disqualified him from frontline
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command. Instead, he was reassigned to fight the
Dakota War . This derailed Lincoln’s plan to rid
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himself of McClellan (with plausible deniability)
by folding his army into Pope’s. Instead,
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McClellan would reabsorb the Army of Virginia.
His cabinet objected to giving McClellan another
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chance, but as Lincoln explained, “We must use
what tools we have. There is no man in the Army
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who can man these fortifications and lick these
troops of ours into shape half as well as he.
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If he can't fight himself, he excels in making
others ready to fight.” Testifying to McClellan’s
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abilities, the army was reorganized and ready for
its bloodiest test a week after Second Bull Run.
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Maryland Campaign
Following First Bull Run , Joseph Johnston
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had contemplated but rejected an offensive against
the North. Doing so would severely undermine
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Confederate diplomacy, claiming they were acting
in self-defence. More importantly, there was no
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viable target. Washington was rapidly becoming the
most fortified city in the world, which protected
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Baltimore by proximity. Marching on Philadelphia
was insanely risky, and no other reachable cities
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would deal a knockout blow to Northern morale.
Thus, he’d remained in Virginia. However,
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Lee concluded by September 3rd that remaining in
Virginia wasn’t viable. While Pope’s depredation
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campaign had done significant damage to northern
Virginia, it was nothing compared to the normal
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damage armies caused on the campaign. From
Shenandoah to the sea, Virginia was devastated
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and couldn’t supply his army. Leaving Virginia
was the only way to feed his increasingly barefoot
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and hungry army, and the only viable justification
for leaving was a northern invasion. Lee’s primary
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goal was to reach Pennsylvania’s rich farmland and
feed his troops. His secondary objective was to
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cut the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, a major
lifeline for both Washington and Baltimore.
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Lee believed threatening a major city might cost
the Republicans their Congressional majority that
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November . After recalling part of the Richmond
garrison to replenish his army to 55,000,
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Lee informed Davis of his plans and
started north, dispatching Jackson to
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take Harpers Ferry to secure their supply route
and hopefully capture extensive military stores.
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Invasion of Maryland
Lee’s vanguard crossed into Maryland
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on September 4th. By pure coincidence, another
invasion was underway in Kentucky led by Edmund
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Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg. Jefferson Davis
sent each general proclamations to distribute,
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explaining that they weren’t a conquering
force and were simply trying to aggressively
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end the war. The action was superfluous, as each
general had already done so. Lee added that he
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was a liberator and invited Marylanders to join
him. He received no takers. Western Maryland was
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firmly antislavery, and most of the Chesapeake
region slaveholders were in prison or had already
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fled southward. Worse, around 10,000 soldiers
fell out of the march. Several units refused to
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cross the Potomac as they’d explicitly enlisted
only to defend the South. Many suffered diarrhea
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after eating unripe corn, and many others simply
couldn’t continue after cutting their bare feet
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on the stony northern roads. Meanwhile, first
panic, then resolution spread through Maryland
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and Pennsylvania as Lee approached. Both states
called out their militia while cities prepared
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to withstand sieges.
Union Pursuit
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McClellan was busily reincorporating Pope’s
former army while trying to regain his former
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job from Halleck when news of Lee’s movement
reached Washington. Lincoln ordered a pursuit,
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but again, McClellan claimed without evidence
that Lee had 120,000 men that his 107,000
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couldn’t hope to match. Knowing that Lee
couldn’t possibly have more than 70,000,
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Lincoln kicked McClellan into motion
with 87,000 men on September 7th.
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The reception frightened Marylanders
gave the army boosted morale, but their
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marching speed was glacial. McClellan finally
reached Frederick early on September 13th,
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where Corporal Barton Mitchell discovered Lee’s
invasion plans wrapped around three cigars. Upon
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receiving the intelligence, McClellan exclaimed,
“Now I know what to do!” He then boastfully wired
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Lincoln that he had Lee bagged and would send
trophies before doing absolutely nothing with
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the intelligence for 18 hours.
South Mountain & Harpers Ferry
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McClellan finally gave orders to advance on
Lee through South Mountain that night. Lee
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learned through unknown means that his plans were
discovered, and McClellan was closing. Realizing
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the danger, he urgently recalled Jackson and
sent reinforcements to hold South Mountain until
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Jackson arrived. They were insufficient, and
Federal troops easily took Crampton’s Gap. The
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defenders of Fox and Turner’s Gaps put up a strong
fight, but superior numbers let the Federals push
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through. Lee withdrew, the first time that had
happened for the Army of the Potomac, boosting
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morale. Rather than pursue the disorganized
rebels, McClellan again halted to reorganize.
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Lee used the time to concentrate and coordinate
his troops to make a stand near Sharpsburg.
