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WOMAN: Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
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MAN: We lost both engines.
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00:00:09,676 --> 00:00:10,944
WOMAN: Put the mask
over your nose.
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00:00:10,944 --> 00:00:12,112
Emergency descend.
MAN: Mayday!
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00:00:12,112 --> 00:00:12,912
Mayday!
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00:00:12,912 --> 00:00:14,914
WOMAN: Brace for impact!
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Think I lost one.
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Investigation started in June.
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It's gonna crash!
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00:00:19,386 --> 00:00:22,422
[tense music playing]
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FRED MILLER: No family
wants to lose a loved one--
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00:00:37,937 --> 00:00:41,074
daughter, son.
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None of us think it's going
to happen to our family.
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00:00:44,677 --> 00:00:47,881
We read about these
horrible crashes,
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00:00:47,881 --> 00:00:51,251
and we think, thank
God, you know?
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00:00:51,251 --> 00:00:53,686
And chances are it
won't happen to us.
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00:00:53,686 --> 00:00:54,921
The odds are in our favor.
18
00:00:54,921 --> 00:00:57,724
[tense music playing]
19
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[grunts] You got it?
20
00:01:05,465 --> 00:01:06,266
Ah!
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00:01:06,266 --> 00:01:07,233
What are you doing?
22
00:01:07,233 --> 00:01:09,803
[grunts] It just
got worse, OK?
23
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NARRATOR: In January
2000, an Air Alaska jet
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00:01:12,906 --> 00:01:16,776
with 88 passengers and crew
suffered a catastrophic failure
25
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that tore it from the sky.
26
00:01:18,912 --> 00:01:22,582
A shocking chain of negligence
and error led to disaster.
27
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When a whistleblower
mechanic from the airline
28
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tried to sound the alarm about
faulty maintenance procedures,
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he was suspended from his job.
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The investigation exposed
deeply worrying shortcomings
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in maintenance and
regulation that
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afflict the airline industry.
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It showed how a series
of devastating errors
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combined to produce
a tragic accident,
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one that could happen again.
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[suspenseful music playing]
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We're stalled!
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Gotta release it.
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[screaming]
40
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[music playing]
41
00:02:01,621 --> 00:02:03,623
[groaning]
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[crashing sounds]
43
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[mariachi music playing]
44
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NARRATOR: Puerto Vallarta
is a popular holiday resort
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on the Mexican
Pacific Coast, one
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of several Mexican destinations
served by Alaskan Airlines.
47
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[music playing]
48
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Colleen Worley went there to
celebrate a family birthday.
49
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The 34-year-old
was a keen traveler
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who spoke Spanish well and
had visited Mexico many times.
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[singing in spanish]
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[applause]
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MAN: Yes!
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[music playing]
55
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NARRATOR: Colleen and the
other holiday makers returning
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00:03:01,247 --> 00:03:03,716
from Puerto Vallarta
settle in for the four-hour
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00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:05,852
flight to San Francisco.
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00:03:05,852 --> 00:03:08,054
In the warm afterglow
of their holidays,
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00:03:08,054 --> 00:03:09,122
they're looking to the future.
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00:03:09,122 --> 00:03:11,891
[music playing]
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00:03:13,326 --> 00:03:15,795
Colleen and her
fiance Monte Donaldson
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00:03:15,795 --> 00:03:18,064
are planning to start a
family later that year.
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MAN (ON RADIO): Be
ready for taxi at 5.
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00:03:24,304 --> 00:03:27,974
NARRATOR: The pilots on Flight
261 are very experienced.
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00:03:27,974 --> 00:03:30,243
Both Captain Ted
Thompson and First
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00:03:30,243 --> 00:03:32,245
Officer Bill Tansky
have thousands
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00:03:32,245 --> 00:03:34,314
of hours flying MD-80s.
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00:03:34,314 --> 00:03:35,548
They know the plane well.
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00:03:39,052 --> 00:03:43,156
The MD83 is one of a successful
group of rear-engine, low wing
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planes.
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00:03:44,223 --> 00:03:47,360
Originally launched
in 1980, over 1,100
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00:03:47,360 --> 00:03:48,294
were delivered worldwide.
73
00:03:48,294 --> 00:03:50,763
[music playing]
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00:03:52,065 --> 00:03:53,066
Flaps?
75
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Check, confirm.
76
00:03:53,933 --> 00:03:54,734
Spoilers.
77
00:03:54,734 --> 00:03:55,935
Check, armed.
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00:03:55,935 --> 00:03:58,805
NARRATOR: But on the
31st of January, 2000,
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00:03:58,805 --> 00:04:02,675
as they prepared Flight
261, Thompson and Tansky
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00:04:02,675 --> 00:04:05,712
had no idea that deep
in the plane's tail
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00:04:05,712 --> 00:04:06,946
lay a critical weakness.
82
00:04:06,946 --> 00:04:09,816
[music playing]
83
00:04:24,030 --> 00:04:26,799
Colleen Worley and her
fiance Monty Donaldson
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00:04:26,799 --> 00:04:30,236
were planning their
forthcoming wedding.
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00:04:30,236 --> 00:04:32,772
They had announced their
engagement at Christmastime,
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00:04:32,772 --> 00:04:35,675
and so it was a
time for everybody
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to sort of congratulate them.
88
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And so we decided we'd have
a party for the family.
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00:04:43,483 --> 00:04:45,718
NARRATOR: Abby Miller
Busche had visited Mexico
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00:04:45,718 --> 00:04:47,587
with her husband Ryan
and their friends
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00:04:47,587 --> 00:04:50,423
to celebrate her new
job at Microsoft.
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00:04:50,423 --> 00:04:57,697
It's hard to describe
how joyful a girl she was.
93
00:04:57,697 --> 00:05:03,936
She was well known for that care
that she had in her, a trait
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00:05:03,936 --> 00:05:06,439
that you can't put a value on.
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00:05:09,442 --> 00:05:11,978
SUSAN DA SILVA: Dean and I
had been there a lot together,
96
00:05:11,978 --> 00:05:14,714
and it was the first time
that he went without me.
97
00:05:14,714 --> 00:05:16,949
Dean taught me how to play.
98
00:05:16,949 --> 00:05:18,685
He was always up.
99
00:05:18,685 --> 00:05:20,319
He told jokes a lot.
100
00:05:20,319 --> 00:05:22,555
People described him
kind of as a puppy dog.
101
00:05:22,555 --> 00:05:25,158
[music playing]
102
00:05:26,392 --> 00:05:28,594
NARRATOR: Alaska Airlines
was a successful carrier,
103
00:05:28,594 --> 00:05:31,064
with routes up and down
the west coast of America
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00:05:31,064 --> 00:05:32,065
and into Mexico.
105
00:05:35,334 --> 00:05:38,604
Flight 261 left Puerto
Vallarta as a routine flight
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00:05:38,604 --> 00:05:40,506
with no hint of
the danger to come.
107
00:05:40,506 --> 00:05:44,444
[music playing]
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00:05:44,444 --> 00:05:48,347
The devastating failure that
would bring catastrophe to 261
109
00:05:48,347 --> 00:05:49,849
did not come out of the blue.
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00:05:53,286 --> 00:05:56,255
In fact, it was the culmination
of a chain of mistakes
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00:05:56,255 --> 00:05:58,725
that began years earlier.
112
00:05:58,725 --> 00:06:00,593
Maintenance procedures
at the company
113
00:06:00,593 --> 00:06:02,795
had come under scrutiny
two years earlier,
114
00:06:02,795 --> 00:06:05,598
when a whistleblower set off
an investigation by the Federal
115
00:06:05,598 --> 00:06:06,933
Aviation Administration.
116
00:06:09,602 --> 00:06:12,605
But the day Flight 261
left Puerto Vallarta,
117
00:06:12,605 --> 00:06:14,974
the investigation
was still underway,
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00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:17,376
and the whistleblower
suspended from his job.
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00:06:20,313 --> 00:06:22,815
Shortly after takeoff,
Captain Thompson
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00:06:22,815 --> 00:06:26,552
and First Officer Tansky get
the first sign of trouble.
121
00:06:26,552 --> 00:06:30,690
The horizontal stabilizer on the
tail of the plane won't move.
122
00:06:30,690 --> 00:06:34,093
The pilots carry out a standard
checklist to try and free it.
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00:06:37,263 --> 00:06:39,398
Stabilizer, trim switch.
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00:06:39,398 --> 00:06:40,533
Normal.
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00:06:40,533 --> 00:06:44,036
Circuit breakers--
reset if tripped.
126
00:06:44,036 --> 00:06:46,205
D9, D10, D11 OK.
127
00:06:46,205 --> 00:06:48,708
NARRATOR: The
stabilizer on the MD-83
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00:06:48,708 --> 00:06:51,010
the 40-foot wide
horizontal surface
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00:06:51,010 --> 00:06:52,478
of the front of the tail.
130
00:06:52,478 --> 00:06:54,480
It's like another wing.
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00:06:54,480 --> 00:06:57,383
Together with the elevators
at the rear of the tail,
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00:06:57,383 --> 00:06:59,852
the stabilizer is used
to adjust the angle
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00:06:59,852 --> 00:07:00,887
of the plane in flight.
134
00:07:04,157 --> 00:07:06,225
The stabilizer was jammed.
