All language subtitles for American Greed s15e04 Boeings Deadly Design.eng

You're watching CNBC On Demand.

In this episode of American Greed.

What brings down the 737 MAX?

It's still a mystery tonight. What
caused this brand new plane to crash

ocean? The Boeing Company's fastest
selling jet falls out of the sky. Not

but twice.

Pieces of the plane on a crash site the
size of a football field.

In all, 346 people are killed.

I'm not able to go on with my life. I
don't know how to live this life.

And the 737 MAX is declared unsafe.

The FAA today ordered the planes
grounded in this country.

American Greed digs up the story of the
jet that kills.

The deadly design.

This was by far the biggest blunder that
I've seen, and there's no close second.

The frenzied production.

Make it work, have it fixed tomorrow.

And the stinging allegations of
corporate greed.

You're continuing to work and make $30
million a year after this horrific two

accidents that caused all these people's
relatives to go, to disappear, to die.

Every day around the world, millions of
people board an airplane.

They sit down, fasten their seatbelts,
trusting that the plane is entirely

That's what 24 -year -old Samya Stumo
from western Massachusetts does in March

2019.

Samya is a non -profit worker preparing
to depart Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

for a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya.

At 8 .30 in the morning, she texts her
mother to say she is on Ethiopian

Airlines Flight 302, a new 737 MAX jet
manufactured by Boeing.

A minute after takeoff, the captain
reports a flight control problem.

And then suddenly, the jet angles down
and begins to dive.

accelerating faster and faster, heading
straight towards the ground.

Six minutes into the flight, Samya's
Tumult's plane disappears from air

control radar screens.

I heard it in the middle of the night.

It was probably 3 in the morning, and I
was in the laundry room. And every time

I went in the laundry room, I just
turned on the radio.

They were saying that there was a plane
crash.

I was standing in the laundry room, and
I was just shaking. And I woke up my

husband, and he said, no way.

Go to sleep.

That is not true. It's not happening.
And I had to wake him up again. And I

said, it is true.

The plane crashes into a farm field
about 40 miles from the airport.

157 people are killed.

For many in the United States, it's just
one more plane crash on the other side

of the world. But this one is different.

All their time from the moment the plane
crashed, they spend the day here, they

spend their night here.

This is the second 737 MAX to go down in
five months.

And this one will trigger international
outrage and accusations of lies, fraud,

and greed at one of America's most
respected brands, the Boeing Company.

Founded in Seattle in 1916, it's the
largest aerospace corporation in the

with 140 ,000 employees.

and a market cap of $114 billion.

It's a business that literally changes
the course of history.

Boeing's legendary bombers helped win
the Second World War.

Its engineers helped take men to the
moon and

revolutionize air travel.

And with each new design, Boeing becomes
synonymous with trust.

of the actual core of Boeing, and that's
the engineers.

Every day, pilots like Dennis Tager put
their lives in the hands of Boeing

engineers.

I've seen the layers of protection, and
on and on they go, and it's like, one

more thing, Captain Tager, we put this
other thing in there, and I go, well,

bad is it going to get?

We're planning for everything.

And that's why practical, meticulous
engineers like Stan Sorcher...

Love working at Boeing.

He starts at the company in 1980.

We had a lot of opportunities, you know,
as engineers to make things work,

solving the right problems in the right
way.

But in 1997, Boeing merges with
McDonnell Douglas, a company that

brings to Boeing a cutthroat culture of
cost cutting.

Let me say that this is a spectacular
and wonderful day for the

people. Of the Boeing company.

But some say it is anything but.

In the years following, engineers begin
to sense that their contributions are no

longer valued.

And before long, they face a new
reality.

We really were not the center of the
universe anymore.

And so, in February 2000, 17 ,000
engineers and technical workers do

surprising. What's being called the
biggest white -collar strike in U .S.

history. They throw down their pocket
protectors and walk out.

The rallying cry of the strike is, no
nerds, no birds.

