Original subtitles

On approach to Cincinnati, Ohio.

The pilots of Air Tahoma Flight 1-85, face disaster.

- 23-hundred feet. - Keep it steady.

- The airplane will fall like a rock.

- My god.

The plane crashes into a golf course.

Only the captain survives.

- He did not remember much of the flight.

When you have a tragic event happen,

the memories are not there.

The wrecked engines provide investigators

with their first clue.

- There's no evidence of burning or charring.

Both engines flamed out before the crash.

But according to the gauges,

there was ample fuel for the flight.

- If there was still 56-hundred pounds of fuel

in the right tank, why didn't that fuel feed the engines?

- That was certainly something that I had not seen before.

Air Tahoma Flight 1-85 is cruising at 15,000 feet.

It's headed for Cincinnati Northern Kentucky

International Airport.

- The coffee's still hot if you want some?

- No, thanks. I'm well rested.

Captain Bruno Pichelli is an experienced pilot

who has flown all over the world

and also worked as a firefighter in British Columbia, Canada.

Convair-5-80 pilot Bruno St. Jacques

has flown alongside Captain Pichelli.

- He was a very good person, easy to get along with.

He flew well.

Me and him, it was a very good joint venture.

Michael Gelwicks has logged nearly 25 hundred hours

as a pilot and flight engineer

and is now a first officer for Air Tahoma.

Tonight's flight from Memphis, Tennessee

to Cincinnati, Ohio is 80 minutes.

- This was the first leg of a round trip

and was done every weeknight by Air Tahoma.

They're flying a Convair 5-80,

a twin turboprop aircraft used for short-haul flights.

- The Convair 5-80 is about 50 years old,

was used in passenger service for a long time,

and then transitioned to cargo service.

- It was always reputed to be a very stable, reliable airplane.

- So, what was it like flying as a firefighter?

- Well, uh, long hours.

Same plane as this.

Different cargo, of course.

There are five pallets containing mail

and parcels from the courier DHL Express onboard the aircraft.

- How's the paperwork?

- Almost done.

- The captain was focused on some paperwork

that he needed to complete before he landed in Cincinnati,

which he did.

- Okay.

You know what? I'm just gonna balance out the fuel here.

Captain Pichelli notices

that one of his fuel tanks has more fuel than the other.

- The Convair 5-80 has two tanks and you can use one tank

to feed both engines until both tanks are even.

One hour into the flight,

the crew receives a weather update.

- Tahoma 1-85. The winds are kinda weird today.

Suggest 10 left to Cincinnati when able.

- Okay, 10 degrees left to Cincinnati when able.

1-85, thank you. - I already had it.

Right on the money.

As Air Tahoma 1-85 begins its descent,

the first officer detects a change in the controls.

- The yoke feels funny.

- Say again?

- It feels like I need a lot of force.

- It's pushing to the right for some reason.

I don't know why.

- The Convair doesn't use hydraulics

to move the control surfaces.

The pilot must use a lot of arm strength

when the autopilot is not on.

- Four in the box.

Thirty miles from the airport,

the controller provides an update on the approach.

- Tahoma 1-85, fly heading 0-9-0 maintain 4,000.

- Maintain 4,000, 1-85.

- They're packed tonight so we're gonna go bang bang bang.

- Got it.

- There was pressure on it, because if you get late

in the sequence of the other aircraft landing in the airport,

you're slowing down all the airplanes behind you.

- Tahoma 1-85,

cleared for visual approach, 3-6 right.

Keep your speed up.

- Visual approach.

3-6 right. Keep the speed up, 1-85. Thank you.

As the crew receives clearance for a visual approach,

the aircraft continues pulling to the right.

- What in the world is going on with this plane?

This sucker is acting so funny.

- We'll do a full-control check on the ground.

Point it down at 3,000 as quick as you can.

- Usually, an airplane flies straight and wings level.

It wouldn't give you a nice feeling to fly the plane,

which always want to turn on one side.

- 1-85, runway 3-6 right, cleared to land.

- Cleared to land, 3-6 right, 1-85.

- Runway's in sight.

- Alright, I'll give you the in-range.

- In-range check... cabin pressure.

- Set.

- Bypass is down. Hydraulic pressure.

Quantity checks.

As the crew runs the in-range checklist.

- AC pump is on. Green light.

