Original subtitles

- I remember being amazed how quickly

the accident took place.

They were flying and the next thing you know,

the airplane's lost.

Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5

crashes seconds after taking off from Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

All 31 people on board are killed.

And what do you say to the public

about the crashes that we've been having?

1985 becomes one of the deadliest years

in civil aviation.

It's up to investigators to put the public at ease.

- This is how the plane hit the ground.

When they examine the engines,

they find a component prone to failure.

Well, when we had heard that this part

had failed 45 times before, that's a big deal.

But the flight data turns the investigation on its head.

- So the ruptured right engine didn't bring down this plane.

- It did not.

- Mayday! Mayday!

There are 27 passengers boarding

Midwest Express Airlines Flight 1-0-5,

a commuter flight from Milwaukee, to Atlanta.

Many are employees

of the manufacturer Kimberley Clark.

- Midwest Express Airlines used the slogan:

"Best Care in the Air," and they really meant it

because they had as close to an all-business aircraft

as you could have.

- Treats for when we're airborne.

- And they also baked fresh cookies on board

and made the place smell amazing when you walked on.

- Midex 1-0-5 requesting IFR clearance to Atlanta.

Both pilots on this flight are captains

with the airline.

They've already flown two flights together today.

- Midex 1-0-5, cleared to Atlanta,

climb and maintain 5000.

- Climb and maintain 5000. Midex 1-0-5.

For this leg of the flight,

Danny Martin will be the acting captain

and Bill Weiss, the first officer.

- You had two captains and they... they literally

could switch seats because of that.

And they did do that over the course of two days,

flipping out who was the pilot flying

and who was the pilot not flying.

- Uh, our alternate will be DCA if we can't make Atlanta.

There are thunderstorms in Atlanta,

so the crew has taken on additional fuel

in case they have to divert to another airport.

- Takeoff weight is 7-7-1-2-2 pounds. Set stab trim 2.2.

Just past 3 in the afternoon,

the pilots start the engines.

- Starting number one.

The DC-9 used for today's flight

is powered by two Pratt and Whitney engines

mounted on the fuselage at the rear of the plane.

- Because the engines were in the back,

they were close together, which made for a little bit easier

flying in emergency situations.

Second of all, for the passengers, it's quieter.

- Thank you.

Can I put that up here for you?

Thank you.

The plane is loaded and ready to depart on schedule.

- Airspeed bug, 1-33 set.

And, ah, 1.9 on the EPR

- Okay.

Ladies and gentlemen,

we are number one for departure so we should be airborne

within one minute.

Flight attendants please be seated.

- Midex 1-0-5 cleared for takeoff.

- Midex 1-0-5.

- Here we go. Spooling up.

- This was a very normal morning,

for a very normal flight.

It was a gorgeous blue sky, September day.

There was a little bit of gusty winds,

but it was nothing for Milwaukee.

- Power normal. One hundred.

The pilots need to reach a speed of 127 knots for take-off.

- V-1. Rotate.

At 3:21 in the afternoon,

Flight 1-0-5 begins its journey.

The flight plan calls for the plane to climb

to an altitude of 33 000 feet for the 2-hour trip to Atlanta.

- Gear Up.

Just 450 feet above the ground...

What the hell was that?

...the pilots lose power in one of the engines.

- It's a critical situation because if you don't do

something about it immediately, you won't have time

to do anything about it. Altitude is your friend.

Midex 1-0-5,

turn left heading 1-7-5.

- What have we got here, Bill? Here!

- Midex 1-0-5 roger, ah we got an emergency here.

- Midex 1-0-5, roger.

The plane begins rolling to the right

and dropping.

- Oh crap!

The DC-9 is stalling.

- Get your heads down.

Heads down! Heads down!

Less than a minute after takeoff,

Flight 1-0-5 is diving towards the ground

at more than 170 miles an hour.

The plane hits the ground

less than 17-hundred feet from the runway.

- A DC-9 has crashed southwest of runway 1-9-right.

All 31 people on board have been killed.

The crash of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5

is the third major accident in the United States this year

and the eighth accident worldwide.

With more than 12-hundred people killed, this is becoming

one of the deadliest years in the history

of civil aviation.

Passengers are unnerved.

Everyone says: "My God, another one."

What do you say to the public about the crashes

that we've been having?

