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In this episode of American Greed, it's
called Operation Get Rich or Die Trying.
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The biggest ID theft in U .S. history.
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A mysterious ring of social outcasts
with an insatiable appetite for sex,
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and your encrypted information.
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There's a very fine line between
exploiting a system to check it out or
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exploiting a system for gain.
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They were looking for data any way they
could get it.
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They steal credit card numbers and make
a fortune by selling them on the black
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market. It just kept building upon
itself.
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500 ,000 numbers, then a million
numbers, up to 130 million numbers.
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You or I might be a victim of this
crime, and we would never know.
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Victims lose millions, but no one pays a
greater price than one of the gang's
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own. It just cracked under the pressure.
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In May 2008, federal agents in full SWAT
gear fan out across South Florida.
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They raid private homes, condos, even a
suite at Miami's posh National Hotel.
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We received multiple search warrants for
numerous houses, cars, for safety
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deposit boxes, for servers, even
individuals in case they had possessed
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drives or media in their pockets or in
their backpacks.
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Agents seize more than a dozen computers
and obtain search warrants for servers
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overseas. On those servers, they find
millions of credit card numbers.
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Their victims were a whole range from
small banks and credit unions to some of
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the largest retailers, well -known
restaurant chains, and some of the
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credit card processors in the United
States.
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The scheme's mastermind is 26 -year -old
Albert Gonzalez.
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The problem with hackers is that those
who might be inclined to try to make
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money off of their skills is that they
don't know anything about the criminal
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underworld. And the criminal underworld
might not know that much about hacking,
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but he could bridge both worlds.
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I've always thought of him as a
forerunner, sort of criminal industry
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this whole area.
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For Gonzalez, who also goes by the
handles Soup Nazi, Kumbhajani, and
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anonymity is key.
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Most individuals will have more than one
handle. So on one particular forum,
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you'll be known as a certain individual.
On another forum, you'll be known as
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something else. In some places, you'll
have a number. It'll be a sequence
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number, a non -sequence number,
depending upon what you're doing.
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These criminals can communicate to one
another anonymously, so a lot of times
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the co -conspirators may not know each
other in real life, but they communicate
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via instant messaging, and they can
assist each other in their crimes.
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But Gonzalez is no ordinary criminal.
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He'll soon be known as the most cunning
cyber crook in American history.
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Albert Gonzales spends his childhood in
South Florida.
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His father came to America from Cuba on
a homemade raft in the 1970s. And they
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raised him in a working class
neighborhood in Miami.
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Gonzales earns allowance working for his
father's landscaping business.
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Albert grew up in a very...
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politically conservative home, church
-going Catholics, in a working -class
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environment. And he was a very sweet,
good -natured boy, outgoing.
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But all that changed when Albert was
about 12 years old, and he bought his
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computer. At first, his hobby seems
innocent enough.
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He just absolutely loved it, and he
wanted to spend all his time with it.
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But before long, Gonzalez's fascination
with computers becomes an obsession.
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His grades started dropping. His mom
begged him to see a psychologist, and he
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absolutely refused.
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He falls in with a group of hackers
called the Keebler Elves Gang, and they
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into NASA and the Indian government's
website.
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It was about...
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Being able to pick those locks and get
those bragging rights to be able to say,
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see, I did this. I might just be a
teenager, and I might be powerless in
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real world, but online, I'm like a god.
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After graduating in 1999, Gonzalez
enrolls in community college.
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Albert dropped out of Miami Dade
Community College after less than a
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and moved to New York to take a job with
a dot -com company, which very quickly
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went under.
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Then he took a job with Siemens in their
IT department, but they very quickly
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relocated to Pennsylvania, and he opted
not to move with them.
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Jobless, he begins dabbling in drugs and
illegal online activity.
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He was in New York sort of feeling like
he had hit rock bottom and not really
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knowing what his options were. What he
did know was that he was really good at
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hacking, and he had access to...
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this internet carding forum that he was
well aware of called Shadow Crew, and
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that seemed like as good a career option
as any.
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In 2002, black market carding websites
like Shadow Crew are beginning to crop
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up. You go to these forums. You can buy
or sell credit and debit card
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information. You can buy access to
retailers.
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You can even hire people to launder your
money off of these web pages.
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These carding forums have no boundaries,
and criminals from every continent join
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them and participate in them.
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Using the alias Kumbhajani...
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Gonzalez quickly becomes a shadow crew
site administrator.
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He helps crooks sell more than a million
stolen cards for between $10 and $15 a
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piece. It's millions.
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I mean, we're not talking about somebody
making a couple of thousand or five,
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ten, fifteen thousand. We're talking
about millions and millions of dollars.
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they steal a debit card number and a
PIN, and they can re -encode that on
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plastic, walk up to an ATM, put the PIN
in, and clean out the account.
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Shadow crew members call these cash -out
trips.
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Once that ATM is out, you go to the next
one, and you continue to do that until
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you're either out of cards or the ATMs
are out of money.
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It's a cash -out trip that would be
Gonzalez's unlikely downfall.
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In 2003, New York police officers see a
young man loading card after card into a
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nearby ATM machine.
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During the arrest, officers discover
he's cyber criminal Albert Gonzalez, and
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they turn him over to the Secret
Service.
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The Secret Service is responsible for
investigating cyber crime, and they very
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quickly recognized Albert's potential in
helping them to bust other cyber
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criminals. There are places that a
cooperating defendant in the cyber world
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bring you that you can't go on your own,
and that is the value of working with
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them. The Secret Service flips Gonzalez
and pays him $75 ,000 a year to help
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with Operation Firewall.
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It wasn't as if we were all sitting
around a table together and he was
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hearing, understanding our strategies,
our techniques. His role was to continue
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as administrator of the site, typing on
a computer, communicating with his
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individuals. The successful undercover
sting nets 28 Shadow Crew members.
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It was a benchmark investigation,
benchmark prosecution, and everything
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every step of the way.
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Authorities say the thieves they
arrested had cost more than $4 million
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losses.
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After Operation Firewall, the Secret
Service cuts Gonzalez loose and he
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to Miami.
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Once a hacker, always a hacker.
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Legitimacy for him was not really an
option at that point because...
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Albert had gained so much insight while
working for the feds, and he was not a
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person to pass on an opportunity.
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Next on American Greed, Gonzalez forms
his own gang with a plan to make
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millions. He called it Operation Get
Rich or Die Trying.
