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00:00:18,481 --> 00:00:20,088
Welcome to Metro-Optic,
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00:00:20,174 --> 00:00:22,740
one of Montreal's
main telecom centres,
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00:00:22,881 --> 00:00:24,695
which is a well-kept secret,
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00:00:25,336 --> 00:00:28,756
a major Internet data centre
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00:00:28,991 --> 00:00:32,787
serving the province
and part of Canada.
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00:00:36,036 --> 00:00:38,496
This room is located
beneath train tracks
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00:00:38,613 --> 00:00:40,461
in the bowels of Montreal.
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00:00:41,128 --> 00:00:47,009
About 75% of Internet
traffic travels through here.
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00:00:51,343 --> 00:00:54,635
Here we have more "private"
clients, as it were,
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00:00:54,717 --> 00:00:59,814
with their own exclusive room,
who wouldn't want it filmed.
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So we'll move on.
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00:01:03,901 --> 00:01:06,487
- Who are they?
- A government agency?
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00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:10,241
- You can't say?
- They... Yeah.
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It's very private.
15
00:01:26,670 --> 00:01:30,319
Privacy
today no longer exists.
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00:01:30,320 --> 00:01:32,779
Take a look behind the
scenes of the internet,
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00:01:32,780 --> 00:01:35,519
and you'll see a great
surveillance engine
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00:01:35,520 --> 00:01:37,499
which is continuously
amalgamating
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00:01:37,500 --> 00:01:40,589
billions of data
points on all of us.
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00:01:40,590 --> 00:01:42,569
Surveillance today is no longer
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solely the business of states.
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The web in its totality
is today driven
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00:01:47,110 --> 00:01:49,233
by the collection
of personal data.
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00:01:54,170 --> 00:01:56,409
Web giants like
Google and Facebook,
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00:01:56,410 --> 00:01:58,259
they know everything about you:
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00:01:58,260 --> 00:02:00,619
Your travels, your friends,
your chronic illnesses,
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00:02:00,620 --> 00:02:03,019
your financial situation,
your political opinions,
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00:02:03,020 --> 00:02:06,099
your sexual preferences,
all your little secrets.
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00:02:06,100 --> 00:02:07,809
And just think about
all of these other
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00:02:07,810 --> 00:02:12,169
highly sophisticated services
that you can use for free.
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00:02:12,170 --> 00:02:15,199
They are fighting to
get access to your data.
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00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:18,329
But the internet today also
includes your televisions,
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00:02:18,330 --> 00:02:21,139
which are now connected,
your smart speakers like Alexa,
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00:02:21,140 --> 00:02:23,619
who are listening in on you
every second of the day,
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00:02:23,620 --> 00:02:26,339
your new vacuum cleaner which
is mapping out your home,
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00:02:26,340 --> 00:02:27,879
your child's Hello Barbie doll,
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00:02:27,880 --> 00:02:31,069
which is recording her voice
somewhere up in the cloud.
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00:02:31,070 --> 00:02:33,729
Wherever you go,
whatever you do,
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00:02:33,730 --> 00:02:36,189
you've become a
generator of data,
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00:02:36,190 --> 00:02:40,359
data stored who knows where
and used who knows how.
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00:02:40,360 --> 00:02:43,179
And all of this
data, is it secure?
42
00:02:43,180 --> 00:02:45,209
Every month,
a new company gets hacked,
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00:02:45,210 --> 00:02:47,379
leaking all of your
personal information,
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00:02:47,380 --> 00:02:50,229
which then becomes available
to the highest bidder.
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00:02:50,230 --> 00:02:53,659
Bell Canada, 2017,
1.9 million leaked accounts.
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00:02:53,660 --> 00:02:56,627
Ashley Madison, 2015,
10 million accounts.
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00:02:56,628 --> 00:02:59,979
LinkedIn, 2016,
117 million leaked accounts.
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00:02:59,980 --> 00:03:03,429
Equifax, 2017,
143 million accounts.
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00:03:03,430 --> 00:03:07,129
Yahoo, 2013,
three billion accounts.
50
00:03:07,130 --> 00:03:11,023
No one can guarantee that
your personal data is safe.
51
00:03:19,950 --> 00:03:22,359
But there is still
some hope for privacy,
52
00:03:22,360 --> 00:03:24,899
and hackers are the
ones showing us the way.
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00:03:24,900 --> 00:03:27,409
The internet is
their playground.
54
00:03:27,410 --> 00:03:30,029
We must listen to them
so they can help us
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00:03:30,030 --> 00:03:33,607
imagine an internet
free from surveillance.
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00:03:48,687 --> 00:03:50,356
Of course...
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00:03:50,431 --> 00:03:52,611
the hoodie's a classic.
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00:03:53,362 --> 00:03:55,448
So trite, huh?
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00:03:55,823 --> 00:03:58,492
Anonymous mask,
a series of ones and zeros,
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00:03:58,617 --> 00:04:00,911
numbers, hexadecimals...
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00:04:02,413 --> 00:04:04,739
That's often
considered a bad thing,
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00:04:04,874 --> 00:04:06,584
a crime, that kind of thing.
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00:04:06,709 --> 00:04:08,461
Not so. There's more to it.
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00:04:08,586 --> 00:04:10,588
There are different
kinds of hackers.
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00:04:10,713 --> 00:04:13,674
Some do it for the money,
some do it professionally,
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00:04:13,799 --> 00:04:17,011
some do it for fun,
some work for the government.
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00:04:17,595 --> 00:04:19,825
There's no such thing
as a typical hacker,
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00:04:19,940 --> 00:04:21,849
because there are
different kinds.
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00:04:23,309 --> 00:04:25,268
Hackers seen in the
movies are just one type.
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00:04:25,454 --> 00:04:27,813
It's important
to make a distinction.
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Hackers are part of
a global community.
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They get together during
large and festive gatherings,
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where the topic of
surveillance and privacy
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00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:48,533
is on everyone's mind.
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00:04:56,730 --> 00:04:59,469
First of all, I would like
to welcome you all to New York.
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I want you all to
feel comfortable.
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00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:03,939
I want to ease your mind.
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00:05:03,940 --> 00:05:06,349
You are constantly
being protected.
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00:05:06,350 --> 00:05:10,529
First of all, we have thousands
of surveillance cameras,
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00:05:10,530 --> 00:05:13,519
they're only for your safety,
only for your safety.
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00:05:13,520 --> 00:05:17,005
There are, right now,
11,000 cameras, and growing.
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00:05:17,030 --> 00:05:22,192
In the city, there's
about 700,000 cameras.
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00:05:22,193 --> 00:05:25,083
11,000 of them are linked
into law enforcement now.
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00:05:26,270 --> 00:05:30,139
Not only do these
cameras go out 24/7, 365
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00:05:30,140 --> 00:05:33,699
and film licence
plates, 60,000 per hour,
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00:05:33,700 --> 00:05:37,359
60,000 per hour,
but they keep the data,
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00:05:37,360 --> 00:05:39,729
they share the data with
other companies like Vigilant,
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00:05:39,730 --> 00:05:41,209
which we're gonna talk about.
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00:05:41,210 --> 00:05:44,099
So far New York has a
buffer of four years.
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00:05:44,100 --> 00:05:46,169
So if you forget where
you parked your car,
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00:05:46,170 --> 00:05:48,079
not a problem,
we can help you out.
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Your privacy is really dead.
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Privacy, there's almost no
point in talking about it.
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00:05:55,110 --> 00:05:58,259
So when I see people
sharing their whole lives
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on Facebook and on Google and
posting a gazillion photos
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00:06:02,010 --> 00:06:04,679
and putting up
12-year-old kids photos
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00:06:04,680 --> 00:06:06,476
that I would never
get any other way
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00:06:06,477 --> 00:06:09,766
and that sort of
thing, my feeling is,
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00:06:09,767 --> 00:06:12,356
"Thank you, I appreciate it.
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00:06:12,357 --> 00:06:14,947
"You've done me a big
favour as an investigator."
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00:06:15,860 --> 00:06:18,639
On the other hand, as a citizen,
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this non-stop oversharing
of data creeps me out.
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You've surrendered
that information.
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You can't get it back.
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You can't put the
genie back in the lamp.
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00:06:40,230 --> 00:06:42,639
This is a custom
wearable computer.
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00:06:42,640 --> 00:06:44,789
It now appears like
basically there's an iPad
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floating a couple
feet in front of me.
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00:06:48,590 --> 00:06:50,449
You have trends that
are going off there
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00:06:50,450 --> 00:06:52,582
like Facebook
Messenger, Amazon Alexa,
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00:06:52,621 --> 00:06:54,080
that are listening
in to everything
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that they have to say.
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So we've gone off and
we've created a solution
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that it securely jams
all of your microphones
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00:06:59,336 --> 00:07:01,338
and your cameras
inside of your phone
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00:07:01,380 --> 00:07:03,006
so that your phone
is not gonna be used
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00:07:03,007 --> 00:07:05,296
as a digital eavesdropping
device in the world today.
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00:07:05,297 --> 00:07:06,349
"Hey, how are you doing?"
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00:07:06,350 --> 00:07:08,949
You can do this, or it's,
"Smile, take a selfie,"
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00:07:08,950 --> 00:07:11,609
or, "Hey Google,
make this dinner reservation."
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00:07:11,610 --> 00:07:13,109
When it goes down from here,
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00:07:13,110 --> 00:07:16,429
it securely jams each one
of the microphones in here
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00:07:16,430 --> 00:07:18,189
to a level that's
never been seen before
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00:07:18,190 --> 00:07:19,691
that no one will be
able to listen in
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00:07:19,731 --> 00:07:21,066
to your phone whatsoever.
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00:07:21,100 --> 00:07:23,429
And then we also have
a cover over here
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that allows you to
be able to do...
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00:07:25,450 --> 00:07:28,269
It's a Verde bag or a
Verde cage from here.
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00:07:28,270 --> 00:07:30,899
So when you slide this over,
this blocks your cellphone
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00:07:30,900 --> 00:07:32,809
so you can be underneath
a cellphone tower,
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00:07:32,810 --> 00:07:35,019
right next to a Wi-Fi
hotspot, et cetera.
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00:07:35,020 --> 00:07:37,620
You are invisible to the
world that is out there.
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00:07:49,610 --> 00:07:53,419
Groups were hacking into NATO.
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They were telling the FBI
every week to fuck off.
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Exactly.
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00:08:00,930 --> 00:08:03,959
And, you know, I actually,
during this period,
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00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:07,499
was having nightmares that
the FBI was gonna visit me
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00:08:07,500 --> 00:08:09,939
as someone who's studied
them, right?
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00:08:09,940 --> 00:08:11,766
There's very different
types of hackers.
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00:08:12,300 --> 00:08:14,609
There's those
precisely who break
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into systems to improve systems.
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00:08:17,070 --> 00:08:19,739
There are those
who want to write
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free and open source software.
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00:08:21,730 --> 00:08:24,777
There are those who are
into making hardware.
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00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:29,359
And then there's a group of
them who are really involved
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00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:33,693
in the fight against
surveillance and for privacy.
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00:08:34,670 --> 00:08:38,739
One of the reasons
why a lot of hackers
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00:08:38,740 --> 00:08:42,179
are aware of these
issues is precisely
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because they know how easy
it is to surveil people.
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00:08:48,840 --> 00:08:52,129
Hackers get together at events
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such as Hackers on Planet Earth,
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the Chaos Computer
Club conference,
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00:08:56,730 --> 00:08:59,099
and they give
impassioned speeches
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about the importance of privacy
and fighting surveillance.
155
00:09:04,100 --> 00:09:07,259
We need heroes
like Edward Snowden.
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00:09:07,260 --> 00:09:10,029
Three cheers for Edward Snowden.
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00:09:10,030 --> 00:09:11,822
Hip, hip, hooray!
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00:09:12,141 --> 00:09:13,969
Hip, hip, hooray!
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00:09:14,221 --> 00:09:15,701
Hip, hip, hooray!
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00:09:21,645 --> 00:09:26,608
I believe that it's
fundamentally inadequate
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00:09:26,636 --> 00:09:27,885
as a solution
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00:09:27,910 --> 00:09:32,659
to restrict the use of
the data once accumulated.
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The data will be misused.
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00:09:35,210 --> 00:09:37,799
It will be misused officially,
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00:09:37,800 --> 00:09:40,409
because our government's
rules for using it
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have such loopholes
that it can get away
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00:09:43,340 --> 00:09:45,659
with doing anything it wants.
168
00:09:45,660 --> 00:09:49,339
We need to do more than limit
the use of these databases.
169
00:09:49,340 --> 00:09:52,373
We need to prevent
them from being made.
170
00:09:54,190 --> 00:09:57,489
The level of surveillance
imposed on us today
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00:09:57,490 --> 00:10:01,439
is more than in the
former Soviet Union.
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00:10:01,440 --> 00:10:05,859
It's so much that there
is little room for dissent
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00:10:05,860 --> 00:10:10,799
or for whistle blowers, and
that puts democracy in danger.