At the time, Stan Sorcher is a union
leader.

But it was very heartfelt.

This was a furious, emotional moment.

In the end, the engineers win their
battle for a new contract.

But the next year, Boeing executives
turn their backs on frontline workers

move company headquarters to Chicago.

And many argue that a new Boeing is
born.

It transformed itself from an
engineering company into a financial

For more than 50 years, consumer safety
activist Ralph Nader challenges

corporate profit -seeking. But Boeing
will become a personal target.

Instead of focusing on engineering,
research and development, it focused on

stock price.

It focused on stock options for the
bosses.

And while Boeing denies the allegation,
that focus leaves the company open to an

accusation of greed, because
prioritizing the price of Boeing stock

bosses get rich.

You tie more and more of their pay to
the stock price or something related to

the stock price, and their pay goes up,
the money goes into their bank accounts.

They're saying, really what matters is
getting the stock price up. And one way

to get the stock price up is for a
company to buy back its own shares.

And Boeing does just that. From 2004
through 2008, Boeing spends $11 billion

on buybacks.

And that is just the start.

Now, stock buybacks don't create any
jobs. They don't bolster pensions. They

don't get put in research and
development.

They just increase the metrics for
executive compensation.

for the guys at the top.

Years later, as Boeing continues to pour
billions into buybacks, critics say the

company is engaged in a new kind of
engineering, financial engineering.

So basically, everyone was geared
towards this incentive by giving money

shareholders, having that keep the share
price up, having that keep executive

compensation high, without anyone really
questioning what this was doing to the

company. But in 2011, Boeing gets what
could be a wake -up call.

4 ,000 miles away from Chicago in
Toulouse, France, one of Boeing's top

competitors, Airbus, is busy producing
the jet airline companies are desperate

to buy.

It's the A320neo.

Airbus promotes it as the answer to the
high cost of jet fuel.

And with the NEO, Airbus hits Boeing
where it hurts, luring one of its best

customers, American Airlines.

American was a longstanding Boeing
customer, big 737 user. And basically,

went in and said, we've got the new
engines. They don't. Fuel is expensive.

You need this.

And American broke with Boeing and said,
yep, we're ordering it.

Suddenly, Boeing needs a fast answer to
Airbus.

The company rules out designing a new
plane and goes with a plan that saves an

estimated $7 billion and years of
production time.

Airbus brings their trap, and the only
thing we can do from, you know, standing

flat -footed is a derivative of the 737.

The 737, that's Boeing's workhorse.

A jet born in the 1960s that already has
been upgraded over and over.

This time, the old machine gets large,
fuel -efficient engines.

And an impressive name, the 737 Max.

Boeing's ads, like this one, are
convincing.

But what does all this mean when you're
running an airline?

It means for once, your decision is
clear.

The new 737 Max.

Sold. The Max becomes the fastest
selling jet in Boeing history.

With 3 ,700 orders at its delivery date.

Each jet is estimated to bring in a
profit of $15 million.

This business is no longer a high -cycle
business. This is a long -term,

sustained growth business.

Dennis Mullenberg, a top Boeing
executive.

is appointed CEO in 2015, and he quickly
becomes the 737 MAX's promoter

-in -chief.

Just to give you an example, our 737
production line, this year we're at 47 a

month. We're going to be taking it up to
52 a month.

Under Mullenberg, Boeing's commitment to
stock buybacks accelerates.

He spends $30 billion in four years,
bringing the total spent in seven years

$43 billion.

That's 104 % of Boeing's net income in
that time.

Meanwhile, Boeing stock is soaring.

Boeing is on track to close its best
month in 35 years. Not bad. In 2018,

Mullenberg's total compensation, pumped
up by stock -based pay, is $30 million.

And they'd convinced themselves that
really nothing bad could happen. Nothing

would derail this process. Everything
was fine.

And Willenberg says, OK, this seems to
be working. Let's keep going.

Up next, Boeing's fatal fix.