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It certainly was a very ominous title,
and it certainly foreshadowed what was
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come.
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Miami, Florida.
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It's a playground for the world's
wealthiest and for those aspiring to
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all, like 23 -year -old hacker Albert
Gonzalez.
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In October 2004, Gonzalez turns rat and
helps the Secret Service bring down
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Shadow Crew, the biggest cybercrime bust
to date.
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But all the while, he's plotting
Operation Get Rich or Die Trying.
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I think it's safe to say the Secret
Service had no idea that Albert was
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both sides, that he was becoming a
master criminal while at the same time
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working as a snitch for them.
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His overall business plan was to break
into a series of major
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retailers, obtain their credit and debit
card information, and then either to
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sell them or in fact use other members
of his gang to...
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cash them out to go to ATMs and use them
as essentially cows and milk them until
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they were dry.
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Gonzalez enlists the help of several
hackers he'd met online years before.
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They started off as teenage friends
trying to get into government sites,
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military sites, and very quickly that
changed from hacking for fun and
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to hacking for profit.
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A number of the collaborators of Albert
Gonzalez had significant day
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jobs. They were doing security intrusion
work, earning tens of thousands or, in
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at least one case, in excess of $100
,000 a year in salary.
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Stephen Watt, Patrick Toohey, Chris
Scott, and Jonathan James become
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hack pack.
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Stephen Watt was a coding genius.
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He graduated from high school at 16.
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He graduated from college at age 19 and
went on to take a job in the IT
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department of Morgan Stanley, a Wall
Street investment banking firm in
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Manhattan.
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Gonzalez meets Patrick Toohey on a
shadow crew cash -out trip in 2003.
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He came from a household with a shifting
cast of characters and had turned to
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hacking as a way to kind of funnel his
alienation, his rage.
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Patrick would do anything that Albert
asked, from the coding to the cash -out
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trips and anything in between. He
probably would have picked up Albert's
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cleaning if he asked him to.
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Chris Scott and Jonathan James round out
the gang.
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Chris Scott was a depressed, overweight
geek from Miami
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who had been ejected from his high
school for disabling all of the
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with the virus.
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Chris's greatest strength was probably
that he was best friends with Jonathan
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James, who was probably the most famous
hacker at the time. He was very well
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known. At 16, Jonathan James stakes his
claim to fame by serving six months for
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hacking into NASA and Defense Department
computers, becoming the youngest hacker
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ever sentenced.
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Together, Gonzalez and his crew become a
tight -knit band of brothers.
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These guys are driven by a lot of the
same things that we're driven by. They
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have an ego, they like challenge, and of
course they like money and everything
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you can get from money.
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Operation Get Rich starts small, using a
technique called war driving.
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So we've just gone by a really nice
place that was not very well encrypted.
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Chris Roberts is a gray hat hacker, an
Internet security expert specializing in
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fraud.
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As we're driving along here, we're still
pulling in a lot of wireless access
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points, a lot of systems.
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Some are encrypted, some aren't very
well encrypted.
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And we've pulled in 800 access points
and almost 500 computers and systems
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are attached to them.
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Like Roberts, the hack pack uses a Wi
-Fi antenna to find unencrypted or
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vulnerable networks.
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We're able to just listen in and see
what kind of wireless systems are
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advertising, no different than a radio.
As you drive along with a radio, you go
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in and out of signal strengths.
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This is basically the same thing.
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Chris Scott and Jonathan James tune in
to one store at a time along US 1 in
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Miami. They'll have pulled into every
single one of these retail areas, slowly
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driven through to see what wireless
access points were advertising.
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and then to see which ones were
encrypted or which ones were not
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The first one that they found was BJ's
Wholesale Club, where they parked
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and downloaded all of the credit and
debit card numbers as they were being
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swiped. by the customers.
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Gonzalez forwards thousands of card
numbers to Patrick Toohey and other
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associates. So at that point in time,
you need a little device which is a card
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reader and a writer, and you also need
some blank credit cards.
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They then encode the information onto
blanks, and runners cash them out at
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Gonzalez, who was raised a Catholic,
feels a slight twinge of guilt.
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He told Patrick, we're going to hell for
this. And he really meant it.
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But he made himself feel better by
telling himself that once the fraud was
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detected, then the credit card companies
would restore people's money and all
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would be fine.
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But war driving and cashing out is
risky.
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I physically have to put myself in a
position where I might be videotaped. I
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might be caught on a surveillance
camera.
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Somebody might be clever enough to work
out that these stores are getting hit.
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Albert Gonzalez himself had learned that
cashing out was a dangerous mechanism
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because he himself had been arrested
while cashing out.
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Gonzalez knows there's a better way to
generate higher volume with less
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exposure. He's associating with elite
carters and hackers in Eastern Europe
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other places, so he's trying to refine
his techniques and make them even better
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and less risky.
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To do this, Gonzalez needs a program
called a sniffer code, which he lacks
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technical skills to write.
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That program then, on its own, will look
around your computer.
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It'll look around for your social, it'll
look around for your credit cards,
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it'll look around for your banking
information, basically whatever I've
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programmed it to do.
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And then it will call back to me and
say, here's all the information, have a
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nice day.
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Gonzalez calls on Stephen Watt, who
fires off the code in ten hours, free of
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charge. It was really the key to this
being the cybercrime of the century.
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Once the sniffer code is installed, they
can access, copy, and download data
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remotely. And it starts to pour in.
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Obviously, when you're attacking a
system, when you're gathering data, you
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somewhere to put this information.
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You're not going to want to put it right
on your computer, because if your
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00:16:03,700 --> 00:16:07,879
computer gets lost, stolen, taken, or
seized, you've just handed somebody a
223
00:16:07,880 --> 00:16:08,930
amount of evidence.
224
00:16:09,050 --> 00:16:12,330
Gonzalez needs a safe place to stash the
data.
225
00:16:12,870 --> 00:16:18,929
Patrick Toohey had set up servers in
Latvia, Singapore, China, and Ukraine to
226
00:16:18,930 --> 00:16:21,850
store all of these reams and reams,
mountains of data.
227
00:16:22,410 --> 00:16:27,009
But in storage, the numbers near their
expiration dates and they diminish in
228
00:16:27,010 --> 00:16:28,060
value.
229
00:16:28,330 --> 00:16:32,730
So he calls on an international crime
lord to expedite distribution.