- Well, insofar as the National Transportation Safety Board

is concerned, we are sparing no effort to determine the cause

of each one of them and we will make the necessary

recommendations to keep any repeat of any one of them

from happening.

- Can you show me where it started to bank?

Investigators from the NTSB begin by interviewing

witnesses of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5's fatal dive.

They either came forward or we tracked them down.

We ended up making out a questionnaire

with 40 or 50 questions on it to kind of cover all the bases.

- OK, got it.

While the witness accounts differ in detail,

they all describe more or less the same thing.

- I saw a couple of puffs of black smoke come out

and I, I just figured that they had gunned the engines

a little bit. An instant later the left wing rolls up

and it tipped over and it went nose first into the trees here.

Most of the witnesses agree that takeoff

appeared normal until the airplane was about 300 feet

from the ground.

Almost all report smoke and fire coming from the right engine

several remember loud bangs.

Most said that the plane then rolled abruptly

into a steep right bank, went into a nose-low spin and crashed.

- The value of having so many witness statements

to look at was that they gave us a picture of what happened

right at the end, a loss of control, a fire,

and, of course, the impact itself.

Investigators must now determine

what could have caused such a catastrophic loss of control

so soon after takeoff.

- I'm guessing this was made by the right wing.

- Yup, agreed.

- Let's see what we can figure out.

After securing the crash site

of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5, investigators begin mapping

the wreckage field.

I think the whole length of the impact site

was about 295 feet, not much more than two times

the length of the airplane.

So the airplane hit pretty steeply and didn't go very far.

- Right-wing tip here, and horizontal stabilizer here.

This is how the plane hit the ground.

A 90-degree right roll, and a right yaw.

Can you grab a picture? - You got it.

The wreckage path confirms eyewitness reports.

It very definitely indicates right up front

that you've got a loss of control.

It doesn't suggest why you had the loss of control.

It kind of opens the door to a lot of different

investigative avenues.

- Yeah, it's fire damage for sure, but it looks like

all the pieces are here.

Investigators study the plane's control surfaces,

starting with the ailerons.

The ailerons on each wing direct the plane's roll.

If an aileron malfunctions and gets stuck in one position,

it could cause a devastating lack of control.

- Control tabs are in place. They seem to be intact.

We didn't find a problem with other components

that are part of that system.

With the ailerons ruled out,

investigators turn their attention

to the rudder system.

- The dampers are still working. The hinges are intact.

The fractures look like overload, not stress.

I don't think the rudder is our culprit.

- We didn't find anything wrong with any

of the control systems based on that preliminary look-see.

Could the engines provide insight into the crash

of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5?

If the engines were, well, obviously banged up,

they were fire-damaged, and they were along

the wreckage path, which is always good,

it means they didn't fall off somewhere earlier.

- There's a spacer missing here.

And most of the blades from this stage are gone.

The team finds damage inside the right engine

that could not have been caused on impact.

The missing engine pieces include a spacer

and the compressor blades

from the 9th and 10th compressor stages.

They're found more than half a mile

from the main wreckage site.

- Finding any part of the airplane

short of where the airplane crashed was a suggestion

of a malfunction or failure that had occurred in-flight

and required further investigation.

The engine and the pieces are moved

to a nearby warehouse where they can be more closely examined.

In the end, though, we ended up finding

about 90% by weight of the spacer,

so, that was a big boon to the investigation.

Investigators study the recovered spacer

to determine why it failed on Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5.

- All along the pedestal, here.

It's definitely not overstress.

They discover a tell-tale crack on the spacer

that appears to have spread over time,

what's called "progressive cracking."

- There may be stress marks. There may be, uh, cracks.

There, there may be things that, that suggest a direction

of failure and, and a timeframe

where the fracture would have occurred.

It doesn't occur all at one time.

- Can we determine how long that crack has been spreading for?

- I'll see what I can do.

- We became interested not just in detailing

that but trying to find whether this was a fracture

that could have been detected previously.

A closer look at the crack on the steel spacer

reveals it is filled with nickel.

A light-weight nickel coating is applied to certain

vital engine pieces like the compressor spacers

and blades to prevent corrosion.

- The compressor was brought in to be refurbished in 1981.

Coating stripped, spacer examined and, oh, here we go,

re-plated.

- That was 4 years ago.

The maintenance records tell investigators

that work had been done on the spacer

that failed on Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5.

