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Robert E. Lee’s invasion of Maryland failed brutally. The Battle of Antietam left his army

crippled and had George McClellan put any effort into pursuing him, it could have been destroyed.

Fortunately for the South, McClellan too was busy celebrating his own army escaping destruction at

the hands of Lee’s imagined overwhelming numbers. As he limped back into Virginia,

Lee prepared to rebuild his army and go into winter quarters, unaware that Abraham Lincoln

didn’t intend to allow him any reprieve. Welcome to our latest video on the American Civil War,

in which the conflict rages on and Robert E. Lee clashes against his Union foes at the dramatic

but strategically ambiguous battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.

The Emancipation Proclamation As war raged on the American Continent,

the continent of Europe looked on. Britain and France hoped to use the war to their strategic

advantage. Both nations needed Southern cotton too much to cut ties with the South post-secession.

The Confederacy knew this and was actively seeking their recognition. However, neither Britain nor

France wanted to go to war with the United States, which Lincoln threatened if they recognized the

Confederacy and officially stayed neutral. France instead used America’s inability to enforce the

Monroe Doctrine to attempt to conquer Mexico , ceasing to be Lincoln’s problem. Similarly,

Spain reconquered the Dominican Republic. However, Britain remained a diplomatic

threat. The French wanted Britain to take the lead on recognizing the Confederacy,

and London was willing to do so. Many cabinet ministers and aristocrats sympathized with and

advocated for the Southern planters. Prime Minister Lord Palmerston wanted to weaken

the United States for power politics purposes. He hoped to play Lincoln off Jefferson Davis as he

did with European rivals for Britain’s advantage, which is why he also quietly supported France’s

Mexican adventure. Defanging Palmerston required making the war about slavery. British workers were

now so anti-slavery that they refused to process Southern cotton on principle and cheered when this

led to a recession in the textile industry. So long as the war was just to preserve the Union,

Palmerston could continuously float support for the South for diplomatic

leverage without suffering internal backlash. However, if the war was about ending slavery,

Palmerston would face riots for even suggesting helping slaveholders, and he knew it.

Furthermore, hundreds of slaves were fleeing to Federal lines, forcing individual commanders

to decide their fate. Most followed Benjamin Butler’s Fort Monroe Doctrine, which declared

that since Southerners were rebels and claimed to be a foreign country, the Fugitive Slave Act

was void. Instead, escaped slaves were classified as “contrabands of war” and enrolled as military

laborers, frequently with pay. Lincoln disliked that the Doctrine tacitly agreed that secession

was possible, as he strenuously maintained it was impossible, but he approved of freeing the slaves

morally and pragmatically. Without slaves, the Southern economy would crumble and end the war.

Lincoln also wanted to formally permit emancipation via Federal arms, but doing so

required an Eastern theatre victory lest it seem like a desperate ploy. Antietam wasn’t the kind

of victory Lincoln wanted, but it would do. On September 22nd , Lincoln issued the Emancipation

Proclamation, declaring that all slaves held in actively rebelling US territory would be free

on January 1, 1863 . The South correctly read it as an ultimatum to surrender or lose its slaves,

which it rejected. Palmerston also got the message, and his government

stopped openly favouring the South . The Struggle to Replace McClellan

Meanwhile, McClellan had to go. As Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln had the authority

to replace him, but doing so was politically dangerous. Both the soldiers and the press loved

Little Mac, and he had acquired many political allies to support his political ambitions. Simply

firing him was out of the question, despite demands from Lincoln’s cabinet. McClellan

made clear that he wouldn’t accept a transfer away from “his” army and that he wanted to be

General-in-Chief again. Thus, moving him to a new army or desk job was out. Lincoln had intended

to fold the Army of the Potomac into the Army of Virginia to sidestep this problem, but John Pope’s

disaster at Second Bull Run killed the plan. Worse, the Union army’s pool of senior generals

with experience victoriously leading independent commands was quite shallow. McClellan’s tenure

had made clear that the general-in-chief shouldn’t also command an army, disqualifying Henry Halleck.