230
00:16:34,010 --> 00:16:36,230
Maxi Khrushchev is a Ukrainian national.
231
00:16:36,750 --> 00:16:40,490
who was the biggest wholesaler of credit
and debit cards around the world.
232
00:16:41,830 --> 00:16:48,249
Yastrzemski sells the card numbers for
between $150 and $300 a pop, of which
233
00:16:48,250 --> 00:16:49,470
Gonzalez takes half.
234
00:16:49,471 --> 00:16:53,889
Yastrzemski would sell those cards via
the Internet or in these carding forums
235
00:16:53,890 --> 00:16:59,009
or portals to other lower -level
salespeople who would then turn around
236
00:16:59,010 --> 00:17:00,060
them again.
237
00:17:00,320 --> 00:17:04,459
Yastrzemski distributes the profits to
Gonzalez through online currency
238
00:17:04,460 --> 00:17:11,439
exchanges. Soon, packages containing up
to $370 ,000 are piling up
239
00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:12,819
at Gonzalez's Dropbox.
240
00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:17,858
He actually complained to Stephen Watt
that once his money counter broke from
241
00:17:17,859 --> 00:17:22,500
overuse, and he complained that he had
to count manually $340 ,000.
242
00:17:23,930 --> 00:17:29,849
By the summer of 2005, Gonzalez begins
to indulge in his new lifestyle as a
243
00:17:29,850 --> 00:17:34,049
mogul. It was completely over the top. I
would say much of the profits from
244
00:17:34,050 --> 00:17:37,000
Operation Get Rich or Guy Trying went
right up their noses.
245
00:17:37,230 --> 00:17:43,149
Gonzalez and his crew book a $5 ,000 a
night suite at the Lowe's Hotel in South
246
00:17:43,150 --> 00:17:48,829
Beach. When they were in Miami, they
would make this insane concoction called
247
00:17:48,830 --> 00:17:49,950
magic milkshake.
248
00:17:50,280 --> 00:17:55,880
which was cookies and cream, Haagen
-Dazs ice cream, skim milk, magic
249
00:17:56,320 --> 00:18:02,299
LSD, and ecstasy, all blended together
to create just the most
250
00:18:02,300 --> 00:18:06,180
extreme, insane experience ever.
251
00:18:07,860 --> 00:18:13,419
Gonzalez also throws himself an
extravagant party to celebrate his
252
00:18:13,420 --> 00:18:14,470
New York City.
253
00:18:16,480 --> 00:18:21,600
Lay out a drug buffet on the coffee
table. So C for Coke, E for ecstasy.
254
00:18:22,220 --> 00:18:24,520
They had the best champagne.
255
00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:26,340
They had the best designer drugs.
256
00:18:26,560 --> 00:18:31,159
They had the most beautiful women there.
It was like life as they would design
257
00:18:31,160 --> 00:18:37,159
it. Despite this drug -fueled lifestyle,
Gonzalez never loses control of his
258
00:18:37,160 --> 00:18:39,520
business. He was always reachable.
259
00:18:40,060 --> 00:18:44,439
He slept with his laptop next to him. He
brought his laptop with him on
260
00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,260
vacation, to the gym. He always had it
with him.
261
00:18:48,360 --> 00:18:53,419
Next on American Greed, Operation Get
Rich or Die Tryin' gets more
262
00:18:53,420 --> 00:18:56,660
sophisticated, and the hackers up the
ante.
263
00:18:56,980 --> 00:19:01,939
The idea that these guys were able to
slip past all of these levels of
264
00:19:01,940 --> 00:19:03,620
security was just incredible.
265
00:19:04,060 --> 00:19:07,380
And the hackers take one company to the
brink.
266
00:19:07,790 --> 00:19:12,029
What do you do when you're facing the
worst possible thing that can happen to
267
00:19:12,030 --> 00:19:13,080
your company?
268
00:19:24,890 --> 00:19:30,869
By 2005, Albert Gonzalez and his crew
have successfully hacked into several
269
00:19:30,870 --> 00:19:33,750
retailers along US -1 in South Florida.
270
00:19:35,060 --> 00:19:40,699
These big box stores send data to
corporate servers, which Gonzalez knows
271
00:19:40,700 --> 00:19:41,860
real goldmine.
272
00:19:41,861 --> 00:19:45,919
It's very much a case of like, well,
hang on, if I can do it to these couple
273
00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:51,979
individuals in a store, or if I can do
it to these couple of stores, can I do
274
00:19:51,980 --> 00:19:55,599
to more stores? Can I do it to a series
of stores? Can I do it to a bigger
275
00:19:55,600 --> 00:20:00,039
store? And then you go to, can I
actually get the core centralized
276
00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:01,300
then it's like, wow, okay.
277
00:20:01,301 --> 00:20:04,709
If I can get the core system, who
processes all the data? I can go for the
278
00:20:04,710 --> 00:20:09,009
mother load at that point. He orders his
crew to perform reconnaissance on
279
00:20:09,010 --> 00:20:10,060
potential targets.
280
00:20:10,330 --> 00:20:14,849
They identified them in a variety of
ways. Christopher Scott simply going up
281
00:20:14,850 --> 00:20:19,169
down Route 1 with his computer, seeing
where there were vulnerable access
282
00:20:19,170 --> 00:20:24,689
points, going down the list of Fortune
500 companies, identifying companies
283
00:20:24,690 --> 00:20:27,790
shared a common credit card processing
system.
284
00:20:28,360 --> 00:20:31,760
We're identifying ones that had
vulnerable payment systems.
285
00:20:32,680 --> 00:20:36,579
So they'd walk in, maybe make a
purchase, or just walk in and look to
286
00:20:36,580 --> 00:20:40,099
point -of -sales terminal the stores
were using so they could reverse
287
00:20:40,100 --> 00:20:43,839
how to break into the corporate networks
through these different point -of
288
00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:44,890
-sales terminals.
289
00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:51,259
That July, they hit TJX Companies, the
publicly traded parent of Marshalls and
290
00:20:51,260 --> 00:20:52,400
TJ Maxx.
291
00:20:52,840 --> 00:20:57,799
Christopher Scott breaks into two
vulnerable wireless access points at two
292
00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:02,979
Marshall stores along Route 1 in
Florida. Within a matter of weeks, he's
293
00:21:02,980 --> 00:21:09,379
move from there into one of the major
payment card processing servers that TJX
294
00:21:09,380 --> 00:21:10,430
is using.
