Original subtitles

1960s, MANY AMERICANS FEARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS

PLANNING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES.

WHAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WAS THAT THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT

WAS CONSIDERING LAUNCHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION FIRST.

HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS INCLUDING

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF PRESENTED A PLAN FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE

FOR A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE TO PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.

NO OFFICIAL RECORD OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND

OF ITS CONTENT WAS FOUND UNTIL 1993.

HELD AT A TIME WHEN KENNEDY WAS RECEIVING VERY BELLIGERENT

ADVICE FROM SOME SENIOR ADVISORS.

A MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED FOR VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON

SUMMARIZING THE SEQUENCE OF DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING

AND THAT MEMORANDUM WAS DECLASSIFIED IN 1993.

UNTIL WE HAD THE BURRIS MEMORANDUM, WE DIDN'T HAVE

A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS SAID.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS BEING PRESENTED WITH A SCENARIO FOR

LAUNCHING A PRE-EMPTIVE SURPRISE

ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SOVIETS WERE LAGGING BEHIND IN THE NUCLEAR

ARMS RACE, AND TOP U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS

SUGGESTED A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE MIGHT BE THE BEST OPTION

BEFORE THEY CAUGHT UP. THE UNITED STATES HAD B-52s

CIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AIR ON A ROTATION BASIS.

EACH ONE OF THE BOMBS THAT ONE B-52 CARRIED HAD MANY

TIMES THE FIREPOWER OF ONE HIROSHIMA.

YOU ALSO HAVE TO REMEMBER THERE WERE FIXED MISSILES,

AND THERE WERE MISSILES IN SUBMARINES.

THE PLAN SUGGESTED A SURPRISE

ATTACK IN LATE 1963. THE COST WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC.

IN A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

AN ESTIMATED 300 MILLION PEOPLE WOULD DIE.

FACED WITH THE HORROR OF NUCLEAR

FALLOUT INCLUDING CANCER, LEUKEMIA, AND BIRTH DEFECTS,

THE SURVIVORS WOULD ENVY THE DEAD.

IT'S VERY HARD TO IMAGINE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT

ORGANIZED HUMAN SOCIETY WOULD HAVE SURVIVED.

THIS IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER HUMAN LIFE, IN ANY CIVILIZED

FORM, IS GOING TO SURVIVE AT ALL.

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK WROTE IN HIS MEMOIR THAT

AS THEY LEFT THE MEETING, KENNEDY SAID TO HIM IN

DISPARAGING TONES, "AND WE CALL OURSELVES

THE HUMAN RACE". KENNEDY HAD AN ENTIRELY

DIFFERENT VIEW ABOUT THE STRATEGIC FUTURE.

IT'S, I THINK, VERY CLEAR THAT THIS MEETING INTENSIFIED

FOR HIM THE SENSE OF DANGER THAT A WAR MIGHT BE UNLEASHED

IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN

MIGHT NOT BE FULLY IN CONTROL OF.

LIVES UNDER A NUCLEAR SORT OF DAMOCLES, HANGING BY THE

SLENDEREST OF THREADS, CAPABLE OF BEING CUT AT ANY

MOMENT, BY ACTION, OR MISCALCULATION,

OR BY MADNESS. THE WEAPONS OF WAR MUST BE

ABOLISHED, BEFORE THEY ABOLISH US.

IN 1961, THE UNITED STATES WAS ENGAGED IN A PROTRACTED

COLD WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION, RED CHINA,

RED CHINA, AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC.

PRESIDENTS HARRY TRUMAN AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

HAD TRIED TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM THEN ROLL IT BACK.

BUT SOVIET PREMIERE NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV REMAINED DEFIANT.

ESCALATING THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS IN CUBA, BERLIN,

AND VIETNAM THREATENED TO TURN THE COLD WAR HOT.

IT WAS INTO THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

AT THE AGE OF 43, WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENT

WAS ELECTED THE 35TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

JANUARY 19, 1961 WAS A REMARKABLE ONE.

THERE WAS THE OLDEST PRESIDENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE

UNITED STATES, AGE 70, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

SITTING DOWN WITH THE YOUNGEST PRESIDENT EVER

TO BE ELECTED, JOHN F. KENNEDY, THE DAY BEFORE

HIS INAUGURATION, AND SHARING WITH HIM THE MOST

INTIMATE CONVERSATION A PRESIDENT THOSE DAYS

COULD HAVE, WHICH IS:

WHAT DO YOU DO IF IT COMES TO MAKING A DECISION ABOUT

NUCLEAR USE? HE OPENS UP THE SATCHEL

IN WHICH THE COMPUTER-LIKE DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN

DEVICE IS IN THAT'S KNOWN AS A "NUCLEAR FOOTBALL".

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, HAS STARTED ROUND-THE-CLOCK

BOMBER PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST

A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS.

EISENHOWER SAYS WHAT HE WANTS KENNEDY TO KNOW ABOUT

KHRUSHCHEV IS, "HE'S BRUTAL, INCALCULABLE;

HE'S GONNA RUN HOT AND COLD ON YOU."

IT STRUCK KENNEDY THAT EISENHOWER WAS REFERRING

TO THE SOVIETS MORE AS ANIMALS TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN

TO BE TAMED RATHER THAN NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.

THERE AT INAUGURATION DAY. OH, BOY, IT WAS COLD.

I REMEMBER HE SAID, "WE MUST NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR."

LET US NEVER NEGOTIATE OUT OF FEAR, BUT LET US NEVER

FEAR TO NEGOTIATE. [ crowd cheering ]

BUT THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY, "BUT WE MUST NEVER FEAR

TO NEGOTIATE," AND I SAID, "UH OH.

THERE'S SOMETHING NEW. WE'VE JUST TURNED,

WE'VE JUST TURNED, TURNED THE PAGE."

PRESIDENT BORN IN THE 20th CENTURY, INSPIRED A YOUTHFUL

GENERATION EAGER FOR FRESH LEADERSHIP.

THERE WAS A FEELING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE KENNEDY

ADMINISTRATION THAT A NEW ERA HAD BEGUN.

JOHN F. KENNEDY CAME PROMISING A NEW FRONTIER.

IT WAS GOING TO BE A TIME OF ENDLESS OPPORTUNITY.

AND TO BE PART OF THAT ERA WAS ONE OF THE GREAT HONORS

OF ONE'S LIFE. I'LL NEVER FORGET THE FIRST

TIME I WALKED INTO THE WHITE HOUSE TO SEE MY OLD

FRIEND KEN O'DONNELL, WHO WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

APPOINTMENT SECRETARY. WE JUST LOOKED AT EACH OTHER

AND BURST OUT LAUGHING. YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE

YOU KNOW, WHAT ARE PEOPLE LIKE US DOING IN A PLACE LIKE THIS?

OF THE KENNEDY WHITE HOUSE. I HAD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE...

LAST. EVERYBODY WAS VERY EXCITED.

WE KNEW WE WERE MAKING HISTORY. WE WERE READY TO GO.

I TRAVELED EVERYWHERE WITH HIM.

HE WAS SUCH AN EXCITING MAN, BUT ALSO ONE

BUT ALSO ONE OF GREAT PRINCIPLE.

COUNCIL, AND I WAS ASSISTANT SPECIAL COUNCIL.

IT WAS JUST PERFECTLY OBVIOUS THE GUY HAD A FIRST-RATE MIND,

AND HE KNEW HOW TO USE IT. FOR EXAMPLE TAKING

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE MOST RENOWNED

HISTORIAN IN THE COUNTRY AND MAKING HIM A SPECIAL

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE WHITE HOUSE SO THAT

THE PRESIDENT HAD REFERENCE TO A HISTORIAN WHO COULD PUT

EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE. JFK PULLED DAD ASIDE

AND SAID, "BOBBY TELLS ME THAT YOU'RE GONNA COME WORK

IN THE WHITE HOUSE." AND DAD SAID, "WELL, OBVIOUSLY

AS A HISTORIAN IT'S A GREAT OPPORTUNITY, I'M VERY EXCITED

ABOUT IT, BUT I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHAT I'LL BE DOING."

AND KENNEDY SAID, "WELL, I DON'T KNOW WHAT I WILL BE DOING

EITHER, BUT I'M SURE THERE WILL BE PLENTY OF WORK

FOR BOTH OF US." DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS,

I WAS A CORRESPONDENT ASSIGNED TO JOHN KENNEDY FOR THE

1960 CAMPAIGN. I WENT WITH HIM INTO THE

WHITE HOUSE BECAUSE I HAD ALREADY BEEN COVERING

EISENHOWER AT THE WHITE HOUSE. KENNEDY WAS A FORCE

IN THIS TOWN... WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY

WELL-VERSED ON FOREIGN POLICY AND VERY ARTICULATE.

PRESIDENCY, KENNEDY KNEW IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FULLY

ASSESS HIS COLD WAR ADVERSARY, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

ADVISERS HAD WARNED HIM THAT THE

HOT-TEMPERED SOVIET LEADER WOULD USE THREATS AND

INTIMIDATION TO IMPOSE HIS WILL.

TO IMPOSE HIS WILL. [ speaking in Russian ]

KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS AND ACTIONS, KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE

KENNEDY HOPED TO GAIN A TRUE MEASURE OF THE MAN.

WASN'T EVEN HOME FROM HIS INAUGURAL DAY

PARTIES WHEN KHRUSHCHEV DECIDED TO SHOWER HIM

TO SHOWER HIM WITH CONCILIATION.

HE DECIDED TO PUBLISH THE ENTIRE INAUGURAL SPEECH.

THEN HE WAS READY TO RELEASE TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN FROM THE

RECONNAISSANCE PLANE THAT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN THE PREVIOUS

AUGUST. HE'D BEEN HOLDING THESE AIRMEN

SO AS NOT TO HELP VICE PRESIDENT

NIXON IN HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST KENNEDY.

AND THIS WAS NOW GOING TO BE HIS INAUGURAL GIFT.

THEREAFTER, HE ALSO MADE KNOWN THAT 500 ELDERLY SOVIETS

WOULD BE ABLE TO REUNITE WITH THEIR FAMILIES IN THE U.S.