There were several successful generals out west , but Pope’s tenure had made bringing another

east unpalatable. Sacrificing the successful West for the struggling East was equally unattractive.

The only option was Ambrose Burnside. During the Peninsula Campaign , Burnside commanded a

joint army-navy expedition that won a number of battles and successfully captured Pamlico

Sound . Lincoln first asked him to replace McClellan in mid-July, but Burnside refused,

believing himself utterly unqualified. His entire Carolina command was currently being reorganized

as the Army of the Potomac’s 9th Corps. Moreover, he’d just been promoted to Major

General and relied heavily on more experienced naval officers during his campaign. This forced

Lincoln to call Pope east. Following Pope’s defeat, Lincoln again asked Burnside to take

command, and again he refused. Once Antietam partially confirmed Burnside’s self-evaluation,

Lincoln attempted to fix McClellan. When orders from Washington failed to stir him to action,

Lincoln dismissed Don Carlos Buell from the Army of the Ohio on October 24th for failing

to pursue Braxton Bragg to send McClellan a message. When the stubborn general didn’t react,

Lincoln relieved him on November 5th. Fredericksburg Campaign

Lincoln ordered Burnside to take command of the army before McClellan's official dismissal.

Refusing again would not save McClellan, but it would mean the next option was Joseph Hooker,

whom Burnside considered more unfit than himself. Burnside reluctantly accepted and met with Halleck

on November 7th, learning that he was to plan a new offensive at once. The Republicans had taken

a beating in the midterms, and Union morale was low. They needed more action to restore flagging

faith and recruitment numbers. This dismayed Burnside, who wanted time to settle into command

and finish planning his spring offensive. However, he couldn’t be given that long, so

he presented the plan to Halleck on November 9th. Lee’s army was separated with Stonewall Jackson in

the Shenandoah Valley, James Longstreet near Culpeper, and JEB Stuart patrolling between

the Rappahanock and Potomac Rivers so that The Army of Northern Virginia could rapidly repel

any incursion down the usual invasion route with multiple flanking attacks. Therefore, Burnside

would flank Lee by crossing the Rappahanock at Fredericksburg via pontoon bridges and use the

Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad as his supply line to swiftly capture Richmond.

The army would first concentrate at Warrenton to draw Lee’s attention and prevent him from

fortifying crossing points. Cavalry would probe toward Gordonsville and Culpeper to distract Lee

before the whole army turned and force-marched to Fredericksburg, using feints and demonstrations

to disguise their movement. Burnside would be across the river and in Lee’s rear before

he knew what was happening. Lincoln doubted that Lee could be deceived but approved the

otherwise sound plan on November 14th, reminding Burnside that the operation depended on speed.

While waiting for approval, Burnside reorganized his command. Finding commanding eight corps and

120,000 men too difficult, he grouped the corps into the right, center, left, and reserve grand

divisions. These groups were commanded by Edwin Sumner, Hooker, William Franklin,

and Franz Sigal, respectively. However, many officers resented Burnside replacing McClellan.

He was an outsider to their Army who lacked command experience, and it showed. Nevertheless,

shortly after Lincoln approved the plan , Burnside was told the pontoons were ready, and

he initiated the forced march on November 15th. Sumner arrived at Falmouth on November 17th and

found barely 500 soldiers guarding Fredericksburg. Consequently, he asked permission to immediately

ford the Rappahannock. However, the river was rising due to heavy fall rains. Rather than let

Sumner risk stranding himself and face Lee alone, Burnside ordered him to wait for the bridges,

which were supposed to arrive that evening. In truth, the pontoon bridges were still in

their assembly yard, upriver from Washington. The November 14th message actually said that

the pontoons were built, but there were no horses to transport them. Burnside hadn’t

been told the critical last part. Neither the Quartermaster General nor Halleck prioritized

moving the pontoons until Burnside’s chief engineer inquired about them on the 17th,

despite Burnside requisitioning them on November 6th and repeatedly meeting with Halleck concerning

them. The first pontoons didn’t start moving until the 19th. The predicted heavy rains

ground the overland march to a halt, forcing them to laboriously switch to river transport.

