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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:36,680 --> 00:00:37,680 Okay. 2 00:01:22,120 --> 00:01:26,160 Less than 48 hours ago, that sound had never been heard on this earth. 3 00:01:26,660 --> 00:01:30,600 Suddenly, it has become as much a part of American life as the sound of your 4 00:01:30,600 --> 00:01:31,499 vacuum cleaner. 5 00:01:31,500 --> 00:01:37,360 It's a report from outer space, a radio signal transmitted by the Soviet Union's 6 00:01:37,360 --> 00:01:42,340 Sputnik, the first man -made satellite as it passes over New York earlier this 7 00:01:42,340 --> 00:01:47,680 evening. This is now the satellite which surrounds all of us. In the competition 8 00:01:47,680 --> 00:01:50,960 for leadership in space, where is it? 9 00:01:51,210 --> 00:01:52,210 the finish line. 10 00:02:02,310 --> 00:02:06,070 In the Cold War, it's pretty clear who shot a nuclear missile at you. 11 00:02:06,410 --> 00:02:07,410 You can see it. 12 00:02:08,030 --> 00:02:11,890 But in today's world, it's pretty unclear who just launched the cyber 13 00:02:11,890 --> 00:02:12,890 against you. 14 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:20,260 People have always been robbing banks. People have always been embezzling 15 00:02:20,400 --> 00:02:22,360 People have always been lying and cheating. 16 00:02:22,740 --> 00:02:27,760 And the Internet just gives people another avenue to lie and cheat and 17 00:02:27,920 --> 00:02:31,880 The nation's largest credit rating bureau may have been the target of a 18 00:02:31,880 --> 00:02:34,120 attack by amateur computer wizards. 19 00:02:34,620 --> 00:02:38,740 TRW's Information Services Division has computer records on 90 million 20 00:02:38,740 --> 00:02:42,040 Americans, 85 % of the breadwinners in this country. 21 00:02:42,490 --> 00:02:47,950 They look at data as ones and zeros that should be liberated and are free for 22 00:02:47,950 --> 00:02:51,570 everybody. And they don't see the boundaries that we all have. 23 00:02:51,930 --> 00:02:55,770 Privacy is one of those things that you don't really notice it until it's gone. 24 00:02:56,630 --> 00:03:01,010 We're entering in a world where all data is now saved. 25 00:03:01,390 --> 00:03:07,650 And this is the end of prehistory. Now your kids are going to have everything 26 00:03:07,650 --> 00:03:08,650 saved. 27 00:03:09,670 --> 00:03:11,650 And that's a real different world. 28 00:03:14,890 --> 00:03:15,890 Good evening, America. 29 00:03:16,250 --> 00:03:21,890 It troubles me to tell you that your personal and private information is in 30 00:03:21,890 --> 00:03:26,690 hands of thousands of people who you never met and will never know. 31 00:03:27,030 --> 00:03:30,790 The stereotype is it's the kid who didn't have a girlfriend, right? And so 32 00:03:30,790 --> 00:03:32,950 spending all of his time down there in the basement, right? 33 00:03:34,350 --> 00:03:38,190 There was something to that. There's sometimes stereotypes at the core of the 34 00:03:38,190 --> 00:03:39,730 stereotype. There's a little bit of truth. 35 00:03:39,990 --> 00:03:41,390 So we had all of these. 36 00:03:41,690 --> 00:03:47,230 kids who were bored and they were exploring and you started to see this 37 00:03:47,230 --> 00:03:53,500 phenomenon where the anonymity of the network let people feel entitled to do 38 00:03:53,500 --> 00:03:55,500 things that they probably wouldn't do otherwise. 39 00:03:55,940 --> 00:03:59,540 The physical morphology of the hacker is something that I think that people have 40 00:03:59,540 --> 00:04:03,000 made a lot of jokes about. And I don't think that the stereotype is necessarily 41 00:04:03,000 --> 00:04:08,500 wrong, that it's somebody with a black t -shirt, drinking a Jolt Cola with a 42 00:04:08,500 --> 00:04:12,100 kind of pale complexion because they haven't been out that much and they 43 00:04:12,100 --> 00:04:15,900 all day and they're up all night. But if you go to hacker conferences like I do, 44 00:04:16,060 --> 00:04:17,760 while that description may... 45 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:23,240 fit a majority of the people at the conference, there's still ample other 46 00:04:23,240 --> 00:04:26,300 of people who are interested in computers and computer security. 47 00:04:26,680 --> 00:04:28,680 Sometimes hackers mean computer criminals. 48 00:04:29,560 --> 00:04:33,600 I'm using hackers in the term, the old Stephen Levy sense of hackers are 49 00:04:33,600 --> 00:04:39,120 explorers. Just like you have criminal plumbers and non -criminal plumbers, you 50 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:42,740 have criminal hackers and non -criminal hackers. The media loves to jump on. 51 00:04:43,310 --> 00:04:48,050 The stereotype of a hacker is some little teenager in his basement who's 52 00:04:48,050 --> 00:04:52,190 at midnight on his little computer and breaking into the Pentagon and launching 53 00:04:52,190 --> 00:04:53,550 ICBMs at Russia. 54 00:04:53,810 --> 00:04:55,790 I mean, that's Hollywood. 55 00:04:56,050 --> 00:05:00,270 It makes a good story, but that is not true. A hacker basically is somebody. 56 00:05:00,510 --> 00:05:03,370 They're not necessarily malicious. They're just curious. 57 00:05:03,910 --> 00:05:10,830 I first heard the term hacker in the 80s, and it was in reference to 58 00:05:11,450 --> 00:05:15,070 hacking their way through something in other words someone learning something 59 00:05:15,070 --> 00:05:21,690 that was difficult in context of computer programming you were just 60 00:05:21,690 --> 00:05:25,250 together to get it to work you weren't making it beautiful you weren't doing it 61 00:05:25,250 --> 00:05:27,680 necessarily right you were hacking it together. 62 00:05:27,920 --> 00:05:31,120 Basically what you're seeing here is a modern day hacker space. 63 00:05:31,700 --> 00:05:34,880 You'll find things not just about computers, you'll find people doing 64 00:05:35,180 --> 00:05:39,260 lock picking, computer hacking, cyber security, physics, chemistry, a whole 65 00:05:39,260 --> 00:05:42,980 bunch of stuff. A hacker is a person who pushes the boundaries of their form and 66 00:05:42,980 --> 00:05:47,120 art. And basically you find people here that are polymaths, like people that 67 00:05:47,120 --> 00:05:50,880 actually do multiple things and they're jack of all trades, master of none, but 68 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:52,640 more often better than a master of one. 69 00:05:52,940 --> 00:05:57,180 The first time I ever heard the term hacker, I was... As a teenager, I was 70 00:05:57,180 --> 00:06:00,820 living in Raleigh, North Carolina, and they had just apprehended Kevin Mitnick. 71 00:06:01,260 --> 00:06:07,140 So, you know, I grew up associating computer hacker with computer criminal. 72 00:06:07,400 --> 00:06:11,820 My early impressions of the word before I really could have lived any of it were 73 00:06:11,820 --> 00:06:17,980 just someone who had the power to work with computers in a way that was kind of 74 00:06:17,980 --> 00:06:21,280 like magic. So they were basically wizards of the computer world. 75 00:06:22,160 --> 00:06:23,600 Mathematician Claude E. Shannon. 76 00:06:24,090 --> 00:06:29,250 of the massachusetts institute of technology designed this electronic maze 77 00:06:29,250 --> 00:06:35,590 to prove any special point but mostly for fun the movable walls of the maze 78 00:06:35,590 --> 00:06:39,390 be arranged to make millions of different patterns through which the 79 00:06:39,390 --> 00:06:45,590 mouse must travel to reach its goal to find its way through the pattern the 80 00:06:45,590 --> 00:06:48,730 mouse proceeds as we would by trial and error 81 00:06:50,730 --> 00:06:53,950 The Pentagon was accused today of not paying enough attention to the security 82 00:06:53,950 --> 00:06:57,630 its computer system. Earlier this year, a network of foreign computer hackers 83 00:06:57,630 --> 00:07:02,150 broke the code of a number of Defense Department computers giving them access 84 00:07:02,150 --> 00:07:03,650 information on American weapons. 85 00:07:03,970 --> 00:07:09,930 We're going to use this modified phone to attack and take over a Windows 86 00:07:09,930 --> 00:07:10,930 computer. 87 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:16,460 A white hat hacker is doing hacking for a good purpose. 88 00:07:16,720 --> 00:07:20,840 Sometimes they're hired to go in and do what's called a penetration test of a 89 00:07:20,840 --> 00:07:24,660 company and expose any vulnerabilities and report that back. 90 00:07:24,880 --> 00:07:28,820 Other times they're doing research that can benefit the Internet community. On 91 00:07:28,820 --> 00:07:32,980 the other end of the spectrum is black hat hacking, which is malicious. 92 00:07:33,530 --> 00:07:37,890 and it tends to benefit the individual, or sometimes it's for profit of an 93 00:07:37,890 --> 00:07:40,770 organization, or it can be a political expression. 94 00:07:42,450 --> 00:07:45,410 Do you ever come comfortable with the idea of actually serving a little time 95 00:07:45,410 --> 00:07:46,249 what you were doing? 96 00:07:46,250 --> 00:07:47,249 No. 97 00:07:47,250 --> 00:07:50,210 But you still kept doing it. Oh, yeah, of course. 98 00:07:50,730 --> 00:07:51,730 It's an addiction. 99 00:07:53,270 --> 00:07:54,270 It's a complete addiction. 100 00:07:54,650 --> 00:07:57,250 So the prospect of jail wasn't enough to stop you? 101 00:07:57,490 --> 00:07:58,490 No. 102 00:08:03,530 --> 00:08:05,330 Don't have too much time to think about that, actually. 103 00:08:06,450 --> 00:08:07,870 I think part of it is the obsession. 104 00:08:09,110 --> 00:08:12,330 It's the obsession of, I have to make this work. It's kind of like a chess 105 00:08:12,610 --> 00:08:13,610 I have to win. 106 00:08:14,090 --> 00:08:18,450 And it's not like playing, you know, tic -tac -toe. Nobody ever wins, right? 107 00:08:18,910 --> 00:08:20,830 When you play chess, it's very strategic. 108 00:08:21,790 --> 00:08:25,250 Attacking computer systems is also very strategic, and it can take days and 109 00:08:25,250 --> 00:08:27,430 weeks to physically get what you want. 110 00:08:27,750 --> 00:08:31,690 So you have to target it out and figure out where the weak point is. How do I 111 00:08:31,690 --> 00:08:36,090 move there to get... over there under that system it literally i mean i can't 112 00:08:36,090 --> 00:08:40,870 even tell you how long i've stayed up in periods of like time to like hit a 113 00:08:40,870 --> 00:08:45,650 system that i wanted i think when i was younger i just didn't care if i got 114 00:08:45,650 --> 00:08:49,830 caught i mean i still worked really hard not to leave any traces the 115 00:08:49,830 --> 00:08:56,510 ramifications were just never more intimidating than the thrill of doing a 116 00:08:56,510 --> 00:09:00,110 attack and it was always really exciting 117 00:09:01,260 --> 00:09:04,800 The hack that I spent considerable amount of time on, I had to have some 118 00:09:04,800 --> 00:09:10,160 reason that I really cared about that data. If someone tries to keep some data 119 00:09:10,160 --> 00:09:16,300 closed, and it's not some ethical rule that's stopping you, it's just their 120 00:09:16,300 --> 00:09:22,260 -up rule and their attempt at secure technology, then it's almost a moral 121 00:09:22,260 --> 00:09:23,820 imperative to take that data. 122 00:09:24,060 --> 00:09:29,020 The question really is, is the law right? Do we need that particular law? 123 00:09:29,790 --> 00:09:34,610 So even though there's a law that says you can't do something, hackers are 124 00:09:34,610 --> 00:09:36,790 really questioning should it even exist. 125 00:09:37,090 --> 00:09:41,250 For most people that I consider to be hackers, the innovators or 126 00:09:41,350 --> 00:09:47,210 it is a desire to know and a desire to learn, often coupled with a slightly 127 00:09:47,210 --> 00:09:53,070 antisocial belief that the man has been lying to you and that what they're 128 00:09:53,070 --> 00:09:54,710 telling you isn't all there is. 129 00:09:55,050 --> 00:09:55,989 to life. 130 00:09:55,990 --> 00:09:59,890 I think always about the Matrix movie, which I think of as one of the 131 00:09:59,890 --> 00:10:05,830 quintessential hacker movies where there's so much more going on under the 132 00:10:05,830 --> 00:10:08,850 surface and you can choose to blind yourself to it or you can choose to 133 00:10:09,050 --> 00:10:12,090 And the hacker is always going to choose to know. 134 00:10:28,750 --> 00:10:32,870 In October 1957, the United States was losing the Cold War. 135 00:10:35,890 --> 00:10:42,770 Russia announcing she had shot 136 00:10:42,770 --> 00:10:48,150 a man -made moon 560 miles into space where it was circling the Earth at the 137 00:10:48,150 --> 00:10:50,690 dizzy speed of 18 ,000 miles per hour. 138 00:10:54,320 --> 00:10:59,060 The launching of Sputnik and what happened subsequent to that radically 139 00:10:59,060 --> 00:11:03,500 the American attitudes towards their own personal safety or the safety of this 140 00:11:03,500 --> 00:11:08,040 country. When it was reported, it shocked the American people absolutely 141 00:11:08,040 --> 00:11:13,440 belief. For them to pull off this feat sending the first satellite into space 142 00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:17,740 created a kind of atmosphere of questioning. 143 00:11:18,350 --> 00:11:23,330 As to what we were, where we were going, Americans had always prided themselves 144 00:11:23,330 --> 00:11:29,090 on being by far the advanced technological culture of the world. So 145 00:11:29,090 --> 00:11:33,830 really two shocks, in a sense. A culture shock, namely how could these backward 146 00:11:33,830 --> 00:11:38,210 peoples have produced something that we were incapable of doing, but also a 147 00:11:38,210 --> 00:11:42,570 shock in terms of our own national safety, because if they could put a 148 00:11:42,570 --> 00:11:46,970 into orbit, into space, surely they could hit any American city. 149 00:11:47,470 --> 00:11:53,250 that they chose to. As a primary deterrent to war, maintain a strong 150 00:11:53,250 --> 00:11:54,490 retaliatory power. 