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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:06,306 --> 00:00:08,675 WOMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 2 00:00:08,675 --> 00:00:09,676 MAN: We lost both engines. 3 00:00:09,676 --> 00:00:10,944 WOMAN: Put the mask over your nose. 4 00:00:10,944 --> 00:00:12,112 Emergency descend. MAN: Mayday! 5 00:00:12,112 --> 00:00:12,912 Mayday! 6 00:00:12,912 --> 00:00:14,914 WOMAN: Brace for impact! 7 00:00:14,914 --> 00:00:15,915 Think I lost one. 8 00:00:15,915 --> 00:00:18,585 Investigation started in June. 9 00:00:18,585 --> 00:00:19,386 It's gonna crash! 10 00:00:19,386 --> 00:00:22,422 [tense music playing] 11 00:00:32,365 --> 00:00:37,937 FRED MILLER: No family wants to lose a loved one-- 12 00:00:37,937 --> 00:00:41,074 daughter, son. 13 00:00:41,074 --> 00:00:44,677 None of us think it's going to happen to our family. 14 00:00:44,677 --> 00:00:47,881 We read about these horrible crashes, 15 00:00:47,881 --> 00:00:51,251 and we think, thank God, you know? 16 00:00:51,251 --> 00:00:53,686 And chances are it won't happen to us. 17 00:00:53,686 --> 00:00:54,921 The odds are in our favor. 18 00:00:54,921 --> 00:00:57,724 [tense music playing] 19 00:01:04,130 --> 00:01:05,465 [grunts] You got it? 20 00:01:05,465 --> 00:01:06,266 Ah! 21 00:01:06,266 --> 00:01:07,233 What are you doing? 22 00:01:07,233 --> 00:01:09,803 [grunts] It just got worse, OK? 23 00:01:09,803 --> 00:01:12,906 NARRATOR: In January 2000, an Air Alaska jet 24 00:01:12,906 --> 00:01:16,776 with 88 passengers and crew suffered a catastrophic failure 25 00:01:16,776 --> 00:01:18,912 that tore it from the sky. 26 00:01:18,912 --> 00:01:22,582 A shocking chain of negligence and error led to disaster. 27 00:01:25,185 --> 00:01:27,654 When a whistleblower mechanic from the airline 28 00:01:27,654 --> 00:01:31,057 tried to sound the alarm about faulty maintenance procedures, 29 00:01:31,057 --> 00:01:35,361 he was suspended from his job. 30 00:01:35,361 --> 00:01:38,698 The investigation exposed deeply worrying shortcomings 31 00:01:38,698 --> 00:01:40,467 in maintenance and regulation that 32 00:01:40,467 --> 00:01:42,735 afflict the airline industry. 33 00:01:42,735 --> 00:01:45,371 It showed how a series of devastating errors 34 00:01:45,371 --> 00:01:47,707 combined to produce a tragic accident, 35 00:01:47,707 --> 00:01:49,409 one that could happen again. 36 00:01:49,409 --> 00:01:51,744 [suspenseful music playing] 37 00:01:53,713 --> 00:01:54,681 We're stalled! 38 00:01:54,681 --> 00:01:55,715 Gotta release it. 39 00:01:55,715 --> 00:01:58,184 [screaming] 40 00:01:58,184 --> 00:02:01,621 [music playing] 41 00:02:01,621 --> 00:02:03,623 [groaning] 42 00:02:07,527 --> 00:02:09,062 [crashing sounds] 43 00:02:09,996 --> 00:02:12,999 [mariachi music playing] 44 00:02:21,341 --> 00:02:23,877 NARRATOR: Puerto Vallarta is a popular holiday resort 45 00:02:23,877 --> 00:02:26,045 on the Mexican Pacific Coast, one 46 00:02:26,045 --> 00:02:29,282 of several Mexican destinations served by Alaskan Airlines. 47 00:02:29,282 --> 00:02:32,685 [music playing] 48 00:02:32,685 --> 00:02:35,822 Colleen Worley went there to celebrate a family birthday. 49 00:02:35,822 --> 00:02:38,024 The 34-year-old was a keen traveler 50 00:02:38,024 --> 00:02:41,928 who spoke Spanish well and had visited Mexico many times. 51 00:02:41,928 --> 00:02:44,731 [singing in spanish] 52 00:02:49,936 --> 00:02:51,070 [applause] 53 00:02:51,070 --> 00:02:51,871 MAN: Yes! 54 00:02:51,871 --> 00:02:54,774 [music playing] 55 00:02:59,045 --> 00:03:01,247 NARRATOR: Colleen and the other holiday makers returning 56 00:03:01,247 --> 00:03:03,716 from Puerto Vallarta settle in for the four-hour 57 00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:05,852 flight to San Francisco. 