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Meanwhile, Jackson had surrounded 14,000
new Union recruits in Harpers Ferry,
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first driving them off Maryland Heights on
September 13 and then surrounding the town. As
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it surrendered on September 15th, Jackson received
word from Lee to march for Sharpsburg. Leaving AP
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Hill to finish securing captured supplies and
paroling prisoners, Jackson marched out and
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reached Lee the next day.
Battle of Antietam
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McClellan finally reached Lee’s position
early September 16th, finding him strung
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out along the low ridge behind Antietam Creek.
McClellan was still convinced that Lee had at
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least 100,000 soldiers despite the captured plans
clearly showing he’d started with 55,000 total.
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Lee currently only had 18,000 troops to face
McClellan’s entire army, but despite pressure,
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McClellan refused to attack immediately. This
allowed Longstreet to arrive from Hagerstown
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and Jackson from Harpers Ferry, increasing Lee’s
force to 37,000. After positioning his troops,
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McClellan issued written orders to his corps
commanders to advance the next day and then went
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to bed. He never held a council of war or actually
explained the battle plan. Based on what happened,
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historians believe he intended an echelon
attack, drawing Lee’s forces to the left
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flank with heavy assaults before rolling up
the right flank. However, McClellan wouldn’t
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arrive on the battlefield until 13:00 and
never realized nobody understood the plan.
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At 05:30, Joseph Hooker’s 1st Corps advanced
towards Dunker Church. An artillery duel began as
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his men left the North Wood and entered Miller’s
Cornfield, where they found Jackson’s concealed
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rebels. A bloody, uncoordinated brawl ensued as
units lost each other in the cornstalks and orders
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went unheard over cannonfire. However, Hooker’s
Iron Brigade pushed through the West Wood,
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repelling counterattacks, and Jackson’s line
neared collapse. Confederate reinforcements
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arrived at 07:00 and drove Hooker
back with a savage counterattack.
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Just then, Joseph Mansfield’s 12th Corps arrived,
attacking in deep columns to keep its raw recruits
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from bolting. Mansfield was mortally wounded as
his 2nd division broke through West Wood, chasing
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off batteries near Dunker Church. Hooker was
wounded trying to reestablish command. Sedgwick’s
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division from Sumner’s 2nd Corps arrived to
turn the rebel flank in East Wood, but by 09:45
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the attack was driven off with heavy casualties.
By this time, the rest of 2nd Corps was assaulting
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Lee’s center, anchored along a sunken road beneath
the ridge. Despite successfully holding off
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multiple attacks, the constant pressure forced Lee
to deploy his last reserves at 10:30. As Southern
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officers fell the defense became confused, and
Caldwell’s New York Brigade discovered a weak
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point. Breaking through, they turned enfilade
fire down the road remembered as Bloody Lane
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to devastating effect. As Confederates fell back,
Longstreet assembled a grand battery that slowed
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the Union advance so a counterattack could halt
it. Had McClellan put in the 5th and 6th Corps,
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the line may have broken, but instead he arrived
and halted the northern attacks at 13:00.
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To the south, Ambrose Burnsides’ 9th Corps was
supposed to demonstrate to draw Lee’s attention
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from Hooker before crossing Antietam Creek to
attack the Confederate right, but only once
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explicitly ordered. Those orders didn’t arrive
until 10:00. By that time his 12,500 troops
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faced no more than 3,000 Confederates as Lee
redeployed against the northern attacks. However,
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not knowing his actual role and thinking he only
had to cross the creek, Burnside took his time
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and didn’t make it across until 13:00, taking far
more casualties than the defenders. Here Burnside
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stalled again for two hours to replenish his
ammunition. His attack finally commenced at 15:00,
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and the rebel line began to collapse and
flee into Sharpsburg. However, at 15:30 AP
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Hill arrived and attacked Burnside’s left, which
crumbled. When Burnside requested reinforcements,
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McClellan told him only one battery was
available, rather than the two corps he was
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keeping in reserve for the massive counterattack
he expected from Lee’s imaginary reserves.
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Fighting ceased at 17:30, but the Battle of
Antietam had been the bloodiest single day
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in American military history. McClellan had
suffered 12,410 casualties, 25% of his army.
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Lee suffered 10,316 casualties, 31% of his
army. Clara Barton brought medical supplies
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and spent weeks treating the wounded. That
night Lee slipped back across the Potomac.
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Other than a half-hearted attempt by Porter’s 5th
Corps at Shepherdstown McClellan didn’t pursue,
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despite explicit orders from the War Department.
This was the final straw for Lincoln. Despite
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holding every material and informational advantage
a general could ask for, the best McClellan could
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do was slightly push Lee back. McClellan
was relieved of command on November 5th,
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ending his military career. In our next video
on the American Civil War, Lincoln will find
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new generals but get the same results. To make
sure you don’t miss that, please consider liking,
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