Nickel cadmium plating is the last step

of the refurbishment process that would have been done

by the maintenance facility that was involved

with essentially the overhaul of that part.

Four years before the accident,

the spacer was removed from the engine,

stripped of its coating, and examined for cracks.

The inspector reported no cracks and sent the part

to be re-plated with nickel.

Since nickel was found inside the crack,

it must have been present when the nickel was applied.

The DC-9 flew about 25-hundred flights over the next 4 years

with the damaged spacer until it finally ruptured

on Flight 1-0-5.

- This should have been caught during an overhaul,

but it wasn't.

And so the crack kept growing and growing

until it finally hit its failure point.

Investigators wonder what caused the crack to form

on the spacer in the first place.

- These spacers have been used inside the JT8D

for more than 20 years.

This can't be the first one to break.

There are identical spacers in more than

1400 J-T-8-D engines used on airplanes around the world.

Is there any history of similar failures?

And it turns out that Pratt and Whitney

were well aware of the spacer failures that occurred before.

And so we started to wonder, what have they done about it?

- It seems to happen a lot.

While researching spacer issues in other aircraft,

investigators uncover 45 similar failures

prior to Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5's accident.

- Well, when we heard that this part had failed

45 times before, we kind of looked askance

a bit at the manufacturer. It's a big deal.

But of all the failures uncovered

by the NTSB...

- Not a single loss of aircraft or even a single injury.

- Well, that says something.

...in every previous incident,

the plane landed safely.

So why did the rupture of a spacer

on Flight 1-0-5 cause the plane to become uncontrollable

and crash?

- Well, we knew that none of the previous failures

had led to an accident, so one of the questions was:

"What made this one different?"

- Let's see what got hit.

Investigators consider the possibility

that pieces of the ruptured spacer on Flight 1-0-5

punctured the plane's fuselage and damaged vital

control systems such as cables or hydraulic lines.

When a part like a spacer or a fan disc breaks

under a lot of stress it's...

it's almost like a small explosion going off.

You have fragments of metal flying at very, very

high speeds.

- OK, let's see 8 9 4.

They study the location and pattern of all

the puncture marks found on the skin of the plane

to see if any were near vital control links.

- No control cables. No hydraulics.

10, 12.

No control cables, no hydraulics.

What about the pieces of the plane

that we haven't been able to find?

There are many critical pieces of the plane

that have not been recovered or are too badly damaged to study.

- Is it possible to figure out if they could have been hit

by the engine pieces?

- We have what we need to run a trajectory analysis.

- Alright.

- We were looking at could these parts

that have left the engine, uh, strike a control surface,

or the hydraulic system or anything else

where they could have done secondary damage

that would have compounded the situation

the pilots were facing.

Knowing the plane's velocity, angle of ascent,

and the wind speed at the time the engine failed,

the team calculates the path of debris ejected

from the engine.

- The smallest piece we found was about half an ounce.

The largest piece was just over a pound.

- So everything moves away from the plane. Nothing hits it.

The trajectory analysis tells investigators

that none of the ejected engine pieces would have struck

the airplane with enough force to cause substantial damage

to the control systems.

- The analysis indicated that it was so unlikely

that we considered it an impossibility,

that those parts leaving the engine in the direction

they went and the size that they had could have caused

secondary damage that would cause loss of control.

If spacer fragments didn't hit vital components

and cause the loss of control,

perhaps the initial explosive force opened the cowling,

or engine cover, affecting the plane's aerodynamics.

- If the cowling had been blown open, it would cause

a lot of drag. It might cause the airplane to roll.

It might cause the airplane to become uncontrollable.

- There's a hole in the cowling.

It looks to be about 2 square inches.

The team finds evidence that the cowling

was pierced by fragments ejected from the engine.

- But all four latches, 1, 2, 3, 4, they're all latched.

- It can't have opened in flight.

- They found them all either latched or fully intact

with no damage at all.

So that scenario kind of went out the window.

- So the ruptured right engine didn't bring down this plane.

- It did not.

Reasonably early in the investigation

the team figured out that a spacer had failed

and the engine had failed.

And now we had the rest of the accident to figure out.

Why would that cause a crash?

Flight 1-0-5's flight data ex recorder in hopes

of understanding how the loss of the right engine

caused the death of 31 people.

- It doesn't give us much,

but it's all we've got to work with.

It was only recording

four flight parameters.

It had airspeed, altitude, uh, heading

and vertical acceleration.