Boost pumps on.

The plane continues to handle poorly.

- Man, I'm telling you, what is wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

Then, less than 5 miles from the airport.

And just 23 hundred feet above the ground,

both engines lose power.

- The airplane will fall like a rock,

because it needs at least one engine in good shape

to bring them to the runway.

Twenty-three hundred feet... my God.

- Cincinnati control, Tahoma 1-85,

we're having engine problems.

- Tahoma 1-85, do you require emergency support?

- Negative.

- I think the reason he said no,

was he was still hoping that somehow

he could get to the airport.

- Pull up.

Pull up.

- Keep it steady.

But they're dropping too fast

to make it to the airport.

- Come on!

They see an opening ahead.

- There's no time at all to raise the gear, raise the flap,

restart the engine before you touch the ground.

Their only option was to go straight to the safest place

to put down the plane, and hope for the best.

- Tahoma 1-85, please respond.

- They were at low altitude. - Hold it up.

- They were short of the runway. It was dark outside.

- Tahoma 1-85, do you copy?

- The situation was very, very dire.

- Trees! - Pull up.

- Pull up. Pull up.

They make it through the trees.

- Come on. Come on!

But can't keep the plane on the ground.

Emergency vehicles soon arrive at the crash site,

just 1. 2 miles

south of Cincinnati's International Airport.

The body of First officer Gelwicks

is found in the wreckage.

Incredibly, Captain Pichelli has survived.

the National Transportation Safety Board, or NTSB,m

rush to Cincinnati and begin looking into the crash

of Air Tahoma Flight 1-85.

- So, what have we got so far?

- Both black boxes have been sent to Washington for analysis.

- Good. Structural failure?

- Take a look.

- When we first arrived what we typically do is to look for the four corners of the airplane,

to be able to rule out some sort of structural failure

or a part or piece of the airplane

departing prior to impact with the ground.

- We found all four corners of the plane.

We found the tail here.

We located both wing tips, here and here.

And the nose was essentially split in half

and fractured into small pieces.

- If it wasn't structural failure then what?

What did the captain have to say?

- He's still recovering in hospital,

but I did speak with the air traffic controller.

- And?

- She says the crew reported having engine problems

just before crashing.

- When we heard that the crew had reported engine problems,

it made us think, as investigators,

whether it was one engine or two engines.

And that would be a big difference.

With one engine they would still be able to make the airfield.

- Tahoma 1-85, we're having engine problems.

If the engines were operating before the crash,

investigators expect to find burnt debris inside the engine.

- There's no evidence of burning or charring.

I don't think we had combustion on this engine.

- Ditto with engine two.

- So both engines flamed out before the crash.

- With a dual engine failure, that's not common,

so we would think immediately about something with the fuel,

either the loss of fuel

or maybe even contamination within the fuel.

Was the fuel onboard Flight 1-85 contaminated?

- Fuel contamination is a danger to flight safety

because it can affect both engines at the same time.

- Do we have the results of that fuel testing?

- Yeah, right here.

Fuel checks out.

- Well, maybe they ran out of fuel?

- Well, it's possible.

In 1978, pilots of United Airlines Flight 1-73

ran out of fuel while troubleshooting

a landing gear issue.

The DC-8 crashed into a neighborhood

in Portland, Oregon.

Ten of the 189 people onboard were killed.

- To explore the possibility of whether the airplane ran out of fuel,

we wanted to look initially at the fuel quantity indicators

in the flight deck.

Investigators recover Flight 1-85's instrument panel.

They focus on the left and right fuel tank indicators.

- Zero and 56-hundred pounds.

That's odd.

- The expectation would be

that both would be approximately the same value.

That one of them was at zero wasn't surprising, I suppose,

but the other one being so much different

was certainly something that I had not seen before.

- Okay, so they didn't exactly run out of fuel,

but why are the tanks so uneven?

- Maybe some kind of problem in the fuel system

stopped fuel from flowing to the engines.

- See what you can salvage in terms of fuel pumps

and piping from the wreckage, and we'll have a look.

- While looking at all the different elements

of the fuel system, the hope was that you would be able to document something going wrong,

either loss of fuel or fuel starvation.

Investigators slowly piece together

elements of the plane's fuel system.

- So these are the crossfeed pipe and valves?

- Check it out.