KHRUSHCHEV IS ESSENTIALLY SAYING,

"WE WANT A NEW START. WE HAVE GREAT HOPES IN

THIS RELATIONSHIP. WE REALLY ARE GOING TO WORK

VERY EARLY IN YOUR ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME

ADMINISTRATION FOR SOME BREAKTHROUGHS."

WELTGESCHICHTE MIT SEINEM SCHUH EINGEGANGEN.

IMPROVE RELATIONS

WITH UNITED STATES. FIRST OF ALL,

HE WAS A REFORMER BECAUSE HE REALLY STARTED REFORMATION

OF RUSSIA WHEN HE CAME TO THE POWER AFTER THE STALIN DAY.

AND SECONDLY, MY FATHER WAS IN TWO WARS,

AND HE EVEN COULD NOT WATCH MOVIE ABOUT THE WAR BECAUSE

IT CAME BACK IN HIS MEMORY WHAT REALLY HAPPENED,

AND HE COULD NOT SLEEP AFTER THIS, SO HE WANT TO SHOW

TO THE NEW PRESIDENT HIS POSITIVE FEELINGS

HIS POSITIVE FEELINGS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES.

GESTURES APPEARED TO SIGNAL A DESIRE FOR A NEW BEGINNING,

KENNEDY PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS ON AN INFLAMMATORY SPEECH

THE SOVIET LEADER HAD GIVEN ONLY A FEW WEEKS EARLIER.

IN IT, KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID HE INTENDED TO BEAT

THE UNITED STATES WITH "SMALL WARS OF LIBERATION"

ALL OVER THE WORLD. CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV THREW

WORLD BY ESSENTIALLY ARGUING

POLICY NOW INCREASINGLY

WOULD BE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WHERE

THE SUPER POWERS BOTH ESSENTIALLY TRIED TO GAIN

INFLUENCE. KENNEDY WAS REALLY QUITE UPSET

ABOUT THIS SPEECH, AND HE GAVE THE TEXT OF THIS SPEECH TO ALL

OF HIS ADVISORS AND SAID, "YOU NEED TO READ THIS."

KENNEDY ENDS UP CARRYING THIS

SPEECH AROUND IN HIS POCKET, AND HE PULLS IT OUT

WITH EXPERTS IN HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND

HE READS FROM THE SPEECH HE'S SO OBSESSED WITH THE

MESSAGE THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS TRYING TO SEND HIM.

IN A DRAMATIC SHIFT IN TONE, KENNEDY USED TOUGH LANGUAGE

TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET THREAT, AND AT HIS FIRST

STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, HE ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION

TO ACCELERATE U.S. MISSILE AND SUBMARINE PRODUCTION.

EACH DAY, WE DRAW NEARER THE HOUR OF MAXIMUM DANGER

AS WEAPONS SPREAD AND HOSTILE FORCES GROW STRONGER.

I FEEL I MUST INFORM THE CONGRESS THAT OUR ANALYSIS

OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN EACH

OF THE PRINCIPLE AREAS OF CRISIS, THE TIDE OF EVENTS

HAS BEEN RUNNING OUT, AND TIME HAS NOT BEEN OUR FRIEND.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATE OF THE UNION WAS ALMOST

APOCALYPTIC IN NATURE AND SUCH A SHIFT FROM CONCILIATION

TO CONFRONTATION. AND HE IGNORES THE CONCILIATORY

GESTURES AND NEVER REALLY ADEQUATELY TESTS THEM...

MAYBE THEY WOULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO NOTHING, BUT WE'LL NEVER

KNOW BECAUSE HE NEVER REALLY TESTED THEM.

KENNEDY'S STRUGGLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW BEST TO DEAL

WITH THE SOVIETS WAS ONLY JUST BEGINNING.

KENNEDY'S PRESIDENCY WAS VERY

SUBSTANTIALLY ABSORBED BY THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLD WAR,

WHICH PLAYED ITSELF OUT ON STAGES ALL OVER THE WORLD:

BERLIN, CUBA, VIETNAM. AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS

AND HE'S OBLIGED TO KEEP TABS ON THESE MATTERS CONTINUALLY.

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV CALLED IT "THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE

ON EARTH." SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR, SOVIET, BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICAN FORCES

HAD STOOD FACE-TO-FACE IN THE STREETS OF THE OCCUPIED CITY.

AND THE SITUATION WAS GROWING TENSER BY THE DAY.

WITH HIM INTO THE ADMINISTRATION

VULNERABILITY OF BERLIN AND

COMMITMENT IN BERLIN.

IN 1961, BERLIN IS AN ISLAND INSIDE

OF EAST GERMANY WITH AN OPEN BORDER.

4 SECTORS,

THE SOVIET SECTOR HOUSING THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.

IN THE OCCUPATION OF THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN,

AND FRANCE. AND KHRUSHCHEV WANTED TO

END THAT SITUATION. BERLIN WAS ALWAYS A SYMBOL

TO THE SOVIET UNION OF COMMUNIST FAILURES.

EMBARRASSED BY THE NUMBERS

OF PEOPLE TRYING TO GET OUT FROM COMMUNIST CONTROL.

THEY WERE LOSING SOME HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR...

THOUSAND PEOPLE EVERY YEAR... MORE THAN 10,000 EVERY MONTH.

IT'S THE BEST FARMERS, IT'S THE BEST TEACHERS,

SO THE FRONT LINE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE IS BEING DRAINED

OF ITS INTELLECTUAL AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE BLOOD,

THEREFORE THREATENING THE ENTIRE SOVIET CONSTRUCT.

IF KHRUSHCHEV WERE TO USE MILITARY FORCE IN BERLIN,

KENNEDY AND HIS WESTERN ALLIES HAD FEW OPTIONS.

IF THEY MARCH ON BERLIN, WE DON'T HAVE THE TROOPS

TO FEND THEM OFF. WHAT ARE WE GOING

TO HAVE TO DO? WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO USE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND WHAT DOES THAT DO?

KENNEDY WAS LOOKING FOR A CAPABLE ADVISOR WHO COULD

PROVIDE A COHERENT POLICY FOR DEALING WITH BERLIN.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BRINGS DEAN ACHESON BACK INTO SERVICE,

THE LEGENDARY SECRETARY OF STATE OF HARRY TRUMAN,

A HAWK'S HAWK WHEN IT COMES TO DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WHO BELIEVED THAT YOU DIDN'T

NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS, THAT THEY ONLY

UNDERSTOOD POWER. YOU HAD TO BE WILLING TO FIGHT,

TO GO TO THE BRINK, TO SHOW THEM THAT YOU HAVE

THE MILITARY CAPACITY AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.

ACHESON PRODUCES A MEMO THAT'S TOUGH...

ESSENTIALLY SAYS YOU CAN'T GIVE AN INCH TO THE SOVIET UNION

IN BERLIN BECAUSE THIS IS ABOUT THE GLOBE.

IF YOU START IN BERLIN, AND YOU GIVE GROUND IN BERLIN,

ITALY'S NEXT, FRANCE, THE REST OF GERMANY,

THE REST OF GERMANY, WHO KNOWS WHERE ELSE.

WITHIN WEEKS WE HAD THE BAY OF PIGS.

IN THE YEARS PRECEDING 1961, A REVOLUTION ON THE CARIBBEAN

ISLAND OF CUBA, LED BY FIDEL CASTRO,

OUSTED THE COUNTRY'S REPRESSIVE DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED

DICTATORSHIP AND SEIZED ALL FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY.

AN EMBARGO ON CASTRO'S REGIME, FREEZING CUBAN ASSETS AND

SEVERING DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH HAVANA.

THE CUBANS TURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT.

THAT KENNEDY ACTUALLY VIEWED

FIDEL CASTRO, IN 1960, AS SOMEBODY WHOSE REVOLUTION

REALLY REPRESENTED THE ASPIRATIONS, BROADLY SPEAKING,

OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT. AND, AND HE BELIEVED THAT IF

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD HANDLED CASTRO RIGHT THAT

HE WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND OF COURSE

THERE'S PLENTY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT POINT OF VIEW,

BUT VERY EARLY ON HE REALIZED THAT POLITICALLY HE COULDN'T

TAKE THAT POSITION PUBLICLY. ONLY MONTHS INTO

HIS ADMINISTRATION, KENNEDY WOULD DISCOVER

THAT THE CUBAN PROBLEM MIGHT LEAD TO HIS UNDOING.

AS SOON AS THE KENNEDYS GOT INTO OFFICE THEY HAD TO WORRY

ABOUT CUBA. THE CIA HAD COOKED UP A PLAN

TO INVADE CUBA WITH A FORCE OF EXILES, AND THE CIA

WAS ITCHING TO USE THIS FORCE AND OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO.

HE HAD INHERITED THE WHOLE THING FROM THE EISENHOWER

THING FROM THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION.

FOR LANDING AT THE BAY OF PIGS WAS GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR HIM TO CONSIDER THE NECESSITY FOR

USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES,

WE DIDN'T HAVE TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, THAT WAS THE PREMISE.

BUT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS MISLED.

HIS LEADING ADVISORS, PARTICULARLY HIS MILITARY

ADVISORS, HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH...

SAME THING WAS TRUE FOR THE CIA, BY THE WAY.

IS NOT ONE BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA. IT IS BETWEEN THE CUBANS

THEMSELVES. AND I INTEND TO SEE THAT WE

ADHERE TO THAT PRINCIPLE, AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT,

THIS ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE IS SO UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED

BY THE ANTI-CASTRO EXILES FROM CUBA IN THIS COUNTRY.

THE INVASION DIDN'T SUCCEED,

INTRODUCE ITS OWN FORCES.

BUT THE CIA NEVER CLEARLY COMMUNICATED THIS RATHER

ESSENTIAL FACT TO THE PRESIDENT. PERSUADED BY CIA OFFICIALS

WHO WERE WITHHOLDING VITAL INFORMATION AND CONCERNED

ABOUT THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT OF APPEARING WEAK ON COMMUNISM,

THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED THE CIA PLAN FOR AN INVASION

OF ARMED CUBAN EX-PATRIOTS AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

THE CUBAN EXILES LANDED AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

IT WAS A DISASTER FROM THE GET-GO.