135
00:07:06,225 --> 00:07:08,261
Thompson and Tansky
assumed there
136
00:07:08,261 --> 00:07:09,929
was a fault in the
electric motors
137
00:07:09,929 --> 00:07:11,631
that move it up and down.
138
00:07:11,631 --> 00:07:14,066
They believed they
could fix the problem.
139
00:07:14,066 --> 00:07:17,203
They had no idea they
were in great danger.
140
00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,605
JOHN NANCE: What they
dealt with was something
141
00:07:19,605 --> 00:07:21,307
that really snuck up on them.
142
00:07:21,307 --> 00:07:24,477
It was not supposed
to be a big deal.
143
00:07:24,477 --> 00:07:25,878
If it had been, they
would have turned
144
00:07:25,878 --> 00:07:28,548
around and gone back in to the
Mexican airfield they came out
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00:07:28,548 --> 00:07:29,916
of.
146
00:07:29,916 --> 00:07:34,086
But they were led down this
road of accepting this problem
147
00:07:34,086 --> 00:07:36,355
as a small problem,
so it's perfectly
148
00:07:36,355 --> 00:07:39,525
all right to troubleshoot it.
149
00:07:39,525 --> 00:07:42,128
NARRATOR: The pilots
repeatedly try the two switches
150
00:07:42,128 --> 00:07:44,063
that operate the stabilizer.
151
00:07:44,063 --> 00:07:46,966
The primary motor is
activated by both the switch
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00:07:46,966 --> 00:07:49,535
on the control stick,
known as the pickle switch,
153
00:07:49,535 --> 00:07:52,772
and the sliding suitcase
handles on the central console.
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00:07:52,772 --> 00:07:54,340
Either system operative.
155
00:07:57,276 --> 00:07:58,477
No.
156
00:07:58,477 --> 00:07:59,879
Both systems inoperative.
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00:07:59,879 --> 00:08:00,980
Consider stab jammed.
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00:08:00,980 --> 00:08:02,515
Do not use autopilot.
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00:08:02,515 --> 00:08:04,517
Check.
160
00:08:04,517 --> 00:08:07,253
NARRATOR: The jammed stabilizer
is pushing the aircraft down
161
00:08:07,253 --> 00:08:08,888
towards the ground.
162
00:08:08,888 --> 00:08:13,025
At 28,500 feet, the pilots
switch off the autopilot
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00:08:13,025 --> 00:08:14,026
and fly the plane manually.
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00:08:14,026 --> 00:08:15,394
PILOT: Full systems inoperative.
165
00:08:15,394 --> 00:08:17,530
NARRATOR: They have to pull
back hard on the control column
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00:08:17,530 --> 00:08:19,665
to lift the nose
of the plane up.
167
00:08:19,665 --> 00:08:22,435
This requires
considerable effort.
168
00:08:22,435 --> 00:08:24,804
The plane climbs for
the next 7 minutes
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00:08:24,804 --> 00:08:28,307
to its cruising
altitude of 32,000 feet.
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00:08:28,307 --> 00:08:30,776
As they fly up the
coast, the pilots
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00:08:30,776 --> 00:08:32,778
contact Alaska
Airlines' maintenance
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00:08:32,778 --> 00:08:34,180
department for assistance.
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PILOT: Maintenance, we
need to know of any faults
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00:08:35,882 --> 00:08:38,684
like this got reported
recently for this aircraft
175
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and whether there are
any switches that we
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00:08:40,219 --> 00:08:43,356
might not be aware of that could
get those motors turning again.
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00:08:43,356 --> 00:08:44,757
Roger 261.
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00:08:44,757 --> 00:08:47,660
I have verified no
history on your aircraft
179
00:08:47,660 --> 00:08:49,328
in the past 30 days.
180
00:08:49,328 --> 00:08:52,164
Yeah, we didn't see
anything in the logbook.
181
00:08:52,164 --> 00:08:54,066
Why don't you move
your seat forward.
182
00:08:54,066 --> 00:08:57,169
I'll check this
pedestal back there.
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00:08:57,169 --> 00:08:58,304
Beyond that, I
don't think there's
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00:08:58,304 --> 00:09:00,172
anything we haven't checked.
185
00:09:00,172 --> 00:09:03,009
I use the example
of the average layman,
186
00:09:03,009 --> 00:09:04,277
I think, can understand.
187
00:09:04,277 --> 00:09:09,348
If you try to start your
car and it doesn't crank,
188
00:09:09,348 --> 00:09:14,287
you try jiggling the key in the
socket and then try it again.
189
00:09:14,287 --> 00:09:17,924
And I think that the crew was
probably understandably going
190
00:09:17,924 --> 00:09:21,394
through a lot of these-- well,
maybe it'll work now, or let's
191
00:09:21,394 --> 00:09:24,730
try this, let's try that.
192
00:09:24,730 --> 00:09:26,966
NARRATOR: The pilots want
to divert to Los Angeles,
193
00:09:26,966 --> 00:09:30,036
but Alaska Airlines dispatch
coordinating the movements
194
00:09:30,036 --> 00:09:32,305
of the company's
planes is worried it
195
00:09:32,305 --> 00:09:34,941
will upset the busy schedule.
196
00:09:34,941 --> 00:09:37,777
261 dispatch, if you
want to land at LA,
197
00:09:37,777 --> 00:09:40,446
of course for safety
reasons we will do that.
198
00:09:40,446 --> 00:09:42,148
I'll tell you, though,
if we land in LA,
199
00:09:42,148 --> 00:09:45,584
we're looking at probably
an hour, an hour and a half.
200
00:09:45,584 --> 00:09:48,354
We've got a major flow
program going right now.
201
00:09:48,354 --> 00:09:49,989
Well, boy.
202
00:09:49,989 --> 00:09:52,558
You really put me
in a spot up here.
203
00:09:52,558 --> 00:09:54,894
I don't want to hear that
the flow is the reason you're
204
00:09:54,894 --> 00:09:56,896
calling, because I'm
concerned about overflying
205
00:09:56,896 --> 00:09:58,998
suitable airports.
206
00:09:58,998 --> 00:10:00,433
Well, we want
to do what's safe,
207
00:10:00,433 --> 00:10:02,535
so if that's what
you feel is safe,
208
00:10:02,535 --> 00:10:05,371
just want to make sure
you have all the info.
209
00:10:05,371 --> 00:10:06,772
We might ask if
they have a ground
210
00:10:06,772 --> 00:10:09,041
school instructor available, and
we could discuss it with him--
211
00:10:09,041 --> 00:10:11,544
and a simulator instructor.
212
00:10:11,544 --> 00:10:15,614
Dispatch 261, we're wondering
if we can get some support out
213
00:10:15,614 --> 00:10:16,749
of the instructors up there.
214
00:10:16,749 --> 00:10:18,084
NARRATOR: Thompson
and Tansky now
215
00:10:18,084 --> 00:10:21,187
ask for a pilot instructor
who might know the solution
216
00:10:21,187 --> 00:10:22,521
to their unusual problem.
217
00:10:22,521 --> 00:10:23,956
Stand by.
218
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:25,725
NARRATOR: As they
wait for a reply,
219
00:10:25,725 --> 00:10:27,526
their frustration
begins to show.
220
00:10:35,701 --> 00:10:37,636
It just drives
me nuts, you know?
221
00:10:37,636 --> 00:10:41,507
Not that I want to go on about
it, but it just blows me away.
222
00:10:41,507 --> 00:10:42,575
They think we're going to land.
223
00:10:42,575 --> 00:10:43,776
They're going to fix it.
224
00:10:43,776 --> 00:10:46,012
Now they're worried
about the flow.
225
00:10:46,012 --> 00:10:48,881
Well, I'm sorry, just--
226
00:10:48,881 --> 00:10:50,783
They're putting
pressure on you.
227
00:10:50,783 --> 00:10:51,684
I don't know.
228
00:10:51,684 --> 00:10:52,518
Yeah.
229
00:10:55,588 --> 00:10:57,990
NARRATOR: The pilots need to
think about what will happen
230
00:10:57,990 --> 00:10:59,625
when they descend for landing.
231
00:10:59,625 --> 00:11:01,293
How will the plane behave?
232
00:11:01,293 --> 00:11:03,596
Will they be able to control it?
233
00:11:03,596 --> 00:11:05,831
But several minutes
after requesting help
234
00:11:05,831 --> 00:11:08,801
from the ground, they're
getting no advice.
235
00:11:08,801 --> 00:11:10,936
[music playing]
236
00:11:10,936 --> 00:11:14,774
As Flight 261 approached
Los Angeles off the coast,
237
00:11:14,774 --> 00:11:17,743
the problems on board were
about to get far worse.
238
00:11:17,743 --> 00:11:18,744
[music playing]
239
00:11:23,216 --> 00:11:26,786
are flying manually at
32,000 feet in a plane that
240
00:11:26,786 --> 00:11:28,488
has a jammed
stabilizer, which is
241
00:11:28,488 --> 00:11:30,123
forcing the plane's nose down.
242
00:11:30,123 --> 00:11:32,993
[music playing]
243
00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:35,729
The pilots have
another go at freeing
244
00:11:35,729 --> 00:11:37,664
up the jammed stabilizer.
245
00:11:37,664 --> 00:11:40,734
They switch on both of the
motors that control it.
246
00:11:40,734 --> 00:11:41,635
This will click it off.