295
00:21:10,431 --> 00:21:13,529
You have access at that point in time to
the corporate site because now you have
296
00:21:13,530 --> 00:21:18,049
all of these stores that are sending
their daily, weekly, monthly batches all
297
00:21:18,050 --> 00:21:19,849
the way up to the corporate location.
298
00:21:19,850 --> 00:21:24,430
Chris Scott, Gonzales' foot soldier,
explores the network.
299
00:21:24,910 --> 00:21:30,049
He gets increasing amounts of rights or
privileges to move around the system and
300
00:21:30,050 --> 00:21:36,950
discovers a storage location that has 40
or 50 million payment card numbers.
301
00:21:37,090 --> 00:21:39,330
They download that batch of data.
302
00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:41,500
But Gonzalez isn't satisfied.
303
00:21:41,900 --> 00:21:47,379
He wants access to all the numbers
coming into TJX, not just the numbers in
304
00:21:47,380 --> 00:21:54,019
storage. In May 2006, Chris Scott
installs and configures a VPN, or
305
00:21:54,020 --> 00:21:55,500
Virtual Private Network.
306
00:21:56,270 --> 00:21:59,989
Albert's crew had set up a virtual
private network, which is a secure
307
00:21:59,990 --> 00:22:03,590
between TJX's server and one of Albert's
servers.
308
00:22:03,890 --> 00:22:07,589
So whenever they wanted to, they could
just tap that keg, open up the
309
00:22:07,590 --> 00:22:12,630
connection, and let the data stream from
TJX's server right onto Albert's.
310
00:22:13,350 --> 00:22:18,709
Scott then installs a snipper code, the
program that copies numbers while
311
00:22:18,710 --> 00:22:19,909
they're being processed.
312
00:22:19,910 --> 00:22:24,730
It turns out that there's a very tiny
window of time when the...
313
00:22:24,731 --> 00:22:28,959
Credit and debit card numbers aren't
being encrypted when it happens to be in
314
00:22:28,960 --> 00:22:30,580
the open as it's being processed.
315
00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:35,380
And it's during that period that they
make a photocopy of it all for
316
00:22:36,280 --> 00:22:42,819
Using the handle 201679996, Gonzalez
instant messages
317
00:22:42,820 --> 00:22:46,360
Maxim Yastrzemski, his Ukrainian partner
in crime.
318
00:22:47,020 --> 00:22:49,620
In that chat, he mentioned the sniffer
code.
319
00:22:49,940 --> 00:22:52,920
Soon, Yastrzemski could expect more
data.
320
00:22:54,760 --> 00:23:00,019
Business is booming for Gonzalez, whose
crew downloads more than 45 million card
321
00:23:00,020 --> 00:23:01,900
numbers through December 2006.
322
00:23:03,020 --> 00:23:06,859
If you shopped at any of these retail
stores during that period of time,
323
00:23:06,860 --> 00:23:10,359
a very good chance that your credit card
or debit card was compromised.
324
00:23:10,360 --> 00:23:16,539
That Christmas, more than 18 months
after Gonzalez's crew first hit TJX, the
325
00:23:16,540 --> 00:23:20,040
retail giant detects suspicious software
on its systems.
326
00:23:20,660 --> 00:23:23,960
Alarm bells sound, and the feds begin to
investigate.
327
00:23:24,570 --> 00:23:28,869
We didn't know if it was one individual,
if it was several different groups
328
00:23:28,870 --> 00:23:30,710
doing these compromises.
329
00:23:30,910 --> 00:23:34,709
What did we know from the forensics as
to where it was going? Did it look like
330
00:23:34,710 --> 00:23:38,769
anybody else that we'd ever seen? All of
these things were being carefully
331
00:23:38,770 --> 00:23:43,110
followed out, wholly, I'm embarrassed to
say, unsuccessfully.
332
00:23:44,050 --> 00:23:46,130
By January 2007...
333
00:23:47,120 --> 00:23:51,519
Gonzalez has pulled in more than 45
million credit and debit card numbers
334
00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:55,300
TJX, and he decides to get out of the
corporate system.
335
00:23:55,780 --> 00:23:58,820
The trouble is beginning to brew half a
world away.
336
00:23:59,320 --> 00:24:03,539
The Secret Service had been conducting a
totally separate and totally unrelated
337
00:24:03,540 --> 00:24:10,319
investigation into Maxim Yastrzemski for
his international sale of credit and
338
00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:11,380
debit card numbers.
339
00:24:11,740 --> 00:24:15,460
Turkish authorities arrest Maxim
Yastrzemski that July.
340
00:24:16,280 --> 00:24:23,119
That leads to the seizure of a laptop
computer, which the Turks provide to the
341
00:24:23,120 --> 00:24:24,170
Secret Service.
342
00:24:24,180 --> 00:24:29,179
When they opened up his computer, they
found all kinds of things, including
343
00:24:29,180 --> 00:24:34,580
of chat logs with an American who went
by an obscure string of numbers.
344
00:24:35,600 --> 00:24:41,879
201 -67 -9996 is passing on a piece of
software and
345
00:24:41,880 --> 00:24:46,790
says... It's one that I modified for use
in TJX.
346
00:24:47,110 --> 00:24:53,309
And that starts the investigation of who
201 is and how Maxim Yastrzemski
347
00:24:53,310 --> 00:24:57,150
relates to TJX and to other
investigations.
348
00:24:58,150 --> 00:25:03,329
They find further chats about a breach
of Dave & Buster's, the entertainment
349
00:25:03,330 --> 00:25:09,129
chain. Maszak Yastrzemski said he had
another hacker who was into a company
350
00:25:09,130 --> 00:25:10,970
named D &B in the United States.
351
00:25:11,610 --> 00:25:17,389
Yastrzemski had asked 201 to provide a
sniffer code to capture Dave and
352
00:25:17,390 --> 00:25:18,440
credit card data.
353
00:25:18,750 --> 00:25:23,629
That sniffer program was the same
sniffer that was utilized in the TJX
354
00:25:23,630 --> 00:25:30,029
that was our first clue that 201 -67996
may have been involved with TJX. The
355
00:25:30,030 --> 00:25:31,890
feds followed these leads for months.