58 00:03:05,852 --> 00:03:08,054 In the warm afterglow of their holidays, 59 00:03:08,054 --> 00:03:09,122 they're looking to the future. 60 00:03:09,122 --> 00:03:11,891 [music playing] 61 00:03:13,326 --> 00:03:15,795 Colleen and her fiance Monte Donaldson 62 00:03:15,795 --> 00:03:18,064 are planning to start a family later that year. 63 00:03:21,167 --> 00:03:24,304 MAN (ON RADIO): Be ready for taxi at 5. 64 00:03:24,304 --> 00:03:27,974 NARRATOR: The pilots on Flight 261 are very experienced. 65 00:03:27,974 --> 00:03:30,243 Both Captain Ted Thompson and First 66 00:03:30,243 --> 00:03:32,245 Officer Bill Tansky have thousands 67 00:03:32,245 --> 00:03:34,314 of hours flying MD-80s. 68 00:03:34,314 --> 00:03:35,548 They know the plane well. 69 00:03:39,052 --> 00:03:43,156 The MD83 is one of a successful group of rear-engine, low wing 70 00:03:43,156 --> 00:03:44,223 planes. 71 00:03:44,223 --> 00:03:47,360 Originally launched in 1980, over 1,100 72 00:03:47,360 --> 00:03:48,294 were delivered worldwide. 73 00:03:48,294 --> 00:03:50,763 [music playing] 74 00:03:52,065 --> 00:03:53,066 Flaps? 75 00:03:53,066 --> 00:03:53,933 Check, confirm. 76 00:03:53,933 --> 00:03:54,734 Spoilers. 77 00:03:54,734 --> 00:03:55,935 Check, armed. 78 00:03:55,935 --> 00:03:58,805 NARRATOR: But on the 31st of January, 2000, 79 00:03:58,805 --> 00:04:02,675 as they prepared Flight 261, Thompson and Tansky 80 00:04:02,675 --> 00:04:05,712 had no idea that deep in the plane's tail 81 00:04:05,712 --> 00:04:06,946 lay a critical weakness. 82 00:04:06,946 --> 00:04:09,816 [music playing] 83 00:04:24,030 --> 00:04:26,799 Colleen Worley and her fiance Monty Donaldson 84 00:04:26,799 --> 00:04:30,236 were planning their forthcoming wedding. 85 00:04:30,236 --> 00:04:32,772 They had announced their engagement at Christmastime, 86 00:04:32,772 --> 00:04:35,675 and so it was a time for everybody 87 00:04:35,675 --> 00:04:37,276 to sort of congratulate them. 88 00:04:37,276 --> 00:04:40,647 And so we decided we'd have a party for the family. 89 00:04:43,483 --> 00:04:45,718 NARRATOR: Abby Miller Busche had visited Mexico 90 00:04:45,718 --> 00:04:47,587 with her husband Ryan and their friends 91 00:04:47,587 --> 00:04:50,423 to celebrate her new job at Microsoft. 92 00:04:50,423 --> 00:04:57,697 It's hard to describe how joyful a girl she was. 93 00:04:57,697 --> 00:05:03,936 She was well known for that care that she had in her, a trait 94 00:05:03,936 --> 00:05:06,439 that you can't put a value on. 95 00:05:09,442 --> 00:05:11,978 SUSAN DA SILVA: Dean and I had been there a lot together, 96 00:05:11,978 --> 00:05:14,714 and it was the first time that he went without me. 97 00:05:14,714 --> 00:05:16,949 Dean taught me how to play. 98 00:05:16,949 --> 00:05:18,685 He was always up. 99 00:05:18,685 --> 00:05:20,319 He told jokes a lot. 100 00:05:20,319 --> 00:05:22,555 People described him kind of as a puppy dog. 101 00:05:22,555 --> 00:05:25,158 [music playing] 102 00:05:26,392 --> 00:05:28,594 NARRATOR: Alaska Airlines was a successful carrier, 103 00:05:28,594 --> 00:05:31,064 with routes up and down the west coast of America 104 00:05:31,064 --> 00:05:32,065 and into Mexico. 105 00:05:35,334 --> 00:05:38,604 Flight 261 left Puerto Vallarta as a routine flight 106 00:05:38,604 --> 00:05:40,506 with no hint of the danger to come. 107 00:05:40,506 --> 00:05:44,444 [music playing] 108 00:05:44,444 --> 00:05:48,347 The devastating failure that would bring catastrophe to 261 109 00:05:48,347 --> 00:05:49,849 did not come out of the blue. 110 00:05:53,286 --> 00:05:56,255 In fact, it was the culmination of a chain of mistakes 111 00:05:56,255 --> 00:05:58,725 that began years earlier. 112 00:05:58,725 --> 00:06:00,593 Maintenance procedures at the company 113 00:06:00,593 --> 00:06:02,795 had come under scrutiny two years earlier, 114 00:06:02,795 --> 00:06:05,598 when a whistleblower set off an investigation by the Federal 115 00:06:05,598 --> 00:06:06,933 Aviation Administration. 