All language subtitles for Israel.and.the.Palestinians.The.Road.to.7th.October.S01E01.1080p.WEBRiP.x264-DARKFLiX_track3_[eng]

This programme contains scenes
which some viewers may find upsetting

I was home, with my family.

Because I'm religious,
I didn't open the TV,

I didn't open the radio, nothing.

I went to the synagogue around 8.30.

SHOUTING

Then I see everyone running to me,

"Come fast,
we have to do something."

It took me hours to understand
what's going on.

Our people, our civilians
that we have a contract with them,

we failed.

We failed to protect them.

The 7th of October attacks and the
devastating war they sparked in Gaza

have brutally reopened scars
from decades of conflict.

The Bible says
there is a time for peace

and a time for war.

This is a time for war.

Now, with lasting peace
as elusive as ever,

we explore the roots of the crisis.

Those at the highest level tell
the story of how, time and again,

they tried - and failed -
to end the deepening conflict,

as strained relationships
reach breaking point.

What Netanyahu did to
Vice President Biden was outrageous.

It's like the biggest slap
in the face.

I think American Secretaries
of State are like moths to a flame

when it comes to the Middle East.

We'll see how two decades
of failed negotiations

helped Hamas' power grew

and we'll hear from their leader

who was killed a month
after our interview.

In this first episode, a
controversial Israeli plan for Gaza

opens the door
for Hamas to seize control.

For Sharon, this is a matter of
political life and death for him.

The gut reaction was to view this
as a trap, as a conspiracy.

And Palestinian, Israeli
and American leaders

grapple with the fallout.

President Bush was looking
for an enormous achievement.

Now, what is sexier
for an American leader

than a peace agreement
in the Middle East?

SHOUTING

SIREN BLARES, SHOUTING CONTINUES

The deadly conflict
between Hamas and Israel

began long before
the 7th of October.

SIREN WAILS

One of Hamas'
most devastating attacks

came in the summer of 2003,

a suicide bombing
on a bus in Jerusalem

which killed 23 and left
over 100 more seriously injured.

It was part of the Intifada,

the Palestinian uprising
against Israeli occupation.

The Palestinian President,
Yasser Arafat,

had long been accused of turning
a blind eye to such attacks.

We had arrested many of those
who are behind these activities.

But no-one can give 100% results.

Arafat, a former guerrilla fighter,

was an icon of
the Palestinian people.

His government,
the Palestinian Authority,

was nominally in charge of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip

despite Israel's
military occupation.

Its goal was a Palestinian state,

recognised by
the international community.

Israel's leader, Ariel Sharon,

had ceased all diplomatic contact
with Arafat and his government.

He was about to take a decision that
would shape the course of events

in Gaza and beyond
for years to come.

Sharon's radical plan was to end
Israel's presence in the Gaza Strip.

But it would be unthinkable for him
to do so without the blessing

of Israel's biggest financial
and military backer.

He dispatched his Chief of Staff
to talk to the Americans.

For us, for the Sharon government,

the peace process
seems to be frozen.

But the whole world pressured us,

"These are the way to agree to a
foundation of a Palestinian state."

And in this mood,
or in this climate,

I met with Condi Rice.

Dubi Weissglas was a kind of
combination of a confessor

and Chief of Staff
and friend of Ariel Sharon.

He had Sharon's confidence.

Dubi came into my office,
and he said, "We have a plan.

"It is a plan that would allow us
to go forward

"in terms
of the Palestinian state."

So what Dubi Weissglas brought
was a proposal for Israel

to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza.

That meant the Israeli
military forces would be gone.

And more importantly, settlements,
Israeli settlements in Gaza,

would be dismantled
and moved out of Gaza.

He started using the phrase
that Israel was going to withdraw

from Gaza and throw the keys
over the fence.

And basically, whatever happened
afterwards was not their problem.

We just sort of all
looked at each other like,

"Are we actually hearing
what we have been hearing?"

I said, "Condi, this is...

"..not just a serious decision,

"this is a matter of
political life or death for him."

Rice took Sharon's plan
to the President.

Like so many of his predecessors,
George W Bush had taken office

hoping to deliver a breakthrough
in the Middle East.

When the President first heard of
what Dubi Weissglas was proposing,

he immediately embraced it.

And when asked why, he said,

"Because Sharon was willing
to take a bold step."

This would sort of shake up things
on the issue of Middle East peace,

which was really at a dead end.

I felt, and President Bush felt,
that if you had Ariel Sharon

willing to talk about
ceding territory,

it was worth taking the chance.

Nobody would question
Ariel Sharon's dedication

and devotion to the security
of Israel.

Ariel Sharon was celebrated
by Israelis as a hero

of their country's long conflict
with its Arab neighbours.

In 1967, as a young commander,

he'd played a crucial role
in the Six-Day War,

which saw Israel gain swathes of
land from Jordan, Syria and Egypt,

including Gaza.

Since then,
despite international condemnation,

Israel had been building settlements

throughout the
Palestinian territories,

further cementing its occupation.

By 2003, there were more than
400,000 Israeli settlers

living in the West Bank,
including East Jerusalem.

In Gaza, there were 7,500 living
alongside a Palestinian population

of around a million who were
largely confined to the territory.

Sharon knew that any withdrawal
would be hugely controversial

in Israel, not least within
his own party, the right-wing Likud.

MUSIC: Likud Jingle

BOOING, WHISTLING

BOOING

Watching Sharon's address

was one of Likud's
most influential politicians.

When the Prime Minister first
raised the disengagement idea,

I said that I had no particular
desire to have Israelis

stay in the Gaza Strip
in a final political settlement.

But I said, "We're not in
a final political settlement.

"And if we withdraw unilaterally,

"it will be understood
by the Arab terrorist

"to be a reward for terror."

So unwittingly, and inadvertently,

we could be putting wind
in the terrorists' sail.

Sharon had made clear that
his plan would be carried out

without any consultation
with the Palestinian Authority.

Arafat summoned his top advisers.

I remember distinctly
the leadership meeting

that was held shortly after
Sharon made that announcement

was characterised by a sense of,
"What do we do with this?"

This guy was saying
he's going to disengage from Gaza,

to withdraw from it. How can we say
no or object or express reservation?

The gut reaction,
the instinctive reaction

of many in the Palestinian
leadership at that time -

to view this as a trap,
as a conspiracy.

You know, "He wants to do Gaza in
order to take over the West Bank."

The accusation that Sharon's plan
was simply a smokescreen

for his designs on the West Bank
was soon gaining traction,

and not just with Palestinians.

Condi came to us and said,

"There are some people in the world
believe that your willingness

to leave Gaza is in order
to distract attention

"from what's happening
in the West Bank,

"and we might be considered
as part of this conspiracy."

We insisted that when we thought
about the Gaza withdrawal,

it couldn't be, as we called it,
Gaza only.

The more he could do in making clear

that this was not about dumping Gaza
and grabbing the West Bank,

the more we would be able to do
to help Sharon politically.

Sharon was ready to give up Gaza
for, let's say, good reasons,

in order to strengthen the Israeli
presence in the West Bank.

But he understood very well
that in order to be able

to pass it through
the Israeli political system,

he needs to get something
in return,

and the only ones who could
give something were the Americans.

Sharon agreed to make
a symbolic gesture.

He'd withdraw from a handful
of settlements in the West Bank

as well all of those in Gaza.

In return, he got
the American support he wanted,

including a recognition
that the biggest settlements

in the West Bank
would remain permanently.

We thought that however much
they might complain about it,

this was a huge opportunity
for the Palestinian people

and the Palestinian Authority.

They got a down payment
on a Palestinian state.

They got Gaza, a territory
which they would be responsible for

and they would have an opportunity
to build and show the world

that they were ready to live
side by side in peace with Israel.

The Palestinian leadership
didn't see it that way -

and they had even more reason
to be sceptical

when Sharon's Chief of Staff said
the withdrawal

would put the peace process
in formaldehyde.

I used the wrong term. I meant to
say that the road map is inactive,

but it's very much alive.

And I said it definitely
for the right-wing of our society,

"The Palestinian statehood
that you are so much against

"will not happen tomorrow,
as might be the case

"if the world will squeeze us."

It will happen
maybe 5, 10, 20 years,

or it may not happen at all.

Sharon began preparations
for the withdrawal,

setting a deadline of August 2005
for all settlers be relocated.

Then, with nine months to go,

came news that shook Palestinians
to the core.

Yasser Arafat, the man who'd been
the symbol of their resistance

for 40 years, was dead.

The new leader of the Palestinians
was a very different character.

Mahmoud Abbas had a background
in diplomacy.

President Abbas
was the antithesis of Arafat.

He did not believe that you could
beat the Israelis in a war.

He thought he would win the battle
by convincing the Americans

that the Palestinians were not
going to be reverting to violence.

The new President vowed to take on
militants like Hamas

in a way that Arafat never had.

Weeks after taking office, he joined
Sharon at a summit in Egypt

and announced
he would end the Intifada.

Abbas and his team hoped
they could now persuade Sharon

to reframe the Gaza withdrawal

as part of a negotiation
with the Palestinian Authority.

I said to Dov Weissglas,
"Dubi, I understand why you wanted

"to do it unilaterally
when Arafat was alive,

"but now you have a new President,

"why not give us the credit
for this?"

Our concern was that
Hamas would say,

"Look, years of negotiations
have failed to produce any results.

"Israel only responds to violence,
only responds to force."

Why not let's sit and negotiate,
even pretend to negotiate?

A couple of photo ops,
a couple of statements,

so I and my team and my boss
can go to our public

and say that disengagement is
a result of our negotiation process.

Sharon was very consistent.

He said, "If we begin negotiations
with the Palestinians,

"it will be endless story
because they will always have

"new reservations and new complaints
and new demands and we will never

"be able to do what I already
decided that we should do."

I remember Weissglas saying to us,

"You don't even understand
how we have to talk about this."

"We have to speak about this
in Likudish," he said.

"This is a language you don't know.

"To speak to the Likud members,
the only way to get this approved

"is to say, 'We're doing this
for Israel.

"'We're not doing this
for the Palestinians.

"'We don't care about
the Palestinians.

"'We're not talking
to the Palestinians.'"

CHANTING

Across Israel, huge protests
against Sharon's disengagement plan

were gathering force.

Despite pressure
from the right,

Sharon had managed to keep
his government together.

Then, just before the withdrawal
was due to begin,

one of his key cabinet ministers
called a press conference.

I remember he comes in
without the usual staff.

So I whispered to Sharon,
"He's planning a little drama."

We had this feeling
that he's about to resign.

I cannot be a partner to a move
that I think

compromises the security of Israel,
tears the people apart.

The only way that we can win
this battle, anywhere, everywhere,

is by confronting terror
and not appeasing it.

Appeasement doesn't work.

A week later, Israel began
the pull-out from Gaza,

sending in its own forces to evict
those settlers who tried to stay.

The operation
bitterly divided Israel.

Some soldiers even refused orders
to dismantle the settlements.

SHOUTING

They took our people out
and give the Arabs this building.

Look, this beautiful area.

I want you just to see that.

They think that it will be peace?

No, no peace. No peace.
With Arabs, will be no peace here.

The final Israeli troops left Gaza
a month after the operation began.

Israel would still police
the borders,

tightly restrict which goods were
allowed in and out of the territory

and place controls
on the Palestinian Authority

re-arming its police on the ground.

But the day-to-day running of Gaza
inside the fence

was now officially in the hands
of the Palestinians.

CHANTING OVER LOUDSPEAKER

Within hours of the withdrawal,

Hamas and other militants
were claiming it as a victory.

Since its founding in the 1980s,
Hamas had promised to destroy Israel

by violent resistance, reclaiming
the land they saw as Palestinian.

Support for Hamas had grown
in both Gaza and the West Bank -

and it would soon be
put to the test.

Earlier that year,

Hamas leaders had met with
12 other Palestinian factions

and - for the first time in
their history - agreed to take part

in elections, in return for what
they called a calming of violence.

Leaders of Hamas
were pushing for election.

They felt great self-confidence.

And therefore,
they wanted the election

because they thought that
they had a chance to win.

Parliamentary elections
were set for January 2006.

Abbas would remain President
whatever the outcome,

but there would be
a new Prime Minister.

With three months to go,
Abbas visited the White House.

The question immediately arose,

"You're going to have parliamentary
elections - what about Hamas?"

Hamas, to us, was a terrorist group.

How is it that they participate
in the elections?

Abbas said, "Look, you say
you like free elections.

"Who is my opposition?
It's Hamas.

"And if I don't let them
participate in any way,

"this is a completely
phoney election."

I remember asking
about whether or not

Hamas should be
allowed to participate

if they were still armed.

In other words, should they have
to give up their militia

to participate in the elections,

rather like Sinn Fein had done
with the Irish Republican Army?

And I remember Abbas saying,
"No, if we say that,

"they won't participate,
and then it won't be legitimate."

Conventional wisdom was,
if Hamas showed up,

the whole process
is going to be derailed.

But consider how much worse
it would have been.

If they were forced not to,

if they were prevented from
participating, it was a nonstarter.

The saving grace, in a sense,
in this argument -

which Abbas also made - was,
"They're going to lose.

"I'm going to win.

"Maybe they get 20% of the vote."

Not only does it show
it's a free election,

it shows they have
a low level of support.

And you're going to divide Hamas
because there are going to be

some people in Hamas who are gunmen,
who are terrorists,

and there are going to be others
who like the taste of politics.

You will be creating a divide
in Hamas.

The President, of course, was a big
advocate of a democracy agenda,

of empowering people.

And he thought that it was time
for the Palestinians to be given

an opportunity to weigh in
on the question of their future.

And so he felt the elections
had to go forward.

I want to thank President Abbas
for his hard work.

I appreciate your service,
Mr President.

I assured him that the United States
will use our influence

to help realise a shared vision
of two democratic states,

Israel and Palestine, living
side by side in peace and security.

Thank you, sir. Good job.

The election campaign
was soon in full swing.

Any Palestinian living in Gaza
or the West Bank,

including East Jerusalem,
would be allowed to vote.

Abbas's party, Fatah, was struggling
to make a real impact -

even with American support.

There was a disconnect
between American culture,

political culture,
and Palestinian political culture.

They sent us the guy who designed
the podium for President Bush.

This was well-intentioned,

but this was irrelevant to
the Palestinian political culture.

No-one cared what the podium
looked like.

I actually went to the West Bank
a week or two before the election,

and it was really extraordinary
because, all over the place,

there were banners
for the Hamas candidates.

And when you looked for
Fatah banners, nope.

Fatah placards on the wall? Nope.

It was really quite extraordinary,

because how does Hamas know
how to do all of this?

They'd never been running
in free elections.

Fatah was fielding multiple
candidates for the same district.

Hamas was disciplined. They fielded
only one candidate everywhere.

They had a very clear,
unified message.

Hamas ran a masterful campaign.
I remember one of their posters,

very powerful.
You know, "America is against Hamas.

"Israel is against Hamas.
Who are you for?"

And you are addressing Palestinians.
I mean, that wins you votes.

With just weeks to go
before the elections,

some Fatah officials
started to worry.

They sought help
in an unlikely place.

I was approached by a high-ranked
Palestinian official. And he said...

.."We are in a big problem
with this election,

"but because of the Americans
monitoring, we can't call them off.

"The only one who can save us
from ourselves, it's you guys."

So I said,
"What are you expecting from us?"

He said, "The issue of
the post offices in Jerusalem."

Palestinians in Jerusalem
had been voting in post offices.

So all that you need
is for Sharon to say,

"There'll be no voting
in post offices."

Then the Palestinian Authority would
say, "We can't go ahead like this.

"The Israelis have ruined
the election."

So he said to the Israelis,
"This is what you have to do."

What he said is,
"Make a public statement

"which would be sort of provocative
and we will call off the election.

"Everybody's happy."

About the participation of those
who are living in East Jerusalem,

Prime Minister Sharon
took a decision

that those who live there
will be able to vote

in the villages around Jerusalem,
like Abu Dis and others,

and not in those post offices
within East Jerusalem.

Word soon got around that Abbas was
preparing to cancel the elections.

The American consul general was
dispatched to see the President,

who was also known as Abu Mazen.

I was asked by the State Department
to convey a message to Abu Mazen

that the administration wanted
the election to go forward.

I passed that message to him,

and after that, there was
no further discussion

from the Palestinian side about
postponing elections at that point.

As election day came around,
Abbas had reason to be optimistic.

The elections went well.

No problems.
Everybody who wanted to vote voted.

Polls were showing that Hamas
will not win the majority.

Hamas will win maybe 30% to 40%,

and Fatah will get the rest.

Of course we are optimistic because
we have democratic elections.

I was in Ramallah at the time.

I woke up to a commotion outside.

WHISTLE BLOWS, DRUMMING

SINGING

I turned on the TV,
and the reporters were saying

that Hamas had won the election.

Gathered myself,
went to the ministry,

and there was a state of shock,

a sense of, "OK, now what?"

CAR HORN BEEPS

When I went to bed, the last report
was that Fatah had won.

So I'm a very early riser,

and the next morning,
I was exercising

and there was a crawl
on the morning news,

and it said, "Hamas wins elections."

And I thought, "Wait a minute.
I thought Fatah won the elections.

"Why would this be the case?"

We got to the office right away
to try to figure out what to do.

You might think we would have
on our desk the scenarios,

"If Hamas wins, we do this,
"and if Fatah wins, we do that,"

but we didn't.

Nobody had any plans
for a Hamas victory.

Nobody believed
it was even conceivable.

This put the United States
in an extremely difficult position.

We were promoting
the freedom agenda,

the importance of democracy,
the importance of elections.

Were we now going to say that
the elections were illegitimate

because Hamas had won them?

I met with Abu Mazen,
and the message from Washington was,

was there any way he could avoid

appointing Hamas
to lead the government?

The president told the Americans,
"You wanted us to have an election,

"free election, democratic election,
and this is the result.

"And now I have to accept the result
and you have to accept it too.

"You have to pay the price with us."

How the international community
responded to the election results

would be determined
by a group called the Quartet.

Established to mediate
Middle East peace talks,

it was made up of the US, EU,
United Nations and Russia -

which was then working with
the Americans in the War on Terror.

Their representatives were attending
a summit on Afghanistan

when Rice called
an emergency meeting.

From the American point of view,

there could be no dealing
with Hamas.

And the argument we made was,
"We will destroy our common position

"about fighting terrorism
if we say it's OK for Hamas

"to be a terrorist group and be in
this government, and we'll just

"deal with them as if they were not
holding a gun in their other hand."

The Americans proposed
a set of principles

for any new Palestinian government.

They must renounce violence,
recognise Israel

and sign up to previous
peace agreements -

all things that Hamas would
almost certainly reject.

The question was,
who would tell Hamas?

Russia was the only member of
the Quartet that actually had

a relationship with Hamas.

And so I had to convince
Sergey Lavrov,

the Russian Foreign Minister,

not only that it was important
that we state these principles

but that Russia was going to have to
carry the water in doing that.

It did take some convincing
with Sergey,

but as we talked it through,
he came to recognise that

the Russian Federation couldn't be
on the side of violence

in the Middle East. And he did
actually carry the message to Hamas.

The Russians were saying to Hamas,
"Guys, say the magic words."

"Just say some formula about,

"'Of course we want peaceful this
and peaceful that,'"

but Hamas was not playing ball.

They were remaining Hamas -
armed struggle.

The Hamas party has made it clear

that they do not support
the right of Israel to exist.

And I have made it clear,
so long as that's their policy,

that we will not support
a Palestinian government

made up of Hamas.

Hamas failed to endorse
the Quartet Principles,

failed to disavow violence
against Israel.