A THOUSAND OF THEM WERE BASICALLY DRIVEN INTO THE SEA

OR CAPTURED. MOST IMPORTANTLY,

MOST IMPORTANTLY, THERE WAS NO AIR COVER.

OFFICIALS REPEATEDLY PRESSURED THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION. KENNEDY REFUSED.

HIS ARGUMENT AT THE TIME IS, IF THE U.S. GETS DIRECTLY

INVOLVED, IF AMERICAN FINGERPRINTS ARE TOO CLEARLY

ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION, THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL USE THAT

AS AN EXCUSE TO ACT ON BERLIN. KENNEDY WAS WORRIED BECAUSE

HE WAS COMING UP TO A SUMMIT MEETING, HE HOPED, WITH

KHRUSHCHEV, AND HE DIDN'T WANT TO DISTRACT FROM THAT

SUMMIT MEETING BY HAVING TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID

TOO MUCH ATTENTION BE PAID TO CUBA.

BAY OF PIGS QUICKLY SHOWED WAS THAT THE

DOMINANT FORCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION WERE PEOPLE

THAT KENNEDY HAD NEVER APPOINTED THAT HE HAD INHERITED FROM

HIS PREDECESSORS IN THE CIA AND THE MILITARY,

AND THEY BASICALLY WERE ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD

ASSUMING THAT THEY COULD PUSH KENNEDY AROUND.

BUILT INTO THE WHOLE SCENARIO, AND KENNEDY REALIZED THAT, TOO,

AND WAS NOT ABOUT TO BECOME A PRESIDENT THAT WAS ENTRAPPED.

JOHN F. KENNEDY CLEARLY FELT THAT HE HAD BEEN MISLEAD,

THAT HIS LEADING ADVISORS HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE TRUTH

AND THAT HE HAD TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS IN THE FUTURE

ABOUT ACCEPTING ANYTHING THAT THEY SAID.

THE CIA WAS VERY UNHAPPY BECAUSE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY

ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD APPROVE OF AIR STRIKES AGAINST

CASTRO'S FORCES IF THE BRIGADE GOT IN TROUBLE ON THE BEACH.

THE BAY OF PIGS WAS A MAJOR DISASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES,

NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE WE HAD BEEN DEFEATED,

BUT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE WORLD OUR BALD AGGRESSION

AGAINST CUBA. AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY

AND IT GAVE CUBA A VICTORY OVER THE GOLIATH OF THE NORTH.

VERY, VERY PERSONALLY BECAUSE HE SAW IT AS

A PERSONAL FAILURE. YOU KNOW, YOU DO THE BEST YOU

CAN AND THINGS DON'T WORK OUT SOMETIMES, WELL, OKAY.

BUT THAT WASN'T THE CASE HERE. AND HE BLAMED HIMSELF,

HE BLAMED HIMSELF FOR NOT ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.

NOBODY LIKES TO TAKE A HIT, ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE SO

BUT YEAH, I THINK HE LEARNED,

AND WHAT HE LEARNED IS... KNOW WHOSE ADVICE TO RELY ON.

KENNEDY RALLIED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS.

FOR ONE THING, HE TOLD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS

HIS RESPONSIBILITY. HE USED A FAMOUS PHRASE,

THAT A "VICTORY HAS A THOUSAND FATHERS BUT DEFEAT IS AN

ORPHAN." BUT HE TOOK RESPONSIBILITY

FOR IT, AND INTERESTINGLY, HIS POLL RATINGS SHOT UP

TO ABOUT 90%. AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN

AMERICANS LIKE IT WHEN POLITICIANS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.

HAD ENORMOUS INFLUENCE

FOREIGN POLICY MAKER.

THE JOINT CHIEFS FELT THAT HE WAS SOFT, HE SHOWED THAT

HE DID NOT HAVE THE CREDENTIALS,

TO BE ABLE TO STAND UP.

THERE WAS AMBIVALENCE ABOUT JFK.

HE WAS A WHIPPERSNAPPER. HE WAS GREEN.

IN WORLD WAR II.

HE SAID, "I WAS A LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE, AND THOSE GUYS

WERE RUNNING THE WAR. AND I JUST DIDN'T

ASK THE QUESTIONS THAT I HAD ON MY MIND.

JOHN F. KENNEDY EMERGED FROM THAT CATASTROPHIC FOREIGN

POLICY FAILURE CHASTENED IN TERMS OF THE

PITFALLS OF THE USE OF FORCE AND WITH A DEGREE OF WISDOM

ABOUT LISTENING TO THE ADVICE OF HIS TOP GENERALS,

HIS TOP CIA OFFICIALS, AND OTHER ADVISORS RATHER

THAN LISTENING TO HIS GUT. AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS,

JACK KENNEDY SAID HE WANTED TO BREAK THE CIA INTO A

THOUSAND PIECES HE WAS SO MAD AT THEM,

AND HE ALMOST DID. HE GOT RID OF ALLEN DULLES,

THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA, AND RICHARD BISSELL,

AND RICHARD BISSELL, THE COVERT OPERATIONS CHIEF.

FIASCO, KENNEDY SENT SIGNALS THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN

HOLDING A SUMMIT MEETING WITH NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

FRUSTRATED BY THE SLOW PACE OF BUREAUCRACY AT THE

STATE DEPARTMENT, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO REACH

OUT TO THE SOVIET LEADER THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS.

ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH

THE SOVIET UNION AND TO SEE IF THERE WERE

ISSUES THAT COULD BE RESOLVED AND RECONCILED WITHOUT

CONSTANT MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

THE KENNEDYS OPERATED ON MAY LEVELS, AND THEY LIKED BACK

CHANNELS AS A WAY OF DOING BUSINESS.

AND THEY FOUND ONE ALMOST BY ACCIDENT.

IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST UNUSUAL BACK CHANNELS AMONG

MAJOR LEADERS IN HISTORY, OF HIS BROTHER THE

BOBBY KENNEDY, WHO KNOWS

MOST INTIMATE THOUGHTS

AND A SOVIET MILITARY SPY, GEORGI BOLSHAKOV, BASED IN

WASHINGTON, WHO REALLY CAN'T KNOW ANYTHING VERY INTIMATELY

ABOUT KHRUSHCHEV. ROBERT KENNEDY, WHEN HE MET

WITH BOLSHAKOV, WANTED TO COMMUNICATE A COUPLE OF THINGS:

ONE, THAT CUBA WAS A MISTAKE, BUT ALSO THAT HE WANTED

TO HAVE A SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MEET

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT THAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN

THAT JUNE, AND THAT SET IN MOTION THE SUMMIT MEETING.

JUNE AND WENT DIRECTLY TO THE

U.S. AMBASSADOR

IN HIETZING, WHICH IS A BEAUTIFUL AREA,

BEAUTIFUL AREA, VERY POSH AREA IN VIENNA.

PROBLEMS IN VIENNA, WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT THE

PUBLIC DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL. HIS DOCTORS RECOMMENDED HIM

TO USE CRUTCHES, BUT KENNEDY, OF COURSE, DID NOT

TAKE CRUTCHES ON TO VIENNA.

IF YOU ASK ME WHAT THE MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS,

MYSTERIOUS TERM "CHARISMA" IS, I WOULD SAY THAT'S KENNEDY.

WITH KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV DURING ALL THESE CONVERSATIONS.

HE WAS YOUNG, ENERGETIC, YET HUMAN...

AND COULD BE FRAIL, AS ALL HUMANS ARE AT SOME POINT.

MY AMERICAN COUNTERPART WAS ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY

ALEXANDER AKALOVSKY ON THE AMERICAN SIDE.

SO I KNEW HOW HE BEHAVES.

HE WAS A VERY VOLATILE PERSON. HE COULD, YOU KNOW, BE ENRAGED

THEN CALM DOWN RIGHT AWAY, AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE,"

AND SAY, "LET'S MAKE PEACE," AND THINGS LIKE THAT.

KHRUSHCHEV LOOKED INTENTLY AT THE PRESIDENT

AND THEN ASKED, "MR. PRESIDENT,

HOW OLD ARE YOU?" AND KENNEDY SAID,

"WELL, I'M FORTY-FOUR." THERE CAME INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S

EYES A VERY WISTFUL LOOK AND HE SAID, "YES, FORTY-FOUR.

WELL, YOU KNOW, MY SON WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE,

WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT AGE, BUT HE WAS KILLED IN THE WAR."

CONVERSATIONS WITH KHRUSHCHEV, KENNEDY GOT OFF ON THE WRONG

FOOT BECAUSE THEY ENGAGED IN A PRETTY INTENSE

IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE. PEOPLE LIKE KHRUSHCHEV,

THEY KNOW MARXIST IDEOLOGY VERY WELL.

YOU CAN'T REALLY HOLD YOUR OWN AGAINST THEM

IN SUCH A DISCUSSION. KENNEDY,

HE BEGAN TO FIDGET IN HIS CHAIR; I LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS

BECAUSE HIS BACK WAS HURTING. AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF

TALKS, AS A FORM OF RELAXATION THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN

THEY WENT OUT INTO THE GARDEN AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

ABOUT MISCALCULATION. THE PRESIDENT USED THAT

A NUMBER OF TIMES... THAT TERM "MISCALCULATION."

AND KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULDN'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT

THAT MEANT. AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID,

"WELL, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, I MADE A MISJUDGMENT IN CUBA."

HE SAID "WHAT HAPPENED IN CUBA, THE BAY OF PIGS."

THE INFERENCE WAS THAT HE HAD INHERITED THAT PROBLEM FROM THE

PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. IT WAS NOT REALLY OF HIS DOING.

INHERITED OR NOT, KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT A GAP

EXISTED BETWEEN AMERICAN IDEALS AND AMERICAN SELF-INTEREST.