151 00:11:55,190 --> 00:12:00,610 The Soviets must be convinced that any attack on us and our allies would 152 00:12:00,870 --> 00:12:05,310 regardless of damage to us, in their own national destruction. 153 00:12:05,750 --> 00:12:11,130 Now we were part of a globe in which no one was protected by physical barriers. 154 00:12:12,620 --> 00:12:17,880 In a purely strategic sense, it meant we had to advance so much that we would 155 00:12:17,880 --> 00:12:20,980 have an unavailable advantage over the Soviet Union. 156 00:12:21,200 --> 00:12:26,860 The Soviet Union now has, in the combined category of scientists and 157 00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:29,780 a greater number than the United States. 158 00:12:30,780 --> 00:12:36,520 And it is producing graduates in these fields at a much faster rate. And the 159 00:12:36,520 --> 00:12:39,080 result was the National Defense Education Act. 160 00:12:39,660 --> 00:12:43,880 which called for spending billions of dollars into the sciences, into 161 00:12:43,880 --> 00:12:48,660 engineering. So it seemed to be that we were moving into a world that was 162 00:12:48,660 --> 00:12:54,700 totally unfamiliar to us, a world, again, of computers and of missiles and 163 00:12:54,700 --> 00:12:57,580 sort of thing, just a very confusing period for Americans. 164 00:12:57,840 --> 00:13:03,820 Indeed, according to my scientific advisors, this is, for the American 165 00:13:04,060 --> 00:13:06,000 the most critical problem of all. 166 00:13:07,530 --> 00:13:13,030 Let me begin by taking you back into time to the origins of the Internet. 167 00:13:13,350 --> 00:13:17,170 Before there was an Internet, the Advanced Research Projects Agency and 168 00:13:17,170 --> 00:13:22,810 Defense Department started a project that they called the ARPANET to try out 169 00:13:22,810 --> 00:13:27,610 this idea called packet switching, which is a very distinct way of switching 170 00:13:27,610 --> 00:13:30,950 data around than the traditional telephone system, which uses what's 171 00:13:30,950 --> 00:13:31,950 circuit switching. 172 00:13:32,460 --> 00:13:36,860 So we built a four -node network, and I was lucky enough to be a graduate 173 00:13:36,860 --> 00:13:38,660 student at UCLA at the time. 174 00:13:39,000 --> 00:13:43,360 I wrote the software that connected the Sigma -7 computer to the first packet 175 00:13:43,360 --> 00:13:48,400 switch of the ARPANET that was installed at UCLA in September of 1969. 176 00:13:48,620 --> 00:13:52,520 And by December, we had four nodes up and running. And then by landline across 177 00:13:52,520 --> 00:13:57,000 the United States, and actually a portion of it went into Europe. 178 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:10,240 That's just for rich men and gabby women. 179 00:14:10,800 --> 00:14:11,800 Nothing but a gadget. 180 00:14:12,700 --> 00:14:13,900 Oh, he says that, does he? 181 00:14:14,560 --> 00:14:16,040 Will you listen to me, Mr. Kendall? 182 00:14:16,820 --> 00:14:19,400 You've got an uncle who's a fool, and you can quote me. 183 00:14:19,960 --> 00:14:22,900 You're talking to a man who helped install one of the very first 184 00:14:22,900 --> 00:14:26,700 there ever was, back in New Haven in 78, who helped string the first line 185 00:14:26,700 --> 00:14:28,740 between cities, from Boston to Providence. 186 00:14:29,000 --> 00:14:31,980 A man who's seen what this telephone has done for the country already in 25 187 00:14:31,980 --> 00:14:36,480 years. A gadget is it? One thing to keep in mind as you're talking about the 188 00:14:36,480 --> 00:14:40,820 phone company in the 1960s and 70s and even up into the early 80s, for the most 189 00:14:40,820 --> 00:14:45,200 part, it really is one giant company. It was all run by AT &T. American 190 00:14:45,200 --> 00:14:48,920 Telephone and Telegraph was a monopoly. It was, in fact, the largest company on 191 00:14:48,920 --> 00:14:49,920 Earth. 192 00:14:50,720 --> 00:14:54,700 Today's telephone network far exceeds Mr. Bell's grandest dream. 193 00:14:55,500 --> 00:15:00,000 And every last inch of it can be linked together to serve the home, business, or 194 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:01,040 continental defense. 195 00:15:01,850 --> 00:15:05,570 The very size and diversity of this network helped to make it strong. 196 00:15:05,790 --> 00:15:09,050 The telephone system was the closest thing that anybody got to a computer, 197 00:15:09,050 --> 00:15:12,310 the sophistication of the telephone system and the telephone network was 198 00:15:12,310 --> 00:15:13,910 approaching that of a computer. 199 00:15:14,110 --> 00:15:17,970 And so the phone company was really sort of the forerunner of a lot of 200 00:15:17,970 --> 00:15:21,660 computing. Phone freaks were, you know, today they'd be called network hackers, 201 00:15:21,900 --> 00:15:23,880 right? The only difference is they're playing around with the telephone. 202 00:15:24,140 --> 00:15:29,420 Finally tonight we have a report on phone freaks, underground hobbyists who 203 00:15:29,420 --> 00:15:33,940 illegal phone calls around the country by confounding the technology of the 204 00:15:33,940 --> 00:15:37,640 telephone companies with technology of their own. For this phone freaking 205 00:15:37,640 --> 00:15:40,660 business to make any sense at all, you almost have to get in a time machine 206 00:15:40,660 --> 00:15:44,960 because you have to go back in time to a time that is really unlike today. 207 00:15:50,180 --> 00:15:53,460 that in the very old days, when you wanted to make a long -distance call, 208 00:15:53,460 --> 00:15:55,720 you did was you picked up the telephone and you talked to an operator. 209 00:15:56,120 --> 00:15:59,160 And you said, I want to call Chicago, and here's my phone number. 210 00:15:59,420 --> 00:16:03,160 That operator would get another operator on the line, which might involve maybe 211 00:16:03,160 --> 00:16:06,120 a couple intermediate cities, and you'd eventually get to Chicago. So there were 212 00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:08,020 human beings in the loop all the way through. 213 00:16:08,640 --> 00:16:11,180 What made phone phreaking possible was... 214 00:16:11,520 --> 00:16:14,660 When that started to get automated, where operators started to get out of 215 00:16:14,660 --> 00:16:19,300 loop so that you could actually use automated equipment to place a call from 216 00:16:19,300 --> 00:16:20,300 Francisco to Chicago. 217 00:16:20,540 --> 00:16:23,480 And what that meant, the automated equipment had some vulnerabilities in 218 00:16:23,540 --> 00:16:28,060 which allowed somebody with a little bit of technical skill to be able to place 219 00:16:28,060 --> 00:16:31,600 their own calls or reroute the calls or otherwise play with things. 220 00:16:36,739 --> 00:16:41,440 John Draper, who's known as his phone freak handle as Captain Crunch, was the 221 00:16:41,440 --> 00:16:44,720 guy who discovered something really interesting about Captain Crunch cereal. 222 00:16:45,240 --> 00:16:48,440 Back in the day, Captain Crunch cereal came with a little prize, and one of the 223 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:52,040 prizes was a little tiny whistle, a little plastic whistle. And it turned 224 00:16:52,040 --> 00:16:55,040 that if you covered up one of the holes in the whistle, it actually allowed you 225 00:16:55,040 --> 00:16:59,140 to generate a perfect 2600 hertz tone, and that you could use to whistle your 226 00:16:59,140 --> 00:17:00,340 way into free phone calls. 227 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:12,520 So if you were good at whistling and you could whistle 2 ,600 hertz, you could 228 00:17:12,520 --> 00:17:16,099 actually whistle your way to free phone calls. And there were several people who 229 00:17:16,099 --> 00:17:19,760 could do that. The most famous was a phone freak at the time known as Joe 230 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:25,160 Ingresia, later known as Joy Bubbles, who was a blind fellow gifted with 231 00:17:25,160 --> 00:17:27,960 pitch and able to whistle free phone calls. 232 00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:38,070 Let's see if I make it this time. 233 00:17:40,750 --> 00:17:44,110 This is really hard to do. It sounded like all the tones were present, so the 234 00:17:44,110 --> 00:17:46,010 phone should be ringing about now. 235 00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:53,970 Okay, it hit the phone. It just takes a little while to... From his one phone to 236 00:17:53,970 --> 00:17:58,310 a town in Illinois and back to his other phone. A thousand mile phone call by 237 00:17:58,310 --> 00:17:59,310 whistling. 238 00:17:59,820 --> 00:18:03,560 So this is a huge problem because we're not talking about software today where 239 00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:06,920 you just patch a few lines of code and mail out a CD -ROM or have people 240 00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:08,160 download updates from the Internet. 241 00:18:08,860 --> 00:18:13,760 This is physical plant. This is central offices all throughout the country that 242 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:18,900 are using big, huge racks of equipment that this has got to change if you want 243 00:18:18,900 --> 00:18:19,900 to patch this whole. 244 00:18:21,420 --> 00:18:22,700 Phone calls were really expensive. 245 00:18:22,940 --> 00:18:28,880 It might cost, you know, the equivalent in today's dollars of $55 for a 10 246 00:18:28,880 --> 00:18:32,180 -minute phone call from San Francisco to New York, right? It was really 247 00:18:32,180 --> 00:18:34,620 expensive. Long distance was a big deal back then. 248 00:18:34,860 --> 00:18:37,780 Everyone knows long -distance rates are lowest at night. 249 00:18:37,980 --> 00:18:43,760 But did you know those same low rates are in effect all day on Sunday? You can 250 00:18:43,760 --> 00:18:47,740 make a three -minute station -to -station call to any of 48 states. 251 00:18:48,220 --> 00:18:51,200 For 90 cents or less, anytime on Sunday. 252 00:18:56,880 --> 00:19:00,880 The way a blue box works is it was based on the observation that when a line is 253 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,020 idle, there's this 2 ,600 hertz tone on it. So the first thing you do with a 254 00:19:04,020 --> 00:19:07,360 blue box is once you've dialed a long -distance call and the call is starting 255 00:19:07,360 --> 00:19:10,660 go through, you would send a burst of 2 ,600 down the line. 256 00:19:11,280 --> 00:19:14,260 And that 2 ,600 hertz would confuse the remote central office. 257 00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:17,500 And now they're again listening for those, they're called multi -frequency 258 00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:21,020 digits. So a blue box is kind of like a touch -tone generator that can generate 259 00:19:21,020 --> 00:19:22,020 these special digits. 260 00:19:22,060 --> 00:19:24,340 And with those, you can now dial your own call. 261 00:19:25,290 --> 00:19:29,590 So if you were a bookmaker as part of organized crime, you spent a lot of time 262 00:19:29,590 --> 00:19:33,610 on the telephone. That cost you a lot of money in the 1960s. And even worse, it 263 00:19:33,610 --> 00:19:36,850 left telephone records that the FBI could later get to figure out who your 264 00:19:36,850 --> 00:19:40,570 associates were. If you were using a blue box, you didn't have to do that. 265 00:19:40,570 --> 00:19:45,250 problem the phone company had is that they had, from the 1940s on, based 266 00:19:45,250 --> 00:19:46,250 their... 267 00:19:47,010 --> 00:19:51,110 entire network and infrastructure around this multi -frequency signaling system. 268 00:19:51,370 --> 00:19:54,270 They had been rolling this out across the entire United States. They'd spent a 269 00:19:54,270 --> 00:19:57,650 lot of money on this. And then it turns out that, well, it's got this problem 270 00:19:57,650 --> 00:20:01,510 that, you know, a guy with a blue box and a tone generator, or even a guy who 271 00:20:01,510 --> 00:20:06,490 can whittle, can make free phone calls. And some estimates at the time were that 272 00:20:06,490 --> 00:20:09,510 it would be, you know, upwards of a billion dollars, and this was back when 273 00:20:09,510 --> 00:20:12,010 billion dollars was real money, to fix this whole thing. 274 00:20:12,390 --> 00:20:13,690 So you've got this vulnerability. 275 00:20:14,470 --> 00:20:15,510 What do you do about it? 276 00:20:15,740 --> 00:20:17,300 You can't make it go away overnight. 277 00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:20,740 Even if you had a billion dollars, you couldn't make it go away overnight. 278 00:20:21,040 --> 00:20:25,040 So then you get into this problem of, well, we're obviously going to have to 279 00:20:25,040 --> 00:20:26,040 live with this for a while. 280 00:20:26,380 --> 00:20:30,660 But at the same time, we want to keep this as quiet as possible so that it 281 00:20:30,660 --> 00:20:32,180 doesn't get out that we have this problem. 282 00:20:33,360 --> 00:20:37,360 But then what do you do when you catch somebody, when you catch a college kid 283 00:20:37,360 --> 00:20:40,060 who's figured out how to make a blue box? You've got a blue box outbreak 284 00:20:40,060 --> 00:20:41,140 someplace, right? 285 00:20:41,360 --> 00:20:44,300 What do you do about that? Because if you prosecute and it gets into the 286 00:20:44,300 --> 00:20:47,600 newspapers, you might well have just done yourself more harm than good. Now 287 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:50,360 everybody in that area reads about it and says, oh, what's the blue box? 288 00:20:50,560 --> 00:20:53,100 That sounds pretty good. I'd like to be able to make free phone calls. 289 00:21:04,140 --> 00:21:08,380 So in 1971, there was an article in Esquire magazine by Ron Rosenbaum, which 290 00:21:08,380 --> 00:21:11,920 called Secrets of the Little Blue Box, which elevated phone frequency and 291 00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:12,920 national attention. 