Original subtitles

New South Wales, Australia. 2020.

After dropping a load of fire retardant...

- The load is away.

- Firefighters on the ground

witness the unthinkable.

- Whoa! - AC 1-30 firebomber crashes,

killing all three crew members.

- It's a guttural, visceral loss.

- Investigators must determine the cause of the crash

within an active fire zone.

- Look at that. Complete destruction.

- And they must do it without a Flight Data Recorder

or a cockpit voice recorder.

- This is a lot of important data

that we did not have access to.

- But fellow pilots do provide valuable insight.

- I didn't think it was safe. I rejected the task.

- Why was the fire bomber even out there?

- Mayday, Mayday!

- Pull up!

Coulson Aviation B 1-3-7

is circling above a wildfire

near Adaminaby, Australia.

- Two thousand feet. - Copy. Two thousand feet.

Let's make another turn and see what we can see.

- Coulson Aviation is one of the world's

leading aerial firefighting companies.

Headquartered in British Columbia, Canada,

they operate a fleet of fixed and rotary-wing

firefighting aircraft around the world.

- The majority of aerial firefighters

are private companies,

and they are contracted by the government.

- Visibility is still pretty bad.

I think we're going to need a closer look.

- Yeah. I'm going to take her down to 1,000 feet.

- The crew of the 7-37 is searching for somewhere

to drop 4,000 gallons of fire retardant.

- Descending to 1,000 feet.

- So they're looking for that sweet spot.

They're looking for the perfect drop altitude

with the perfect line to be able to drop

that retardant right where the firefighter needs it.

- The 7-37's mission

is just one battle in a much bigger war.

- The Black Summer fires were some of the worst

that Australia has seen.

New South Wales was the hardest hit state.

They suffered a loss of 21% of its alpine vegetation,

which encompassed over 68,000 acres of burned area.

It challenged everybody in the fire services,

in aerial firefighting

in ways that they have never been challenged before.

- Air crews from the United States

and around the world respond to the call for help

and join their Australian counterparts

to battle the wildfires.

As the crew prepares,

they get as low as they can to make a drop.

- Descending to 800 feet.

- 800 feet.

- Whoa. We've got wind shear.

- There's been a rapid change in wind speed and direction.

- Affirmative. - Increasing thrust.

Climbing.

- In aerial firefighting,

you've got to get very low and very slow,

and at times you'll all of a sudden get hit

by a gust that you weren't expecting.

- Alright. I think we got her back under control.

- Aerial firefighting pilots face unique challenges

compared to your average, everyday pilot.

That's why they are so experienced

and so skilled in what they do.

- Alright, can you get us direct to base?

- After almost 30 minutes of difficult flying

in dangerous conditions,

the crew decides not to return to the fire in Adaminaby.

- Heading set for return to Richmond air base.

- Auto-pilot on.

You know what, though? We need to contact Fire Control,

and the bird dog.

Everybody needs to know that conditions out there

are deteriorating rapidly.

- Agreed. A hundred per cent.

- The crew sends out a warning about the conditions

to the control center and their lead plane.

- There's often what's called a "bird dog"

or a lead plane, which is a much smaller aircraft,

more nimble, a very experienced pilot

who can better assess the drop for the tanker pilot,

before the tanker pilot even arrives.

Coulson B 1-3-4 en route

to Adaminaby.

- Did you hear that? B 1-3-4?

- The pilots of the 7-37

overhear another Coulson aircraft

headed to the fire zone they just abandoned.

- Uh, B 1-3-4, this is B 1-3-7, do you read?

- Coulson B-1-3-4, a modified Hercules C-1-30

with a crew of three,

is approaching the fire in Adaminaby.

- Good afternoon, B 1-3-7.

B 1-3-4, reading you loud and clear.

- The pilot-in-command is 45-year-old Ian McBeth.

He's flown nearly 1,000

firefighting missions like this one.

We just did a drop at Adaminaby.

Conditions are very bad.

We had some crazy wind, and visibility is really poor.

You can go take a look, but I'm not going back there.

- Copy that, B 1-3-7.

We'll assess conditions carefully.

Thanks for the warning.

- Communications in aerial firefighting

is an integral part of the overall firefight

for weather conditions and changes on the fire ground.

- The C 1-30 co-pilot is 42-year-old Paul Hudson,

a former U.S. Marine pilot.

43-year-old Flight Engineer Rick DeMorgan

is on leave from active duty in the United States Air Force.