WITH LITTLE ACCOMPLISHED, THE TWO LEADERS RESOLVED

TO RESUME THEIR TALKS THE FOLLOWING DAY.

AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY, ALL THE TALK WAS ABOUT BERLIN.

TIRADE ABOUT BERLIN. HE KEPT REITERATING THAT

BY THAT VERY WINTER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD

BLOCK OFF WEST BERLIN, WHILE EAST BERLIN WOULD BECOME

THE OFFICIAL SEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EAST GERMANY.

KHRUSHCHEV KEPT SAYING THAT THE DECISION TO CONCLUDE

A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY

WAS IRREVOCABLE; IT WILL HAPPEN,

NOBODY COULD STOP HIM... NOBODY IN THE WORLD.

THAT'S HIS WORDS. AND KENNEDY WAS UNPREPARED

FOR THIS AND WAS SHOCKED AT THE IDEA THAT HIS LEADING

COUNTERPART IN THE COLD WAR WAS SEEMINGLY SO IRRATIONAL.

KHRUSHCHEV AT ONE POINT SAID,

"YOU KNOW, BERLIN IS LIKE THE SCROTUM IN OUR HANDS,

WHICH WE CAN SQUEEZE AT ANY TIME WE WANT."

HOW THE PRESIDENT TOOK IT: HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED,

HE TURNED TO ME AND HE ASKED, "ALEX, IS HE ALWAYS LIKE THAT?"

WARNINGS THAT HE ISSUED ABOUT POTENTIAL WAR.

IN THE EYE AND SAID,

IT MIGHT AS WELL BE NOW."

KENNEDY, WITH HIS HANDS IN HIS COAT POCKETS

IN A TYPICALLY KENNEDY-ESQUE GESTURE REMARKED,

"WELL, IT'S GONNA BE A COLD WINTER."

JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS A VERY CONFIDENT MAN IN SO MANY WAYS,

EVEN COCKY, BUT HE WAS HUMBLED BY HIS EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

EXPERIENCES. TO HAVE THE FIASCO

OF THE BAY OF PIGS AND THEN GET BULLIED BY KHRUSHCHEV

AT VIENNA WAS A PRETTY TOUGH ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR

ONE-TWO PUNCH THAT MADE HIM FEAR FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORLD.

THAT HE'S FAILED IN THE MOST

PRESIDENCY AND BELIEVING

THE STAKES ARE NUCLEAR.

FROM VIENNA, HIS BROTHER, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

FOUND HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS

IN TEARS. AND HE SAID, "YOU KNOW, BOBBY,

YOU AND ARE ADULTS, WE'VE HAD A GOOD LIFE.

BUT I JUST... OUR CHILDREN, I JUST CAN'T

STOMACH THE IDEA OF OUR CHILDREN NOT HAVING A CHANCE.

THE SUMMER OF 1961 WAS A TIME

FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGER. PRESIDENT KENNEDY GOT HIS

THERE WERE A SERIES OF

MEETINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO ABOUT BERLIN.

ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE THE HARDLINERS ON BERLIN,

LED BY DEAN ACHESON. AND THEN YOU HAVE THE

SOFTLINERS ON BERLIN, LED BY ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.

BUT ACHESON WAS THE ONLY ONE WITH A PLAN.

AND IT'S A TOUGH ONE. ACHESON WANTED THE PRESIDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES TO DECLARE A NATIONAL EMERGENCY,

RAISE TAXES, FULLY MOBILIZE THE MILITARY, INCREASE THE DEFENSE

SPENDING BY FIVE BILLION DOLLARS, GO EVERYTHING

RIGHT UP TO THE EDGE OF WAR. WHAT IS KENNEDY DOING

IN THIS THING? AGAIN, HE'S ASKING QUESTIONS,

CONSTANTLY ASKING QUESTIONS. AND THE QUESTION HE'S CONSTANTLY

COMING BACK TO IS: WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO

WHAT DOES THE OTHER GUY DO IF WE DO THIS?

BY THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO LABEL BERLIN AS A HOT BED

OF WAR. THERE IS PEACE IN BERLIN TODAY.

THE SOURCE OF WORLD TROUBLE AND TENSION IS MOSCOW,

NOT BERLIN. AND IF WAR BEGINS,

IT WILL HAVE BEGUN IN MOSCOW AND NOT BERLIN.

MISCALCULATED WITH JOHN KENNEDY.

HE WAS A LOT TOUGHER THAN KHRUSHCHEV THOUGHT HE WAS.

KENNEDY CLEARLY WANTED TO SEND A SIGNAL

TO KHRUSHCHEV. HE WAS READY TO CONFRONT HIM

MILITARILY IF THAT IS WHAT HE CHOSE; IF HE WANTED WAR,

THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE READY.

WE MUST MEET OUR OFTEN-STATED PLEDGE TO THE FREE PEOPLES

OF WEST BERLIN AND MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS AND THEIR SAFETY

EVEN IN THE FACE OF FORCE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE

CONFIDENCE OF OTHER FREE PEOPLES IN OUR WORD AND OUR RESOLVE.

THE MESSAGE SEEMED TO BE HOW TOUGH HE WAS BEING WITH

THE SOVIET UNION, HOW HE WAS STANDING UP TO THEM.

BUT FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND FOR KHRUSHCHEV,

BETWEEN THE LINES IS A VERY CLEAR MESSAGE, WHICH IS:

WHAT I CARE ABOUT IS OUR TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN AND OUR ACCESS

TO WEST BERLIN. WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUT

WHAT I DON'T CARE ABOUT IS EAST BERLIN.

TO DEFEND OUR INTEREST, WE SHALL ALSO BE READY

TO SEARCH FOR PEACE: IN QUIET EXPLORATORY TALKS,

IN FORMAL OR INFORMAL MEETINGS.

WE DO NOT WANT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS TO DOMINATE

THE THINKING OF EITHER EAST OR WEST.

ONE CAN UNDERSTAND KENNEDY'S APPROACH TO BERLIN

AT THAT TIME. HE'S LESS CONCERNED ABOUT

BERLIN AND MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS

OF NUCLEAR WAR. HE THINKS THAT IF HE CAN HELP

KHRUSHCHEV SOLVE HIS PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEE FLOOD FROM

BERLIN THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A MORE AMICABLE, COOPERATIVE

NEGOTIATING PARTNER ON A HOST OF OTHER ISSUES.

WITHIN DAYS OF KENNEDY'S SPEECH,

KHRUSHCHEV APPROVED EAST GERMAN PLANS TO SEAL THE

BORDER IN BERLIN. ON AUGUST 13, 1961,

COMMUNIST FORCES ERECTED BARRICADES AND

STOOD GUARD ALONG THE PERIMETER OF WEST BERLIN.

RESIDENTS OF EAST BERLIN SOON FOUND THEMSELVES TRAPPED

BEHIND A BARRIER THAT WOULD BECOME THE NOTORIOUS

BECOME THE NOTORIOUS BERLIN WALL.

AS BEING THIS TERRIBLE MOMENT IN THE COLD WAR...

A SYMBOLIC MOMENT WHEN THE WALL GOES UP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ACTUALLY, IT WAS A RELIEF TO KENNEDY BECAUSE IT WAS SUCH A

CRISIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE THIS MASS MIGRATION,

PEOPLE JUST FLEEING EAST TO WEST, THAT BY PUTTING

UP THE WALL IT STOPPED THAT, AND IN A WAY, IT DIFFUSED

THAT CRISIS AND MADE BERLIN LESS OF A CRISIS POINT.

SO IN THE LONG RUN, IT HELPED THE WEST TO HAVE A BERLIN WALL.

THAT THE PEOPLE WHO WERE

WERE BEING FRUSTRATED

BY KENNEDY'S POLICIES, WERE ANGRY, WERE FRUSTRATED.

THEY WERE TALKING AMONG THEMSELVES, PUTTING HIM DOWN.

DEAN ACHESON HAD GROWN SO FRUSTRATED THAT DURING A

SMALL WORKING GROUP MEETING ON BERLIN HE SAID,

"GENTLEMAN YOU MIGHT AS WELL FACE IT: THIS NATION IS

FACE IT: THIS NATION IS WITHOUT LEADERSHIP."

OF THE UNITED STATES, SOMEONE TRYING TO FRAME

HIS MOST IMPORTANT POLICIES, TALKING IN FRONT OF A GROUP

OF EXPERTS AND SAYING THIS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF

THE UNITED STATES... AND HE SAID IT IN EVEN HARSHER

TERMS IN A LETTER TO HIS FORMER BOSS, HARRY TRUMAN

A FEW WEEKS LATER. FOR A LOT OF AMERICANS,

KENNEDY'S EARLY FOREIGN POLICY DAYS WERE AMATEUR HOUR,

AND IT WAS UNSETTLING. THE COUNTRY WAS SCARED IN THE

SUMMER OF 1961 THAT THEIR LEADER MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT

MAYBE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT HE WAS DOING.

THAT BY ACQUIESCING TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERLIN WALL

HE WOULD HAVE A MORE CONCILIATORY

NEGOTIATING PARTNER IN THE SOVIET LEADER WERE

DASHED DAYS THEREAFTER, WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TESTING.

TO BE CONCILIATORY. HE FINALLY HAS TO GIVE UP THAT

COURSE, AND HE HAS TO RESUME, THOUGH HE WAS VERY RELUCTANT

TO DO SO, HIS OWN TESTING PROGRAM.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID ONE PHRASE, WHICH I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER.

HE SAID, "WELL, I PITY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE

ELECTED SUCH A MAN TO BE THEIR PRESIDENT."

KHRUSHCHEV PERCEIVED KENNEDY AS BEING INDECISIVE AND WEAK

REGARDING BERLIN AND THE BERLIN CRISIS.

AND BECAUSE OF THAT, HE WAS WILLING TO ESCALATE

RHETORIC, NUCLEAR TESTING, ETC. SO, BY ACQUIESCING TO THE

BERLIN WALL, HE'S FACING A SOVIET LEADER THAT IS BECOMING

EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME AND PROBLEMATIC.