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00:10:10,800 --> 00:10:15,399
We have to reduce the overall
general level of surveillance
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00:10:15,400 --> 00:10:18,029
to the point where
the state doesn't know
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00:10:18,030 --> 00:10:20,279
where each person
goes, and the state
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00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:22,273
doesn't know who
talks with whom.
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00:10:24,513 --> 00:10:29,003
I will never use Uber
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00:10:29,028 --> 00:10:31,499
unless it's
fundamentally changed.
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00:10:31,500 --> 00:10:34,179
It snoops on people,
which means Uber
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00:10:34,180 --> 00:10:36,289
keeps track of who goes where.
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00:10:36,290 --> 00:10:39,709
This should be illegal,
because it's too threatening
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00:10:39,710 --> 00:10:44,369
to fundamental freedoms that
are needed for democracy.
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00:10:44,370 --> 00:10:47,439
So, companies like
Uber should be told
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00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:50,809
either allow people to
get rides anonymously
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00:10:50,810 --> 00:10:52,779
and pay with cash
187
00:10:52,780 --> 00:10:57,780
and not have to use any
device that tracks them,
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00:10:58,550 --> 00:11:01,559
or shut down, you're gone.
189
00:11:01,560 --> 00:11:04,969
Because, when it comes
to something as important
190
00:11:04,970 --> 00:11:09,869
as maintaining our democracy,
we need a stronger defence
191
00:11:09,870 --> 00:11:13,929
than just saying that
companies have to ask users
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00:11:13,930 --> 00:11:15,789
to give up their freedom.
193
00:11:15,790 --> 00:11:19,719
Getting the user's
consent for treating users
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00:11:19,720 --> 00:11:21,759
in a way that
threatens democracy
195
00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:24,509
does not excuse it,
does not make it legitimate.
196
00:11:24,510 --> 00:11:25,844
And do you yourself
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00:11:25,869 --> 00:11:27,299
consider yourself a hacker?
198
00:11:27,300 --> 00:11:28,839
Of course.
199
00:11:28,840 --> 00:11:30,889
I enjoy playful cleverness.
200
00:11:30,890 --> 00:11:32,449
That's what it means
to be a hacker,
201
00:11:32,450 --> 00:11:35,009
to enjoy playful cleverness.
202
00:11:35,010 --> 00:11:38,109
Everybody's first
hack is trying to walk
203
00:11:38,110 --> 00:11:40,003
the wrong way on the escalator,
204
00:11:40,890 --> 00:11:42,809
'cause you've got a
system that was designed
205
00:11:42,810 --> 00:11:46,189
to be used one way,
and you're trying to make it
206
00:11:46,190 --> 00:11:49,263
do something different,
which it wasn't designed for.
207
00:11:50,200 --> 00:11:52,093
That's the hacker spirit.
208
00:12:11,985 --> 00:12:13,426
The pessimist in me thinks
209
00:12:13,533 --> 00:12:15,643
the battle has been
lost for some time.
210
00:12:16,361 --> 00:12:20,366
The mere fact that everyone
carries a cellphone,
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00:12:20,782 --> 00:12:22,616
the optimal surveillance device,
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00:12:22,713 --> 00:12:25,307
beyond George Orwell's
wildest dreams
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00:12:25,447 --> 00:12:28,126
when trying to imagine
an omniscient panopticon.
214
00:12:28,329 --> 00:12:30,665
This is also fuelled
by social media.
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00:12:30,879 --> 00:12:32,381
I do it, too. Everyone does.
216
00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:36,557
Anything that can be
monitored is monitored,
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00:12:37,090 --> 00:12:38,345
as well as monetized.
218
00:12:38,929 --> 00:12:41,040
And the prevailing
business model
219
00:12:41,255 --> 00:12:43,266
for all high-tech companies now
220
00:12:43,392 --> 00:12:45,644
is the selling of
personal information.
221
00:12:45,894 --> 00:12:50,023
It remains a cash cow
for these companies.
222
00:12:51,066 --> 00:12:55,195
And all this is based on data
collection, mass surveillance,
223
00:12:55,320 --> 00:12:59,241
and the slow but steady
erosion of privacy.
224
00:13:00,534 --> 00:13:03,120
It's an Orwellian
nightmare of sorts.
225
00:13:03,245 --> 00:13:07,874
And I think I can
help in that regard,
226
00:13:08,000 --> 00:13:10,319
through Crypto.Québec,
what we produce,
227
00:13:10,331 --> 00:13:12,546
with our podcast,
articles, training,
228
00:13:12,671 --> 00:13:14,631
and what we say to the media.
229
00:13:15,048 --> 00:13:16,364
These matters affect everyone,
230
00:13:16,376 --> 00:13:17,926
though people may
not realize it.
231
00:13:18,385 --> 00:13:20,762
They affect everyone,
so this must be addressed.
232
00:13:21,972 --> 00:13:23,590
Welcome to the 37th edition of
233
00:13:23,602 --> 00:13:25,559
Crypto.Quebec's
Watchdogs podcast.
234
00:13:25,684 --> 00:13:27,535
Hosted by Geneviève Lajeunesse,
235
00:13:27,547 --> 00:13:28,547
Luc Lefebvre,
236
00:13:28,603 --> 00:13:30,025
Jean-Philippe Décarie-Mathieu,
237
00:13:30,037 --> 00:13:31,037
And Sophie Thériault.
238
00:13:31,398 --> 00:13:34,609
We have a lot to
talk about today.
239
00:13:35,222 --> 00:13:37,524
I simply wanted to look back
240
00:13:37,693 --> 00:13:39,790
on a little trip
we made last week,
241
00:13:39,995 --> 00:13:41,391
myself, Jean-Philippe and Luc,
242
00:13:41,780 --> 00:13:44,992
to the nation's capital, Ottawa.
243
00:13:45,245 --> 00:13:49,291
We visited CSIS and
CSE headquarters.
244
00:13:49,416 --> 00:13:51,334
- Just to check them out.
- From outside.
245
00:13:51,460 --> 00:13:53,545
- Well, you tried.
- Right.
246
00:13:54,129 --> 00:13:56,119
Can you see the
building back there?
247
00:13:56,238 --> 00:13:57,238
Kinda.
248
00:14:00,677 --> 00:14:04,595
I really didn't expect to
see Canada's cyber elite
249
00:14:04,712 --> 00:14:06,808
across from Loblaws.
250
00:14:06,933 --> 00:14:09,352
For real, it's... Imagine...
251
00:14:09,853 --> 00:14:14,775
Like, a huge, magical airport
next to the Quartier DIX30.
252
00:14:15,195 --> 00:14:17,112
- It's kind of like that.
- That's exactly it.
253
00:14:17,819 --> 00:14:20,363
- With nice bay windows...
- It's awesome.
254
00:14:20,489 --> 00:14:21,698
Bay windows?
255
00:14:22,282 --> 00:14:24,242
Of course.
They're all about transparency.
256
00:14:26,161 --> 00:14:27,204
There they are.
257
00:14:27,746 --> 00:14:29,831
Those who must be stopped.
258
00:14:29,956 --> 00:14:34,836
Those who track your aunt's
metadata when she goes jogging,
259
00:14:34,961 --> 00:14:38,423
because she happens to be
related to a person of interest.
260
00:14:38,924 --> 00:14:40,801
- They work there.
- That's it.
261
00:14:41,343 --> 00:14:42,847
I would tell an ordinary citizen
262
00:14:42,964 --> 00:14:45,680
that they're the cyber
strong arm of the government.
263
00:14:45,806 --> 00:14:49,226
To work there is to be part
of the problem, really.
264
00:14:49,327 --> 00:14:51,749
Because they're really knee-deep
265
00:14:51,909 --> 00:14:53,772
in the global
surveillance network.
266
00:14:55,398 --> 00:14:58,026
I wonder what happens when
we reach the no-filming zone.
267
00:14:58,151 --> 00:15:00,946
If we don't go beyond the
sign, we should be okay.
268
00:15:01,068 --> 00:15:03,227
But we will be there in
about eight seconds.
269
00:15:03,348 --> 00:15:04,348
There you go.
270
00:15:05,117 --> 00:15:07,494
- "Breakin' the law."
- Story of my life.
271
00:15:09,204 --> 00:15:10,204
Wait.
272
00:15:21,922 --> 00:15:24,007
It's no surprise
that we're not allowed
273
00:15:24,020 --> 00:15:26,439
to film our Canadian NSA.
274
00:15:26,440 --> 00:15:29,759
What is surprising, however,
is the fact that this building
275
00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:32,469
is the priciest piece
of public architecture
276
00:15:32,470 --> 00:15:34,309
in the history of Canada.
277
00:15:34,310 --> 00:15:37,328
It cost us $1.2 billion.
278
00:15:37,820 --> 00:15:40,029
This confirms that
internet surveillance
279
00:15:40,030 --> 00:15:44,009
does not only concern the
United States and its NSA.
280
00:15:44,010 --> 00:15:46,159
Intelligence agencies
like CSIS and the CSE
281
00:15:46,160 --> 00:15:48,734
have far more permissive powers
to engage in surveillance.
282
00:15:49,203 --> 00:15:51,715
And part of the problem with
how those agencies operate
283
00:15:51,740 --> 00:15:54,949
is that a lot of not
only their activities
284
00:15:54,950 --> 00:15:57,739
but also the legal
frameworks which authorise
285
00:15:57,740 --> 00:15:59,664
those activities
exist in secret.
286
00:16:00,328 --> 00:16:03,639
There is a track record
of abuse and misconduct
287
00:16:03,640 --> 00:16:06,179
of these types of
powers, of overreach,
288
00:16:06,180 --> 00:16:08,309
and of interference with
the democratic process
289
00:16:08,310 --> 00:16:12,609
and with lawful
advocacy organisations
290
00:16:12,610 --> 00:16:15,169
that I think is well evidenced.
291
00:16:15,170 --> 00:16:18,039
There is really clear
material around that.
292
00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:20,559
I mean, we also have
recently seen cases in Quebec
293
00:16:20,564 --> 00:16:24,656
where there was government
surveillance of journalists.
294
00:16:25,194 --> 00:16:27,362
Here, we're
referring to the surveillance
295
00:16:27,379 --> 00:16:29,249
of journalist Patrique Lagacé,
296
00:16:29,250 --> 00:16:31,529
as well as at least
nine other journalists
297
00:16:31,530 --> 00:16:33,229
who were placed
under surveillance
298
00:16:33,230 --> 00:16:35,079
by the Montreal
police as well as
299
00:16:35,080 --> 00:16:36,479
the Quebec provincial police.
300
00:16:36,480 --> 00:16:39,059
But this is just
one of many examples
301
00:16:39,060 --> 00:16:41,989
that show how intelligence
and law enforcement agencies
302
00:16:41,990 --> 00:16:45,029
frequently abuse their
cyber surveillance powers.
303
00:16:45,030 --> 00:16:46,459
Through the Snowden revelations
304
00:16:46,460 --> 00:16:47,909
we also learned of the existence
305
00:16:47,910 --> 00:16:50,679
of numerous mass surveillance
programmes in Canada
306
00:16:50,680 --> 00:16:52,599
set up by our
intelligence agencies
307
00:16:52,600 --> 00:16:55,009
with little to no
legislative oversight.
308
00:16:55,010 --> 00:16:58,779
In 2017, the Trudeau government
introduced Bill C-59,
309
00:16:58,780 --> 00:17:01,509
supposed to better regulate
the powers of these agencies.
310
00:17:01,510 --> 00:17:04,369
But for the critics,
this was unconvincing.
311
00:17:04,370 --> 00:17:06,412
The problem is that the
framework they've set out
312
00:17:06,437 --> 00:17:08,359
is profoundly permissive.
313
00:17:08,360 --> 00:17:09,769
So I'll give you one example.
314
00:17:09,770 --> 00:17:11,929
There are frameworks that
allow for the capture
315
00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:13,989
of what the
government has called
316
00:17:13,990 --> 00:17:17,539
"publicly available information"
or "publicly available data".
317
00:17:17,540 --> 00:17:20,049
And the definition of that
is effectively any data
318
00:17:20,050 --> 00:17:23,219
that could be accessed
publicly in any manner at all
319
00:17:23,220 --> 00:17:25,289
or could be purchased.
320
00:17:25,290 --> 00:17:28,569
So if you could imagine
every possible bit of data
321
00:17:28,570 --> 00:17:30,549
that could be known
or purchased about you
322
00:17:30,550 --> 00:17:33,629
that is in some way
justifiably public,
323
00:17:33,630 --> 00:17:35,839
whether that's something
that you put on Facebook
324
00:17:35,840 --> 00:17:39,419
or something that you said in
a radio interview 20 years ago
325
00:17:39,420 --> 00:17:42,199
or the path you walk to school
326
00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:45,659
'cause there's neighbourhood
surveillance cameras everywhere,
327
00:17:45,660 --> 00:17:48,593
this starts to get
deeply, deeply invasive.
328
00:17:51,796 --> 00:17:53,465
Another
chapter can be added
329
00:17:53,490 --> 00:17:55,323
to this list: IMSI-catchers.