- If you were to put together the perfect crew

for the type of thing that 1-34 was fighting,

you would get these guys, or somebody exactly like them.

- Now approaching the target area in Adaminaby,

the crew descends to 25-hundred feet

and begins a circuit pattern.

- Hoo-boy. There's that chop B 1-3-7

was talking about.

- And no doubt this wind will be pushing the smoke

all over the fire ground.

Visibility is terrible.

- Another day at the office, right, fellas?

Well, let's take her down to 2,000 feet,

get a closer look.

- Despite the other crew's warnings,

McBeth wants to assess conditions for himself.

- Aerial firefighters are a unique breed

in that they're highly experienced pilots

before they ever get behind the controls

of an aerial firefighting aircraft.

They are already people who conduct risk assessments.

They're people that know how to handle

a crisis situation.

- Coming around for one more circuit.

- Though the conditions seem dire,

a C 1-30 fire bomber like B 1-3-4

is modified for such extreme conditions.

- The C 1-30 is an amazing aircraft.

It's a robust, strong airplane

that was built to haul and deliver a lot of cargo

and a lot of weight. They make wonderful air-tankers.

- C 1-30 air tankers are retrofitted

with structural reinforcements in their fuselage

to accommodate tanks that carry more than

16 tons of fire retardant.

- Having four big engines on the C-130 like that,

it is wonderful to be able to power out of something

if you find yourself in a position to be in trouble.

- But no aircraft is invulnerable,

and for professional flight crews,

safety is a priority.

- The 7-37 crew was dead right. These winds are too crazy.

Alright, I'm calling this one off.

I'll notify Fire Control.

Cooma FCC, Coulson B 1-3-4.

Go ahead, Coulson B 1-3-4.

- Cooma FCC, conditions at Adaminaby

too smoky and windy.

There's no way to make a drop here.

- Copy that, Coulson B 1-3-4.

The Fire Control Centre in Cooma, Australia

serves as a local base for the New South Wales

Rural Fire Service.

It coordinates firefighting efforts in the area,

both on the ground and in the air.

- B 1-3-4, we're sending through coordinates

for an alternative target at Peak View.

Standby.

Your new heading is zero-eight-five.

- Copy that, Cooma FCC, zero-eight-five.

Proceeding to Peak View.

The C 1-30 is directed to another fire.

- New heading is set.

- Alright, Plan B. Here we go.

- When you've got a crew assessing the situation

and saying it's a little bit too windy,

it's a little bit too smoky, uh, let's not drop here,

it's a good thing to have the ability to go

onto another location.

- The C 1-30 is re-routed

to an area 58 kilometers to the east of Adaminaby

known as Peak View,

a remote area of hills and farmland

running up to a mountain ridge.

- Alright, let's see what we've got here.

There, along that ridgeline,

if we aim for the east side.

- I see it. Yeah, that could work.

- Let's get a closer look.

Starting first circuit now.

- Following standard procedure,

the C 1-30 flies several low altitude circuits

over the fire ground.

- There's a multitude of factors

that air-tanker pilots look at when they go into a fire.

We're talking about the fire behavior.

We're talking about the weather.

What are my escape routes like?

- Alright, that's three circuits.

I'd say we're good to drop just east of that ridge there.

Agreed? - Yes, sir.

- Good to go.

Standby. Descending towards drop area.

- Now all that's needed is for the C 1-30

to get in close enough to make a successful drop.

The crew of Bomber 1-3-4

prepares to drop a load of fire retardant

on a wildfire near Peak View, Australia.

- Okay, there's our line.

Release point in sight.

Rolling in on final.

- Passing through 400 feet.

300.

Standby to drop.

- Hang on. Almost there.

- Probably the most critical time in this whole process

is on the drop, because you're losing

a lot of weight in the airplane, which means the aerodynamics

of the airplane are gonna be different.

You're gonna need to climb fast.

- We are at 200 feet. Clear to drop.

- Dropping. Dropping. Load is away.

- As soon as the C 1-30 drops its load of fire retardant...

- Climb thrust, flaps 50.

- Flaps 50.

- ...the crew tries to regain altitude.

- Whoa! Hang on.

Come on.

- Still not gaining altitude.

- But the plane won't climb.

Bomber 1-3-4 has crashed into the Australian bush.

- Tragically, there appears to be no survivors

as a result of the crash.

- The aerial firefighter community is very small

and it's a guttural, visceral loss.

- If we could just have a minute silence.