IN THE FALL OF 1961, KENNEDY WOULD FACE YET ANOTHER

GRAVE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION...

THIS TIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. A COMMUNIST-BACKED INSURGENCY

WAS GAINING MOMENTUM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING

SOUTH VIETNAM, DESTABILIZING THE REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS BELIEVED THE INSURGENCY

COULD BE DEFEATED AND LOBBIED

FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS.

BUT THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE FAILED FRENCH COLONIAL WAR

IN VIETNAM, JUST A DECADE EARLIER,

JUST A DECADE EARLIER, HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS.

BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN IN VIETNAM DURING THE

WANING YEARS OF THE FRENCH COLONIAL PRESENCE THAT

IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEAT A

VIETNAMESE MOVEMENT, WHETHER IT WAS COMMUNIST-LED OF NOT,

THAT HAD NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS, THAT HAD...

THAT REPRESENTED VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM.

IN INDOCHINA HAS NOT HAD

OF THAT AREA AND THE PEOPLE

HAVE MAINTAINED TOO GREAT A

OF THE PEOPLE.

AND THEREFORE, THE COMMUNIST UNDER HOCHI MINH

ARE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE,

AND THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE FIGHTING FOR A MAINTENANCE

OF COLONIAL RULE. I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MOVES IN, IN ANY DEGREE,

THAT INDEPENDENCE MUST BE GRANTED TO THE PEOPLE;

THAT THE PEOPLE MUST SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE BECAUSE UNLESS,

AS I SAID, THAT SUPPORT IS FORTHCOMING, ANY INTERVENTION

BY THE UNITED STATES IS BOUND TO BE FUTILE.

THE AGE OF COLONIALISM WAS OVER.

GOING TO INTRODUCE COMBAT TROOPS

INTO VIETNAM.

FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF TRYING TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES OUT

OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA CAME IN 1961.

THE CONSENSUS VIEW IN THE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE

ESTABLISHMENT WAS THAT WE HAD TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM,

THAT THAT WAS OUR CLIENT, OUR ALLY, THAT WE HAD A

MORAL OBLIGATION TO STAND BY PRESIDENT DIEM,

AND TO PROTECT SOUTH VIETNAM FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

THE MILITARY, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REALLY HAD

BOUGHT INTO THE IDEA THAT WE COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM

COULD WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARILY.

UP IN NOVEMBER OF 1961 WITH THE TAYLOR-ROSTOW REPORT,

WHICH RECOMMENDS THE INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS.

THIS WAS SAYING WE WANT 40,000 TROOPS TO GO

INTO SOUTH VIETNAM AND DEFEAT THE VIETCONG.

AND THEN WE WANT TO HAVE 125 TO 130,000 TROOPS JUST IN

CASE NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA INTERVENE, JUST TO HANDLE

THAT POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY. JFK TOLD HIS NATIONAL SECURITY

ADVISORS, "WE'RE NOT GOING TO DO THIS, BASED ON

MY EXPERIENCE AND MY KNOWLEDGE, MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE

OF VIETNAM. THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, AND

THIS IS NOT AN INTEREST THAT DESERVES THE UNITED STATES

GOING TO WAR." SO, IT WAS A VERY DECISIVE

MOMENT WHEN A U.S. PRESIDENT REALLY RESPONDED TO A VERY

SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR GOING TO WAR WITH A VERY LOUD "NO".

HOWEVER, AS PART OF THE POLITICAL POSITIONING THAT

HE FELT THAT HE HAD TO ASSUME, HE THEN MADE A DEAL THAT HE

WOULD AGREE TO THEIR REQUEST FOR THOUSANDS OF U.S. ADVISORS.

"ADVISORS" IS AN IMPORTANT WORD; THEY WERE MILITARY

FOR THE MOST PART, A LOT OF THEM

WERE ECONOMIC AID PEOPLE, TOO. BUT IT WAS PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S

INSISTENCE THAT IT NOT BE OUR WAR THAT LIMITED OUR INVOLVEMENT

IN THAT KIND OF WAY. WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING

WE COULD TO ADVISE AND TO TRAIN,

BUT KENNEDY WAS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD

IT WOULDN'T BE US THAT WOULD BE IN THE FRONT LINES.

YEAR IN THE WHITE HOUSE, MORE FORMIDABLE

CHALLENGES WOULD BESET THE YOUNG PRESIDENT...

SUBORDINATES WOULD QUESTION HIS LEADERSHIP...

AND THE CALCULATIONS OF HIS ADVERSARIES WOULD BRING

THE WORLD TO THE BRINK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AT THE BEGINNING OF '62, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,

PARTICULARLY LED BY CURTIS LEMAY,

AIR FORCE, WERE VERY SCATHING

TO DEAL WITH THE CASTRO PROBLEM.

VIVA... EL INTERNACIONALISMO

PROLETARIADO! AND THEY FELT THAT

IN THE END, A INVASION OF THE ISLAND WOULD BE NECESSARY

AND THEN MADE DETAILED PLANS FOR AN INVASION OF CUBA

AND, IN FACT, MADE A FORMAL RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT

THAT AN INVASION SHOULD BE LAUNCHED.

AT THE SAME TIME, KHRUSHCHEV HAD VERY REAL

CONCERNS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES

INVADING CUBA. BOTH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV WERE

CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY AGAIN.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS DETERMINED TO SAVE CUBA ONE WAY

OR THE OTHER. AND HE CAME UP WITH THIS

IDEA THAT NOBODY ELSE HAD PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING

PREDICTED OF DEPLOYING NUCLEAR MISSILES TO CUBA.

SOVIET UNION TO OPENLY SEND THESE MISSILES TO CUBA.

THE SOVIET UNION POSITIONING

MISSILES IN CUBA.

THE UNITED STATES, UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,

HAD DEPLOYED SIMILAR MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

IT WAS THE POLITICS THAT WORRIED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV.

HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE TRIED TO OPENLY DEPLOY THESE MISSILES

TO CUBA, THE UNITED STATES WOULD OBJECT.

AND SO KHRUSHCHEV CAME UP WITH THIS PLAN TO SURREPTITIOUSLY

TRANSPORT THE MISSILE PARTS AND THE PERSONNEL IN A WAY THAT

WOULD KEEP THEM SECRET UNTIL THEY WERE READY TO BE ANNOUNCE,

AND AT THAT POINT, KHRUSHCHEV PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA

AND ANNOUNCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND HAVE THOSE MISSILES THERE AS

A DETERRENT AGAINST ANOTHER BAY OF PIGS.

HE WANT TO PREVENT AMERICAN INVASION.

SIGNAL THAT WE ARE SERIOUS.

AND THAT MEAN TO HIM WE WILL SEND THESE MISSILES

TO CUBA THAT WILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS:

WILL CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS: BE CAUTIOUS, DON'T DO THIS.

BEGIN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET TRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT

TRANS-ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES TO CUBA...

SOUTH VIETNAM, SOME OF THE NEWLY ARRIVED U.S. ADVISERS

WERE DEFYING ORDERS AND ACTUALLY

AND ACTUALLY ENGAGING IN COMBAT.

LEADERSHIP, THEY WERE VERY VULNERABLE,

OF INTERVENTION BY THE

SOUTH VIETNAM.

POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT.

AND SO THEY DID, IN FACT, BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT THE

NECESSITY FOR SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT,

SOME KIND OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THAT INFORMATION REACHED KENNEDY'S APPOINTED AMBASSADOR

TO INDIA, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.

ONE OF THE REASONS THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY CHOSE MY

TO INDIA RATHER THAN KEEPING

HIM IN WASHINGTON WAS THAT THIS PERMITTED

KENNEDY TO CALL ON MY FATHER AS A FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR.

HE HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF WATCHING THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN

INDOCHINA IN 1954, SO HE HAD

VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, AND THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO

THOSE VIEWS WERE CLOSE TO KENNEDY'S OWN.

TO KENNEDY IN APRIL OF 1962. WHAT GALBRAITH WAS SUGGESTING

WAS THAT THEY COULD GET THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO HELP

ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF CONTACT WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

THERE COULD BE SOME TALK ABOUT A DEAL UNDER WHICH,

IF THEY WOULD LOWER THE LEVEL OF INSURGENCY,

WE WOULD THEN BEGIN TO WITHDRAW TROOPS, WE COULD TALK

ABOUT SOME CORRESPONDING EFFORTS

OR MOVES TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF WAR.

AND JFK DEFINITELY BOUGHT INTO THAT.

BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS FILLED UP WITH HOLDOVERS

FROM THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION:

PEOPLE WHO HAD THESE VERY RIGHT-WING VIEWS ON

EAST ASIAN POLICY. AND SO, JFK UNDERSTOOD THAT;

HE KNEW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO WORK AROUND THE

STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUCRACY AND REALLY, HARRIMAN WAS

THE LOGICAL PERSON FOR HIM TO TURN TO.

AVERELL HARRIMAN WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT.

HE HAD BEEN AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SECOND

WORLD WAR. HE'D BEEN GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK.

HARRIMAN HAD CALLED FOR AVOIDING SENDING TROOPS

TO VIETNAM IN NOVEMBER OF 1961, BUT WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT

HARRIMAN MIGRATED FROM JFK'S SIDE OF THE LEDGER TO THE

COALITION OF MILITARY AND STATE DEPARTMENT PEOPLE WHO WERE

CALLING FOR SENDING TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

AND I DON'T THINK JFK UNDERSTOOD THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE HAD

REALLY TURNED TO THE OTHER SIDE ON THAT QUESTION.

JFK ORDERED AVERELL HARRIMAN TO SEND A CABLE THAT INSTRUCTED

GALBRAITH TO ESTABLISH A NEGOTIATING CHANNEL WITH

NORTH VIETNAM. WHAT IS SO INTERESTING ABOUT

THE DOCUMENT IS THAT IMMEDIATELY

HARRIMAN, IN VERY HEAVY PENCIL, CROSSES OUT THE PART

OF THE DIRECTION FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT CALLS

PRESIDENT THAT CALLS FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION.