- Right here.

A sudden deceleration at 450 feet.

This must be where the right engine failed.

- Well, that's consistent with what the witnesses told us.

The engine failure we know occurred

above the airport, so the airplane

had only been airborne for a few seconds.

- But their heading doesn't change when the engine fails.

They must be applying left rudder to compensate.

- Dead right engine, left rudder. That's the right move.

When the right engine fails,

the remaining engine should force the plane to the right.

To counteract that, a pilot would apply left rudder

to keep the plane flying straight.

- What the hell was that?

The data shows that's precisely

what Captain Martin did in response

to Flight 105's engine failure.

After a few seconds,

they start this yaw to the right.

- So, right rudder?

Four seconds after the failure of the right engine,

the FDR data indicates that the pilot moved the rudder

from left to right.

That forced the plane into a sudden yaw to the right.

- He's in a sideslip.

And he's deviating further and further to the right.

And then he starts to lose altitude.

148 knots.

He's in a high-speed stall.

- How'd they let that happen?

He went into a right skid, and then followed

by an abrupt right turn and dive.

That would be consistent with a stall.

But the airspeeds indicated were high enough

that you wouldn't normally have a stall at those speeds.

- They've clearly lost control of the plane.

Five seconds later, they hit the ground.

The flight data tells investigators that it took

only 10 seconds for the pilots to lose control of the plane

after the failure of the right engine.

I have never seen an accident sequence

that brief, um, before or since.

- So, he responds correctly at first with left rudder

and nose down pitch.

Then he inexplicably switches to right rudder?

- And that's what leads to the yaw,

the right roll and the eventual stall.

- Right rudder. It makes no sense.

- It was clear, from all the data,

that the pilot didn't understand what happened.

He responded inappropriately, and within seconds,

the airplane was lost, and everybody on board

was killed in the accident.

Was there something about the DC-9's handling characteristics

that led the pilots to input the right rudder?

- So, it was relatively easy to control then?

Just with the control wheel?

Investigators interview DC-9 pilots

to determine how the plane handles with only one engine.

- The DC-9 pilots that we talked to, it was overwhelmingly

described as a very easy, docile aircraft

to handle in those situations.

- Oh, this has been extremely helpful. Thanks. OK. Bye.

They all say the same thing.

It's no big deal with one engine.

Because the DC-9's engines are mounted

on the fuselage instead of the wings,

when one engine fails it does not force the plane

into a severe turn.

- The DC-9 is almost a centerline thrust aircraft.

So if you lose one engine on either side,

there's not that much excess yawing

or controllability problems at all.

How easy is it to handle a DC-9

in the situation the pilots of Flight 1-0-5

found themselves in?

- It was valuable to do a simulation or test flight,

to get a better idea of exactly how the airplane performed

under the circumstances of the accident

but at a higher altitude.

- OK, when we get to 10 000 feet I'm going to cut power

to the right leaving the left at takeoff power.

Keep the flaps at 20. Target speed is 170 knots.

They tried to match the parameters

of the airplane in terms of the flaps, gear, uh...

and airspeed and then proceeded to cut the engine power.

- OK, cutting power.

OK, thank you. Let's go around for another.

The flight demonstrations showed that

the pilot didn't have to input rudder at all.

If he had only used the ailerons,

he could have safely flown out of it.

- OK, this time no reaction. Let's see what the plane does.

With no input from the pilot after the loss

of the right engine, the plane rolls right and the nose drops.

- OK, you can recover?

Even with no immediate action,

the pilot is easily able to recover the plane.

- OK, I think we have what we need.

- That may have actually been the best thing to do was...

was to do nothing, watch the airplane's response,

understand the airplane's response

and respond appropriately to the nature of the emergency.

- What the hell was that?

If the DC-9 is so easy to control,

why were two experienced pilots unable to recover

from the loss of their right engine?

- OK, we kpt with the airline.

But how much experience did they actually have?

Investigators look into the backgrounds

of the pilots of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5

to understand why they didn't recover from

a single-engine failure.

- Neither had a lot of turbo jet experience.

One was upgraded to captain

with 600 hours on the DC-9, the other with only 500.

- It doesn't seem like a whole lot.

- Advancement to captain happened within a year

for both of these pilots, at Midwest Express Airlines

at that time.

And the reason why was it was a small airline.

It was growing quickly. They were adding airplanes.