292 00:21:13,290 --> 00:21:17,750 It was so well written and so intriguingly written, it made what was 293 00:21:17,750 --> 00:21:22,230 a boring and geeky hobby of playing around with the telephone system seem 294 00:21:22,230 --> 00:21:23,930 it was something out of an espionage novel. 295 00:21:24,190 --> 00:21:27,170 And it really captured the imagination of so many people. 296 00:21:27,530 --> 00:21:31,050 The phone company now has a real problem because they still haven't fixed their 297 00:21:31,050 --> 00:21:34,690 network. They've got a fix on the horizon, but that fix was going to take 298 00:21:34,690 --> 00:21:35,689 to deploy. 299 00:21:35,690 --> 00:21:39,730 And now you've got all these people who know about it. When phone freaks have a 300 00:21:39,730 --> 00:21:43,780 convention... As they did in the ballroom of a seedy New York hotel 301 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:46,360 Masks are given out at the door. 302 00:21:46,900 --> 00:21:48,880 People don't give their right names. 303 00:21:49,320 --> 00:21:53,740 And the illegal electronic devices which phone freaks use to defraud the 304 00:21:53,740 --> 00:21:56,040 telephone companies are nowhere to be seen. 305 00:21:56,560 --> 00:21:59,340 So the cat's out of the bag at this point. So at that point, starting right 306 00:21:59,340 --> 00:22:03,600 after, around 1970, 1971, right after the Esquire article, the phone company 307 00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:07,600 started to adopt much more of a prosecutorial stance, where every time 308 00:22:07,600 --> 00:22:09,780 this, we're going to prosecute it, we're going to go to law enforcement. 309 00:22:10,160 --> 00:22:13,200 And now at this point, it has to be just pure deterrence. We have to scare 310 00:22:13,200 --> 00:22:14,260 people into not doing this. 311 00:22:18,600 --> 00:22:22,120 One of the things that the phone company did when it became aware of blue and 312 00:22:22,120 --> 00:22:27,060 black boxes was it started an internal investigation unit. And from 1964 to 313 00:22:27,060 --> 00:22:31,140 1970, they randomly monitored some 33 million long -distance calls. 314 00:22:31,540 --> 00:22:36,960 And of those 33 million calls, they actually tape -recorded between 1 .5 and 315 00:22:36,960 --> 00:22:37,960 .8 million calls. 316 00:22:38,590 --> 00:22:42,450 So in some sense, it's probably the largest warrantless wiretapping campaign 317 00:22:42,450 --> 00:22:46,170 that anybody has ever undertaken, and it was done entirely without any approval 318 00:22:46,170 --> 00:22:50,270 from anyone, the government or anything else. It was simply AT &T doing this. 319 00:22:51,530 --> 00:22:54,950 Keep your eye on that bell, son, and mark my words. 320 00:22:55,470 --> 00:22:59,790 That as this nation grows, the telephone will grow with it, and it will play a 321 00:22:59,790 --> 00:23:01,130 strong part in that growing. 322 00:23:02,470 --> 00:23:07,450 And the future that lies ahead is beyond the belief of any man. 323 00:23:09,640 --> 00:23:13,240 Much of what we've learned about the universe has actually come from radio 324 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:17,760 telescopes because they can see things that optical telescopes can't. 325 00:23:18,260 --> 00:23:23,160 And behind me is one such amateur radio telescope here in my backyard. 326 00:23:23,720 --> 00:23:29,140 This is a 12 -foot satellite dish that's been repurposed to operate as a 327 00:23:29,140 --> 00:23:33,840 telescope. If you're a professional astronomer, you usually are using very 328 00:23:33,840 --> 00:23:35,980 instruments and you have limited... 329 00:23:37,000 --> 00:23:40,780 time to use them because you're competing with other folks for the 330 00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:45,280 If you have your own system, you can run it as much as you want and observe 331 00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:46,280 anything you wish. 332 00:23:47,600 --> 00:23:51,320 And the people who do this are hardware hackers. 333 00:23:52,240 --> 00:23:59,020 These are folks who, just like in the Homebrew Computer Club, want access to 334 00:23:59,020 --> 00:24:02,160 something that ordinary people normally can't have. 335 00:24:02,380 --> 00:24:06,000 Well, there's no question that what came out of the Homebrew Computer Club 336 00:24:06,570 --> 00:24:08,430 changed the world in a major way. 337 00:24:08,730 --> 00:24:14,150 Some may wonder, when did the computer begin to really compete with television 338 00:24:14,150 --> 00:24:16,670 and radio for our personal attention? 339 00:24:17,010 --> 00:24:21,890 I'd say that for members of the Homebrew Computer Club, that competition began 340 00:24:21,890 --> 00:24:23,510 back in 1975. 341 00:24:23,910 --> 00:24:27,990 Folks building their own systems became obsessed with what they were doing to 342 00:24:27,990 --> 00:24:31,050 the point where not only were they not necessarily watching much TV, 343 00:24:32,320 --> 00:24:37,740 but they were probably not spending much time with their families because it was 344 00:24:37,740 --> 00:24:41,900 very time consuming to design and construct and code your own machine. 345 00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:46,680 One of the most well -known members of the Homebrew Computer Club was Steve 346 00:24:46,680 --> 00:24:47,680 Wozniak. 347 00:24:48,080 --> 00:24:52,720 I was there the night that Steve brought in a circuit board that he said he was 348 00:24:52,720 --> 00:24:57,020 going to call the Apple and wanted to know what we all thought about it. It 349 00:24:57,020 --> 00:25:01,240 pretty cool. He had mounted a circuit board onto a piece of wood and had a 350 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:03,860 keyboard on it, and it was a self -contained computer. 351 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:08,720 A lot of the folks in the club were making systems that were somewhat 352 00:25:09,760 --> 00:25:12,980 No one at the time had any idea where his system was going to go. 353 00:25:13,340 --> 00:25:17,280 Nobody in the large corporate environment really saw much use for the 354 00:25:17,280 --> 00:25:18,119 in the home. 355 00:25:18,120 --> 00:25:22,800 In fact, when we first developed these systems, there was a lot of skepticism 356 00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:25,980 that we had heard from people on the outside saying, why do you want a 357 00:25:26,180 --> 00:25:27,179 Who needs a computer? 358 00:25:27,180 --> 00:25:29,060 What good would it be to have one in your house? 359 00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:32,840 And they just didn't get it. 360 00:25:33,950 --> 00:25:37,830 Comes as no surprise to say that it's all but impossible to conduct any kind 361 00:25:37,830 --> 00:25:41,130 business these days without a computer. What is new is that computers are 362 00:25:41,130 --> 00:25:43,310 suddenly becoming a factor beyond business. 363 00:25:43,870 --> 00:25:47,990 Overnight, manufacturing personal computers has become a half -billion 364 00:25:47,990 --> 00:25:50,570 business, one that's doubling every two years. 365 00:25:50,870 --> 00:25:55,730 Stephen Jobs is a 27 -year -old multimillionaire whose large fortune is 366 00:25:55,730 --> 00:25:57,410 something little, the personal computer. 367 00:25:57,730 --> 00:25:59,030 How many calculators do you own? 368 00:25:59,680 --> 00:26:03,040 Two, maybe? Right. And you have to use the automatic bank telling machines? 369 00:26:03,320 --> 00:26:06,580 Sure. So life is already seducing you into learning this stuff. 370 00:26:06,840 --> 00:26:11,620 Random access memory is internal memory that's built inside of this computer. 371 00:26:12,140 --> 00:26:15,680 They talk their own language here. At trade shows across the country, when 372 00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:18,980 manufacturers show off their wares, the house is usually packed. 373 00:26:19,630 --> 00:26:24,750 Small personal computers, selling from $500 to $5 ,000, are fast becoming a 374 00:26:24,750 --> 00:26:25,990 multi -billion dollar business. 375 00:26:26,230 --> 00:26:29,410 And if words like bits and bytes mean nothing, try this one. 376 00:26:29,710 --> 00:26:35,270 Money. I have seen the future, said one industry observer, and it computes. 377 00:26:35,920 --> 00:26:40,620 It is becoming so commonplace that many of us are becoming dependent on it. 378 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:45,640 Something that didn't exist a few years ago to a very large business today. And 379 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:49,100 in the future, of course, personal computers, a lot of people anticipate, 380 00:26:49,100 --> 00:26:51,120 be as ubiquitous as the telephone. 381 00:26:51,520 --> 00:26:55,800 Computers have become personal tools as prices dropped and components shrank. 382 00:26:55,900 --> 00:27:00,460 This personal computer costs about $1 ,400 and fits nicely on a desk corner. 383 00:27:00,660 --> 00:27:04,940 The idea of the small computer has become so big that the giant of computer 384 00:27:04,940 --> 00:27:08,960 companies... IBM is busy marketing its new small computer. 385 00:27:09,160 --> 00:27:14,140 IBM spending an estimated $13 million on TV this year alone. Wall Street hit a 386 00:27:14,140 --> 00:27:17,180 record high again today. One of the better performers was IBM. 387 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:22,100 The first reliable computer was built by an American about 50 years ago. Since 388 00:27:22,100 --> 00:27:24,220 then, computers have multiplied like puree. 389 00:27:24,420 --> 00:27:28,400 Big Mac Day, the day Apple unveiled its new Macintosh computer to shareholders. 390 00:27:31,420 --> 00:27:34,980 Suddenly, personal computers have become the business of at least 25 391 00:27:34,980 --> 00:27:40,400 manufacturers, RadioShack, Apple, and Commodore, grabbing three -quarters of 392 00:27:40,400 --> 00:27:44,600 market. For weeks, the Macintosh has been rolling off the line, one every 27 393 00:27:44,600 --> 00:27:49,420 seconds. A whole generation is being weaned on computers, and manufacturers 394 00:27:49,420 --> 00:27:54,360 that guarantees that computers will become the household appliance of the 395 00:27:54,360 --> 00:27:58,640 future. In more and more schools, small computers are taking over the job of 396 00:27:58,640 --> 00:28:02,620 teaching reading or math or foreign language. A generation of children is 397 00:28:02,620 --> 00:28:04,180 becoming comfortable with computers. 398 00:28:04,480 --> 00:28:08,000 Steve Wozniak co -founded Apple, the most successful of all home computer 399 00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:11,720 companies. In just six years, Apple has become a half billion dollar a year 400 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:14,700 corporation, leaving Wozniak worth more than $50 million. 401 00:28:15,540 --> 00:28:20,500 Retired now at 32, Wozniak had never been to an outdoor rock concert, so he 402 00:28:20,500 --> 00:28:22,920 $12 .5 million of his dollars and bought one. 403 00:28:23,940 --> 00:28:28,680 The significance of the emergence of the personal computer really can't be 404 00:28:28,680 --> 00:28:34,420 understated. Its impact has been profound and reaches almost every corner 405 00:28:34,420 --> 00:28:35,420 lives. 406 00:28:39,540 --> 00:28:43,420 The big changeover came when people started getting modems on their home 407 00:28:43,420 --> 00:28:49,320 computers. So you got the home computer, and you can play your game on it or 408 00:28:49,320 --> 00:28:53,200 whatever, and there were these bulletin board systems out there. 409 00:28:53,630 --> 00:28:57,590 In the bulletin board systems, you'd have somebody who was a hobbyist also 410 00:28:57,590 --> 00:29:01,110 get a computer and put a couple of modems on it and write a bulletin board 411 00:29:01,110 --> 00:29:05,670 package that allowed people to dial in and yell at each other, make friends, 412 00:29:05,870 --> 00:29:08,310 fight, talk about whatever their hobby was. 413 00:29:08,630 --> 00:29:12,370 200 years ago in this country, notices were tacked up on a tree in the village 414 00:29:12,370 --> 00:29:14,610 square which served as a community bulletin board. 415 00:29:14,830 --> 00:29:18,710 And in the years since, when people wanted to post a bill, they've used 416 00:29:18,950 --> 00:29:21,370 barns, walls, and buses, not to mention newspapers. 417 00:29:22,380 --> 00:29:24,360 But now the village bulletin board has gone electronic. 418 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:28,880 Generally in your neighborhood or in your dialing area, there'd be maybe 50, 419 00:29:28,980 --> 00:29:32,200 80 bulletin boards for you to call. And in a really small town, there might only 420 00:29:32,200 --> 00:29:33,200 be 5 or 10. 421 00:29:33,380 --> 00:29:37,220 And each bulletin board had a different sort of group of follower. 422 00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:40,460 Like the engineers might like this one, the hackers might like that one, the 423 00:29:40,460 --> 00:29:43,200 game people might like this one, the hobbyists might like that one. 424 00:29:43,420 --> 00:29:44,420 And so... 425 00:29:44,720 --> 00:29:47,660 you'd get accounts on a bunch of systems locally to figure out what the local 426 00:29:47,660 --> 00:29:51,160 scene was like. Phone long distance kept getting cheaper, so it went from the 427 00:29:51,160 --> 00:29:54,000 standalone island bulletin boards to a network. 428 00:29:54,220 --> 00:29:58,240 And some of these networks had thousands and thousands of other bulletin boards. 429 00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:02,800 Back then, it was probably 83 or something, and computers were just 430 00:30:02,820 --> 00:30:06,540 We were in San Francisco near Silicon Valley, and my dad decided it was time 431 00:30:06,540 --> 00:30:07,880 get the family a computer. 432 00:30:08,810 --> 00:30:12,250 My sister had no interest in it, so therefore it ended up in my room. And 433 00:30:12,250 --> 00:30:14,190 when I got hooked, addicted to computers. 