The crossfeed valves allow the pilot

to provide both engines with fuel

from only one tank when there's a fuel imbalance.

- Both valves are open.

That means they were crossfeeding fuel

before the crash.

- When we found that the crossfeed valves were open,

that was a huge discovery.

We wondered if that may have some sort of connection

between the left tank having no fuel

and the right tank having excessive fuel.

- But why would the crew be crossfeeding fuel

so close to landing?

Did they make a mistake?

- Only one person knows.

Let's see if the captain can talk to us yet.

- The good thing in this accident

was that the captain did survive.

He was able to talk with us in the hospital

because he only had minor injuries.

- How are you feeling?

- Okay. Thanks.

- Can you tell me what you remember of the flight?

Every detail counts.

What is wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

- I remember...

- Visual approach. 36 right. Keep the speed up.

I remember talking on the radio.

- Tahoma 1-85, you're cleared for visual approach.

Keep your speed up. - I saw the approach lights.

Then we weren't getting power.

Then the next thing I remember is the impact.

- Keep it steady.

- And then...

I was standing outside.

- One more thing.

We found the crossfeed valves open.

Do you remember crossfeeding fuel during the flight?

- I'm... I'm sorry.

I don't.

- He did not remember much of the flight

because when you have a tragic event happen,

the memories are not there.

Investigators search the wreckage for clues

that could explain why the two crossfeed valves were open.

- It's the weight and balance form for the flight.

- Hm.

- The weight and balance form reflects

where the cargo pallets are located,

whether they're towards the front of the airplane

or towards the back of the airplane,

and that determines whether the airplane is nose heavy,

or tail heavy, or right where it should be in the middle.

- That's strange.

It looks like the captain was revising his calculations,

possibly during the flight.

- Well, this is stranger.

Here's a second one.

- This one has no corrections and the captain signed it.

- Finding two weight and balance sheets for the same flight

with different data on it at the accident site

raised lots of questions for us.

What was the captain doing during the fight?

- So it looks like the captain was revising his numbers

on this first form almost using it like a working copy.

And this was his hard copy to hand in.

Did the captain's weight and balance calculations

play a role in the crash?

- Well, the center of gravity limits were within the envelope.

- So a mistake in his weight and balance calculations

didn't bring down the plane.

- Well, whatever his process,

he was supposed to hand this in before departure.

- Check with the airline.

See if the captain handed in his numbers before takeoff.

- Taking off without having computed the weight

and balance limits is against procedures.

It cuts the safety margin.

- You're sure?

Okay, thanks.

- The airline just confirmed,

the plane departed without the captain leaving a weight

and balance form behind in Memphis.

- So... why did our captain depart before completing his paperwork?

- Would you like coffee? - I'm fine, thanks.

Investigators reinterview Captain Bruno Pichelli

to find out why he didn't follow proper procedure

before Flight 1-85's departure.

- So, we found some weight and balance forms in the wreckage.

Why didn't you complete them before taking off?

- What can I say? I ran out of time.

Normally I fill out the form using their handheld computer.

It had been acting up, now it was just dead.

I'm not used to filling out that form manually.

Frankly, I'd never been trained to.

So, I thought I'd finish it en route.

Captain Pichelli explains how he determined

that Flight 1-85 was safe to take off.

- I did my own assessment.

I checked that the plane's maximum weight was acceptable.

I saw that the position of the cargo pallets

were evenly balanced.

I also looked at the nose landing gear strut.

And the plane sat properly on it.

- If the nose wheel strut was compressed,

that would be nose heavy, and if it were extended,

it would be tail heavy. But it was in a normal position.

So on that basis, he decided that the airplane

was actually within its weight and balance limits.

- From your corrections,

it looks like your numbers weren't adding up.

- That's true. Yeah. At first they didn't.

So I had to keep working on them.

Yeah, it took me a while to get them right.

- How long did it take?

- I don't know.

- Did it interfere with your workflow?

- It was stressful. I mean, I was buried in paperwork.

- Right.

- So even though the weight and balance was not an issue

with the operation of the engines,

it did raise questions with regard to the crew activity.

- Hey. Any news?

With no explanation for the cause

of Flight 185's engine failure,

the investigation finally gets a break.

- Great. Send it to us right away.

The lab just finished transcribing the CVR.

We've got good data.

But we don't have impact.