They had no limits on it. Not only was
it powerful and violent, it had no

Yeah, I'm terrified.

On an October morning in 2018, in
Jakarta, Indonesia, 181

passengers board a brand new Boeing 737
MAX, Lion Air Flight 610,

for a 75 -minute flight to a city on a
nearby island.

Their pilot is 31 -year -old Babye
Suneja, with more than 6 ,000 flight

under his belt, he is experienced.

But still, his mother, Sangeeta, who
works in commercial aviation herself,

worries about his brand -new jet.

Because I'd seen the promo of the Boeing
aircraft, you know, the new.

I thought it was a more powerful
aircraft.

It was different than 737.

But Babier tells her not to worry.

Even if all the systems fail, I can land
it safely.

You don't worry about me. In any
situation, I can handle.

He was so confident.

But on this flight, moments after
liftoff, Babier is bombarded by one

after another.

He's got unreliable airspeed. He's got
stick shaker. He's got an altitude that

doesn't make sense.

And then it gets worse.

Two and a half minutes after takeoff, as
the airplane climbs above 2 ,000 feet,

it inexplicably heads into a violent 700
-foot dive.

So the captain is now battling the
airplane is pitching down. He doesn't

why he pulls back on it. And when he
hits the thumb wheel switch, it stops.

takes a break. But then, as if the plane
is possessed, it begins to dive once

again. Nose comes down and it runs
faster than anything you've ever

For 11 minutes, the jet careens through
the air.

So he battles this over 20 times.

All this other noise is going on. I
mean, he is getting gut punched, head

punched, kicked in the shin, and a knife
wound across the belly.

Finally, Babier asks the first officer
to take over while he checks the manual.

There is nothing there to help.

Last struggling moment, he's the one who
tried hard, you know.

The news pilots never gave up, but
there's some point where the earth is

at you too quick.

Twelve minutes after takeoff, the plane
dives into the Java Sea at 450 miles per

hour.

189 people are killed, including three
children.

Shortly after, in Washington,
Congressman Peter DeFazio, the chairman

House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, gets a visit from the head of

safety for the FAA.

He said this was a one -off, never going
to happen again.

Maybe bad maintenance, maybe pilot
error, whatever.

Pilot error.

Sangeeta hears that and hears her son
being blamed for the deaths of 188

If you look at the history of aviation,
any aviation accident that happens, you

know, the easiest thing is to blame the
captain.

But this time...

The explanation is found in the trade
-offs Boeing makes to upgrade its 50

-old 737.

Javier De Luis, an aerospace engineer
and lecturer at MIT, who will pay a

personal price for the decisions Boeing
makes, is dumbfounded by what the

company comes up with.

There was just a cascade of bonehead
decisions that were made in this that

it's hard to even know where to start.

Boeing's problem is that it needs to
position its new large fuel -efficient

engines forward on the wing.

But in the air, under certain maneuvers,
that positioning can change the

handling of the jet, pitching it higher
than pilots expect.

And so Boeing solves the problem with
software, a program called NCAS, an

acronym for the Maneuvering
Characteristic Augmentation System.

The software is designed to
automatically push the nose of the plane

sensor detects the plane is pointing at
too high of an angle.

There is nothing wrong with having
computers control airplanes.

We've been doing it since the 1970s at
least.

But Boeing makes a critically important
choice, to have the software triggered

by just one notoriously unreliable
sensor.

A little vein on the nose of a jet, and
that decision will spell disaster.

I mean, airplanes are big, heavy things
that we fill up full of fuel, and then

we tell them to defy the laws of
gravity.

You know, we know that one mistake, one
thing going wrong can be catastrophic.

That's why we beat into students, right?
You have to have backups, and a lot of

times the backups have backups.

In this case, there wasn't any backup.

Joe Jacobson, a former safety engineer
at the Federal Aviation Administration,

is stunned by Boeing's choice.