330
00:17:55,324 --> 00:17:58,669
These devices can intercept
data from your mobile phones.
331
00:17:58,670 --> 00:18:01,639
And in April 2017,
it was reported that at least
332
00:18:01,640 --> 00:18:04,399
eight IMSI-catchers were
operating in Ottawa.
333
00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:07,379
The RCMP later admitted
it was using IMSI-catchers
334
00:18:07,380 --> 00:18:08,623
all across the country.
335
00:18:09,910 --> 00:18:11,699
An IMSI-catcher is a small box
336
00:18:11,700 --> 00:18:13,969
that mimics a cellphone antenna.
337
00:18:13,970 --> 00:18:15,609
Your phone connects
to it automatically
338
00:18:15,610 --> 00:18:17,589
and allows the
IMSI-catcher to intercept
339
00:18:17,590 --> 00:18:19,349
your phone's unique identifier
340
00:18:19,350 --> 00:18:22,803
or the IMSI for international
mobile subscriber identity.
341
00:18:25,790 --> 00:18:27,459
Some IMSI-catchers can also
342
00:18:27,460 --> 00:18:29,580
intercept calls
and text messages.
343
00:18:30,370 --> 00:18:32,279
IMSI-catchers are
tremendously invasive
344
00:18:32,280 --> 00:18:36,359
mass surveillance tools,
but they are a tiny,
345
00:18:36,360 --> 00:18:39,879
tiny fraction of the
range of technologies
346
00:18:39,880 --> 00:18:42,303
available to an agency like CSE,
347
00:18:43,260 --> 00:18:45,339
and I think that we need
to put that in context.
348
00:18:45,340 --> 00:18:47,246
So if your question is,
349
00:18:47,247 --> 00:18:51,249
"How can I be surveyed
in the world?"
350
00:18:51,250 --> 00:18:54,929
My answer to that is
use your imagination.
351
00:18:54,930 --> 00:18:56,739
You know?
352
00:19:12,697 --> 00:19:16,659
The reason we came to the
march against police brutality
353
00:19:16,785 --> 00:19:19,089
was to see what
kind of surveillance
354
00:19:19,197 --> 00:19:21,081
was conducted on protesters.
355
00:19:21,206 --> 00:19:24,255
Would surveillance methods
be more conventional,
356
00:19:24,373 --> 00:19:25,902
more technological?
357
00:19:28,588 --> 00:19:32,467
So the CryptoPhone is the
device that was used in Ottawa
358
00:19:32,592 --> 00:19:35,095
when IMSI-Catchers were found.
359
00:19:35,220 --> 00:19:36,638
Same device.
360
00:19:40,225 --> 00:19:43,083
I think it's highly
likely the Montreal Police
361
00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:45,313
uses this type of equipment.
362
00:19:45,438 --> 00:19:47,857
Here too, I'd wager.
363
00:19:51,027 --> 00:19:55,490
This is a warning from the
Montreal Police Department.
364
00:19:55,615 --> 00:20:00,662
Some protesters persist
in breaking the law.
365
00:20:00,787 --> 00:20:03,164
Due to offences committed,
366
00:20:03,873 --> 00:20:08,461
protesters are ordered to
disperse and leave the scene.
367
00:20:08,962 --> 00:20:11,881
Otherwise,
we will be forced to step in.
368
00:20:12,841 --> 00:20:15,885
I'm opposed to the
use of IMSI-Catchers,
369
00:20:16,010 --> 00:20:19,722
because it not only affects
the targeted individual,
370
00:20:19,848 --> 00:20:21,933
but everyone within range
of the IMSI-Catcher.
371
00:20:22,058 --> 00:20:24,667
So everyone around
can be overheard,
372
00:20:24,779 --> 00:20:26,521
can be tracked down here.
373
00:20:28,523 --> 00:20:29,941
There isn't much to see,
374
00:20:30,066 --> 00:20:34,946
the readings are not
showing anything abnormal.
375
00:20:36,781 --> 00:20:40,201
Seems IMSI-Catchers
weren't used tonight.
376
00:20:41,077 --> 00:20:45,582
For years,
the police denied using them.
377
00:20:45,707 --> 00:20:49,210
So they were being manufactured
and sold, but to no one.
378
00:20:49,335 --> 00:20:51,421
They caught me and took my cell!
379
00:20:53,381 --> 00:20:54,799
Interesting.
380
00:21:03,440 --> 00:21:06,299
The Montreal
hacker scene is alive and well.
381
00:21:06,300 --> 00:21:08,409
Montreal is becoming
an important node
382
00:21:08,410 --> 00:21:10,283
in the global hacker network.
383
00:21:16,070 --> 00:21:19,189
Each year, over 400
hackers gather in Montreal
384
00:21:19,190 --> 00:21:21,209
to participate in
the largest on-site
385
00:21:21,210 --> 00:21:24,206
hacking competition in
North America: NSEC.
386
00:21:25,090 --> 00:21:28,489
The goal is simple: Score
points by solving challenges
387
00:21:28,490 --> 00:21:31,627
in bypassing security
systems and obstacles.
388
00:21:37,759 --> 00:21:42,263
The scenario is a thinly veiled
parody of North Korea, I guess.
389
00:21:42,639 --> 00:21:45,975
Elections are being held in
the fictional kingdom of Rao.
390
00:21:46,476 --> 00:21:47,681
It's rather unclear.
391
00:21:47,808 --> 00:21:50,267
Seems we can either help
the regime or the rebels.
392
00:21:50,813 --> 00:21:52,982
Now, we're helping everyone
to get more points.
393
00:21:58,331 --> 00:22:01,680
Rao is basically a
fictional character.
394
00:22:02,033 --> 00:22:04,075
People will think
he's North Korean,
395
00:22:04,229 --> 00:22:07,247
but he's really based on
Mao, so more Chinese.
396
00:22:07,747 --> 00:22:08,873
Everyone okay?
397
00:22:09,749 --> 00:22:10,792
What are you working on?
398
00:22:12,377 --> 00:22:13,419
Ah, nice!
399
00:22:13,545 --> 00:22:14,546
Nice challenge.
400
00:22:16,086 --> 00:22:17,396
Six points.
401
00:22:17,421 --> 00:22:18,465
Yes!
402
00:22:20,802 --> 00:22:23,930
NorthSec is a somewhat
elitist organization.
403
00:22:24,639 --> 00:22:27,016
Since the event was launched,
404
00:22:27,141 --> 00:22:30,103
we're the first to question
people's abilities.
405
00:22:30,228 --> 00:22:32,272
They should hone their
skills to help,
406
00:22:32,436 --> 00:22:34,686
because cybersecurity
is about helping people.
407
00:22:35,525 --> 00:22:40,113
30 to 40% of our challenges
are won by all teams.
408
00:22:40,238 --> 00:22:43,581
So about 60% of them go unsolved
409
00:22:43,708 --> 00:22:46,828
by the end of the
weekend competition.
410
00:22:46,953 --> 00:22:48,745
So people come here
because they know
411
00:22:48,874 --> 00:22:50,665
they're really gonna
bust their humps.
412
00:22:50,790 --> 00:22:54,377
They'll really challenge
themselves. And it's non-stop.
413
00:22:54,877 --> 00:22:56,170
All hail Rao.
414
00:22:58,214 --> 00:22:59,924
We can only vote once.
415
00:23:01,259 --> 00:23:02,260
All hail Rao.
416
00:23:06,126 --> 00:23:08,335
I think most people
with NorthSec
417
00:23:08,454 --> 00:23:10,810
are against the idea
of mass surveillance.
418
00:23:10,935 --> 00:23:12,812
Essentially, it's problematic,
419
00:23:12,937 --> 00:23:15,564
giving so much
information to people
420
00:23:15,690 --> 00:23:17,859
who have no business having it.
421
00:23:23,197 --> 00:23:26,117
I was what's known as
a penetration tester,
422
00:23:26,242 --> 00:23:27,617
a professional hacker,
423
00:23:27,760 --> 00:23:30,371
in the banking world,
for several years.
424
00:23:30,705 --> 00:23:34,125
When you work in this
field, in cybersecurity,
425
00:23:34,250 --> 00:23:38,046
you realize that every scrap
of information is a key.
426
00:23:38,379 --> 00:23:41,090
The more keys you have,
the more powerful you are.
427
00:23:41,591 --> 00:23:44,761
And if this information
is misused, mishandled,
428
00:23:45,345 --> 00:23:48,097
it can become a weapon
for many people.
429
00:23:48,222 --> 00:23:51,052
So, of course,
most cybersecurity experts
430
00:23:51,208 --> 00:23:53,327
are troubled by
mass surveillance,
431
00:23:53,483 --> 00:23:56,296
because they know the stakes.
432
00:23:56,773 --> 00:24:01,319
Why do it when it's
probably pointless?
433
00:24:01,611 --> 00:24:04,614
Surveillance and intelligence
agencies already exist.
434
00:24:04,739 --> 00:24:08,117
In Canada, we have one with a
relatively decent reputation.
435
00:24:08,372 --> 00:24:10,524
Why do they need
more information?
436
00:24:10,703 --> 00:24:12,080
Is it because they're...
437
00:24:12,955 --> 00:24:14,374
...caught short?
438
00:24:14,499 --> 00:24:17,251
Or are they simply really lazy?
439
00:24:18,127 --> 00:24:19,837
Maybe they're lazy.
440
00:24:32,806 --> 00:24:34,308
The
Montreal hacker scene
441
00:24:34,315 --> 00:24:37,229
also includes groups
like Subgraph and Peerio,
442
00:24:37,230 --> 00:24:39,739
who develop internationally
renowned applications
443
00:24:39,740 --> 00:24:42,179
and platforms which aim
to protect their users
444
00:24:42,180 --> 00:24:44,034
from surveillance
and data collection.
445
00:24:44,401 --> 00:24:48,235
Subgraph is a Linux-based
operating system
446
00:24:48,366 --> 00:24:51,703
designed to thwart
malicious attacks.
447
00:24:52,492 --> 00:24:56,742
Peerio aims to
provide easy to use,
448
00:24:56,750 --> 00:24:59,369
beautiful end-to-end
encrypted communications
449
00:24:59,370 --> 00:25:01,869
and collaboration
tools for teams.
450
00:25:01,870 --> 00:25:04,919
Our goal is really
to be sort of a suite
451
00:25:04,920 --> 00:25:08,849
and a whole environment
of tools that teams
452
00:25:08,850 --> 00:25:12,042
and organisations can use in
order to secure their work.
453
00:25:12,432 --> 00:25:14,475
There are two kinds
of surveillance:
454
00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:16,811
Mass surveillance, dragnets;
455
00:25:17,145 --> 00:25:19,986
And targeted surveillance.
456
00:25:20,982 --> 00:25:23,980
We try to prevent
targeted surveillance.
457
00:25:24,489 --> 00:25:26,665
If you're a journalist,
if you're a lawyer,
458
00:25:26,690 --> 00:25:31,690
if you're a therapist and you
have all this communication
459
00:25:31,715 --> 00:25:36,553
that's highly confidential,
we try to make sure that
460
00:25:36,578 --> 00:25:38,662
communications that are
understood to be private
461
00:25:38,664 --> 00:25:40,165
between parties are
actually private
462
00:25:40,166 --> 00:25:41,442
and they're private from us.
463
00:25:42,128 --> 00:25:43,421
There's very little privacy.
464
00:25:43,546 --> 00:25:46,716
Even people who are very...
465
00:25:46,841 --> 00:25:50,678
shrewd about their
Internet usage,
466
00:25:50,803 --> 00:25:53,973
their use of technology, even
they have very little privacy.
467
00:25:54,098 --> 00:25:56,934
Among other things,
even if they're careful,
468
00:25:57,059 --> 00:26:01,063
someone they know is posting
information about them
469
00:26:01,189 --> 00:26:02,690
without their knowledge.
470
00:26:03,050 --> 00:26:06,439
Platforms that were
meant to provide
471
00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:10,009
some kind of joy
and value for users
472
00:26:10,010 --> 00:26:14,109
are being monetized in a way
that's almost adversarial
473
00:26:14,110 --> 00:26:17,989
to the users that are
actually using it, right?
474
00:26:17,990 --> 00:26:20,669
Like, your user,
who you thought was going to be
475
00:26:20,670 --> 00:26:23,579
your customer,
suddenly became your product.
476
00:26:23,580 --> 00:26:25,268
I find that quite tragic.
477
00:26:29,530 --> 00:26:31,709
As elsewhere,
the Montreal hacker scene
478
00:26:31,710 --> 00:26:34,489
was born in the
1980s and gave rise
479
00:26:34,490 --> 00:26:37,199
to several hacks that
became legendary.
480
00:26:37,200 --> 00:26:39,343
Rob Masse comes
from this period.
481
00:26:44,920 --> 00:26:47,869
So I started in
computers when I was five,
482
00:26:47,870 --> 00:26:51,679
on an Apple II Plus,
and I started telecommunication
483
00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:54,489
and understanding how
phone systems work
484
00:26:54,490 --> 00:26:55,683
when I was about nine.