NEGOTIATING CABLE AND, IN FACT, WHEN ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES

TRIED TO WRITE A CABLE THAT WAS HEADED IN THAT DIRECTION,

HE SAID, "NO, WE'RE NOT GOING TO DO THAT."

AND THERE WAS NEVER A CABLE SENT.

SO, IT WAS AN ASTONISHING CASE OF A LEADING OFFICIAL

OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT COMPLETELY SUBVERTING

AN EXPLICIT ORDER FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY

PRESIDENT FOR TRYING TO CARRY OUT A DIPLOMATIC POLICY.

WAS A REFLECTION OF A MUCH BROADER PATTERN IN WHICH ALL

OF THESE ADVISORS WERE ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAT

ESSENTIALLY SUBVERTING WHAT JFK WANTED TO DO.

THAT SAID "NO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WEAKNESS"

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND UNTIL THAT

SITUATION TURNS ITSELF AROUND AND WE CAN NEGOTIATE FROM

STRENGTH AND THE COMMUNISTS UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE WINNING

AND NOT LOSING, OF COURSE WE ARE NOT GOING TO NEGOTIATE.

GALBRAITH WOULD LAUGH AT THAT

AND SAY, "WEAKNESS, THE GREATEST COUNTRY

IN THE WORLD, THE STRONGEST NATION IN THE WORLD,

A COUNTRY OF 50 MILLION PEOPLE,

THAT HAS NO INDUSTRY, AND

THAT IS JUST EMERGING AS A NATION, THE UNITED STATES

HAS TO BE AFRAID OF THAT AND NOT SHOW WEAKNESS?"

AND IT'S NOT WEAKNESS, WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID

IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS. IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS

IT IS NOT WEAKNESS TO DISCUSS OR TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.

NEGOTIATIONS HELD BY MANY U.S. OFFICIALS WENT MUCH

DEEPER THAN DISDAIN FOR KENNEDY'S TRACK RECORD

IN FOREIGN POLICY. FOR THOSE WHO FOUGHT AND WON

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, ONE OF THE GREATEST ERRORS A

LEADER COULD MAKE WAS TO TAKE AN ENEMY AT HIS WORD.

IN 1938, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN

HAD BELIEVED HE COULD NEGOTIATE PEACE

WITH ADOLF HITLER. AS A RESULT, BRITISH WAR

PRODUCTION WAS DELAYED, AND ENGLAND NEARLY

AND ENGLAND NEARLY LOST THE WAR.

A DIRTY WORD BY A GENERATION OF U.S. MILITARY LEADERS WHO KNEW

ALL TOO WELL THE HUMAN PRICE OF NAÏVE LEADERSHIP.

AND DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM

WERE ABOUT TO TEST THEM TO THE LIMIT.

CRISIS WERE LARGE, MEDIUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

TIPPED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THESE ARE MISSILES THAT CAN

FLY TO THE UNITED STATES, HIT TEXAS AND NEW YORK CITY

AND A WIDE RANGE OF U.S. TARGETS.

MISSILES, AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY

WAS BRIEFED. THE PRESIDENT ASKED BUNDY,

"HOW MANY DAYS DO WE HAVE BEFORE

AND BUNDY SAID,

"MAYBE A WEEK." WE WERE RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE

OF POLITICAL ELECTION IN OCTOBER OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN

OF '62, AND KENNEDY IS TORN LOTS OF DIFFERENT WAYS.

A SPECIAL GROUP THAT THEY CALLED THE EXCOMM TO HELP HIM DEAL

WITH THIS. ALL OF THE JOINT CHIEFS,

INCLUDING THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, MAXWELL TAYLOR,

WHO WAS A FAVORITE OF KENNEDY'S,

MISSILES FOLLOWED BY

AN INVASION.

"I'LL TAKE CARE OF THIS,

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

AND THEN THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE,

OF THE ARMY WANTED TO INVADE, AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "NO."

FEW DAYS TO REFLECT, HE THOUGH, "WELL, A WISER COURSE OF ACTION

WILL BE TO IMPOSE SOME KIND OF NAVAL BLOCKADE ON CUBA

TO PREVENT MORE MISSILES FROM REACHING THE ISLAND."

HE DECIDES TO FORGO VIOLENCE,

KNOWING THAT IF HE NEEDS TO LATER ON, HE CAN INVADE CUBA,

AND ADOPT AN INTERIM STEP OF QUARANTINE, WHICH BUYS TIME

FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WHEN CURTIS LEMAY HEARD THAT KENNEDY WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK

CUBA IMMEDIATELY, HE WAS FURIOUS AND COMPARED THIS

TO CHAMBERLAIN'S APPEASEMENT OF HITLER AT MUNICH.

AND LEMAY KNEW EXACTLY WHAT THAT WAS ABOUT BECAUSE

JFK'S FATHER, OF COURSE, WAS A GREAT SUPPORTER

OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN AND BELIEVED IN TRYING TO

BELIEVED IN TRYING TO DEAL WITH HITLER.

THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE SAYS TO THE PRESIDENT,

"YOU'RE IN A BIG FIX, MR. PRESIDENT," AND KENNEDY

IS TAKEN ABACK AND HE SAID, "WHAT, WHAT DID YOU SAY?

AND LEMAY SAID, "YOU'RE IN A BAD FIX!"

AND THE PRESIDENT SAID, "AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IT

"AND YOU'RE RIGHT IN IT WITH ME."

ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 22, 1962 AND GAVE WHAT IS CERTAINLY

THE MOST CHILLING, FRIGHTENING OF PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

TO THE NATION AND THE WORLD THAT HAS EVER BEEN GIVEN.

WHEN HE CAME INTO THE ROOM, HE WAS DELIBERATE, COOL.

I THOUGHT HE WAS NERVOUS. BUT ONCE THE RED LIGHT WENT ON,

LOOKED IN THE CAMERAS,

AND HE SAID "GOOD EVENING" TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT HE HAD TO DO, BUT HE WAS A DIFFERENT GUY.

THIS GOVERNMENT, AS PROMISE, HAS MAINTAINED THE CLOSEST

SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD UP ON THE ISLAND

OF CUBA. WITHIN THE PAST WEEK,

UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT A

SERIES OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IS NOW IN PREPARATION

ON THAT IMPRISONED ISLAND. TO HALT THIS

OFFENSIVE BUILD-UP, A STRICT QUARANTINE ON ALL

OFFENSIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT UNDER SHIPMENT TO CUBA

IS BEING INITIATED. ALL SHIPS OF ANY KIND BOUND

FOR CUBA FROM WHATEVER NATION OR PORT, WERE THEY FOUND

TO CONTAIN CARGOS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,

BE TURNED BACK. IT SHALL BE THE POLICY OF THIS

NATION TO REGARD ANY NUCLEAR MISSILE LAUNCHED FROM CUBA

AGAINST ANY NATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AS AN ATTACK

BY THE SOVIET UNION ON THE UNITED STATES REQUIRING A

FULL RETALIATORY RESPONSE UPON THE SOVIET UNION.

WITH BOMBERS, JET FIGHTERS, NAVY VESSELS AND OVER A HUNDRED

THOUSAND COMBAT PERSONNEL ASSEMBLED IN THE GULF,

U.S. MILITARY OFFICIALS PUSHED FOR AN INVASION.

THE INVASION WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY SIMILAR IN SCALE TO THE

INVASION OF NORMANDY ON D-DAY IN 1944.

BUT THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL

THAT SOVIETS HAVE 94 TECHNICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE.

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT

THE CIA NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD WERE THERE.

THE SOVIETS HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BEACH

WAITING FOR AN AMERICAN INVASION FORCE, AND THAT COULD

HAVE BEEN EASILY THE BEGINNING OF NUCLEAR WAR.

CASTRO SENT A MESSAGE TO KHRUSHCHEV SAYING THAT

IF THE AMERICANS INVADE CUBA, "YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED

"YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE UNITED STATES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

MARCHING ALMOST INEVITABLY TOWARDS A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

THE U.S. MILITARY WAS NOT ONLY PRIMED TO ATTACK CUBA,

THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND WAS PREPARED TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR

STRIKE ON THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

OVER 150 NUCLEAR MISSILES AND TWELVE HUNDRED AIRPLANES

CARRYING NEARLY THREE THOUSAND NUCLEAR WARHEADS

WERE ON STANDBY SHOULD THE PRESIDENT GIVE THE ORDER.

WITH THE WORLD TEETERING ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION,

BOTH KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY WERE DETERMINED TO FIND A

WAY OUT THAT WOULD NOT INVOLVE ARMED CONFLICT.

WE KNOW TODAY THAT THE CRISIS WAS OVERCOME THROUGH A SERIES

OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

BETWEEN NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND JOHN KENNEDY.

TO KENNEDY IS AN EXCHANGE OF SOVIET

MISSILES IN CUBA FOR U.S. MISSILES IN TURKEY AND ITALY.

THIS POSES A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BECAUSE HE'S ALREADY BEEN ACCUSED OF WEAKNESS BY THE JOINT

CHIEFS, BY HIS REPUBLICAN OPPONENTS.

HE SECRETLY HAS HIS BROTHER INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ONLY PUBLICLY GUARANTEE THAT

WE WON'T BE INVADING CUBA IN THE

FUTURE, IF THE SOVIETS WITHDREW THEIR MISSILES, BUT SECRETLY

THE UNITED STATES AND JOHN KENNEDY PLEDGES TO START TO

DISMANTLE U.S. MISSILES IN TURKEY SO THAT KHRUSHCHEV

CAN WALK AWAY FROM THIS FEELING THAT HE GOT

FEELING THAT HE GOT SOMETHING HE NEEDED.

THAT TIME IS RUNNING OUT; IT'S A MATTER OF HOURS BECAUSE

THE PRESIDENT IS COMING UNDER PRESSURE FROM HIS SENIOR

MILITARY LEADERS TO DO SOMETHING.