247
00:11:44,037 --> 00:11:44,838
Holy sh--
248
00:11:44,838 --> 00:11:47,741
[screaming]
249
00:11:47,741 --> 00:11:50,677
[tense music playing]
250
00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:55,415
Shit, you got it?
251
00:11:55,415 --> 00:11:56,216
Ah!
252
00:11:56,216 --> 00:11:57,017
What are you doing?
253
00:11:57,017 --> 00:11:58,585
Damn, it kicked off.
254
00:12:01,988 --> 00:12:05,358
NARRATOR: At 31,000
feet, Flight 261 plunges
255
00:12:05,358 --> 00:12:07,227
downwards for over a minute.
256
00:12:07,227 --> 00:12:09,796
The crew battles for control.
257
00:12:09,796 --> 00:12:10,897
It just got worse, OK?
258
00:12:10,897 --> 00:12:13,767
[tense music playing]
259
00:12:15,635 --> 00:12:17,637
[grunts] We're stalled.
260
00:12:17,637 --> 00:12:20,540
[indistinct radio chatter]
261
00:12:21,941 --> 00:12:24,544
NARRATOR: At first, they pull
back on the control columns
262
00:12:24,544 --> 00:12:25,979
to fight the dive.
263
00:12:25,979 --> 00:12:28,915
Then the pilots push the
nose down into the dive
264
00:12:28,915 --> 00:12:30,884
to regain control.
265
00:12:30,884 --> 00:12:33,553
It's a risky maneuver,
pushing the plane's speed
266
00:12:33,553 --> 00:12:36,756
to up to 350 miles per hour.
267
00:12:36,756 --> 00:12:37,557
You gotta release it.
268
00:12:37,557 --> 00:12:38,925
You gotta release it.
269
00:12:38,925 --> 00:12:41,561
NARRATOR: The pilots slowly
bring the plane out of its dive
270
00:12:41,561 --> 00:12:42,662
and back under control.
271
00:12:46,966 --> 00:12:49,936
[groaning]
272
00:12:49,936 --> 00:12:53,907
[breathing heavily]
273
00:12:53,907 --> 00:12:54,808
Let's get speed brakes.
274
00:12:58,011 --> 00:12:59,079
Give me high pressure pumps.
275
00:12:59,079 --> 00:13:01,848
OK.
276
00:13:01,848 --> 00:13:03,016
Help me back.
277
00:13:03,016 --> 00:13:03,983
Help me back.
278
00:13:03,983 --> 00:13:05,485
OK.
279
00:13:05,485 --> 00:13:06,986
[gasping]
280
00:13:16,696 --> 00:13:19,599
Center, Alaska 261.
281
00:13:19,599 --> 00:13:21,234
We're in a dive here.
282
00:13:21,234 --> 00:13:25,238
I've lost control,
vertical pitch.
283
00:13:25,238 --> 00:13:27,407
Alaska 261, say again, sir.
284
00:13:27,407 --> 00:13:30,043
Yeah, we're out
of 26,000 feet.
285
00:13:30,043 --> 00:13:32,846
We are in a vertical dive.
286
00:13:32,846 --> 00:13:35,849
Not a dive yet, but we
have lost vertical control
287
00:13:35,849 --> 00:13:36,683
of our airplane.
288
00:13:39,219 --> 00:13:41,187
Just help me.
289
00:13:41,187 --> 00:13:46,059
Once we get the speed
slope, maybe we'll be OK.
290
00:13:46,059 --> 00:13:48,661
NARRATOR: Maintaining
level flight is difficult.
291
00:13:48,661 --> 00:13:51,464
The jammed stabilizer keeps
pushing the nose of the plane
292
00:13:51,464 --> 00:13:52,665
down.
293
00:13:52,665 --> 00:13:55,001
[gasping]
294
00:13:55,001 --> 00:13:56,503
We're at 23-7.
295
00:13:56,503 --> 00:14:00,940
Request-- yeah, we got
it under control here.
296
00:14:00,940 --> 00:14:03,676
PILOT: No, we don't.
297
00:14:03,676 --> 00:14:05,512
[grunting]
298
00:14:05,512 --> 00:14:06,312
OK.
299
00:14:06,312 --> 00:14:07,147
PILOT: OK.
300
00:14:09,649 --> 00:14:11,351
NARRATOR: To counteract
the downward force
301
00:14:11,351 --> 00:14:14,254
of the stabilizer, the
pilots use the elevators,
302
00:14:14,254 --> 00:14:17,624
movable panels at the back
of the tail linked by cables
303
00:14:17,624 --> 00:14:19,425
to the control column.
304
00:14:19,425 --> 00:14:21,861
The pilots pull with
all their might.
305
00:14:21,861 --> 00:14:25,165
The fate of the plane hangs
on the strength of their arms.
306
00:14:25,165 --> 00:14:26,866
[baby crying]
307
00:14:26,866 --> 00:14:29,702
In the cabin, frightened
passengers try to recover
308
00:14:29,702 --> 00:14:31,704
from the terrifying plunge.
309
00:14:31,704 --> 00:14:34,007
They have no idea
what will happen next.
310
00:14:37,510 --> 00:14:40,647
In the cockpit, the pilots
struggle to control the plane's
311
00:14:40,647 --> 00:14:43,349
speed so they can land.
312
00:14:43,349 --> 00:14:44,884
JOHN NANCE: They've got
a handful of airplane.
313
00:14:44,884 --> 00:14:48,421
They get her stabilized, and
they're now in a situation
314
00:14:48,421 --> 00:14:50,657
where they make the
decision properly
315
00:14:50,657 --> 00:14:53,660
to go in on an emergency landing
to Los Angeles International.
316
00:14:53,660 --> 00:14:57,130
And they have to be able
to slow the airplane up,
317
00:14:57,130 --> 00:14:59,566
so you've got to
experiment a little bit.
318
00:14:59,566 --> 00:15:00,967
Let's take the
speed brakes off.
319
00:15:00,967 --> 00:15:02,001
No, no leave them there.
320
00:15:02,001 --> 00:15:02,836
It seems to be helping.
321
00:15:05,772 --> 00:15:08,174
Damn, OK, it really
wants to pitch down.
322
00:15:08,174 --> 00:15:09,742
OK.
323
00:15:09,742 --> 00:15:10,710
Don't mess with that.
324
00:15:10,710 --> 00:15:13,780
I agree with you.
325
00:15:13,780 --> 00:15:16,382
NARRATOR: With the plane
under temporary control,
326
00:15:16,382 --> 00:15:18,384
the crew makes the
fateful decision
327
00:15:18,384 --> 00:15:19,853
to do more troubleshooting.
328
00:15:19,853 --> 00:15:23,389
They need a block of clear space
around the aircraft in case
329
00:15:23,389 --> 00:15:25,124
they lose control again.
330
00:15:25,124 --> 00:15:27,861
They contact air
traffic control.
331
00:15:27,861 --> 00:15:30,797
Alaska 261, say
your conditions.
332
00:15:30,797 --> 00:15:36,903
261, we are at 24,000
feet, kind of stabilized.
333
00:15:36,903 --> 00:15:39,772
We're slowing down
here, and we're going
334
00:15:39,772 --> 00:15:41,508
to do a little troubleshooting.
335
00:15:41,508 --> 00:15:45,345
Can you give me a block
altitude between 20 and 25?
336
00:15:45,345 --> 00:15:48,381
Alaska 261, maintain
block altitude flight level
337
00:15:48,381 --> 00:15:52,318
200 through flight level 250.
338
00:15:52,318 --> 00:15:55,054
NARRATOR: The pilots know
they now have clear airspace
339
00:15:55,054 --> 00:15:57,123
above and below the plane.
340
00:15:57,123 --> 00:15:58,925
They try to figure
out their next move.
341
00:15:58,925 --> 00:16:00,159
You've got the airplane.
342
00:16:00,159 --> 00:16:01,027
Let me just try it.
343
00:16:01,027 --> 00:16:03,630
OK.
344
00:16:03,630 --> 00:16:04,797
How hard is it?
345
00:16:04,797 --> 00:16:05,598
I don't know.
346
00:16:05,598 --> 00:16:07,033
My adrenaline's going.
347
00:16:07,033 --> 00:16:09,168
It was really rough
back there for a while.
348
00:16:09,168 --> 00:16:11,070
Yeah, it is.
349
00:16:11,070 --> 00:16:12,438
Whatever we did is no good.
350
00:16:12,438 --> 00:16:13,539
Let's not do that again.
351
00:16:13,539 --> 00:16:16,976
Yeah, it went to
down-- to full nose down.
352
00:16:16,976 --> 00:16:18,544
It's worse than it was before.
353
00:16:18,544 --> 00:16:20,780
Yeah, we're in
much worse shape now.
354
00:16:20,780 --> 00:16:23,850
NARRATOR: The crew knows this
is no mere electrical problem.
355
00:16:23,850 --> 00:16:25,852
From what they've
experienced, they assume
356
00:16:25,852 --> 00:16:29,656
the stabilizer is now jammed.
357
00:16:29,656 --> 00:16:30,957
I think it's at the stop--
358
00:16:30,957 --> 00:16:32,425
full stop.
359
00:16:32,425 --> 00:16:34,694
And I'm thinking can
it get any worse?
360
00:16:34,694 --> 00:16:36,729
But it probably can.
