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Laura, at this stage I can offer nothing
more than my word.
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I am a senior government employee in the
intelligence community.
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I hope you understand that contacting
you is extremely high risk, and you are
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willing to agree to the following
precautions before I share more.
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This will not be a waste of your time.
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The following sounds complex, but should
only take minutes to complete for
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someone technical.
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I would like to confirm out of email
that the keys we exchanged were not
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intercepted and replaced by your
surveillance.
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Please confirm that no one has ever had
a copy of your private key and that it
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uses a strong passphrase. Assume your
adversary is capable of one trillion
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guesses per second.
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If the device you store the private key
and enter your passphrase on has been
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hacked, it is trivial to decrypt our
communications.
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Understand that the above steps are not
bulletproof and are intended only to
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give us breathing room. In the end, if
you publish the source material, I will
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likely be immediately implicated.
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This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.
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Thank you and be careful.
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Hey,
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can you hear me?
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I am here, David. How are you?
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Well, I would just start by pointing to
what Barack Obama himself said about
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those questions when he was running.
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For the office that he now occupies, in
December of 2007, he said, quote, the
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president does not have the power under
the Constitution to unilaterally
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authorize a military attack in a
situation that does not involve stopping
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actual or imminent threat to the nation.
So by Obama's own words, the president
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does not have the power that he's now
exercising under the Constitution.
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And as far as why it matters, on August
1, 2007, when he laid out his reasons
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why he was running for office and why he
thought it was so important to change
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the way we were doing things, he said,
quote, no more ignoring the law when
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inconvenient. That is not who we are. We
will again set an example for the world
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that the law is not subject to the whims
of stubborn rulers.
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So to allow presidents to simply start
words on their own.
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You asked why I picked you.
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I didn't. You did.
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The surveillance you've experienced
means you've been selected, a term which
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will mean more to you as you learn about
how the modern SIGINT system works.
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For now, know that every border you
cross, every purchase you make, every
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you dial, every cell phone tower you
pass, friend you keep, article you
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site you visit, subject line you type,
and packet you route, is in the hands of
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a system whose reach is unlimited, but
whose safeguards are not.
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Your victimization by the NSA system
means that you are well aware of the
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that unrestricted, secret police pose
for democracies.
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This is a story you bet you can tell.
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Thank you for inviting me here to give
me the opportunity to express my story.
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But let me give you some of my
background.
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I spent about four years in the military
and then I went into NSA directly. So I
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ended up with about 37 years of service
combined.
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Most of it was a lot of fun, I tell you.
It was really a lot of fun breaking
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these puzzles, solving problems and
things like that. And that's really what
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did. I fundamentally started working out
with data, looking at data and data
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systems and how you do that. I was
developing this concept of analysis that
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could lay it out in such a way that it
could be coded and executed
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electronically, meaning you could
automate analysis.
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And it has to do with metadata and using
metadata relationships.
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So that was my whole...
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Being there, I didn't say that.
Eventually, that's what I ended up
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the only one there doing that, by the
way.
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So, at any rate, 9 -11 happened, and it
must have been right after a few days,
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no more than a week after 9 -11, that
they had decided to begin actively
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on everyone in this country.
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And they wanted that back part of our
program to run all the spying.
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All right?
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So that's exactly what they did.
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And then he started taking the telecom
data, and it expanded after that.
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So, I mean, the one I knew was AT &T,
and that one provided 320 million
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every day.
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That program was reauthorized every 45
days by what I called the YES Committee,
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which was Hayden and Tennant and the
DOJ.
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The program was called Stellar Wind.
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So first I went to the House
Intelligence Committee and the staff
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personally knew there.
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She then went to the chairman of that
committee.
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Nancy Pelosi was the minority rep.
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They were all briefed into the program
at the time, by the way, and all the
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other programs that were going on,
including all these CIA programs.
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I wasn't alone in this. There were four
others out of NSA, and we were all
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trying to work internally in the
government over these years, trying to
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to come around to being constitutionally
acceptable and take it into the courts
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and have the courts' oversight of it,
too.
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So we naively kept thinking that that
could happen, and it never did.
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But at any rate, after that and all the
stuff we were doing, they decided to
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raid us to keep us quiet, threaten us,
you know.
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So we were raided simultaneously, four
of us. In my case, they came in with
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drawn. I don't know why they did that,
but they did.
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Laura, I will answer what I remember of
your questions as best I can. Forgive
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the lack of structure.
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I am not a writer, and I have to draft
this in a great hurry.
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What you know as Stellar Wind has grown.
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SSO, the expanded special source
operations that took over Stellar Wind's
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of the pie, has spread all over the
world to practically include
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coverage of the United States.
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Disturbingly, The amount of U .S.
communication ingested by NSA is still
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increasing.
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Publicly, we complain that things are
going dark, but in fact, our accesses
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improving.
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The truth is that the NSA has never in
its history collected more than it does
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now.
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I know the location of most domestic
interception points and that the largest
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telecommunication companies in the U .S.
are betraying the trust of their
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customers, which I can prove.
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We are building the greatest weapon for
oppression in the history of man, yet
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its directors exempt themselves from
accountability.
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NSA director Keith Alexander lied to
Congress, which I can prove.
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Billions of U .S. communications are
being intercepted.
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In gathering evidence of wrongdoing, I
focus on the wronging of the American
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people. But believe me when I say that
the surveillance we live under is the
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highest privilege compared to how we
treat the rest of the world.
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This I can also prove.
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On cyber operations, the government's
public citizen is that we still lack a
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policy framework.
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This too is a lie. There is a detailed
policy framework, a kind of Markle law
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for cyber operations created by the
White House.
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It's called Presidential Policy
Directive 20 and was finalized at the
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last year.
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This I can also prove.
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I appreciate your concern for my safety,
but I already know how this will end
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for me, and I accept the risk.
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If I have luck, and you are careful, you
will have everything you need.
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I ask only that you ensure this
information makes it home to the
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public.
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Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens emails?
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No.
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Does the NSA intercept Americans cell
phone conversations?
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No. Google searches?
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No. Text messages?
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No. Amazon .com orders?
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No. Bank records?
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No. What judicial consent is required
for NSA to intercept communications
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and information involving American
citizens?
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Within the United States, that would be
the FBI lead. If it was a foreign actor
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in the United States, the FBI would
still have to lead and could work that
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NSA or other intelligence agencies as
authorized.
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But to conduct that kind of collection
in the United States, it would have to
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through a court order.
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and the court would have to authorize
it. We are not authorized to do it, nor
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we do it.
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All right.
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The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is now in session.
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Please be seated.
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Good morning and welcome to the Ninth
Circuit.
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The first case for argument is Jewell v.
National Security Agency.
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You may proceed.
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May it please the Court, Kevin Bankston
for Carolyn Jewell and her fellow
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plaintiff appellants in Jewell v. NSA.
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Your Honors, plaintiffs have
specifically alleged that their own
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and communications records have been
acquired by the government.
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But the district court found that we had
failed to allege facts that
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differentiated the injury that our
plaintiffs suffered from the injury
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by every other AT &T user whose
communications and records have been
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the government, basically concluding
that so long as everyone is being
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surveilled, no one has standing to sue.
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However, to deny standing to persons who
are injured simply because many others
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are also injured would mean that the
most injurious and widespread government
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actions could be questioned by nobody.
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Do you have anything concrete that, in
fact, a specific communication of your
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client was intercepted? We have evidence
that all the communications passing
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between AT &T's network and other
networks in their Northern California
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have been intercepted, and so that would
necessarily include the Internet
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communications of our Northern
California plaintiffs.
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Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.
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May it please the court, I'm Thomas
Byron from the Department of Justice
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behalf of the government defendants. We
think this litigation need not be
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resolved in federal court in light of
the oversight of the political branches,
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both legislative and executive, which
provides a better opportunity for
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oversight and resolution of the concerns
raised concerning nationwide policy of
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alleged surveillance in these... in
these complaints. Even if it's revealed
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one or more of the plaintiffs had email
or telephone conversations intercepted
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that had nothing to do with national
security.
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Your Honor, I don't know that anyone
necessarily would have standing to raise
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the particular claims at issue in these
two cases.
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We think instead that the kinds of
claims at issue here against these...
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defendants are those that are better
suited to resolution before the
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representative branches of our
government. So what rule would the
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if your approach is adopted?
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Judge Ferguson, I think that the... I
mean, we just get out of the way, is
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it? Well, Judge Ferguson, I think that
there is a narrow category, a subset of
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cases in which it may be appropriate to
step aside.
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for that narrow category of cases. But
the judiciary plays a role.
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To be sure, Judge Ferguson.
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In our system.
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Yes, Your Honor.
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And we don't mean to diminish that.
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You're asking us to abdicate that role.
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No, Your Honor, but it is a question of
this court's discretion whether to reach
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that issue.
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We do think that there is simply no way
for the litigation to proceed without
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risk of divulging those very questions
of privileged information that would
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cause, as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,
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grave damage to national security if
disclosed.
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Thanks for having me.
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If anybody has any questions, like I
said, just basically just raise your
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and I'll try to call on you as soon as I
possibly can.
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Who here actually feels like they are
under surveillance pretty regularly?
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Everyone inside of Occupy. How many
people here have been arrested and at
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court date they had their phone taken
into the back room?
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How many people here had their retina
scanned?
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Wow.
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So you guys are actually, in a sense,
the canaries in the coal mine, right?
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Because the incentives are all lined up
against you.
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Anybody see on the subway, link your
MetroCard to your debit card?
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and auto -refill.
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This is a concept which is key to
everything we'll talk about today. It's
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linkability. Take one piece of data and
link it to another piece of data.
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For example, if you have your MetroCard
and you have your debit card, you have
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those things and you can draw a line
between them.
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That's not a scary thing.
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Except your bank card is tied to
everything else that you do during the
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they know where you're going, when you
make purchases.
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When they decide to target you, they can
actually recreate your exact steps.
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with a MetroCard and with a credit card
alone, like literally where you go and
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what you buy.
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And potentially, by linking that data
with other people on similar travel
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they can figure out who you talked to
and who you met with.
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When you then take cell phone data,
which logs your location, and you link
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purchasing data, MetroCard data, and
your debit card, you start to get what
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could call metadata in aggregate over a
person's life.
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And metadata in aggregate is content.
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It tells a story about you, which is
made up of facts, but it's not
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true. So, for example, just because you
were on the corner and all those data
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points point to it, it doesn't mean you
committed a crime.
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So it's important to note that if
someone has a perception of you having
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thing, it will now follow you for the
rest of your life.
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So just keep in mind that what happens
to you guys, for example, with
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fingerprints and retinal scans and
photographs...
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That is what is going to happen to
people in the future when they resist
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changes and when they try to protest in
a totally constitutionally protected
230
00:18:08,160 --> 00:18:09,160
way.
231
00:18:09,940 --> 00:18:13,280
This is for you, Director Clapper, again
on the surveillance front. And I hope
232
00:18:13,280 --> 00:18:17,320
we can do this in just a yes or no
answer because I know Senator Feinstein
233
00:18:17,320 --> 00:18:18,099
to move on.
234
00:18:18,100 --> 00:18:25,100
So does the NSA collect any type of data
at all on millions or hundreds of
235
00:18:25,100 --> 00:18:26,260
millions of Americans?
236
00:18:27,560 --> 00:18:28,560
No, sir.
237
00:18:29,380 --> 00:18:30,380
It does not?
238
00:18:31,850 --> 00:18:33,010
Not wittingly.
239
00:18:33,850 --> 00:18:40,130
There are cases where they could
inadvertently, perhaps, collect, but not
240
00:18:40,130 --> 00:18:41,130
wittingly.
241
00:19:06,860 --> 00:19:10,180
The encrypted archive should be
available to you within seven days.
242
00:19:10,540 --> 00:19:12,940
The key will follow when everything else
is done.
243
00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:19,600
The material I provide and investigative
effort required will be too much for
244
00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:20,600
any one person.
245
00:19:20,760 --> 00:19:24,160
I recommend, at a very minimum, you
involve Glenn Greenwald.
246
00:19:24,380 --> 00:19:25,660
I believe you know him.
247
00:19:28,180 --> 00:19:32,300
The plain text of the payload will
include my true name details for the
248
00:19:33,580 --> 00:19:37,520
though it will be your decision as to
whether or how to declare my
249
00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:42,500
My personal desire is that you paint the
target directly on my back.
250
00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:48,880
No one, not even my most trusted
confidant, is aware of my intentions,
251
00:19:48,880 --> 00:19:51,800
would not be fair for them to fall under
suspicion for my actions.
252
00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:57,080
You may be the only one who can prevent
that, and that is by immediately nailing
253
00:19:57,080 --> 00:19:59,700
me to the cross, rather than trying to
protect me as a source.
254
00:20:03,180 --> 00:20:05,860
On timing regarding meeting up in Hong
Kong.
255
00:20:06,980 --> 00:20:11,020
The first rendezvous attempt will be at
10 a .m. local time on Monday.
256
00:20:12,140 --> 00:20:15,600
We will meet in the hallway outside of a
restaurant in the Mira Hotel.
257
00:20:17,340 --> 00:20:20,360
I will be working on a Rubik's Cube so
you can identify me.
258
00:20:22,120 --> 00:20:24,700
Approach me and ask if I know the hours
of the restaurant.
259
00:20:25,700 --> 00:20:29,720
I'll respond by stating that I'm not
sure and suggest you try the lounge
260
00:20:29,720 --> 00:20:30,720
instead.
261
00:20:30,930 --> 00:20:33,950
I'll offer to show you where it is, and
at that point, we're good.
262
00:20:35,170 --> 00:20:36,830
You simply need to follow naturally.
263
00:21:14,879 --> 00:21:18,700
As far as positioning, I mean, if you
want us to sit in any particular way.
264
00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:20,500
You know, I'm going to go there.
265
00:21:20,820 --> 00:21:21,820
Okay.
266
00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:34,360
There's so many different
267
00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:40,900
enormous stories just that are kind of
stand -alone stories that
268
00:21:41,680 --> 00:21:45,520
even certain things about individual
documents that can just be their own
269
00:21:45,900 --> 00:21:47,940
And I just want to start turning those
stories out.