Despite Lincoln’s skepticism, Burnside’s distractions had utterly bamboozled Lee.

He was preparing to intercept Burnside’s impending attack between Brandy Station and Sperryville when

the Army of the Potomac simply disappeared. Stuart couldn’t find it south or north of Warrenton,

leaving headquarters frantically guessing where it was headed. Lee began spreading units across

the Rappahannock and down to the James River to find Burnside. On November 19th, word arrived of

the Federal appearance near Fredericksburg. Assuming that Burnside had already crossed

the Rappahannock, Lee moved to prepare defences along the North Anna River. However, Davis asked

him to fight further away from Richmond to keep up civilian morale. Additionally, Longstreet arrived

at Fredericksburg on November 23rd to find the Federal Army still on the northern bank. Burnside

had refused more requests from his generals to ford up and downriver from Fredericksburg

as the river continued to rise and fall unpredictably. Instead,

he feinted crossings at numerous points and sent gunboats to probe known defences to keep

Lee guessing while waiting for the engineers. The first pontoons arrived on November 25th,

but Burnside wouldn’t cross on only one bridge. From Stafford Heights, he could clearly see

Confederates on Marye’s Heights across the river valley. He didn’t know he only faced

Longstreet’s command and that Lee, Jackson, and Stuart were still days away. He did know

Fredericksburg was full of rebel sharpshooters with artillery support that could just range

the crossing point. He feared that forcing his entire army across a single chokepoint would

lead to a slaughter. Thus, he waited until December 1st for all six bridges to arrive.

The Battle of Fredericksburg By this point, Burnside’s generals

were all advising against continuing the campaign. Lee’s reinforced army of 72,000 were

now well entrenched along the heights outside Fredericksburg. Scouting had shown that all

alternative crossing points were now well covered and fortified. Federal artillery on Stafford

Heights could clear the river valley of rebels, but couldn’t hit Marye’s Heights. Any attack

would be suicidal. However, political pressure meant Burnside had to attack. Furthermore,

he knew that Lee had deployed two divisions east at Skinner’s Neck, and believed the forces

in Fredericksburg were now too thinly spread to effectively resist 120,000 soldiers. Thus,

on December 9th, he issued his attack orders. After engineers built the bridges by night,

Sumner’s grand division would cross and seize Fredericksburg. Franklin would cross downstream,

seize Prospect Hill, and turn the rebel flank. Sumner would then assault the disintegrating

Confederate front, driving them to Richmond. Hooker would remain in reserve to be deployed as

needed. While no general supported the plan, they reluctantly moved into position December 10th.

That night, the engineers got to work. The three downstream bridges were complete by 11:00 , but

Franklin didn’t actually start crossing until 16:00, and wasn’t finished until 13:00 December

12th. Meanwhile, Confederate sharpshooters stopped construction of the upstream bridges . After a

150-gun artillery barrage destroyed but failed to clear the town, Norman Hall’s brigade rowed

across and cleared the town in a vicious street fight while the engineers completed the bridges.

Sumner finally started crossing at 16:30 as soldiers fanned out in the ruined town to root out

surviving sharpshooters and loot. The Union and Confederate armies moved into position December

12th. Lee recalled all his dispatched units and deployed along the heights west of Fredericksburg

behind cover, trenches, and a stone wall behind a sunken road on Marye’s Heights. Burnside

surveyed the battlefield but deferred actually giving any attack orders until the next day.