You know, I've got 36 years in the
aviation business, and this was by far

the biggest blunder that I've seen, and
there's no close second.

A blunder that is packed with power.

And Boeing designed it to go to the full
nose down position. They had no limits

on it. Not only was it powerful and
violent, it had no limits.

Beyond terrifying.

Up next, Boeing's big gamble.

The fact that their own analysis told
them that there were likely to be lots

further accidents, that they did
nothing, and they still did nothing.

In the fall of 2018, after a Boeing 737
MAX jet crashes shortly after takeoff in

Jakarta, Indonesia, investigators search
for answers, focusing on maintenance

records, damaged sensors, and software.

But back in the United States, insiders
like former Boeing engineer Adam Dixon

believe the problem is not software,
it's culture.

Dixon works at the company for 30 years,
starting in the 90s in the good old

days.

I had watched leaders who just were
remarkable men and women who

put their career second to doing what
they thought was the right thing.

But more than 20 years into his career,
he says the notorious focus on cost

-cutting and stock price is deeply
rooted in the company.

That's when he is assigned to work on
the 737 MAX, where he says two things

matter most.

Time schedule and cost.

You know, make it work and have it fixed
tomorrow.

Every worker knows there are billions of
dollars at stake, and beating Airbus is

about beating the clock.

That's where all the pressures began
that emanated down right from the CEO

the board.

right down to the least experienced line
worker.

Hurry it up, hurry it up, hurry it up.

And according to Adam Dixon, when
engineers voice concerns and make

they are often discounted. We often hear
the term, they're just polishing the

apple. It's unnecessary and it's costly
to make these fine improvements.

that maybe don't have a real impact.

At one point, Dixon persists in a safety
concern of his own, not related to the

737 MAX.

He goes to his boss's boss.

And I just said, I have 25 years of
experience in this area.

You know, please trust me on this. And
he looked at me dead in the eye and

Adam, I don't trust anybody. Why in the
world would I trust you?

And eventually, engineers learn to just
keep quiet.

Certainly, engineers are not
unintelligent, and when you have made

decisions that are unpopular, challenged
by your own leadership,

you may not get an opportunity to work
on the next new airplane.

And so, it is in that culture that
serious concerns about MCAS are raised.

In 2012, a Boeing employee reports a
finding that... If pilots don't respond

MCAS within a fast 10 seconds, it could
be catastrophic, meaning people could

die.

In 2015, a Boeing employee raises a
question about the critical flaw that

take down the Indonesian jet,
questioning whether MCAS is vulnerable

-sensor failures.

But the concerns are either ignored or
dismissed.

That's what that culture does.

You're denying that there's this risk.
You're denying that there's this

shortcoming. You're denying that there's
this thing that won't work.

Because it appears there is one
overriding goal.

We've got to get these planes out the
doors because we're getting all these

orders, and nobody wants to be the one
who says, hey, we've got to go back to

the drawing board here.

But there is one risk that Boeing takes
seriously.

spelled out in a summary of the minutes
of a Boeing meeting.

If we emphasize MCAS as a new function,
there may be greater certification and

training impact.

In other words, new software could mean
the pilots have to be retrained, and

that will cost Boeing money.

They guaranteed some of their first
customers a million dollars per plane if

they had to.

go to simulator training.

So the pressures started on day one
before the thing was even fully designed

under production.

And so employees at Boeing, presumably
looking to save that money, do not fully

disclose MCAS to the FAA.

Retired FAA safety engineer Joe Jacobson
first learns about it after the

Indonesian crash.

I got an email asking if I knew
anything, if we'd done any issue papers

And I had no idea what MCAS was.

And so my answer was, no, we haven't
done any issue papers. What is it?

The concealment of MCAS is so thorough,
it is even deleted in flight manuals.

And that is why, in October 2018,

Bob Yasuneja, hiding with his jet,
checks the manual and finds nothing that

help. It was not in the engineering
manual. It was not in the operation

manual. It was nowhere written. They had
not mentioned.