270
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:50,640
I basically woke up this morning and
already started writing stories.
271
00:21:51,740 --> 00:21:57,860
So I'm hoping to start publishing within
a day or two days, as long as you're
272
00:21:57,860 --> 00:21:58,860
good with that.
273
00:21:59,080 --> 00:22:05,620
And so as far as the stuff we have to
talk about, I'm kind of dichotomizing it
274
00:22:05,620 --> 00:22:06,620
between...
275
00:22:08,650 --> 00:22:11,070
You know, stuff that I'd like to talk to
you about in terms of like the
276
00:22:11,070 --> 00:22:13,670
documents and the content. And Laura has
a bunch of questions about that as
277
00:22:13,670 --> 00:22:17,090
well. Sort of working through the
documents, getting your take on a lot of
278
00:22:17,090 --> 00:22:20,750
stuff that, you know, will help me
understand it better. But then also the
279
00:22:20,750 --> 00:22:26,130
of you story, right? Like the who you
are, what you've done, why you've done
280
00:22:26,130 --> 00:22:28,190
what you've done. And I'd love to do
that first.
281
00:22:28,650 --> 00:22:33,510
Okay. In part because you're the only
one who could do that. So I'd like to
282
00:22:33,510 --> 00:22:34,610
get it done so that it's done.
283
00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:39,920
And also because, you know, it might be
that you want to do that early because
284
00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:43,920
it might be necessary or we might choose
to have that done early.
285
00:22:44,180 --> 00:22:48,580
Tell me your thoughts on where you are
with that. The primary one on that, I
286
00:22:48,580 --> 00:22:54,380
think I've expressed a couple times
online, is I feel the modern media has a
287
00:22:54,380 --> 00:22:56,000
focus on personalities.
288
00:22:56,240 --> 00:23:02,160
Totally. And I'm a little concerned the
more we focus on that, the more they're
289
00:23:02,160 --> 00:23:03,220
going to use that as a distraction.
290
00:23:04,680 --> 00:23:08,000
And I don't necessarily want that to
happen, which is why I've consistently
291
00:23:08,000 --> 00:23:10,520
said, you know, I'm not the story here.
292
00:23:12,660 --> 00:23:15,220
Nervous, huh? No, it's a very, very
cheap plan.
293
00:23:15,520 --> 00:23:17,200
Go ahead.
294
00:23:18,880 --> 00:23:25,580
But, yeah, anything I can do to help you
guys get this out, I will do.
295
00:23:25,860 --> 00:23:31,720
I don't have any experience with media
with how this works.
296
00:23:32,709 --> 00:23:35,330
So I'm kind of learning as I go.
297
00:23:36,090 --> 00:23:40,110
Right. So I just want to get a sense of
why did you decide to do what you've
298
00:23:40,110 --> 00:23:45,830
done? So for me, it all comes down to
state power against the people's ability
299
00:23:45,830 --> 00:23:47,930
to meaningfully oppose that power.
300
00:23:48,450 --> 00:23:55,070
And I'm sitting there every day getting
paid to design methods to
301
00:23:55,070 --> 00:24:00,770
amplify that state power. And I'm
realizing that if, you know, the policy
302
00:24:00,770 --> 00:24:07,240
switches, that are the only things that
restrain these states were chained, you
303
00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:11,380
couldn't meaningfully oppose these. I
mean, you would have to be the most
304
00:24:11,380 --> 00:24:14,520
incredibly sophisticated technical actor
in existence.
305
00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:20,320
I mean, I'm not sure there's anybody, no
matter how gifted you are, who could
306
00:24:20,320 --> 00:24:25,540
oppose all of the offices and all the
bright people, even all the mediocre
307
00:24:25,540 --> 00:24:28,240
people out there with all of their tools
and all their capabilities.
308
00:24:29,290 --> 00:24:35,210
And as I saw the promise of the Obama
administration be betrayed and walked
309
00:24:35,210 --> 00:24:42,130
from, and in fact actually advance the
things that had been promised to be sort
310
00:24:42,130 --> 00:24:46,910
of curtailed and reined in and dialed
back, and actually at work, particularly
311
00:24:46,910 --> 00:24:52,030
drone strikes, which I also learned at
NSA, we could watch drone videos from
312
00:24:52,030 --> 00:24:53,030
desktops.
313
00:24:55,939 --> 00:24:59,680
As I saw that, that really hardened me
to action. In real time?
314
00:24:59,980 --> 00:25:01,040
In real time, yeah.
315
00:25:01,840 --> 00:25:05,660
It'll stream a lower quality of the
video to your desktop.
316
00:25:06,140 --> 00:25:09,500
Typically, you'd be watching
surveillance drones as opposed to
317
00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:12,220
you know, murder drones where they're
going out there to bomb somebody.
318
00:25:12,520 --> 00:25:17,040
But you'll have a drone that's just
following somebody's house for hours and
319
00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:20,200
hours. And you won't know who it is
because, you know, you don't have the
320
00:25:20,200 --> 00:25:24,640
context for that. But it's just a page
where it lists and lists.
321
00:25:25,050 --> 00:25:28,690
of drone feeds in all these different
countries under all these different code
322
00:25:28,690 --> 00:25:30,970
names. And you can just click on which
one you want to see.
323
00:25:33,730 --> 00:25:38,250
Right. So if your self -interest is to
live in a world in which there's maximum
324
00:25:38,250 --> 00:25:43,690
privacy, doing something that could put
you into prison in which your privacy is
325
00:25:43,690 --> 00:25:46,470
completely destroyed is sort of the
antithesis of that.
326
00:25:46,690 --> 00:25:50,010
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?
327
00:25:50,820 --> 00:25:55,340
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched, and there's
328
00:25:55,340 --> 00:25:58,640
never been anything in the history of
man that's like it. I mean, you could,
329
00:25:58,660 --> 00:26:04,540
again, have children from one part of
the world having an equal discussion
330
00:26:04,540 --> 00:26:10,900
where, you know, they were sort of
granted the same respect for their ideas
331
00:26:10,900 --> 00:26:15,740
conversation with experts in the field
from another part of the world on any
332
00:26:15,740 --> 00:26:18,440
topic, anywhere, anytime, all the time.
333
00:26:19,300 --> 00:26:25,240
And it was free and unrestrained. And
we've seen the chilling of that and the
334
00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:28,720
cooling of that and the changing of that
model toward something in which people
335
00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:30,300
self -police their own views.
336
00:26:30,540 --> 00:26:35,660
And they literally make jokes about
ending up on the list if they donate to
337
00:26:35,660 --> 00:26:38,420
political cause or if they say something
in a discussion.
338
00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:43,120
And it's become an expectation that
we're being watched.
339
00:26:43,900 --> 00:26:47,160
Many people I've talked to have
mentioned that they're careful about
340
00:26:47,160 --> 00:26:50,900
type into search engines because they
know that it's being recorded. And that
341
00:26:50,900 --> 00:26:54,680
limits the boundaries of their
intellectual exploration.
342
00:26:56,020 --> 00:27:01,860
And I am more willing to
343
00:27:01,860 --> 00:27:08,700
risk imprisonment or any other negative
outcome personally
344
00:27:08,700 --> 00:27:12,260
than I am willing to risk.
345
00:27:13,070 --> 00:27:19,730
the curtailment of my intellectual
freedom and that of those around me whom
346
00:27:19,730 --> 00:27:22,930
care for equally as I do for myself.
347
00:27:23,190 --> 00:27:29,050
And again, that's not to say that I'm
self -sacrificing because it gives me, I
348
00:27:29,050 --> 00:27:33,890
feel good in my human experience to know
that I can contribute to the good of
349
00:27:33,890 --> 00:27:34,890
others.
350
00:27:51,120 --> 00:27:52,280
Could you elaborate on that?
351
00:27:52,680 --> 00:27:59,140
So I don't know how much of the programs
and the actual technical capacity that
352
00:27:59,140 --> 00:28:02,720
everybody's talked to you about, but
there's an infrastructure in place in
353
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:09,160
United States and worldwide that NSA has
built in cooperation
354
00:28:09,160 --> 00:28:15,200
with other governments as well that
intercepts
355
00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:19,240
basically every digital communication.
356
00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:26,680
every radio communication, every analog
communication that it has sensors in
357
00:28:26,680 --> 00:28:27,720
place to detect.
358
00:28:28,020 --> 00:28:34,840
And with these capabilities, basically
the vast majority
359
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:40,700
of human and computer -to -computer
communications, device -based
360
00:28:40,700 --> 00:28:45,320
communications, which sort of inform the
relationships between humans, are
361
00:28:45,320 --> 00:28:47,180
automatically ingested.
362
00:28:47,680 --> 00:28:48,680
without targeting.
363
00:28:48,860 --> 00:28:55,460
And that allows individuals to
retroactively search your communications
364
00:28:55,460 --> 00:29:01,700
on self -certifications. So, for
example, if I wanted to see the content
365
00:29:01,700 --> 00:29:08,540
email or your wife's phone calls or
anything like that, all I have to do
366
00:29:08,540 --> 00:29:12,980
is use what's called a selector, any
kind of...
367
00:29:14,210 --> 00:29:19,950
thing in the communications chain that
might uniquely or almost uniquely
368
00:29:19,950 --> 00:29:21,570
identify you as an individual.
369
00:29:21,810 --> 00:29:25,650
And I'm talking about things like email
addresses, IP addresses, phone numbers,
370
00:29:25,810 --> 00:29:32,090
credit cards, even passwords that are
unique to you that aren't used by anyone
371
00:29:32,090 --> 00:29:33,090
else.
372
00:29:33,370 --> 00:29:37,910
I can input those into the system and it
will not only go back through the
373
00:29:37,910 --> 00:29:41,370
database and go, have I seen this
anywhere in the past?
374
00:29:42,150 --> 00:29:43,150
It will
375
00:29:43,889 --> 00:29:49,270
basically put an additional level of
scrutiny on it, moving into the future
376
00:29:49,270 --> 00:29:53,850
says, if this is detected now or at any
time in the future, I want this to go to
377
00:29:53,850 --> 00:29:58,650
me immediately and alert me in real time
that you're communicating with someone,
378
00:29:58,730 --> 00:29:59,730
things like that.
379
00:30:03,810 --> 00:30:06,450
So I don't know who you are or anything
about you.
380
00:30:06,650 --> 00:30:07,650
Okay.
381
00:30:08,110 --> 00:30:11,930
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton.
382
00:30:12,620 --> 00:30:14,240
a defense contractor.
383
00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:17,180
I'm sort of on loan to NSA.
384
00:30:17,600 --> 00:30:21,060
I don't talk to a Booz Allen boss. I
don't get tasking from Booz Allen. It's
385
00:30:21,060 --> 00:30:21,919
from NSA.
386
00:30:21,920 --> 00:30:23,480
So I don't know your name.
387
00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:24,720
Oh, sorry.
388
00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,500
My name is Edward Snowden. I go by Ed.
389
00:30:30,000 --> 00:30:32,000
Edward Joseph Snowden is the full name.
390
00:30:32,340 --> 00:30:35,120
S -N -O -W -D -E -N.
391
00:30:35,580 --> 00:30:37,160
And where are you from?
392
00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:40,420
I'm originally, I was born in North
Carolina.
393
00:30:40,940 --> 00:30:42,800
a small town, Elizabeth City.
394
00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:45,460
There's a Coast Guard station there. I'm
from a military family.
395
00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:50,780
But I spent most of my time growing up
around Fort Meade in Maryland.
396
00:30:53,000 --> 00:30:57,040
And your family, what's the consequences
for them?
397
00:30:57,540 --> 00:31:01,660
This is actually what has made this
hardest.
398
00:31:02,020 --> 00:31:06,600
My family doesn't know what's happening.
They're unaware.
399
00:31:08,020 --> 00:31:09,420
I don't think...
400
00:31:09,870 --> 00:31:16,510
I'll be able to keep the family ties
that I've had for my life
401
00:31:16,510 --> 00:31:22,970
because of the risk of associating them
with this. And I'll
402
00:31:22,970 --> 00:31:28,410
leave what to publish on this and what
not to publish to you guys. I trust you
403
00:31:28,410 --> 00:31:29,410
to be responsible on this.
404
00:31:31,270 --> 00:31:36,900
But basically, the closer I stay to my
family, the more likely they are to be
405
00:31:36,900 --> 00:31:38,920
leaned on. So you don't want me to
report this?
406
00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:44,780
Yeah, we definitely want to do whatever
we can not to include them or bring them
407
00:31:44,780 --> 00:31:45,780
into the mix.
408
00:31:46,360 --> 00:31:47,219
That's fine.
409
00:31:47,220 --> 00:31:50,960
I'm sorry, let me interrupt you. Can we
just stop for a second and do the
410
00:31:50,960 --> 00:31:52,220
document and then go back to that?
411
00:31:53,409 --> 00:31:56,790
What do I need? Do I need an email
address that we're using?
412
00:31:57,170 --> 00:31:59,130
Well, so you can send them.
413
00:31:59,570 --> 00:32:02,230
Once you've encrypted it, you can send
it from whatever you think is
414
00:32:02,230 --> 00:32:06,550
appropriate. The main thing is you've
got to encapsulate all of this in a way
415
00:32:06,550 --> 00:32:13,130
that it can't be decrypted and read in
transit across the network or on
416
00:32:13,130 --> 00:32:14,550
either of the endpoints.
417
00:32:14,790 --> 00:32:17,970
Okay. I mean, just so you know, these
documents are basically all going to be.
418
00:32:18,330 --> 00:32:23,310
public within 48 hours, 72 hours,
whatever. You want to get in the process
419
00:32:23,310 --> 00:32:26,710
doing this for everything because it
seems hard, but it's not hard. It's
420
00:32:26,710 --> 00:32:28,830
easy. Just walk me through it.
421
00:32:29,150 --> 00:32:32,830
Show me the actual folder structure
where these files are first.
422
00:32:36,490 --> 00:32:38,350
How many documents did you say there
were?
423
00:32:39,050 --> 00:32:40,050
Seven.
424
00:32:40,710 --> 00:32:41,710
Okay, go ahead.
425
00:32:44,490 --> 00:32:47,490
How many documents are we talking about?
Because when The Guardian did
426
00:32:47,490 --> 00:32:52,270
WikiLeaks, technical people set up a
system so that they were available for
427
00:32:52,270 --> 00:32:53,270
anybody to see.
428
00:32:53,410 --> 00:32:59,470
And I just wonder if it's possible to do
the same thing. That would be the ideal
429
00:32:59,470 --> 00:33:05,810
endgame. But because some of these
documents are
430
00:33:05,810 --> 00:33:10,690
legitimately classified in ways that
could cause harm to people and methods.
431
00:33:12,270 --> 00:33:16,250
I'm comfortable in my technical ability
to protect them. I mean, you could
432
00:33:16,250 --> 00:33:19,850
literally shoot me or torture me, and I
could not disclose the password if I
433
00:33:19,850 --> 00:33:20,850
wanted to.
434
00:33:22,530 --> 00:33:25,130
I have the sophistication to do that.
435
00:33:25,590 --> 00:33:29,950
There are some journalists that I think
could do that, but there are a number of
436
00:33:29,950 --> 00:33:36,310
them that couldn't. But the question
becomes, can an organization actually
437
00:33:36,310 --> 00:33:39,890
control that information in that manner?
438
00:33:40,510 --> 00:33:43,370
without risking basically an
uncontrolled disclosure.
439
00:33:43,610 --> 00:33:48,430
But I do agree with that. Honestly, I
don't want to be the person making
440
00:33:48,430 --> 00:33:52,730
decisions on what should be public and
what shouldn't, which is why rather than
441
00:33:52,730 --> 00:33:57,930
publishing these on my own or putting
them out openly, I'm running them
442
00:33:57,930 --> 00:34:02,950
journalists so that my bias... and my
things, because clearly I have some
443
00:34:02,950 --> 00:34:08,030
strongly held views, are removed from
that equation and the public interest is
444
00:34:08,030 --> 00:34:09,929
being represented in the most
responsible manner.
445
00:34:11,350 --> 00:34:16,110
Actually, given your sort of geographic
446
00:34:16,110 --> 00:34:22,969
familiarity with the UK and whatnot, I'd
like to point out that GCHQ
447
00:34:22,969 --> 00:34:28,230
has probably the most invasive
448
00:34:30,610 --> 00:34:33,190
Network intercept program anywhere in
the world.
449
00:34:34,330 --> 00:34:37,449
It's called Tempora, T -E -M -P -O -R
-A.
450
00:34:37,889 --> 00:34:42,770
And it's the world's first full take,
they call it. And that means content in
451
00:34:42,770 --> 00:34:44,630
addition to metadata on everything.
452
00:34:47,710 --> 00:34:51,909
So this is what I like to do in terms of
scheduling, if it's good with everybody
453
00:34:51,909 --> 00:34:53,270
else. Are you...
454
00:34:53,600 --> 00:34:59,660
Do you feel like you're done with what
you... So, I'm anxious to go back, get
455
00:34:59,660 --> 00:35:03,820
those articles done, and then there's a
bunch of documents that aren't about
456
00:35:03,820 --> 00:35:07,000
those first two or three stories that
I'd like to spend time with you, you
457
00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:08,000
kind of going over.
458
00:35:09,040 --> 00:35:11,120
I'm not going anywhere. You're
available?
459
00:35:11,460 --> 00:35:16,220
You want to check your book first? Yeah,
let me check my schedule. Is that good
460
00:35:16,220 --> 00:35:17,220
for you, Oren? Okay.
461
00:35:35,930 --> 00:35:36,930
Hello? Yes.
462
00:35:37,790 --> 00:35:39,850
My meal was great. Thank you very much.
463
00:35:43,550 --> 00:35:47,090
No, I still have some left, and I think
I'm going to be eating it later, so you
464
00:35:47,090 --> 00:35:48,090
can just leave me alone for now.
465
00:35:50,950 --> 00:35:52,470
Okay, great. Thank you so much.
466
00:35:52,910 --> 00:35:53,910
Have a good one. Bye.
467
00:36:02,680 --> 00:36:06,160
Another fun thing I was telling Laura
about, all of these new VoIP phones,
468
00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:09,820
have little computers in them, and you
can hot mic these over the network all
469
00:36:09,820 --> 00:36:11,340
the time, even when the receiver's down.
470
00:36:11,840 --> 00:36:16,240
As long as it's plugged in, it can be
listening on and on. I hadn't even
471
00:36:16,240 --> 00:36:17,860
considered that earlier, but yeah.
472
00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:19,520
There are so many ways.
473
00:36:20,500 --> 00:36:24,000
Everything that's in here is pretty much
going to be on the public record at
474
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:27,900
some point. We should operate on that.
Yeah, yeah, I think we are.
475
00:36:28,360 --> 00:36:30,360
Do you have your hair cap machine? I do,
I do.
476
00:36:30,820 --> 00:36:31,820
Let me pop that out.
477
00:36:36,040 --> 00:36:39,000
Do you have an understanding or
commitment on when you guys are going to
478
00:36:39,000 --> 00:36:40,000
with the first stories?
479
00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:43,120
It's about 7 or 8 in the morning in
London.
480
00:36:43,520 --> 00:36:44,520
Okay.
481
00:36:46,980 --> 00:36:47,980
Let's see here.
482
00:36:56,280 --> 00:36:57,540
Okay, look, there's the other one.
483
00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:03,360
Pro tip, let's not leave the same SD
cards in our laptops forever in the
484
00:37:10,440 --> 00:37:13,740
Did you know that this was still kicking
around in your laptop?
485
00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:18,300
Yeah, I mean, that would be... Okay,
just making sure. Okay, yeah.
486
00:37:20,940 --> 00:37:24,580
You will have a new one that looks
exactly identical, but it's a different
487
00:37:24,580 --> 00:37:26,760
archive, so you might want to take a
Sharpie to it or something.
488
00:37:28,620 --> 00:37:31,520
Could you pass me my magic mantle of
power?
489
00:37:40,270 --> 00:37:43,190
Is that about the possibility of
overhead?
490
00:37:43,470 --> 00:37:44,650
Yeah, visual collection.
491
00:37:51,870 --> 00:37:54,890
I don't think at this point there's
anything in this regard that will shock
492
00:37:56,310 --> 00:38:01,070
We've become pretty... In fact, Ewan
said before, he's like, I'm never
493
00:38:01,070 --> 00:38:03,970
my room. He's like, I'm never leaving
anything in my room again, not a single
494
00:38:03,970 --> 00:38:07,490
machine. I was like, you've been
infected with a paranoia bug. That was
495
00:38:07,490 --> 00:38:08,490
us.
496
00:38:09,100 --> 00:38:12,740
And the way he said it, he was like, I
would never leave a single device in the
497
00:38:12,740 --> 00:38:13,740
room again alone.
498
00:38:14,420 --> 00:38:16,480
My bike is getting heavier and heavier.
Are you sorry?
499
00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:24,400
That's your evil informant. All right,
I'm going to need you to enter your root
500
00:38:24,400 --> 00:38:25,980
password for that. No idea.
501
00:38:28,180 --> 00:38:30,820
If you want to use this one, you're more
than welcome to.
502
00:38:31,930 --> 00:38:34,590
It looks like your root password is
about four characters long anyway. It's
503
00:38:34,590 --> 00:38:37,270
usually a lot longer, but that's just
like the one -time -only thing, right?
504
00:38:37,850 --> 00:38:38,910
So it is.
505
00:38:39,170 --> 00:38:42,490
It had been a lot longer, but ever since
I knew that it was just like a one
506
00:38:42,490 --> 00:38:44,290
-time -only session one, I've been
making it shorter.
507
00:38:44,730 --> 00:38:45,730
Is that not good?
508
00:38:46,010 --> 00:38:50,770
It's actually not. I was expressing this
with Laura either. The issue is because
509
00:38:50,770 --> 00:38:53,550
of the fact that it's got a hardware MAC
address and things like that, if people
510
00:38:53,550 --> 00:38:58,630
are able to identify your machine and
they're able to. The fact you're about
511
00:38:58,630 --> 00:38:59,468
break them.
512
00:38:59,470 --> 00:39:00,288
setting stories.
513
00:39:00,290 --> 00:39:04,850
Right, that's true. So they might kind
of prioritize... It's 10 letters. I type
514
00:39:04,850 --> 00:39:09,050
very quickly. It actually is 10 letters.
Okay, so 10 letters would be good if
515
00:39:09,050 --> 00:39:11,110
they had to brute force the entire key
space.
516
00:39:11,330 --> 00:39:12,330
Right.
517
00:39:12,470 --> 00:39:15,250
That would still probably only take a
couple days for NSA.
518
00:39:18,490 --> 00:39:19,610
That's a fire alarm.
519
00:39:20,930 --> 00:39:21,930
Okay.
520
00:39:23,550 --> 00:39:26,730
Hopefully it sounds like a two -second
test.
521
00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:30,220
Do you want to call the desk and ask?
522
00:39:32,080 --> 00:39:33,080
I think it's fine.
523
00:39:33,540 --> 00:39:36,020
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue, but
it's interesting to do this. Does that
524
00:39:36,020 --> 00:39:37,020
happen before?
525
00:39:37,540 --> 00:39:40,300
Maybe they got mad that they couldn't
listen in to us via the phone anymore.
526
00:39:42,540 --> 00:39:45,200
Did the final alarm get off before?
527
00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:47,220
No, that's the first time that's
happened.
528
00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:53,040
Yeah, I think they've got like an alert
that goes to final.
529
00:39:53,340 --> 00:39:54,360
That's unusual.
530
00:39:57,640 --> 00:40:00,940
You probably might have to go back and
ignore that.
531
00:40:01,460 --> 00:40:02,460
I don't know.
532
00:40:03,440 --> 00:40:04,940
If it goes... No, it's not continuous.
533
00:40:05,400 --> 00:40:06,400
It's not continuous.
534
00:40:07,240 --> 00:40:14,160
No, I'm just saying, if it continues...
And then we go
535
00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:15,840
and we meet the guys down in the lobby.
536
00:40:16,100 --> 00:40:17,200
Yeah, right? Yeah.
537
00:40:18,840 --> 00:40:22,480
Yeah, let's leave for now. Let me finish
this up.
538
00:40:36,470 --> 00:40:39,030
Not that they're going to answer because
they probably got like 7 ,000 calls.
539
00:40:39,110 --> 00:40:40,110
Yeah.
540
00:40:42,770 --> 00:40:46,730
Hi, we hear a loud buzzing on the 10th
floor. Can you tell us what that is?
541
00:40:49,710 --> 00:40:50,710
Oh, okay.
542
00:40:51,430 --> 00:40:52,930
Okay, great. Thank you. Bye.
543
00:40:55,070 --> 00:40:56,750
Fire alarm testing maintenance.
544
00:40:57,090 --> 00:40:57,848
That's good.
545
00:40:57,850 --> 00:40:58,870
That's what we want to do here.
546
00:40:59,090 --> 00:41:03,610
Nice of them to let us know about that
in advance.
547
00:41:08,850 --> 00:41:10,690
I just wanted to give you kind of a
quick tour.
548
00:41:10,950 --> 00:41:14,290
When Laura was looking at this, she was
kind of salivating and couldn't stop,
549
00:41:14,330 --> 00:41:17,570
like, actually reading the document.
Right, right, right. We'll try and
550
00:41:17,570 --> 00:41:20,730
ourselves without promising that we'll
succeed. Yeah, I just wanted to kind of
551
00:41:20,730 --> 00:41:24,230
explain a brief overview of what these
are and how they're organized.
552
00:41:24,910 --> 00:41:26,530
The beginning are just some documents of
interest.
553
00:41:26,750 --> 00:41:31,190
The primary purpose of the second
archive is to bring the focus over to
554
00:41:31,190 --> 00:41:34,170
opposed to PRISM. And this is in
general.
555
00:41:35,030 --> 00:41:36,550
SSO are special source operations.
556
00:41:36,910 --> 00:41:42,590
Those are the worldwide passive
collection on networks. They're both
557
00:41:42,590 --> 00:41:44,270
the U .S. and international.
558
00:41:45,240 --> 00:41:49,160
There's a lot of different ways they do
it, but corporate partnerships are one
559
00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:52,160
of the primary things they do
domestically. They also do this with
560
00:41:52,160 --> 00:41:55,000
multinationals that might be
headquartered in the U .S. who they can
561
00:41:55,000 --> 00:41:57,200
coerce or just pay into giving them
access.
562
00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:00,740
And they also do it bilaterally with the
assistance of certain governments.
563
00:42:01,220 --> 00:42:04,520
And that's basically on the premise that
they go, all right, we'll help you set
564
00:42:04,520 --> 00:42:06,560
the system up if you give us all the
data from it.
565
00:42:11,170 --> 00:42:15,070
There's a lot more in here than any one
person or probably one team could do.
566
00:42:16,650 --> 00:42:21,530
XKeyscore Deep Dive, XKeyscore in
general, and there's a huge folder of
567
00:42:21,530 --> 00:42:25,790
documentation on XKeyscore and how it
works, is the front -end system that
568
00:42:25,790 --> 00:42:29,790
analysts use for querying that sort of
ocean of raw signals that I was telling
569
00:42:29,790 --> 00:42:33,570
you about. All of that stuff where you
can sort of do the retroactive searches
570
00:42:33,570 --> 00:42:35,590
and live searches and get flagging and
whatnot.
571
00:42:36,510 --> 00:42:37,990
XKeyscore is the front -end for that.
572
00:42:39,850 --> 00:42:44,410
I'm just going to show you one slide
here because Laura thought it was
573
00:42:44,410 --> 00:42:50,170
and was talking about kind of how these
capabilities ramp up in sophistication
574
00:42:50,170 --> 00:42:51,170
over time.
575
00:42:51,910 --> 00:42:57,170
This is kind of nice. As of fiscal year
2011, they could monitor one billion
576
00:42:57,170 --> 00:43:01,650
telephone or Internet sessions
simultaneously per one of these devices.
577
00:43:02,570 --> 00:43:08,670
And they could collect at a rate of
about 125 gigabytes a second, which is a
578
00:43:08,670 --> 00:43:12,010
terabit per second. That's for each one
of these devices? That's for each one of
579
00:43:12,010 --> 00:43:12,689
these, yeah.
580
00:43:12,690 --> 00:43:15,130
How many tumult missions would that be
then?
581
00:43:15,730 --> 00:43:21,090
Per this, back then, there were 20
sites. There's 10 at DoD installation.
582
00:43:21,690 --> 00:43:24,430
But these are all outdated. We've
expanded pretty rapidly.
583
00:43:26,190 --> 00:43:29,030
But still 20 sites, that's at least 20
billion.
584
00:43:29,290 --> 00:43:31,330
This all needs to get out. You know what
I mean?
585
00:43:32,690 --> 00:43:38,730
Just in terms of understanding the
capabilities, it's so opaque. It's not
586
00:43:38,730 --> 00:43:42,410
science fiction. This stuff is happening
right now. No, that's what I mean. It's
587
00:43:42,410 --> 00:43:48,290
like the magnitude of it. And this is a
pretty inaccessible technical document.
588
00:43:48,650 --> 00:43:51,910
But even this is really chilling.
589
00:43:52,190 --> 00:43:56,170
Do you know what I mean? And yeah, I
mean, we could be having debates about
590
00:43:56,170 --> 00:43:57,550
whether we want government.
591
00:43:58,960 --> 00:44:03,680
massive and extraordinary it's amazing
even though you know it you know even
592
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:09,040
though you know that to see it like the
physical blueprints of it and sort of
593
00:44:09,040 --> 00:44:13,680
the technical expressions of it really
hits home in like a super visceral way
594
00:44:13,680 --> 00:44:20,480
that is so needed this
595
00:44:20,480 --> 00:44:26,820
is dnn breaking news An explosive new
report is reigniting the concern that
596
00:44:26,820 --> 00:44:30,040
privacy is being violated to protect
America's security.
597
00:44:30,320 --> 00:44:35,720
It reveals a court order giving the
National Security Agency blanket access
598
00:44:35,720 --> 00:44:39,100
millions of Verizon customers' records
on a daily basis.
599
00:44:39,420 --> 00:44:42,560
Earlier, I had the chance to conduct the
first TV interview with the reporter
600
00:44:42,560 --> 00:44:46,640
who broke this story wide open, Glenn
Greenwald of The Guardian.
601
00:44:48,020 --> 00:44:51,180
Congratulations on the scoop. Explain
for our viewers.
602
00:44:51,710 --> 00:44:52,730
Why this is important.
603
00:44:53,810 --> 00:44:57,550
It's important because people have
understood that the law that this was
604
00:44:57,550 --> 00:45:00,210
under, which is the Patriot Act enacted
in the wake of 9 -11.
605
00:45:00,910 --> 00:45:04,610
was a law that allowed the government
very broad powers to get records about
606
00:45:04,610 --> 00:45:09,370
people with a lower level of suspicion
than probable cause, the traditional
607
00:45:09,370 --> 00:45:12,610
standard. So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act, if the
608
00:45:12,610 --> 00:45:15,690
government had even any suspicion that
you were involved in a crime or
609
00:45:15,690 --> 00:45:19,410
terrorism, they could get a lot of
information about you. What this court
610
00:45:19,410 --> 00:45:24,010
does that makes it so striking is that
it's not directed at any individuals who
611
00:45:24,010 --> 00:45:27,990
they believe or have suspicion of
committing crimes or part of a terrorist
612
00:45:27,990 --> 00:45:32,530
organization. It's collecting the phone
records. of every single customer of
613
00:45:32,530 --> 00:45:36,310
Verizon Business and finding out every
single call that they've made
614
00:45:36,310 --> 00:45:37,670
internationally and locally.
615
00:45:37,910 --> 00:45:41,710
So it's indiscriminate and it's
sweeping. It's a government program
616
00:45:41,710 --> 00:45:45,030
collect information about all Americans,
not just people where they believe
617
00:45:45,030 --> 00:45:46,870
there's reason to think they've done
anything wrong.
618
00:46:47,120 --> 00:46:52,380
Yeah, it's a tough situation, you know,
hearing that the person that you love,
619
00:46:52,420 --> 00:46:56,000
that you've spent a decade with, may not
be coming back.
620
00:47:01,400 --> 00:47:02,540
What did they ask her?
621
00:47:04,000 --> 00:47:07,680
When was the last time she saw me? Where
am I?
622
00:47:08,620 --> 00:47:09,680
What am I doing?
623
00:47:10,240 --> 00:47:12,260
What does she know about my illness?
624
00:47:12,640 --> 00:47:13,640
Things like that.
625
00:47:17,740 --> 00:47:23,380
So, yeah, they're pretty solidly aware
because
626
00:47:23,380 --> 00:47:27,440
I'm clearly not at home ill.
627
00:47:49,080 --> 00:47:50,320
Hello? Hello?
628
00:47:50,640 --> 00:47:53,640
Hello. I mean, disconnect from the
internet.
629
00:47:57,100 --> 00:48:00,660
So, there's some news?
630
00:48:01,360 --> 00:48:07,080
Yes, there was indeed some news. I have
config today, I think, maybe just a few
631
00:48:07,080 --> 00:48:07,819
hours ago.
632
00:48:07,820 --> 00:48:10,800
What kind of people visit?
633
00:48:12,689 --> 00:48:19,570
An HR lady, I'm assuming from NSA, as
opposed to Booz Allen, because
634
00:48:19,570 --> 00:48:22,250
she was accompanied by a police officer,
which means NSA police.
635
00:48:22,630 --> 00:48:25,670
And they were planning to break into my
house, which regular police don't do.
636
00:48:26,790 --> 00:48:27,790
Does she live there?
637
00:48:28,070 --> 00:48:31,550
Yeah, she lives there, so I told her to
cooperate fully.
638
00:48:32,370 --> 00:48:35,030
I can't find my phone, just one second.
Don't worry about her, Phillip.
639
00:48:35,270 --> 00:48:37,990
You know what I'm going to do? I'll just
take out the stuff I want to use.
640
00:48:38,410 --> 00:48:39,410
Okay.
641
00:48:40,310 --> 00:48:44,330
Okay, well, look, I mean, this is not a
surprise at all. Not, yeah, I know, I
642
00:48:44,330 --> 00:48:46,890
plan for it, but it's just, you know,
when it's impacting them and they're
643
00:48:46,890 --> 00:48:49,150
talking to you, it's a little bit
different. Absolutely.
644
00:48:51,150 --> 00:48:55,470
But it's possible that they just noticed
that you're missing. I guess it's not
645
00:48:55,470 --> 00:48:56,388
really impossible.
646
00:48:56,390 --> 00:48:58,410
It is, but yeah, they're, I mean...
647
00:48:58,410 --> 00:49:05,410
Let me just get
648
00:49:05,410 --> 00:49:06,410
rid of this.
649
00:49:08,330 --> 00:49:11,850
So I... I obviously was focused on other
things than appearance this morning.
650
00:49:14,270 --> 00:49:18,970
How did she react? Was she relatively
calm about it? She's relatively calm.
651
00:49:18,970 --> 00:49:22,530
she know anything about what you're
doing in life? She has no idea.
652
00:49:23,670 --> 00:49:29,210
I mean, I feel badly about that, but
that's the only way I could think of
653
00:49:29,210 --> 00:49:33,190
she can't be in trouble. Did you just
basically do a I have to go somewhere
654
00:49:33,190 --> 00:49:36,390
reasons that I can't tell you about kind
of thing? I just disappeared when she
655
00:49:36,390 --> 00:49:37,390
was on vacation.
656
00:49:38,720 --> 00:49:42,620
And I left a note saying, hey, I'm going
to be gone for a while for work, which
657
00:49:42,620 --> 00:49:44,240
isn't unusual for me in my business.
658
00:49:45,340 --> 00:49:46,340
Okay,
659
00:49:47,060 --> 00:49:48,840
so let me ask you a couple of things
just quickly.
660
00:49:49,060 --> 00:49:52,320
Are they going to be able to go into
your stuff and figure out what you took?
661
00:49:55,700 --> 00:50:01,540
In some kind of, some sort of like
peripheral senses, but not necessarily.
662
00:50:01,540 --> 00:50:04,480
with great specificity. Yes, because I
cast.
663
00:50:04,860 --> 00:50:05,860
such a wide net.
664
00:50:06,000 --> 00:50:08,140
If they do that, the only thing they're
going to do is they're going to have a
665
00:50:08,140 --> 00:50:10,340
heart attack because they're going to
go, he had access to everything.
666
00:50:10,660 --> 00:50:14,380
And they're not going to know what
specifically has been done.
667
00:50:14,680 --> 00:50:18,100
I think they're going to start to
actually feel a little better, although
668
00:50:18,100 --> 00:50:21,620
they're not going to be wild about this
in any case.
669
00:50:22,140 --> 00:50:26,000
When they see that the stories are kind
of cleaving to a trend, it's not like
670
00:50:26,000 --> 00:50:28,280
here's the list of everybody who works
everywhere.
671
00:50:28,600 --> 00:50:33,600
Right. I also think they're going to be
paranoid in the extreme and assuming all
672
00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:39,580
kinds of worst -case scenarios, which is
going to, I think, make them react in
673
00:50:39,580 --> 00:50:43,780
ways that probably aren't going to be
particularly rational on their part.
674
00:50:44,300 --> 00:50:48,840
But at the same time, I do think they're
limited for the moment.
675
00:50:49,260 --> 00:50:54,820
I agree. And, I mean, I had kind of time
to set a stage where we all enjoy at
676
00:50:54,820 --> 00:50:57,660
least a minimum level of protection, you
know, no matter who we are who's
677
00:50:57,660 --> 00:51:00,600
involved in this. You know, you're
either a journalist or you're either out
678
00:51:00,600 --> 00:51:04,040
jurisdiction. So we have some time to
play this before they can really get
679
00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:07,140
nasty. I think it's over, you know, the
weeks when they have time to get lawyers
680
00:51:07,140 --> 00:51:09,900
really sort of go, this is a special
situation.
681
00:51:10,600 --> 00:51:12,240
How can we interpret this to our
advantage?
682
00:51:12,440 --> 00:51:15,740
Like, we see them do this all the time,
you know, whether it's drones or
683
00:51:15,740 --> 00:51:20,340
wiretapping or whatever. They'll go,
well, according to this law from the
684
00:51:20,340 --> 00:51:22,060
you know, we can apply X, Y, or Z
authority.
685
00:51:22,720 --> 00:51:27,140
But that takes time, and that takes
agreement. And also, you know, I mean, I
686
00:51:27,140 --> 00:51:31,240
think the more public we are out there
to, like, as journalists, the more
687
00:51:31,240 --> 00:51:32,900
protection that's going to give as well.
688
00:51:34,000 --> 00:51:37,240
Have you started to give thought to when
you're ready to come forward?
689
00:51:37,680 --> 00:51:39,180
I'm ready whenever.
690
00:51:40,779 --> 00:51:45,580
Honestly, I think there's sort of an
agreement that it's not going to bias
691
00:51:45,580 --> 00:51:48,440
reporting process. That's my primary
concern at this point. I don't want to
692
00:51:48,440 --> 00:51:52,900
myself into the issue before it's going
to happen anyway and where it takes away
693
00:51:52,900 --> 00:51:54,420
from the stories that are getting out.
694
00:52:34,990 --> 00:52:39,390
of millions of Americans who weren't
suspected of doing anything who were
695
00:52:39,390 --> 00:52:42,570
surveilled in this way. Your thoughts
for a moment. I want to continue this
696
00:52:42,570 --> 00:52:45,890
conversation because these are really
important, sensitive issues and the
697
00:52:45,890 --> 00:52:50,410
out there has a right to know what's
going on. Stand by. This is CNN Breaking
698
00:52:50,410 --> 00:52:51,410
News.
699
00:52:51,880 --> 00:52:55,920
Another explosive article has just
appeared, this time in The Washington
700
00:52:56,080 --> 00:53:00,540
It's breaking news that it reveals
another broad and secret U .S.
701
00:53:00,540 --> 00:53:01,620
surveillance program.
702
00:53:02,000 --> 00:53:06,600
The Washington Post and The Guardian in
London reporting that the NSA and the
703
00:53:06,600 --> 00:53:11,880
FBI are tapping directly into the
central servers of nine leading Internet
704
00:53:11,880 --> 00:53:17,060
companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo,
Google, Facebook, AOL, Skype, YouTube,
705
00:53:17,200 --> 00:53:20,960
and Apple. The Post says they're
extracting audio, video.
706
00:53:21,540 --> 00:53:26,100
photographs, e -mails, documents, and
connection logs that enable analysts to
707
00:53:26,100 --> 00:53:29,160
track a person's movements and contacts
over time.
708
00:53:29,560 --> 00:53:31,940
Let's discuss this latest revelation.
709
00:53:32,240 --> 00:53:33,260
They're coming out fast.
710
00:53:33,560 --> 00:53:38,040
Bill Binney, the former official of the
NSA who quit back in 2001, you were
711
00:53:38,040 --> 00:53:41,940
angry over what was going on. You'd be
known as a whistleblower right now.
712
00:53:42,060 --> 00:53:45,400
what do you think about this Washington
Post story? Well, I assume it's just a
713
00:53:45,400 --> 00:53:47,420
continuation of what they've been doing
all along.
714
00:53:47,700 --> 00:53:48,700
So you're not surprised?
715
00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:50,820
Do you have any idea who's leaking this
information?
716
00:53:51,300 --> 00:53:55,780
I don't know who leaked this. I have no
doubt that the administration will
717
00:53:55,780 --> 00:54:00,500
launch an investigation, not into who
approved these programs, but into who
718
00:54:00,500 --> 00:54:01,520
leaked the information.
719
00:54:01,840 --> 00:54:07,200
I'm not shocked that the companies are
denying it. I don't assume that there
720
00:54:07,200 --> 00:54:11,060
be some technical basis on which they
can say that we are not actively
721
00:54:11,060 --> 00:54:12,680
collaborating or they don't have.
722
00:54:13,040 --> 00:54:17,040
what we consider in our own definition
to be direct access to our servers. But
723
00:54:17,040 --> 00:54:21,700
what I do know is that I've talked to
more than one person who has sat at a
724
00:54:21,700 --> 00:54:27,980
at a web portal and typed out commands
and reached into those servers from a
725
00:54:27,980 --> 00:54:31,520
distance. So whatever they want to call
that, that's what's happening. Well,
726
00:54:31,560 --> 00:54:34,980
what I would call it is the single
biggest infringement on American civil
727
00:54:34,980 --> 00:54:37,260
liberties probably of all time, isn't
it?
728
00:54:37,560 --> 00:54:39,940
It's interesting. I already have the New
York Times now today saying that the
729
00:54:39,940 --> 00:54:41,380
administration has lost all credibility.
730
00:54:41,920 --> 00:54:44,980
Yeah, the New York Times slammed
President Obama for this. And frankly, I
731
00:54:44,980 --> 00:54:48,120
used to that. The New York Times slammed
George Bush for protecting the country
732
00:54:48,120 --> 00:54:51,360
and for the steps he took. I don't want
us to drop our guard. I don't want us to
733
00:54:51,360 --> 00:54:56,080
be struck again. As we saw in Boston,
Anderson, people are willing to
734
00:54:56,080 --> 00:54:58,340
their civil liberties. People are
sheltered inside.
735
00:54:58,560 --> 00:55:01,480
How can you believe in freedom, do you
think? I mean, try and play devil's
736
00:55:01,480 --> 00:55:06,000
advocate for me. When you have secret
courts, secret operations like prison.
737
00:55:06,560 --> 00:55:10,960
Secret investigations which go into
every bit and cough of every American's
738
00:55:10,960 --> 00:55:14,380
without any member of the American
public knowing about it. That's not
739
00:55:14,440 --> 00:55:19,080
is it? In 2008, they eliminated the
warrant requirement for all
740
00:55:19,080 --> 00:55:23,840
except ones that take place by and among
Americans exclusively on American soil.
741
00:55:24,060 --> 00:55:28,400
So they don't need warrants now for
people who are foreigners outside of the
742
00:55:28,400 --> 00:55:31,860
.S., but they also don't need warrants
for Americans who are in the United
743
00:55:31,860 --> 00:55:35,780
States communicating with people
reasonably believed to be outside of the
744
00:55:36,010 --> 00:55:39,570
So, again, the fact that there are no
checks, no oversight about who's looking
745
00:55:39,570 --> 00:55:43,050
over the NSA's shoulder means that they
can take whatever they want. And the
746
00:55:43,050 --> 00:55:46,570
fact that it's all behind a wall of
secrecy and they threaten people who
747
00:55:46,570 --> 00:55:50,970
expose it means that whatever they're
doing, even violating the law, is
748
00:55:50,970 --> 00:55:53,890
something that we're unlikely to know
until we start having real
749
00:55:53,890 --> 00:55:58,210
and real transparency into what it is
that the government is doing. Glenn
750
00:55:58,210 --> 00:56:01,910
Greenwald, congratulations again on
exposing what is a true scandal. I
751
00:56:01,910 --> 00:56:02,910
appreciate you joining me.
752
00:56:49,480 --> 00:56:56,440
I just heard from Lindsay, and she's
still alive, which is good, and free.
753
00:56:56,660 --> 00:57:00,800
My rent checks apparently are no longer
getting through to my landlord.
754
00:57:01,440 --> 00:57:06,300
So they said if we don't pay them in
five days, we'll be evicted, which is
755
00:57:06,300 --> 00:57:09,760
strange because I've got a system set up
that automatically pays them.
756
00:57:12,640 --> 00:57:16,460
So there's that, and apparently there's
construction trucks all over the street
757
00:57:16,460 --> 00:57:17,460
of my house.
758
00:57:18,700 --> 00:57:23,340
I wonder what they're looking for.
759
00:58:06,990 --> 00:58:13,330
It is an unusual feeling that's kind of
hard to describe
760
00:58:13,330 --> 00:58:19,310
or convey in words, but not knowing
what's going to happen the next day, the
761
00:58:19,310 --> 00:58:20,690
next hour, the next week.
762
00:58:21,510 --> 00:58:23,670
It's scary, but at the same time it's
liberating.
763
00:58:23,990 --> 00:58:29,470
The planning comes a lot easier because
you don't have that many variables to
764
00:58:29,470 --> 00:58:32,610
take into play. You can only act and
then act again.
765
00:58:33,800 --> 00:58:37,700
Now, all these phone calls are being
recorded digitally, not for content, but
766
00:58:37,700 --> 00:58:38,920
for origin and destination.
767
00:58:39,280 --> 00:58:42,680
Now, where the government is going right
into the servers of these large
768
00:58:42,680 --> 00:58:46,840
Internet companies. How does the
government, politically speaking, make
769
00:58:46,840 --> 00:58:50,660
argument that this is essential to
national security and not a dramatic
770
00:58:50,660 --> 00:58:53,240
overreach in terms of personal privacy?
771
00:58:53,930 --> 00:58:57,890
It's difficult, Matt, because as Peter
was pointing out overnight, we had an
772
00:58:57,890 --> 00:59:02,210
extraordinary late night, close to
midnight announcement and a
773
00:59:02,210 --> 00:59:03,850
from the director of national
intelligence.
774
00:59:04,050 --> 00:59:08,010
They are scrambling. The administration
is already supported strongly by leaders
775
00:59:08,010 --> 00:59:09,890
in both parties from the intelligence
committees.
776
00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:15,590
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia at the
top secret, you know, super classified
777
00:59:15,590 --> 00:59:19,250
level where anybody working in
intelligence can work on anything they
778
00:59:20,109 --> 00:59:23,070
That's what this is. I'm giving it to
you. You can make the decisions on that,
779
00:59:23,110 --> 00:59:24,230
what's appropriate, what's not.
780
00:59:24,730 --> 00:59:28,230
It's going to be documents with
different types of pictures and
781
00:59:28,230 --> 00:59:29,730
Word documents, stuff like that.
782
00:59:30,710 --> 00:59:31,850
Sorry, can I take that seat?
783
00:59:35,390 --> 00:59:39,030
I'm sorry, I've got you to repeat. So in
these documents, they will show...
784
00:59:39,030 --> 00:59:42,430
Yeah, there will be a couple more
documents on that. That's only one part,
785
00:59:42,530 --> 00:59:45,790
though. Like it talks about Tempora and
a little more thing. That's the wiki
786
00:59:45,790 --> 00:59:46,790
article itself.
787
00:59:47,320 --> 00:59:52,200
It was also talking about a self
-developed tool called UDAQ, U -D -A -Q.
788
00:59:52,960 --> 00:59:56,500
It's their search tool for all the stuff
they collect, was what it looked like.
789
00:59:57,320 --> 01:00:00,780
It's going to be projects. It's going to
be troubleshooting pages for a
790
01:00:00,780 --> 01:00:01,780
particular tool.
791
01:00:02,120 --> 01:00:03,120
Thanks.
792
01:00:04,140 --> 01:00:05,140
What's the next step?
793
01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:07,060
When do you think you'll go public?
794
01:00:08,640 --> 01:00:12,000
I think it's pretty soon. I mean, with
the reaction, this escalated more
795
01:00:12,000 --> 01:00:15,900
quickly. I think pretty much as soon as
they start trying to make this about me,
796
01:00:16,000 --> 01:00:21,820
which should be any day now, I'll come
out just to go, hey, you know, this is
797
01:00:21,820 --> 01:00:25,940
not a question of somebody skulking
around in the shadows.
798
01:00:26,240 --> 01:00:27,440
These are public issues.
799
01:00:27,660 --> 01:00:28,760
These are not my issues.
800
01:00:29,020 --> 01:00:33,660
These are everybody's issues. And I'm
not afraid of you. You're not going to
801
01:00:33,660 --> 01:00:36,300
bully me into silence like you've done
to everybody else.
802
01:00:37,000 --> 01:00:39,120
And if nobody else is going to do it, I
will.
803
01:00:39,540 --> 01:00:43,220
And hopefully when I'm gone, whatever
you do to me, there will be somebody
804
01:00:43,220 --> 01:00:44,220
who will do the same thing.
805
01:00:44,320 --> 01:00:49,060
It will be the sort of Internet
principle of the Hydra. You can stomp
806
01:00:49,060 --> 01:00:51,020
person, but there's going to be seven
more of us.
807
01:00:51,780 --> 01:00:56,480
Are you getting more nervous?
808
01:00:57,700 --> 01:01:01,360
I mean, no.
809
01:01:01,900 --> 01:01:08,360
I think the way I look at stress,
particularly because I sort of knew this
810
01:01:08,360 --> 01:01:12,760
coming, you know, because I sort of
volunteered to walk into it,
811
01:01:12,800 --> 01:01:19,520
I'm already sort of familiar
812
01:01:19,520 --> 01:01:23,380
with the idea. I'm not worried about it.
When somebody, like, busts in the door,
813
01:01:23,540 --> 01:01:28,200
suddenly I'll get nervous and it'll
affect me. But until they do, you know.
814
01:01:28,970 --> 01:01:32,070
I'm eating a little less. That's the
only difference I take.
815
01:01:38,810 --> 01:01:42,910
Let's talk about the issue with when
we're going to say who you are.
816
01:01:43,710 --> 01:01:49,850
You have to talk me through this because
I have a big worry about this. Okay,
817
01:01:49,870 --> 01:01:56,650
tell me. Which is that if we come out
and I know that you believe that
818
01:01:56,650 --> 01:01:57,650
you're
819
01:01:57,920 --> 01:02:01,460
detection is inevitable and that it's
inevitable imminently.
820
01:02:02,080 --> 01:02:05,020
There's, you know, in the New York Times
today, Charlie Savage, the fascinating
821
01:02:05,020 --> 01:02:09,860
Sherlock Holmes of political reporting,
deduced that the fact that there's been
822
01:02:09,860 --> 01:02:13,100
these leaks in succession probably means
that there's some one person who's
823
01:02:13,100 --> 01:02:15,520
decided to leak a bunch of stuff.
Somebody else quoted you as saying it
824
01:02:15,520 --> 01:02:16,459
of your readers.
825
01:02:16,460 --> 01:02:19,720
Yeah. Somebody else who put in all the
things. Yeah. So, you know, I mean, it's
826
01:02:19,720 --> 01:02:24,880
fine. I want people to, I want it to be,
you know, like this is a person. I want
827
01:02:24,880 --> 01:02:28,020
to start introducing the concept that
this is a person who has a particular.
828
01:02:28,780 --> 01:02:32,320
set of political objectives about
informing the world about what's taking
829
01:02:32,660 --> 01:02:38,580
So I'm keeping it all anonymous,
totally, but I want to start introducing
830
01:02:38,580 --> 01:02:39,760
that kind of incremental way.
831
01:02:40,160 --> 01:02:41,640
But here's the thing.
832
01:02:42,080 --> 01:02:46,260
What I'm concerned about is that if we
come out and say, here's who this is,
833
01:02:46,420 --> 01:02:49,300
here's what he did, the whole thing that
we talked about, that we're going to
834
01:02:49,300 --> 01:02:51,780
basically be doing the government's work
for them, and we're going to basically
835
01:02:51,780 --> 01:02:54,600
be handing them a confession.
836
01:02:56,120 --> 01:02:59,860
and helping them identify who found it.
I mean, maybe you're right. Maybe
837
01:02:59,860 --> 01:03:03,800
they'll find out quickly, and maybe
they'll know, but is there any
838
01:03:03,800 --> 01:03:08,980
that they won't? Are we kind of giving
them stuff that we don't, or...
839
01:03:08,980 --> 01:03:12,180
Possibility that they know, but they
don't want to reveal it because they
840
01:03:12,180 --> 01:03:15,360
know. Or that they don't know, and we're
going to be telling them. Like, is it a
841
01:03:15,360 --> 01:03:17,700
possibility that they're going to need,
like, two, three months of uncertainty,
842
01:03:17,840 --> 01:03:22,260
and we're going to be solving that
problem for them? Or, let me just say,
843
01:03:22,260 --> 01:03:27,040
part... Maybe it doesn't matter to you.
Like, maybe you want it. Maybe, I mean,
844
01:03:27,060 --> 01:03:31,400
you're not coming out because you think
inevitably they're going to catch you
845
01:03:31,400 --> 01:03:32,660
and you want to do it first.
846
01:03:33,160 --> 01:03:37,000
You're coming out because you want to
fucking come out. Well, there is that. I
847
01:03:37,000 --> 01:03:40,320
mean, that's the thing. I don't want to
hide on this and skulk around. I don't
848
01:03:40,320 --> 01:03:41,320
think I should have to.
849
01:03:42,320 --> 01:03:45,080
Obviously, there's circumstances that
are saying that. And I think it is
850
01:03:45,080 --> 01:03:47,240
powerful to come out and be like, look.
851
01:03:47,610 --> 01:03:51,110
I'm not afraid, you know, and I don't
think other people should either. You
852
01:03:51,110 --> 01:03:54,570
know, I was sitting in the office right
next to you last week. You know, we all
853
01:03:54,570 --> 01:03:56,370
have a stake in this. This is our
country.
854
01:03:56,670 --> 01:04:01,370
And the balance of power between the
citizenry and the government is becoming
855
01:04:01,370 --> 01:04:06,530
that of the ruling and the ruled as
opposed to actually, you know, the
856
01:04:06,530 --> 01:04:10,790
and the electorate. Okay, so that's what
I need to hear, that this is not
857
01:04:10,790 --> 01:04:13,450
about... But I do want to say...
858
01:04:13,840 --> 01:04:17,980
I don't think there's a case that I'm
not going to be discovered in the
859
01:04:17,980 --> 01:04:21,220
of time. It's a question of time frame.
You're right. It could take them a long
860
01:04:21,220 --> 01:04:24,960
time. I don't think it will. But I
didn't try to hide the footprint
861
01:04:25,000 --> 01:04:28,820
again, I intended to come forward. Okay.
I'm going to post this morning just a
862
01:04:28,820 --> 01:04:33,300
general defense of whistleblowers.
That's fine. And you in particular
863
01:04:33,840 --> 01:04:36,540
saying anything about you i'm gonna go
post that right when i get back and i'm
864
01:04:36,540 --> 01:04:39,680
also doing like a big fuck you to all
the people who keep like talking about
865
01:04:39,680 --> 01:04:44,680
investigations like that i want that to
be like the fearlessness and the fuck
866
01:04:44,680 --> 01:04:49,420
you to like the bullying tactics has got
to be completely pervading everything
867
01:04:49,420 --> 01:04:53,320
we do and i think that's brilliant i i
mean your principles on this i love i
868
01:04:53,320 --> 01:04:54,320
can't support them enough
869
01:04:55,580 --> 01:05:00,020
because it's inverting the model that
the government has laid out where people
870
01:05:00,020 --> 01:05:03,420
who are trying to say the truth skulk
around and they hide in the dark and
871
01:05:03,420 --> 01:05:08,200
quote anonymously and whatnot. I say,
yes, fuck that. Okay, so here's the plan
872
01:05:08,200 --> 01:05:12,320
then. I mean, and this is the thing.
It's like once you, I think we all just
873
01:05:12,320 --> 01:05:14,420
felt the fact that this is the right way
to do it.
874
01:05:14,860 --> 01:05:18,560
It's the, you feel the power of your
choice. You know what I mean? It's like,
875
01:05:18,560 --> 01:05:23,120
and I want that power to be felt in the
world. Okay. And it is the, I mean, it's
876
01:05:23,120 --> 01:05:27,560
the ultimate standing up to them, right?
Like I'm not going to fucking hide even
877
01:05:27,560 --> 01:05:28,560
for like one second.
878
01:05:28,720 --> 01:05:30,640
I'm going to get right in your face.
879
01:05:30,840 --> 01:05:31,860
You don't have to investigate.
880
01:05:32,380 --> 01:05:34,440
There's nothing to investigate. Here I
am.
881
01:05:35,260 --> 01:05:38,460
You know, and I think that it's just
incredibly powerful.
882
01:05:38,680 --> 01:05:42,840
And then the question just becomes, how
do we do this in the right, you know,
883
01:05:42,880 --> 01:05:47,220
the perfect way? And that's my burden
and that's what I'm going to... So today
884
01:05:47,220 --> 01:05:50,580
is going to be the story in the morning,
assuming that it doesn't change on the
885
01:05:50,580 --> 01:05:52,860
Guardian. It's going to be the story in
the morning just to keep the momentum
886
01:05:52,860 --> 01:05:55,140
going, just to keep, like, the
disclosures coming.
887
01:05:55,740 --> 01:05:56,860
A big one at night.
888
01:05:57,100 --> 01:06:02,550
Now it's becoming like, okay, this is...
a major leak and after today i only
889
01:06:02,550 --> 01:06:07,290
post the two stuff things that we're
going to post it's going to be what the
890
01:06:07,290 --> 01:06:09,830
fuck is this leak and who did it i
guarantee you
891
01:06:09,830 --> 01:06:20,310
i
892
01:06:20,310 --> 01:06:23,730
just want to make sure move over
slightly and you want me to move a
893
01:06:23,730 --> 01:06:24,730
over okay
894
01:06:28,750 --> 01:06:29,750
All right, we're rolling.
895
01:06:30,470 --> 01:06:34,650
So let's just begin with some basic
background information, like just state
896
01:06:34,650 --> 01:06:38,690
name, what position you held in the
intelligence community, and how long you
897
01:06:38,690 --> 01:06:39,690
worked within that community.
898
01:06:40,810 --> 01:06:41,810
Okay.
899
01:06:42,360 --> 01:06:45,120
Just so I'm aware of where we're going.
How in depth are we going? Just in
900
01:06:45,120 --> 01:06:48,480
general, like I'm currently an
infrastructure analyst, you know, Booz
901
01:06:48,480 --> 01:06:50,840
Hamilton, not going through my whole
backstory.
902
01:06:51,260 --> 01:06:54,140
Yeah. Okay. Just like, yeah, summary
kind of. Okay.
903
01:06:54,440 --> 01:07:00,880
My name is Ed Snowden. I'm 29 years old.
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton as an
904
01:07:00,880 --> 01:07:03,720
infrastructure analyst for NSA in
Hawaii.
905
01:07:05,070 --> 01:07:08,710
And what are some of the positions that
you held previously within the
906
01:07:08,710 --> 01:07:09,609
intelligence community?
907
01:07:09,610 --> 01:07:15,950
I've been a systems engineer, systems
administrator, senior advisor
908
01:07:15,950 --> 01:07:22,010
for the Central Intelligence Agency,
solutions consultant, and a
909
01:07:22,010 --> 01:07:24,890
telecommunications information systems
officer.
910
01:07:25,310 --> 01:07:29,750
And what kind of clearances have you
held? What kind of classification?
911
01:07:30,490 --> 01:07:31,630
Top secret.
912
01:07:36,560 --> 01:07:40,880
So people in my levels of access for
systems administration or as an
913
01:07:40,880 --> 01:07:47,480
infrastructure analyst typically have
higher accesses than an NSA employee
914
01:07:47,480 --> 01:07:48,259
normally have.
915
01:07:48,260 --> 01:07:54,960
Normal NSA employees have a combination
of clearances called TS, SI, TK, and
916
01:07:54,960 --> 01:07:55,960
Gamma.
917
01:07:56,720 --> 01:08:02,660
That's top secret signals intelligence,
talent keyhole, and Gamma. And they all
918
01:08:02,660 --> 01:08:05,720
relate to certain things that are sort
of core to the NSA mission.
919
01:08:06,440 --> 01:08:11,460
As a systems administrator, you get a
special clearance called Prisac for
920
01:08:11,460 --> 01:08:16,100
privileged access, which allows you to
be exposed to information of any
921
01:08:16,100 --> 01:08:19,220
classification, regardless of what your
position actually needs.
922
01:08:54,540 --> 01:08:58,100
So just before we go, a reminder of our
top story, and that's that the former
923
01:08:58,100 --> 01:09:02,819
CIA technical worker, Edward Snowden,
says he's responsible for leaking
924
01:09:02,819 --> 01:09:08,200
information that U .S. authorities have
been monitoring phone and Internet data.
925
01:09:08,439 --> 01:09:13,140
The U .S. Justice Department confirmed
it in the first stages of a criminal
926
01:09:13,140 --> 01:09:15,819
investigation. Leave it longer? I've got
to shorten it. What do you think?
927
01:09:16,100 --> 01:09:17,880
As far as the video that people saw.
928
01:09:18,380 --> 01:09:20,260
Am I laughing at Apple now? Was it?
929
01:09:21,200 --> 01:09:24,260
Because I can't go all the way down.
It's still going to be double. I don't
930
01:09:24,260 --> 01:09:25,260
the blade for closer.
931
01:09:28,460 --> 01:09:31,600
Are you going to be talking to any other
media about the story today?
932
01:09:31,979 --> 01:09:32,979
I am.
933
01:09:34,060 --> 01:09:36,260
Will you be coming to our office if you
have any questions?
934
01:09:36,560 --> 01:09:39,660
Of course, about where is Snowden now,
what his plans are. Well, I'm obviously
935
01:09:39,660 --> 01:09:42,140
not going to talk about that. Unless you
have any other questions, it's going to
936
01:09:42,140 --> 01:09:44,120
be a pretty brief interview. What are
your plans, please?
937
01:09:44,340 --> 01:09:46,840
Are you staying in Hong Kong for the
time being? For a little while.
938
01:09:47,420 --> 01:09:52,060
And do you have any hopes to write more
about this story? Are you stopping new
939
01:09:52,060 --> 01:09:54,900
writing about this story? No, I'm going
to continue to write about it. Have you
940
01:09:54,900 --> 01:09:58,380
had any pressure from the U .S.
authorities about continuing to report
941
01:09:58,480 --> 01:09:59,358
No.
942
01:09:59,360 --> 01:10:03,820
And have you heard anything about what
could be the attitude of Hong Kong
943
01:10:03,820 --> 01:10:07,000
authorities towards this case, whether
they've contacted you or asked you
944
01:10:07,000 --> 01:10:11,420
anything about the whereabouts of
Snowden and whether that is another... I
945
01:10:11,420 --> 01:10:13,480
haven't heard from the authorities of
any of them.
946
01:10:15,160 --> 01:10:19,960
And where do you think the story is
going for you and, of course, for
947
01:10:19,960 --> 01:10:23,580
and, of course, for the U .S. media and
the U .S. administration in general?
948
01:10:23,780 --> 01:10:27,380
Well, for me, I'm going to continue to
report on, do my reporting on what the
949
01:10:27,380 --> 01:10:30,500
government has been doing and what I
think my readers should know about.
950
01:10:31,100 --> 01:10:35,320
As for him, I don't think anyone knows.
I can have people come after me or any
951
01:10:35,320 --> 01:10:36,900
of their third -party partners.
952
01:10:37,120 --> 01:10:39,680
You know, they work closely with a
number of other nations.
953
01:10:40,400 --> 01:10:44,180
Or, you know, they make a payout to
ProHeads or, you know, any of their
954
01:10:44,180 --> 01:10:45,180
or assets.
955
01:11:34,340 --> 01:11:38,440
Now it's time for our newspaper review
and looking at what's making headlines
956
01:11:38,440 --> 01:11:40,740
around the world. Let's start with The
Guardian.
957
01:11:41,340 --> 01:11:45,400
This is revealing the identity of the
former CAA employee.
958
01:11:45,820 --> 01:11:50,280
So the paper has leaked information
exposing the scale of American
959
01:11:50,280 --> 01:11:51,300
of the internet.
960
01:11:52,540 --> 01:11:54,620
Edward Snowden. What a great story.
961
01:11:54,940 --> 01:11:57,760
Peter, do you want to know what this is?
Well, I think it's a fantastic story,
962
01:11:57,800 --> 01:12:00,940
first off. It could be straight out of a
John le Carré novel. I mean, when you
963
01:12:00,940 --> 01:12:04,440
read what he did, you actually got the
material. He then decided to go to the
964
01:12:04,440 --> 01:12:08,060
place he identified as being very
difficult for America to get at him.
965
01:12:08,430 --> 01:12:12,590
Which is Hong Kong, because, of course,
technically inside China, the one
966
01:12:12,590 --> 01:12:16,070
country, two systems policy there,
meaning that you can even get
967
01:12:16,070 --> 01:12:20,570
some protection, you thought, all very
well planned. It could be just out of a
968
01:12:20,570 --> 01:12:22,370
spy mode. But what about the details?
969
01:12:25,610 --> 01:12:27,630
That could make it worse.
970
01:12:33,170 --> 01:12:35,010
It's just the lower half of my face.
971
01:13:20,250 --> 01:13:23,950
How do you feel?
972
01:13:29,520 --> 01:13:30,540
What happens, happens.
973
01:13:30,900 --> 01:13:33,660
We've talked about this. I knew what the
risks were.
974
01:13:34,880 --> 01:13:36,820
If I get arrested, I get arrested.
975
01:13:39,000 --> 01:13:43,080
We were able to get the information that
needed to get out, out.
976
01:13:45,020 --> 01:13:50,240
And you and Glenn are able to keep
reporting regardless what happens to me.
977
01:14:03,290 --> 01:14:04,290
Yes.
978
01:14:07,090 --> 01:14:08,270
I'm sorry, who's asking?
979
01:14:11,670 --> 01:14:13,510
I'm afraid you have the wrong room.
Thank you.
980
01:14:15,230 --> 01:14:16,230
Wall Street Journal.
981
01:14:32,000 --> 01:14:33,380
Yes. I'm sorry, say again?
982
01:14:36,560 --> 01:14:38,020
No, no, thank you. No calls.
983
01:14:38,400 --> 01:14:39,720
I think they have the wrong number.
984
01:14:41,340 --> 01:14:42,620
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
985
01:14:43,380 --> 01:14:44,380
Wait, I'm sorry.
986
01:14:44,740 --> 01:14:49,900
If it's two men from the front desk,
they can call, but no outside calls.
987
01:14:50,120 --> 01:14:51,640
Wait, actually, just let them through.
988
01:14:54,060 --> 01:14:55,060
Wait, wait, ma 'am?
989
01:15:05,350 --> 01:15:06,350
Yes. Wait,
990
01:15:08,930 --> 01:15:10,230
is it a lawyer?
991
01:15:12,510 --> 01:15:16,230
Yeah, no, no, no. I mean the people who
are asking. Ask them if they are
992
01:15:16,230 --> 01:15:17,230
lawyers.
993
01:15:19,490 --> 01:15:26,150
No, tell her that she has the wrong
994
01:15:26,150 --> 01:15:28,030
number and there's no Mr. Snowden here.
995
01:15:37,580 --> 01:15:38,580
Can you talk right now?
996
01:15:39,520 --> 01:15:41,280
I'm safely going into the room.
997
01:15:42,180 --> 01:15:48,740
I'm not saving the client, okay? So can
we talk together about the plan?
998
01:15:48,980 --> 01:15:52,340
Is the application started already or
not, technically?
999
01:15:55,500 --> 01:15:58,820
Yeah, so technically it hasn't started
yet.
1000
01:16:09,160 --> 01:16:11,320
Would you mind to talk to him in
speakerphone?
1001
01:16:12,860 --> 01:16:14,520
Sorry. Hi, Robert.
1002
01:16:15,600 --> 01:16:16,600
Hi,
1003
01:16:17,420 --> 01:16:18,420
I'm the client.
1004
01:16:21,400 --> 01:16:23,420
Pretty good. I'm doing well.
1005
01:16:39,250 --> 01:16:40,250
Okay.
1006
01:16:43,890 --> 01:16:44,890
Okay.
1007
01:16:55,210 --> 01:17:01,970
Okay, that's great. Is it okay if I
bring equipment? Because I'm just kind
1008
01:17:01,970 --> 01:17:05,530
going so I can leave in any direction at
any time and not come back, if
1009
01:17:05,530 --> 01:17:06,530
necessary.
1010
01:17:09,520 --> 01:17:12,340
Okay. Take whatever you want with you.
Just go with Mr. Matt.
1011
01:17:12,720 --> 01:17:15,960
I will pick you. He knows where I'm
going to pick you guys up, and then I'll
1012
01:17:15,960 --> 01:17:18,000
bring you to the UNHCR. Okay, that
sounds good.
1013
01:17:18,460 --> 01:17:21,400
All right. Thank you so much for helping
me.
1014
01:17:21,700 --> 01:17:25,880
He's quite worried about the big thing.
It's about the accommodation, or he's
1015
01:17:25,880 --> 01:17:30,040
going to say whether there's something
pirate and they cannot be discovered by
1016
01:17:30,040 --> 01:17:31,040
the police.
1017
01:17:34,700 --> 01:17:38,560
Okay, I see. Okay, I will give you a
call, hit up before I restart, okay?
1018
01:17:39,080 --> 01:17:40,660
Okay, bye. Okay, thank you. Bye -bye.
1019
01:17:42,120 --> 01:17:46,420
Sorry, not yet, but we don't have a car.
1020
01:17:47,040 --> 01:17:53,900
Okay. What I'm thinking, we may ask the
concierge to arrange
1021
01:17:53,900 --> 01:17:56,180
a car or we just go down and catch a
taxi.
1022
01:17:56,680 --> 01:18:02,020
But it's quite, the traffic here in Tsim
Sha Tsui is quite difficult to catch a
1023
01:18:02,020 --> 01:18:03,480
taxi. Yeah, sorry.
1024
01:18:04,080 --> 01:18:09,080
And so is there precedent for this,
where Hong Kong would extradite someone
1025
01:18:09,080 --> 01:18:10,080
political speech?
1026
01:18:10,440 --> 01:18:15,600
No, I'm not aware of. If we have a
torture claim or asylum seeking claim on
1027
01:18:15,600 --> 01:18:20,480
death, then they ought, under the law,
they ought to give you a reconnaissance
1028
01:18:20,480 --> 01:18:26,180
for you to stay in Hong Kong because
they don't know where to come you back
1029
01:19:17,480 --> 01:19:20,540
The President certainly does not welcome
the way that this debate has earned
1030
01:19:20,540 --> 01:19:24,080
greater attention than last week, that
the leaked classified information about
1031
01:19:24,080 --> 01:19:27,760
sensitive programs that are important in
our fight against terrorists who would
1032
01:19:27,760 --> 01:19:30,260
do harm to Americans is a problem.
1033
01:19:30,520 --> 01:19:33,740
But the debate itself is legitimate and
should be engaged.
1034
01:21:16,639 --> 01:21:19,040
But tomorrow it will be on the internet,
right?
1035
01:21:19,460 --> 01:21:20,460
Yes.
1036
01:21:24,000 --> 01:21:30,460
I want to show you the new document now.
1037
01:21:30,800 --> 01:21:33,900
You will see this much clearer than this
one.
1038
01:21:34,460 --> 01:21:40,840
This is the map of the cables where they
are collecting the data for the prison.
1039
01:21:41,080 --> 01:21:44,260
Here it shows how many they are
collecting.
1040
01:21:44,890 --> 01:21:48,370
The bigger the line, the more they are
collecting.
1041
01:21:48,830 --> 01:21:53,010
You can see here the line, the cable, is
very thick.
1042
01:21:53,450 --> 01:21:59,330
For Brazil in the south and the north,
the cable in the sea of Brazil. It shows
1043
01:21:59,330 --> 01:22:02,910
that they are collecting a lot of things
in the Prism program, which I think is
1044
01:22:02,910 --> 01:22:08,970
very important because Prism is
Facebook, Skype, YouTube, Yahoo,
1045
01:22:08,970 --> 01:22:11,390
shows a lot of transactions being stolen
from Brazil.
1046
01:22:12,050 --> 01:22:13,690
But we don't know...
1047
01:22:14,300 --> 01:22:19,800
how much the Brazilian government was
and how much collaboration they have
1048
01:22:19,800 --> 01:22:21,200
Brazilian companies as well.
1049
01:22:21,420 --> 01:22:22,600
We don't know, but we will know.
1050
01:23:25,590 --> 01:23:27,610
Right, so which ones do we want here
then?
1051
01:23:27,850 --> 01:23:31,430
This is operational stuff, so we mustn't
pay any less. So redact that.
1052
01:23:31,730 --> 01:23:36,390
What about the Alexander quote? Yeah,
that's in tarmac.
1053
01:23:36,930 --> 01:23:41,290
Why can't we collect all the signals all
the time? Sounds like a good summer
1054
01:23:41,290 --> 01:23:45,530
homework project for Menwick. Peter
Alexander, the head of the NSA, on a
1055
01:23:45,530 --> 01:23:46,289
to the UK.
1056
01:23:46,290 --> 01:23:47,049
This one.
1057
01:23:47,050 --> 01:23:48,050
Yeah.
1058
01:23:48,130 --> 01:23:50,690
Secret documents in there, secret
documents.
1059
01:23:51,190 --> 01:23:53,870
We've got a stick here that should just
have three single...
1060
01:23:54,800 --> 01:23:57,840
slides on them. If it's got more than
three single slides on them, we're an
1061
01:23:57,840 --> 01:23:58,960
extreme example.
1062
01:24:02,040 --> 01:24:03,340
Yeah, that's it.
1063
01:24:04,160 --> 01:24:08,800
This is really dangerous stuff for us.
Guardian is going to make mistakes at
1064
01:24:08,800 --> 01:24:11,600
very end where we kept it all under lock
and key and no one knows.
1065
01:24:11,860 --> 01:24:12,860
I'm not saying that.
1066
01:24:13,960 --> 01:24:18,020
They will come in and smack the front
door down if we elaborate on that.
1067
01:24:18,700 --> 01:24:22,440
And he said the Prime Minister is
extremely concerned about this.
1068
01:24:22,750 --> 01:24:25,190
And they were kept saying, this is from
the very top.
1069
01:25:44,280 --> 01:25:50,720
As you may have heard, there is a CIA
agent who has
1070
01:25:50,720 --> 01:25:57,300
revealed a lot of information and he is
now trapped in the airport in Moscow.
1071
01:25:57,740 --> 01:26:01,400
We managed to get him out of Hong Kong,
but when he landed in the Moscow
1072
01:26:01,400 --> 01:26:06,020
airport... the American government had
cancelled his passport.
1073
01:26:06,340 --> 01:26:11,840
So formally, he hasn't entered into
Russian territory. He's in the transit
1074
01:26:11,840 --> 01:26:16,660
of the airport, and one of our people is
accompanying him. We are trying to
1075
01:26:16,660 --> 01:26:23,620
arrange a private jet to take him from
1076
01:26:23,620 --> 01:26:29,020
Moscow to Ecuador or perhaps maybe
Venezuela.
1077
01:26:30,700 --> 01:26:34,420
Or maybe I planned the country's wages
would be saved.
1078
01:26:57,500 --> 01:27:03,120
for Americans, for everything, since the
September 11th attack, is terrorism.
1079
01:27:03,520 --> 01:27:07,220
Everything for national security, to
protect our population.
1080
01:27:07,800 --> 01:27:09,900
In reality, it's the opposite.
1081
01:27:10,400 --> 01:27:17,180
There are many, many documents that have
no reasoning with anything about
1082
01:27:17,180 --> 01:27:18,180
terrorism.
1083
01:27:28,099 --> 01:27:30,760
The second thing about the X -Keys
score.
1084
01:27:31,420 --> 01:27:37,340
When we publish the first, second, third
articles, the defense of the American
1085
01:27:37,340 --> 01:27:42,780
government is that we are not invading
the content or communication, only the
1086
01:27:42,780 --> 01:27:49,680
metadata, the facts about, or identity,
about what you are talking about, what
1087
01:27:49,680 --> 01:27:52,720
you are talking about, calling you, the
duration of the communication.
1088
01:27:53,600 --> 01:27:58,660
In reality, if I can know all the people
with whom you are communicating, and
1089
01:27:58,660 --> 01:28:03,800
all the people with whom they are
communicating, and where you are when
1090
01:28:03,800 --> 01:28:09,260
communicating, and the address, and the
location, I can know a lot about your
1091
01:28:09,260 --> 01:28:12,340
personality, your activity, your life.
1092
01:28:12,840 --> 01:28:14,880
It's a big advantage in privacy.
1093
01:28:15,540 --> 01:28:19,180
But in reality, this defense is totally
false.
1094
01:28:19,540 --> 01:28:22,440
The American government has the capacity
to...
1095
01:28:22,830 --> 01:28:24,250
Thank you very
1096
01:28:24,250 --> 01:28:34,210
much.
1097
01:28:50,700 --> 01:28:53,980
Thank you very
1098
01:28:53,980 --> 01:29:08,980
much.
1099
01:29:16,830 --> 01:29:21,010
If you are American, living in the
United States, you need to be the first
1100
01:29:21,010 --> 01:29:24,690
to court and ask for permission to
always receive.
1101
01:29:25,090 --> 01:29:31,870
But if you are not American, you don't
need anything, no approval from the
1102
01:29:31,870 --> 01:29:33,150
to do that.
1103
01:29:33,390 --> 01:29:38,850
I think the consequences of the
elimination of privacy are sometimes
1104
01:29:38,850 --> 01:29:42,690
for Anandazar, but it is very important
to understand that...
1105
01:30:03,849 --> 01:30:06,590
May I collect all the phones, please?
1106
01:30:19,310 --> 01:30:20,310
Put them in the refrigerator.
1107
01:30:31,790 --> 01:30:38,710
So, as you know, in June, Snowden was in
charge with three
1108
01:30:38,710 --> 01:30:45,490
legal violations, felonies, principally
under a World War I era criminal
1109
01:30:45,490 --> 01:30:47,110
law called the Espionage Act.
1110
01:30:48,119 --> 01:30:54,580
The Espionage Act is an extremely broad
criminal prohibition against the sharing
1111
01:30:54,580 --> 01:30:57,740
or dissemination of what's called
national defense information.
1112
01:30:58,220 --> 01:31:04,320
It was only used to prosecute people who
had been accused of acting with a
1113
01:31:04,320 --> 01:31:08,760
foreign power, spies, not
whistleblowers. And it's a very unusual
1114
01:31:08,760 --> 01:31:12,640
representation, I think, not just for
all of you, but for me as well.
1115
01:31:13,240 --> 01:31:15,440
The Espionage Act does not distinguish.
1116
01:31:16,270 --> 01:31:20,870
between leaks to the press and the
public interest and selling secrets to
1117
01:31:20,870 --> 01:31:23,130
foreign enemies for personal profit.
1118
01:31:23,490 --> 01:31:28,430
So under the Espionage Act, it's not a
defense if the information that was
1119
01:31:28,430 --> 01:31:31,970
disclosed should not have been withheld
in the first place, that it was
1120
01:31:31,970 --> 01:31:32,970
improperly classified.
1121
01:31:33,350 --> 01:31:37,490
It's not a defense if the dissemination
was in the public interest, that it led
1122
01:31:37,490 --> 01:31:38,490
to reform.
1123
01:31:38,550 --> 01:31:43,230
Even if a court determines that the
programs that were revealed were illegal
1124
01:31:43,230 --> 01:31:45,390
unconstitutional, that's still not a
defense.
1125
01:31:45,770 --> 01:31:49,710
under the espionage act the government
doesn't have to defend the
1126
01:31:49,710 --> 01:31:54,950
it doesn't have to demonstrate harm from
the release all of this is irrelevant
1127
01:31:54,950 --> 01:32:00,990
so when we say that the trial wouldn't
be fair we're not talking about what
1128
01:32:00,990 --> 01:32:04,370
human rights lawyers think of as fair
trial practices we're saying the law the
1129
01:32:04,370 --> 01:32:11,010
statute itself eliminates any kind of
defense that snowden might be able to
1130
01:32:11,010 --> 01:32:15,130
and essentially would equate him with a
spy and of course those three count
1131
01:32:15,660 --> 01:32:20,260
could be increased to 100 or 200 or 300,
they could charge them separately for
1132
01:32:20,260 --> 01:32:23,900
each document that has been published by
a journalist.
1133
01:32:24,120 --> 01:32:28,540
And I think that we all recognize, even
though we sit here as lawyers in a
1134
01:32:28,540 --> 01:32:35,400
lawyers' meeting, that it's probably 95
% politics and 5 % law how
1135
01:32:35,400 --> 01:32:36,760
this will be resolved.
1136
01:33:08,740 --> 01:33:13,800
Mr. Snowden has been charged with very
serious crimes, and he should be
1137
01:33:13,800 --> 01:33:17,900
to the United States where he will be
granted full due process and every right
1138
01:33:17,900 --> 01:33:22,940
available to him as a United States
citizen facing our justice system under
1139
01:33:22,940 --> 01:33:23,940
Constitution.
1140
01:34:14,800 --> 01:34:16,560
I don't think Mr. Snowden was a patriot.
1141
01:34:16,820 --> 01:34:23,600
I called for a thorough review of our
surveillance operations before
1142
01:34:23,600 --> 01:34:24,940
Mr. Snowden made these leaks.
1143
01:34:26,060 --> 01:34:32,780
My preference, and I think the American
people's preference, would have been for
1144
01:34:32,780 --> 01:34:37,800
a lawful, orderly examination of these
laws, a
1145
01:34:37,800 --> 01:34:41,920
thoughtful, fact -based debate.
1146
01:34:43,160 --> 01:34:46,440
that would then lead us to a better
place.
1147
01:35:24,540 --> 01:35:25,540
Oh, my God.
1148
01:35:26,720 --> 01:35:27,720
David.
1149
01:35:29,360 --> 01:35:32,440
You okay?
1150
01:35:38,980 --> 01:35:39,980
Okay,
1151
01:35:40,180 --> 01:35:40,978
okay, okay.
1152
01:35:40,980 --> 01:35:42,220
You just have to walk in.
1153
01:35:50,980 --> 01:35:53,780
Good, good. I'm totally fine. I didn't
sleep at all. I couldn't sleep.
1154
01:35:54,040 --> 01:35:55,040
I know.
1155
01:36:17,160 --> 01:36:22,040
Recent reports have revealed that the
NSA have access to encryption keys and
1156
01:36:22,040 --> 01:36:25,500
they paid tech companies to introduce
backdoors in encryption protocols.
1157
01:36:25,840 --> 01:36:30,600
So we are going to talk about ways in
which we can defend ourselves against
1158
01:36:30,600 --> 01:36:33,480
governments spying on us. So Mr.
1159
01:36:33,720 --> 01:36:37,840
Jacob Appelbaum is an encryption and
security software developer and
1160
01:36:38,140 --> 01:36:44,000
Ladar Levinson, the founder of the
encrypted email service Lavabit, used by
1161
01:36:44,000 --> 01:36:45,560
Edward Snowden. You have the floor.
1162
01:36:46,140 --> 01:36:47,140
Thank you.
1163
01:36:47,200 --> 01:36:53,020
LavaBit is an email service that
hopefully one day will be able to stand
1164
01:36:53,020 --> 01:36:59,260
own without any references. My service
was designed to remove me from the
1165
01:36:59,260 --> 01:37:03,720
possibility of being forced to violate a
person's privacy.
1166
01:37:04,440 --> 01:37:08,740
Quite simply, LavaBit was designed to
remove the service provider from the
1167
01:37:08,740 --> 01:37:14,160
equation. By not having logs on my
server and not having access to a
1168
01:37:14,160 --> 01:37:15,160
emails on disk,
1169
01:37:15,820 --> 01:37:19,880
I wasn't eliminating the possibility of
surveillance. I was simply removing
1170
01:37:19,880 --> 01:37:25,300
myself from that equation in that
surveillance would have to be conducted
1171
01:37:25,300 --> 01:37:29,240
target, either the sender or the
receiver of the messages.
1172
01:37:29,920 --> 01:37:36,820
But I was approached by the FBI quite
recently and told that because I
1173
01:37:36,820 --> 01:37:39,460
turn over the information from that one
particular user.
1174
01:37:39,930 --> 01:37:43,750
I would be forced to give up those SSL
keys and let the FBI collect every
1175
01:37:43,750 --> 01:37:46,610
communication on my network without any
kind of transparency.
1176
01:37:48,330 --> 01:37:53,550
And, of course, I wasn't comfortable
with that, to say the least.
1177
01:37:54,330 --> 01:37:57,930
More disturbing was the fact that I
couldn't even tell anybody that it was
1178
01:37:57,930 --> 01:37:58,930
on.
1179
01:37:59,130 --> 01:38:05,110
So I decided if I didn't win the fight
to unseal my case, if I didn't win the
1180
01:38:05,110 --> 01:38:07,810
battle to be able to tell people what
was going on,
1181
01:38:08,620 --> 01:38:11,680
then my only ethical choice left was to
shut down.
1182
01:38:14,400 --> 01:38:15,440
Think about that.
1183
01:38:17,160 --> 01:38:21,300
I believe in the rule of law. I believe
in the need to conduct investigations.
1184
01:38:22,540 --> 01:38:26,960
But those investigations are supposed to
be difficult for a reason. It's
1185
01:38:26,960 --> 01:38:32,180
supposed to be difficult to invade
somebody's privacy because of how
1186
01:38:32,180 --> 01:38:35,080
it is, because of how disruptive it is.
1187
01:38:36,200 --> 01:38:40,480
If we don't have our right to privacy,
how do we have a free and open
1188
01:38:40,480 --> 01:38:41,480
discussion?
1189
01:38:41,900 --> 01:38:48,320
What good is the right to free speech if
it's not protected
1190
01:38:48,320 --> 01:38:53,320
in the sense that you can't have a
private discussion with somebody else
1191
01:38:53,320 --> 01:38:54,560
something you disagree with?
1192
01:38:55,400 --> 01:38:59,320
Think about the chilling effect that
that has. Think about the chilling
1193
01:38:59,320 --> 01:39:02,360
it does have on countries that don't
have a right to privacy.
1194
01:39:03,470 --> 01:39:06,770
I've noticed a really interesting
discussion point, which is that what
1195
01:39:06,770 --> 01:39:09,530
used to call liberty and freedom, we now
call privacy.
1196
01:39:10,870 --> 01:39:14,130
And we say in the same breath that
privacy is dead.
1197
01:39:15,170 --> 01:39:19,230
This is something that really concerns
me about my generation, especially when
1198
01:39:19,230 --> 01:39:20,970
we talk about how we're not surprised by
anything.
1199
01:39:21,230 --> 01:39:25,690
I think that we should consider that
when we lose privacy, we lose agency. We
1200
01:39:25,690 --> 01:39:29,350
lose liberty itself because we no longer
feel free to express what we think.
1201
01:39:29,760 --> 01:39:31,920
There's this myth of the passive
surveillance machine.
1202
01:39:32,140 --> 01:39:34,560
But actually, what is surveillance
except control?
1203
01:39:34,980 --> 01:39:38,180
This notion that the NSA are passive,
this is nonsense.
1204
01:39:38,400 --> 01:39:42,080
What we see is that they actively attack
European citizens, American citizens,
1205
01:39:42,300 --> 01:39:45,480
and, in fact, anyone that they can if
they perceive an advantage.
1206
01:40:01,000 --> 01:40:05,820
And then comes the decisive part, which
speaks a lot for the fact that it was
1207
01:40:05,820 --> 01:40:10,480
the SDS that took the cell phone from
Chancellor Merkel into the museum.
1208
01:40:11,360 --> 01:40:12,960
So we have the map.
1209
01:40:13,200 --> 01:40:14,200
Yes.
1210
01:41:21,760 --> 01:41:22,760
Okay.
1211
01:41:23,920 --> 01:41:24,920
All right.
1212
01:41:29,320 --> 01:41:30,920
I'll have to give that in testimony.
1213
01:41:33,220 --> 01:41:35,480
Everything I can truthfully.
1214
01:41:40,000 --> 01:41:41,740
Whatever the questions they ask me.
1215
01:41:43,600 --> 01:41:44,680
Okay. All right.
1216
01:41:45,600 --> 01:41:46,600
Thank you.
1217
01:41:51,530 --> 01:41:54,350
Hello, good day. How are you?
1218
01:41:54,610 --> 01:41:56,950
Good to see you again. Nice to meet you.
1219
01:41:59,910 --> 01:42:00,350
It
1220
01:42:00,350 --> 01:42:08,610
is
1221
01:42:08,610 --> 01:42:12,770
my pleasure to be here. I feel that it's
important to testify about what's
1222
01:42:12,770 --> 01:42:17,010
really going on behind the scenes and
the intelligence community around the
1223
01:42:17,010 --> 01:42:18,730
world, not just in a day.
1224
01:42:19,370 --> 01:42:23,910
All these programs that Edward Snowden
exposed fundamentally are ways of
1225
01:42:23,910 --> 01:42:24,910
acquiring information.
1226
01:42:25,790 --> 01:42:29,850
Every dictatorship down through history
has always done it. One of the first
1227
01:42:29,850 --> 01:42:34,250
things they need to do is to try to
acquire knowledge of their population,
1228
01:42:34,250 --> 01:42:35,870
that's exactly what these programs do.
1229
01:42:36,630 --> 01:42:40,430
I see this as the most major threat to
our democracy all around the world.
1230
01:43:29,580 --> 01:43:33,040
What do you think they're doing to
reporters, those of us that are working
1231
01:43:33,040 --> 01:43:35,420
directly with Snowden documents?
1232
01:43:35,840 --> 01:43:38,200
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
1233
01:43:38,460 --> 01:43:45,320
You're on the cast iron cover list,
which means any electronic device you
1234
01:43:45,320 --> 01:43:49,260
use that they can attach to you, they'll
record and capture all that data.
1235
01:43:49,520 --> 01:43:51,880
And what do they do with that data?
They're just trying to figure out what
1236
01:43:51,880 --> 01:43:52,880
doing?
1237
01:43:53,220 --> 01:43:54,220
Well, they're trying to...
1238
01:43:54,510 --> 01:43:58,130
That's part of it, but the other part,
primarily part, for them, I think, is to
1239
01:43:58,130 --> 01:43:59,770
find the sources of information you're
getting.
1240
01:43:59,990 --> 01:44:03,090
So if I have a confidential source who's
giving me information as a
1241
01:44:03,090 --> 01:44:06,890
whistleblower, and he works within the U
.S. government, and he's concerned
1242
01:44:06,890 --> 01:44:12,130
about what he perceives as violations of
the Constitution, and he gets in touch
1243
01:44:12,130 --> 01:44:14,350
with me, they... Go ahead.
1244
01:44:14,710 --> 01:44:19,130
From there on, they would nail him and
start watching everything he did, and if
1245
01:44:19,130 --> 01:44:21,370
he started passing data, I'm sure they'd
take him off the street.
1246
01:44:22,410 --> 01:44:27,010
I mean, the way you have to do it is
like Deep Throat did, right, in the
1247
01:44:27,010 --> 01:44:31,150
years. Meet in the basement of a parking
garage, physically.
1248
01:45:12,370 --> 01:45:16,290
Let's disassociate our metadata one last
time, so we don't have a clear record
1249
01:45:16,290 --> 01:45:18,790
of your true name and our final
communication chain.
1250
01:45:19,470 --> 01:45:23,210
This is obviously not to say you can't
claim your involvement, but as every
1251
01:45:23,210 --> 01:45:27,210
trick in the book is likely to be used
in looking into this, I believe it's
1252
01:45:27,210 --> 01:45:30,090
better that that particular disclosure
come on your own terms.
1253
01:45:31,730 --> 01:45:33,590
Thank you again for all you've done.
1254
01:45:33,930 --> 01:45:37,810
So sorry again for the multiple delays,
but we've been in uncharted territory
1255
01:45:37,810 --> 01:45:39,510
with no model to benefit from.
1256
01:45:41,200 --> 01:45:46,080
If all ends well, perhaps the
demonstration that our methods work will
1257
01:45:46,080 --> 01:45:47,140
more to come forward.
1258
01:45:47,920 --> 01:45:49,500
So the
1259
01:45:49,500 --> 01:45:56,360
update that I want to give you
1260
01:45:56,360 --> 01:46:03,260
is about the new source that we...
1261
01:46:03,260 --> 01:46:04,260
Okay.
1262
01:46:05,420 --> 01:46:07,880
That... You picked what?
1263
01:46:10,060 --> 01:46:15,740
This is the, you know, this is the
person who's doing the most of the work
1264
01:46:15,740 --> 01:46:16,740
it.
1265
01:46:18,400 --> 01:46:21,640
And now, and then, like, basically
what's happened is,
1266
01:46:21,780 --> 01:46:28,740
and... That's actually, that's really
dangerous
1267
01:46:28,740 --> 01:46:32,280
on the sources side.
1268
01:46:32,500 --> 01:46:35,900
Do they know how to take care of
themselves? Well, he knows. I mean, it's
1269
01:46:35,900 --> 01:46:37,980
being done.
1270
01:46:40,580 --> 01:46:41,580
Through this.
1271
01:46:42,100 --> 01:46:46,420
Okay. And they're all talking this way.
1272
01:46:46,840 --> 01:46:47,840
Okay.
1273
01:46:48,100 --> 01:46:51,820
And... I was going to say, one of the
big questions there is, can they handle
1274
01:46:51,820 --> 01:46:55,880
it? You know, do they have the... No,
they're very careful, even though
1275
01:46:55,880 --> 01:46:56,880
that. Okay. Yeah.
1276
01:47:02,640 --> 01:47:03,640
And...
1277
01:47:10,670 --> 01:47:11,670
That's where that is.
1278
01:47:14,290 --> 01:47:15,710
Wow, that's really something.
1279
01:47:28,410 --> 01:47:29,650
You know that?
1280
01:47:36,430 --> 01:47:39,170
It's not the actual plane. Right, right.
1281
01:47:39,770 --> 01:47:40,770
You mean the control.
1282
01:47:41,010 --> 01:47:42,110
It's the process.
1283
01:47:44,550 --> 01:47:45,910
There's a chart.
1284
01:47:46,570 --> 01:47:49,410
There's a whole layout for everyone.
1285
01:47:49,630 --> 01:47:51,550
That is really bold. It's really risky.
1286
01:47:52,050 --> 01:47:55,670
But that's the thing. If they understand
what they're doing. There's this chart.
1287
01:47:55,810 --> 01:47:58,790
It shows the decision -making chart.
1288
01:47:59,010 --> 01:48:01,550
It's shaped like this.
1289
01:48:07,730 --> 01:48:08,890
So up here it says,
1290
01:48:09,870 --> 01:48:13,730
That's the decision -making chart for
each one.
1291
01:48:18,790 --> 01:48:21,930
It's so political. This part's amazing.
1292
01:48:28,930 --> 01:48:31,130
That's fucking ridiculous.
1293
01:48:32,310 --> 01:48:33,850
It's so shocking.
1294
01:48:40,009 --> 01:48:43,730
That's the population of an entire
country. I know.
1295
01:48:47,530 --> 01:48:49,570
That's what we're working on.
1296
01:49:03,470 --> 01:49:05,390
That person is incredibly bold.
1297
01:49:07,370 --> 01:49:08,930
But also very well aware.
1298
01:49:09,190 --> 01:49:11,330
Right. You know, I just hope, I mean.
1299
01:49:11,810 --> 01:49:15,230
No, I mean, the boldness of it is
shocking, but I mean, it was obviously
1300
01:49:15,230 --> 01:49:22,090
motivated by what you did. This is going
to, this is going to, that could raise
1301
01:49:22,090 --> 01:49:28,050
the profile of this whole political
situation with whistleblowing to a whole
1302
01:49:28,050 --> 01:49:29,050
level. Exactly.
1303
01:49:29,350 --> 01:49:30,350
It's going to.
1304
01:49:30,490 --> 01:49:32,750
Yeah, I actually think that's a great
thing.
1305
01:49:33,290 --> 01:49:37,930
And I think people are going to see
what's being hidden again, again, by a
1306
01:49:37,930 --> 01:49:40,010
totally different part of the
government.
1307
01:51:35,780 --> 01:51:36,780
Thank you.
117698
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