The recording stops just before the crash.

- Well, if the recording stopped,

that means the plane must have lost power.

- It looks like it.

And it supports a dual engine flameout.

- Having the CVR stop about two minutes prior to impact

is another indication that we lost both engines

because we likely had a rollback of both engines

and therefore a change in electrical configuration.

- When you're ready.

Investigators listen to the cockpit voice recording,

or CVR, to determine why the engines flamed out

even though the plane still had plenty of fuel.

How's the paperwork?

- Almost done.

Okay.

You know what?

I'm just gonna balance out the fuel here.

- The captain wanted to balance his fuel tanks.

But he didn't remember that at his interview.

That must be when he opened the crossfeed valves at 12:17 a.m.

- Question is: Did he forget to close them?

- Let's find out.

Okay ten degrees left to Cincinnati when able.

1-85, thank you.

I already had it.

Right on the money.

The team pays close attention to any mention

of the crossfeed valves being closed.

- The captain doesn't indicate that he's stopping the crossfeed

or even mention it.

It made me wonder if they had forgotten

that the crossfeeding operation was going on.

Then, just minutes before the flight's scheduled arrival.

- AC pump is on. Green light.

Boost pumps on.

Man, I'm telling you,

what is wrong with this plane? It is really funny.

- Yeah. - Can you feel it?

It feels like it's swinging back and forth.

- Yeah, we've got an imbalance

on this darn crossfeed I left open.

The captain finally realizes he forgot to stop

crossfeeding fuel from the left tank.

- Is that what it is?

- Yeah.

- Oh, damn.

I see.

- The crossfeed's been going on for almost half an hour.

- It looks like he never shut the crossfeed valves.

- He forgot to close it.

That explains why the plane was so hard to handle.

With the crossfeed valves open for 29 minutes,

only the left fuel tank fed both engines.

As the tank emptied, it created an imbalance,

which made it difficult to control the aircraft.

- That also explains why the left tank was empty.

- Yeah, but if there was still 56-hundred pounds of fuel

in the right tank, why didn't that fuel feed the engines?

- Do you have the list? Thanks.

- Alright, let's figure this out.

Did the pilots of Air Tahoma Flight 1-85

follow the correct procedure for balancing their fuel?

- The question that it raised, for me in the investigation is:

If there is ample fuel in the right tank,

why did both engines fail?

- Alright, to crossfeed fuel from the left tank

to both engines first the crew has to open

the crossfeed valves here and here.

Investigators consult the wreckage inventory.

- And we know from the wreckage

the crew did the first step correctly.

The valves were open.

- Second, they're supposed to close the right fuel pump here.

- Got it. It was turned off at the time of the crash.

- Step three:

they were supposed to close

the right tank fuel shutoff valve here.

- It looks like the right one was left open.

- They didn't shut the valve.

- So they did the procedure incorrectly.

- So the question we had was,

by leaving the right fuel tank valve open,

did that somehow lead to the engine failure?

- I know they made a mistake, but I'm still confused.

If they didn't close the valve

why wasn't fuel flowing from the right tank

all the way to both engines?

And why would the engines flame out?

- There's only one way to find out.

- As the investigation progressed,

we decided to run a test to determine

what occurred during the accident flight.

Investigators build a replica

of Flight 1-85's fuel system to better understand

how both engines could have failed.

- Lets simulate what the captain did.

Step one: open the crossfeed valves.

- Crossfeed valves open.

- Alright. Step two: turn off the right fuel pump.

- Right fuel pump off.

- Step three:

he didn't close the right fuel tank shutoff valve.

- So we've got this in the open position.

- Let's see what happens.

- Okay.

It looks like the left fuel pump is sending fuel

from the left fuel tank to both engines.

So that part's working out just fine.

- Yeah, but fuel from the left fuel tank

is also flowing to the right tank.

With the right shut off valve open,

the left pump supplied fuel not only to both engines

but also to the right fuel tank.

- Look how quickly the left fuel tank emptied.

- This was new to me.

I had never seen a case where fuel is transferred to the point

of the one tank being emptied.

- So the left tank ran dry.

And with that pump still running,

that means that air was likely being pumped

through the whole system.

Investigators now understand

why the plane's engines flamed out just before the crash.

Once the left tank was empty,

air was pumped into the fuel system,

causing both engines to flame out.

- Turbine engines require a steady flow of fuel.

When you start entering air into the system,

the air bubbles then cause the interruption

of the ignition of the fuel,

and that will cause the engines to roll back and stop.

- So if the captain had just followed procedure

and shut off that valve...

- If he had, there would have been enough fuel

in the left fuel tank to power both engines to the airport.

- I'm just gonna balance out the fuel here.

The captain's failure to close

the right fuel tank shutoff valve, sealed their fate.

- So, why didn't he follow procedure?

- As the investigation progressed

and new information came to light,

it was helpful to go back to the captain

to discuss his recall of what happened.

- In your airline's handbook, they instruct pilots

to shut the right tank valve during the crossfeed procedure.

You didn't shut the valve.

- I don't... I don't remember doing a crossfeed on the day,

but, uh, typically when I do the procedure,

I leave the tank valve open.

- Really?

- This was a surprise because that is totally contrary

to the flight operating manual.

- I heard if you shut that valve it might fail.

Then you have no access to your fuel.

- So you've heard the valve is faulty?

- I sure have.

And my old employer allowed me to do it this way.

- Previous employers had told him

it was the captain's discretion whether he closes

the shutoff valve or not.

And we confirmed that that was their position.

Was there a history

of fuel tank shutoff valves failing?

- I've gone through the FAA's Service Difficulty Reports database and I found nothing.

- I can't find anything either.

- I don't think that valve has ever failed.

- There was no evidence of the valve getting stuck.

This was a fiction that had somehow spread

among the pilot community

that simply did not have an accurate basis.

- This is the part I don't get.

So, what were they doing for 29 minutes?

- Twenty-nine minutes is a long time to miss

that there's a crossfeed problem,

especially when the first officer reports

that there are handling difficulties as well.

And so it was very important to look into

what might have caused this.

- Keep it steady.

- Alright, the captain started the crossfeed at 12:17 a.m.

He didn't notice the mistake until 29 minutes later.

What happened in between?

Investigators return to Flight 1-85's CVR

to determine why the pilots didn't notice

that there was a growing fuel imbalance.

- It looks like the captain finished his paperwork at 12:26 a.m.,

but he kept talking about it.

- All this time I couldn't figure out why

on the landing I was out,

and I was okay on the takeoff.

And it was my chicken scratch. - Ah.

- Yeah. The momentum is 1-6-6-7,

but I thought my chicken scratch I put 1-0-6-7.

I couldn't work it out. - Ah.

- It was my own doing. - Ah damn.

I had it all along.

We were okay all along.

- Is that right? - Yeah.

- Oh, man.

- Okay, first he's distracted by his paperwork

and then he keeps talking about it.

- Yeah. The captain's focus is on his paperwork for a while

instead of monitoring the flight.

- What about after that? Any mention of the fuel gauges?

- What about the first officer?

How come he didn't pick up on this?

- Twenty minutes after the crossfeed was opened,

the first officer knew something was wrong.

- The yoke feels funny.

- Say again?

- It feels like I need a lot of force.

It's pushing to the right for some reason, I don't know why.

I'm trying to...

I'm not sure what's going on.

- Alright, the first officer reports a problem with the flight controls,

but he doesn't check his fuel gauges for an imbalance. Why?

- Well, according to his work record,

he was still pretty new at flying the plane.

Plus he'd only been with the airline three months.

- To his credit, he was assertive

that he was having difficulty in the handling characteristics.

So he was completely appropriate in asking for help.

And unfortunately, the captain did not respond

as a pilot in command would be expected.

- It feels like I need a lot of force.

- Tahoma 1-85, fly heading 0-9-0 maintain 4,000.

- 0-9-0, 4,000, 1-85. Thank you.

0-9-9, 4,000.

- How many times did he alert the captain to the problem?

- He repeated his concerns at least seven times.

Finally, the captain replied.

- We'll do a full-control check on the ground then.

- He missed the cues from his co-pilot.

- How long has he been a captain?

- Here's the thing.

He's been in a cockpit for over 20 years,

but only 100 hours or so as a captain.

- As captain, we would expect him to actually help

the first officer troubleshoot why the aircraft was flying

in a non-normal state.

- Still, wouldn't they have caught this mistake

during the in-range checklist?

- That's a good point.