A month after the crash, Boeing informs
American Airlines executives about MCAS.

They said the MCAS misbehaved.

A little bit of software misbehaved.
You're talking like this is a child.

This was a beast wrapped in a cage that
we knew nothing about.

And when you let it out, we didn't know
about it, and it ran.

Havoc throughout the cockpit.

It's good to see you this morning. Good
to see you, Maria. That same month,

Dennis Mullenberg goes on Fox Business
to defend his jet. And the bottom line

here is the 737 MAX is safe.

At this point, it is suspected that
there may be a safety issue with the

But Mullenberg points back to the
pilots.

We've already issued a couple of
bulletins to pilots and operators that

them back to existing flight procedures.

He looks confident, unconcerned, but
apparently there is one thing that is of

concern, the price of Boeing's stock.

What they did do is they doubled down on
getting the stock price up.

And, you know, that's totally egregious.

In December, two months after the crash,
Boeing boosted stock dividend by 20 %

and authorizes a $20 billion program to
buy back more shares in coming years.

They're sending a signal out to people
who are buying their shares. And you can

be confident despite the fact we had a
crash, everything's under control.

And that was in a sense saying we're not
really worried about the fact that we

had a crash.

But all indications are that Boeing
should be worried.

At the FAA, a new risk assessment shows
that without a fix to MCAS, there could

be 15 more fatal 737 MAX crashes over
the next 30 years.

But at the time, that report is not made
public. And day after day around the

world, hundreds of people board a 737
MAX, trusting that the plane is safe.

The fact that their own analysis told
them that there were likely to be lots

further accidents, that they did
nothing, and they still did nothing?

I mean, I don't understand how these
people go to bed at night.

I really don't.

Up next, Boeing sticks to its story.

We followed exactly the steps in our
design and certification processes that

consistently produce safe airplanes.

For 25 years, on a 180 -acre farm in
Sheffield, Massachusetts,

Nadia Milleran and Michael Stumo carve a
peaceful life for themselves and three

children.

Over the years, their precocious
daughter, Samya, is a constant source of

surprise. She teaches herself to read at
age three.

At age 13, she makes a wild
announcement.

I'm 13. I think I want to go to college.

And I said, oh, no, we're not going to
college.

This is not going to happen. And then
she comes back to us with financial aid,

and she comes back to us with this. And
all of a sudden, turning age 14, she's

in college.

In 2019, Samia is 24, working for a
nonprofit organization helping to bring

patient -centered health care to local
communities in East Africa.

Her great -uncle is Ralph Nader.

He is certain she will one day become a
leader in global health.

She was very conscious that public
health had to be done at the grassroots,

to strengthen the villages. She had it
all down.

In the early spring of 2019, Samia is
heading from Washington to a work

in Nairobi.

She changes planes in Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian Airlines flight takes off
at 8 .38 a .m.

At first, there is nothing unusual about
the trip.

But then, an all -too -familiar scenario
comes into play.

That sensor on the nose of the plane is
damaged.

Did a bird hit it? Did it just get
damaged some other way?

We just don't know.

And so, the demon, MCAS, is unleashed.

So, boom.

comes the nose down, and it comes in for
almost 10 seconds, and it comes in

fast, just like it did for Lion Air. So
this hits them like a punch to the head.

But this time, the pilots know about the
software. They switch off power to

MCAS, just as Boeing says to do.

Right, game on. We're going to save this
airplane.

But they're going too fast.

Try as they might, the two pilots cannot
pull the plane out of the dive.

So they take a step.

The aircraft is pointing down to the
ground, and I'm sure it's their last

ever. The captain directs the first
officer to put the switches back on.

The MCAS wakes up immediately and gives
its last burst until it's almost almost

down.

Six minutes after takeoff.

The jet slammed into a farm field at 700
miles per hour.

I don't know how you can even explain
your feeling at that time. Just pacing.

And my son, Tor, is just pacing back and
forth. And what do you do? You can't

even think.