Franklin had expected to attack at first light with his entire grand division. However,

he didn’t receive orders until 07:30. For reasons unknown, rather than the bold attack described

on December 9th, he was to hold his forces in position and only send “one or more divisions”

to seize Prospect Hill and to be ready to commit his whole force as necessary. The

vague and weakly worded order caused Franklin to proceed cautiously, sending only George

Meade’s division to attack once the morning fog lifted, supported by John Gibbon’s division.

Stuart’s horse artillery delayed Meade until the Iron Brigade drove them off at 11:00. Jackson’s

artillery then opened up and halted Meade’s advance until counter battery fire cleared

them out at 13:00. Meade had only 4500 soldiers to attack 36,000, but the terrain created a gap

in Jackson’s line. Meade found the gap and charged through it, routing two brigades and

splitting Jackson’s front line. Gibbon’s attack ran into the prepared Confederate

defenses, but he still managed to summit the ridgeline with heavy casualties. However,

Franklin never sent reinforcements and Meade was repelled by Jubal Early, whose counterattack was

subsequently driven back by Federal artillery. The upstream fight went disastrously. Sumner

was also ordered to probe Marye’s Heights through the open fields with one division,

but when it was devastated by presighted artillery and Longstreet’s protected infantry,

he ordered an all-out attack at 13:00. Wave after wave of blue-clad soldiers were

slaughtered valiantly charging the stone wall. None came within 40 yards. Burnside ordered

Hooker forward at 15:30 despite him strenuously arguing against attacking, to meet the same fate.

Darkness ended the fighting. The Confederates suffered 5,377 casualties, almost entirely from

Jackson’s command. The Union lost 12,653 men in a futile attack described to Lincoln as not

a battle, but butchery. Lincoln lamented that Burnside had snatched defeat from the jaws of

victory. On December 14, Burnside asked for and received a truce to recover the wounded. Some

subordinates argued to hold Fredericksburg as an operations base, but the town was strategically

worthless while Lee held the heights. Burnside retreated across the Rappahannock the next day.

Replacing Burnside The Army of the Potomac’s

morale was shattered and desertion rose, which Burnside’s subordinates openly blamed on him.

To restore morale, Burnside attempted to flank Lee by crossing the Rappahannock at

US Ford on January 20th. However, heavy rain turned the roads into construction mortar,

trapping the artillery. The Mud March ended in failure January 22nd. The Mud March was Burnside’s

last straw. He’d complained to Lincoln before about insubordinate officers, and now many were

openly defiant. Two brigadiers left their posts to go to Washington and complain directly to Lincoln.

Burnside demanded the authority to dismiss his generals. Halleck recommended the complainers

be court martialed for insubordination, but he did confirm their story. Neither the soldiers

nor officers had any faith in Burnside. Lincoln had to either purge the entire officer corps or

Burnside. Lincoln met with Burnside on January 26th, who complained bitterly about being

undermined and set up to fail before offering his resignation. Lincoln heard him out, accepted,

and reassigned him west . Burnside had served at his level of incompetence for two months.

The Chancellorsville Campaign After Burnside was swept out of the way,

command fell to Joseph Hooker. As an old Potomac hand, he was well respected by the soldiers and

morale immediately improved. However, many generals disliked pugnacious and womanizing

Fighting Joe. Those senior to him resigned , enabling Hooker to disband the grand divisions

and elevate new corps commanders. Significantly, all the cavalry was organized as a single corps,

commanded by George Stoneman, and a Bureau of Military Information was established.

Additionally, he launched a massive corruption investigation into the quartermaster and medical

departments, improved the soldiers' living conditions and food, and rebuilt their confidence

with better drills and officer training. Burnside had shown that Lee could be deceived and

would detach units to respond to feints. Hooker intended to use this for his spring campaign.