- When I got the call that Bomber 1-34 had crashed,

near Cooma, New South Wales,

a Hercules, a C 1-30 is a very reliable airplane,

and I honestly couldn't believe it.

- So, how far is the crash site from Cooma?

- The Australian Transport Safety Bureau,

or ATSB, is alerted to the disaster immediately.

- About 35 miles northeast, near Peak View.

- I know that area. That's pretty remote.

- It's surrounded by brush fires.

We've a few teams dispatched to the area.

- It was located on a single direction access road

that was impacted by fire a number of times

during our on-site activities.

- So, the firebomber is a modified C 1-30.

What do we know about its history?

- While investigators wait for updates from the crash site,

they look into the plane's history for anything

that could explain the crash.

- Alright, here's the certificate

of airworthiness.

Looks like everything is in accordance with FAA standards.

- And according to the aircraft specs,

it was converted to fire bomber in 2018.

Since then, it's accrued 683 hours

of firefighting operations.

- And it had an inspection just yesterday.

- Any issues?

- Nothing significant.

- A review of the aircraft's maintenance logbooks

and worksheets showed that there was no pre-existing

defects prior to the flight departing.

So we were now looking at something happening

during the flight that we had to consider.

- Investigators continue to sift through the aircraft's records.

- Take a look at this.

The C 1-30 was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder,

but no Flight Data Recorder.

Nor was it required to have one.

- Really? Well, that makes it more challenging.

- Where aircraft are fitted with a Flight Data Recorder,

this gives investigators a huge amount of information

that can be used to determine aircraft performance.

This is a lot of important data that we did not have access to.

- Thank you.

- Footage from the New South Wales Police

gives investigators a bird's-eye-view

of the severity of the crash.

- Look at that.

- The scale of devastation was incredible to see.

It was a shocking sight.

All that was recognizable while approaching

was that tail and the aft section.

Everything forward of the back of the wing

was in multiple pieces throughout the site.

- So the first point of impact is here.

It clipped a tree.

Then the wreckage extends all the way up to here.

- Investigators discover that after impact,

the wreckage slid 600 feet uphill.

- It must have come in pretty steep

for that kind of damage.

- It was evident that the aircraft

had come in quite heavy.

We're talking a lot of energy here.

- So what could have caused the devastating crash?

- Investigating an accident like this,

we start to sort of think about

what could possibly have gone wrong?

Are we looking at an engineering issue here?

Are we looking at an operational issue here?

Or are we looking, even, at an environmental issue?

- With that level of devastation,

we have to consider a structural problem.

- Agreed.

Did the Coulson C 1-30 experience

a structural failure

prior to crashing violently into the ground?

- One of the fundamental things we have to determine,

is all the aircraft on the site?

- So the cockpit was torn away and the nose is here.

- We have to locate, effectively, the four corners

of the aircraft to determine that all the components

of the C 1-30 were on site.

- There's evidence of the left wing tip...

and the right...

And, of course, the tail.

It's all there.

- The C 1-30 did not suffer

any kind of structural failure prior to impact.

- If there had've been an in-flight break up,

there would have been pieces of the aircraft that

weren't in the wreckage site.

They would have been further back along the flight path.

- Look at this.

We've got retardant at the site.

- So they only released a partial load,

which means they were carrying extra weight.

- Typically, the flight crew are trained

if they do run into any emergency situation

to dump that retardant.

This would increase the aircraft's performance.

- Why didn't the crew release its remaining fire retardant?

- It could be a factor if they were struggling

to regain altitude.

- Whoa. Hang on.

Come on.

- Still not gaining altitude.

- We've got something.

- Several days after the crash

of the Coulson fire bomber,

the investigation receives unexpected evidence.

- Eyewitness video from the RFS.

- A firefighter with the RFS,

or Rural Fire Service,

captured the final seconds of the C 1-30 on video.

- We were provided with a witness video

which had captured the last 25 seconds

of the aircraft's flight.

Whoa!

- You see it coming in low.

It drops the fire retardant.

- And then it looks like it starts to climb.

- Right.

And for some reason, it doesn't regain altitude.

All of a sudden...

Whoa!

- The witness videos essentially provided

an unedited version of the aircraft's final movement.

A short time after the retardant drop,

the aircraft became obscured by smoke.

- I think there's more we can do with this video.

- Typically, when we receive a witness video,

we're able to use basic photogrammetry on determining

the aircraft attitude. In this case,

we're using new software that we had just got access to.

Will video analysis software provide investigators

with more information about how and why

the Coulson fire bomber crashed?