Samia's brother, Adnan, is in New
Zealand at the time, holding out hope.

Until we knew what the death toll was,
if there were any survivors, you've got

to think, well, even if there's one
survivor, she's the survivor, you know.

That morning, Ralph Nader gets a call
from a relative.

He said, was Sammy on that plane?

I said, no, no, no, it can't be.

But it is.

And there is just one word.

Devastating. All in the name of
corporate profiteering.

It didn't have to happen. Those two
crashes were eminently avoidable.

In all, 157 people have died.

One is Javier De Luis's sister,
Graciela.

His younger sister calls him with the
news.

But they don't have an identified body.
And I'm like, no, they're not going to

be anybody.

Shortly after the 737 MAX goes down in
Ethiopia...

The similarities between it and the
Indonesian crash are clear.

The pilots are not the problem.

The jet is unsafe.

The 737 MAX is grounded around the
world.

Across the country today, the minute 737
MAX flights landed, they face immediate

grounding. You know, it felt like it
never faced anything like this before.

A certified jet being grounded and,
well, 346 tragic deaths.

This is completely different from
anything that Boeing had ever faced

In April, with his fastest -selling jet
parked and billions of dollars at risk,

Dennis Mullenberg holds a press
conference.

Once again, he insists Boeing has done
nothing wrong.

We have gone back and confirmed again as
we do the safety analysis, the

engineering analysis, that we followed
exactly the steps in our design and

certification processes that
consistently produce safe airplanes.

And the thing that's most infuriating to
me and to the other families is that

there's this attitude of, we did nothing
wrong, nothing to see here, everything,

system worked.

No, it did not.

Obviously it did not.

You have hundreds of bodies in Indonesia
and Africa that tell you that them

didn't work. So stop telling me you all
did your jobs right. You didn't.

Later, anger at Boeing's board.

The incompetence at that level of salary
and bonus is

astounding. How can you be so stupid,
much less callous?

Six months after the crash of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302, families come from

around the world to hold a memorial
vigil in Washington.

Paul Jirogi lost his wife, three
children, and mother -in -law.

I'm not able to go on with my life. I
don't know how to live this life.

With their personal stories, the
families are serving a warning.

As we remember our family members, I
want to remind you all that you could

be in this position.

This happened to me because of the
negligence within Boeing and within the

FAA.

At this point, Samya Stumo's parents are
working overtime in her name, leading

the effort to bring about change.

And now we want no third crash.

They meet with every government official
they can to insist that future

travelers be protected.

And you have to tell the story every
time. It's a new trauma every time.

got to tell the story.

But important people are listening.

In the spring of 2019...

The House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure begins a series of

hearings as part of an enormous
investigation into the 737 MAX.

I don't think we should be here today. I
don't think 346 people should have

died, and I believe that this was
preventable. It's by far the largest

investigation we ever undertook. In
July, family members are called to

And we were very...

unhappy and worried that there was going
to be a rush to unground this plane.

And others all around the world are
watching.

My wife and I came to Washington after
Samuel's death far earlier than we would

ever want to.

The hearings continue over a period of
six months.

Finally, in October, Dennis Mullenberg
sits down to answer some questions.

And, uh...

We are deeply, deeply sorry.

We'll never forget.

He points out that changes are underway.

MCAS will now rely on two sensors.

And I guess the question is, why wasn't
it that way from day one?

Mr. Chairman, we've asked ourselves that
same question over and over. And if

back then we knew everything that we
know now, we would have made a different

decision.

Well, that's not true, because you did
know, and people in your organization

knew.

And, you know, you just ignored it or
covered it up.

Mullenberg is grilled for hours.

Eventually, he gets the question many
people want to ask.

Your salary's still on. Is anybody at
Boeing taking a cut or working for free

try to rectify this? Congressman, it's
not about the money for me. That's not

why I came. Are you giving up any money?

Congressman.