They consult large US airlines to determine

their qualifications for an upgrade.

- Ok. Thanks.

- It's the same for both airlines: 10 years seniority

and 75-hundred hours as DC-9 first officer

to be considered for an upgrade.

- You know, these guys weren't anywhere near that.

While the pilots may have been experienced,

neither had spent much time piloting the DC-9

before they were promoted to captain.

The more experience someone has

exercising command, the more likely they are to exercise

that command in situations that call for calm thinking,

for rational response and so on.

- So how much training did these guys get on engine failures?

To understand why the pilots of Flight 1-0-5

were not able to control their plane

following an engine failure,

investigators look at their training records.

What was their experience?

What kind of pilots were they?

How did they respond to unusual events?

Did they seem self-confident? How well did they work together?

- OK, so the captain's practiced 12 engine failures

on takeoff in the simulator. The first officer, 15 sessions.

They discover that both pilots

had been extensively trained to cope with engine failure

on take-off...

- It's precisely the type of emergency they faced

on Flight 1-0-5.

...but what exactly were they taught?

- We looked very closely at the training these pilots

received and interviewed the flight instructor

who oversaw their training in the DC-9 for Midwest Express.

- Tell me what you can remember about captains Martin and Weiss.

- They were both excellent pilots, trained to proficiency.

- Lots of simulator training on engine failure.

- You bet. We ran them through all sorts of scenarios.

- Let's focus on takeoff with simulated engine failure.

What were they taught?

- Pay attention to your yaw. It's your best cue.

Yawing right. Applying left rudder.

- Control wheel as needed. Keep the plane level.

Nice and easy. That's a good job.

- Got it.

Captain Martin was trained to pay close attention

to the plane's yawing motion when identifying

and correcting an engine failure.

- It looks like they had excellent training.

Thanks for the insight.

We found the instructor,

uh, to be very capable, very dedicated,

and we found the simulators to be... to be okay,

uh, for that time.

If Captain Martin was extensively trained to cope

with engine failure on take-off,

why didn't he do what he was trained to do.

- Most of their training was for an engine failure at take-off.

Pretty easy to identify which way you're yawing.

Yeah.

- Investigators consider the timing

of the engine failure.

If you're closer to the ground,

there are much more visual cues available from the ground

to see what the airplane is encountering.

Not so easy when you're already

in a steep climb.

- Right.

As Flight 1-0-5 was climbing, only blue sky

would have been visible to the pilots,

making it more difficult to identify

the direction of the yaw.

- What the hell was that?

With no outside visual cues,

investigators believe Captain Martin's initial response

was a spontaneous reaction to the plane's changing motion

and not the result of an analysis of the situation.

But what triggered the incorrect rudder application

a few seconds later,

that resulted in a total loss of control?

- Alright, let's see what these guys were doing.

Midex 1-0-5, cleared for takeoff.

Midex 1-0-5.

Here we go.

Investigators pin their hopes on the CVR

to explain Captain Martin's actions.

Spooling up.

Power normal.

100.

V-1. Rotate.

Gear up.

- The spacer?

(controller on CVR: Midex 1-0-5,

turn left heading 1-7-5.

What have we got here, Bill?

Here!

Midex 1-0-5 roger,

ah we got an emergency here.

Midex 1-0-5 roger.

Oh crap.

Get your heads down. Heads down!

- I've never heard an accident unfold so quickly.

Holy smokes.

And I remember just being amazed

how quickly the accident took place.

It was like they're... they were flying.

You hear the engine fail,

uh, and the next thing you know, the airplane's lost.

- OK, so what did we hear?

- It sure happened fast.

- Yup, 15 seconds from the sound of the engine exploding

to the end of the recording.

Astonishing.

What else?

- "What was that? What have we got?"

The captain seemed uncertain.

- Agreed.

- What have we got here, Bill?

- Well, it was clear from the cockpit voice recorder

that the pilot didn't recognize what had happened.

He articulates that.

"What was that? What have we got here, Bill?"

- What the hell was that?

The sound of the engine,

the sensation of the right yaw, and the instruments

should have told Captain Martin that he was dealing

with a failure of his right engine.

- Anything else on that tape?

- Not a lot of troubleshooting or communication

between them really.

- Actually none.

- What have we got here, Bill? Here!

- Midex 1-0-5 roger, ah we got an emergency here.