434 00:30:14,390 --> 00:30:18,830 And one guy I was totally jealous of, he had a modem. He had a 110 -bot acoustic 435 00:30:18,830 --> 00:30:23,010 coupler modem, which is what you see in old movies now. But through that, he'd 436 00:30:23,010 --> 00:30:27,010 dial up the phone, stick it on the coupler, and dial up bulletin boards in 437 00:30:27,010 --> 00:30:31,450 San Francisco Bay Area. And through my friend's computer, a whole new universe 438 00:30:31,450 --> 00:30:33,130 opened up for me. It was unbelievable. 439 00:30:33,750 --> 00:30:36,770 You could be on a bulletin board chat system. 440 00:30:37,340 --> 00:30:38,500 It's a 14 -year -old kid. 441 00:30:38,820 --> 00:30:42,400 Nobody knows your name. Nobody knows your age. Nobody knows your education, 442 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:46,140 ethnicity, anything about you. All they know about is what you type on the 443 00:30:46,140 --> 00:30:51,200 keyboard. So their entire opinion of you is based on how logical or how 444 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:52,200 intelligent you sound. 445 00:30:52,380 --> 00:30:56,300 So you could have these great debates about music or movies or whatever it is, 446 00:30:56,360 --> 00:30:59,540 and for all they know that you could be a professor at Berkeley. 447 00:30:59,740 --> 00:31:03,420 And that was really liberating because it taught me it was all about what you 448 00:31:03,420 --> 00:31:07,020 know. It wasn't about what you looked like or where you were from or any of 449 00:31:07,020 --> 00:31:08,900 because that just didn't come into the picture. 450 00:31:09,120 --> 00:31:11,880 And the other thing is that it opened up this whole other adult universe. 451 00:31:12,180 --> 00:31:15,300 You know, you're like 13, 14 years old. You're kind of sheltered. You know, you 452 00:31:15,300 --> 00:31:19,160 can't drive a car. You're not watching R -rated movies. And here you are talking 453 00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:23,300 about drugs or movies or sex or whatever it is, adult concepts. 454 00:31:24,730 --> 00:31:28,290 You're like 14 years old. The whole world opened up through the computer for 455 00:31:28,310 --> 00:31:31,630 It was awesome. Because in those days, it really did feel like exploring. There 456 00:31:31,630 --> 00:31:34,870 was no standard addressing, the WWF, whatever. 457 00:31:35,090 --> 00:31:39,030 You kind of just got this phone number, and you would get in there, and then 458 00:31:39,030 --> 00:31:42,450 you'd see what was on the other side of that computer and where it led to. 459 00:31:42,590 --> 00:31:47,090 Because there were people who really weren't Internet users. You couldn't 460 00:31:47,090 --> 00:31:51,050 track them back and figure out what machine they were coming from because 461 00:31:51,050 --> 00:31:52,009 were some kid. 462 00:31:52,010 --> 00:31:54,790 sitting in their parents' basement with a modem attached to a computer. 463 00:31:55,170 --> 00:32:01,150 And they were on this fairly small sea of information, but they were completely 464 00:32:01,150 --> 00:32:05,370 anonymous, and they had no vested interest in behaving because they could 465 00:32:05,370 --> 00:32:07,870 misbehave all that they wanted, and then all they had to do was turn off their 466 00:32:07,870 --> 00:32:08,870 connection and disappear. 467 00:32:09,030 --> 00:32:13,170 And I remember back then, you would start to get the first generation of the 468 00:32:13,170 --> 00:32:18,430 games dialers or war dialers who would call all of the telephones in an entire 469 00:32:18,430 --> 00:32:20,530 urban area and see if a modem picked up. 470 00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:34,480 And then when they got a pickup, they would try to log in as guest, password 471 00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:39,920 guest, admin, password admin. And sometimes they'd get in, and it was 472 00:32:39,920 --> 00:32:44,320 shocking. When it makes contact with the wall of the maze and discovers it 473 00:32:44,320 --> 00:32:49,800 cannot go straight ahead, it turns and keeps on turning until it has found its 474 00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:50,499 way again. 475 00:32:50,500 --> 00:32:53,980 It explores each step of the way with its copper whiskers. 476 00:32:54,400 --> 00:32:58,080 Those of us who were running the machines on the administrative side, the 477 00:32:58,080 --> 00:33:01,480 problem that we were seeing was we would just see in our system logs that, you 478 00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:05,020 know, someone had tried to log in as a guest 800 times, and we'd laugh because 479 00:33:05,020 --> 00:33:08,760 maybe we didn't have a guest account, and we'd know that somebody was playing 480 00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:13,620 around. And it was all seen as kind of fairly benign activity because we hadn't 481 00:33:13,620 --> 00:33:17,620 really started to see a downstream cost for all of this kind of activity. 482 00:33:17,960 --> 00:33:21,520 In the mid-'80s, a lot of the hackers would launch physical attacks. 483 00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:26,720 They would go find a phone company office, and they would walk in with a 484 00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:29,720 clipboard and try to look official, and they would look around, and they'd try 485 00:33:29,720 --> 00:33:30,720 to find a modem. 486 00:33:31,040 --> 00:33:34,960 If you found a computer sitting someplace and it had a modem connected 487 00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:38,560 frequently if you turned the modem over, there'd be a little plastic tag with 488 00:33:38,560 --> 00:33:41,440 the phone number that the modem was sitting on, and sometimes there'd be 489 00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:42,440 usernames and passwords. 490 00:33:42,680 --> 00:33:47,200 And some of the hackers had no qualms whatsoever about just walking into a 491 00:33:47,200 --> 00:33:48,200 building. 492 00:33:48,820 --> 00:33:52,800 coming out with whatever information they could. Pretty much every kid who's 493 00:33:52,800 --> 00:33:56,440 interested in science and technology at some point or another goes over the edge 494 00:33:56,440 --> 00:33:59,320 of the dumpster. But there were always people who would be going in there and 495 00:33:59,320 --> 00:34:02,880 looking for printouts, and it was really pretty shocking some of the stuff that 496 00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:04,400 you would find getting thrown away. 497 00:34:04,680 --> 00:34:08,840 Oh, wow, look, it's billing information from the hospital from five years ago. 498 00:34:09,400 --> 00:34:12,820 There wasn't really a model for how to make money off of that stuff. And we 499 00:34:12,820 --> 00:34:16,920 didn't realize at the time how much it was going to wind up costing us in the 500 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:21,000 long run. It was kind of a hobby environment where people didn't really 501 00:34:21,000 --> 00:34:25,060 like there was anything wrong with going and diving in somebody's dumpster and 502 00:34:25,060 --> 00:34:28,120 trying to come out with whatever you could find. 503 00:34:28,340 --> 00:34:31,760 But things were a little bit more Wild West in those days. 504 00:34:33,420 --> 00:34:34,820 In the early days... 505 00:34:35,280 --> 00:34:37,159 You couldn't own a computer. It was too expensive. 506 00:34:37,500 --> 00:34:40,600 You couldn't get on the Internet. It was only for universities and governments. 507 00:34:40,940 --> 00:34:45,480 You couldn't get a computer programming manual generally, and you couldn't learn 508 00:34:45,480 --> 00:34:48,880 anything about security because there wasn't anything really written. So 509 00:34:48,880 --> 00:34:52,920 everything was closed, and you had to break into it. You had to find a way in. 510 00:34:53,340 --> 00:34:57,560 You had to break into a university to get access on a computer, and then you'd 511 00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:00,600 read all the manual pages learning how did the computer actually work because 512 00:35:00,600 --> 00:35:01,600 there was no... 513 00:35:01,660 --> 00:35:04,980 material available. And then you had to find somebody that knew something about 514 00:35:04,980 --> 00:35:06,700 security and convince them to teach you. 515 00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:10,260 And then maybe you would teach someone else. And then you'd build this 516 00:35:10,260 --> 00:35:12,200 around sharing information. 517 00:35:12,780 --> 00:35:16,780 I think it would have been unheard of in the mid -1980s that if you found some 518 00:35:16,780 --> 00:35:20,300 kid wandering around in a telephone company building that they'd call the 519 00:35:20,300 --> 00:35:24,240 and have the guy hauled off. Nowadays, in the days of Homeland Security, the 520 00:35:24,240 --> 00:35:27,600 would be at Gitmo being waterboarded or something. What were you doing in the 521 00:35:27,600 --> 00:35:29,160 phone company office? All this kind of thing. 522 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:34,840 But in the 80s, it was kind of cute. And that's how you get these guys like 523 00:35:34,840 --> 00:35:39,920 Kevin Mitnick, who are basically loser sociopaths, but the entire community 524 00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:43,220 them as cute and interesting people. We love you, Kevin! 525 00:35:44,820 --> 00:35:48,120 Kevin Mitnick is arguably the most famous former hacker. 526 00:35:48,580 --> 00:35:49,558 You got me, dude! 527 00:35:49,560 --> 00:35:53,480 At a hacker gathering in Las Vegas, where he now lives and works as a 528 00:35:53,480 --> 00:35:56,580 consultant, he's treated like a celebrity. 529 00:35:56,800 --> 00:36:00,060 He served nearly five years in federal prison for break... 530 00:36:02,140 --> 00:36:05,800 If the 80s was the Wild West, the 90s would have been the gold rush. 531 00:36:06,340 --> 00:36:10,120 That was when things really started to get interesting, and that's when the 532 00:36:10,120 --> 00:36:14,460 knives came out as well, because suddenly you were injecting value into 533 00:36:14,780 --> 00:36:19,820 As soon as the money comes, then you get these streams of parasites coming in 534 00:36:19,820 --> 00:36:20,820 after the money. 535 00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:27,080 And the innocence of the Internet really ended around 536 00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:28,080 1994. 537 00:36:29,640 --> 00:36:33,880 Can't afford a computer at home? It's okay if you have some spare change. 538 00:36:34,340 --> 00:36:39,320 Coin -operated computer terminals have started popping up in public places like 539 00:36:39,320 --> 00:36:40,960 this San Francisco coffee house. 540 00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:44,440 Users send electronic mail all over the globe. 541 00:36:44,700 --> 00:36:46,700 Cost, two bits for four minutes. 542 00:36:46,940 --> 00:36:51,120 Connecting people in new ways has become a major business in this country. 543 00:36:51,740 --> 00:36:56,460 Commercial services like Prodigy, CompuServe, and America Online, which 544 00:36:56,460 --> 00:37:00,740 information into people's computers through regular phone lines, now have 4 545 00:37:00,740 --> 00:37:01,740 million subscribers. 546 00:37:02,380 --> 00:37:07,520 The fastest growing of these services, America Online, charges $9 .95 a month 547 00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:11,380 plus $3 .50 an hour after the first five hours of use. 548 00:37:11,720 --> 00:37:16,640 Soon as the Internet hit, I'm saying within two years, within two years 549 00:37:16,640 --> 00:37:20,280 probably, Dial -up bulletin boards went away. I mean, they died that quickly. 550 00:37:20,620 --> 00:37:24,200 What was the point of dialing up and having the slow interaction where you 551 00:37:24,200 --> 00:37:25,200 get online immediately? 552 00:37:25,540 --> 00:37:29,000 So what happened there is information sharing took a great leap forward, but 553 00:37:29,000 --> 00:37:33,060 community collapsed because anybody could come to your system now on the 554 00:37:33,060 --> 00:37:34,100 Internet from anywhere. 555 00:37:34,300 --> 00:37:38,220 So you got a whole lot of idiots, people that you couldn't filter them out. I 556 00:37:38,220 --> 00:37:39,480 mean, they used to call it the AOL effect. 557 00:37:40,780 --> 00:37:44,560 Dial -up system hit the Internet, and all those people, millions of users, 558 00:37:44,700 --> 00:37:50,040 flooded into the early Internet. It was just, you know, the IQ level just 559 00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:54,180 dropped like a rock. And so that forced the people that were trying to have 560 00:37:54,180 --> 00:37:59,260 serious conversations on the net into the corners, into private groups, and it 561 00:37:59,260 --> 00:38:00,360 stratified the Internet. 562 00:38:00,780 --> 00:38:06,620 AOL was a really interesting aspect of the early history of the Internet. 563 00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:11,360 They used their huge dial -up infrastructure to become this portal to 564 00:38:11,360 --> 00:38:17,440 Internet for millions of people. And that's part of why AOL got so rich, that 565 00:38:17,440 --> 00:38:19,780 they were able to buy Time Warner, if you think about that. 566 00:38:20,040 --> 00:38:25,520 That moment epitomized the early stage of the Internet gold rush. 567 00:38:25,740 --> 00:38:31,160 Here you have an old -school mainline media company, which is used to kind of 568 00:38:31,160 --> 00:38:36,400 shaping American popular culture, gets bought by a bunch of computer kids who 569 00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:40,810 just... appear out of no place. And it was, as we all know now, it was a merger 570 00:38:40,810 --> 00:38:45,590 made in hell. But that was really kind of the symbol of the early stage of the 571 00:38:45,590 --> 00:38:48,110 gold rush. From a security standpoint... 572 00:38:48,780 --> 00:38:52,360 AOLs coming on the Internet brought us millions of new users. 