This did not sound to us
like the way to get

a peaceful democratic
Palestinian state.

This new democracy that's emerging
in the Palestinian territories

must understand that you can't have
a political party

that also has got a armed wing to
it, that democracies yield peace.

We were in a state of confusion,
but also a state of indignation.

We undertook this process
as you demanded,

at the time that you insisted
we do it,

and now you are rejecting it.

How is that democracy?
How is that rational?

But we were told in no uncertain
terms by the Quartet, "Nope.

"That outcome is not amenable
to our principles, to our vision.

"You either fix this
or it's a no-go."

Abbas invited Ismail Haniyeh,
Hamas' leader in Gaza,

to become Prime Minister.

The government he formed
would be in charge of crucial parts

of Palestinian life in both Gaza
and the West Bank.

But the Quartet Principles meant
its ministries could not directly

receive the international aid
on which they desperately relied.

The money would instead
have to go through

the Fatah-run Presidency of Abbas
in Ramallah.

Our hope really was that
Hamas would be isolated in Gaza,

so either Hamas would reform and
become a legitimate political party

or it would remain isolated.

And the hope was that if you had
a failure in Gaza, you had a success

in the West Bank, Palestinian
politics would resolve this issue

and, in short, that Gazans
would throw off the yoke of Hamas.

The Western powers

wanted to create a split between
the President's office

and the Prime Minister's office.

And the split would be total
because the President's office

will be receiving the money
and will be talking to the West

while the government,
with its health ministry

and economic ministry and education
ministry, would receive no money.

This was a disaster
for Palestinians altogether.

The breakdown in relations
between Hamas and Fatah was soon

only too evident and quickly
spilled onto the streets of Gaza.

With American backing, Abbas had
started training thousands

of new recruits to his Presidential
Guard to police the territory.

GUNSHOTS

Hamas fighters refused
to accept their authority.

By early 2007, dozens had died
in clashes between the two sides

and images of Palestinians
killing Palestinians

were broadcast around
the Arab world.

The region's most powerful leader
decided to intervene.

The King of Saudi Arabia -

the custodian of Islam's
most sacred sites -

invited Hamas and Fatah to Mecca
to talk about reconciling.

The Saudis pay a lot of money
for the Palestinian Authority.

Therefore, it was not only hard
to say no to them,

it was almost impossible.

The final text didn't mention
the recognition of Israel.

It simply stated that both Hamas
and Fatah would stop shedding

Palestinian blood and stressed
the importance of national unity

to confront the Israeli occupation.

Back in Gaza, the divisions between
Hamas and Fatah would only deepen.

Hamas was very frightened
that the Americans

were helping Fatah to end
the presence of Hamas by force.

And Fatah was thinking the same,

that Hamas was going to do something
to take over Gaza.

So, one night, I decided to go
to see what's the situation like.

And it was a bit shocking.

We were driving around and we saw,
on every corner of every street,

a Hamas fighter carrying his RPG
on his back, not hiding.

So the next day, I went to
the President and we said to him

that the situation is not good
and something has to happen.

GUNSHOTS

It was Hamas who acted first.

In June, its fighters caught
the Fatah security forces off-guard

and seized control,

saying that only Hamas had
the legitimacy to run Gaza.

Within days, Hamas had pushed
the Presidential Guard

out of Gaza entirely.

Abbas called his top advisers
to his West Bank headquarters.

There was a very solemn meeting,
as you can imagine.

And, you know, by that time,

the feeling had set in that this
was a violent takeover of power.

Well, this was the
ultimate...scenario, if you want,

the ultimate split. You have
two powers, two factions

controlling the two areas of
the West Bank and Gaza.

Abbas's authority
was at rock-bottom.

He'd come to office promising
to negotiate a two-state solution,

but had now lost control of
one of the Palestinian territories

on which that vision depended.

Weeks later, he was in Egypt for
a summit with some of the region's

biggest players, including
Israel's new Prime Minister.

Abu Mazen, for all
practical purposes,

seemed to have been dead,
and we decided to revive him,

to bring him into life again.

Ehud Olmert had taken office
the previous year,

after Ariel Sharon
suffered a massive stroke

from which he would never recover.

Unlike Sharon, Olmert promised
direct peace talks

with the Palestinians.

Olmert was totally different
to Sharon.

Olmert was the mayor of Jerusalem,
which had East Jerusalem within it.

And therefore he knew how to deal
with the Palestinians,

with the Arabs.

He knew that the predicament
of Abbas

was very difficult at the time.

And he knew that the Israelis
need peace,

need to finish this issue
once and for all.

While we were talking, one of
my assistants broke into the room

and said, "Prime Minister,
we need you outside."

I have a telephone call. The head
of the secret service calls me,

and he says, "There is a meeting
now taking place in Gaza

"with 12 of all the leaders
of Hamas."

And he said, "We have an F-16
with one-ton bomb ready,

"and they will all be killed.
I just need your OK."

I said, "Look, I sit right now
with President Mubarak,

"with King Abdullah
and with President Mahmoud Abbas."

"If, while we sit in Sharm
El Sheikh, the leaders of Hamas

"will be assassinated -
I mean, eliminated - by us,

"they will be implicated to have
cooperated with us

"in killing Palestinians
and this will be their end.

"And I'm not going to
risk my partners,

"even for the sake of
such...a very desired achievement.

"Say no."

Hamas' leadership in Gaza
remained intact.

And while Olmert and Abbas
were talking about a peace deal,

its fighters were building
their capabilities,

firing barrage after barrage
of rockets into Israel.

For the US President
and his Secretary of State,

the clock was ticking.

Their final term in office
was coming to an end,

and they desperately
wanted to see a peace deal.

The President thought if Abbas
could work out an agreement

that would establish
a Palestinian state,

then that outcome could be taken
to the people of Gaza and say,

"Do you want to continue to live
under Hamas?

"Or do you want to join and be part
of this Palestinian state?

"You decide."

Condi was in no doubt that
we should continue to move forward

despite, you know, the loss of Gaza.

This was hers. And, after all,
she had a partner in Olmert.

Progress was slow.

After several rounds of talks,
Olmert and Abbas

had made little headway.

Rice flew to Israel to try
to move things forward.

I was invited to dinner
with the Prime Minister

and a little bit surprised
that he said to me,

"I want to have dinner
with you alone.

"I don't want anyone to be there."

There was a table, two seats,
and I started to talk.

The waiters came with food,
and I say, "No, no, no, no!"

And they went!

I could tell that he was
a bit nervous somehow,

that this was different.

And he started to say that
he believed that if we were

going to make progress, what he had
to do was to put on the table...

He didn't say it this way, but
it was almost Israel's final offer

on how we would get to
a two-state solution.

And then he began to describe
what he had in mind.

Olmert told Rice that he was ready
to offer Abbas a deal

that would see Israel withdraw
from 95% of the West Bank.

And he even went on to talk about
the controversial subject

of Jerusalem and its iconic
religious sites.

I said the Arab side of Jerusalem
will be part of a Palestinian state,

will be the capital of
a Palestinian state.

And then I said the Holy Basin
will not be under

the exclusive sovereignty of anyone.

And there will be
a trust of five nations -

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine,
Israel and America -

under the auspices of
the UN Security Council.

I thought, "This, in some ways,
might be the breakthrough."

It's easy to think of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

as a political conflict.

But I remember my first trip
to Jerusalem

and looking at the Holy Sites
with that extraordinary light

that is only there in Jerusalem

and seeing that the Holy Sites
don't meet in Jerusalem,

they clash in Jerusalem.

And so this acknowledgement that
something had to be done also

about the religious element of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

I was very excited
because it was the first time

that I presented the full scale,
the whole programme.

And it... It erupts like a volcano

from my chest to her.

I was writing as fast as I could,

trying to keep up
with what I was hearing,

and he was accelerating in
his speech as he went through this.

And I knew that this was
a very special moment

and what to do about it,
what to do with it.

Rice went back to her hotel
to talk to her team.

I was amazed by the offer

because it went much further than
the Israelis had ever gone.