Lincoln had concluded that Lee’s army was the real target, and Hooker agreed. The BMI told him that

Lee was closely guarding the Rappahannock, but only Stuart was watching the northern end. Thus,

Hooker planned to distract Stuart, then pin and swing around Lee via Kelly’s Ford. First,

the 9th corps was deployed to Ft. Monroe in early February, prompting Lee to send Longstreet with

two divisions to contain it. Union cavalry would launch a deep penetration raid in April to cut

Lee’s supply lines and draw off Stuart. John Sedgwick would take three corps and cross the

Rappahannock south of Fredericksburg to distract Lee while the rest of the army swung down on Lee’s

left across the Rapidan. Cut off and squeezed between two forces, Lee would either retreat

toward Richmond and be intercepted or forced to fight on Hooker’s terms. Key to the plan

was swiftly clearing The Wilderness, a dense secondary-growth forest of briars, thorns,

and hardwood trees. Any army marching through found communication difficult and deployments

almost impossible. Hooker planned to fight Lee on the open ground to the east, where he could

effectively use his numerical advantage. Stoneman’s Raid

Stoneman was ordered to begin the raid on April 13th, but nature intervened. Torrential

rains again made the roads impassable and the Rappahannock unfordable. He tried to relaunch

the raid on April 30th, only to literally bog down once over the Rappahannock. The only unit to reach

its target was John Buford’s Reserve Brigade, composed of prewar regulars like Buford himself,

which reached and cut the Orange & Alexandria Railway near Gordonsville May 2nd . Buford’s

troopers destroyed supply trains, tore up railway tracks, and skirmished with Stuart’s cavalry until

rejoining Stoneman on May 6th. The damage Buford caused was too late to affect the main campaign,

while Stoneman failed to do any meaningful damage. The raid’s failure ensured that Lee’ and Stuart’s

attention was never away from Hooker. The Battle of Chancellorsville

The first of Hooker’s columns advanced on April 27th, and on April 30th Hooker

made headquarters in the Chancellorsville hamlet within The Wilderness. Sedgwick’s

force made its crossing on the 28th, and advanced toward Fredericksburg. By May 1st,

Hooker had 70,000 men around Chancellorsville and Sedgwick had about 27,000 across the river and

another 15,000 remaining near Falmouth. Stuart was initially cut off by Stoneman’s advance,

but quickly ducked the plodding “raiders” and discovered Hooker’s movements, reporting to

Lee on April 30th. Deciding that Sedgwick would only demonstrate and could be mostly ignored,

Lee divided his army. Jubal Early’s 11,000 men were left to hold the Fredericksburg

fortifications while Lee took the remaining 40,000 to confront Hooker. Longstreet and half his

divisions were too far south to join the battle . Lee’s closest division to Hooker was dug in

between the Zoan and Tabernacle churches. Jackson arrived at 11:00 May 1st and ordered them to join

him advancing on Hooker. At the same time, Hooker began advancing out of The Wilderness.

The two forces ran into each other at the forest edge around 11:20. A confused fight ensued,

with many gaps in both lines. As the Union forces straightened their line,

Meade’s 5th corps advanced down River Road, threatening Jackson’s flank. However,

Hooker halted the advance and pulled back . He’d always planned to fight defensively

rather than risk another Fredericksburg, and his advanced columns were outnumbered. Jackson

and Lee would make him pay for that decision. That night, Stuart reported that while the Union

left was solidly anchored on the river, the right was floating unsupported along the Orange

Turnpike. Better, a recently constructed road provided a route around the flank hidden from

Union sight. Lee and Jackson couldn’t resist such an opportunity. Meanwhile,

Hooker realized that Sedgwick’s demonstrations hadn’t worked, and recalled 1st Corps from

Fredericksburg to bolster his left flank. However, the telegram didn’t arrive until

after dawn, and the corps didn’t arrive in time. Jackson began secretly moving 28,000 men at dawn,

leaving Lee with 13,000 men to pin Hooker. Union pickets and observation balloons noticed rebel

movement, but couldn’t determine what kind. Hooker decided that it could be a flanking maneuver and

warned the 11th corps. Falsely assured that they were prepared, he ordered Sedgwick to attack and

Sickles’ 3rd corps forward to probe Lee’s line. Sickles found and captured Jackson’s rearguard,

but missed the column, which marched past the 11th corps’ line, fully flanking it.