356
00:25:32,570 --> 00:25:38,069
Just as Gonzales heads into the final
phase of Operation Get Rich, with
357
00:25:38,070 --> 00:25:42,429
Yastrzemski behind bars, Gonzales
decides to keep a closer eye on his
358
00:25:42,430 --> 00:25:45,950
associates, especially Patrick Toohey,
his right -hand man.
359
00:25:46,330 --> 00:25:51,089
It was more important than ever that he
exert as much control as possible over
360
00:25:51,090 --> 00:25:52,140
all of the variables.
361
00:25:52,410 --> 00:25:56,210
In August, Gonzales moves Toohey into
his Miami condo.
362
00:25:56,470 --> 00:26:00,050
It's a far cry from the hotel suites
they've partied in before.
363
00:26:00,051 --> 00:26:04,269
It was a dump. In part, it was because
he wanted to live under the radar,
364
00:26:04,270 --> 00:26:08,009
because he understood from his
experience with law enforcement that
365
00:26:08,010 --> 00:26:10,369
money is one of those things that gives
you away.
366
00:26:10,370 --> 00:26:13,489
It's different, though, from some of the
hackers we've seen in Eastern Europe
367
00:26:13,490 --> 00:26:17,830
where they'll buy a restaurant, they'll
buy a housing project or complex,
368
00:26:17,950 --> 00:26:20,010
they'll buy million -dollar apartments.
369
00:26:20,350 --> 00:26:21,810
That wasn't this crew here.
370
00:26:22,110 --> 00:26:27,789
They might buy a few nice computers or
recreational items, but they're not
371
00:26:27,790 --> 00:26:30,620
living in the million -dollar apartments
in Manhattan.
372
00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:35,799
By late fall, Operation Get Rich
progresses from more driving to more
373
00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:37,640
complicated web -based hacks.
374
00:26:38,440 --> 00:26:43,139
Gonzalez conspires with TUI and two
Russians to commit a series of other
375
00:26:43,140 --> 00:26:47,960
intrusions using a diabolical plan known
as a SQL injection attack.
376
00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:54,439
SQL injection attack is an internet
-based attack on a website that's
377
00:26:54,440 --> 00:26:58,939
-driven. So the most important
difference is you don't need that
378
00:26:58,940 --> 00:27:00,080
proximity anymore.
379
00:27:00,670 --> 00:27:06,129
to conduct these types of remote hacks
into systems. You can be sitting in
380
00:27:06,130 --> 00:27:11,569
and do a SQL injection, internet -based
attack on a computer system in
381
00:27:11,570 --> 00:27:12,620
California.
382
00:27:13,090 --> 00:27:19,409
Coming up, Gonzalez and his co
-conspirators go to the motherlode and
383
00:27:19,410 --> 00:27:23,330
credit card processing company, their
biggest prize yet.
384
00:27:23,530 --> 00:27:25,290
They were in a position to...
385
00:27:26,179 --> 00:27:32,879
accessed tens of millions of payment
card numbers quickly, and that was a
386
00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,459
goose. So the hack is the credit card
processing company. It's like the Holy
387
00:27:36,460 --> 00:27:37,780
Grail at that point in time.
388
00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:47,660
By December 2007,
389
00:27:48,060 --> 00:27:52,680
Operation Get Rich or Die Tryin' has
entered its most ambitious phase yet.
390
00:27:53,280 --> 00:27:57,859
Albert Gonzalez and his co -conspirators
target several companies, including
391
00:27:57,860 --> 00:28:01,820
Heartland Payment Systems, one of the
world's largest payment processors.
392
00:28:02,440 --> 00:28:08,140
We process for about 250 ,000 locations
in America and a few in Canada,
393
00:28:08,320 --> 00:28:12,320
and we process about 4 billion
transactions a year.
394
00:28:12,760 --> 00:28:17,659
Bob Carr is the founder, chairman, and
chief executive officer of Heartland
395
00:28:17,660 --> 00:28:18,710
Payment Systems.
396
00:28:19,340 --> 00:28:25,299
There's no doubt that people who process
billions of transactions are the mother
397
00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:27,200
load of data, that's for sure.
398
00:28:27,560 --> 00:28:32,639
When we were doing our initial public
offering of stock on the roadshow, the
399
00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:36,379
question everyone asked is, what keeps
you awake at night? And my answer was
400
00:28:36,380 --> 00:28:37,900
always getting breached.
401
00:28:38,360 --> 00:28:43,020
But Carr is totally unaware that his
worst nightmare is coming true.
402
00:28:44,140 --> 00:28:47,620
Gonzalez and Patrick Toohey invisibly
hack into Heartland.
403
00:28:48,060 --> 00:28:50,060
using a sequel injection attack.
404
00:28:50,061 --> 00:28:53,739
If I were to walk up to you on the
street and say, can you tell me the
405
00:28:53,740 --> 00:28:54,820
you'd tell me the time.
406
00:28:54,821 --> 00:28:57,899
But if I were to walk up to you on the
street and say, can you tell me your
407
00:28:57,900 --> 00:29:01,339
name, address, social security number
and mother's maiden name, then you're
408
00:29:01,340 --> 00:29:02,099
going to do that.
409
00:29:02,100 --> 00:29:05,059
You're smart enough to know the
difference between information you
410
00:29:05,060 --> 00:29:07,290
out and information you shouldn't give
out.
411
00:29:07,400 --> 00:29:08,540
Whereas with...
412
00:29:08,830 --> 00:29:13,189
A website that's subjected to a SQL
injection attack, it's not programmed to
413
00:29:13,190 --> 00:29:16,949
correctly recognize which commands it
should obey and which commands it should
414
00:29:16,950 --> 00:29:23,150
ignore. They install a sniffer code to
copy data in small, well -timed chunks.
415
00:29:23,151 --> 00:29:27,429
From there, it was a matter of having
that sniffing software work and send the
416
00:29:27,430 --> 00:29:31,150
payment card information, the credit and
debit card information out to...
417
00:29:31,151 --> 00:29:34,739
Hacking platforms in foreign countries
and in the United States that could be
418
00:29:34,740 --> 00:29:39,280
used to receive and store the card data
that was stolen, but also the malware,
419
00:29:39,500 --> 00:29:41,300
the software that was used to sell it.
420
00:29:42,120 --> 00:29:45,480
For months, the hackers tap into
Heartland's network.