485
00:26:57,150 --> 00:26:59,959
There's no, necessarily,
rules at that time
486
00:26:59,960 --> 00:27:02,362
about how to use computers
and how to leverage computers.
487
00:27:02,995 --> 00:27:06,329
And my main goal when I was nine
488
00:27:06,330 --> 00:27:08,823
was how do I download
video games for free?
489
00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:12,559
The first component at
that age when I was nine
490
00:27:12,560 --> 00:27:13,808
was phone phreaking.
491
00:27:13,833 --> 00:27:15,277
Back then there was no internet,
492
00:27:15,302 --> 00:27:16,845
but there was other
types of networks
493
00:27:16,846 --> 00:27:18,469
of interconnected systems,
494
00:27:18,470 --> 00:27:19,949
and we would use
the phone phreaking
495
00:27:19,950 --> 00:27:22,850
to kind of get into those
networks and then leverage that.
496
00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:26,159
A lot of the video
games I would play
497
00:27:26,160 --> 00:27:29,899
are like, Dungeons and Dragons,
at the time it was Ultima.
498
00:27:29,900 --> 00:27:34,900
And in those games, the goal
is to kind of explore the land.
499
00:27:35,120 --> 00:27:40,043
Then you'd get into castles and
take gold and fight dragons.
500
00:27:40,077 --> 00:27:41,245
So that's the video game.
501
00:27:41,254 --> 00:27:43,249
It's important to
understand that context.
502
00:27:43,250 --> 00:27:45,839
In the hacking
world at that time,
503
00:27:45,840 --> 00:27:49,749
you would connect to the
X.25 network data pack,
504
00:27:49,750 --> 00:27:51,829
and you'd be able
to go into castles
505
00:27:51,830 --> 00:27:54,599
and take information and
leverage that information.
506
00:27:54,600 --> 00:27:57,189
So for me it was a
question of just, you know,
507
00:27:57,190 --> 00:27:58,929
hacking into systems
just for fun.
508
00:27:58,930 --> 00:28:01,279
There was never any
malicious intent.
509
00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:03,509
It was just a
question of learning.
510
00:28:03,510 --> 00:28:06,529
I started going into
systems around the world.
511
00:28:06,530 --> 00:28:08,630
It just happened to
upset a lot of people.
512
00:28:09,675 --> 00:28:12,099
At the age of
15, Rob Masse connected
513
00:28:12,100 --> 00:28:15,099
to a state network belonging
to the Soviet Union.
514
00:28:15,100 --> 00:28:16,929
The year was 1989.
515
00:28:16,930 --> 00:28:19,083
The Cold War was still ongoing.
516
00:28:20,340 --> 00:28:22,983
The RCMP quickly took
notice of this hack.
517
00:28:24,290 --> 00:28:27,669
So when I was in grade
10, 15 years old,
518
00:28:27,670 --> 00:28:30,079
RCMP came to my house,
did a full raid.
519
00:28:30,080 --> 00:28:33,299
And then,
after that I had to kind of
520
00:28:33,300 --> 00:28:35,199
work with law enforcement.
521
00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:37,399
Ultimately, over that year,
522
00:28:37,400 --> 00:28:40,399
I would go to the
Ottawa police college.
523
00:28:40,400 --> 00:28:41,949
The RCMP would sponsor me.
524
00:28:41,972 --> 00:28:44,119
Other law enforcement
agencies from around the world
525
00:28:44,144 --> 00:28:46,829
would come just to
listen to me speak.
526
00:28:46,830 --> 00:28:48,362
Like, hey,
we caught this hacker.
527
00:28:48,387 --> 00:28:50,033
Come see the hacker,
and he'll tell you
528
00:28:50,058 --> 00:28:52,599
all about what goes
on in the hack world.
529
00:28:52,600 --> 00:28:53,737
Did you work
530
00:28:53,762 --> 00:28:55,471
for the intelligence
agencies after that?
531
00:28:57,350 --> 00:29:00,343
I've been engaged by
various people to help them.
532
00:29:02,260 --> 00:29:03,610
So that's the answer.
533
00:29:07,730 --> 00:29:10,259
Today, Rob Masse
is a professional hacker
534
00:29:10,260 --> 00:29:13,289
working to compromise
systems and individuals.
535
00:29:13,290 --> 00:29:15,369
The traces we leave of
ourselves on the internet
536
00:29:15,370 --> 00:29:18,493
have become one of the main
resources he can leverage.
537
00:29:23,140 --> 00:29:26,009
I would say the two main
components of my background
538
00:29:26,010 --> 00:29:28,559
personally is on the
instant response side
539
00:29:28,560 --> 00:29:31,169
as well as what we call
offensive cyber security,
540
00:29:31,170 --> 00:29:32,503
so breaking into things.
541
00:29:33,580 --> 00:29:35,983
And we have a 100%
success ratio.
542
00:29:36,693 --> 00:29:38,611
Unfortunately,
I don't think it's necessarily
543
00:29:38,612 --> 00:29:39,654
'cause we're that great.
544
00:29:39,655 --> 00:29:41,905
I just think that many of
the organisations right now
545
00:29:41,906 --> 00:29:44,019
have the same challenges
on the business side
546
00:29:44,020 --> 00:29:45,279
and on the security side.
547
00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:47,339
And we're kind of losing the war
548
00:29:47,340 --> 00:29:48,740
on cyber security right now.
549
00:29:49,730 --> 00:29:54,073
My personal opinion on privacy
is that there's almost none.
550
00:29:55,180 --> 00:30:00,615
If you are using social media
or any of those other services
551
00:30:00,640 --> 00:30:03,599
where you're not a paying
customer, you are not
552
00:30:03,600 --> 00:30:06,279
the client or the customer,
you are the product.
553
00:30:06,280 --> 00:30:09,263
And as such, you trade your
personal data for that usage.
554
00:30:15,020 --> 00:30:16,799
To break
free from surveillance,
555
00:30:16,800 --> 00:30:19,549
hackers try to regain
control over computing
556
00:30:19,550 --> 00:30:20,649
and democratise it.
557
00:30:20,650 --> 00:30:23,799
In hackerspaces,
they dismantle and dismember
558
00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:27,389
everything they can to better
understand computer systems.
559
00:30:27,390 --> 00:30:31,042
Here the motto is "programme
or be programmed."
560
00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:49,769
Foulab is a hackerspace.
561
00:30:50,105 --> 00:30:54,273
It's really a collective that
offers its members resources,
562
00:30:54,398 --> 00:30:58,027
and, above all, know-how.
563
00:30:58,150 --> 00:31:02,332
So human capital,
in terms of knowledge,
564
00:31:02,469 --> 00:31:05,326
for the sharing of
ideas and techniques.
565
00:31:05,785 --> 00:31:10,790
In hacker culture, access to
information is fundamental,
566
00:31:10,915 --> 00:31:14,585
in order to understand a system.
567
00:31:14,710 --> 00:31:17,213
I call it an
open-source think-tank.
568
00:31:21,258 --> 00:31:23,719
Now we'll rid this computer
569
00:31:24,678 --> 00:31:26,514
of its malicious
piece of software.
570
00:31:29,058 --> 00:31:31,160
The computer comes
with software,
571
00:31:31,327 --> 00:31:33,729
which users are
usually unaware of,
572
00:31:33,854 --> 00:31:36,524
installed by the supplier.
573
00:31:36,855 --> 00:31:38,731
For example,
574
00:31:38,859 --> 00:31:43,697
the NSA and ThinkPad
could have conspired
575
00:31:44,240 --> 00:31:48,744
to install software to
access the computer remotely.
576
00:31:49,995 --> 00:31:54,792
So we'll replace this
with open-source software
577
00:31:54,917 --> 00:31:56,877
to ensure there's no backdoor,
578
00:31:57,002 --> 00:32:01,465
or to simply make changes and
change the computer's features.
579
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:08,499
A back door is a point of
entry unknown by the user
580
00:32:08,500 --> 00:32:11,159
that provides secret
access to a computer system
581
00:32:11,160 --> 00:32:13,209
to the person who has the key.
582
00:32:13,210 --> 00:32:16,149
Here, Matthieu knows that
a back door is present
583
00:32:16,150 --> 00:32:18,463
in a component of his
ThinkPad, the BIOS.
584
00:32:19,870 --> 00:32:21,819
The BIOS is the first
set of functions
585
00:32:21,820 --> 00:32:24,069
that the computer
performs at startup.
586
00:32:24,070 --> 00:32:26,609
A back door in the BIOS
would give full access
587
00:32:26,610 --> 00:32:28,503
of the computer
to the key holder.
588
00:32:29,920 --> 00:32:32,329
Several people could
leverage this back door:
589
00:32:32,330 --> 00:32:34,429
IBM, that produces the ThinkPad,
590
00:32:34,430 --> 00:32:36,339
Intel, that produces the BIOS,
591
00:32:36,340 --> 00:32:38,179
the company that bought
all of the ThinkPads
592
00:32:38,180 --> 00:32:42,129
for its employees, the NSA
or CSE, or malicious hackers
593
00:32:42,130 --> 00:32:45,083
who are easily able to
exploit this vulnerability.
594
00:32:47,636 --> 00:32:51,557
There. I have a copy
of the previous BIOS,
595
00:32:51,682 --> 00:32:55,269
so I could configure
a new one here.
596
00:32:55,686 --> 00:32:59,815
So I'll get OpenBIOS
or Coreboot.
597
00:33:00,566 --> 00:33:02,941
I need to know the ins
and outs of a computer,
598
00:33:03,108 --> 00:33:04,233
because I can't...
599
00:33:04,361 --> 00:33:07,114
BIOS is at the
core of a computer.
600
00:33:07,239 --> 00:33:09,033
It controls...
601
00:33:09,158 --> 00:33:11,160
all functions.
602
00:33:11,869 --> 00:33:13,780
So if we don't know how it works
603
00:33:13,792 --> 00:33:15,956
and can't guarantee
its operation,
604
00:33:16,332 --> 00:33:18,918
we can't guarantee the
computer's integrity.
605
00:33:19,919 --> 00:33:23,255
So you can have the most
secure operating system ever,
606
00:33:23,756 --> 00:33:25,424
but if the BIOS isn't secure,
607
00:33:25,549 --> 00:33:28,886
unfortunately,
the rest won't be either.
608
00:33:46,820 --> 00:33:48,739
Let me know if you need help.
609
00:33:52,812 --> 00:33:55,299
Do it yourself.
610
00:33:55,300 --> 00:33:59,209
This often means that things
won't go exactly as planned.
611
00:33:59,210 --> 00:34:02,007
Hackers have become the
masters of trial and error.
612
00:34:06,131 --> 00:34:09,218
Yeah, Mathieu...
if you could... hold it.
613
00:34:09,343 --> 00:34:12,054
- Need help?
- Yeah. Thanks.
614
00:34:20,602 --> 00:34:23,856
Danukeru is building a
drone from top to bottom.
615
00:34:23,860 --> 00:34:25,639
If he can get his drone to fly,
616
00:34:25,640 --> 00:34:28,043
he'll use it to perform
security experiments.
617
00:34:29,488 --> 00:34:31,947
It'd be fun - it's
been done before -
618
00:34:32,091 --> 00:34:33,951
to crack WiFi
networks from above.
619
00:34:34,076 --> 00:34:37,621
So build a drone that flies
over and cracks WiFi networks.
620
00:34:38,998 --> 00:34:42,084
Another thing would be - just
to prove it can be done -
621
00:34:42,209 --> 00:34:47,923
to use an aerial cellphone
surveillance device,
622
00:34:48,433 --> 00:34:51,769
like that used by the
police, known as a StingRay.
623
00:34:51,885 --> 00:34:53,380
Essentially,
we do this to detect
624
00:34:53,517 --> 00:34:55,848
critical flaws in
the infrastructure.
625
00:34:56,932 --> 00:34:59,059
That's why most
people would do this.
626
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:03,419
If he is able, alone and
with his limited resources,
627
00:35:03,420 --> 00:35:06,269
to compromise
residential Wi-Fi routers
628
00:35:06,270 --> 00:35:09,059
using a drone pieced
together with styrofoam,
629
00:35:09,060 --> 00:35:11,209
it's because there are
important security flaws
630
00:35:11,210 --> 00:35:12,719
in our infrastructure.
631
00:35:12,720 --> 00:35:15,159
We need hackers to
seek out and find
632
00:35:15,160 --> 00:35:17,229
these flaws that
threaten our privacy
633
00:35:17,230 --> 00:35:18,878
so they can be quickly patched.
634
00:35:19,496 --> 00:35:24,043
The issue of what society
considers private and public
635
00:35:24,168 --> 00:35:26,253
will define our generation.
636
00:35:28,547 --> 00:35:30,497
What really worries me
637
00:35:30,673 --> 00:35:34,094
is when neighbours
start pointing fingers.
638
00:35:35,262 --> 00:35:39,308
We may well eventually
reach the point
639
00:35:39,433 --> 00:35:42,079
where someone could
download a program
640
00:35:42,189 --> 00:35:44,521
as powerful as a military weapon
641
00:35:44,647 --> 00:35:47,232
and use it against
their neighbour.