361
00:16:36,729 --> 00:16:39,165
But let's slow it.
362
00:16:39,165 --> 00:16:42,201
Let's get down to 200
knots and see what happens.
363
00:16:44,671 --> 00:16:46,873
NARRATOR: The crisis
is worse than ever.
364
00:16:46,873 --> 00:16:50,109
Uncertain about how the plane
will react if they try to slow
365
00:16:50,109 --> 00:16:53,112
it down, the pilots must
still pull on the elevators
366
00:16:53,112 --> 00:16:54,480
to maintain level flight.
367
00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:58,117
[music playing]
368
00:16:58,117 --> 00:16:59,352
Maintenance, 261.
369
00:16:59,352 --> 00:17:02,322
Are you on?
370
00:17:02,322 --> 00:17:03,289
Yeah, 261.
371
00:17:03,289 --> 00:17:06,025
This is maintenance.
372
00:17:06,025 --> 00:17:08,261
OK, we did both
the pickle switch
373
00:17:08,261 --> 00:17:11,331
and the suitcase
handles, and it ran away.
374
00:17:11,331 --> 00:17:14,000
It ran away full nose trim down.
375
00:17:14,000 --> 00:17:16,769
MAN: Oh, it ran away trim down?
376
00:17:16,769 --> 00:17:21,074
Hoke-- and now we're in a
damn pinch, and we're holding.
377
00:17:21,074 --> 00:17:22,642
We're worse than we were before.
378
00:17:22,642 --> 00:17:25,478
[tense music playing]
379
00:17:32,852 --> 00:17:34,253
You're getting
full nose trim down,
380
00:17:34,253 --> 00:17:35,621
but you don't get
no nose trim up.
381
00:17:35,621 --> 00:17:36,923
Is that correct?
382
00:17:36,923 --> 00:17:38,458
That's affirm.
383
00:17:38,458 --> 00:17:40,793
We went to full
nose down, and I'm
384
00:17:40,793 --> 00:17:42,829
afraid to try it again
to see if it would
385
00:17:42,829 --> 00:17:44,497
go in the other direction.
386
00:17:44,497 --> 00:17:46,366
OK, well, your discretion.
387
00:17:46,366 --> 00:17:48,134
If you want to try
it, that's OK with me.
388
00:17:48,134 --> 00:17:49,769
If not, that's fine.
389
00:17:49,769 --> 00:17:50,636
We'll see you at the gate.
390
00:17:50,636 --> 00:17:53,439
[tense music playing]
391
00:17:55,274 --> 00:17:56,743
NARRATOR: Maintenance
clearly does not
392
00:17:56,743 --> 00:17:59,479
appreciate the significance
of the situation.
393
00:17:59,479 --> 00:18:02,048
This is the last the
crew will hear from them.
394
00:18:02,048 --> 00:18:05,084
No one can help the pilots
now as they struggle with
395
00:18:05,084 --> 00:18:07,420
the plane's jammed stabilizer.
396
00:18:07,420 --> 00:18:09,589
Ever professional,
however, they try
397
00:18:09,589 --> 00:18:12,592
to put the passengers at ease.
398
00:18:12,592 --> 00:18:13,926
[indistinct chatter]
399
00:18:13,926 --> 00:18:15,261
(WHISPERING) Is everything OK?
400
00:18:15,261 --> 00:18:16,062
We're going to be OK.
401
00:18:16,062 --> 00:18:18,931
We're just redirecting.
402
00:18:18,931 --> 00:18:22,535
Folks, we have had a flight
control problem up front here.
403
00:18:22,535 --> 00:18:23,970
We're working it.
404
00:18:23,970 --> 00:18:26,005
That's Los Angeles off
to the right there,
405
00:18:26,005 --> 00:18:28,274
and that's where
we're intending to go.
406
00:18:28,274 --> 00:18:31,310
We're pretty busy up here
working this situation.
407
00:18:31,310 --> 00:18:34,080
I don't anticipate any big
problems once we get a couple
408
00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:35,882
of subsystems on the line.
409
00:18:35,882 --> 00:18:38,751
But we will be going
into LAX, and I
410
00:18:38,751 --> 00:18:42,822
anticipate us parking there
in about 20 to 30 minutes.
411
00:18:42,822 --> 00:18:46,092
NARRATOR: In fact, they will
never make it to Los Angeles.
412
00:18:46,092 --> 00:18:48,895
A full-blown disaster
is about to unfold.
413
00:18:55,601 --> 00:18:58,805
Alaska Airlines Flight
261 has now leveled out.
414
00:18:58,805 --> 00:19:01,741
LA, Alaska 261,
we're with you.
415
00:19:01,741 --> 00:19:03,776
We're at 225.
416
00:19:03,776 --> 00:19:06,379
We have a jammed stabilizer,
and we're maintaining
417
00:19:06,379 --> 00:19:08,181
altitude with difficulty.
418
00:19:08,181 --> 00:19:11,818
But we can maintain
altitude we think,
419
00:19:11,818 --> 00:19:14,954
and our intention is
to land at Los Angeles.
420
00:19:17,657 --> 00:19:19,258
NARRATOR: The pilots
request to be routed
421
00:19:19,258 --> 00:19:20,693
out over the Pacific Ocean.
422
00:19:23,629 --> 00:19:26,265
Center, Alaska 261.
423
00:19:26,265 --> 00:19:28,368
I need to get down
about 10, change
424
00:19:28,368 --> 00:19:32,338
my configurations to make
sure I can control the jet.
425
00:19:32,338 --> 00:19:35,842
And I'd like to do that
over the bay here if I may.
426
00:19:35,842 --> 00:19:37,910
NARRATOR: If the worst
happens, the pilots
427
00:19:37,910 --> 00:19:41,214
don't want to kill people on the
ground as well as on the plane.
428
00:19:41,214 --> 00:19:44,717
There are a lot of lives saved
that people maybe don't realize
429
00:19:44,717 --> 00:19:47,120
by the fact that this air
crew said let's stay out
430
00:19:47,120 --> 00:19:49,088
over the water until
we've got this thing
431
00:19:49,088 --> 00:19:51,524
completely under control.
432
00:19:51,524 --> 00:19:54,460
NARRATOR: The crew tries to slow
the aircraft down to landing
433
00:19:54,460 --> 00:19:58,331
speed without losing control,
but every move they make
434
00:19:58,331 --> 00:20:02,602
could have fatal consequences.
435
00:20:02,602 --> 00:20:06,172
OK, bring the flaps and
the slats back up for me.
436
00:20:06,172 --> 00:20:07,039
Slats, too?
437
00:20:07,039 --> 00:20:08,141
Yep.
438
00:20:08,141 --> 00:20:10,176
NARRATOR: Treading a
knife edge of control,
439
00:20:10,176 --> 00:20:13,079
the pilots are still trying
to free up the stabilizer.
440
00:20:13,079 --> 00:20:15,782
What we want to do
is get the nose up
441
00:20:15,782 --> 00:20:19,118
and then let the nose
fall through and see if we
442
00:20:19,118 --> 00:20:23,222
can stab it when it's unloaded.
443
00:20:23,222 --> 00:20:24,957
NARRATOR: The only
hope for the passengers
444
00:20:24,957 --> 00:20:27,260
is that the pilots'
skill and experience
445
00:20:27,260 --> 00:20:30,630
will get the plane to Los
Angeles International Airport.
446
00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:31,564
It's on the stop now.
447
00:20:31,564 --> 00:20:32,632
It's on the stop.
448
00:20:32,632 --> 00:20:35,735
Not according
to this it's not.
449
00:20:35,735 --> 00:20:38,104
NARRATOR: As one effort
after another fails,
450
00:20:38,104 --> 00:20:42,341
the crew wonders if the
stabilizer is damaged.
451
00:20:42,341 --> 00:20:46,345
The trim might be, and then
it might be if something's
452
00:20:46,345 --> 00:20:47,246
popped back there.
453
00:20:47,246 --> 00:20:48,414
Yeah.
454
00:20:48,414 --> 00:20:50,016
It might be
mechanical damage, too.
455
00:20:50,016 --> 00:20:52,652
[tense music playing]
456
00:20:54,020 --> 00:20:55,922
I think it was controllable.
457
00:20:55,922 --> 00:20:57,290
We ought to just
try and land it.
458
00:20:57,290 --> 00:20:58,624
Think so?
459
00:20:58,624 --> 00:21:01,494
OK, let's head for LA.
460
00:21:01,494 --> 00:21:04,697
NARRATOR: But just as they
prepare to land in Los Angeles,
461
00:21:04,697 --> 00:21:08,201
something in the
tail suddenly breaks.
462
00:21:08,201 --> 00:21:09,001
Did you feel that?
463
00:21:09,001 --> 00:21:09,802
Yup.
464
00:21:09,802 --> 00:21:11,137
OK, give me slats.
465
00:21:11,137 --> 00:21:12,138
This is a bitch.
466
00:21:12,138 --> 00:21:12,939
Is it?
467
00:21:12,939 --> 00:21:13,739
Yeah.
468
00:21:13,739 --> 00:21:16,375
[tense music playing]
469
00:21:18,744 --> 00:21:21,180
[screaming]
470
00:21:21,180 --> 00:21:24,517
NARRATOR: The plane dives
straight down from 18,000 feet.