- The use of the 3D tracking software

allowed us to look at the witness video

in a lot more detail. We could look at the aircraft's,

uh, attitude. We could look at the pitch

and roll angles to get a better sense

of what was happening.

- Okay, that's everything.

- At the beginning of the drop, the pitch is level

with a slight left bank.

- It seems pretty normal.

- After the drop, the plane is banked left

and pitched up. - They're climbing out.

- For 10 seconds following the drop,

we could see that the aircraft had established

a positive rate of climb

up to about 170 feet above the drop height.

- And through the remaining images,

the plane appears to be sinking.

It looks like a stall.

- All the signs are there.

- The witness video showed that the aircraft's

final movements were consistent with an aerodynamic stall

in terms of the aircraft stopped climbing

and the rolling movement of the aircraft.

However, without a Flight Data Recorder,

we were unable to confirm with a degree of certainty

that the aircraft had stalled.

- The question is...

Did it stall and if so, why?

Will the wreckage of the Coulson C 1-30

support the ATSB's theory that the fire bomber stalled?

- Excellent. The Cockpit Voice Recorder?

Let's get that to HQ for download, straight away.

- Finding the cockpit voice recorder gave us

an opportunity to understand

the crew's communications within the cockpit.

- While data from the Cockpit Voice Recorder,

or CVR, is processed,

investigators examine the engines.

- Thanks for coming in.

- An expert from the engine manufacturer,

Rolls Royce, assists with the examination.

- Were the engines operating?

Were they operating comparably

across all four of them?

And is an engine failure

why this aircraft stopped flying?

- As you can see, there's pretty heavy impact

and fire damage. - Well, let's have a look.

Have a look at that.

- The compressor blades are badly damaged.

And that looks like molten metal.

- All signs of engine ingestion.

- There was a significant explosion and fireball

when this aircraft impacted the ground.

The evidence of molten metal inside the compressor casing

was indicative that the engines were operating

when this fireball occurred.

The engines had ingested the fire

and the broken bits of metal.

- I just got confirmation from our wreckage team,

the flaps were at 50.

That's the right configuration for climb out.

- So we've ruled out engine failure

and improper configuration as causes for a stall.

- Normally, we would have airspeed

and engine parameter data from the Flight Data Recorder,

but because we didn't, we had to come up

with different ways to determine

if the aircraft aerodynamically stalled.

- Let's look at the CVR transcript.

- Will it explain what could have caused

the C 1-30 to stall?

- Training exercise? What is this?

- This is not our flight.

It looks like it's from a previous flight in California.

- Nine months prior to the accident flight,

the inertia switch had activated during the hard landing.

This meant that the recording device

stopped recording any further information.

- With no CVR or FDR available,

investigators turn to what data they do have.

- Okay. According to the equipment list,

the C 1-30 was equipped with two tracking devices:

The ADS-B and SKYTRAC.

- ADS-B and SKYTRAC

are two onboard positioning systems

that transmit the plane's location

and other data to satellites

and ground stations in real time.

- At the very least, that'll give us a flight path.

- And perhaps more evidence of a stall.

- We had to look at alternative ways

to start looking at the aircraft performance.

This included other real time tracking data

that was available to us.

- I've got the data.

- So, they approach the area at 2,000 feet.

They complete their first circuit at 15-hundred feet.

Second circuit at 500 feet.

Final circuit, 1,000 feet.

- They're doing a proper survey of the situation.

- This is really to assess the weather conditions

at that lower level...

- Okay, so what about the drop itself?

...before they drop into the higher risk

200-foot altitude.

- They make the drop at 200 feet,

and then they climb up to 370.

- They're at a very low altitude.

Three seconds later...

- What airspeed would the plane have to be flying

in order to stall if it was in a climb out configuration?

While the tracking data further supports

the enhanced witness video,

can it reveal if the plane was flying so slowly

that it stalled?

- An airplane has a specific stall speed

for specific configurations:

flaps up, flaps down, and particular weight.

- That's flaps, 50.

Weight, 131,000 pounds

after a partial retardant drop.

- Investigators start by calculating the stall speed

of a C 1-30 on climb out.

- We'll need to factor in some turbulence

near the drop area.

- Turbulence introduces the possibility that

you're gonna have a sudden updraft or a sudden downdraft

and it's going to affect your altitude and your attitude.

- Alright, let's start with moderate turbulence

with a load factor from 0.5 Gs to 0.99 Gs.