Investigators hear Captain Martin

asking his first officer for assistance in assessing the situation,

but First Officer Weiss never replies.

- That was troubling to me because I would have expected

that in an emergency situation and especially

when asked for help, that the other crew member

would have helped if he could.

So that prompted some further investigation.

- OK, let's start with that: Why was the Captain confused

about what had happened?

- It should have been obvious.

46-hundred flight hours:

but he's never experienced an actual engine failure.

NTSB Investigators looking into the crash

of Midwest Express Flight 1-0-5 have learned that

Captain Martin's only experience

with a single-engine failure was in a simulator.

- Yaw and deceleration don't feel the same,

plus all the sounds are different.

- It's not the same as the real thing.

- It was a catastrophic engine failure where they had thrust

and then they didn't. It was immediate. Uh...

I don't think they were trained in that kind of scenario.

- What have we got here, Bill?

The limitations of the simulator may explain

Captain Martin's initial confusion,

but it does not explain the first officer's unusual silence.

- Let's have another listen.

They return to the cockpit voice recording

to better understand how First Officer Weiss

reacted to the emergency.

What the hell was that?

- That's one.

Midex 1-0-5,

turn left heading 1-7-5.

What have we got here, Bill?

- That's two. - Here!

- That's three.

He asks for help three times,

but the FO says absolutely nothing to him the entire time.

- Not even "I'm not sure," or "I don't know."

Not a word.

- In this situation, seconds were critical.

Had he said right away, "I don't know," then the captain

would immediately have tried to rely on his own understanding

of the situation, rather than expect the first officer

to come up with an explanation of what he had.

What could have caused the first officer's silence?

- Hang on. What altitude where they at when the engine failed?

- 450 feet.

- This could be it then.

Pilots say they were taught not to make callouts

or even verbalize the nature of an emergency

after 100 knots, before reaching 800 feet.

- Let me see.

Not even to identify a failed engine.

No communication at all until 800 feet.

I couldn't imagine a management team

at Midwest Express thinking this silent cockpit business

made any sense.

It just flies in the face of communication,

which is kind of the fabric that holds a safe flight together.

So it just blew my mind, frankly.

- What the hell was that?

Investigators think First Officer Weiss

may have been following a Midwest Express unwritten rule

of not discussing emergencies until the plane reaches 800 feet.

It's important during an emergency

for people to talk to each other because they both may not be

looking at the same instrument.

They both may not be looking at the same thing outside.

You have to talk. You have to talk.

One last thing troubles investigators.

In spite of his first officer's silence, Captain Martin

could have easily identified which engine had failed

simply by looking at his instruments.

Both pilots had visual information

from the engine flight instruments,

the bank turn indicator and so on,

that would have told them um...

what was going on in terms of the loss of thrust.

- I don't think either of them were scanning the instruments.

- Agreed.

They never saw which engine had failed,

the direction of the yaw or the severity of the roll.

The NTSB concludes that the pilots' failure

to monitor their instruments contributed to Captain Martin's

incorrect rudder application.

With the lack of visual cues,

the only sure way they would have had to recognize

which engine failed would be to look at the instruments.

The pilots' lack of awareness ultimately led

to the stall that brought down Flight 1-0-5.

- Up until here he should be fine.

But then there's no communication

and no instrument scanning.

And this, this is what dooms them.

He puts in right rudder, which sends them

into a sideslip, an extreme right roll and a stall.

- If they had talked to each other,

scanned their instruments you don't get this accident.

- The reality of the situation is the mismanagement

inside the cockpit caused the accident,

not the engine failure.

The NTSB's final report

makes several key recommendations to prevent

this type of accident from happening again.

They recommend a directive requiring airlines

to replace the existing spacers with a new type of spacer

which is less likely to fail.

They also recommend that airlines are advised

to teach their pilots to communicate

during on-board emergencies.

It should never be overstated the importance

of crew coordination.

Every crew member has something valuable to add.

Anything that is an abnormality needs to be discussed

at the proper time.

They also suggest that airlines review

their simulator training to ensure pilots are taught

to use their instruments to assess the nature

of engine failures.

- I think this accident still has an impact today

because it's such a clear illustration of what happens

when you don't do what you should to do in an emergency.

Any time there's an emergency,

you should have the exact same procedures,

and you should run right to them.

Midwest Express Airlines continued to operate

until 2009.

It merged with Frontier Airlines in 2010.

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