My board will conduct a comprehensive
review. So you're saying you're not

up any compensation at all. You're
continuing to work and make $30 million

year after this horrific two accidents
that caused all these people's relatives

to go, to disappear, to die.

You're not taking a cut in pay at all?

After the hearing, Mullenberg reportedly
offers to take a cut in pay, but in

December, he's asked to resign.

He was put in place to not rock the
boat. And all of a sudden, the boat got

rocked. And obviously, he was not the
right person in the right place at the

right time.

Mullenberg leaves Boeing without a
severance, but he takes with him close

million in salary, pension, and stock
awards.

What kind of motivation to run companies
properly is that? You can cause it to

lose. Billions of dollars, and then you
get a huge benefit from that?

Up next, who gets the blame?

Test pilots don't run Boeing.

For two years.

Following the deadly crashes of the 737
MAX jets, family members of those who

died wait to see how Boeing will be held
accountable.

For many, there is no question of who is
responsible.

So it's all for commercial purposes.

Very, very clear.

The steps from Boeing's decisions at the
top all the way to the Java Sea and

to the farmland in Ethiopia couldn't be
clearer.

And evidence of Boeing's apparent
negligence is expanding.

In a ruling from a lawsuit brought by
shareholders, a Delaware judge finds

Boeing's board of directors did not
establish a committee to oversee the

of the 737 MAX until after the second
crash, after 346 people had died.

The board denies that and settles the
case.

But victims' families find the judge's
103 -page ruling convincing.

The incompetence, the incompetence at
that level of salary and

bonus is astounding. How can you be so
stupid, much less callous?

But still, the big question is, will
Boeing be criminally prosecuted?

The answer comes in January 2021.

The Department of Justice charges the
company with fraud for deceiving the FAA

with misleading statements and half
-truths about MCAS.

But there is a surprise.

The employees said to be responsible for
Boeing's deception are two test pilots.

One is later individually indicted for
fraud.

Boeing has essentially thrown two of its
lowest level employees under the bus

and assigned all responsibility to them.

Test pilots don't run Boeing. Those test
pilots did not come up with this on

their own. I mean, it started with the
CEO. It started with the board.

It came all the way down the food chain.

But the Justice Department finds that
the problems are not pervasive and not

facilitated by senior management.

Boeing settles with what is called a
deferred prosecution agreement.

The case will likely be dismissed in
three years.

Dennis Mullenberg and the Department of
Justice did not respond to requests for

comment for this report.

For Boeing, it may be that the 737 MAX
problems are over. Twenty months after

its grounding, the redesigned jet goes
back into service.

With new flight control software and
updated pilot procedures, the 737 MAX

been cleared to take off.

In all, the whole crisis cost Boeing an
estimated $20 billion.

The company put to pause on stock
buybacks.

Today, as people assess what went wrong
with the 737 MAX, some believe the

answer goes back to the late 1990s.

to those days when engineers stopped
being the center of Boeing's universe.

The cultural explanation for what
happened is probably the best. The

difference between doing MCAS wrong and
doing it right is nonexistent.

The only thing that makes any sense is
that there was a deliberate

disempowerment of engineers and a
culture that basically ignored their

In a statement to American Greed, Boeing
says that it has made significant

changes as a company and to the design
of the 737 MAX to ensure

that accidents like those in Indonesia
and Africa never happen again.

But those who are looking for signs of a
deep change in Boeing's corporate

culture are disappointed in what they
see so far.

I had hoped that this would...

be a major reckoning.

They would bring in someone new, and
they would say, no, we're going to go

to being what we were, the best
aerospace engineering company in the

we're not going to watch the daily stock
price.

But that didn't happen. At this time,
Boeing is putting its two deadly

behind.

But for the families of those who were
killed in Boeing's jets, that option is

not available.

Our whole life is totally different,
like every single moment of our life. I,

you know, just have trouble getting
regular life done.

I have a long way to go, I think.

And I definitely don't want this for any
other family or any other mother.

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