116 00:06:09,602 --> 00:06:12,605 But the day Flight 261 left Puerto Vallarta, 117 00:06:12,605 --> 00:06:14,974 the investigation was still underway, 118 00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:17,376 and the whistleblower suspended from his job. 119 00:06:20,313 --> 00:06:22,815 Shortly after takeoff, Captain Thompson 120 00:06:22,815 --> 00:06:26,552 and First Officer Tansky get the first sign of trouble. 121 00:06:26,552 --> 00:06:30,690 The horizontal stabilizer on the tail of the plane won't move. 122 00:06:30,690 --> 00:06:34,093 The pilots carry out a standard checklist to try and free it. 123 00:06:37,263 --> 00:06:39,398 Stabilizer, trim switch. 124 00:06:39,398 --> 00:06:40,533 Normal. 125 00:06:40,533 --> 00:06:44,036 Circuit breakers-- reset if tripped. 126 00:06:44,036 --> 00:06:46,205 D9, D10, D11 OK. 127 00:06:46,205 --> 00:06:48,708 NARRATOR: The stabilizer on the MD-83 128 00:06:48,708 --> 00:06:51,010 the 40-foot wide horizontal surface 129 00:06:51,010 --> 00:06:52,478 of the front of the tail. 130 00:06:52,478 --> 00:06:54,480 It's like another wing. 131 00:06:54,480 --> 00:06:57,383 Together with the elevators at the rear of the tail, 132 00:06:57,383 --> 00:06:59,852 the stabilizer is used to adjust the angle 133 00:06:59,852 --> 00:07:00,887 of the plane in flight. 134 00:07:04,157 --> 00:07:06,225 The stabilizer was jammed. 135 00:07:06,225 --> 00:07:08,261 Thompson and Tansky assumed there 136 00:07:08,261 --> 00:07:09,929 was a fault in the electric motors 137 00:07:09,929 --> 00:07:11,631 that move it up and down. 138 00:07:11,631 --> 00:07:14,066 They believed they could fix the problem. 139 00:07:14,066 --> 00:07:17,203 They had no idea they were in great danger. 140 00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,605 JOHN NANCE: What they dealt with was something 141 00:07:19,605 --> 00:07:21,307 that really snuck up on them. 142 00:07:21,307 --> 00:07:24,477 It was not supposed to be a big deal. 143 00:07:24,477 --> 00:07:25,878 If it had been, they would have turned 144 00:07:25,878 --> 00:07:28,548 around and gone back in to the Mexican airfield they came out 145 00:07:28,548 --> 00:07:29,916 of. 146 00:07:29,916 --> 00:07:34,086 But they were led down this road of accepting this problem 147 00:07:34,086 --> 00:07:36,355 as a small problem, so it's perfectly 148 00:07:36,355 --> 00:07:39,525 all right to troubleshoot it. 149 00:07:39,525 --> 00:07:42,128 NARRATOR: The pilots repeatedly try the two switches 150 00:07:42,128 --> 00:07:44,063 that operate the stabilizer. 151 00:07:44,063 --> 00:07:46,966 The primary motor is activated by both the switch 152 00:07:46,966 --> 00:07:49,535 on the control stick, known as the pickle switch, 153 00:07:49,535 --> 00:07:52,772 and the sliding suitcase handles on the central console. 154 00:07:52,772 --> 00:07:54,340 Either system operative. 155 00:07:57,276 --> 00:07:58,477 No. 156 00:07:58,477 --> 00:07:59,879 Both systems inoperative. 157 00:07:59,879 --> 00:08:00,980 Consider stab jammed. 158 00:08:00,980 --> 00:08:02,515 Do not use autopilot. 159 00:08:02,515 --> 00:08:04,517 Check. 160 00:08:04,517 --> 00:08:07,253 NARRATOR: The jammed stabilizer is pushing the aircraft down 161 00:08:07,253 --> 00:08:08,888 towards the ground. 162 00:08:08,888 --> 00:08:13,025 At 28,500 feet, the pilots switch off the autopilot 163 00:08:13,025 --> 00:08:14,026 and fly the plane manually. 164 00:08:14,026 --> 00:08:15,394 PILOT: Full systems inoperative. 165 00:08:15,394 --> 00:08:17,530 NARRATOR: They have to pull back hard on the control column 166 00:08:17,530 --> 00:08:19,665 to lift the nose of the plane up. 167 00:08:19,665 --> 00:08:22,435 This requires considerable effort. 