- The purpose of the in-range checklist is to prepare the airplane for landing.

And that includes a review of the cockpit instruments,

including the fuel gauges.

- So, did they perform the in-range checklist?

- Yup. They started the checklist at 12:45 a.m.

- I'll give you the in-range.

AC pump is on. Green light. Fuel panel.

Boost pumps on.

- Man, I'm telling you what is wrong with this plane?

It is really funny.

- Yeah.

We have an imbalance on this darn crossfeed I left open.

- Is that what it is?

- Yeah.

- Oh damn.

I see. - Yeah.

- We're gonna flameout if we don't, aren't we?

- Ten seconds later, the engines flamed out.

- Wow.

The plane had become one gigantic glider

about to hit the ground.

- They were too late to save it.

- They found out about the crossfeed issue

at the same time they lost their engines.

- Did they start the checklist too late?

- They were at about 3,000 feet when they started.

- According to the airline's operating manual,

they should have started the checklist at 12,000 feet.

- They should have started at least 10 minutes earlier.

- If they had, they would have caught their mistake

with enough time to save the plane.

- If you're not monitoring the fuel gauges,

when you run the in-range checklist that will remind you.

But they waited until it was so late,

they didn't have time to prevent the engines from flaming out.

- It still bugs me.

Even with all the distractions and the inexperience,

all professional pilots

are trained to scan their instruments.

Why didn't they?

- Maybe the fuel gauges are hard to see?

- Could the pilots actually see the fuel gauges

from the seating positions that they were at?

- Alright, so both our seats are fully forward.

Investigators now visit a Convair 5-80 cockpit

to determine if its layout somehow prevented the pilots

from monitoring their fuel gauges.

- So both fuel gauges are visible.

But is that the case for every seat position?

- Let's make an adjustment.

- Wow.

From this angle, the fuel gauges are much harder to see.

The throttle control console is in the way.

- It depended on what position the seat was in.

When the seat was aft it was more difficult to see

the fuel gauges.

- So the degree to which the fuel gauges are obscured changes

depending on the seat position.

Hard to say if it played a role.

- Unfortunately, because of the destruction of the aircraft,

the wreckage did not allow us to determine

whether the captain's seat was forward or aft.

- What in the world is going on with this plane?

This sucker is acting so funny.

- In this case there was a concern about the fuel gauges

and their location

and whether they could be seen by the pilots.

- Yes, he would have to rise up just a little bit

to look over the thrust levers to be able to see the gauges,

but it's your job to know what those instruments are saying at all times.

- I've been told some pilots put this sign up

during a crossfeed as a reminder.

Investigators have pieced together

what led to the crash of Flight 1-85.

- You know what?

I'm just gonna balance out the fuel here.

When the captain decides to even out

the fuel in the tanks, he skips a key step in the procedure

and leaves the right fuel tank shutoff valve open.

- If the captain had shut the right fuel tank valve,

there may have been enough fuel to complete the flight.

It's my chicken scratch.

I had it all along.

Then, he forgets to close the crossfeed valves.

- It was my own doing. - Oh, man.

- There are priorities when you're flying

and you don't wanna be distracted

by something like doing paperwork that's overdue.

- Yoke feels funny.

As fuel drained out of the left fuel tank...

- Say again?

- It feels like I need a lot of force.

...the plane became unbalanced.

- It's pushing to the right for some reason.

I don't know why.

- When you have a flight control problem,

that's an urgent problem.

You have to deal with it immediately.

- The runway's in sight.

- I'll give you the in-range.

Then the pilots started the in-range checklist

later than required.

- Yeah.

We've got an imbalance on that darn crossfeed I left open.

When the captain finally realized there was a fuel problem, it was too late.

- Fuel is life in an airplane.

You have no more fuel,

there's only one way you're gonna go and it's down.

- Pull up. - Keep it steady.

- Pull up. Pull up.

- I think the lesson to be learned is that

regardless of the airplane that you're flying

and the conditions, that you should adhere to the procedures

as they're provided to you.

In its report on Flight 1-85,

the NTSB makes a recommendation to all Convair 5-80 operators.

- One of the main recommendations

was to inform pilots that they should shut off

the fuel shutoff valves if they are crossfeeding.

Ultimately, if flight crews follow the procedures

that they are given, they will get on the ground safely.

Subtitling: difuze