421
00:29:45,481 --> 00:29:49,279
You don't want to turn the spigot on the
whole way and just drain the thing
422
00:29:49,280 --> 00:29:53,540
immediately. You want to take a little
bit of time and keep on taking it.
423
00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:58,360
They access more than 130 million credit
and debit card numbers.
424
00:29:58,700 --> 00:30:00,160
These bad guys spent.
425
00:30:00,161 --> 00:30:04,579
Hours and hours and hours for months and
months and months trying to figure out
426
00:30:04,580 --> 00:30:09,039
and customize an attack that would get
through and get into our payments
427
00:30:09,040 --> 00:30:10,900
network, and they were able to do that.
428
00:30:11,580 --> 00:30:16,239
Back at the Secret Service, agents have
been combing through Maxim Yastrzemski's
429
00:30:16,240 --> 00:30:17,290
computer.
430
00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:21,740
They find chats referring to someone
with the initials CJ.
431
00:30:22,600 --> 00:30:24,880
CJ is short for Kumbhajani.
432
00:30:25,420 --> 00:30:31,139
which is the name we had Gonzalez use
when he was an informant in Operation
433
00:30:31,140 --> 00:30:37,259
Firewall. It's a very small connection,
very much at the periphery, but we had
434
00:30:37,260 --> 00:30:41,100
one or two of those little indications
start to unravel.
435
00:30:41,840 --> 00:30:45,959
They also learn the Ukrainian crime lord
has been chatting with a mysterious
436
00:30:45,960 --> 00:30:52,699
American, 201 -67 -9996, who was somehow
involved in the
437
00:30:52,700 --> 00:30:54,180
TJX hack.
438
00:30:55,150 --> 00:31:01,989
201 -679 -996 is connected to an email
address, supnazi at
439
00:31:01,990 --> 00:31:03,330
efnet .ru.
440
00:31:03,630 --> 00:31:09,049
And the Secret Service recognizes that
email address as one that has been used
441
00:31:09,050 --> 00:31:14,850
previously by Albert Gonzalez. For the
first time, there was a major lead.
442
00:31:16,490 --> 00:31:18,900
Shockwaves ripple through the Secret
Service.
443
00:31:18,990 --> 00:31:21,510
Is Gonzalez playing both sides?
444
00:31:22,540 --> 00:31:27,459
While Albert is masterminding this
incredible cybercrime, he is still
445
00:31:27,460 --> 00:31:28,660
an informant for the Fed.
446
00:31:29,860 --> 00:31:34,420
Agents move quickly to secure warrants
to arrest Gonzalez and his crew.
447
00:31:34,800 --> 00:31:36,020
And by now...
448
00:31:36,270 --> 00:31:39,010
Gonzalez knows the heat is coming down.
449
00:31:39,011 --> 00:31:43,009
When you were involved with someone that
gets arrested, you're going to be more
450
00:31:43,010 --> 00:31:47,489
apprehensive. And we had seen in the
chats that 201 person being apprehensive
451
00:31:47,490 --> 00:31:48,570
about that situation.
452
00:31:49,010 --> 00:31:55,969
So he most likely knew from reading
public information about our cases,
453
00:31:55,970 --> 00:31:58,250
things that we were closing in.
454
00:31:58,750 --> 00:32:03,070
On May 7, 2008, after nearly a year
-long investigation,
455
00:32:04,010 --> 00:32:06,150
The feds go after their informant.
456
00:32:06,370 --> 00:32:11,349
These young kids had access to documents
that would allow them to immediately
457
00:32:11,350 --> 00:32:12,400
flee the country.
458
00:32:12,490 --> 00:32:17,449
And we were very, very concerned that
Gonzalez was going to be one of those,
459
00:32:17,450 --> 00:32:20,090
once he was gone, we would never get him
back.
460
00:32:22,610 --> 00:32:29,389
About 150 agents scour Gonzalez's condo,
his parents' house, and several other
461
00:32:29,390 --> 00:32:30,440
residences.
462
00:32:30,910 --> 00:32:32,790
From Gonzalez's condominium.
463
00:32:33,160 --> 00:32:39,339
There was multiple computers and media
that was seized, a large quantity of
464
00:32:39,340 --> 00:32:41,720
from Gonzalez's parents' residence.
465
00:32:41,940 --> 00:32:46,080
We seized a number of computers,
documents, a money counter.
466
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,240
But Gonzalez is nowhere to be found.
467
00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:53,959
When they arrived at the place where
they thought Albert Gonzalez would be,
468
00:32:53,960 --> 00:32:56,459
his parents' house or his girlfriend's
house, he was neither.
469
00:32:56,460 --> 00:32:58,480
And that's when the panic began.
470
00:32:59,420 --> 00:33:03,980
On a tip, they search a suite at the
National Hotel in Miami's South Beach,
471
00:33:04,300 --> 00:33:10,899
where they find Gonzalez, along with two
laptops, $22 ,000 in cash, and a Glock
472
00:33:10,900 --> 00:33:11,980
27 handgun.
473
00:33:12,960 --> 00:33:16,400
They arrest Gonzalez and Christopher
Scott that same day.
474
00:33:16,980 --> 00:33:19,340
Patrick Toohey is arrested soon after.
475
00:33:19,620 --> 00:33:24,079
Patrick knew he was sunk. He knew that
he and the entire operation, they were
476
00:33:24,080 --> 00:33:27,080
just dead meat. He started talking
immediately.
477
00:33:27,900 --> 00:33:32,719
After Albert discovered that Patrick was
cooperating, Albert himself became very
478
00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:37,319
cooperative, and he led them to a lot of
information, including he told them
479
00:33:37,320 --> 00:33:39,970
where the money was buried in his
parents' backyard.
480
00:33:40,900 --> 00:33:45,500
Investigators return to Albert's
childhood home, where they search the
481
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:48,880
They find a barrel buried beneath a palm
tree.
482
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:55,200
Once the earth was unsealed, inside was
over $1 million of vacuum -packed cash.
483
00:33:55,820 --> 00:34:01,420
Gonzalez has stashed $1 .1 million in
plastic bags for safekeeping.
484
00:34:02,000 --> 00:34:05,820
Soon, the feds unearth more secrets
about the case.
485
00:34:06,220 --> 00:34:11,479
When we executed those search warrants,
one of the individuals spoke and said
486
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,719
that Albert Gonzalez used the nickname
Segveg.