471
00:21:24,517 --> 00:21:27,186
[music playing]
472
00:21:27,186 --> 00:21:29,088
[grunting]
473
00:21:29,088 --> 00:21:31,924
To avoid collisions,
LA control has warned
474
00:21:31,924 --> 00:21:34,694
the pilots of nearby
planes that Alaska
475
00:21:34,694 --> 00:21:37,029
Flight 261 is in difficulty.
476
00:21:37,029 --> 00:21:39,465
These pilots have now
reported back to the tower.
477
00:21:42,935 --> 00:21:45,638
[alarms sounding]
478
00:21:45,638 --> 00:21:46,472
Yep.
479
00:21:54,013 --> 00:21:57,016
[alarms sounding]
480
00:22:05,658 --> 00:22:07,560
[gasping]
481
00:22:08,694 --> 00:22:11,197
The plane was being
knocked from side to side.
482
00:22:11,197 --> 00:22:12,565
It turned upside down.
483
00:22:12,565 --> 00:22:13,900
It was spinning.
484
00:22:13,900 --> 00:22:16,335
Persons were being thrown
against the walls of the plane,
485
00:22:16,335 --> 00:22:18,371
falling out of their
seats, on the cockpit
486
00:22:18,371 --> 00:22:20,072
voice recorder screaming--
487
00:22:22,575 --> 00:22:27,813
unbelievable, horrible last
few minutes of their lives.
488
00:22:27,813 --> 00:22:30,082
[alarms sounding]
489
00:22:40,359 --> 00:22:41,994
Uh, here we go.
490
00:22:41,994 --> 00:22:44,931
[tense music playing]
491
00:23:10,189 --> 00:23:13,226
NARRATOR: After a
terrifying 60-second dive,
492
00:23:13,226 --> 00:23:15,828
Flight 261 hits
the Pacific Ocean
493
00:23:15,828 --> 00:23:17,763
and over 250 miles an hour.
494
00:23:17,763 --> 00:23:20,700
[music playing]
495
00:23:24,070 --> 00:23:27,039
Rescue helicopters were
soon at the crash site,
496
00:23:27,039 --> 00:23:29,442
but there were no survivors.
497
00:23:29,442 --> 00:23:31,911
The plane had
broken up on impact.
498
00:23:31,911 --> 00:23:35,348
88 passengers and crew,
including three young children,
499
00:23:35,348 --> 00:23:36,315
died instantly.
500
00:23:36,315 --> 00:23:39,185
[waves crashing]
501
00:23:40,586 --> 00:23:43,990
The investigation into
Alaska Airlines Flight 261
502
00:23:43,990 --> 00:23:47,460
began, but the wreckage
lay 700 feet down.
503
00:23:47,460 --> 00:23:50,129
So National Transportation
Safety Board officials
504
00:23:50,129 --> 00:23:53,065
called on Navy submersibles
to retrieve the debris
505
00:23:53,065 --> 00:23:54,333
from the ocean floor.
506
00:23:54,333 --> 00:23:56,302
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: We set
up a base of operations,
507
00:23:56,302 --> 00:23:58,471
and we had a remote
operating vehicle
508
00:23:58,471 --> 00:24:00,973
with the side-scanning
sonar which they used
509
00:24:00,973 --> 00:24:03,676
to map the debris field
and get an idea of how
510
00:24:03,676 --> 00:24:05,144
widely spread the wreckage was.
511
00:24:05,144 --> 00:24:08,414
[music playing]
512
00:24:14,320 --> 00:24:16,522
NARRATOR: At the National
Transportation Safety Board
513
00:24:16,522 --> 00:24:19,091
headquarters in Washington,
the investigators'
514
00:24:19,091 --> 00:24:21,260
immediate concern
was to find out what
515
00:24:21,260 --> 00:24:22,928
had brought the plane down.
516
00:24:22,928 --> 00:24:25,931
The first clues came from
the cockpit voice recordings.
517
00:24:25,931 --> 00:24:27,533
LA, Alaska 261.
518
00:24:27,533 --> 00:24:28,868
We're with you.
519
00:24:28,868 --> 00:24:30,870
We're at 225.
520
00:24:30,870 --> 00:24:33,506
We have a jammed stabilizer,
and we're maintaining
521
00:24:33,506 --> 00:24:35,541
altitude with difficulty.
522
00:24:35,541 --> 00:24:37,943
We immediately
suspected some problem
523
00:24:37,943 --> 00:24:40,279
in the tail of the
airplane, which
524
00:24:40,279 --> 00:24:41,647
is where the controls are.
525
00:24:41,647 --> 00:24:43,315
Just something was
wrong back there,
526
00:24:43,315 --> 00:24:45,785
and that was the key piece
of wreckage to look for.
527
00:24:45,785 --> 00:24:50,790
[indistinct radio chatter]
528
00:24:50,790 --> 00:24:53,092
NARRATOR: The MD-83
that crashed was
529
00:24:53,092 --> 00:24:56,962
a revised version of the Douglas
Corporation's popular DC-9.
530
00:24:56,962 --> 00:25:00,299
Over 2,000 were delivered
to airlines worldwide.
531
00:25:00,299 --> 00:25:02,501
The engines were at
the rear of the plane,
532
00:25:02,501 --> 00:25:05,771
and the distinctive T-shaped
tail was an essential element
533
00:25:05,771 --> 00:25:07,106
of the design.
534
00:25:07,106 --> 00:25:10,109
In a big turbojet aircraft,
one of the rather brilliant
535
00:25:10,109 --> 00:25:13,045
elements of the design is
that since you are going
536
00:25:13,045 --> 00:25:14,880
to be loading
passengers and cargo,
537
00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:17,550
you want to be able to have that
aircraft load it a little nose
538
00:25:17,550 --> 00:25:18,751
heavy or a little tail heavy.
539
00:25:18,751 --> 00:25:21,153
Well, in order to do that,
you actually had to have
540
00:25:21,153 --> 00:25:23,389
that entire stabilizer moving.
541
00:25:23,389 --> 00:25:25,791
But the ones that are the
most difficult to engineer
542
00:25:25,791 --> 00:25:27,426
are the T-tailed
airplanes, where
543
00:25:27,426 --> 00:25:30,329
you have the vertical stabilizer
and the horizontal sitting
544
00:25:30,329 --> 00:25:31,197
on top.
545
00:25:31,197 --> 00:25:33,466
And we call that
stabilizer trim,
546
00:25:33,466 --> 00:25:35,701
and that is an essential
element of what
547
00:25:35,701 --> 00:25:38,971
makes these aircraft so usable.
548
00:25:38,971 --> 00:25:42,875
NARRATOR: In the MD-83, a
motorized jackscrew on the tail
549
00:25:42,875 --> 00:25:45,778
moves the horizontal
stabilizer up and down.
550
00:25:45,778 --> 00:25:48,914
As the stabilizer moves up,
the nose of the airplane
551
00:25:48,914 --> 00:25:50,049
moves down.
552
00:25:50,049 --> 00:25:52,752
As the stabilizer moves
down, the nose moves up.
553
00:25:55,721 --> 00:25:58,691
But what role have the
two-foot jackscrew played
554
00:25:58,691 --> 00:26:00,860
in the loss of Flight 261?
555
00:26:00,860 --> 00:26:04,130
The investigators were anxious
to inspect it as soon as it was
556
00:26:04,130 --> 00:26:05,898
recovered from the ocean floor.
557
00:26:05,898 --> 00:26:09,802
The jackscrew wasn't
mated with the nut
558
00:26:09,802 --> 00:26:10,970
that it screws into.
559
00:26:10,970 --> 00:26:12,772
It was just by itself.
560
00:26:12,772 --> 00:26:15,341
And the nut was found in
another piece of structure
561
00:26:15,341 --> 00:26:17,576
a few feet away from
where the jackscrew was.
562
00:26:17,576 --> 00:26:21,981
To have a screw separate
itself from a nut with very
563
00:26:21,981 --> 00:26:24,817
thick threads surprised us.
564
00:26:24,817 --> 00:26:28,387
Secondly, we noticed that there
was a curled piece of brass
565
00:26:28,387 --> 00:26:32,758
around the jackscrew,
and all of the threads
566
00:26:32,758 --> 00:26:36,061
that you can see here,
these ridges, were gone.
567
00:26:36,061 --> 00:26:39,131
They had been stripped out,
and the remnants of those
568
00:26:39,131 --> 00:26:43,903
were found coiled
on the jackscrew.
569
00:26:43,903 --> 00:26:46,505
NARRATOR: Once the thread had
been stripped off the nut,
570
00:26:46,505 --> 00:26:49,108
the jackscrew could
no longer turn.
571
00:26:49,108 --> 00:26:52,077
The pilots could not have known
the real nature of the problem.
572
00:26:52,077 --> 00:26:55,347
[music playing]
573
00:26:58,717 --> 00:27:01,821
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: The crew
was confronted with a situation
574
00:27:01,821 --> 00:27:03,522
that had never occurred before.
575
00:27:03,522 --> 00:27:07,326
There is no failed
jackscrew procedure
576
00:27:07,326 --> 00:27:10,696
in the quick reference handbooks
that they have available.
577
00:27:10,696 --> 00:27:12,097
There is no training for it.
578
00:27:12,097 --> 00:27:15,568
[music playing]
579
00:27:18,971 --> 00:27:20,606
NARRATOR: When the
jackscrew jammed,
580
00:27:20,606 --> 00:27:23,609
the crew was unable to
adjust the stabilizer.