Individual Union units realized that something was wrong, but no alert was raised.

At 17:30, Jackson’s attack began. Most of the Union army was preparing dinner when the rebel

yell rang out. A few regiments had taken the warnings seriously and attempted to resist but

were rolled over as 11th corps disintegrated. Seeing soldiers routing past his headquarters,

Hooker sprang onto his horse and attempted to rally the panicked soldiers while ordering his

old division forward to halt the advance. Artillery was moved to Fairview Cemetery

to form a new line. The Confederates advanced over a mile before being halted by darkness

and Wilderness caused disorganization. During the night, Sickles pulled back to

Hazel Grove. Hoping to continue the attack under the full moon, Jackson rode out to reconnoiter

the Federal line. Disastrously, he failed to return the way he’d left and was fired on by

soldiers expecting Union cavalry, not their beloved general, hitting Jackson three times.

AP Hill was wounded by artillery fire while evacuating Jackson. Jackson’s arm had to be

amputated and pneumonia set in. Stonewall Jackson died May 10th. Stuart took over Jackson’s command,

but was separated from Lee by Sickles’ position in Hazel Grove and vulnerable to counterattack.

Lee didn’t know how to drive Sickles from the formidable position and reunite his army until

Hooker helped him by ordering Sickles to tighten the line and withdraw to the Plank

Road. Stuart seized this critical high ground and made it his chief artillery position. From here,

he successfully drove Hooker from Chancellorsville into a horseshoe around US Ford by noon. Hooker

was concussed by shrapnel and failed to effectively lead the army thereafter.

Lee intended to finish off Hooker with a combined mass assault, but learned that Sedgwick was

attacking and had successfully stormed Marye’s Heights . After two failed probes, his men flanked

the stone wall and devastated the defenders, getting some revenge for First Fredericksburg.

With Sedgwick now advancing on his rear, Lee again divided his army and moved to defeat Sedgwick,

believing Hooker defeated. Hooker was largely incapacitated that night and into the 4th,

but he refused to cede command or give any orders. Consequently, Lee led 20,000 soldiers to link up

with Early and successfully attacked Sedgwick near Salem Church. Sedgwick retreated back to Falmouth

on May 5th, having requested but received neither reinforcements nor orders from Hooker. Meanwhile,

Hooker’s war council advocated staying and fighting but a delirious Hooker overruled them

and ordered a retreat, which was successfully completed May 6th. Stoneman rejoined the army

the next day. Aftermath

In one sense, Chancellorsville was Lee’s perfect battle. He’d repeatedly divided his army in the

face of superior numbers and overcome his primary foe through audacity, exceptional scouting,

and superior morale. He’d then defeated the secondary one through superior numbers,

knowledge of the terrain, and tactical supremacy. Everything that made Robert E. Lee Robert E. Lee

was on full display in glorious victory and Lee now believed his army was invincible. However,

Longstreet considered Chancellorsville a disaster and heavily criticized Lee’s strategy once he

rejoined the army. Losing Jackson was equivalent to losing half the army. Even had he survived,

the casualties were unacceptable. Hooker had suffered about 17,200 casualties including 4,000

captured. Lee had lost about 13,300 casualties including 2,000 missing or captured. Discounting

the captured and missing, casualties were effectively the same but Hooker could replace

his losses and Lee couldn’t. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were impressive but empty

victories at best. Strategically, nothing had changed from 1861 except the army’s raggedness,

and its victories were bleeding it dry. Lee must have felt some truth in Longstreet’s assessment,

and he began planning another offensive to either win the war or doom the South. To see how that

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