573 00:38:52,620 --> 00:38:57,360 And I think that was really when you first started to see people doing scams 574 00:38:57,360 --> 00:39:00,060 get people's passwords, people doing online fraud. 575 00:39:01,380 --> 00:39:05,520 Millions of new users means millions of new victims. People were literally just 576 00:39:05,520 --> 00:39:09,300 kind of buying machines and plugging them in as fast as they could. And 577 00:39:09,300 --> 00:39:12,300 everybody was saying, well, we'll worry about securing it later. 578 00:39:12,780 --> 00:39:15,080 And now for a traffic report of sorts. 579 00:39:15,320 --> 00:39:20,440 This one is from the Information Superhighway. In a word, it is jammed. 580 00:39:20,440 --> 00:39:21,860 online jams the Internet. 581 00:39:22,240 --> 00:39:26,720 And for some, the World Wide Web becomes the World Wide Wait. 582 00:39:26,960 --> 00:39:30,920 Hacking really changed when money got involved, when computers became free, 583 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:35,000 AOL gave away free Internet access, when everybody has a spare computer. The 584 00:39:35,000 --> 00:39:39,160 things that were motivating you in the first place are no longer there. 585 00:39:39,690 --> 00:39:43,230 So you have to find a new reason. What's the new thing that motivates you if all 586 00:39:43,230 --> 00:39:44,370 the old motivations are gone? 587 00:39:44,610 --> 00:39:48,210 All of the systems, all of the software, all the components on which the first 588 00:39:48,210 --> 00:39:53,090 couple of years of the big commercial Internet were built, none of it was 589 00:39:53,090 --> 00:39:55,630 designed really with good security in mind. 590 00:39:55,890 --> 00:40:02,390 I'm informed that you think that within 30 minutes, the seven of you could 591 00:40:02,390 --> 00:40:05,230 make the Internet unusable for the entire nation. 592 00:40:05,900 --> 00:40:06,799 Is that correct? 593 00:40:06,800 --> 00:40:10,840 That's correct. It would definitely take a few days for people to figure out 594 00:40:10,840 --> 00:40:14,640 what was going on. This will be an ongoing effort to try to make sure we 595 00:40:14,640 --> 00:40:18,380 all the benefits of the Internet, all the benefits of the computer revolution, 596 00:40:18,680 --> 00:40:21,880 but we develop better defenses and better defenders. 597 00:40:22,200 --> 00:40:28,280 Hacking has changed a lot over the years. It used to be almost an 598 00:40:28,280 --> 00:40:32,800 pursuit. I heard it likened to a spelunking one. 599 00:40:33,190 --> 00:40:35,230 where you're just kind of exploring. 600 00:40:35,450 --> 00:40:41,350 And in the late 80s, early 90s, it very much felt like that. There was this 601 00:40:41,350 --> 00:40:44,210 cavernous, dark internet. 602 00:40:45,070 --> 00:40:50,670 And you could find things in there if you went looking. And most of the people 603 00:40:50,670 --> 00:40:57,030 that I knew at the time that did that were out for access. They were out for 604 00:40:57,030 --> 00:41:01,870 exploration, for learning, that sort of thing. Very few people were out for 605 00:41:01,870 --> 00:41:07,290 profit. Police say they've arrested the cyber mastermind responsible for 606 00:41:07,290 --> 00:41:12,170 infecting 12 million computers around the world. Today, it's very, very 607 00:41:12,170 --> 00:41:14,110 different. Even the hacker mentality. 608 00:41:14,380 --> 00:41:18,920 is a much different breed. Some of the younger kids have a moral flexibility 609 00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:22,740 that would make a Fortune 500 CEO blush. 610 00:41:23,140 --> 00:41:26,360 The hackers nowadays are oftentimes professionals. 611 00:41:26,880 --> 00:41:31,700 They've been trained to do this. They work for organizations that do this. 612 00:41:31,920 --> 00:41:36,640 You yourself sitting at home, you know, shopping online and reading your email, 613 00:41:36,680 --> 00:41:41,240 you are the target. And they're after you and they're after your financial 614 00:41:41,240 --> 00:41:43,300 information. They're after your money. 615 00:41:43,600 --> 00:41:48,260 in Eastern Europe, you have a lot of individuals that are very intelligent 616 00:41:48,260 --> 00:41:53,220 underemployed. And that may sound cliche, but that is the circumstance 617 00:41:53,220 --> 00:41:55,900 they're in. And so they become entrepreneurs. 618 00:41:56,840 --> 00:42:02,200 And they create companies. However, the motivation of the company is not to make 619 00:42:02,200 --> 00:42:04,660 money for the common good. It's to make money for themselves. 620 00:42:04,880 --> 00:42:09,160 And so they remain black hats and they remain hackers. 621 00:42:09,540 --> 00:42:13,880 Computer hackers in Russia reportedly succeeded in breaking into the 622 00:42:13,880 --> 00:42:18,720 money transfer system of Citibank. Organized hacker groups, primarily from 623 00:42:18,720 --> 00:42:23,140 Russia and Ukraine, are said to be targeting U .S. companies, stealing 624 00:42:23,140 --> 00:42:26,020 of dollars in credit card numbers. There's a lot of bias. 625 00:42:26,250 --> 00:42:27,009 that exists. 626 00:42:27,010 --> 00:42:32,370 When I work with U .S. representatives, you know, they will say that, oh, this 627 00:42:32,370 --> 00:42:36,910 other country is attacking us. And then I go to the other country and they're 628 00:42:36,910 --> 00:42:38,590 saying, oh, the Americans are attacking us. 629 00:42:38,850 --> 00:42:42,390 And they're more technologically advanced. So every country is panicking 630 00:42:42,390 --> 00:42:43,049 each other. 631 00:42:43,050 --> 00:42:46,770 The newspaper gets all upset, you know, North Korea or China is hacking into our 632 00:42:46,770 --> 00:42:49,030 computers. Well, yeah, they are. 633 00:42:49,580 --> 00:42:53,580 But the other side is the United States is doing that to Russia and China and 634 00:42:53,580 --> 00:42:57,540 Japan and France is doing it to us and England's doing it to Norway and 635 00:42:57,540 --> 00:43:02,700 everyone's doing it. The advantage that I have is I'm, in a sense, neutral. 636 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:08,480 I'm in the business of tech, media, cyber security. 637 00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:12,520 I don't particularly represent any government or... 638 00:43:13,210 --> 00:43:14,210 any corporation. 639 00:43:22,590 --> 00:43:29,350 Growing up, being a little boy, I 640 00:43:29,350 --> 00:43:33,690 always looked at technology and media as a means to 641 00:43:34,410 --> 00:43:36,150 Look, a window to the outside. 642 00:43:36,490 --> 00:43:41,790 And my father was the first person who brought a personal computer into the 643 00:43:41,790 --> 00:43:46,130 Soviet Union. And I remember being a little boy, playing on this massive 644 00:43:46,130 --> 00:43:51,750 machine, typing like this, big keys. And all of this made me realize how 645 00:43:51,750 --> 00:43:54,490 important and how fast this technology grows. 646 00:43:54,690 --> 00:43:56,550 It really, truly is a fascinating place. 647 00:43:56,770 --> 00:44:01,610 Three, two, one, zero. All engines on. 648 00:44:06,060 --> 00:44:10,220 You have air, land, space, and maritime. 649 00:44:10,460 --> 00:44:14,440 Cyber is the new sphere. It's the fifth common domain. 650 00:44:15,640 --> 00:44:17,080 It's not just internet. 651 00:44:17,280 --> 00:44:21,740 Cyber is your cell phone, your mobile phone connected to your PC. 652 00:44:22,520 --> 00:44:27,220 which is connected to the grid, which is connected, the grid's connected to the 653 00:44:27,220 --> 00:44:31,900 traffic lights, to the air traffic control, to the satellites, to the 654 00:44:31,900 --> 00:44:34,580 weapons, to the nuclear power station and the arms forces. 655 00:44:34,780 --> 00:44:39,480 So suddenly you have this massive connection everywhere. 656 00:45:25,770 --> 00:45:30,570 It is kind of amazing the transformations that have occurred even 657 00:45:30,570 --> 00:45:35,990 lifetime, and I'm not that old. We've seen just an increase in data being 658 00:45:35,990 --> 00:45:39,110 everywhere and the ability to access things on the Internet. 659 00:45:39,410 --> 00:45:43,070 Whenever my kids ask me a question and I don't know the answer, they say, well, 660 00:45:43,190 --> 00:45:44,690 we should just ask Google. Google knows. 661 00:45:45,110 --> 00:45:48,670 And they just kind of take for granted that information is out there and 662 00:45:48,670 --> 00:45:54,520 available. Privacy was sort of de facto protected in the olden days just by 663 00:45:54,520 --> 00:45:57,740 virtue of how difficult it was to collect information. 664 00:45:57,980 --> 00:46:02,240 And now with computer technology, what's happened is that it's really made the 665 00:46:02,240 --> 00:46:03,640 collection of this information. 666 00:46:04,350 --> 00:46:08,050 Very cheap and easy because primarily a lot of companies have interest in 667 00:46:08,050 --> 00:46:12,390 collecting information about you, and consumers have an interest in giving up 668 00:46:12,390 --> 00:46:15,770 this information about themselves, whether it be to a social network that 669 00:46:15,770 --> 00:46:20,630 who your friends are or to Amazon that knows what books you're interested in or 670 00:46:20,630 --> 00:46:22,650 to Google that knows what you're searching for. 671 00:46:22,930 --> 00:46:27,790 I remember at one point when I was traveling in China and in the gift shops 672 00:46:27,790 --> 00:46:31,510 they like to bring American tourists into, they actually do follow you 673 00:46:31,630 --> 00:46:34,700 and every time you look at something, they're like, They offer a suggestion 674 00:46:34,700 --> 00:46:37,500 that, oh, very nice product, you should purchase it. 675 00:46:37,980 --> 00:46:40,140 And it was kind of a creepy feeling. 676 00:46:40,380 --> 00:46:42,840 And that's sort of what happens online. 677 00:46:43,280 --> 00:46:48,380 When you use a bookseller like Amazon .com, they're keeping information not 678 00:46:48,380 --> 00:46:51,540 about what books you buy and where your house is that they have to ship the 679 00:46:51,540 --> 00:46:52,780 books to, but about what books you browse. 680 00:46:53,040 --> 00:46:57,120 All that information gets collected and stored and is potentially available to 681 00:46:57,120 --> 00:47:01,780 civil litigants and to the government later on. This is some of the most 682 00:47:01,780 --> 00:47:05,380 kinds of information, what books you're interested in, what you search on 683 00:47:05,380 --> 00:47:09,060 Google. You know, Google looks at your search histories and they use that 684 00:47:09,060 --> 00:47:10,500 information for all sorts of purposes. 685 00:47:10,840 --> 00:47:14,460 Think about how you would feel if somebody could get access to... 686 00:47:14,700 --> 00:47:17,660 What you're searching for is basically what are you thinking? What are you 687 00:47:17,660 --> 00:47:21,980 interested in? Some of the most intimate personal information that's out there. 688 00:47:22,160 --> 00:47:26,880 As we move around with our mobile phones, we move from cell tower to cell 689 00:47:26,980 --> 00:47:28,240 and this creates records. 690 00:47:28,560 --> 00:47:32,880 And these records are retained by the service carriers for many years, 691 00:47:33,040 --> 00:47:34,840 ostensibly for billing disputes. 692 00:47:35,240 --> 00:47:40,140 But they can also be used later to figure out where you were at any given 693 00:47:40,140 --> 00:47:40,859 in time. 694 00:47:40,860 --> 00:47:44,200 Every time you have your cell phone on, not even when you're making a call. But 695 00:47:44,200 --> 00:47:47,880 just when you have your cell phone on, that enables them to find out physically 696 00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:52,340 where you are. It's something that I think is really of concern to people. 697 00:47:52,580 --> 00:47:56,420 People think that that information should be private. And we understand 698 00:47:56,420 --> 00:47:59,140 could be followed on the public street, but we think that that requires the 699 00:47:59,140 --> 00:48:03,740 government to have a good reason and to be worth the money for them to appoint 700 00:48:03,740 --> 00:48:08,160 an officer to follow us. In the U .S., we actually don't have very many privacy 701 00:48:08,160 --> 00:48:12,980 laws, which comes as a surprise to a lot of people who just sort of assume that 702 00:48:12,980 --> 00:48:15,140 the government maybe is protecting them. 703 00:48:15,660 --> 00:48:19,640 There is no right to privacy in this country. Let me just say that out loud. 704 00:48:20,260 --> 00:48:21,620 It's not in the Constitution. 705 00:48:22,080 --> 00:48:26,960 It's not in any of the Bill of Rights or any other amendment. There is no right 706 00:48:26,960 --> 00:48:30,560 to privacy. The way it is now, I don't own my own identity. If I give it to 707 00:48:30,560 --> 00:48:33,800 Facebook, they own it. I can't go back to them and say, you know what? 708 00:48:34,140 --> 00:48:37,120 I want to change that. I don't want that to be visible anymore. They say, too 709 00:48:37,120 --> 00:48:39,180 bad. You gave it to us. It's in our systems. It's there forever. 710 00:48:39,900 --> 00:48:42,780 We're going to sell it. We're going to monetize it. We're going to create like 711 00:48:42,780 --> 00:48:47,380 graphic analysis of who our users are so we can better target advertising to 712 00:48:47,380 --> 00:48:50,960 them. People think that they're the customers of Facebook or Google or 713 00:48:50,960 --> 00:48:52,160 LiveJournal or Twitter. 714 00:48:52,440 --> 00:48:53,740 In fact, they're not. 715 00:48:55,040 --> 00:48:59,520 They're the products of these companies that they sell to their customers who 716 00:48:59,520 --> 00:49:00,520 are the advertisers. 717 00:49:01,080 --> 00:49:06,700 The reason Facebook is free, the reason Gmail is free, is not because the 718 00:49:06,700 --> 00:49:07,720 company likes you. 719 00:49:08,200 --> 00:49:10,720 It's because you are their product. 720 00:49:10,960 --> 00:49:15,340 And by making it free, they get a better product they can sell to their 721 00:49:15,340 --> 00:49:20,100 advertisers. Over the last few years, we've heard the CEOs of several major 722 00:49:20,100 --> 00:49:22,220 technology companies talk about the death of privacy. 723 00:49:22,780 --> 00:49:26,240 Eric Schmidt of Google talks about it. Larry Ellison of Oracle. 724 00:49:27,230 --> 00:49:31,590 We're hearing it from Mort Zuckerberg of Facebook that the rules of privacy are 725 00:49:31,590 --> 00:49:33,570 changing and people expect less privacy. 726 00:49:33,810 --> 00:49:38,890 What's interesting is those are the very CEOs that are deliberately undermining 727 00:49:38,890 --> 00:49:44,600 privacy. At a presentation to advertisers in 2007, Mark Zuckerberg 728 00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:46,980 benefits of Facebook's vast database. 729 00:49:47,360 --> 00:49:51,060 On Facebook, we know exactly what gender someone is and exactly how old they are 730 00:49:51,060 --> 00:49:54,900 and exactly what they're interested in. We're finding a very slow and deliberate 731 00:49:54,900 --> 00:50:01,720 ratcheting down of privacy from all of these companies because they make 732 00:50:01,720 --> 00:50:06,440 money from people sharing, from information being visible, from 733 00:50:06,440 --> 00:50:08,660 being collated and networked. 734 00:50:09,420 --> 00:50:13,380 and being seen by others. A lot of my friends have grown up with nothing but 735 00:50:13,380 --> 00:50:15,200 computers. That's all they know are computers. 736 00:50:15,760 --> 00:50:19,740 Well, starting with them, there's an electronic digital record of everything 737 00:50:19,740 --> 00:50:20,860 they've ever done online. 738 00:50:21,460 --> 00:50:25,180 Now, whether or not the record is kept, somebody deletes the hard drive or 739 00:50:25,180 --> 00:50:26,620 throws away the backup tapes, fine. 740 00:50:27,120 --> 00:50:29,180 But records are being kept. 741 00:50:29,440 --> 00:50:32,560 Hard drives, data storage is cheap. It'll be around forever. 742 00:50:33,550 --> 00:50:36,730 So can you imagine the implications? How does that change your behavior if 743 00:50:36,730 --> 00:50:39,150 everything you've ever done is recorded somewhere? 744 00:50:39,650 --> 00:50:43,250 Can you imagine what the presidential debates will be like 20, 30 years from 745 00:50:43,250 --> 00:50:47,890 when they're pulling up your first tweet, your first Facebook love note, 746 00:50:47,890 --> 00:50:51,270 first status change on Google Talk where you said you were going to go get 747 00:50:51,270 --> 00:50:56,050 hammered? I mean, it's fundamentally going to change the way that people 748 00:50:56,230 --> 00:50:59,210 There's a common myth that privacy is about something to hide. I don't have 749 00:50:59,210 --> 00:51:00,450 anything to hide, so I don't need privacy. 750 00:51:00,990 --> 00:51:02,410 But you know that's not true. 751 00:51:02,840 --> 00:51:08,500 I mean, we don't have anything to hide when we sing in the shower or write a 752 00:51:08,500 --> 00:51:10,020 love letter and then tear it up. 753 00:51:10,700 --> 00:51:14,760 Privacy is about us as individuals. 754 00:51:15,060 --> 00:51:21,080 It's about our ability to be who we are without necessarily telling everybody. 755 00:51:21,460 --> 00:51:25,000 I mean, when someone says I have nothing to hide, just ask them, what's your 756 00:51:25,000 --> 00:51:26,840 salary? What are your sexual fetishes? 757 00:51:27,540 --> 00:51:29,840 What kind of diseases do you have? 758 00:51:30,250 --> 00:51:33,210 I mean, it's not about hiding. It's about personal dignity. 759 00:51:33,630 --> 00:51:36,130 This baby is just one second old. 760 00:51:37,330 --> 00:51:42,390 Here in the delivery room of Mount Sinai Hospital in New York, he has just won 761 00:51:42,390 --> 00:51:45,330 his first fight, the fight to life. 762 00:51:46,630 --> 00:51:48,570 His footprints are taken for identification. 763 00:51:49,330 --> 00:51:52,490 He is still less than a minute old, and this is his first record. 764 00:51:53,070 --> 00:51:58,250 This newborn boy and all the others of his generation face a new and serious 765 00:51:58,250 --> 00:52:03,380 battle. which they may not win the right to privacy. 766 00:52:05,300 --> 00:52:09,620 Data is a fundamental byproduct of every computer -mediated interaction. 767 00:52:10,860 --> 00:52:15,420 You used to throw a quarter into a toll booth. Now you use an E -ZPass, and a 768 00:52:15,420 --> 00:52:16,420 record is saved. 769 00:52:16,860 --> 00:52:22,560 You used to chat with someone over a water cooler or across a partition in 770 00:52:22,560 --> 00:52:26,940 office, but now that's done over IM or SMS, and that data is being saved. 771 00:52:28,020 --> 00:52:33,880 Right? So things that used to be ephemeral are now permanent. 772 00:52:34,520 --> 00:52:39,520 And more and more of that data is being saved and sifted through and used by 773 00:52:39,520 --> 00:52:41,820 government, by corporations, by marketers. 774 00:52:42,240 --> 00:52:47,500 I mean, you can find, if you go on the net and you start searching for, maybe 775 00:52:47,500 --> 00:52:50,700 you're going to buy a new house or move in and get a new apartment, start 776 00:52:50,700 --> 00:52:54,420 looking at real estate or rental listings, you go on Facebook and 777 00:52:54,420 --> 00:52:55,420 you're going to see ads. 778 00:52:56,240 --> 00:52:57,860 For real estate companies or rental companies. 779 00:52:58,940 --> 00:53:02,440 And that sometimes feels a bit icky. 780 00:53:03,880 --> 00:53:08,280 We're finding more and more that as people surf on the net, they're being 781 00:53:08,280 --> 00:53:13,800 followed. They're being followed and a profile about them is being collected 782 00:53:13,800 --> 00:53:14,800 then sold to others. 783 00:53:15,100 --> 00:53:17,320 And this is without people's knowledge or consent. 784 00:53:17,580 --> 00:53:20,280 You might sort of know what's going on, but not really. 785 00:53:21,280 --> 00:53:24,500 A meeting of the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington. 786 00:53:25,340 --> 00:53:30,040 These men are fearful that the National Data Center poses a threat to privacy 787 00:53:30,040 --> 00:53:31,800 and the American way of life. 788 00:53:32,060 --> 00:53:38,840 All we can expect is to hold off the data bank for a while, to get in our 789 00:53:38,840 --> 00:53:44,060 links, because there are not only governmental data banks, there are 790 00:53:44,060 --> 00:53:47,840 data banks. The data center is not just here and now. 791 00:53:48,260 --> 00:53:52,480 You build it with the best intentions now, you build it with limitations now, 792 00:53:52,580 --> 00:53:53,700 and tomorrow those... 793 00:53:53,950 --> 00:53:56,810 intentions may pass and the limitations may dissolve. 794 00:53:57,270 --> 00:53:59,670 We always talk about security versus privacy. 795 00:53:59,890 --> 00:54:01,110 There's some sort of balance. 796 00:54:01,670 --> 00:54:06,010 And the government likes to use that trade -off. How much privacy would you 797 00:54:06,010 --> 00:54:07,010 up for security? 798 00:54:07,390 --> 00:54:09,970 Being secure requires you to give up some privacy. 799 00:54:10,230 --> 00:54:12,490 I think it's a false dichotomy. I think it's actually a red herring. 800 00:54:12,750 --> 00:54:14,650 Security and privacy go hand in hand. 801 00:54:15,390 --> 00:54:20,850 We do not feel more secure when our private data is released. 802 00:54:21,090 --> 00:54:23,010 We don't feel more secure. 803 00:54:23,630 --> 00:54:25,910 in a police state with its ubiquitous surveillance. 804 00:54:26,470 --> 00:54:29,350 That privacy is essential for security. 805 00:54:30,150 --> 00:54:33,010 And good security provides for privacy. 806 00:54:33,550 --> 00:54:37,150 It's only bad security that goes in opposition to privacy. 807 00:54:37,410 --> 00:54:38,950 A great example is airplane security. 808 00:54:39,430 --> 00:54:42,910 After 9 -11, there have been exactly two things that have improved security. 809 00:54:43,290 --> 00:54:47,210 The first one is reinforcing the cockpit door. And the second is passengers 810 00:54:47,210 --> 00:54:48,710 knowing they have to fight back. 811 00:54:49,330 --> 00:54:52,070 Those two measures have nothing to do with privacy. 812 00:54:52,940 --> 00:54:57,760 If you think about the airplane security measures that affect privacy, the photo 813 00:54:57,760 --> 00:55:02,040 ID check, the full body scanners, they actually don't improve security. 814 00:55:03,040 --> 00:55:04,760 They're what I call security theater. 815 00:55:05,680 --> 00:55:08,580 Real security goes hand in hand with privacy. 816 00:55:09,240 --> 00:55:14,440 How do we create a world where freedom and expression is still valued and 817 00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:21,240 protected at the same time as security is maintained? 818 00:55:21,820 --> 00:55:28,240 So there will always be a battle, a battle between privacy, security, and 819 00:55:28,240 --> 00:55:29,240 essence of the Internet. 820 00:56:04,840 --> 00:56:08,020 This is Harry Butler, a real great guy. 821 00:56:08,320 --> 00:56:12,920 Harry's a very busy man, and he's conscientious and hardworking. 822 00:56:14,400 --> 00:56:19,140 But security -wise, Harry is naive. 823 00:56:19,720 --> 00:56:23,460 What? You heard me. You don't know what security is. 824 00:56:23,780 --> 00:56:24,780 What do you mean? 825 00:56:25,120 --> 00:56:29,280 Information security has a physical component. There's no doubt about it. 826 00:56:29,560 --> 00:56:35,100 It's not just someone from overseas trying to get in with an exploit. 827 00:56:35,360 --> 00:56:38,240 That's kind of the trick shot of hacking. 828 00:56:40,980 --> 00:56:46,240 There's a physical aspect to it, especially at a local level, where if 829 00:56:46,240 --> 00:56:51,040 can access your data networks, they can steal your data. And we're often paid to 830 00:56:51,040 --> 00:56:52,640 test that. 831 00:56:53,040 --> 00:56:57,720 One of my favorite ways into a company is the smoking door. You'll find like a 832 00:56:57,720 --> 00:56:59,100 car swipe to get in and out. 833 00:56:59,340 --> 00:57:04,380 So all you have to do is find the smoking door, walk up to the door when 834 00:57:04,380 --> 00:57:06,360 one's there, and have a lit cigarette. 835 00:57:09,140 --> 00:57:14,720 When the door opens, just quickly crush out your cigarette and say thank you, 836 00:57:14,780 --> 00:57:18,180 grab the door and walk in, and it works every time. 837 00:57:19,580 --> 00:57:26,040 Another really clever way that I like getting in is a USB key, which 838 00:57:26,040 --> 00:57:31,500 I've written some very simple software that will use the computer it's plugged 839 00:57:31,500 --> 00:57:34,780 into to tunnel out and give us control of that computer. 840 00:57:35,060 --> 00:57:40,100 And then we take that key and we label it, usually something to the effect of 841 00:57:40,100 --> 00:57:42,080 your company's name and HR. 842 00:57:42,670 --> 00:57:47,390 you know, something tempting to plug in. And then we have someone walk that into 843 00:57:47,390 --> 00:57:51,310 the receptionist and explain that they found it in the parking lot or they 844 00:57:51,310 --> 00:57:55,070 it in the lobby of the building and it's got your name on it, it must be yours. 845 00:57:55,330 --> 00:58:00,850 Of course, minutes after the person drops the key, we're waiting for this 846 00:58:00,850 --> 00:58:05,770 get the hookup from the computer when they plug it in and then we're in and 847 00:58:05,770 --> 00:58:06,770 and running. 848 00:58:07,610 --> 00:58:11,190 Would it be dangerous for everyone to walk around with the knowledge I have? I 849 00:58:11,190 --> 00:58:12,210 would worry about that. 850 00:58:12,560 --> 00:58:18,040 Throughout my career, I've made a lot of difficult choices. The temptation to 851 00:58:18,040 --> 00:58:22,640 just do something that goes over the line is always there. I've been working 852 00:58:22,640 --> 00:58:27,120 this for many, many years. I have a lot of experience, and I've been offered 853 00:58:27,120 --> 00:58:28,520 some pretty tempting... 854 00:58:29,720 --> 00:58:35,820 In one case, a briefcase full of cash to do something that was very wrong would 855 00:58:35,820 --> 00:58:39,680 have been very easy to do, probably wouldn't have gotten caught. But you 856 00:58:39,680 --> 00:58:43,400 make a decision in life because once you go to that side and get caught, you can 857 00:58:43,400 --> 00:58:44,600 never really come back. 858 00:58:46,460 --> 00:58:48,960 People can't protect what they don't understand. 859 00:58:49,500 --> 00:58:53,640 How do you evaluate the risk around what's the risk of having a computer 860 00:58:53,640 --> 00:58:54,640 -controlled car? 861 00:58:54,960 --> 00:58:58,780 Well... People don't really know. We've never had computer -controlled cars 862 00:58:58,780 --> 00:59:01,800 before, and it's not something that we sort of intuitively understand. 863 00:59:02,280 --> 00:59:05,920 You know, if you're at the ATM and there's a shady guy next to you, you get 864 00:59:05,920 --> 00:59:10,420 that, like viscerally. Your brain, your little reptile part of your brain says, 865 00:59:10,500 --> 00:59:12,120 danger, danger, something weird here. 866 00:59:12,780 --> 00:59:16,340 But your brain doesn't necessarily pick up that the keypad looks a little 867 00:59:16,340 --> 00:59:19,660 unusual. because somebody swapped it with a keyboard capturing device. 868 00:59:19,920 --> 00:59:23,400 Or where you put your card into the ATM, that looks a little fatter than it 869 00:59:23,400 --> 00:59:26,120 normally does. Well, that's because somebody's put a capture device over it. 870 00:59:26,340 --> 00:59:30,200 We don't get that intuitively, not like a shady character right there. 871 00:59:30,440 --> 00:59:36,120 And so as humans, we just aren't good at estimating and managing risk when it 872 00:59:36,120 --> 00:59:39,100 comes to computers. And that's going to get us into all kinds of trouble. 873 00:59:39,320 --> 00:59:45,460 I see people that will go out to a public, free public Wi -Fi cafe. 874 00:59:46,280 --> 00:59:50,480 And they'll access their banking information or they'll make a purchase 875 00:59:50,740 --> 00:59:55,680 And they won't stop and think, is this a safe place for me to be conducting a 876 00:59:55,680 --> 00:59:58,720 transaction? Is this something I should be doing out in public? 