487
00:34:15,040 --> 00:34:21,019
And that was the evidence we were
looking for to get us over the edge and
488
00:34:21,020 --> 00:34:22,080
able to indict him.
489
00:34:22,500 --> 00:34:27,259
Segveg. The handle Gonzalez used during
chats with Yastrzemski about Dave and
490
00:34:27,260 --> 00:34:32,238
Busters clinches it for the feds.
Finally, really, we're starting to
491
00:34:32,239 --> 00:34:35,999
understand all these data breaches we
had seen happen over the years. It was
492
00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:37,019
really exciting.
493
00:34:37,020 --> 00:34:38,070
It was shocking.
494
00:34:38,560 --> 00:34:43,819
A few weeks later, the criminal
complaint against Gonzalez is posted
495
00:34:43,820 --> 00:34:45,440
it rocks the hacking underworld.
496
00:34:46,250 --> 00:34:48,750
This is a very close community of
hackers.
497
00:34:48,751 --> 00:34:52,329
These are people you have to remember
who are very alienated from the rest of
498
00:34:52,330 --> 00:34:55,170
society. They feel that all they have is
each other.
499
00:34:55,949 --> 00:35:01,469
24 -year -old Jonathan James, Gonzalez's
former war driver, was shocked to learn
500
00:35:01,470 --> 00:35:04,950
that his boss has been working for the
Secret Service since 2003.
501
00:35:04,951 --> 00:35:08,969
There's just been this nice set of
clicky groups, and you can trust
502
00:35:08,970 --> 00:35:11,440
and now you're like, well, whose side
are you on?
503
00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:16,779
James, who had become famous for hacking
as a teen, believes his friends will
504
00:35:16,780 --> 00:35:17,830
rat him out.
505
00:35:18,440 --> 00:35:23,779
Coming up, James takes matters into his
own hands, and Operation Get Rich or Die
506
00:35:23,780 --> 00:35:25,840
Tryin' takes a deadly turn.
507
00:35:26,420 --> 00:35:31,379
He did not want to have that kind of
heat on him again, and the idea that
508
00:35:31,380 --> 00:35:34,320
were now turning on each other, it was
intolerable to him.
509
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:51,079
In May 2008, with Albert Gonzalez and
his hack pack behind bars, the feds
510
00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:52,300
to shore up their case.
511
00:35:52,780 --> 00:35:56,800
But Jonathan James, one of Gonzalez's
war drivers, is still free.
512
00:35:57,140 --> 00:36:02,319
And he jumps to the conclusion that
Gonzalez is going to set him up. He said
513
00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:07,619
that he was sure that he was going to be
the scapegoat for this crime, given his
514
00:36:07,620 --> 00:36:12,600
notoriety, and also given that he knew
that Albert...
515
00:36:12,601 --> 00:36:16,549
was a government cooperator, and he was
sure that Albert was going to pin the
516
00:36:16,550 --> 00:36:17,600
crime on him.
517
00:36:17,670 --> 00:36:19,970
James pens a letter titled Storytime.
518
00:36:20,230 --> 00:36:23,170
In it, he says he had nothing to do with
the hats.
519
00:36:23,690 --> 00:36:27,649
He couldn't bear the idea that they were
all betraying each other. Once these
520
00:36:27,650 --> 00:36:30,240
hackers turned on each other, they had
nobody left.
521
00:36:30,550 --> 00:36:34,969
Remember, it's not whether you win or
lose, it's whether I win or lose. And
522
00:36:34,970 --> 00:36:40,369
sitting in jail for 20, 10, or even 5
years for a crime I didn't commit is not
523
00:36:40,370 --> 00:36:41,430
me winning.
524
00:36:42,230 --> 00:36:43,280
I die free.
525
00:36:44,250 --> 00:36:50,469
Minutes later, he picks up a handgun,
points it to his temple, and pulls the
526
00:36:50,470 --> 00:36:51,520
trigger.
527
00:36:51,830 --> 00:36:57,009
If he, in fact, played a part in this
crime, he played a very small part, and
528
00:36:57,010 --> 00:37:00,860
it's not clear whether he would have
been indicted had he not killed himself.
529
00:37:02,410 --> 00:37:07,330
The feds file more indictments against
Gonzalez and his crew in August 2008.
530
00:37:08,300 --> 00:37:12,480
And for the first time, the scope of the
crime becomes clear.
531
00:37:12,900 --> 00:37:16,980
We had to keep replacing our press
releases. This is the most significant,
532
00:37:17,240 --> 00:37:21,100
largest data breach we've had. It just
kept building upon itself.
533
00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:24,260
500 ,000 numbers, then a million
numbers.
534
00:37:24,860 --> 00:37:29,140
The first indictment is filed in New
York for the Dave and Buster's breach.
535
00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:31,420
The second in Massachusetts.
536
00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:38,119
for the hacks into TJX companies, BJ's
Wholesale Club, OfficeMax, and several
537
00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:39,170
other businesses.
538
00:37:39,780 --> 00:37:44,900
But despite being in jail, Gonzalez is
still wreaking havoc on the outside.
539
00:37:45,460 --> 00:37:50,759
In October 2008, credit card companies
warned Heartland Payment Systems of
540
00:37:50,760 --> 00:37:52,100
suspicious activity.
541
00:37:52,660 --> 00:37:58,219
We hired forensics companies to help try
to find it. We got a report that there
542
00:37:58,220 --> 00:38:01,110
were no problems found, so we thought we
were in the clear.
543
00:38:01,370 --> 00:38:05,649
When forensics companies tell you that
they can't find anything and they do
544
00:38:05,650 --> 00:38:09,710
for a living, you get some sense of
comfort that there's not a problem.
545
00:38:10,370 --> 00:38:17,049
Three months go by, and in January 2009,
Heartland chiefs get the call they've
546
00:38:17,050 --> 00:38:18,100
been dreading.
547
00:38:18,250 --> 00:38:23,749
Someone had found data in our system
that could not be explained, data that
548
00:38:23,750 --> 00:38:24,769
did not create.
549
00:38:24,770 --> 00:38:29,209
In the next couple of days, we learned
that there was malware that was creating
550
00:38:29,210 --> 00:38:30,260
this data.
551
00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:34,849
And that turned out to be the card
numbers that were put into files that
552
00:38:34,850 --> 00:38:39,789
compressed. I knew it would be
disastrous for a lot of the stockholders
553
00:38:39,790 --> 00:38:40,930
company, including me.
554
00:38:41,870 --> 00:38:45,210
Heartland goes public with news of the
breach days later.
555
00:38:45,650 --> 00:38:50,250
Another big story at 6. A credit card
processing company gets hacked into.
556
00:38:50,690 --> 00:38:55,990
The company's stock plummets from about
$16 a share to less than $4.
557
00:38:56,530 --> 00:38:58,510
But the loss is really much greater.
558
00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:04,919
We've reported losses of $139 million
that we've paid out or booked that we
559
00:39:04,920 --> 00:39:10,979
pay out. So we suffered a net $110
million loss, and we still don't know if
560
00:39:10,980 --> 00:39:15,540
we're finished. We probably are not, but
we think the bulk of it is behind us.
561
00:39:15,740 --> 00:39:18,500
In focus this evening, security in
cyberspace.
562
00:39:18,740 --> 00:39:23,299
A lot of people will look at Heartland,
and they don't want to be the next
563
00:39:23,300 --> 00:39:24,350
headline on CNBC.
564
00:39:24,500 --> 00:39:27,120
So they're going to be quite careful,
too.
565
00:39:27,121 --> 00:39:31,409
improve the standards and make sure that
they're defending themselves.
566
00:39:31,410 --> 00:39:37,389
In August 2009, Gonzalez, Patrick
Toohey, and two unnamed Russian hackers
567
00:39:37,390 --> 00:39:41,849
indicted in New Jersey for conspiring to
break into Heartland and several other
568
00:39:41,850 --> 00:39:46,110
companies. Software has sort of a
digital fingerprint, a kind of digital
569
00:39:46,111 --> 00:39:50,009
And in the process of investigating it,
if it has that same DNA, there's a link
570
00:39:50,010 --> 00:39:51,570
between those two victim sites.
571
00:39:51,870 --> 00:39:53,970
And what we ended up with was...
572
00:39:53,971 --> 00:39:57,919
enough similarities between the five
victim sites to know that we were
573
00:39:57,920 --> 00:39:59,560
with one hacking crew.
574
00:39:59,800 --> 00:40:04,599
But much about the case remains a
mystery, like how many credit card
575
00:40:04,600 --> 00:40:05,519
were stolen.
576
00:40:05,520 --> 00:40:11,939
There were tens of millions more at TJX
and in excess of 100 million at
577
00:40:11,940 --> 00:40:16,280
Heartland that could have been taken,
but nobody knows the exact number.
578
00:40:16,600 --> 00:40:21,220
And how much money Gonzalez and his crew
ultimately earned from their hacks.
579
00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:24,150
They're young kids. They spent a lot of
money.
580
00:40:24,320 --> 00:40:29,480
They spent a lot of money on partying, a
lot of money on drugs, fun nights out,
581
00:40:29,600 --> 00:40:35,639
spending $80 ,000. So it's hard for us
to know if they didn't just spend most
582
00:40:35,640 --> 00:40:36,690
it, too.
583
00:40:37,180 --> 00:40:43,099
Prosecutors do know that victims lose at
least $400 million, and restitution is
584
00:40:43,100 --> 00:40:45,020
set at $172 million.
585
00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:51,240
Gonzalez, with his team, committed the
largest identity theft.
586
00:40:51,840 --> 00:40:55,240
ever prosecuted in the United States and
perhaps the world.
587
00:40:55,440 --> 00:41:02,179
The dollar loss was so large that it
changed the behavior of corporations as
588
00:41:02,180 --> 00:41:06,659
they realized that they had to increase
the level of security because there was
589
00:41:06,660 --> 00:41:08,820
a large dollar risk involved.
590
00:41:09,120 --> 00:41:14,060
So it was changing to the whole culture
in the size of what he did.
591
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:19,840
Patrick Tuohy, Stephen Watt, Chris Scott
and Maxim Yastrzemski.
592
00:41:20,430 --> 00:41:22,990
all served multi -year sentences in
prison.
593
00:41:24,250 --> 00:41:29,509
And as for Gonzalez... He agreed to
plead guilty to all of them and
594
00:41:29,510 --> 00:41:33,850
received a 20 -year sentence to run on
each of them at the same time.
595
00:41:34,290 --> 00:41:40,690
Restitution well in excess of $100
million and forfeiture of jewelry,
596
00:41:40,890 --> 00:41:46,409
computers, and over a million dollars in
cash that had been dug up in his
597
00:41:46,410 --> 00:41:47,460
parents' backyard.
598
00:41:48,040 --> 00:41:52,300
At sentencing, Gonzalez's attorney
argues these were not crimes of greed.
599
00:41:52,700 --> 00:41:57,960
Rather, that Gonzalez suffers from
Asperger's syndrome, a mild form of
600
00:41:58,200 --> 00:42:00,670
which could explain his addiction to
computers.
601
00:42:01,360 --> 00:42:07,399
People with Asperger's are unable to
relate to other people. Whereas Albert
602
00:42:07,400 --> 00:42:09,160
a natural leader.
603
00:42:09,380 --> 00:42:15,919
He, by definition, could relate to other
people, size them up, negotiate with
604
00:42:15,920 --> 00:42:20,099
them. squeeze work product out of them.
He was the exact opposite of somebody
605
00:42:20,100 --> 00:42:21,150
with Asperger's.
606
00:42:21,420 --> 00:42:25,360
Court -appointed psychologists find no
evidence of the disorder.
607
00:42:25,900 --> 00:42:31,799
These guys spent a lot of time on their
computers, but so does about half to two
608
00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:35,040
-thirds of all the students at nearby
MIT.
609
00:42:35,360 --> 00:42:39,479
So the fact that you spend a lot of time
on your computer as a kid, that you
610
00:42:39,480 --> 00:42:43,240
communicate with others on your
computers, does not justify crime.
611
00:42:44,340 --> 00:42:50,369
In the end, What begins as teenagers
hacking for fun soon becomes the
612
00:42:50,370 --> 00:42:54,710
cybercrime in history, an operation that
lives up to its name.
613
00:42:55,290 --> 00:43:00,989
When Albert called this caper Operation
Get Rich or Die Trying, I'm sure he
614
00:43:00,990 --> 00:43:02,959
didn't actually intend for anyone to
die.
615
00:43:02,960 --> 00:43:07,510
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