- They factor in different levels of turbulence

likely present at the time of the incident.

- And severe turbulence up to 1.99 Gs.

- The higher the turbulence,

the higher your airspeed needs to be

to ensure that you don't stall.

- Alright, that should do it.

So in moderate turbulence, the C 1-30 stall speed

is between 101 and 117 knots.

In severe turbulence, it's between 117 and 143 knots.

- Was the C 1-30 flying at a stall speed

between 101 and 143 knots,

causing it to plummet to the ground?

- Pull up the groundspeed from the tracking data?

- To determine if the C 1-30 was flying at stall speed,

investigators examine the groundspeed

recorded in the tracking data.

- We didn't have the airspeed,

and therefore, had to estimate it

based on ground speeds that had been recorded.

- Okay... Groundspeed for the C 1-30

is 144 knots before they dropped the retardant,

increasing to 151 knots before impact.

- Alright. Now let's factor in the windspeed.

- We knew that they were flying in hazardous

environmental conditions which included gusting

and changing wind conditions,

and this then posed a challenge for us

to determine what the airspeed was.

- Airspeed measures a plane's speed relative

to the air it's flying through.

- That's the weather at Peak View,

less than a mile from the crash site.

- We've got a lot of turbulence

with winds gusting from the north-west...

15, 30, and 40 knots.

Pull up the aerial image from the crash site.

What direction was the C 1-30 flying?

- Right after the drop, the C 1-30 was flying

south, south-east.

- With winds from the north-west,

that would mean they would have had a tailwind.

- A tail wind as high as 40 knots.

That's extreme.

It sounds like wind shear.

- Wind shear is a sudden change in the wind's direction

or speed resulting in drastic changes to a plane's airspeed.

At low altitudes, it can be deadly.

- If you have a sudden tail wind,

that's going to rob you of airspeed.

And you may have a struggle staying in the air.

- Alright, we've got the windspeed.

Now let's calculate the airspeed.

- To calculate the C 1-30's airspeed,

investigators also factor in other weather data on the day.

- Temperature. Atmospheric pressure.

- The airspeed was between 100 and 123 knots

in the last 20 seconds of flight.

- There it is. The C 1-30's airspeed

falls within its stall speed in those conditions.

- The team concludes the plane

was hit by wind shear...

- Whoa, hang on.

- ...that resulted in a sudden increase in tailwind...

- Still not gaining altitude.

- ...which robbed the plane of vital airspeed

and caused it to stall.

- Here's what's troubling.

Many planes experience wind shear events

and don't crash. So why did the C 1-30?

Investigators examine Coulson's

onboard safety features

to determine if their pilots were equipped

with a warning system that could have helped them

recover from wind shear events.

- It looks like some of the Coulson aircraft

like the 7-37

have an onboard wind shear warning system.

- Oh. We've got wind shear.

Wind shear. Wind shear.

Wind shear.

- Affirmative. - Terrain. Terrain.

Pull up.

- Anytime you can put something in the cockpit

that is going to give you the capability

of identifying wind shear,

or the potential for wind shear, it is a win.

Did the Coulson C 1-30 firebomber

also have a wind shear warning system?

- The C 1-30 did not have a wind shear warning system.

- The C 1-30 H model aircraft

was built in the early '80s.

- Whoa. Hang on.

- Coulson believed that their highly experienced pilots

would be better able to identify wind shear

than an onboard warning system.

- Wind shear!

Wind shear.

- They are trained to recognize the onset

of wind shift through the degradation

of the aircraft performance.

- Come on. Come on.

- A wind shear warning at a higher altitude

would have allowed the crews to immediately respond

to the situation. But if such a warning occurred

at a low altitude,

there may not have been sufficient time

for the crew to recover.

- We're at 200 feet. Clear to drop.

- Dropping. Dropping. Load is away.

- Investigators conclude that wind shear warning or not,

at such a low altitude...

- Whoa! Hang on.

Come on.

- ...with 25,000 pounds

of fire retardant still onboard...

- Still not gaining altitude.

- ...the C-130 firebomber was just too heavy...

- If all the retardant had been dumped,

it would have increased the aircraft's performance

by about 50%.

- ...and lost too much airspeed

from the extreme wind shear event.

- Wind shear. Maximum thrust.

- As a result of flying into a combination

of wind shear and tailwind

at low altitude and a relatively slow speed,

the aircraft performance decayed into the stall region...

- We're stalling.

- ...resulting in the aircraft colliding with terrain.