THE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS OFFICIALLY ENDED WITH A

BROADCAST ON SOVIET RADIO OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

AGREEING TO JOHN KENNEDY'S PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF A

NON-INVASION PLEDGE OF CUBA, THE MORNING OF

OCTOBER 28, 1962. The Soviet government has

ordered the dismantling of weapons in Cuba, as well as

their crating and return to the Soviet Union.

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO HAVE IT BROADCAST

OVER MOSCOW RADIO IN ENGLISH, AND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAT

AND IT WAS THE MESSAGE THAT FINALLY BROKE THE CRISIS.

CRISIS, WHEN THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE

PULLING THEIR MISSILES OUT, WHICH REALLY WAS A GREAT

VICTORY FOR THE WEST, KENNEDY WISELY PUT THE WORD OUT,

"DO NOT GLOAT. DO NOT BRAG ABOUT THIS.

DON'T TREAT THIS AS A VICTORY." HE WAS VERY CAREFUL.

YOU NEVER RUB YOUR VICTORY INTO YOUR OPPONENT'S FACE.

AT THE END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

CURTIS LEMAY BELLOWED, "WE LOST, WE SHOULD HAVE GONE IN

THERE AND CLEARED THEM OUT WITH MISSILES AND BOMBS."

KENNEDY'S GREATNESS IN THE MISSILE CRISIS WAS HE THOUGHT

IN TERMS OF AVOIDING THE POINTLESS DEATHS OF MILLIONS OF

PEOPLE, WHETHER THEY WERE AMERICANS OR RUSSIANS.

SO IN THAT SENSE, HE HAD A KIND OF UNIVERSAL HUMANISM.

THERE'S A WEIRD SCENE AT THE END OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

WHEN JACK AND BOBBY ARE TOGETHER AND JACK KENNEDY, I GUESS

THINKING ABOUT LINCOLN AFTER THE CIVIL WAR ON THE

NIGHT OF HIS ASSASSINATION, LINCOLN WENT TO THE THEATER,

AND JACK KENNEDY SAYS TO BOBBY, "THIS IS THE NIGHT

I SHOULD GO TO THE THEATRE." AND BOBBY SAYS,

AND BOBBY SAYS, "IF YOU GO, I WILL GO, TOO."

OF THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS LIFE

IS AT RISK. AND I THINK JOHN KENNEDY,

WHO HAD HIS OWN VERY PERSONAL SENSE OF MORTALITY THROUGH

THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER, THROUGH HIS OWN WOUNDING

IN THE WARS IN THE PACIFIC, HAD A VERY REAL SENSE

HAD A VERY REAL SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITIES.

MISSILE CRISIS, KENNEDY HOPED TO FORGE A

NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV AND RESTART

TALKS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN. INFORMED THAT NORMAN COUSINS,

EDITOR OFTHE SATURDAY REVIEW AND A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

ACTIVIST, WAS HEADED TO THE SOVIET UNION,

KENNEDY ASKED THAT HE CARRY A PERSONAL MESSAGE

KENNEDY DID WANT MY FATHER

WAS NO ONE IN THE UNITED STATES

MORE EAGER THAN HE TO PUT ALL THESE

TO PUT ALL THESE DIFFERENCES ASIDE.

COUSINS WAS GOING TO BE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

SAW AN INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE

CITIZEN WHO WAS ABLE TO BE A GOOD BACK CHANNEL ENVOY,

AND JFK WAS INTERESTED IN RESTARTING THE TEST BAN TREATY

TALKS WHICH HAD BROKEN DOWN BECAUSE THERE WAS A

MISCOMMUNICATION ABOUT HOW MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS

MANY ON-SITE TEST BAN VISITS EACH SIDE WOULD GET EACH YEAR.

US THAT KENNEDY SAID HE WAS VERY SCARED OF THE POWER OF THE

MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES, AND WHAT HE WAS SCARED OF IS

WHETHER THE MILITARY WOULD SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND

SOMEHOW POSITION ITSELF AND UNDERMINE HIS EXECUTIVE POWER.

TO SEE KHRUSHCHEV IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE

SOVIET UNION WERE ANDREA AND CANDICE COUSINS.

STAYING AT THIS LOVELY RETREAT ON THE EDGE OF THE BLACK SEA;

IT WAS SORT OF THE CAMP DAVID OF THE SOVIET UNION.

WE CAME INTO THIS BEAUTIFUL INDOOR/OUTDOOR ROOM WITH A

POOL, AND THERE WERE GLASS PANELS, AND KHRUSHCHEV

PRESSED A BUTTON AND THE PANELS FOLDED BACK.

AND THEN TO OUR SURPRISE, HE SAYS TO MY SISTER ANDREA

AND TO ME, "WHILE YOUR FATHER AND I

ARE TALKING, WHY DON'T YOU TAKE A SWIM?"

WHILE WE WERE PADDLING AROUND

IN THE SWIMMING POOL, MY FATHER AND KHRUSHCHEV

THE FATE OF THE WORLD BASICALLY,

I DON'T KNOW IF WE REALLY

UNDERSTOOD AT THAT TIME HOW SERIOUS, HOW ENORMOUS

THESE QUESTIONS WERE, AND HOW MUCH WAS AT STAKE.

WHAT KENNEDY WANTED FOR MY FATHER TO CONVEY

TO KHRUSHCHEV WAS THAT IT WAS TIME TO START AFRESH...

AND TO SEE IF THEY COULD GO FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED

FORWARD WITH THEIR BASIC SHARED INTENTION OF A TEST BAN TREATY.

"WE'RE WILLING TO RESTART THESE TALKS AND GET SOMETHING GOING,

BUT THE BALL'S IN JFK'S COURT IN TERMS OF DOING IT."

EVENTUALLY, THEY CAME AND GOT

US AND BROUGHT US BACK UP TO KHRUSHCHEV'S STUDY, AND

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK OUT A GREAT BIG COAT

AND WAS FOOLING AROUND WITH THE COAT, SORT OF PLAYING

HIDE AND SEEK, COVERING HIMSELF UP WITH IT AND THROWING

IT OFF AND GROWLING, AND THEN COVERING HIMSELF UP AGAIN.

IT WAS REALLY DELIGHTFUL THAT THIS MAN...

HE WAS UNDER SO MUCH PRESSURE, AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY

AND YET, HE HAD THIS CAPACITY TO PLAY AND TO BE SILLY.

THIS PERSONAL VIEW OF HIM WITH THE WAY HE WAS PICTURED

IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA, YOU KNOW, POUNDING HIS SHOE

AT THE U.N... "WE'LL BURY YOU."

YOU KNOW, IT WAS REALLY HARD TO SQUARE THOSE TWO THINGS.

SO, COUSINS COMES BACK IN APRIL OF 1963,

VISITS THE WHITE HOUSE ON APRIL 22 AND REPORTS TO KENNEDY

THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS INTERESTED, BUT SOME OF THE HARDLINERS ARE

VERY SKEPTICAL AND READY TO DENOUNCE THE U.S.

COUSINS FOLLOWS UP WITH A LETTER

TO JFK WHERE HE SUGGESTS A SPEECH OF BREATHTAKING

IMPORTANCE EXPRESSING HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIETS,

UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY WENT THROUGH IN THE WAR,

AND HE POINTS OUT THAT THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS

GOING TO MEET IN JUNE OF THAT YEAR, AND SAYS THAT

WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO DO IT. AND, OF COURSE, JFK FORWARDS

THE LETTER ON TO TED SORENSON, HIS CHIEF SPEECH WRITER,

AND THEY AGREE THAT SINCE JFK IS GOING TO SPEAK AT AMERICAN

UNIVERSITY ON JUNE 10, THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH

THAT WOULD BE THE TIME FOR SUCH A SPEECH.

TIME AND PLACE TO DISCUSS A TOPIC ON WHICH IGNORANCE TOO

OFTEN ABOUNDS AND THE TRUTH TOO RARELY PERCEIVED,

AND THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT TOPIC ON EARTH, PEACE.

WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO I MEAN AND WHAT KIND OF A PEACE DO WE

SEEK? NOT A "PAX AMERICANA,"

ENFORCED ON THE WORLD BY AMERICAN WEAPONS OF WAR;

NOT THE PEACE OF THE GRAVE, OR THE SECURITY OF THE SLAVE.

I AM TALKING ABOUT GENUINE PEACE, THE KIND OF PEACE THAT

MAKES LIFE ON EARTH WORTH LIVING.

CERTAINLY THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SPEECH WAS A BREAK

WITH THE PREVAILING WISDOM AND A BREAK WITH THE

ESTABLISHMENT, WHAT THE ESTABLISHMENT VIEW OF

THE COLD WAR WAS AND WHETHER OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND

OR NOT WE CAN SURVIVE AND LIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.

WHO DESPAIRS OF WAR AND WISHES TO BRING PEACE SHOULD BEGIN BY

LOOKING INWARD BY EXAMINING HIS OWN ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE, TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION,

TOWARDS THE COURSE OF THE COLD WAR,

AND TOWARDS FREEDOM AND PEACE HERE AT HOME.

FIRST, EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS PEACE ITSELF.

TOO MANY OF US THINK IT IS IMPOSSIBLE.

TOO MANY THINK IT IS UNREAL, BUT THAT IS A DANGEROUS,

DEFEATIST BELIEF. IT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE, THAT MANKIND IS DOOMED,

THAT WE ARE GRIPPED BY FORCES WE CANNOT CONTROL.

WE NEED NOT ACCEPT THAT VIEW. OUR PROBLEMS ARE MAN-MADE,

THEREFORE THEY CAN BE SOLVED BY MAN.

WHEN KENNEDY DELIVERED HIS SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,

SOVIET PEOPLE THAT THERE COULD

BE A NEW BEGINNING. TO MAKE CLEAR OUR GOOD FAITH

AND SOLEMN CONVICTIONS ON THIS MATTER,

I NOW DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT

PROPOSE TO CONDUCT NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE,

SO LONG AS OTHER STATES DO NOT DO SO.

WE WILL NOT... [ applause ]

WE WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO RESUME.

SUCH A DECLARATION IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A FORMAL, BINDING

TREATY, BUT I HOPE IT WILL HELP US ACHIEVE ONE.