581
00:27:23,609 --> 00:27:25,444
JEFF GUZZETTI: We felt
that it was due to the fact
582
00:27:25,444 --> 00:27:27,780
that these nut
threads had worn away,
583
00:27:27,780 --> 00:27:30,850
and it was just too
hard for that jackscrew
584
00:27:30,850 --> 00:27:33,419
under the power of the
electric motor to turn.
585
00:27:33,419 --> 00:27:35,321
That gave the flight
crew an indication
586
00:27:35,321 --> 00:27:36,755
that there was a problem.
587
00:27:36,755 --> 00:27:38,224
NARRATOR: The crew
knew they had a problem
588
00:27:38,224 --> 00:27:41,260
in the tail of the plane,
but they had no idea what.
589
00:27:41,260 --> 00:27:43,495
Two motors controlled
the jackscrew,
590
00:27:43,495 --> 00:27:45,297
and they tried each
of them in turn.
591
00:27:45,297 --> 00:27:47,499
But the pilots' attempts
to free the jammed
592
00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:51,503
stabilizer inadvertently
made the situation worse.
593
00:27:51,503 --> 00:27:52,972
We're at 23-7.
594
00:27:52,972 --> 00:27:57,409
Request-- yeah, we got
it under control here.
595
00:27:57,409 --> 00:27:59,445
No, we don't.
596
00:27:59,445 --> 00:28:01,080
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ:
Where they went wrong
597
00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:06,785
was that they wanted to try both
the alternate and the primary
598
00:28:06,785 --> 00:28:08,854
trim motors at the same time.
599
00:28:08,854 --> 00:28:10,589
NARRATOR: When the
pilot switched both
600
00:28:10,589 --> 00:28:13,559
the electric motors on,
the jackscrew moved,
601
00:28:13,559 --> 00:28:17,630
but the threads had given way,
and the jackscrew was now held
602
00:28:17,630 --> 00:28:20,666
only by a single retaining nut.
603
00:28:20,666 --> 00:28:24,236
From here on, the
plane was doomed.
604
00:28:24,236 --> 00:28:26,772
That end nut
was never designed
605
00:28:26,772 --> 00:28:30,009
to hold the loads
generated aerodynamically
606
00:28:30,009 --> 00:28:30,809
by the airplane.
607
00:28:30,809 --> 00:28:33,412
[music playing]
608
00:28:34,713 --> 00:28:35,581
Let's get speed brakes.
609
00:28:38,717 --> 00:28:39,785
Give me high pressure pumps.
610
00:28:39,785 --> 00:28:42,221
OK.
611
00:28:42,221 --> 00:28:44,456
JOHN NANCE: Now we know-- in
the glaring light of hindsight,
612
00:28:44,456 --> 00:28:48,227
now when we turn the situation
around in time and look back,
613
00:28:48,227 --> 00:28:51,964
we can see that this
air crew and no air crew
614
00:28:51,964 --> 00:28:54,233
should have ever been
fooling with the trim
615
00:28:54,233 --> 00:28:56,902
and trying to run
it back and forth.
616
00:28:56,902 --> 00:28:59,104
[gasping]
617
00:28:59,104 --> 00:29:03,208
NARRATOR: The retaining
nut grew weaker and weaker.
618
00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:06,946
JEFF GUZZETTI: Then finally,
through the loads beating down
619
00:29:06,946 --> 00:29:11,383
on that nut, the
nut finally failed.
620
00:29:11,383 --> 00:29:12,184
Feel that?
621
00:29:12,184 --> 00:29:12,985
Yup.
622
00:29:12,985 --> 00:29:14,186
OK, give me slats.
623
00:29:14,186 --> 00:29:15,587
JEFF GUZZETTI: The jackscrew
slid completely out
624
00:29:15,587 --> 00:29:18,524
of the acme nut, allowing
the horizontal stabilizer
625
00:29:18,524 --> 00:29:22,761
to move well beyond
its aerodynamic limits.
626
00:29:22,761 --> 00:29:23,862
This is a bitch.
627
00:29:23,862 --> 00:29:24,663
Is it?
628
00:29:24,663 --> 00:29:26,332
Yeah.
629
00:29:26,332 --> 00:29:28,200
[screaming]
630
00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:30,803
NARRATOR: The stabilizer
forced the plane down,
631
00:29:30,803 --> 00:29:33,238
and now completely
out of control,
632
00:29:33,238 --> 00:29:35,374
it rolled over into
its final dive.
633
00:29:35,374 --> 00:29:38,210
[music playing]
634
00:29:43,983 --> 00:29:45,951
It was clear to
the investigators
635
00:29:45,951 --> 00:29:47,619
that the failure of
the jackscrew screw
636
00:29:47,619 --> 00:29:50,422
was the only explanation for
the plane's erratic flight
637
00:29:50,422 --> 00:29:52,458
path and final dive.
638
00:29:52,458 --> 00:29:54,293
But why had this happened?
639
00:29:54,293 --> 00:29:56,328
Why have the jackscrew failed?
640
00:30:00,900 --> 00:30:03,169
The investigators
began looking deeper
641
00:30:03,169 --> 00:30:05,505
into the condition of
the faulty jackscrew
642
00:30:05,505 --> 00:30:08,307
on Alaska Airlines Flight 261.
643
00:30:08,307 --> 00:30:11,144
What had caused it to fail?
644
00:30:11,144 --> 00:30:15,348
There was no lubrication or
visible grease on the working
645
00:30:15,348 --> 00:30:16,682
area of the screw.
646
00:30:16,682 --> 00:30:19,485
That was surprising and strange.
647
00:30:19,485 --> 00:30:21,888
[music playing]
648
00:30:35,234 --> 00:30:38,104
NARRATOR: The discovery of
no grease on the jackscrew
649
00:30:38,104 --> 00:30:39,839
alarmed the investigators.
650
00:30:39,839 --> 00:30:42,542
They alerted the Federal
Aviation Administration,
651
00:30:42,542 --> 00:30:46,946
who ordered an immediate check
on all the MD-80s in the USA.
652
00:30:46,946 --> 00:30:49,882
This led to a
shocking discovery.
653
00:30:49,882 --> 00:30:54,087
At Alaska Airlines, in 6
of its fleet of 34 planes,
654
00:30:54,087 --> 00:30:57,023
the jackscrew assembly
needed to be replaced
655
00:30:57,023 --> 00:30:58,758
after failing new inspections.
656
00:30:58,758 --> 00:31:02,128
[music playing]
657
00:31:02,128 --> 00:31:04,030
No grease is the culprit.
658
00:31:04,030 --> 00:31:07,834
No grease, or inadequate
grease, is the only thing that
659
00:31:07,834 --> 00:31:11,170
can give you that wear rate.
660
00:31:11,170 --> 00:31:12,705
NARRATOR: A simple
lack of grease
661
00:31:12,705 --> 00:31:14,807
led to the failure
of the jackscrew
662
00:31:14,807 --> 00:31:17,510
and the loss of 88 lives.
663
00:31:17,510 --> 00:31:20,880
But why did this happen
at Alaska Airlines?
664
00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:23,816
The investigators' attention
now switched to the company's
665
00:31:23,816 --> 00:31:26,319
maintenance program.
666
00:31:26,319 --> 00:31:29,355
What emerged was
deeply worrying.
667
00:31:29,355 --> 00:31:30,623
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ:
We interviewed
668
00:31:30,623 --> 00:31:33,759
all the mechanics who had
worked on these airplanes.
669
00:31:33,759 --> 00:31:37,830
We knew that they had been
falsifying records or not doing
670
00:31:37,830 --> 00:31:40,233
the work they had indicated.
671
00:31:40,233 --> 00:31:42,135
NARRATOR: The mechanics
at Alaska Airlines
672
00:31:42,135 --> 00:31:44,537
complained that they were
pressured to keep the planes
673
00:31:44,537 --> 00:31:46,939
in the air, or that
their recommendations
674
00:31:46,939 --> 00:31:49,375
were overruled by supervisors.
675
00:31:49,375 --> 00:31:51,878
Some allege that records
were altered to show
676
00:31:51,878 --> 00:31:53,412
work done that was not done.
677
00:31:53,412 --> 00:31:56,015
[music playing]
678
00:31:57,850 --> 00:32:00,586
Alaska Airlines has long
been one of America's most
679
00:32:00,586 --> 00:32:04,090
successful airlines,
but in the early 1990s,
680
00:32:04,090 --> 00:32:06,993
the economic downturn
hit the company hard.
681
00:32:06,993 --> 00:32:10,563
Its response was to costs
to revive its fortunes.
682
00:32:10,563 --> 00:32:13,199
[music playing]
683
00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:16,936
Pilots, maintenance workers,
management, and others
684
00:32:16,936 --> 00:32:18,471
had to make sacrifices.
685
00:32:18,471 --> 00:32:19,872
Jobs were lost.
686
00:32:19,872 --> 00:32:21,274
Pay was cut.
687
00:32:21,274 --> 00:32:24,777
And every hour aircraft spent
on the ground was seen as waste.
688
00:32:27,480 --> 00:32:29,582
Two years of
aggressive axe wielding
689
00:32:29,582 --> 00:32:32,518
saw costs come down
by $80 million.
690
00:32:32,518 --> 00:32:33,786
Profits leaped.
691
00:32:33,786 --> 00:32:36,489
It was a corporate triumph.
692
00:32:36,489 --> 00:32:40,293
In Alaska's case in the early
'90s, this airline had to do
693
00:32:40,293 --> 00:32:44,430
an incredible job of reforming
itself from a fairly high-cost
694
00:32:44,430 --> 00:32:46,532
carrier to a lower
cost carrier that
695
00:32:46,532 --> 00:32:48,834
could compete head
on with Southwest
696
00:32:48,834 --> 00:32:49,802
Airlines and with others.
697
00:32:49,802 --> 00:32:50,603
And they did it.
698
00:32:50,603 --> 00:32:51,904
They did it brilliantly.
699
00:32:51,904 --> 00:32:54,941
Nobody really believed
that it could happen.
700
00:32:54,941 --> 00:32:56,876
NARRATOR: Alaska
Airlines began flying
701
00:32:56,876 --> 00:32:58,844
the planes more intensively.
702
00:32:58,844 --> 00:33:03,182
It doubled the average
daily use of its fleet.
703
00:33:03,182 --> 00:33:05,518
Keeping the planes in
the air earning money
704
00:33:05,518 --> 00:33:07,486
put maintenance
schedules under pressure.
705
00:33:07,486 --> 00:33:10,156
[music playing]
706
00:33:14,293 --> 00:33:18,030
John Liotine was a former lead
mechanic at Alaska Airlines'
707
00:33:18,030 --> 00:33:20,032
Oakland maintenance
facility, where
708
00:33:20,032 --> 00:33:21,234
he worked for eight years.
709
00:33:24,103 --> 00:33:26,839
Liotine felt that the new
pressures on maintenance
710
00:33:26,839 --> 00:33:28,841
put passengers' lives at risk.
711
00:33:28,841 --> 00:33:32,245
He was to pay dearly for
expressing those concerns.
712
00:33:32,245 --> 00:33:35,514
We have used an actor to
portray his experiences,
713
00:33:35,514 --> 00:33:37,883
based on his sworn
testimony to the NTSB.
714
00:33:37,883 --> 00:33:40,486
[music playing]
715
00:33:41,787 --> 00:33:44,357
Liotine claimed that
planes were being pushed
716
00:33:44,357 --> 00:33:46,259
back into service too quickly.
717
00:33:46,259 --> 00:33:49,895
Sometimes rather than wait for
a replacement part or repair,
718
00:33:49,895 --> 00:33:53,065
supervisors passed
planes fit for service,
719
00:33:53,065 --> 00:33:55,568
free to carry passengers
up into the air.
720
00:33:55,568 --> 00:33:58,738
[music playing]
721
00:34:04,944 --> 00:34:09,081
In October 1998, over 15
months before the crash,
722
00:34:09,081 --> 00:34:12,218
John Liotine became so worried
that he did something that
723
00:34:12,218 --> 00:34:14,687
would change his life forever.
724
00:34:14,687 --> 00:34:17,556
He reported Alaska Airlines
to the US Department
725
00:34:17,556 --> 00:34:20,159
of Transportation,
alleging violations
726
00:34:20,159 --> 00:34:23,829
in maintenance procedures.
727
00:34:23,829 --> 00:34:27,900
There were very few
voices at Alaska who had
728
00:34:27,900 --> 00:34:29,035
concerns about the maintenance.
729
00:34:29,035 --> 00:34:30,436
There should have been
more, and there should
730
00:34:30,436 --> 00:34:31,537
have been people listening.
731
00:34:31,537 --> 00:34:34,240
John Liotine is a
hero in my book.
732
00:34:34,240 --> 00:34:37,043
[music playing]
733
00:34:38,377 --> 00:34:41,847
NARRATOR: In December 1999,
over a year before the crash,
734
00:34:41,847 --> 00:34:43,983
the Federal Aviation
Administration
735
00:34:43,983 --> 00:34:46,085
and Department of
Transportation officials
736
00:34:46,085 --> 00:34:47,720
moved on Alaska Airlines.
737
00:34:47,720 --> 00:34:50,656
[music playing]
738
00:35:01,067 --> 00:35:03,736
The case was referred
to federal prosecutors,
739
00:35:03,736 --> 00:35:06,906
and the FBI raided Alaska's
maintenance facilities
740
00:35:06,906 --> 00:35:08,574
and seized thousands of records.
741
00:35:11,210 --> 00:35:14,280
The raid was the opening
shot in a federal grand jury
742
00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:16,382
investigation that
would last three years.
743
00:35:16,382 --> 00:35:19,151
[music playing]
744
00:35:19,151 --> 00:35:22,121
No criminal charges were
brought against the airline.
745
00:35:22,121 --> 00:35:25,091
Alaska's officials denied
that any unsafe planes
746
00:35:25,091 --> 00:35:27,460
were put into service
or that passengers'
747
00:35:27,460 --> 00:35:29,795
lives were ever at risk.
748
00:35:29,795 --> 00:35:32,665
But the investigation revealed
hundreds of violations
749
00:35:32,665 --> 00:35:36,435
of federal regulations.
750
00:35:36,435 --> 00:35:38,437
Alaska Airlines was fined.
751
00:35:38,437 --> 00:35:41,974
The FAA insisted on changes
to the company's maintenance
752
00:35:41,974 --> 00:35:43,342
and safety procedures.
753
00:35:43,342 --> 00:35:46,178
The FAA also suspended
two supervisors
754
00:35:46,178 --> 00:35:47,446
for falsifying records.
755
00:35:47,446 --> 00:35:50,216
[music playing]
756
00:35:55,855 --> 00:35:59,225
Like other whistleblowers,
John Liotine would pay heavily
757
00:35:59,225 --> 00:36:01,560
for his efforts to save lives.
758
00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:04,864
Alaska Airlines put him on
paid leave from his job,
759
00:36:04,864 --> 00:36:08,234
costing him thousands of dollars
in regular overtime earnings.
760
00:36:08,234 --> 00:36:11,036
[music playing]
761
00:36:16,342 --> 00:36:19,745
Then, in January
2000, Liotine saw
762
00:36:19,745 --> 00:36:21,847
his worst nightmare come true.
763
00:36:21,847 --> 00:36:25,117
The kind of accident he
had tried to prevent now
764
00:36:25,117 --> 00:36:27,486
took place just off
the California coast.
765
00:36:39,165 --> 00:36:43,202
After the loss of Flight 261,
mechanic John Liotine went
766
00:36:43,202 --> 00:36:46,672
back to his own work records.
767
00:36:46,672 --> 00:36:49,675
Incredibly, he found
that he had a direct link
768
00:36:49,675 --> 00:36:51,544
to the crashed airliner.
769
00:36:51,544 --> 00:36:54,647
Two years before, at the
plane's last overhaul,
770
00:36:54,647 --> 00:36:58,151
he had ordered that the
jackscrew on this very airplane
771
00:36:58,151 --> 00:36:59,619
be replaced.
772
00:36:59,619 --> 00:37:00,720
He then went off shift.
773
00:37:00,720 --> 00:37:03,422
[music playing]
774
00:37:03,422 --> 00:37:05,625
When investigators
examined the record,
775
00:37:05,625 --> 00:37:08,161
they found that Liotine's
recommendation had been
776
00:37:08,161 --> 00:37:11,297
overruled by the next
shift and the plane put
777
00:37:11,297 --> 00:37:14,500
back into service.
778
00:37:14,500 --> 00:37:17,470
It would be two years
before the next overhaul,
779
00:37:17,470 --> 00:37:19,505
but time ran out.
780
00:37:19,505 --> 00:37:23,376
Four months before the overhaul
was due, Flight 261 crashed.
781
00:37:23,376 --> 00:37:26,145
[music playing]
782
00:37:30,349 --> 00:37:34,687
Alaska Airlines labeled
Liotine a disruptive influence.
783
00:37:34,687 --> 00:37:37,056
He sued the company for libel.
784
00:37:37,056 --> 00:37:39,792
Alaska settled, but
Liotine could no longer
785
00:37:39,792 --> 00:37:42,528
work in the industry he loved.
786
00:37:42,528 --> 00:37:45,198
I get calls almost every
week of somebody saying,
787
00:37:45,198 --> 00:37:46,332
should I blow the whistle?
788
00:37:46,332 --> 00:37:48,568
And I always tell
them, you need to know.
789
00:37:48,568 --> 00:37:51,604
You need to be prepared to
find another line of work,
790
00:37:51,604 --> 00:37:53,306
because you will not
work in the industry,
791
00:37:53,306 --> 00:37:55,141
and you will not work
in the government.
792
00:37:55,141 --> 00:37:57,977
In most cases, it's
almost impossible
793
00:37:57,977 --> 00:38:00,947
to be a whistleblower
and survive your career.
794
00:38:00,947 --> 00:38:03,749
[music playing]
795
00:38:12,024 --> 00:38:14,427
NARRATOR: As the investigators
continued their work
796
00:38:14,427 --> 00:38:18,331
into Flight 261, they made
another disturbing discovery
797
00:38:18,331 --> 00:38:21,601
about the drive to cut
costs at Alaska Airlines.
798
00:38:21,601 --> 00:38:24,337
To keep planes flying
more intensively,
799
00:38:24,337 --> 00:38:29,342
Alaska had dramatically extended
the intervals between service.
800
00:38:29,342 --> 00:38:32,678
This was significant, because
when a plane is designed,
801
00:38:32,678 --> 00:38:34,947
every part has a
schedule listing
802
00:38:34,947 --> 00:38:38,517
when it is to be serviced
and when it must be replaced.
803
00:38:38,517 --> 00:38:41,888
You're supposed to go in and
inspect every so many hours,
804
00:38:41,888 --> 00:38:44,023
and that's different on
parts all over the planes.
805
00:38:44,023 --> 00:38:46,359
Some things you have to
look at after every flight.
806
00:38:46,359 --> 00:38:48,127
Other things have
to be inspected
807
00:38:48,127 --> 00:38:51,364
every two or three days.
808
00:38:51,364 --> 00:38:54,066
NARRATOR: In 1996,
Alaska Airlines
809
00:38:54,066 --> 00:38:57,603
extended the intervals between
MD-80 jackscrew inspections
810
00:38:57,603 --> 00:39:00,473
by 400%.
811
00:39:00,473 --> 00:39:03,643
Before 1996, jackscrews
were inspected
812
00:39:03,643 --> 00:39:05,711
every 600 flight hours.
813
00:39:05,711 --> 00:39:10,149
Now there was over 2,500
between each service.
814
00:39:10,149 --> 00:39:14,086
If you had 600 hours between
inspection points and greasing
815
00:39:14,086 --> 00:39:17,590
points, we have no chance of
ever having a metal-to-metal
816
00:39:17,590 --> 00:39:18,891
contact situation.
817
00:39:18,891 --> 00:39:21,928
But if you put that out to
2,000 hours or 2,500 hours,
818
00:39:21,928 --> 00:39:25,998
now what you do is eat into
some of these protective stages,
819
00:39:25,998 --> 00:39:29,135
these barriers that we have
towards catastrophic failure.
820
00:39:29,135 --> 00:39:31,437
[music playing]
821
00:39:31,437 --> 00:39:32,905
Investigations division--
822
00:39:32,905 --> 00:39:36,375
NARRATOR: In its final report
into the crash of Flight 261,
823
00:39:36,375 --> 00:39:40,379
the NTSB concluded that Alaska
Airlines' extended service
824
00:39:40,379 --> 00:39:43,015
intervals to the
jackscrews on its MD-80s
825
00:39:43,015 --> 00:39:45,184
were a significant
contributor to the crash.
826
00:39:45,184 --> 00:39:47,019
Nor with any of
your supervisors
827
00:39:47,019 --> 00:39:49,322
up the chain in the
engineering area.
828
00:39:51,824 --> 00:39:53,159
JAY MALONEY: I
don't recall any--
829
00:39:53,159 --> 00:39:57,463
With carriers doing anything
to save a dime, maintenance,
830
00:39:57,463 --> 00:39:59,565
safety took a back seat.
831
00:39:59,565 --> 00:40:02,501
And one of the shocking
things about Alaska
832
00:40:02,501 --> 00:40:06,205
is that they were allowed to
increase inspection intervals.
833
00:40:06,205 --> 00:40:08,074
And it was very
shocking, because that
834
00:40:08,074 --> 00:40:09,976
is the only way we have safety.
835
00:40:14,246 --> 00:40:15,982
NARRATOR: The extended
maintenance intervals
836
00:40:15,982 --> 00:40:21,287
meant that lack of grease in
the jackscrew went undiscovered.
837
00:40:21,287 --> 00:40:24,357
But now, investigators also
wondered if the failure
838
00:40:24,357 --> 00:40:26,959
of the jackscrew assembly
revealed a basic floor
839
00:40:26,959 --> 00:40:30,329
in the plane's design.
840
00:40:30,329 --> 00:40:34,000
They found that the MD-80 broke
one of the fundamental rules
841
00:40:34,000 --> 00:40:35,468
of aircraft design.
842
00:40:35,468 --> 00:40:38,971
It was not fail safe.
843
00:40:38,971 --> 00:40:40,373
JOHN NANCE: The
design philosophy
844
00:40:40,373 --> 00:40:44,076
that has made aviation so safe
is that we should never, ever
845
00:40:44,076 --> 00:40:47,480
have a situation in which
one catastrophic failure
846
00:40:47,480 --> 00:40:49,115
of some component
of the airplane
847
00:40:49,115 --> 00:40:50,816
causes us to lose the airplane.
848
00:40:50,816 --> 00:40:54,153
These backups to the backup
backing up the backups
849
00:40:54,153 --> 00:40:57,456
is why we can get on an airplane
with almost 100% assurance
850
00:40:57,456 --> 00:41:00,292
that we're going to get
where we want to go safely.
851
00:41:00,292 --> 00:41:03,529
NARRATOR: There was no backup
to the jackscrew and its nut.
852
00:41:03,529 --> 00:41:06,866
Engineers never envisioned
a situation on the MD-80
853
00:41:06,866 --> 00:41:08,901
where the jackscrew might fail.
854
00:41:08,901 --> 00:41:12,438
With inspections every 600
flight hours and replacements
855
00:41:12,438 --> 00:41:15,374
every 2,000 hours,
the designers did not
856
00:41:15,374 --> 00:41:19,979
add an additional
redundant backup system.
857
00:41:19,979 --> 00:41:22,348
It was utterly
laughable that they
858
00:41:22,348 --> 00:41:23,783
said it was a redundant system.
859
00:41:23,783 --> 00:41:27,386
There's one screw,
and there's one nut.
860
00:41:27,386 --> 00:41:28,821
That's all there is.
861
00:41:28,821 --> 00:41:31,223
It's not redundant.
862
00:41:31,223 --> 00:41:32,591
--investigations division.
863
00:41:32,591 --> 00:41:35,294
NARRATOR: In its final report,
the National Transportation
864
00:41:35,294 --> 00:41:38,764
Safety Board concluded that
the crash of Flight 261
865
00:41:38,764 --> 00:41:41,667
was due to the lack of
adequate greasing and the
866
00:41:41,667 --> 00:41:43,202
stretched service intervals.
867
00:41:43,202 --> 00:41:45,871
When coupled with the
design of the jackscrew,
868
00:41:45,871 --> 00:41:49,375
these failures led to a
completely avoidable accident
869
00:41:49,375 --> 00:41:51,343
and the loss of 88 lives.
870
00:41:51,343 --> 00:41:54,213
[music playing]
871
00:42:06,525 --> 00:42:09,495
Three years after the
crash of Flight 261,
872
00:42:09,495 --> 00:42:11,697
the relatives and
friends of the dead
873
00:42:11,697 --> 00:42:15,134
dedicated a permanent
memorial at Port Hueneme close
874
00:42:15,134 --> 00:42:16,368
to the crash site.
875
00:42:16,368 --> 00:42:18,037
Janice Stokes.
876
00:42:18,037 --> 00:42:19,972
[bell tolls]
877
00:42:24,243 --> 00:42:27,079
JOHN NANCE: I think
the best thing
878
00:42:27,079 --> 00:42:30,716
and the only thing in our
infinite inadequacy of making
879
00:42:30,716 --> 00:42:33,686
up for the loss from this life
is to say something that we've
880
00:42:33,686 --> 00:42:35,454
been able to say in a
lot of other accidents
881
00:42:35,454 --> 00:42:36,922
to other grieving families.
882
00:42:36,922 --> 00:42:40,126
And that is those deaths
will not be in vain.
883
00:42:40,126 --> 00:42:42,128
We will not let them be in vain.
884
00:42:42,128 --> 00:42:44,396
Every one of those
lives will be made
885
00:42:44,396 --> 00:42:47,800
to count in terms of making
sure that 3, 4, 5 or 10
886
00:42:47,800 --> 00:42:49,001
other people do not die.
887
00:42:49,001 --> 00:42:51,537
[music playing]
888
00:42:52,838 --> 00:42:54,306
MAN: Miss Carol Karlsson.
889
00:42:54,306 --> 00:42:57,243
[bell tolls]
890
00:42:57,243 --> 00:42:59,411
Colleen was different.
891
00:42:59,411 --> 00:43:06,719
She was adventurous, and there's
nobody like that in our family.
892
00:43:06,719 --> 00:43:13,526
And I don't know what we can
do except to remember Colleen
893
00:43:13,526 --> 00:43:16,862
and to live our lives now a
little bit better for her.
894
00:43:16,862 --> 00:43:19,565
[music playing]
895
00:43:20,966 --> 00:43:22,501
MAN: Ryan Busche.
896
00:43:22,501 --> 00:43:24,737
None of us are
the same anymore.
897
00:43:24,737 --> 00:43:28,541
It's like walking into
a giant storm, wave
898
00:43:28,541 --> 00:43:32,745
after wave forming up, coming
in, because it never stops.
899
00:43:35,414 --> 00:43:38,050
Grief over the loss
of a child is not
900
00:43:38,050 --> 00:43:42,354
something I wish on anybody.
901
00:43:42,354 --> 00:43:46,692
This plane went down
because of neglect.
902
00:43:46,692 --> 00:43:50,863
It seems like such an
unholy type of loss.
903
00:43:50,863 --> 00:43:55,401
What a hard way to die so
an airline can, you know,
904
00:43:55,401 --> 00:43:56,835
make more money.
905
00:43:56,835 --> 00:43:57,836
[music playing]
68414
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