- But understanding why the C 1-30 crashed

doesn't entirely explain the accident.

- Given the dangerous conditions,

why was the firebomber even out there?

- As aerial firefighting is operating

within a very dynamic environment,

it's important that any new information

or changing information is communicated

to ensure that the safety of flight

and the operation as a whole

is maintained to a high standard.

- Investigators examine the vast communication network

involved in monitoring and dispatching firefighters

the day the C 1-30 crashed.

- Who knew what and when?

- There is a large number of individuals

at various different locations all with different information.

- What were the pilots told

about weather conditions in the drop zones?

- There were three planes tasked to Adaminaby

on the day of the crash.

First, the 7-37 departs at 11:27 AM.

- And what time did the C 1-30 depart?

It departed at 12:05 PM.

- And the bird dog's departure?

What is it?

At 12:04 PM,

virtually the same time the C 1-30 departed,

the bird dog declined the task.

- We had learned through the investigation

that the bird dog pilot assigned to Adaminaby

had rejected that tasking.

- But why?

- Why did you reject the tasking?

Investigators speak with the bird dog pilot

to understand why he refused the assignment.

- I was in the Snowy Mountains a couple weeks earlier.

- There was heavy turbulence.

The bird dog pilot experienced a downdraft

and an uncommanded 30 to 40 degree roll.

- You were able to recover?

- Barely. I had to execute an escape maneuver.

- So tell me about the day of the accident.

- The forecast

and the conditions were even worse.

I didn't think it was safe, I rejected the task.

- You told the Richmond Air Base manager.

Did you tell anyone else?

- I thought they would inform the other aircraft.

- The bird dog pilot expected that their decision

not to fly and to reject the task

based on the weather would be communicated

to other crews who were going to operate in that same area.

- The Richmond Airbase informed the State Air Desk

that the bird dog rejected the task,

but did the State Air Desk tell other crews?

- They didn't tell the 7-37 or the C 1-30.

- What time did the 7-37 leave Adaminaby?

12:25 PM.

- Did they return to the area?

- It doesn't look like it.

But the conditions were really bad.

- The pilot-in-command warned the bird dog

of the conditions and that they wouldn't

be returning to the area.

- Well that's not all. They also reported the situation

to Cooma Fire Control.

- Uh, Cooma FCC, this is B 1-3-7.

Conditions in Adaminaby are dangerous.

Cancel all aircraft operating in the area.

- They even radioed the Richmond Air Base.

Investigators learn the 7-37 made multiple efforts

to advise others of the dangers in Adaminaby.

- Did anyone inform the C 1-30 of those messages?

- Not the Richmond Air Base, not the State Air Desk.

No official body told the C 1-30 that conditions were worsening.

- While there was a lot of information

that was being shared with all the flight crews

on that particular day,

there were missed opportunities to provide the crew

of bomber 1-3-4 with a lot more information

about what was happening in this area.

- It looks like the 7-37 overheard the C 1-30

on the approach frequency and reached out to them.

- We just did a drop.

Conditions are very bad. We had some crazy wind

and visibility is really poor.

You can go take a look, but I'm not going back there.

- Copy that, B 1-3-7.

We'll assess conditions carefully.

Thanks for the warning.

Despite warnings about the conditions

at Adaminaby proving to be correct...

- The 7-37 crew was dead right.

Cooma FCC, there's no way to make a drop here.

- Copy that.

- ...the crew of B 1-3-4 was sent

to a second location just 10 minutes away at Peak View.

- Your new heading is zero-eight-five.

- Copy that Cooma FCC. Zero-eight-five.

- Even though it was the C 1-30 crew's decision,

they didn't get a complete picture of the risky conditions

they were flying into.

- If additional sources had warned the C 1-30

of the conditions in the area,

the crew may have rejected the task at Peak View.

- The ability of flight crews to make the most informed

decision about the safety of continuing these operations

in a high-risk environment relies on clear,

solid communication of all of the available information,

whether that be from local crews and their activities

or from task rejections based on previous experience.

- In the ATSB's final report,

they make many detailed recommendations,

including fitting wind shear warning systems

on all C 1-30 firebombers.

Above all, the ATSB highlights the need for new procedures

for making risk-based decisions.

- Aerial firefighting pilots are not reckless individuals.

They're very smart and methodical.

This is definitely a brotherhood of pilots.

And I believe that in aerial firefighting,

when a pilot's lost, it's not only felt

by one person and their family,

the families of the pilots, the company,

but it's felt throughout the whole industry.

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