IN SHORT, KENNEDY MADE AN ADVANCE TOWARDS KHRUSHCHEV,

TOWARDS THE NEED FOR MORE DISCUSSIONS AND FOR A CLOSER

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO, AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF

AND THAT DID NOT FALL ON DEAF EARS, LET ME ASSURE YOU.

KENNEDY GREW THROUGH THESE YEARS, ESPECIALLY THROUGH

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. MY FATHER REPEATED THAT

WE DEFEND OUR SYSTEMS

THEY'RE DIFFERENT,

WE HAVE ONE IN COMMON: WE WANT TO PREVENT THE WAR.

AND I CAN DEAL WITH THE PRESIDENT KENNEDY."

I THINK THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SPEECH

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS...

NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.

KENNEDY'S STYLE, HE BROUGHT KHRUSHCHEV

AROUND, AND WE HAVE A TEST BAN TREATY TODAY.

MANY HAVE ARGUED THAT THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

WAS KENNEDY'S GREATEST ACCOMPLISHMENT AS PRESIDENT.

HOW THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD RANK HAD KENNEDY LIVED AND BEEN

PERMITTED TO FULFILL HIS OTHER FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE.

DECISION TO BRING THE

THEN-EXISTING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM OUT OVER

IN VIETNAM OUT OVER A CERTAIN TIMETABLE.

MEMORANDUM 263 WAS A DECISION DOCUMENT

THAT BASICALLY SUMMARIZED KENNEDY'S

APPROVAL TO BRING OUT THE 17,000 OR SO U.S. FORCES

THAT WERE IN VIETNAM AT THAT TIME.

THE FIRST 1,000 WOULD BE WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF

1963, THE REMAINDER WOULD BE OUT BY THE END OF '65.

AND THAT WAS A FORMAL PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

IT WAS THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

ON THE DAY HE DIED. THAT'S, IN FACT, NO LONGER,

I THINK, HISTORICALLY CONTROVERSIAL.

THE MOST IMPORTANT INDICATION

OF THE THINKING OF JFK ABOUT HIS POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

SHOT DOWN, HE HAD A CONVERSATION

WITH HIS NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER,

WHO WORKED ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, MICHAEL FORRESTAL, IN WHICH

HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO INITIATE A COMPLETE, THOROUGH

REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM, AND THAT THE REVIEW

HAD TO INCLUDE OR INVOLVE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE

UNITED STATES SHOULD BE THERE AT ALL.

PERHAPS EVEN MORE STARTLING THAN KENNEDY'S PLAN TO WITHDRAW

PERSONNEL FROM VIETNAM WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE

WAS HIS SECRET EFFORT TO ENGAGE FIDEL CASTRO IN A DIALOGUE.

RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE MOST INFAMOUS ACTS

OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA AND YET,

SECRETLY HE WAS, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH,

PURSUING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH FIDEL CASTRO.

WAS BURIED IN SECRET DOCUMENTS

THAT WERE IN A VAULT AT THE KENNEDY LIBRARY UNTIL I ASKED

FOR THE ENTIRE FILE, WHICH WAS TITLED,

"CONTACTS WITH CUBAN LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED

LEADERS TO BE DECLASSIFIED IN THE LATE 1990s."

ACTUALLY NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH CASTRO?

TOP STATE DEPARTMENT AIDES WERE SAYING, "THE UNITED STATES

WON'T TALK TO CUBA UNLESS CUBA THROWS THE SOVIET UNION OUT

AND PROMISES, GUARANTEES THAT IT WILL STOP SCREWING

AROUND IN THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA AND PROMOTING

REVOLUTION AGAINST THE U.S. INTERESTS.

AND KENNEDY ACTUALLY TOOK A VERY DIFFERENT POSITION.

HE TOLD MCGEORGE BUNDY, HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,

"I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD BOX FIDEL CASTRO INTO A CORNER.

I DON'T THINK WE SHOULD MAKE PRE-CONDITIONAL DEMANDS

FOR TALKING TO HIM THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE

TO MEET." MY FATHER,

HE REPEATEDLY TOLD FIDEL CASTRO THAT,

"I TRUST KENNEDY. I TRUST THAT HE WILL NOT INVADE

YOUR COUNTRY, AND WE HAVE ANOTHER SIX YEARS BECAUSE

I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL BE REELECTED."

WHILE U.S. EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE FIDEL CASTRO'S

GOVERNMENT CONTINUED, KENNEDY WORKED THROUGH BACK

CHANNELS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1963, A BREAKTHROUGH SEEMED NEAR,

AND KENNEDY SENT WORD TO CASTRO THAT HE WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATING

AN AGREEMENT. HE SENT HIS OWN EMISSARY

TO TALK TO FIDEL CASTRO, A FRENCH JOURNALIST

NAMED JEAN DANIEL WHO HAD COME TO WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER,

MET WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT

FOUND OUT THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO CUBA, HE BASICALLY

SENT A MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO WITH JEAN DANIEL.

AND JEAN DANIEL WAS GIVING THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO

THIS MESSAGE TO FIDEL CASTRO ON NOVEMBER 22, 1963.

THAT KENNEDY MIGHT BECOME A HISTORIC PRESIDENT,

ONE OF THE FIRST PRESIDENTS WHO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE WORLD

WAS A DIVERSE PLACE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD LIVE

WITH COMMUNIST REGIMES PEACEFULLY.

AND SO THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT THIS WHEN, DRAMATICALLY,

AN AIDE CAME IN AND SAID, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SHOT."

AND SAID, "THERE GOES YOUR MISSION

"THERE GOES YOUR MISSION OF PEACE."

BECAUSE HE DIDN'T KNOW WHO COULD DO IT.

AND THAT MEAN THAT SOME HAWKISH AMERICANS

KILLED THE PRESIDENT WHO WANT TO PRESERVE PEACE AND MAYBE

TOMORROW THEY WILL START NUCLEAR WAR AGAINST

THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE KILLING AMERICAN PRESIDENT,

IT IS NOT A SMALL EVENT, SO HE WAS VERY NERVOUS.

ONE OF THE SADNESSES OF MY GROWING UP WAS THAT WHEN

I WAS A BOY AND KENNEDY CAME TO OFFICE... I WAS 10 YEARS OLD

WHEN HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT... THERE WAS THIS GREAT BELIEF IN

PUBLIC SERVICE, IN PUBLIC LIFE AND BY THE TIME I WAS A YOUNG

MAN BECAUSE OF VIETNAM AND WATERGATE, THAT HOPEFULNESS HAD

TURNED TO CYNICISM AND APATHY. THAT'S A GREAT SADNESS TO ME,

AND WE'VE NEVER QUITE OVERCOME IT.

THOSE WHO WERE LIVING ON THIS

PLANET AT THAT TIME HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED A PRESIDENT BEING

SHOCK BEYOND BELIEF.

STAGGERING, YEAH.

I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS THAT KENNEDY DID FOR US

AND FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE PLANET WAS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO

GO AGAINST A GROUP THAT WAS POWERFUL AND SPEAK UP IN SPITE

OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALONE. I THINK THAT THAT'S A...

MAYBE THE HARDEST THING FOR A PERSON TO DO.

"ONE MAN CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE,

AND EVERYONE SHOULD TRY." THAT IS PROFOUNDLY TRUE.

AND IT'S NOT JUST TRUE OF PRESIDENTS AND WITH PRESIDENTS.

IT'S TRUE OF ALL OF US, WHEREVER WE MAY BE,

WHEREVER WE MAY BE, WHEREVER WE MAY BE IN LIFE.

ONLY STILL WITH US, BUT IT'S GREATER THAN EVER.

AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST IT.

BUT TAKING A STAND AGAINST IT, AS WE KNOW FROM KENNEDY,

IS NOT JUST A DIFFICULT THING, BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING.

BUT IT'S A DANGEROUS THING. BUT IT MUST BE DONE ANYWAY.

Male announcer: IN A 1964 COUP, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED

FROM POWER BY SOVIET CONSPIRATORS WHO CLAIMED HIS

RESIGNATION WAS DUE TO ADVANCED AGE AND POOR HEALTH.

SOURCES IN MOSCOW LATER REVEALED

THAT BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S DISMISSAL WAS THE HUMILIATION

OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS

LEADERSHIP. FORCED FROM PUBLIC LIFE,

KHRUSHCHEV'S NAME WAS OMITTED FROM RUSSIAN HISTORY BOOKS,

AND IN 1971, THE FORMER SOVIET LEADER WAS DENIED

A STATE FUNERAL. ACCORDING TO DECLASSIFIED

RECORDS, IN THE MONTH FOLLOWING HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION,

ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY SENT A MEMO

TO SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK SEEKING AN

END TO THE U.S. TRAVEL BAN TO CUBA, CALLING IT

"INCONSISTENT WITH TRADITIONAL AMERICAN LIBERTIES."

TODAY AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A RESOLUTION

CALLING FOR AN END TO THE ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND

FINANCIAL BLOCKADE IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES ON CUBA

WAS ADOPTED BY A MARGIN OF 188 TO 3.

THIS MARKS THE 21st CONSECUTIVE YEAR THE UNITED STATES HAS

IGNORED U.N. CONDEMNATION OVER ITS CUBAN POLICIES.

PENTAGON PAPERS MADE PUBLIC TODAY REVEALED NEW DETAILS

SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS OF THE VIETNAM WAR.

ACCORDING TO THE PAPERS, PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S PLAN FOR

DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTH

VIETNAM BY 1965 WAS REVERSED BY THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER KENNEDY’S

DEATH. TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE

HAVE TAKEN PART IN CELEBRATIONS TO MARK 30 YEARS SINCE THE END

OF THE VIETNAM WAR TODAY. BY THE TIME THE UNITED STATES

WITHDREW ITS FORCES IN 1975, THE TRAGIC CONFLICT HAD CLAIMED

THE LIVES OF SOME 60,000 AMERICANS, 1 MILLION VIETNAMESE

SOLDIERS, AND NEARLY HALF A MILLION VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS.