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[indistinct voices on radio]

[man on radio]
Contact DCA, you read?

[man 2]
Roger, loud and clear.

[man 2]
Roger, station 7,
prepare for pressurization

of stage 2 oxidizer.

[man 3]
Roger.

[hissing as suits
are pressurized]

[Plumb] I was fairly new
to working out
on the missile sites.

At the age of 19, you know,

you've got that
"no fear" mentality.

[man on radio] WCB, we got
a transient read on 54...

[hatch opening and hissing]

[Plumb] Right above us

was a nine-megaton
thermonuclear warhead.

To see the magnitude
of that weapon

within ten feet from you,

it was a monster
waiting to go off.

When you think about
working on a weapon
of mass destruction,

you're counting on
everything to work
perfect all the time,

and things just don't work
perfect all the time.

[piece hits floor]

[alarms beeping]

[urgent voices on radio]

[Childers] The first thing
that my commander heard
are the words, "Uh-oh."

[Powell] The fuel vapors
in the silo

are just climbing
and climbing
and climbing.

[Plumb] We need
to get the hell out
of this complex

because this thing's
going to blow up.

[Rutherford] Do we let
the world know?

Do I run out and say,
"We got a potential
nuclear explosion"?

What do you do?

[men chatting]

Complex 3-1 has phase 14
missile age inspection.

Complex 3-2,
instructor crew
scheduled for...

That day, September 18th,

it was basically five days
before my 24th birthday.

So I was 23.

Lieutenant Childers was 24,
was the deputy.

When we went on alert
in a Titan system,

we were on alert for 24 hours.

That's what a tour was,
24 hours.

We had 18 silos spread
all the way out

to the eastern corner
of Arkansas.

We went up the main highway
to a certain point,

and then you had to pull off
of the highway
onto much smaller roads.

Until you came over
a particular rise,

you wouldn't even know that
the missile complex was there.

[Holder]
As we drove up
to missile complex 4-7,

it's very unassuming.

There's not a lot there.

There's this huge door
and there are some antennas.

However, underneath that door
was the most powerful warhead

that the U.S.
has ever operated.

[Childers]
Before you left the base,
they gave you some codes

that gave you access
to the complex.

[man on intercom] MCC,
what is your ident code?

[man] Ident code is
alpha-niner-victor...

[Childers]
You would read the code
to the commander

and then you would
take a lighter,

set the codes on fire,
and drop them down into a box

so they would burn up
and no one else
could use those codes.

[door buzzes]

All four of the crew
members went down
three flights of stairs.

At the bottom of that,
you got to a blast door.

[hissing and unlatching]

There were a series
of blast doors,
6, 7, 8, and 9.

So you'd walk through this,
and you'd step
into the middle level

of the launch control center,

with all of the equipment
that you needed
to maintain the missile.

When we took charge
of a complex,

that meant that we owned
that missile
until the next crew came out.

So if we went to war,
we were prepared

to launch
those weapons on command.

[crew member]
Apps power, silo soft,
guidance go.

We're standing by
for fire engine.

We never knew what
our specific targets were,

because you didn't really
want to know
who you were going to destroy.

[crew member]
Turning on my command,
everybody, turn keys.

On the word "keys",
we will turn.

Is the crew ready? Your B-Man?

[crew member 2]
B-Man's Ready.

[crew member]
MFT?

[crew member 3]
MFT ready.

[crew member]
Deputy?

[crew member 4]
Deputy ready.

[crew member]
Crew is ready-- Ready?

[Childers] You had to be
prepared to destroy
an entire civilization,

and we were trained on that.

As heartless as it sounds,
I never had a problem with it.

I was doing it for my country,
I was doing it
to protect my country.

The whole reason
I sat out there

was to prevent that
kind of thing from happening.

That's what deterrence
was about.

But deterrence is worthless

if you don't demonstrate
that you're willing
to do it, too,

and we always
had to demonstrate

that I would walk out there
and turn those keys
in a second

and I would kill ten million
people and never hesitate.

[rumbling]

Every time I went
onto a complex,

every time I saw
a Titan II missile,

I had the same sense
of excitement.

You couldn't see the warhead
from the bottom

because you were
eight stories down,

and the cone of the warhead
disappeared off
in the distance.

The warhead on top
of the Titan II

was three times as powerful
as all the bombs

used by all of the armies
in the Second World War,

including both
the atomic bombs.

When the crew members
successfully turned the keys,

the 330,000 pound missile
would lift up out of the silo.

[Holder] And it would
head out for about five
minutes of powered flight

to the edge of space,

fly for another 20 minutes,

and hit its target
halfway around the world.

[Childers]
Before September 18,

the only warheads
that we thought

would go off
in the United States
would be Soviet warheads.

We never considered
that our own warheads

could detonate
on our own continent.

[Schlosser]
From the very beginning
of the atomic age,

there has been a sense
of this immense power

just being on the verge
of slipping out
of our control.

The world's first
nuclear device was
fully assembled

in a small tent
in the middle of the desert.

Nobody was sure
what would happen

when this thing would detonate.

They were even concerned

that when the first
nuclear device detonated,

the Earth's atmosphere
would catch on fire

and every single
living thing on Earth
would die.

And yet they
did the test anyway.

[explosion roars and echoes]

[Schlosser]
After the war ended,

an engineering section
of the nuclear weapons program

became known
as the Sandia Laboratory,

and Sandia became America's
first atomic bomb factory.

I realized if I joined Sandia,
I would be working

on atomic bombs,
and that was okay with me.

We were driven by the fear
of the Soviet Union.

Anything we conceived of
the military wanted,

and money was free.

[Schlosser]
As the technology improved,

as the number
of nuclear weapons in
our arsenal increased,

there were soon assembly lines
for making nuclear weapons.

We had bombers in the air
at all times

loaded with nuclear weapons.

We had submarines
that had missiles

carrying nuclear warheads.

It was feared that the Soviets
would have far more missiles
than the United States,

so we went on a huge
missile-building binge.

At one point, we only
thought we needed
50 to 200 nuclear weapons

to completely annihilate
the Soviet Union,

and by the mid-1960s,
we had 32,000
nuclear weapons.

But every one of those
weapons you build

not only threatens
your enemy, but poses
a threat to yourself.

[man]
One more time, ready?
Launch verification...

[men running launch drill]

[Childers]
September 18

was one of those days
where nothing was going
the way it was supposed to go.

[Holder]
That day, September 18,

we find out that they have
a problem with
the oxidizer tank,

that the pressure
is a little bit low.

[Childers]
Each stage of the missile
had two separate tanks.

One was filled with fuel
and the other was filled
with oxidizer.

[Holder]
All you got to do
is mix those two fuels

and you're going
to have an explosion.

We called back to base.

They said, "We had
a maintenance team
coming out."

A specialized unit,
they called them the PTS team.

The difference
between PTS people

and any other person
on a missile site is,

we get to play with fuel
and oxidizer,

uh, and they don't.

I loved PTS.
I loved my job.

My major goal at that time
was to be a PTS team chief,

and be the best
PTS team chief ever.

When I arrived
at Little Rock Air Force Base,

I would have been 19, yeah.

Ah, no, 18.
My birthday is in March,

so I would have been
one month away from being 19.

I think I was ready to take on
the world at that point.

I wanted to go out to the field
and work
on that Titan II missile.

You know, we called it a bird,
and I wanted to work
on the birds, you know?

[gas hissing]

[Powell]
Oxidizer, when you breathe it,
it turns to nitric acid.

And you basically drown
in your lungs
if you breathe enough of it.

[PTS member]
We would work 12, 14-hour,
up to 16-hour shifts,

and then go to sleep,

and then five hours
later or so, you get up
and head back in

for another 12, 13,
or 14-hour day.

[Powell]
On September 18,
we'd had a long week,

we had the next day off,

so when we finished
the maintenance task
at the site that we were at,

you know,
we thought we were done.

[men talking]

[man]
Roger that, we'll send them
back your way.

[Powell]
Our team chief called back
to the base

to tell them
we were on our way back

and they said,
"Well, before you come back,

we want you to stop over
at 4-7 at Damascus."

When we got there,
they didn't have
the right part.

They had to bring the part out
on a helicopter.

I would say we waited
from 3:30 to about 6:00
in the evening

before we could
actually enter the silo.

We'd been on duty
about eleven
and a half hours.

[men talking on radio]

[Powell] So we started down
the cableway to the silo,

when all of a sudden,
I realized that I
had forgotten

the torque wrench
up in the truck.

There was a change
in the checklist

that we were supposed
to use a torque wrench
from here on out,

but that was a recent change.

I had spent three years

basically taking
the pressure cap off
with a ratchet.

And so instead of sending
somebody back
to get the torque wrench,

I grabbed the ratchet
to do that.

The ratchet's
about three feet long

and the socket's
about eight pounds.

And I radioed to
the team chief that we're
ready to begin the checklist

for pressurization
of stage 2 oxidizer tank.

[hatch opens, air hisses]

[Plumb]
We had a problem
with that ratchet.

It wouldn't allow Dave
to actually get the socket

to clip or snap into place
to be secure.

He held the socket
up against the dust cap

and he put the ratchet
up against it.

[Powell] Basically you
hold it with one hand
on that ratchet handle,

and one hand cradles
the head of the ratchet

with the socket on it.

[Plumb] And so I got
on the end of it

and kind of gave it
a little force,

and I remember saying to him,
"You got this?"

"Yeah, I got it, I got it,
let go of it."

[Powell]
And I go to pick it up,

and the socket falls
off the end of the ratchet.

[Plumb]
Just boompf,
right through the hole

and just straight down.

As it was falling,
I was thinking,

"Oh, no, oh, no, oh, no."

I wanted to jump
after that thing.

[Powell]
Anytime I want,

I can close my eyes
and see that socket.

I see the socket
bouncing off the platform.

I see my RFHCO glove
reaching for it.

And I see it falling
in slow motion.

Seventy feet.

Hitting the thrust mount
like it had eyeballs.

[clangs]

[hissing]

And then a stream of fuel
coming out of the missile.

[Plumb]
I was just in total shock.

I think we both just looked
at each other for a second,

and we're like,
"Oh, my God,
what are we going to do?"

That missile was just
blowing fuel.

Then the magnitude set in
as far as what could happen.

The destructive force
if that thing exploded,
and we can't stop it.

[Schlosser]
Nineteen years before
the Damascus accident,

a B-52 bomber carrying
two powerful hydrogen bombs

took off on a routine mission
over North Carolina.

During the mission,
the plane experienced
a fuel leak,

and suddenly, the B-52 began
to break apart mid-air.

As the fuselage was
spinning and heading
back towards Earth,

the centrifugal forces
pulled on a lanyard
in the cockpit,

and that lanyard was pulled
exactly the way it would be

if a crew member
wanted to release
its hydrogen bombs

over enemy territory.

Bombs are relatively dumb.

They sort of think
that if you drop the bomb
out of the bomb bay,

you must have intended
to do that.

[Schlosser]
One of the weapons
in particular

went through all of its
arming steps to detonate,

and when that weapon
hit the ground,

a firing signal was sent.

And the only thing
that prevented

a full-scale detonation
of a powerful hydrogen bomb

in North Carolina
was a single safety switch.

All it is,
is a two-position
on-off switch.

That prevented
a four-megaton disaster.

If the right two wires
had touched,

the bomb would have detonated.

Period.

[Schlosser] The Goldsboro
accident occurred at a time

when the number
of nuclear weapons
accidents was increasing.

[Peurifoy] I read through
all of the known
accident reports.

And it scared
the hell out of me.

We were shocked
when we realized,

all these years
we've been thinking

along this nice, neat line.

That's not reality.

[Schlosser] There had been
all these statistical
assurances

that weapons
wouldn't detonate
in an accident.

And then there
was a realization

that the weapons were
nowhere near as safe

as everyone had assumed.

[Stevens] We knew
that fire, for example,
could set off

these electro-explosive
devices inside the warhead

in a random way.

[Schlosser]
During a fire, the solder
might melt on a circuit board.

It created all kinds
of new electrical pathways

that could completely
circumvent a safety device.

[Peurifoy] Of the
20,000 or 25,000 weapons
that we had in stockpile,

I could not,
in good conscience,

swear that they were
adequately safe.

[Schlosser]
What they were saying is,

thousands of weapons
in the American nuclear arsenal

were vulnerable
during an accident,

including the most powerful
warhead on
an American missile,

the warhead on top
of the Titan II.

I was sitting down
in the kitchen,
eating a sandwich,

when the klaxon went off.

[alarm beeping]

So I didn't think
too much of it.

I mean, it went off,
it's like,
"Okay, they just...

They're doing
their procedures."

But about ten seconds later,
we got another klaxon.

[alarm beeping]

I got up and I walked about
halfway down the stairs.

And I looked down
and I can see the
commander's console.

Then the commander's
console has lots
of red lights flashing,

and so I know
something's wrong.

[Childers]
Captain Mazzaro
was our crew commander.

The first thing
that Mazzaro heard

and that the other team
members heard
are the words, "Uh-oh."

Mazzaro said,
"What do you mean, 'uh-oh'?
What's going on?"

They said, "There's smoke
in the bottom
of the launch duct.

Commander's trying
to clear up."

"What do you mean,
smoke in the bottom
of the launch duct?

Do you see a fire?"

[Powell]
The fuel vapors in the silo
are just climbing

and climbing and climbing.

So I radioed back
that we had a cloud.

A milky white cloud.

I wasn't going
to say "fuel"
over the radio.

The reason I didn't want
to say the word "fuel"
over the radio

was because, uh,

in case the missile
commander was listening,

I didn't want him
to freak out.

[Plumb]
I think David was just
scared to say anything

about really
what was happening.

Only being 21 years old.

I guess it'd almost be like,
you know, you doing
something wrong as a kid

and you got to
tell your parents
about it, you know?

You know, how you
kind of just stand there

and you don't want to say
what you just did.

[Powell] I grabbed Plumb
and we walked back up
the cable way.

I immediately started looking
at the fuel level reader.

When it hits
that explosive level,

any spark
can set off the fuel.

You could
run through each of
the tanks on each stage

and see what the pressure was,

and we saw
that the pressure
was dropping.

It was dropping fast.

And then all of a sudden,
sprays came on
in the launch duct.

We thought,
"Well, there must be a fire."

It doesn't make any sense,
nothing made any sense.

And I jumped into
my checklist.

We did everything
according to checklists.

[voice breaking]
You know, we ran
the oxidizer checklists,

we ran the fuel checklists.

You know,
you stay in the checklist,
it'll take care of you.

[Holder] About that time,
the PTS team that
had been out working

had gotten back,

and they're standing over
in the short cableway,

and the maintenance
team chief went over
and met them

and they started talking.

At that point, I said,
"Okay, guys, what happened?"

And they came in

and then they explained
to the crew at that point
exactly what happened.

And that's when we finally
got him to admit

that he had done something,
that he had dropped it,

and there was a hole,
and he saw vapors
coming out.

It was more than "uh-oh."
And that was
the first time we knew.

It was a good
half-hour into it.

By then it was basically
out of control.

[alarm beeping]

[Brown]
When I became
secretary of defense,

we had tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons.

The numbers
were a big problem,

because it only takes
a few or one getting
out of hand

to cause
a catastrophic problem.

And we worried about that.
We probably didn't worry
about it enough.

The Titan II missiles,
by 1980, were both old

and much more prone
to accidents.

Why was it still
in the arsenal?

[applause]

In part because it was part
of a negotiating strategy.

We anticipated trading
them off against
Soviet heavy missiles

in strategic
arms negotiations.

[Schlosser]
It was a bargaining chip,

something that we
could give up in order
to persuade the Soviets

to get rid of a class
of their missiles.

[Brown]
So that was why
we still had it,

and it was therefore
available for an accident.

[reporter]
Nearly 14,000 gallons

of poisonous liquid fuel
poured out,

killing two persons
and injuring more
than 20 others.

[reporter 2] This would be
missile leak number ten
so far in Arkansas.

The Titan II is potentially
an awesome weapon of war

whose only victims so far
have been Americans.

September 18, 1980,

I got a call
from the command post,

said we had
a serious problem.

I was the new guy.

I had no previous
experience in Titan,

I had no training in Titan,

I had about three months
under my belt

before the accident
occurred on the night
of September 18.

I got to the command center,

started to figure out
what was going on.

And then I activated
the missile potential
hazard team.

[Schlosser]
The missile potential
hazard team

gathered together some
of the top figures
in the Air Force

to deal with the accident.

At Barksdale Air Force Base
in Louisiana,

there was
Colonel Ben Scallorn,

the Air Force's leading expert
on the Titan II missile.

As we're dumping fuel,
the oxidizer expands,

and there's a possibility
that it can rupture a tank,

and with a silo full of fuel

and you rupture
an oxidizer tank

and the oxidizer
hits the fuel,
it's gone.

[Schlosser] In Denver,
there were executives
from Martin Marietta,

who designed and built
the Titan II missile.

And in Omaha, Nebraska,
there was the
underground headquarters

of the Strategic Air Command,
known as SAC.

That night,
all the major decisions

would be made
at SAC headquarters
by General Lloyd Leavitt.

[Moser]
General Leavitt was
a very dedicated pilot,

a very courageous pilot
in Korea and Vietnam,

but he had no missile
background at all,
that I'm aware of.

As things progressed,
we were trying to do
everything we could.

We knew what
was going to happen

if we lost pressure
in the fuel tank.

You know, of course,
the missile was going
to collapse

on top of itself.

If the missile collapsed,
the entire missile
would blow up,

but what would happen
to the warhead
was anybody's guess.

There was no one
that we kept on alert

that knew anything
about the warhead.

There was no checklist,

so it became a seat-of-
the-pants operation
as things unfolded,

and I used every resource
we had that night

to try to face the problem
and solve the problem.

One of the options was,

if the silo closure door
was opened,

there's a possibility
that the gas could
have been vented.

But there was also
a possibility,

if the missile did explode
while that door was open,

it would throw the warhead
out of the silo.

We would not have known
where it went.

It could go almost anywhere.

[Schlosser]
Twenty-five years earlier,

a weapon similar to the one
on the Titan II

was tested
in the South Pacific.

[bang echoing thunderously]

The explosion wound up being

three times more powerful
than they had estimated.

And the test revealed

that the radioactive fallout
from a hydrogen bomb

could be even more deadly
than the blast itself.

Back in Washington,

they took a map
of the fallout pattern
from the Bravo Test,

and they superimposed it
on a map of the United States.

A similar weapon
detonated over
Washington, D.C.,

could release
enough radioactive fallout

to kill everyone
in Washington, D.C.,

everyone in Baltimore,
everyone in Philadelphia,

half the population
of New York City,

with casualties and fatalities
as far north as Boston.

[Holder]
The fuel tank readings
started going negative,

and at that point,
I felt that it was
potentially going to collapse.

And although there
are safety measures
within the warhead,

in the back of my mind,
you always wonder.

I don't think
anybody truly knew

what was going to happen
with the warhead.

[men speaking on radios]

[Plumb]
As they were talking
about these tank pressures

and all these
different things,

I'm getting
more and more anxious
and more and more anxious,

thinking, "I need...
We need to get out of here.

We need to get the hell out
of this complex,

because this thing's
going to blow up."

[Moser] Some of
the crew members were
eager to make an exit,

so with that in mind,
we started discussing,

should we evacuate the people
in the launch control center

or leave them in there?

The reason to get them
out of the silo,

we had no idea
what was going to happen
to the launch control center

if the missile exploded.

I still thought
we should be there.

We needed to be there.

If we evacuated
that launch control center,

we would be giving up
any ability to control any
of the equipment,

we would be giving up
the capacity to try
any of the ideas

that people were trying
to come up with in order
to save this system.

Rodney and I told
the crew commander

that we wanted to stay behind.

I couldn't leave.
You know, emotionally,
I couldn't go.

From our standpoint,
we could stay

because neither one
of us had children
at that time, and...

Not that we didn't care
about our lives,

but, you know, it just
seemed that it made
sense to us

that we should stay
and let everybody else go.

[people chatting]

[man] On the evening
of September 18,

people were gathering
in Hot Springs.

Vice President Mondale
was the keynote speaker.

Senator Pryor
and Governor Clinton
and others

had already
gone to Hot Springs.

And I was scheduled
to go over the next day.

That night we had invited
a friend over for dinner,
and the phone rang.

[phone ringing]

And it was this airman
who worked on
the Titan missiles.

When I got off the phone
from this airman,

I looked around and people
started asking me, saying,

"What's happening?"

And I said, "A Titan missile
is going to explode."

And the question was,
"Well, what does
that mean?"

"What it means...

is if that nuclear
warhead explodes,

we're incinerated."

You know, I said,
"Little Rock's gone."

I said,
"Little Rock is gone.

We're 46 miles
from this site,
we're gone."

I walked into our
living room and looked
out the front window,

and it was still
daylight savings time,

so it wasn't totally dark,

and you could see children
in the front yard

or people walking out
to their cars,

carrying on
their normal everyday lives.

And I thought,
"Do I run out on the street

and say we got
a potential nuclear explosion

46 miles from here?"

"Do I grab my friends
and neighbors

and get in the car
and start driving?"

What do you do?

I was there in Hot Springs
at night,

and the phone rang
and it was Skip.

And Skip says,
"We have a problem."

He said, "What's
the Air Force saying?"

I said, "The Air Force
is telling people
it's not happening.

That's what they've told
the people on the site.

They're going to tell you
that these things
are under control.

But I think you need to be
prepared for an explosion."

[cheering and applause]

As the general manager of
the radio station in Clinton,

we were doing
quite a bit of local news,

and you realize
in a small town

that you need to have
a police scanner,

because everything
comes off of it.

And the person said,
"We've got a chemical leak

at the Titan II
missile silo."

We get there about
the same time the
sheriff is getting there,

Gus Anglin.

This is Gus Anglin.

He was the sheriff
of Van Buren County,

very popular sheriff
by the way.

And so we decide
to walk down the narrow road

that goes down to the silo.

And when you get down there,

there's, like, this
ten-foot-tall
chain link fencing

with barbed wire
around the top of it.

Out of nowhere, here comes
two guys with M-16 rifles.

Gus says, "Do I need
to start evacuating?"

"Oh, no, sir, no, sir,
we've got it under control,
I assure you."

So we went back
to the edge of the road,
which was just off Highway 65.

[reporter] This is as close
as the military will
allow us to get...

[King] So here comes
Channel 4, here comes
Channel 11.

Before you know it,
we've got about
25 people out there.

They ignored us.

We'd yell at them
as they'd come by.

We'd go, "Hey,
is everything under control?"

You know,
"Have you fixed it yet?"

And they'd just keep driving.

They wouldn't even
acknowledge that
you existed.

Sheriff Gus Anglin,
he didn't get the information
he thought he needed from them

to make really
good decisions,

and finally he just went
to running everybody off.

When they were evacuating,
he said, you know,

"I don't know how bad
it's going to be
or anything else,

get out of here right now,

and then we'll get you
back in quick as we can."

They had roadblocks set up
back two miles from it

diverting traffic
around the area.

I had a problem,
that nine months
before that happened,

I had synchronized
a bunch of heifers,

which means you give them
a shot of Lutalyse

and they all come into heat
at the same time.

You breed them
all at the same time,

which also means they're
all going to calve
at the same time.

Well, their due date
was that day.

We would have lost the farm,
everything we had,

you know, if them cows
all got sick and died.

So, well,
we were going back in.

[Moser]
We finally made the decision
to evacuate the crew,

because when
the missile explodes,

if it does explode,

you're risking life
of the four crew
members on site.

So we thought the best avenue
was to take the crew
out of the control center.

Mike said, "We're going
to have to evacuate."

Uh...

It was one
of the hardest things
I think anybody could do,

because you were responsible
for a nuclear weapon

that was capable
of destroying

an unbelievable amount
of territory

and an unbelievable
number of people,

and you were
leaving it behind.

Nobody left it before,
nobody would leave
a nuclear warhead.

The whole time
I was leaving,
I kept thinking,

"I need to stay,
I should have stayed."

I look back on it now,
I still can't believe
we left it empty.

[alarm beeping, men talking]

We had all these
classified checklists.

Nobody had ever tried to
put them in a safe before,
they wouldn't fit.

So we left all of them
in the safe with
the door open.

We thought, "We're going
to go out the regular way,
we'll open a door up."

[Holder]
As we started to open
the blast door,

we immediately saw vapor.

Once we closed that door,

that cut off
our main escape route.

We were instructed to evacuate
through the emergency
escape hatch,

which we had never
actually fully opened.

[Childers]
It was just a metal tube
with a ladder in it,

buried a good 40 feet
under the ground.

There's a light at the top,

and it's supposed
to shine down into
the escape route,

and it didn't come on.
It wasn't working.
Nothing was working.

It was a hell of a thing
to climb up five stories
in the dark with this mask on,

and you couldn't breathe,

and it filled up
with vapors and you
couldn't see anything.

We knew there was
very little wind that night,
and all of the vapors

that were being evacuated
out of the launch duct

were settling over the site.

[James Sandaker]
I was at home
with my wife and kid,

and I got a call
from job control,

and they said
they had a problem
out at 4-7.

They told everybody here,

"This is a very
dangerous situation,

we don't know
what's going to happen,

this is a purely
voluntary mission only,

and if you don't want to go,
you don't have to go."

[engine roaring]

[Devlin]
The PTS group,
it was like a brotherhood.

There's no question
that we weren't
going to be the team

that was going out there.

Dave Livingston was
one of the guys,

and he was sitting
in the back seat

and he said to me,

"Somebody's going to die
out here tonight.
I just feel it."

And I said, "Dave,
don't say something
like that, man.

Don't even say it."

And he goes,
"No, I got a bad vibe, man,

Somebody's going to die
out here, man."

[Holder]
We know, at this point,
that there's a helicopter

on the way,
and Jeff Kennedy
was on there.

He was one of the best,
if not the best,

team chief in the wing.

Jeff Kennedy was
the kind of guy that...

Uh, he would never ask you
to do anything
he wouldn't do himself.

[Kennedy]
When I got out on site,
Powell came running up to me

and said, "Jeff, I fucked up
like you wouldn't believe."

I know that I need
to get the tank readings

to find out how serious
the leak is.

[Powell] Jeff thought
the longer we wait,
the more dangerous it gets.

What Jeff
didn't tell anybody was

we're going to go down
into that silo
and look at those pressures.

So we run across the silo
to the escape hatch.

Kennedy goes
into the tube first,

I follow him in,
and all of a sudden,

he looks up at me
and he says,
"Stay here."

We violated
the most sacred
rule in SAC,

which is the two-man rule.

Nobody goes to certain parts
of the silo

without being accompanied
by another person.

He felt like
that he could get
in and out quicker

if he went by himself.

[Kennedy]
Stage one fuel was now
at a negative imbalance.

There's 14,000
gallons of fuel

that have leaked out
of the tank.

So now we have less
than 30 pounds of pressure

before stage one
oxidizer blows.

[Powell] Kennedy shows
the readings that he just got,

and says we still
had time to save it,
but we had to move.

We had to move now.

[Childers]
The commander was furious

that he had violated
the two-man policy

by going down there
and didn't even have
a crew member with him,

he was just on his own.

He violated everything.

[Kennedy]
Fifteen minutes later,

SAC headquarters relieves us
of all command
decision making.

Now, here's SAC
headquarters

that has never stepped foot
on a complex.

That just pissed me off.

[phones ringing]

[Scallorn]
Time was of the essence

if we were going
to accomplish anything.

Every minute that passed by,

we were further,
simply because we're
dumping more fuel

and everything
is getting worse.

[Holder]
People started showing up
from base.

Communications,
portable vapor detectors,

they were bringing all kinds
of maintenance equipment.

[King] You think all of these
experts must be coming in
to work on this thing.

Then I see this bus come in,

and here are these
about ten guys,

and they start putting on
what looks like space outfits.

And you're looking at these
and you're thinking,

"I'm 24 years old
and they're all
younger than me,

and these guys are the experts
that are going to go in there
and fix this?"

All I saw was just young guys
that were being thrown
to the lions.

[Devlin]
One of the hard things
for us was

it seemed like we were
waiting and waiting
and waiting

for some decision
to be made at SAC
as specifically what to do.

So the time frame of, like,

"Man, you know,
whatever we're going
to do, let's do it."

[phone ringing]

[Moser]
The SAC command center
finally decided that

we had to know
what the status was

in the silo,
if we could get back in.

What they considered
the best alternative

was go back in
and check pressures.

[Devlin]
When we find out
what the plan is,

we have to break into
a nuclear missile complex,

which has never
been done before in history.

[Childers]
If we had stayed
in the control center,

we could have opened
every door they had
to break their way in.

[Holder] The plan was
to go down and go
through the blast doors,

get into the control center,

and depending on the fuel
and oxidizer readings,

they wanted to get
to the missile itself,

open up a valve
to vent that tank

so it would stabilize
and not collapse.

[Kennedy]
It's absolute,
total bullshit.

You know, I said,
"Colonel, why don't we just
go down the escape hatch?"

"Kennedy, this plan
has come down,

it's the plan we're going
to go with, and that's it."

[Powell]
Jeff thought the plan
was nuts.

But on the
other hand, you're...

This is what you do,
you're a PTS guy.

This is the plan
that came down

and you suck it up
and you do it.

[Moser] We were directed
to ask for volunteers
to go back in.

I personally wasn't in favor
of sending anybody else in
after all the time.

It was the wee hours
of the morning,

this has been going on
for many hours at this point,

probably eight hours.

But I guess you go back
and say, as a good soldier,

your boss says,
"Do this," and you
eventually do it.

And we had enough
brave souls to volunteer
to go back in the silo.

[Devlin] Rex Hukle and I
were the first guys
to go in.

They said, "You only have
30 minutes of air.

There is no crew
down there, the crew
is already evacuated,"

so they said,
"You're going to have to cut

and break your way
into this missile complex."

[Scallorn]
When they got
to the exhaust duct,

they took a reading
and the meter pegged out,

which is 250 parts
per million.

[Holder]
250 parts per million
is when the vapor

is in such
a high concentration,

it could start to melt
the RFHCO suits.

Almost anything
could cause it to ignite.

[Scallorn] General Leavitt
directed them to press on.

I knew it was
the wrong thing to do.

Whatever was going
to happen was not
going to be good.

[Devlin]
We got to the portal door.

We used bolt cutters
and a great big crowbar

to pry open the main lock

and then go down
three levels of steps

to get to your first
6,000-pound blast lock door

with great big hydraulic
pins that lock it in place.

We were getting close
to the 30 minutes of air

and then they said,
"You guys got it hooked up,
come on back.

"We're going to send
Kennedy and Livingston
in to replace you."

[Moser]
Those guys were brave.

They knew what they were
getting into

when they went back in
on the underground.
What could happen to them.

[Holder] I was sitting
in a security
police vehicle,

listening and hearing
what's going on.

The next team went in,

which was going to be
Kennedy and Livingston.

[man over radio]
AR to CC, stand by.

[Holder] They're relaying
the information

that they've opened
the blast door.

[Kennedy]
When we went
into the blast lock area,

there's eight lights,
bright as hell.

I'm less than ten feet
away from it and I
can't even see it.

[Holder] So they
immediately evacuated
and started topside.

[Kennedy]
I had got topside,

and now we get a command
from the team chief

to go down
and turn on an exhaust fan.

Livingston taps himself
on the chest,
and he went down.

[Holder]
After that, within seconds,

I saw the explosion.

[booming explosion]

[radio static]

[Moser]
All of a sudden,
I lost all communications.

PTS-1, do you copy?

I repeat, PTS-1, do you copy?

[Moser] Everything you
ever read or heard about
a nuclear explosion,

all communications were lost
until things settled out.

And that's the first
thing I, uh...

That's the first thing
that entered my mind,

that we had
a nuclear explosion
out there

and we may
have a shock wave

coming into Little Rock
Air Force Base

and all the
surrounding communities,

and that's the first thing
I thought about.

And all the people
would be dead out there
on site, of course,

and I just...

It was unimaginable
what was going
through my mind.

It was almost like

you wanted to get down
on your knees and, uh...

And, uh, pray
to the higher power...

[laughs]

...uh, to protect everybody.

[Hutto]
About 3:00 in the morning,

I decided, "Well,
might as well go milk."

And just before I got
to the roadblock,

you drop off a hill
on Highway 65,
there's a spot

that you can see the ground
at the missile base.

Just as I got to that spot,
it blew.

[booming explosion]

You felt it
more than you saw it.

I mean, I was
a mile and three quarters,
two miles away from it,

and it almost shook
my truck off the road.

[King]
I was sitting on the hood
of Gus' sheriff's car,

just kind of sitting there,

and had on slip-on shoes
and was kicking
one off and on.

Then all of a sudden,
it was just, "Ka-whoom!"

[King] Everybody was
running as hard as they
could to get out of there

because we may be living
our last few minutes.

[man]
Go, go, go!

[King]
I thought,
when I jumped in my car

and drove
as hard as I could,

that I was probably
outrunning a nuclear blast,
you know?

I thought, "This Dodge Omni
is going to outrun
this thing."

[booming explosion]

[Childers]
The sky just lit up.

It really looked like the sun
was coming up,

which is why our initial
reaction was,

"The nuclear bomb went off,
the nuclear warhead exploded."

[glass shattering]

[Childers]
So much gravel and rocks
were coming down.

It was smashing windshields
and putting holes in trucks.

I was literally
trying to crawl
underneath a truck,

and it started to move
and I crawled out again

real fast,
and somebody drove it off.

[tires screeching]

[debris falling]

[man]
Oh, my God!

[Childers]
The stuff stopped falling,

but there was flames
everywhere and you
could hear this roar.

And you looked down there,
you could see

this steam and fire
coming out of the complex.

[Devlin] All I know is
the first thing to hit me
was wind.

It was like, "Boom!"

Just like a concussion, man,
it was like, "Bang!"

And you're blown backwards,
you have no control
over anything.

[booming explosion]

As I was sliding on my back,

burning, going up the street,
my left eye opened

and I could see
glowing steel
blowing past me,

And in my heart, I said,
"It's over.

You're not going to live
through this."

You know, "I just hope
it's not painful."

[men screaming]

I got up
and took off running.

I got five steps away,

and a chunk of concrete
bigger than a school bus

hits the ground
right behind me,

and it's got steel rebar
hanging out of it.

As I'm running,

I feel this whack hit
my ankle and just
shatters my ankle.

The next step I took,
I just buckled
and went down.

That's when I
started to realize

that my face and neck
and back were all on fire.

[Childers] And I was
picking people up and
carrying them up the road,

trying to get them away
from the debris.

[tires screeching]

[man]
Evacuate, evacuate!

[Childers] All you
heard was, "Evacuate,
evacuate, evacuate!"

Air Force Colonel said,

"The other two
who are on the site,
they have to be dead."

And we looked down
at the site and said,

"I'm with you, Colonel,
they have to be dead."

I got into the last truck
that was there

with a bunch of hurt guys,
and I said, "Let's go."

[man over radio]

[sirens blaring]

[Kennedy]
As soon as it blew,

I can remember
being flipped ass
over tea kettle.

When I woke up,
I was laying on my back,

my legs were up
against the complex fence.

I was screaming and crying.

There was nobody there.

You only had yourself.

You know, the pain
I had to deal with

was trivial to the fact
that I wanted to live,
I wanted to survive.

I mean, I thought
of my kids, my wife.

I said, "I am not
going to die
in this complex."

I went to stand up
and I fell right down.

My leg was broken.

I fell down four,
five times, got back up.

All the time that
I'm walking,
I can hear Livingston,

"Oh my God, help me.
Please, somebody help me."

Because of my leg
being broken,

I determined that
I could not get him.

This is something that
I fought with for eons.

If Livingston had known
that I was there,

would that have been
enough of an
adrenaline rush,

to know somebody's
got to get some help?

Off the complex was a truck.

I had to make it
from one end of
the complex to the other.

When I got to the truck
and I radioed for help,

the truck went dead.

[Sandaker]
On my way back
to the missile site,

I could hear Kennedy
on the radio in the truck.

[switching through
radio frequencies]

[Kennedy on radio]
Help! Help me!

Help me!

Can anybody read me?

[Sandaker]
And I headed down the road

as fast as I could get
that truck to go.

I got partway there,
and two security policemen
were in the road

and they waved me down.

[knocking]

Who's bringing them?

What?

Who's bringing
people here?

They've got them
in trucks.

[Sandaker]
And he told us to evacuate
and not go down there.

And I said, "Screw you.

Our friends are down there,
we're going."

I'm not gonna wait here.

[Kennedy on radio]
Please help me!

Where are you?

[Sandaker]
When I got back
to the missile site,

I saw Kennedy.

He was burnt, and...

He had a hole in his leg
the size of your fist.

He was really
hurt bad, and...

He told me
to go find Livingston.

We put our helmets on
and we went onto the site.

It was like another world.

Ordnance guys had told us
that the warhead

was full of
plastic explosives

that could be laying
all over the ground,

so somehow we were
not supposed to step on them.

There was giant
chunks of concrete
blasted all over

that looked like
the size of semi trucks.

There's a strange glow
coming out of where
the silo used to be.

And when we got back
to the truck,

they had already
found Livingston,

and I was angry
because they didn't
have an ambulance.

I put him in the back
of a pickup truck.

And we...

I held him.

He begged me
not to tell his mother,

like he had done
something wrong.

[sirens blaring]

[Devlin] When we
arrived at the hospital,
I was hyperventilating,

breathing, because
the burn pain
was so great.

I had a nurse tell me,

"If you don't calm down,
you're going to pass out."

And I couldn't calm down.

I was on fire,
I felt like I was on fire.

[man]
Take it easy, Dev.

I went to the hospital
that Kennedy and
Livingston went to.

And we were there
for a few hours, I think.

And then the doctor
comes out and informs us

that David Livingston
had passed away

and that Kennedy was,
like, hanging by a thread.

You just keep replaying
things in your head.

"What if I did this?
What if I did that?"

The ifs and buts.

You know, and you just
keep replaying it.

[Plumb] Dave Powell was
a lot closer to
David Livingston

than most people knew.

I remember looking over
when I was at the funeral,

and I remember Powell
just weeping.

He feels responsible
for the death of David,
he really does.

He felt responsible
for the death
of his friend.

[Kennedy]
As soon as I found out
Livingston died,

I wanted nothing more to do
with the Air Force.

We were in the hospital
two days

before a single, solitary
Air Force personnel

were out at that hospital.

[Devlin] They came in
every eight hours
on my face, neck, and back,

and they used a scrub pad,
it was like a Brillo pad,

and they scrubbed
all the skin,
the dead skin, off

so that the new skin
would grow back.

All the scrubbing was
immensely painful.

The Air Force was
in a really big hurry

to get me back to
the base so that no one
could get to us,

there could be no interviews,
and you would not
be speaking to the press.

[phone ringing]

[Rutherford]
The phone rang about 3:30

with a call from one
of the airmen that said,

"It just blew."

The first thing I did was
look around and say,

"I'm alive, we're alive,
my family's alive,

my neighborhood's alive."

And my response was,
"Where's the warhead?"

And the person said,
"We don't know."

[man on radio]
...will once again,
partly, will be up

throughout the remainder
of the night
and into the morning...

When you were trying
to talk to the Air Force
to find out,

is there a nuclear warhead?

Was one involved?

Did you find it?

Was it, you know...
what condition was it in?

Had it burst open?

Was there uranium spread
all over the area?

They would not admit
that there was even
a nuclear warhead.

We could not tell
the local populace

or any of the political
or law enforcement people

that we had a warhead
on the missile.

That was, we could not
confirm nor deny
that we had

a nuclear weapon on-site,

and that was SAC
and national policy
at that time.

My personal feeling
was that it was
a ridiculous policy,

but nevertheless,
we had to live with it.

Sheriff, has the Air Force
told you very much?

Haven't told me
a darned thing.

Does that
make you mad?

Yes, it does.

[King]
So they wouldn't
tell us anything,

but one of the local
merchants in town

found the Air Force
frequencies.

[man]
Could you give us a status

on those EOD and disaster
preparedness people?

[man on Air Force radio]
Still walking up the hill.

[King]
They know that you're
listening to them,

and they said, "Be real
evasive about what
you talk about."

They keep on talking about,

"We cannot find it,
we cannot find the unit."

And that's how we knew
they were trying
to figure out

what happened to this
nuclear warhead.

Where did it go?

[man on radio]
Roger, on-scene commander.

The team went to the unit,

now they're on their way out
to give a full report.

[man] Team commander,
command post,

what unit are you
talking about, sir?

[man on radio]
Let's not talk about that.

It's laying in a ditch.

Besides, it's not
even up close.

It blew it out and it's
laying in the ditch,
it's all exposed.

[Moser] I went out there
the next day.

Somebody said, "There it is."

And it was in the ditch

and somewhat,
as I recall,
somewhat buried.

And then someone
called the nuclear
people at Sandia

to assess whether or not
we had a hazardous situation.

[Peurifoy]
The phone rang.

They said,
"We had a problem."

I knew I had
to get to Damascus.

We helicoptered into the silo.

I was apprehensive.

I knew that the warhead
could have been armed,

ready to fire.

[Kenner] Was there
a chance that that bomb
could have detonated?

Yes.

It was only after
we had landed
I learned that

because of the absence
of any power source,

the risk of a nuclear
detonation was
approximately zero.

[Brokaw]
The governor of the state
of Arkansas is Bill Clinton.

As you can see,
he's standing by
in Little Rock this morning

to talk with us
about the situation.

Do you think that
the people of Arkansas

who lived around
the Titan II missile site,
Governor,

were in danger at the time
of the explosion?

Well, Tom, of course,
as regards
to nuclear explosion,

all we can do is to trust
the experts there.

They say there was
never a danger of
a nuclear explosion.

[reporter]
As far as the community
itself is concerned

and the danger
from possible
radioactive leak,

if the warhead itself
has been...

If there is a warhead
and if it has been damaged,

have you heard anything
from Washington confirming

whether there is
one there or not?

I have not.

I've heard rumors,
I won't go into those
right now.

I remember that
Vice President Mondale,

he was trying to find out,
"Did this have
a real warhead?

Did this missile...
Was it armed with
a nuclear warhead?"

[Moser] You know, when
Vice Commander Colonel Ryan

went to Hot Springs,

Vice President Mondale
asked that question,

whether a nuclear weapon
was involved,

and, of course,
Colonel Ryan said,

"I can't confirm or deny,"

and that's
to the vice president.

That's when he got
on the phone
with Secretary Brown.

[Brown]
The first thing
I wanted to know was

whether there had been
any scattering
of nuclear material,

or still worse,
a nuclear explosion.

And when I heard that
there had not been,

my level of attention
went way down.

Accidents were not unusual
in the Defense Department.

There was at least...

There must have been
several every day.

[Schlosser]
According to the Department
of Defense,

there have been
32 broken arrows...

That is, serious
nuclear weapons accidents

that could have
endangered the public.

But a few years ago,

the Department of Energy
released a declassified
document

that said there had been
more than
a thousand accidents

and incidents involving
our nuclear weapons.

Not only had the public
not been told

about these hundreds
and hundreds of accidents,

but even the man responsible

for the safety
of our nuclear weapons

wasn't being told
about accidents

involving those weapons.

[Peurifoy]
When I was the director
of weapon development,

I was unaware of

a large number
of accidents and incidents

because I had no access
to the information.

I was surprised
when I read
about the number

of nuclear accidents
that we had
in the Air Force.

I knew about some of those,

but I didn't know
there were so many.

[Schlosser] Again and again,
in looking at these
documents,

you find an effort
to blame the person
who dropped the wrench,

who used the wrong tool
at a Minuteman site,

blew the warhead
off the missile,

who brought the seat
cushions onto the plane

that caught on fire
and crashed the plane.

There's this instinct
to blame the operator,

to blame the little guy.

If the system worked properly,
somebody dropping a tool

couldn't send
a nuclear warhead
into a field.

No special precautions
have been ordered

at other Titan missile bases
around the country

because of that explosion
in Arkansas.

[news announcer]
In Arkansas, the system itself
apparently did not fail.

A mechanic's wrench
fell from a ledge

and struck the missile,
puncturing a fuel tank.

That is classified
as human error.

The Air Force says
the Titan is not to blame...

that it was human error
that caused the accident.

The accident
that I've described here

is unrelated to the state
or the age of this system.

I was served with
an article 15 for
dereliction of duty

because I chose
to use the ratchet

instead of the torque wrench.

Sergeant Kennedy got
a letter of reprimand

for violating
the two-man rule.

I gave them my all.

And what did I get from them?

A letter of reprimand.

[Sandaker]
After the accident, I thought
that Kennedy and Devlin

and the others that
were hurt would be
treated like heroes,

because they were.

And they were
treated like crap.

Some of the officials here
at the air base

apparently have also
changed their attitude

towards some of the men
who risked their lives
that morning.

[Devlin] Channel 4 News
called and said,
"You want to tell us

about how well
the Air Force
is treating you

since the missile explosion?"

I said,
"Yeah, I'll tell them."

I worked
three-and-a-half years,

did a good job
for three-and-a-half years,

and then I wound up hurt
from this explosion,

and then all of a sudden,
they don't want you anymore.

You know,

I don't know
if I'm going
to be railroaded out,

or you know, I don't know
where I stand, really.

Oh, man, were they mad.

I think every brass on base
was mad at me.

When I wore my military uniform
with my boots on,

I almost couldn't walk.

I couldn't even move
the boot because my
ankle was shattered,

there's no Achilles tendon.

So I just went in
and said, "Colonel,
would it be possible

for me to wear a gym shoe
on my left foot?"

He looked at me and he said,

"Devlin, I wouldn't
authorize a fucking
thing for you."

I planned on staying
in the Air Force
for a career.

Within only a few months,

I knew I couldn't stay
in the Air Force.

I kind of lost it, um,
after that accident.

I just had a meltdown.

I went into the TV room
where we all played
cards one evening,

and there was beer bottles
all over the place,

and I just started throwing
a bunch of beer bottles
all over the place

and took my
frustrations out
on that.

The base commander,
he gave me an
honorable discharge

which I was thankful for,
but that was not my goal,

was to leave the military
at that time.

There was an old motto
that went around

that to err was human,
to forgive
wasn't SAC policy.

[Moser]
We have a checklist
in our command post

that calls for us
to notify the OES.

Now, I'm not saying
it broke down there.

Don't misconstrue
what I'm saying.

What I'm saying is
from there on down,
there was no plan.

This is the test bed,
4-7 was the test bed,
and we never...

Nothing like this
has ever happened before.

[Moser] Even though,
you know, I'd just had
three months there,

I was in charge,
and a senior guy

is responsible
for the whole operation.

I expected I was going
to lose my job,

let's put it that way,
after that happened.

I thought that was...
That would be
the next step,

and that happened
on Thanksgiving.

My regret was that...

I took orders from my boss,

I clicked my heels
like a good soldier

and tried to execute
those orders as best I could.

[rifles fire a salute]

And as a result of that,
we lost life.

[Powell] I think
about Livingston often...

What it'd be like
to still have him around

and call him up on the phone.

Jeff Kennedy passed away
a couple of years ago.

I have no doubt that Jeff
died from being
involved at Damascus,

no doubt in my mind.

I hear a song on the radio,
I'll see something on TV,

and bam, there it is,
it's back, you know?

It's very hard to talk about,
even today.

I tried to live
as normal a life as I can,

but there isn't a day goes by
that I don't think about it.

Thirty-whatever, 35 years,
whatever it's been.

Every day.

[news announcer]
It went like clockwork,

6,500 pounds of explosives
set to go at high noon.

[beeping]

[booming explosions]

[Schlosser]
Seven years
after the Damascus accident,

the last Titan II
was deactivated.

[cow mooing]

[Hutto]
If you didn't know
they were there,

you wouldn't know
what it was now.

It just looks like
a small hill.

[Sandaker]
I think nowadays,
people don't realize that

we still have 7,000
nuclear weapons.

They think that's all
in the past

and that they're
not there anymore,

and the reality is
they're all over the place.

[Brown]
Nuclear accidents continue
to the present day,

although there have not been
nearly as many occasions

of things being dropped
or blown out of silos.

In part, that's because
there are fewer of them.

On the other hand, the...

degree of oversight
and attention

has, if anything,
gotten worse,

because people don't worry
about nuclear war as much.

[Schlosser]
Since the beginning
of the atomic age,

the United States has
built about 70,000
nuclear weapons.

None of them
have ever
detonated by accident.

That's due to the skills
of our weapons designers,

whose safety recommendations
were finally adopted,

and the bravery
of our military personnel.

But it's also due to luck.

Pure luck.

And the problem with luck is
eventually, it runs out.

Nuclear weapons are machines,

and every machine
ever invented eventually
goes wrong.

[Childers]
It doesn't matter
how much you plan,

it doesn't matter
how many checklists
you have,

somebody's got
a ringer somewhere

they're going to throw
out there at you.

[Peurifoy]
Nuclear weapons
will always have a chance

of an accidental detonation.

It will happen.

It may be tomorrow,
or it may be a million
years from now,

but it will happen.

["4 Minute Warning" playing]

♪ This is just a nightmare ♪

♪ Soon I'm gonna wake up ♪

♪ Someone's gonna
bring me round ♪

♪ Just like everybody ♪

♪ Stepping over heads ♪

♪ Running from
the underground ♪

♪ This is your warning ♪

♪ Four minute warning ♪

♪ I don't wanna hear it ♪

♪ I don't wanna know ♪

♪ I just wanna run and hide ♪

♪ This is just a nightmare ♪

♪ Soon I'm gonna wake up ♪

♪ Someone's gonna
bring me round ♪

♪ This is our warning ♪

♪ Four minute warning ♪