877 00:59:59,140 --> 01:00:03,920 Until we start thinking in those terms, I think we're going to find that the 878 01:00:03,920 --> 01:00:09,060 problem of identity theft and cybercrime is going to be with us for a while. 879 01:00:09,560 --> 01:00:12,560 A lot of people who are on the network, people we want to have on the network, 880 01:00:12,620 --> 01:00:17,520 like my mom and dad, aren't really capable of securing their own computer 881 01:00:17,520 --> 01:00:21,660 or maybe even of understanding why it is that they shouldn't be checking their 882 01:00:21,660 --> 01:00:25,440 email or their bank statement in the coffee shop or something like that. 883 01:00:25,900 --> 01:00:27,600 Or they may just simply... 884 01:00:28,040 --> 01:00:31,340 They misassess the risk. They may understand that there's a risk that 885 01:00:31,340 --> 01:00:34,460 might be using a sniffer and they look around the room and they think everybody 886 01:00:34,460 --> 01:00:37,840 looks pretty busy, you know, reading the paper and drinking their coffee and 887 01:00:37,840 --> 01:00:40,880 they really need to get their email and they take that chance. 888 01:00:41,180 --> 01:00:46,040 I just don't think that it's fair to put the full burden of that on the 889 01:00:46,040 --> 01:00:49,600 individual. There's a whole hobby called war driving, which is just driving 890 01:00:49,600 --> 01:00:53,180 around and accessing other people's wireless networks and seeing how many 891 01:00:53,180 --> 01:00:53,959 can rack up. 892 01:00:53,960 --> 01:00:56,960 It's really easy to just drive around the neighborhood and get into people's 893 01:00:56,960 --> 01:01:01,580 networks. And even if they have basic wireless encryption, that's usually not 894 01:01:01,580 --> 01:01:04,860 preventing people because most of those protocols have been hacked and you don't 895 01:01:04,860 --> 01:01:08,020 even need to do any work to get in. Once you're in someone's wireless network, 896 01:01:08,200 --> 01:01:10,020 then you're seeing all the traffic that's getting sent across. 897 01:01:10,520 --> 01:01:15,260 So if they're typing credit card information or social security numbers, 898 01:01:15,260 --> 01:01:17,920 data can be sniffed right out of the air by anyone. 899 01:01:18,430 --> 01:01:22,030 within range of that network. And there are people driving around just trying to 900 01:01:22,030 --> 01:01:25,730 do that for fun. So if someone wants to steal your private information, they're 901 01:01:25,730 --> 01:01:28,810 probably going to get it. Years ago, you'd have to have a complete computer 902 01:01:28,810 --> 01:01:31,970 system with you to do any hacking or access to a complete computer system. 903 01:01:32,410 --> 01:01:36,410 Nowadays, you can make a complete hacking system out of a cell phone. 904 01:01:36,910 --> 01:01:41,450 This looks like a fairly typical iPhone, or at least it would appear so. This 905 01:01:41,450 --> 01:01:46,630 iPhone has been modified, though, to run applications that are not approved by 906 01:01:46,630 --> 01:01:51,730 Apple. In this case, specifically one designed to remotely take over other 907 01:01:51,730 --> 01:01:55,870 computers from either across the Internet or, in our case, across an open 908 01:01:55,870 --> 01:01:58,350 wireless network. It's actually a cafe. 909 01:01:59,000 --> 01:02:03,220 So we'll start by pulling up a terminal. And in the terminal, what we're going 910 01:02:03,220 --> 01:02:08,840 to do is run an application called Metasploit that will allow us to run an 911 01:02:08,840 --> 01:02:14,100 exploit and take over a machine. You can look at the exploit as how you get into 912 01:02:14,100 --> 01:02:15,100 the vulnerable application. 913 01:02:16,200 --> 01:02:19,700 So having identified a specific computer, 914 01:02:20,440 --> 01:02:25,140 From across the street, over an open wireless network, we'll collect our 915 01:02:25,140 --> 01:02:31,680 first. In our case, we're going to choose a Microsoft exploit, since our 916 01:02:31,680 --> 01:02:37,500 computer that we're looking at appears to be quite behind on its patches. We're 917 01:02:37,500 --> 01:02:44,080 going to choose a payload that causes that machine to give us control of it. 918 01:02:44,300 --> 01:02:47,820 And a payload is what you want the machine to do. 919 01:02:48,680 --> 01:02:51,160 once you've exploited a vulnerable service. 920 01:02:51,540 --> 01:02:54,660 All right, now we're ready to go. Let's give it a try. 921 01:02:55,660 --> 01:02:58,380 We type exploit and enter. 922 01:03:04,200 --> 01:03:08,940 And we have successfully exploited our target. We now have control of it. At 923 01:03:08,940 --> 01:03:12,200 this point, we would set software on this computer so that when the person 924 01:03:12,200 --> 01:03:13,200 leaves the cafe, 925 01:03:14,080 --> 01:03:17,060 The machine would report all user activity. 926 01:03:17,360 --> 01:03:23,120 That activity would include website visited, login ID, and password pair. 927 01:03:23,320 --> 01:03:28,480 We could even activate the camera or the microphone on the particular computer 928 01:03:28,480 --> 01:03:33,800 at will. So we'd have complete control over it. So, I mean, that right there is 929 01:03:33,800 --> 01:03:35,060 pretty cool. 930 01:03:35,640 --> 01:03:36,640 Yeah. 931 01:03:38,760 --> 01:03:42,560 Hacking and causing disruption. 932 01:03:44,850 --> 01:03:47,770 is sipping into the mainstream, into the general public. 933 01:03:47,990 --> 01:03:54,290 You no longer have to be an MIT or Cambridge computer science graduate to 934 01:03:54,290 --> 01:03:58,370 how to hack into a system. You can just be a kid from around the block, go buy a 935 01:03:58,370 --> 01:04:04,230 computer for 400 bucks, have a connection for 30 bucks, and go online 936 01:04:04,230 --> 01:04:05,610 out how to hack into different systems. 937 01:04:14,380 --> 01:04:18,600 Having been through the maze just once, the mechanical mouse is able to remember 938 01:04:18,600 --> 01:04:19,640 the correct path. 939 01:04:20,000 --> 01:04:25,360 Set down anywhere along that path, it takes the most direct route without 940 01:04:25,360 --> 01:04:28,920 a single false turn on through to the end of the trail. 941 01:04:31,080 --> 01:04:37,320 As the crime continues to be effective and make money, 942 01:04:37,440 --> 01:04:43,920 and the victims become more numerous, that you're going to get... the effect 943 01:04:43,920 --> 01:04:47,180 where people start saying, well, someone should do something about that. 944 01:04:47,420 --> 01:04:52,400 And the victim there is going to be freedom on the Internet. 945 01:04:52,820 --> 01:04:54,600 All right, all right. 946 01:04:55,360 --> 01:04:57,820 I'll abide by your red tape regulations. 947 01:04:59,240 --> 01:05:01,320 Red tape regulations? 948 01:05:02,320 --> 01:05:05,800 I'll wear a badge and lock my desk when I go home at night. 949 01:05:07,300 --> 01:05:10,500 But I still say we've got guards for that sort of thing. 950 01:05:11,100 --> 01:05:13,720 We'd have to put a permanent guard on everyone in the business. 951 01:05:14,440 --> 01:05:18,600 We probably could build a society in which it was impossible for people to 952 01:05:18,600 --> 01:05:22,620 from each other, but the consequences of building that society are probably a 953 01:05:22,620 --> 01:05:24,680 society none of us would want to live in. 954 01:05:24,920 --> 01:05:27,880 There'd be a tremendous amount of surveillance. There would be a 955 01:05:27,880 --> 01:05:30,480 amount of onerous security on top of us. 956 01:05:30,700 --> 01:05:34,420 We could build an Internet where there were no hackers. 957 01:05:35,220 --> 01:05:38,880 The downside of building an Internet where there were no hackers would be an 958 01:05:38,880 --> 01:05:40,540 Internet where there was no anonymity. 959 01:05:41,550 --> 01:05:45,030 There was no ability to post anything that was not subject to censorship. 960 01:05:45,590 --> 01:05:49,750 You might find yourself being held liable for anything that you said 961 01:05:49,750 --> 01:05:53,870 could be proven to be having come from you. If we built a perfect internet that 962 01:05:53,870 --> 01:05:57,290 was completely hacker -proof, we have built a perfect surveillance system for 963 01:05:57,290 --> 01:05:59,010 Big Brother that you can never evade. 964 01:06:05,210 --> 01:06:07,930 We meet today at a transformational moment. 965 01:06:08,950 --> 01:06:09,970 A moment... 966 01:06:10,240 --> 01:06:15,440 in history when our interconnected world presents us at once with great promise, 967 01:06:15,620 --> 01:06:17,120 but also great peril. 968 01:06:17,420 --> 01:06:22,680 The very technologies that empower us to create and to build also empower those 969 01:06:22,680 --> 01:06:24,700 who would disrupt and destroy. 970 01:06:25,200 --> 01:06:30,820 This world, cyberspace, is a world that we depend on every single day. 971 01:06:31,360 --> 01:06:33,160 It's our hardware and our software. 972 01:06:33,630 --> 01:06:38,490 Our desktops and laptops and cell phones and BlackBerrys that have become woven 973 01:06:38,490 --> 01:06:40,630 into every aspect of our lives. 974 01:06:41,090 --> 01:06:46,050 The broadband networks beneath us and the wireless signals around us. The 975 01:06:46,050 --> 01:06:51,110 networks in our schools and hospitals and businesses and the massive grids 976 01:06:51,110 --> 01:06:52,110 power our nation. 977 01:06:52,330 --> 01:06:55,750 The classified military and intelligence networks that keep us safe. 978 01:06:56,010 --> 01:07:00,770 And the World Wide Web that has made us more interconnected than at any time in 979 01:07:00,770 --> 01:07:01,770 human history. 980 01:07:01,900 --> 01:07:05,460 The vast majority of our critical information infrastructure in the United 981 01:07:05,460 --> 01:07:09,880 States is owned and operated by the private sector. Traditionally, 982 01:07:09,880 --> 01:07:12,080 military stuff and civilian stuff were different. 983 01:07:12,740 --> 01:07:16,180 Both had planes, the avionics would be different. 984 01:07:16,380 --> 01:07:19,100 Both had computers, they would work differently. 985 01:07:19,360 --> 01:07:20,360 That's changing. 986 01:07:20,520 --> 01:07:23,960 Technology is moving so fast that government can't keep up. 987 01:07:24,580 --> 01:07:28,860 They're forced to buy the same stuff that we use. That's a very interesting 988 01:07:28,860 --> 01:07:29,860 situation. 989 01:07:29,960 --> 01:07:34,240 Everybody is using the same operating systems, the same networking 990 01:07:34,600 --> 01:07:36,620 the same hardware, the same software. 991 01:07:37,120 --> 01:07:44,060 And whether it's a person or a bank or a military or a foreign military, we're 992 01:07:44,060 --> 01:07:45,060 all using the same stuff. 993 01:07:46,080 --> 01:07:51,100 And yes, this is different and we're not used to it. It's not going away. 994 01:07:52,160 --> 01:07:55,800 We're never going to go back to the military being on the leading edge. 995 01:07:56,320 --> 01:08:00,820 Because leading edge moves so fast and only industry has that distributed 996 01:08:00,820 --> 01:08:04,660 ability to try every option and have the correct one succeed. 997 01:08:04,940 --> 01:08:07,920 Only the market can do that. Government can't. 998 01:08:08,440 --> 01:08:13,120 The government is forced to rely on corporate security. 999 01:08:13,500 --> 01:08:18,060 We've just come out with the Cyberscope, which is this probe right here. 1000 01:08:18,750 --> 01:08:23,310 And as far as network security, it takes it to a new level. We have over 140 1001 01:08:23,310 --> 01:08:27,710 federal agencies that use this, from the intelligence community, Department of 1002 01:08:27,710 --> 01:08:30,250 Defense, as well as civilian agencies. 1003 01:08:30,649 --> 01:08:35,189 We sell a bit to the military and U .S. government, but we also sell to 1004 01:08:35,189 --> 01:08:38,069 organizations that are just trying to audit their system. 1005 01:08:38,350 --> 01:08:40,470 So all of a sudden you have the military with... 1006 01:08:40,830 --> 01:08:45,149 Next generation cellular communications in an area that typically wasn't 1007 01:08:45,149 --> 01:08:51,710 available. The private industry owns at least 85 % of the digital 1008 01:08:51,710 --> 01:08:54,050 infrastructure that we are all so dependent upon. 1009 01:08:54,330 --> 01:08:58,510 When you mention cybersecurity to most members of Congress, they just kind of 1010 01:08:58,510 --> 01:08:59,510 glaze over. 1011 01:08:59,649 --> 01:09:04,649 And they don't really get it. They don't want to get it. My administration will 1012 01:09:04,649 --> 01:09:09,050 pursue a new comprehensive approach to securing America's digital 1013 01:09:09,050 --> 01:09:13,680 infrastructure. I think there is a lack of understanding among the politicians, 1014 01:09:13,819 --> 01:09:20,180 and it might be due to the fact that the know -how has moved to the younger 1015 01:09:20,180 --> 01:09:23,439 generation, and they are not very eager to move to politics. 1016 01:09:23,840 --> 01:09:29,060 I get the phone call, and, you know, hi, I'm from the White House. Well, 1017 01:09:29,080 --> 01:09:32,100 actually, I'm really from DHS. Well, actually, I'm the liaison between the 1018 01:09:32,180 --> 01:09:35,420 so, you know, I have a couple different titles. But anyway, there's this 1019 01:09:35,420 --> 01:09:38,460 Homeland Security Advisory Council we want you to be a part of. 1020 01:09:39,149 --> 01:09:42,390 And I'm thinking, oh, that's not so bad. I can read white papers. I can provide 1021 01:09:42,390 --> 01:09:44,689 my advice. Sure, yeah, sure. Yeah, I'll take it. 1022 01:09:45,029 --> 01:09:49,130 The next day I come into work and I've got all these ethics disclosure forms 1023 01:09:49,130 --> 01:09:52,790 Office of Professional Responsibility and security clearance. 1024 01:09:53,050 --> 01:09:53,988 I call them back. 1025 01:09:53,990 --> 01:09:56,250 How is this really working? What are my responsibilities? 1026 01:09:56,670 --> 01:10:00,750 But as a technologist, I get to deal with a lot of questions that touch our 1027 01:10:00,750 --> 01:10:03,990 lives every day because almost every government initiative depends on IT 1028 01:10:03,990 --> 01:10:06,810 systems. Anything to do with border crossing, that's technology. 1029 01:10:07,310 --> 01:10:11,070 Air traffic control, FEMA, emergency communications, all of this stuff relies 1030 01:10:11,070 --> 01:10:11,949 computer networks. 1031 01:10:11,950 --> 01:10:13,830 But there's never been an overarching coordination. 1032 01:10:14,130 --> 01:10:17,830 And to me, that's an acknowledgment that there has never been a recognition on 1033 01:10:17,830 --> 01:10:21,270 the part of the federal government that this is a really serious thing. 1034 01:10:22,770 --> 01:10:23,910 Nations want secrets. 1035 01:10:24,210 --> 01:10:28,150 They're going to break into governments and companies and try to steal plans and 1036 01:10:28,150 --> 01:10:32,870 chemical formulas and troop movements and how we route airplanes. 1037 01:10:33,390 --> 01:10:35,950 things that might help them at a very strategic level or might give their 1038 01:10:35,950 --> 01:10:37,510 companies a competitive advantage. 1039 01:10:38,250 --> 01:10:42,510 China's interests have been long -term to look at our government. 1040 01:10:42,860 --> 01:10:47,440 And to look at what our military is doing, looking at what various agencies 1041 01:10:47,440 --> 01:10:52,040 the federal government are up to, and also what our academic institutions are 1042 01:10:52,040 --> 01:10:56,340 capable of doing, stealing research and the intellectual property associated 1043 01:10:56,340 --> 01:10:57,380 with universities. 1044 01:10:57,940 --> 01:11:02,420 And they even go so far as to look at individual companies and trying to 1045 01:11:02,420 --> 01:11:06,040 out what their business plans might be and how they might impact Chinese 1046 01:11:06,040 --> 01:11:09,880 companies. CBS News has learned that there are factories in China and 1047 01:11:09,880 --> 01:11:14,380 Asia. that are exact replicas of plants in the United States, built with 1048 01:11:14,380 --> 01:11:18,560 everything from hacked blueprints and supplier lists down to the settings used 1049 01:11:18,560 --> 01:11:21,280 to regulate valve pressures for individual machines. 1050 01:11:21,800 --> 01:11:25,820 Two years ago, hackers stole top -secret exploration data from oil and gas 1051 01:11:25,820 --> 01:11:31,300 industry giants ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Marathon Oil. In 1052 01:11:31,300 --> 01:11:34,840 Systems of Central Command, the State Department, Department of Commerce, and 1053 01:11:34,840 --> 01:11:37,440 NASA were successfully hacked. They lost. 1054 01:11:37,790 --> 01:11:40,030 Millions of pages of classified information. 1055 01:11:40,350 --> 01:11:45,030 This country is completely under attack 24 -7. And not just our country, 1056 01:11:45,090 --> 01:11:46,068 everybody's country. 1057 01:11:46,070 --> 01:11:48,150 And not just governments, but companies and corporations. 1058 01:11:48,490 --> 01:11:51,450 It's a giant feeding frenzy out there. Here's another question. 1059 01:11:51,990 --> 01:11:57,030 And this might have an interesting perspective from the various areas that 1060 01:11:57,030 --> 01:11:59,370 come from, the various nations they come from. 1061 01:12:00,930 --> 01:12:02,790 What's your nightmare scenario? 1062 01:12:03,710 --> 01:12:06,710 In other words, the event that you fear the most. 1063 01:12:07,130 --> 01:12:09,030 I live in a world of nightmares. 1064 01:12:09,370 --> 01:12:15,930 In fact, I'm in charge of the cyber defense agency in France, and I'm paid 1065 01:12:15,930 --> 01:12:16,930 imagine nightmares. 1066 01:12:17,330 --> 01:12:21,690 In addition to the attacks on the nation's telecommunications 1067 01:12:21,690 --> 01:12:26,930 are also now receiving alarming reports of significant and growing power outages 1068 01:12:26,930 --> 01:12:31,470 in major metropolitan areas in the eastern half of the United States. 1069 01:12:31,770 --> 01:12:35,290 You're going to see planes being grounded now. You're going to see trains 1070 01:12:35,290 --> 01:12:36,850 taking to the track. 1071 01:12:37,250 --> 01:12:38,690 People are going to stop moving. 1072 01:12:38,910 --> 01:12:44,010 Do we have a declared policy in the cyber realm in the same way we had for 1073 01:12:44,010 --> 01:12:46,590 decades in the realm of nuclear weapons? 1074 01:12:51,230 --> 01:12:53,150 So I want to answer a question from this morning. 1075 01:12:53,510 --> 01:12:54,670 What's your nightmare scenario? 1076 01:12:55,550 --> 01:12:58,430 My nightmare scenario is that we spend our time thinking about nightmare 1077 01:12:58,430 --> 01:12:59,430 scenarios. 1078 01:12:59,630 --> 01:13:03,330 This is important. There's a certain blindness that comes to worst -case 1079 01:13:03,330 --> 01:13:07,590 thinking. It leads to bad decisions, it leads to bad system design, and it leads 1080 01:13:07,590 --> 01:13:08,509 to bad security. 1081 01:13:08,510 --> 01:13:12,090 And you all know an example of this, airline security and the TSA. 1082 01:13:12,590 --> 01:13:15,350 That's what you get when you think about nightmare scenarios. 1083 01:13:15,570 --> 01:13:17,610 That's what you get from worst -case decision -making. 1084 01:13:17,810 --> 01:13:20,970 We will take action against that nation -state. Now, specifically what that is, 1085 01:13:21,030 --> 01:13:23,870 I don't think you should say publicly, but we have ways to do that. What 1086 01:13:23,870 --> 01:13:27,210 everybody in this room will be judged on, and trust me, you'll all be judged. 1087 01:13:27,630 --> 01:13:33,070 when this is all over for years to come, is did we carve out every absolute 1088 01:13:33,070 --> 01:13:35,350 option, every piece of power we had? 1089 01:13:36,630 --> 01:13:38,370 Cyber war is largely hype. 1090 01:13:38,810 --> 01:13:42,730 I mean, it's hype by the media because it's cool and interesting, but it's 1091 01:13:42,730 --> 01:13:45,790 really hype by the government trying to seize more control. 1092 01:13:46,390 --> 01:13:49,550 I mean, there's a huge power struggle going on in government right now. It's 1093 01:13:49,550 --> 01:13:55,090 the NSA, Homeland Security, FBI, over who gets control over the Internet and 1094 01:13:55,090 --> 01:13:55,809 Internet security. 1095 01:13:55,810 --> 01:13:57,070 And the NSA is winning. 1096 01:13:57,840 --> 01:14:04,560 And they're winning by pushing this cyber war fear, this fear of cyber 1097 01:14:04,560 --> 01:14:08,640 attacking us. It's largely nonsense. It's largely hype. It doesn't hold up to 1098 01:14:08,640 --> 01:14:10,980 scrutiny. But it's big and scary. 1099 01:14:11,280 --> 01:14:14,840 And when people are scared, they're much more willing to give up their 1100 01:14:14,840 --> 01:14:17,580 liberties, their privacy, their freedoms to someone who will make them feel 1101 01:14:17,580 --> 01:14:19,980 safer. Is the public scared? 1102 01:14:20,900 --> 01:14:22,560 Yes, and that's a good thing. 1103 01:14:23,760 --> 01:14:25,620 Now the maze has changed again. 1104 01:14:26,190 --> 01:14:31,810 near its very end. Things go smoothly enough at first as the mouse proceeds on 1105 01:14:31,810 --> 01:14:33,970 the basis of information it remembers. 1106 01:14:35,250 --> 01:14:37,010 Now it's running into trouble. 1107 01:14:38,770 --> 01:14:42,890 But fortunately, it is able to adapt to this new situation. 1108 01:14:43,290 --> 01:14:49,150 It resorts once more to trial and error and acquires reliable new information to 1109 01:14:49,150 --> 01:14:50,150 replace the old. 1110 01:14:53,290 --> 01:14:58,250 My doomsday scenario is a single EMP bomb above the country. 1111 01:14:58,710 --> 01:15:05,150 If you can build one nuke and you can blow it up 200 to 500 miles above the 1112 01:15:05,150 --> 01:15:11,330 country, the resulting electromagnetic pulse is enough to basically stop almost 1113 01:15:11,330 --> 01:15:13,790 all electronics in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 1114 01:15:14,070 --> 01:15:16,770 And when that happens, you're screwed. 1115 01:15:17,630 --> 01:15:18,770 There's no fixing that. 1116 01:15:18,990 --> 01:15:21,150 It would take us back to the 1920s. 1117 01:15:21,500 --> 01:15:24,820 with the resulting population of the 1920s, because that's all our 1118 01:15:24,820 --> 01:15:29,060 infrastructure would be. And I think about 180 million people would die in 1119 01:15:29,060 --> 01:15:30,080 country within six months. 1120 01:15:30,380 --> 01:15:31,880 It's pretty severe. 1121 01:15:32,180 --> 01:15:34,340 And that's how dependent we are on technology. 1122 01:15:35,520 --> 01:15:40,480 Is there anything that East West or government institutes around the world 1123 01:15:40,480 --> 01:15:45,400 working with education programs to help close that divide, make it part of the 1124 01:15:45,400 --> 01:15:48,840 mandatory curriculum to help educate kids? 1125 01:15:49,580 --> 01:15:51,700 on the foundation of technology? 1126 01:15:52,080 --> 01:15:55,820 So I think that's kind of backwards. I think the kids need to educate us. I 1127 01:15:55,820 --> 01:15:58,680 mean, the thing about generation gaps is the younger generation always wins 1128 01:15:58,680 --> 01:16:00,080 because the older generation dies. 1129 01:16:01,240 --> 01:16:06,180 And the way the kids are doing it is the correct way. We're doing it wrong. 1130 01:16:06,240 --> 01:16:10,240 We're doing it old, right? Emails for old people, not for kids. 1131 01:16:10,540 --> 01:16:14,840 And that's the way it's going to be. So I think better than us educating... 1132 01:16:15,050 --> 01:16:19,410 the younger generation, is let them educate us on how they use the net, how 1133 01:16:19,410 --> 01:16:23,210 want the net to work, how it fits into their lives so we can build 1134 01:16:23,210 --> 01:16:24,710 infrastructure that benefits them. 1135 01:16:25,150 --> 01:16:27,250 Because the education is not going to go the other way. 1136 01:16:27,690 --> 01:16:30,030 I mean, the internet is the greatest generation gap since rock and roll. 1137 01:16:30,730 --> 01:16:35,430 You know, younger people are using these technologies in ways that the older 1138 01:16:35,430 --> 01:16:37,330 people can't even fathom. 1139 01:16:38,130 --> 01:16:42,430 Regularly, I get people asking me, what can I do to convince my kids not to do 1140 01:16:42,430 --> 01:16:45,030 these things on the net? And I tell them, You can't. 1141 01:16:45,510 --> 01:16:48,830 And more importantly, they're right and you're wrong. 1142 01:16:49,510 --> 01:16:53,750 But the younger generation gets to decide how technology will be used. 1143 01:16:54,130 --> 01:16:59,170 I mean, they're going to build the social systems that will be used in the 1144 01:16:59,170 --> 01:17:06,030 10, 20, 30, 40 years. Because Internet's about people, about connecting people, 1145 01:17:06,210 --> 01:17:10,290 about people being able to find other people of common interest. 1146 01:17:10,800 --> 01:17:14,120 We're being able to communicate with their family or friends in ways that 1147 01:17:14,120 --> 01:17:15,360 impossible before. 1148 01:17:15,600 --> 01:17:19,440 Be able to bring information into communities that didn't have access to 1149 01:17:19,440 --> 01:17:26,020 before. To democratize knowledge and information and communication. The 1150 01:17:26,020 --> 01:17:30,560 value of this information is so great that it's changing the planet. 1151 01:17:37,550 --> 01:17:40,630 But sometimes there's a problem without a solution. 1152 01:17:44,930 --> 01:17:48,330 And even a mechanical mouse must have a helping hand. 1153 01:17:49,710 --> 01:17:54,070 I'm not sure if I know how to end this story. 1154 01:17:54,870 --> 01:17:59,550 Where does this story end? Does it happen anywhere? The problem with ending 1155 01:17:59,550 --> 01:18:03,030 we're still in the middle of it. We are in the middle of the information age 1156 01:18:03,030 --> 01:18:04,030 revolution. 1157 01:18:04,040 --> 01:18:07,940 In 50 years, you can do this documentary, and you know how it ends. 1158 01:18:09,020 --> 01:18:13,600 Now, in the middle, we can just guess, and not even very well. 1159 01:18:14,220 --> 01:18:16,960 When you're riding the ride, you don't know how it ends. 1160 01:18:17,320 --> 01:18:18,320 That's just the way it goes. 1161 01:18:18,520 --> 01:18:20,500 On the plus side, it's kind of a fun ride. 1162 01:18:22,580 --> 01:18:27,140 This agile, three -wheeled little mouse contains a small bar magnet. 1163 01:18:28,000 --> 01:18:32,440 100 relays and electrical circuits. Remember the directions for the mouse. 1164 01:18:34,030 --> 01:18:38,730 Dr. Shannon's mechanical mouse demonstrates that machines can learn by 1165 01:18:38,730 --> 01:18:43,850 experience and can revise what they've learned when it no longer works. Two 1166 01:18:43,850 --> 01:18:47,350 important characteristics, at least, of intelligent behavior. 1167 01:19:15,280 --> 01:19:18,940 Lives are being rapidly changed by the development of large computing machines. 1168 01:19:19,920 --> 01:19:23,920 A complete computer system weighs 22 ,000 pounds. 1169 01:19:24,540 --> 01:19:31,280 When the hero of any science fiction show has a problem, he usually turns to 1170 01:19:31,280 --> 01:19:37,180 trusty computer for an answer. Sometimes, they think so hard, they get 1171 01:19:37,720 --> 01:19:39,500 They blow their cool. 1172 01:19:41,780 --> 01:19:46,710 Around the world, Economic factors will continue to stimulate the application of 1173 01:19:46,710 --> 01:19:47,910 computers to new areas. 1174 01:19:48,310 --> 01:19:53,190 But advancing computer hardware technology is just one part of the 1175 01:19:53,190 --> 01:19:57,090 to Ken Jennings now. Bram Stoker is what we're looking for, and we find. 1176 01:19:57,350 --> 01:20:01,610 Who is Stoker? I, for one, welcome our new computer overlord. 1177 01:20:07,350 --> 01:20:09,390 Accurately and tirelessly. 1178 01:20:09,750 --> 01:20:10,990 Electronic computers. 1179 01:20:11,640 --> 01:20:16,680 can trace out the consequences of a thousand possible actions, can pick out 1180 01:20:16,680 --> 01:20:21,980 best design among thousands of possible designs, thus providing a better base 1181 01:20:21,980 --> 01:20:24,640 for the informed exercise of human judgment. 113322

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