642
00:35:47,775 --> 00:35:50,069
Against their spouse, even.
643
00:35:50,194 --> 00:35:52,071
That's what worries me most.
644
00:36:06,085 --> 00:36:11,460
...3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ground.
645
00:36:12,089 --> 00:36:14,716
Resolib is a group trying
to rebuild the internet
646
00:36:14,720 --> 00:36:16,179
one antenna at a time.
647
00:36:16,180 --> 00:36:18,319
This is called a mesh network.
648
00:36:18,320 --> 00:36:19,769
Someone who puts up an antenna
649
00:36:19,770 --> 00:36:22,399
can connect with
other antennas nearby.
650
00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:24,189
These users can connect
whatever they want
651
00:36:24,190 --> 00:36:26,099
to their antennas: A hard drive,
652
00:36:26,100 --> 00:36:28,849
a local internet site,
or other services,
653
00:36:28,850 --> 00:36:30,559
and all of this without the need
654
00:36:30,560 --> 00:36:32,219
for an internet service provider
655
00:36:32,220 --> 00:36:34,419
or for costly
fibre optic cables,
656
00:36:34,420 --> 00:36:37,749
simply by connecting people
directly to one another.
657
00:36:37,750 --> 00:36:39,879
Each antenna acts as a relay.
658
00:36:39,880 --> 00:36:42,719
A person can connect to
another, more distant person
659
00:36:42,720 --> 00:36:45,679
by tracing a route through
all of the antennas.
660
00:36:45,680 --> 00:36:49,369
As it grows, the mesh network
can cover an entire city
661
00:36:49,370 --> 00:36:51,729
or even an entire
region, as is the case
662
00:36:51,730 --> 00:36:54,129
with the Guifinet
mesh network in Spain,
663
00:36:54,130 --> 00:36:57,129
which is now 35,000
antennas strong.
664
00:36:57,130 --> 00:36:59,589
We can call this
a local grass-roots
665
00:36:59,590 --> 00:37:01,663
and totally distributed network.
666
00:37:07,563 --> 00:37:09,898
A mesh is a distributed network.
667
00:37:10,023 --> 00:37:12,943
The idea is to have
rooftop antennas
668
00:37:13,068 --> 00:37:16,572
to create a network alongside
commercial Internet service
669
00:37:16,697 --> 00:37:19,825
and connect homes directly.
670
00:37:19,950 --> 00:37:22,453
Like, connect
neighbours together.
671
00:37:23,035 --> 00:37:25,035
So you can just buy metal
bands that go around.
672
00:37:25,037 --> 00:37:26,085
Yeah.
673
00:37:26,086 --> 00:37:27,316
Yeah, at some point.
674
00:37:27,317 --> 00:37:28,508
I mean, it wouldn't be hard
675
00:37:28,509 --> 00:37:30,107
to get back up on
the roof and do that.
676
00:37:30,132 --> 00:37:31,132
Right.
677
00:37:31,719 --> 00:37:33,587
Just so you can have
a clear conscience
678
00:37:33,588 --> 00:37:36,053
that this is not a
permanent solution.
679
00:37:37,509 --> 00:37:38,552
I'm kind of discouraged.
680
00:37:39,344 --> 00:37:40,344
Honestly.
681
00:37:40,929 --> 00:37:42,895
People must change
their mentality,
682
00:37:42,991 --> 00:37:44,410
but they seem unwilling.
683
00:37:44,516 --> 00:37:46,101
They want "ubiquitous
computing."
684
00:37:46,226 --> 00:37:47,893
They're willing
to be monitored by Amazon
685
00:37:48,022 --> 00:37:49,897
24/7 at home through a device,
686
00:37:50,022 --> 00:37:53,525
which they can order from
at the push of a button.
687
00:37:53,650 --> 00:37:56,401
They use Gmail, Google
knows their every move,
688
00:37:56,528 --> 00:37:58,322
their location, everything.
689
00:37:58,447 --> 00:38:00,115
- What they think.
- Same with Facebook.
690
00:38:00,240 --> 00:38:04,453
They're dominated by computer
technology - unwittingly.
691
00:38:04,578 --> 00:38:07,164
Even when they know, it's: "I
can't do anything about it."
692
00:38:08,370 --> 00:38:10,049
So...
693
00:38:10,050 --> 00:38:11,050
done!
694
00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:15,249
Isn't that fucking beautiful?
695
00:38:15,250 --> 00:38:17,529
Yeah, like I said, I gotta...
696
00:38:17,530 --> 00:38:19,419
There's a plan,
there's a phase two.
697
00:38:19,420 --> 00:38:21,182
There's a phase two here, yeah.
698
00:38:22,095 --> 00:38:24,095
Basically, it's a lot
easier to monitor everyone
699
00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:26,067
when they're in the same room.
700
00:38:26,892 --> 00:38:29,520
We're gonna run about
10 feet of cable down.
701
00:38:29,645 --> 00:38:34,399
Google, Facebook and the like
centralize information,
702
00:38:34,775 --> 00:38:36,151
making surveillance easier.
703
00:38:36,276 --> 00:38:37,796
If services are distributed,
704
00:38:37,943 --> 00:38:40,749
it's more difficult
for a hostile party -
705
00:38:40,864 --> 00:38:46,370
be it the government or
"black hats" - to spy on you.
706
00:38:46,869 --> 00:38:49,925
It doesn't prevent
targeted surveillance of
707
00:38:50,061 --> 00:38:52,501
a particular individual,
or even a group,
708
00:38:52,626 --> 00:38:55,306
but it makes
dragnet surveillance
709
00:38:55,437 --> 00:38:57,422
a lot more complicated.
710
00:38:57,548 --> 00:38:59,241
Monitoring everyone at once,
711
00:38:59,368 --> 00:39:01,385
then targeting
someone in particular.
712
00:39:01,510 --> 00:39:04,888
Okay, the tester's hooked up.
Let's check it again?
713
00:39:06,139 --> 00:39:10,519
- Let's do it.
- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
714
00:39:10,644 --> 00:39:14,106
- 6, 7, 8, ground. - Done.
715
00:39:15,440 --> 00:39:17,674
Excellent. It works.
It's all good.
716
00:39:18,418 --> 00:39:20,427
Great. I'll plug into the wall.
717
00:39:20,946 --> 00:39:23,991
The big problem now is
that huge corporations,
718
00:39:24,116 --> 00:39:25,826
the world's most
powerful companies -
719
00:39:25,951 --> 00:39:29,538
like Amazon, Google, Facebook,
Microsoft and Apple -
720
00:39:29,663 --> 00:39:31,705
their goal now, their lobbying,
721
00:39:31,872 --> 00:39:34,334
is geared toward
destroying the Internet.
722
00:39:35,085 --> 00:39:38,213
Facebook's goal is to replace
the Internet... with Facebook.
723
00:39:39,506 --> 00:39:43,093
They want you to go on
Facebook and stay there.
724
00:39:44,636 --> 00:39:46,634
They entice you to
stay on Facebook
725
00:39:46,761 --> 00:39:48,432
and away from ordinary sites.
726
00:39:49,141 --> 00:39:51,226
Google is similar. They...
727
00:39:52,496 --> 00:39:53,701
When you use search engines,
728
00:39:53,727 --> 00:39:55,243
sometimes you're
stuck within Google
729
00:39:55,270 --> 00:39:56,729
instead of going
to the real site.
730
00:39:56,747 --> 00:39:59,151
So there are a lot of
forces at work preventing
731
00:39:59,176 --> 00:40:01,028
us from re-distributing
the Internet
732
00:40:01,153 --> 00:40:04,448
and make it the horizontal
platform it was devised to be.
733
00:40:06,116 --> 00:40:08,327
There it is: Relais.reseaulibre.
734
00:40:08,869 --> 00:40:10,662
It's the original
version of the Internet.
735
00:40:10,989 --> 00:40:13,575
When I first went online in
'96, it was free.
736
00:40:16,251 --> 00:40:18,170
We didn't pay for
Internet access, and...
737
00:40:18,754 --> 00:40:22,382
...Internet access also
meant having a web page.
738
00:40:22,758 --> 00:40:25,010
That was it, really.
739
00:40:25,135 --> 00:40:28,472
It was about checking out
your friends' web pages.
740
00:40:28,597 --> 00:40:32,684
What did he post? "Hi.
I'm Antoine. I play guitar."
741
00:40:32,809 --> 00:40:34,222
With a picture of your guitar.
742
00:40:34,770 --> 00:40:36,021
People had all kinds of stuff.
743
00:40:36,146 --> 00:40:38,774
Then they started sharing
increasingly interesting things.
744
00:40:38,899 --> 00:40:40,150
And it grew,
745
00:40:40,275 --> 00:40:44,446
turning into Wikipedia,
into Google, and so on.
746
00:40:44,571 --> 00:40:46,497
But it started with
someone in their garage.
747
00:40:46,613 --> 00:40:49,157
Google started out
with a web page.
748
00:40:50,327 --> 00:40:53,205
And I've always done that.
749
00:40:53,955 --> 00:40:56,249
It's good enough for me.
750
00:40:57,167 --> 00:40:58,567
That's it.
751
00:40:58,709 --> 00:41:01,962
I don't need to connect with
all my friends on Facebook 24/7,
752
00:41:02,089 --> 00:41:04,466
know the latest news,
the latest opinion,
753
00:41:04,883 --> 00:41:08,595
Trump's latest fake news,
this and that on Facebook.
754
00:41:08,720 --> 00:41:11,348
I don't want to be online 24/7.
755
00:41:11,640 --> 00:41:13,684
For me,
it's something you turn on,
756
00:41:13,809 --> 00:41:16,770
you go online, you're online,
757
00:41:16,895 --> 00:41:19,690
then you turn it off
and you're offline.
758
00:41:20,732 --> 00:41:22,693
I'm not always connected,
759
00:41:22,818 --> 00:41:25,112
and I choose when to go online.
760
00:41:25,237 --> 00:41:27,698
I call the shots.
761
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:37,339
But we are not about
to collectively disconnect.
762
00:41:37,340 --> 00:41:38,889
Quite the opposite.
763
00:41:38,890 --> 00:41:42,689
So how can we make sure our
privacy is protected on the web?
764
00:41:42,690 --> 00:41:45,209
For many hackers,
encryption is the best,
765
00:41:45,210 --> 00:41:46,943
if not the only, solution.
766
00:41:48,470 --> 00:41:51,529
The first hackers who made
encryption a political issue
767
00:41:51,530 --> 00:41:53,579
were called the cypherpunks.
768
00:41:53,580 --> 00:41:55,569
Montreal made an
important contribution
769
00:41:55,570 --> 00:41:57,499
to the history of
the cypherpunks,
770
00:41:57,500 --> 00:42:00,193
and it was in great part
because of this man.
771
00:42:01,610 --> 00:42:04,369
So the cypherpunks,
particularly in the mid-'90s,
772
00:42:04,370 --> 00:42:07,409
were a group of people
who believed that
773
00:42:07,410 --> 00:42:12,410
security and privacy should
come through technology,
774
00:42:12,430 --> 00:42:14,389
through the laws of mathematics,
775
00:42:14,409 --> 00:42:16,458
not through the legal system.
776
00:42:16,962 --> 00:42:20,529
And the reason is that
legal systems change
777
00:42:20,530 --> 00:42:23,199
from place to place
and time to time.
778
00:42:23,200 --> 00:42:25,969
And one of the main
mottoes of the cypherpunks
779
00:42:25,970 --> 00:42:28,099
was that cypherpunks write code.
780
00:42:28,100 --> 00:42:31,529
And the point was to actually
781
00:42:31,530 --> 00:42:33,049
not just talk about these things
782
00:42:33,050 --> 00:42:36,219
but to produce
software that protected
783
00:42:36,220 --> 00:42:38,469
people's privacy and security.
784
00:42:38,470 --> 00:42:42,319
And a lot of what I
did over those years
785
00:42:42,320 --> 00:42:44,453
was produce software like that.
786
00:42:45,390 --> 00:42:48,629
The 1990s was
the decade of the crypto wars.
787
00:42:48,630 --> 00:42:50,569
The U.S. government
had made it illegal
788
00:42:50,570 --> 00:42:52,799
for cryptographers
to freely distribute
789
00:42:52,800 --> 00:42:56,279
their encryption software,
under penalty of imprisonment.
790
00:42:56,280 --> 00:43:00,042
To avoid legal issues,
many cypherpunks fled the U.S.
791
00:43:00,043 --> 00:43:02,019
Many of them came to Canada.
792
00:43:02,020 --> 00:43:04,549
This was definitely
one of the major reasons
793
00:43:04,550 --> 00:43:07,349
that, when I finished
my PhD at Berkeley,
794
00:43:07,350 --> 00:43:09,089
I returned to Canada.
795
00:43:09,090 --> 00:43:12,683
So what brought me to Montreal
was Zero Knowledge System.
796
00:43:15,290 --> 00:43:16,929
When we're on the
internet with email,
797
00:43:16,930 --> 00:43:18,289
we say personal things.