My reaction to this was,
"Wait a minute.

"He told Condi.
Has he told his cabinet?"

And I was actually fearful.

Because where are we
if Olmert proposes this to Abbas

and Abbas says yes

and the Israeli cabinet says no,
or the Knesset says no?

That's the end of the peace effort.

Before Olmert had a chance
to present his plan to Abbas,

he was forced to confront
a different problem.

NEWSREADER: The Israeli
Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert,

has denied allegations that he took
illegal campaign contributions

from an American businessman.

The allegation, essentially,
is that he received

hundreds of thousands of dollars
from a Jewish-American financier

who is known in Israeli press
as The Laundryman.

As we say in Hebrew,
in Yiddish, it's a "lange maiseh" -

it's a long story -

because from day one of
my Prime Ministership,

there were investigations
conducted against me

by all my political rivals.

And I knew from the beginning
that I was, in a way,

playing on a borrowed time,

and therefore I have to hurry up and
to move forward as fast as I can.

After police launched
an official investigation,

Olmert announced he would step down
as soon as a new leader was chosen.

Nevertheless, he decided to
press ahead with Abbas.

We went to this meeting.
It was the President and myself.

So after we had some time talking,

Olmert asked the President
to go with him to a separate room.

I brought this map
and I presented it to Abu Mazen.

This is the first time that
I exposed this map to the media.

You can see here it says,

"Annexed to Israel 4.9% of
the territory of the West Bank,"

and the blue stains here
are what was scheduled

or what was planned
to be annexed to Israel.

The map that Olmert presented
showed Israel withdrawing

from the vast majority
of the West Bank.

It would retain
the largest settlements,

but the Palestinians would be given
Israeli land in return.

The plan would also connect Gaza
and the West Bank via a tunnel

or highway, to help re-unite
the two territories politically.

He said, "Prime Minister,
this is very serious.

"It is very, very, very serious."

He says, "Give me the map."

I said, "President, I will not
give you the map

"unless you sign it by initials."

I said, "President, I beg you.

"Listen, in the next 50 years,

"you will not find one Israeli
leader that will propose to you

"what I propose to you now. Sign it,
sign it and let's change history!"

And he said to me, you know, "I need
my map expert to go over it."

So I said, "OK, let's set up
a meeting tomorrow

"for your map expert and
my map expert." And he said, "Fine."

So we parted, you know, like

we are about to embark on
an historic step forward.

We said goodbye
and we went into the car.

And the President said that
Prime Minister Olmert said,

"If you agree to this,
we can sign a deal."

And of course we laughed

because it is unfortunate
that Olmert,

regardless of how nice he was, he's
a lame duck - in American terms -

and therefore
we will go nowhere with this.

Next day, they called,

and they said, "Well, the President
forgot that he has got to go

"to Amman and, you know,
we'll come back to you."

I've been waiting 15 years for this.

Nine days later,
Abbas flew to America to see Bush.

Mr President, welcome back.

The American President
hadn't given up hope

of making a breakthrough
before he left office.

His argument to Abbas was,
"Seize the opportunity

"and do a peace deal now."

If he would accept a peace deal
with the Israelis,

it would then give him a platform

to go to the people of Gaza

and bring Gaza and the West Bank
back together.

Bush's view was, "This was a time
for boldness, for leadership,

"a historic opportunity."

And unfortunately,
Abbas did not seize it.

Olmert presented this map
to President Abbas

but told him that he cannot
take a copy.

How can you sign on the biggest deal
in the history of the Palestinians -

that is peace agreement
with Israel -

when you don't know what the map
looked like exactly,

and what are the conditions
surrounding the map?

That's not a good deal.

We might as well wait for
the next Prime Minister to come.

In four months, Bush would
leave office -

the latest US President
who would do so

without the peace deal
they'd craved.

Israelis, meanwhile, prepared to
go to the polls in an election

that would determine the course of
the peace process for years to come.

With Netanyahu, you had to lay down
a very strong line to begin with.

Netanyahu said Obama said to him,

"You know what I do with people
who disagree with me?"

and then drew a finger
across his neck.