798
00:43:18,290 --> 00:43:21,369
We talk about things we might
not say in other places.
799
00:43:21,370 --> 00:43:23,579
The internet is the worst
place to do that right now,
800
00:43:23,580 --> 00:43:25,551
because that email is
not private at all.
801
00:43:26,125 --> 00:43:28,199
So what Zero Knowledge
has done is gone back
802
00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:29,706
and said,
"Let's make that private.
803
00:43:29,707 --> 00:43:31,136
Let's give you all the benefits
804
00:43:31,137 --> 00:43:32,886
of being able to communicate
805
00:43:32,887 --> 00:43:34,319
and still have your privacy."
806
00:43:34,320 --> 00:43:38,369
So we wrap your messages in
strong, cryptographic envelopes,
807
00:43:38,370 --> 00:43:39,899
and we make sure
that the delivery
808
00:43:39,900 --> 00:43:42,369
of those envelopes is private.
809
00:43:42,370 --> 00:43:45,739
Privacy is going to be the
most fundamental battle
810
00:43:45,740 --> 00:43:46,899
in the next hundred years.
811
00:43:46,900 --> 00:43:49,769
It will be the battle
over your personal space,
812
00:43:49,770 --> 00:43:52,856
the ability to say, "Although
I exist in a global community,
813
00:43:52,857 --> 00:43:55,256
this belongs to
me, this is private.
814
00:43:55,257 --> 00:43:57,629
You don't get to see
this part of my life."
815
00:43:57,630 --> 00:44:00,099
And if we don't lay
that groundwork now,
816
00:44:00,100 --> 00:44:02,369
the ability to say that,
to make that statement
817
00:44:02,370 --> 00:44:04,193
20 years from now won't exist.
818
00:44:05,796 --> 00:44:10,796
They sought me out, and
they wanted to build a product
819
00:44:10,821 --> 00:44:14,469
based on the ideas I
had in my PhD thesis.
820
00:44:14,470 --> 00:44:18,496
So I said, "Okay, I am gonna
help make the internet better,
821
00:44:18,497 --> 00:44:20,816
help make it so that
people can communicate
822
00:44:20,817 --> 00:44:25,817
privately online," and thus
started the Freedom Network.
823
00:44:28,260 --> 00:44:29,639
The Freedom Network.
824
00:44:29,640 --> 00:44:31,959
It was developed
here in Montreal.
825
00:44:31,960 --> 00:44:34,759
For the first time, it was
possible to use the internet
826
00:44:34,760 --> 00:44:36,959
with privacy built in.
827
00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:39,349
There should be
no way to communicate
828
00:44:39,350 --> 00:44:40,829
in an insecure fashion.
829
00:44:40,830 --> 00:44:42,539
The network should just provide
830
00:44:42,540 --> 00:44:44,619
the security and
privacy for you.
831
00:44:44,620 --> 00:44:46,889
The Freedom
Network was short-lived,
832
00:44:46,890 --> 00:44:48,829
but many of its
technical innovations
833
00:44:48,830 --> 00:44:50,649
were integrated into what became
834
00:44:50,650 --> 00:44:53,639
the most important
anonymity tool in the world:
835
00:44:53,640 --> 00:44:55,009
The Tor network.
836
00:44:55,010 --> 00:44:57,439
Tor stands for The Onion Router.
837
00:44:57,440 --> 00:44:59,739
Basically, it's a web
browser that allows you
838
00:44:59,740 --> 00:45:01,829
to use the internet anonymously.
839
00:45:01,830 --> 00:45:04,309
Normally,
when you access a website,
840
00:45:04,310 --> 00:45:06,189
the connection goes
from your computer
841
00:45:06,190 --> 00:45:07,689
to your internet provider,
842
00:45:07,690 --> 00:45:10,419
and then to the server where
the website is located.
843
00:45:10,420 --> 00:45:13,319
It's easy for anyone who
wants to keep an eye on you
844
00:45:13,320 --> 00:45:15,599
to know which sites
you visit at what time
845
00:45:15,600 --> 00:45:17,249
and what neighbourhood
you live in.
846
00:45:17,250 --> 00:45:19,399
But, by going through
the Tor network,
847
00:45:19,400 --> 00:45:21,489
the signal has to go
through three relays
848
00:45:21,490 --> 00:45:23,599
before reaching the
desired website.
849
00:45:23,600 --> 00:45:26,359
Each relay only sees the
immediate source of the signal
850
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:28,759
and the immediate destination
of the next signal,
851
00:45:28,760 --> 00:45:30,863
and all of this is
encrypted, of course.
852
00:45:31,720 --> 00:45:34,329
Using Tor,
it becomes extremely difficult
853
00:45:34,330 --> 00:45:37,089
to know who is accessing what.
854
00:45:37,090 --> 00:45:40,399
But Tor also runs what are
called hidden services.
855
00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:42,809
These are websites
ending with .onion.
856
00:45:42,810 --> 00:45:45,519
They can only be reached
through the Tor browser.
857
00:45:45,520 --> 00:45:48,839
Often, news outlets like
Fox News give a bad image
858
00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:51,128
of onion sites,
describing them like this:
859
00:45:51,930 --> 00:45:54,399
It's a secret world
used by criminals
860
00:45:54,400 --> 00:45:56,739
to buy and sell
drugs, guns, sex,
861
00:45:56,740 --> 00:45:58,527
just about anything
you can imagine.
862
00:45:58,777 --> 00:46:00,529
But this
blanket criticism
863
00:46:00,530 --> 00:46:04,389
suggests that all .onion
websites are used by criminals,
864
00:46:04,390 --> 00:46:06,899
when, in fact, many
activists, journalists,
865
00:46:06,900 --> 00:46:08,969
and community
groups heavily rely
866
00:46:08,970 --> 00:46:10,909
on these services
to do their work.
867
00:46:10,910 --> 00:46:11,939
And guess what?
868
00:46:11,940 --> 00:46:15,079
The code that maintains these
services is made possible
869
00:46:15,080 --> 00:46:17,399
by the work of only
two Tor employees,
870
00:46:17,400 --> 00:46:20,003
including one who
lives here in Montreal.
871
00:46:22,117 --> 00:46:25,453
I'm currently coding...
872
00:46:25,912 --> 00:46:28,790
...what's known as
next-generation hidden services.
873
00:46:29,332 --> 00:46:32,210
It's being completely
re-engineered
874
00:46:32,335 --> 00:46:34,087
to improve security.
875
00:46:36,708 --> 00:46:38,631
The concept of privacy
is extremely important.
876
00:46:38,715 --> 00:46:39,734
Increasingly so.
877
00:46:39,801 --> 00:46:41,553
If people are being monitored...
878
00:46:41,678 --> 00:46:44,514
Today, it's not that
people aren't aware of it.
879
00:46:44,639 --> 00:46:46,808
They know and accept it.
880
00:46:47,507 --> 00:46:50,802
They're not acting in
bad faith or ignorant.
881
00:46:50,937 --> 00:46:54,357
It's just the new normal.
882
00:46:55,900 --> 00:46:58,486
When you know you're
under surveillance,
883
00:46:58,611 --> 00:47:01,156
unconsciously or not,
you change your ways.
884
00:47:01,281 --> 00:47:03,616
It really controls society.
885
00:47:04,159 --> 00:47:07,495
So the beauty of Tor is,
whatever you do online,
886
00:47:08,255 --> 00:47:11,050
your privacy is
protected to some extent.
887
00:47:14,044 --> 00:47:15,419
I requested access
to information
888
00:47:15,575 --> 00:47:16,880
from the federal government,
889
00:47:17,005 --> 00:47:19,340
for all my personal information.
890
00:47:19,841 --> 00:47:22,635
They sent me this letter,
which basically said:
891
00:47:22,761 --> 00:47:26,181
We have your information on
file - maybe, maybe not...
892
00:47:26,514 --> 00:47:29,059
I'm under investigation.
893
00:47:31,269 --> 00:47:35,482
I was kind of proud, because I
must be doing something right.
894
00:47:35,607 --> 00:47:37,150
I'm doing something useful,
895
00:47:37,275 --> 00:47:40,779
and the powers-that-be clearly
aren't too happy about it.
896
00:47:42,739 --> 00:47:44,824
So it's a vindication of sorts.
897
00:47:49,287 --> 00:47:51,247
What's the conference
in Montreal about?
898
00:47:51,664 --> 00:47:56,461
Okay, we're currently holding
our biannual Tor meeting.
899
00:47:56,586 --> 00:47:58,546
We invite everyone -
900
00:47:59,380 --> 00:48:03,426
staff and the community -
to get together, convene,
901
00:48:03,551 --> 00:48:07,180
and over the course of five
days, we problem-solve, rally,
902
00:48:07,305 --> 00:48:09,307
seek to improve Tor.
903
00:48:10,892 --> 00:48:13,686
Any particular reason it's
in Montreal this year?
904
00:48:14,479 --> 00:48:18,733
Yeah, a lot of people refuse
to go to the Five Eyes,
905
00:48:18,858 --> 00:48:20,401
including Canada.
906
00:48:20,527 --> 00:48:22,946
But especially since Trump,
907
00:48:23,071 --> 00:48:26,616
I'd say at least half our
team refuses to go to the U.S.
908
00:48:26,771 --> 00:48:29,494
- Half the team refuses...
- Minimum.
909
00:48:31,514 --> 00:48:34,017
Can you explain why we
can't film the meeting?
910
00:48:34,457 --> 00:48:38,002
Right. I mean,
these people are for privacy.
911
00:48:38,108 --> 00:48:39,747
They don't want to
end up on Facebook,
912
00:48:39,878 --> 00:48:41,063
have anyone know they came.
913
00:48:41,243 --> 00:48:43,496
Some people here
literally can't be filmed,
914
00:48:43,603 --> 00:48:45,927
because they're coming
here at their peril.
915
00:48:46,594 --> 00:48:50,515
So, overall, their
privacy must be respected.
916
00:48:52,900 --> 00:48:55,699
Some of the hackers and
volunteers who support Tor
917
00:48:55,700 --> 00:48:58,289
want to maintain a certain
level of discretion,
918
00:48:58,290 --> 00:49:00,289
but that doesn't make
them hooded paranoids.
919
00:49:00,290 --> 00:49:01,489
Quite the contrary.
920
00:49:01,490 --> 00:49:03,269
This is a community
that has understood
921
00:49:03,270 --> 00:49:06,539
that change is only possible
through public debate.
922
00:49:06,540 --> 00:49:08,839
So my name is Jennifer Helsby,
923
00:49:08,840 --> 00:49:11,109
and I am the lead
developer of Secure Drop,
924
00:49:11,110 --> 00:49:13,570
which is a whistle-blowing
platform that uses Tor.
925
00:49:14,064 --> 00:49:15,714
Hi, my name is Arturo Filastò.
926
00:49:16,773 --> 00:49:21,149
I'm a Tor developer,
I guess, from Italy.
927
00:49:21,150 --> 00:49:24,829
We monitor the internet
and measure when
928
00:49:24,830 --> 00:49:28,483
and how internet censorship
occurs around the world.
929
00:49:29,420 --> 00:49:33,309
That is our Quatro,
as we call him,
930
00:49:33,310 --> 00:49:37,009
which is our mascot,
the uni-octopus.
931
00:49:37,010 --> 00:49:38,709
Yes, my name is Patrick.
932
00:49:38,710 --> 00:49:41,439
I live in San Francisco,
but I'm originally from Ireland.
933
00:49:41,440 --> 00:49:45,739
And I run some exit
capacity on the Tor network
934
00:49:45,740 --> 00:49:47,869
as part of an organisation
called Noise Tor
935
00:49:47,870 --> 00:49:49,549
with some volunteers.
936
00:49:49,550 --> 00:49:53,139
My name is William Budington,
and I am a technologist
937
00:49:53,140 --> 00:49:56,773
and security engineer at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation.
938
00:49:57,630 --> 00:49:59,709
Well,
we're at the point now where
939
00:49:59,710 --> 00:50:03,196
many major governments have
mass surveillance systems.
940
00:50:03,197 --> 00:50:05,452
For just a few million
dollars you can set up
941
00:50:05,477 --> 00:50:07,559
a mass surveillance
system in your country,
942
00:50:07,560 --> 00:50:09,969
and we need to take
steps to protect
943
00:50:09,970 --> 00:50:13,039
civil liberties
in this situation.
944
00:50:13,040 --> 00:50:17,389
So, if you're at danger
in a repressive regime,
945
00:50:17,390 --> 00:50:21,049
for instance,
then you can access the web
946
00:50:21,050 --> 00:50:24,269
and access the internet in
a way that doesn't put you
947
00:50:24,270 --> 00:50:27,859
under the danger
by your government.
948
00:50:27,861 --> 00:50:31,195
It's useful for people doing
research, even domestically,
949
00:50:31,198 --> 00:50:33,742
that they don't want necessarily
associated with their name.
950
00:50:33,760 --> 00:50:36,529
I personally don't want
all of my search history
951
00:50:36,530 --> 00:50:37,979
to be associated
with my identity,
952
00:50:37,980 --> 00:50:41,829
because you never know how that
might come back to bite you.
953
00:50:41,830 --> 00:50:46,729
Tor is the best way to
protect people's anonymity.
954
00:50:46,730 --> 00:50:49,099
Without it, we couldn't
do the work that we do,
955
00:50:49,100 --> 00:50:51,999
making sure that sources
can talk to journalists
956
00:50:52,000 --> 00:50:55,048
in a secure and anonymous way.
957
00:51:00,940 --> 00:51:02,792
So, what is the future
of internet privacy
958
00:51:02,793 --> 00:51:04,799
when we all have things to hide
959
00:51:04,800 --> 00:51:06,919
in an age of big surveillance?
960
00:51:06,920 --> 00:51:09,354
Please join me in
welcoming Roger Dingledine.
961
00:51:16,870 --> 00:51:19,847
How many people here know
the phrase "the dark web"?
962
00:51:20,930 --> 00:51:23,229
Okay,
so there's this really cool,
963
00:51:23,230 --> 00:51:24,599
from the journalist perspective,
964
00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:27,039
thing where you get people
all excited and scared,
965
00:51:27,040 --> 00:51:29,635
and they don't understand,
but there's this dark web.
966
00:51:30,448 --> 00:51:32,869
So, basically they end up
with this terrible picture
967
00:51:32,870 --> 00:51:34,336
of an iceberg,
where they're like,
968
00:51:34,337 --> 00:51:37,346
"You didn't know, but there are
99 other internets out there,
969
00:51:37,347 --> 00:51:39,649
and they're all other things."
970
00:51:39,650 --> 00:51:42,879
And that's true; A lot of
the web pages on the internet
971
00:51:42,880 --> 00:51:45,319
are things that
Google can't get to.
972
00:51:45,320 --> 00:51:47,449
But approximately 0% of them
973
00:51:47,450 --> 00:51:49,869
have anything to do
with Tor in any way.
974
00:51:49,870 --> 00:51:51,809
Nonetheless,
Time Magazine was like,
975
00:51:51,810 --> 00:51:54,219
picture of Tor,
picture of spiderweb,
976
00:51:54,220 --> 00:51:56,619
picture of iceberg,
you should be scared.
977
00:51:56,620 --> 00:51:59,102
And facts have very little
to do with any of this.
978
00:52:04,420 --> 00:52:07,499
I think people are very
interested in privacy today.
979
00:52:07,500 --> 00:52:10,509
People also feel,
to a certain extent,
980
00:52:10,510 --> 00:52:13,469
that privacy can
be a lost cause.
981
00:52:13,875 --> 00:52:16,269
We see private
information about people
982
00:52:16,270 --> 00:52:20,649
being collected, and not
only collected and sold,
983
00:52:20,650 --> 00:52:24,629
which is the primary business
of most of the data collectors,
984
00:52:24,645 --> 00:52:27,062
but also collected and lost,
985
00:52:27,810 --> 00:52:30,129
misused,
986
00:52:30,130 --> 00:52:31,459
abused,
987
00:52:31,460 --> 00:52:36,099
generally treated as though
it were an abundant resource
988
00:52:36,100 --> 00:52:37,919
that there's no need to protect.
989
00:52:37,920 --> 00:52:40,729
But I think there's
also a lot of hope.
990
00:52:40,730 --> 00:52:42,549
I think more people
are using encryption
991
00:52:42,550 --> 00:52:45,499
to talk to each other
now than ever before.
992
00:52:45,500 --> 00:52:47,625
I think if you want to
have a private conversation
993
00:52:47,626 --> 00:52:49,418
with someone on the
other side of the world,
994
00:52:49,419 --> 00:52:51,899
there has never been a better
time in history to do it.
995
00:52:51,900 --> 00:52:54,250
Who here knows the
phrase "lawful intercept"?
996
00:52:55,175 --> 00:52:56,218
A couple.
997
00:52:56,218 --> 00:52:57,780
Okay, more hands
than for "blue coat".
998
00:52:57,780 --> 00:52:57,802
Okay, more hands
than for "blue coat".
So, lawful intercept
is the phrase they use
999
00:52:57,802 --> 00:52:59,539
So, lawful intercept
is the phrase they use
1000
00:52:59,540 --> 00:53:02,689
for the back doors in all
the telephony infrastructure
1001
00:53:02,690 --> 00:53:04,499
and the internet
routers and so on.
1002
00:53:04,500 --> 00:53:06,609
And the goal is,
if somebody does a bad thing,
1003
00:53:06,610 --> 00:53:08,029
then we should be
able to tap them,
1004
00:53:08,030 --> 00:53:10,379
and there should be judges
involved, and so on.
1005
00:53:10,380 --> 00:53:13,099
And maybe that's okay
in the Western world,
1006
00:53:13,100 --> 00:53:15,189
but exactly the
same infrastructure
1007
00:53:15,190 --> 00:53:17,169
gets sold to Saudi Arabia.
1008
00:53:17,170 --> 00:53:20,199
And the guy in Saudi Arabia is
like, "What's that port for?"
1009
00:53:20,200 --> 00:53:22,659
And the answer is, "Oh, that's
the lawful intercept port."
1010
00:53:22,660 --> 00:53:24,953
And he says, "Well,
I am the law, plug it in."
1011
00:53:25,760 --> 00:53:27,799
The internet is more
centralised than you think.
1012
00:53:27,800 --> 00:53:31,429
There are only so many cables
that go underneath oceans.
1013
00:53:31,430 --> 00:53:33,739
If you're in Peru
and you want to send
1014
00:53:33,740 --> 00:53:35,579
an internet
connection to Ecuador,
1015
00:53:35,580 --> 00:53:37,529
it's gonna go through Miami.
1016
00:53:37,530 --> 00:53:39,529
That's just how the
internet is built.
1017
00:53:39,530 --> 00:53:41,729
And that means that there
are so many bottlenecks,
1018
00:53:41,730 --> 00:53:45,089
there are so many places where
large intelligence agencies
1019
00:53:45,090 --> 00:53:49,609
can go in order to grab traffic,
compared to what you think.
1020
00:53:49,610 --> 00:53:52,019
You might imagine the internet
is kinda like the world,
1021
00:53:52,020 --> 00:53:54,049
where there are a lot
of different countries,
1022
00:53:54,050 --> 00:53:55,509
and everything's spread out.
1023
00:53:55,510 --> 00:53:57,579
And I'd like an internet
that's built that way,
1024
00:53:57,580 --> 00:53:59,277
but that's not
how we built ours.
1025
00:54:05,890 --> 00:54:09,089
Writing software is a fun
and easy way to help the world.
1026
00:54:09,090 --> 00:54:10,779
If you're good at
writing software,
1027
00:54:10,780 --> 00:54:14,209
then there's lots
of things you can do
1028
00:54:14,210 --> 00:54:16,409
that aren't collecting
data on people
1029
00:54:16,410 --> 00:54:20,099
and helping people
control each other.
1030
00:54:20,100 --> 00:54:21,719
You could help people be free.
1031
00:54:21,720 --> 00:54:24,469
And it's a good thing
to do with your talent
1032
00:54:24,470 --> 00:54:26,452
if it's a talent you have.
1033
00:54:26,453 --> 00:54:28,017
And it's a good life to live.
1034
00:54:42,390 --> 00:54:44,529
Tor is one of
the most important tools
1035
00:54:44,530 --> 00:54:46,289
in the fight against
surveillance,
1036
00:54:46,290 --> 00:54:48,419
but it's far from
being the only one.
1037
00:54:48,420 --> 00:54:51,599
For almost every application
and platform you use daily,
1038
00:54:51,600 --> 00:54:54,809
there are alternatives that
protect your privacy online.
1039
00:54:54,810 --> 00:54:58,289
For messaging, replace
Facebook Messenger with Signal.
1040
00:54:58,290 --> 00:55:00,729
For your emails, use ProtonMail
1041
00:55:00,730 --> 00:55:03,979
or instal GnuPG and
encrypt emails yourself.
1042
00:55:03,980 --> 00:55:05,939
Replace Skype by Jitsi,
1043
00:55:05,940 --> 00:55:09,059
and Google by
DuckDuckGo or StartPage.
1044
00:55:09,060 --> 00:55:11,069
The alternatives already exist,
1045
00:55:11,070 --> 00:55:13,373
and their numbers are
constantly growing.
1046
00:55:17,920 --> 00:55:20,309
Most of these tools
are free software
1047
00:55:20,310 --> 00:55:22,619
or open source software.
1048
00:55:22,620 --> 00:55:24,069
Free software is developed
1049
00:55:24,070 --> 00:55:26,799
by online communities
of volunteers.
1050
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:29,459
They freely publish and
tinker with the source code
1051
00:55:29,460 --> 00:55:32,373
of the software and usually
distribute it for free.
1052
00:55:33,240 --> 00:55:35,099
For Richard Stallman,
free software
1053
00:55:35,100 --> 00:55:37,623
is the main solution
to surveillance.
1054
00:55:38,510 --> 00:55:42,069
The alternative to
proprietary software is free,
1055
00:55:42,070 --> 00:55:46,639
"libre" software, software that
is controlled by its users,
1056
00:55:46,640 --> 00:55:50,449
that therefore respects
those users' freedom.
1057
00:55:50,450 --> 00:55:52,669
If you're using
a free programme,
1058
00:55:52,670 --> 00:55:55,739
you, as one of a
community of users,
1059
00:55:55,740 --> 00:55:59,639
are collectively
exercising control also.
1060
00:55:59,640 --> 00:56:03,109
If people are enthusiastic
about removing the snooping,
1061
00:56:03,110 --> 00:56:05,639
which they probably
are, they will spread
1062
00:56:05,640 --> 00:56:08,749
that version around,
and you will eventually get it
1063
00:56:08,750 --> 00:56:12,653
just in the normal course of
upgrading from time to time.
1064
00:56:13,660 --> 00:56:17,059
This is how free software
creates a defence
1065
00:56:17,060 --> 00:56:19,578
against malicious
functionalities,
1066
00:56:19,590 --> 00:56:21,253
for instance snooping,
1067
00:56:22,970 --> 00:56:25,083
and it's the only known defence.
1068
00:56:25,586 --> 00:56:28,105
And what Opid's
first projects do
1069
00:56:28,130 --> 00:56:33,130
is give you the source code,
and that's why it's free,
1070
00:56:33,143 --> 00:56:34,731
so you can take the source code.
1071
00:56:35,340 --> 00:56:38,389
And that really matters,
precisely because
1072
00:56:38,390 --> 00:56:42,489
it allows outsiders to
vet that source code
1073
00:56:42,490 --> 00:56:44,809
and let people know
you can trust this.
1074
00:56:44,810 --> 00:56:48,229
Facebook is not
open source at all.
1075
00:56:48,230 --> 00:56:54,005
And you don't know precisely
what their software is doing.
1076
00:56:54,030 --> 00:56:58,649
You don't know how their
algorithms are functioning,
1077
00:56:58,650 --> 00:57:02,129
so you don't know why
you see what you see.
1078
00:57:02,130 --> 00:57:04,419
If it was open source,
if it was open source
1079
00:57:04,420 --> 00:57:06,459
the way that Tor
was open source,
1080
00:57:06,460 --> 00:57:08,110
you could really
to an audit of it,
1081
00:57:08,111 --> 00:57:09,783
and you could
understand how it works,
1082
00:57:09,784 --> 00:57:11,013
and you could pick it apart.
1083
00:57:11,014 --> 00:57:15,117
It's a black box. Open
source is a transparent box.
1084
00:57:27,072 --> 00:57:28,248
Light.
1085
00:57:28,249 --> 00:57:30,281
It's only 1.1 kilos in weight.
1086
00:57:31,170 --> 00:57:33,659
This is a fully
functioning computer.
1087
00:57:33,660 --> 00:57:36,469
This is a laptop 3-D printed
1088
00:57:36,470 --> 00:57:39,473
so you can turn the
computer card into a laptop.
1089
00:57:39,498 --> 00:57:40,528
All right?
1090
00:57:40,904 --> 00:57:43,279
You have the right to
repair as well as modify.
1091
00:57:43,280 --> 00:57:45,259
So, 3-D printed,
you can just go down
1092
00:57:45,260 --> 00:57:50,163
to your local maker centres
and repair your own laptop.
1093
00:57:51,100 --> 00:57:53,109
If you get fed up
with the fact that
1094
00:57:53,110 --> 00:57:56,399
this is not fast enough
in a couple of years,
1095
00:57:56,400 --> 00:57:58,739
you just buy a
replacement computer card.
1096
00:57:58,740 --> 00:58:00,849
It upgrades, double the
RAM, double the speed,
1097
00:58:00,850 --> 00:58:03,089
double the processing,
et cetera.
1098
00:58:03,090 --> 00:58:06,729
Instead of throwing away
the whole $500 laptop,
1099
00:58:06,730 --> 00:58:09,209
you buy a $50 computer card.
1100
00:58:09,210 --> 00:58:12,519
So it's eco-conscious,
as well as saving money,
1101
00:58:12,520 --> 00:58:14,089
and blah blah blah, et cetera.
1102
00:58:14,090 --> 00:58:17,649
Now, the other thing is
that we've researched
1103
00:58:17,650 --> 00:58:20,509
the processors on here
so that the source code
1104
00:58:20,510 --> 00:58:23,269
for everything,
for the entire boot process,
1105
00:58:23,270 --> 00:58:25,569
is available online.
1106
00:58:25,570 --> 00:58:29,069
So there's no NSA back
doors in their processor
1107
00:58:29,070 --> 00:58:31,349
like there are in Intel ones.
1108
00:58:31,350 --> 00:58:32,892
It's full source code. So...
1109
00:58:40,730 --> 00:58:43,069
Facebook just won a
court case in Belgium.
1110
00:58:43,070 --> 00:58:47,259
They spent millions and
millions and millions of euros
1111
00:58:47,260 --> 00:58:50,773
to maintain their right to
build profiles on every Belgian.
1112
00:58:52,150 --> 00:58:55,225
You're worth money. You're
worth a lot of money.
1113
00:58:55,226 --> 00:58:56,894
You may have a right
to be forgotten,
1114
00:58:56,895 --> 00:58:58,656
but you're not
gonna be forgotten.
1115
00:58:58,664 --> 00:59:00,445
If privacy is an
illusion and it's dead
1116
00:59:00,470 --> 00:59:01,958
and everything,
what do we do now?
1117
00:59:01,959 --> 00:59:06,049
Okay. There has to be a sea
change in public attitude.
1118
00:59:06,050 --> 00:59:08,519
There has to be some...
1119
00:59:08,520 --> 00:59:12,253
I hate to say this, because
I am the most libertarian,
1120
00:59:13,610 --> 00:59:17,220
free commercial activity
believing type guy
1121
00:59:17,245 --> 00:59:18,634
on the planet,
1122
00:59:18,810 --> 00:59:22,039
but there has to
start being regulation
1123
00:59:22,040 --> 00:59:23,399
on Facebook and on Google.
1124
00:59:23,400 --> 00:59:26,119
The problem is you
and everybody else
1125
00:59:26,120 --> 00:59:28,609
look at them as if
they're a public utility.
1126
00:59:28,610 --> 00:59:30,239
We have water,
we have electricity,
1127
00:59:30,240 --> 00:59:32,909
we have the telephone,
we have Google.
1128
00:59:32,910 --> 00:59:35,089
They're a private company.
1129
00:59:35,090 --> 00:59:37,309
They own your data,
they sell your data,
1130
00:59:37,310 --> 00:59:40,459
they sell the essence
of who you are.
1131
00:59:40,460 --> 00:59:42,989
And there is zero regulation.
1132
00:59:42,990 --> 00:59:44,269
There's no regulation.
1133
00:59:44,270 --> 00:59:47,279
There's not a single
law in the United States
1134
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:51,503
that allows you to say no,
or not that, or too much.
1135
00:59:53,210 --> 00:59:55,859
Google and Facebook
really don't give a damn.
1136
00:59:55,860 --> 01:00:01,575
They have the vast bulk of
all information out there.
1137
01:00:01,600 --> 01:00:03,089
Private entities.
1138
01:00:03,090 --> 01:00:05,560
Google, Facebook, Axiom,
1139
01:00:05,585 --> 01:00:08,996
Information USA,
Microsoft, Apple.
1140
01:00:09,350 --> 01:00:13,379
There's about 20 companies
that have the bulk
1141
01:00:13,380 --> 01:00:17,779
of the world's PII, personally
identifiable information,
1142
01:00:17,780 --> 01:00:19,759
and all the related stuff.
1143
01:00:19,760 --> 01:00:23,969
And there is no law
and no regulation,
1144
01:00:23,970 --> 01:00:26,465
nothing that governs
how they use it.
1145
01:00:30,410 --> 01:00:33,029
In May
2018, the European Union
1146
01:00:33,030 --> 01:00:36,209
implemented the General
Data Protection Regulation,
1147
01:00:36,210 --> 01:00:39,409
which aims to better regulate
the use of our personal data
1148
01:00:39,410 --> 01:00:41,409
by major service providers.
1149
01:00:41,410 --> 01:00:44,309
Meanwhile, in the U.S.,
Congress became interested
1150
01:00:44,310 --> 01:00:47,909
for the first time in
Facebook's business model.
1151
01:00:47,910 --> 01:00:49,949
It's clear now that
we didn't do enough
1152
01:00:49,950 --> 01:00:53,259
to prevent these tools from
being used for harm as well,
1153
01:00:53,260 --> 01:00:55,269
and that goes for fake news,
1154
01:00:55,270 --> 01:00:58,069
for foreign interference in
elections, and hate speech,
1155
01:00:58,070 --> 01:01:00,423
as well as developers
and data privacy.
1156
01:01:01,320 --> 01:01:04,789
We didn't take a broad enough
view of our responsibility,
1157
01:01:04,790 --> 01:01:08,249
and that was a big mistake,
and it was my mistake,
1158
01:01:08,250 --> 01:01:09,250
and I'm sorry.
1159
01:01:13,440 --> 01:01:15,259
This is
also true for Canada.
1160
01:01:15,260 --> 01:01:17,789
Our laws have to change
to better protect us
1161
01:01:17,790 --> 01:01:19,819
against abusive data collection.
1162
01:01:19,820 --> 01:01:21,676
But why isn't this
already the case?
1163
01:01:22,596 --> 01:01:24,530
Government doesn't
have the technical skills
1164
01:01:24,531 --> 01:01:28,199
or the resources to build a
Facebook and make you adopt it.
1165
01:01:28,200 --> 01:01:30,499
But they're perfectly
happy to take advantage
1166
01:01:30,500 --> 01:01:32,449
of the fact that
a Facebook exists,
1167
01:01:32,450 --> 01:01:34,619
and they can use it
to harvest information
1168
01:01:34,620 --> 01:01:37,289
for investigative and
intelligence purposes.
1169
01:01:37,290 --> 01:01:40,849
So I think that it's
right to acknowledge
1170
01:01:40,850 --> 01:01:43,539
that there is a bit of
a symbiotic relationship
1171
01:01:43,564 --> 01:01:47,273
between these corporate
actors and the state.
1172
01:01:48,208 --> 01:01:49,959
I don't think it's
right to think about it
1173
01:01:49,960 --> 01:01:51,460
in some sort of
conspiratorial way,
1174
01:01:51,461 --> 01:01:53,379
but just to say that I
think that government,
1175
01:01:53,380 --> 01:01:55,659
when they see these
private actors
1176
01:01:55,660 --> 01:01:58,459
having access to this
kind of personal data,
1177
01:01:58,460 --> 01:02:00,010
they want to get their cut too.
1178
01:02:00,950 --> 01:02:03,469
So, yeah, that's probably
part of the reason
1179
01:02:03,470 --> 01:02:05,535
there isn't a huge amount
of political willpower
1180
01:02:05,559 --> 01:02:07,141
to reign those kinds
of behaviours in.
1181
01:02:07,603 --> 01:02:10,731
Projects like Tor,
like Subgraph, aren't winning.
1182
01:02:11,482 --> 01:02:17,029
This great surveillance machine
is obviously prevailing.
1183
01:02:17,863 --> 01:02:19,239
Clearly.
1184
01:02:19,365 --> 01:02:23,869
Of course, there's pushback now.
1185
01:02:24,828 --> 01:02:29,375
But I think we're 20 years
behind our rival, as it were.
1186
01:02:29,500 --> 01:02:32,091
The forces at work
behind this security and
1187
01:02:32,228 --> 01:02:34,254
surveillance campaign
are very powerful.
1188
01:02:34,380 --> 01:02:39,677
We're talking huge corporations,
governments, and so on.
1189
01:02:39,802 --> 01:02:43,180
So it takes tremendous effort
1190
01:02:43,305 --> 01:02:47,726
to make a real impact.
1191
01:02:50,590 --> 01:02:53,969
A new world is
unfolding right before our eyes,
1192
01:02:53,970 --> 01:02:57,949
a world in which all our actions
and thoughts are monetized,
1193
01:02:57,950 --> 01:03:00,068
and where it becomes
truly impossible
1194
01:03:00,093 --> 01:03:03,223
to be hidden from view
and to be truly alone.
1195
01:03:04,620 --> 01:03:06,229
But the internet
could not have turned
1196
01:03:06,230 --> 01:03:09,439
into this surveillance
machine without our help.
1197
01:03:09,440 --> 01:03:12,169
This internet that
monitors everything,
1198
01:03:12,170 --> 01:03:14,509
we made it happen all together.
1199
01:03:14,510 --> 01:03:18,076
It's up to us to invent the
internet that will replace it.
1200
01:03:18,640 --> 01:03:20,479
A lot of people,
when they think of privacy,
1201
01:03:20,480 --> 01:03:23,179
they just think of, "Oh,
what do I have to hide?"
1202
01:03:23,180 --> 01:03:25,389
And that's not what
privacy is at all,
1203
01:03:25,390 --> 01:03:28,359
or it's the tiniest
part of privacy.
1204
01:03:28,360 --> 01:03:31,839
Privacy is about freedom,
privacy is about autonomy,
1205
01:03:31,840 --> 01:03:34,299
privacy is about
self-determination.
1206
01:03:34,300 --> 01:03:36,779
Privacy is about
being able to think
1207
01:03:36,780 --> 01:03:40,749
the thoughts for yourself
and not be coerced
1208
01:03:40,750 --> 01:03:43,889
into behaving or thinking
in a certain way.
1209
01:03:43,890 --> 01:03:47,909
It's about growing as a person,
especially for young people,
1210
01:03:47,910 --> 01:03:50,499
and it's about
growing as a society.
1211
01:03:50,500 --> 01:03:53,453
The fundamental thing is
the willingness to say no.
1212
01:03:54,830 --> 01:03:57,679
When you're offered something
1213
01:03:57,680 --> 01:04:01,239
and the price is your
freedom, say no.
1214
01:04:01,240 --> 01:04:04,489
The willingness to
do that is crucial.
1215
01:04:04,490 --> 01:04:08,339
It's a sacrifice that I
make to keep my freedom.
1216
01:04:08,340 --> 01:04:09,464
It's worth it.
1217
01:04:19,000 --> 01:04:21,049
More than anyone
else, Edward Snowden,
1218
01:04:21,050 --> 01:04:23,229
in his willingness
to come forward
1219
01:04:23,230 --> 01:04:25,779
with very concrete details
about surveillance,
1220
01:04:25,780 --> 01:04:28,309
has helped us grasp
the bigger picture.
1221
01:04:28,310 --> 01:04:30,769
He has helped us sharpen
our understanding
1222
01:04:30,770 --> 01:04:33,629
of the harms of
pervasive surveillance
1223
01:04:33,630 --> 01:04:36,689
and helped us see
how new technologies
1224
01:04:36,690 --> 01:04:39,439
facilitate ubiquitous spying.
1225
01:04:39,440 --> 01:04:42,049
These issues are
vitally important,
1226
01:04:42,050 --> 01:04:43,749
and this is why I
want you to join me,
1227
01:04:43,750 --> 01:04:46,249
not just in welcoming,
but in thanking,
1228
01:04:46,250 --> 01:04:48,749
Edward Snowden for
opening up the space
1229
01:04:48,750 --> 01:04:51,447
to discuss and
debate these topics.
1230
01:04:57,174 --> 01:04:58,174
Thank you.
1231
01:05:09,770 --> 01:05:12,549
The days where they could
monitor everyone, everywhere,
1232
01:05:12,550 --> 01:05:15,529
all the time, simply
what the government calls
1233
01:05:15,530 --> 01:05:17,809
by means of bulk collection,
1234
01:05:17,810 --> 01:05:20,144
which is the government
euphemism for mass surveillance.
1235
01:05:20,145 --> 01:05:22,627
They say, "We just want to
collect everything and store it
1236
01:05:22,652 --> 01:05:24,141
in case we want to
search it later."
1237
01:05:24,970 --> 01:05:26,789
Those days are numbered.
1238
01:05:26,790 --> 01:05:30,719
We are going to move towards
a freer and fairer future,
1239
01:05:30,720 --> 01:05:32,439
rather than simply the one
1240
01:05:32,440 --> 01:05:34,129
that has already
been laid out for us.
1241
01:05:34,130 --> 01:05:35,969
We are at a decision point,
1242
01:05:35,970 --> 01:05:38,119
and we could have
a very dark future
1243
01:05:38,120 --> 01:05:41,759
or a very bright future,
but the ultimate determination
1244
01:05:41,760 --> 01:05:44,039
of which fork in
the road we take
1245
01:05:44,040 --> 01:05:47,429
won't be my decision, it won't
be the government's decision,
1246
01:05:47,430 --> 01:05:50,719
it will be your
generation's decision,
1247
01:05:50,720 --> 01:05:53,029
and I'm looking forward
to seeing what it is
1248
01:05:53,030 --> 01:05:54,530
that you guys actually decide.
99524
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