168 00:08:22,435 --> 00:08:24,804 The plane climbs for the next 7 minutes 169 00:08:24,804 --> 00:08:28,307 to its cruising altitude of 32,000 feet. 170 00:08:28,307 --> 00:08:30,776 As they fly up the coast, the pilots 171 00:08:30,776 --> 00:08:32,778 contact Alaska Airlines' maintenance 172 00:08:32,778 --> 00:08:34,180 department for assistance. 173 00:08:34,180 --> 00:08:35,882 PILOT: Maintenance, we need to know of any faults 174 00:08:35,882 --> 00:08:38,684 like this got reported recently for this aircraft 175 00:08:38,684 --> 00:08:40,219 and whether there are any switches that we 176 00:08:40,219 --> 00:08:43,356 might not be aware of that could get those motors turning again. 177 00:08:43,356 --> 00:08:44,757 Roger 261. 178 00:08:44,757 --> 00:08:47,660 I have verified no history on your aircraft 179 00:08:47,660 --> 00:08:49,328 in the past 30 days. 180 00:08:49,328 --> 00:08:52,164 Yeah, we didn't see anything in the logbook. 181 00:08:52,164 --> 00:08:54,066 Why don't you move your seat forward. 182 00:08:54,066 --> 00:08:57,169 I'll check this pedestal back there. 183 00:08:57,169 --> 00:08:58,304 Beyond that, I don't think there's 184 00:08:58,304 --> 00:09:00,172 anything we haven't checked. 185 00:09:00,172 --> 00:09:03,009 I use the example of the average layman, 186 00:09:03,009 --> 00:09:04,277 I think, can understand. 187 00:09:04,277 --> 00:09:09,348 If you try to start your car and it doesn't crank, 188 00:09:09,348 --> 00:09:14,287 you try jiggling the key in the socket and then try it again. 189 00:09:14,287 --> 00:09:17,924 And I think that the crew was probably understandably going 190 00:09:17,924 --> 00:09:21,394 through a lot of these-- well, maybe it'll work now, or let's 191 00:09:21,394 --> 00:09:24,730 try this, let's try that. 192 00:09:24,730 --> 00:09:26,966 NARRATOR: The pilots want to divert to Los Angeles, 193 00:09:26,966 --> 00:09:30,036 but Alaska Airlines dispatch coordinating the movements 194 00:09:30,036 --> 00:09:32,305 of the company's planes is worried it 195 00:09:32,305 --> 00:09:34,941 will upset the busy schedule. 196 00:09:34,941 --> 00:09:37,777 261 dispatch, if you want to land at LA, 197 00:09:37,777 --> 00:09:40,446 of course for safety reasons we will do that. 198 00:09:40,446 --> 00:09:42,148 I'll tell you, though, if we land in LA, 199 00:09:42,148 --> 00:09:45,584 we're looking at probably an hour, an hour and a half. 200 00:09:45,584 --> 00:09:48,354 We've got a major flow program going right now. 201 00:09:48,354 --> 00:09:49,989 Well, boy. 202 00:09:49,989 --> 00:09:52,558 You really put me in a spot up here. 203 00:09:52,558 --> 00:09:54,894 I don't want to hear that the flow is the reason you're 204 00:09:54,894 --> 00:09:56,896 calling, because I'm concerned about overflying 205 00:09:56,896 --> 00:09:58,998 suitable airports. 206 00:09:58,998 --> 00:10:00,433 Well, we want to do what's safe, 207 00:10:00,433 --> 00:10:02,535 so if that's what you feel is safe, 208 00:10:02,535 --> 00:10:05,371 just want to make sure you have all the info. 209 00:10:05,371 --> 00:10:06,772 We might ask if they have a ground 210 00:10:06,772 --> 00:10:09,041 school instructor available, and we could discuss it with him-- 211 00:10:09,041 --> 00:10:11,544 and a simulator instructor. 212 00:10:11,544 --> 00:10:15,614 Dispatch 261, we're wondering if we can get some support out 213 00:10:15,614 --> 00:10:16,749 of the instructors up there. 214 00:10:16,749 --> 00:10:18,084 NARRATOR: Thompson and Tansky now 215 00:10:18,084 --> 00:10:21,187 ask for a pilot instructor who might know the solution 216 00:10:21,187 --> 00:10:22,521 to their unusual problem. 217 00:10:22,521 --> 00:10:23,956 Stand by. 218 00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:25,725 NARRATOR: As they wait for a reply, 219 00:10:25,725 --> 00:10:27,526 their frustration begins to show. 220 00:10:35,701 --> 00:10:37,636 It just drives me nuts, you know? 221 00:10:37,636 --> 00:10:41,507 Not that I want to go on about it, but it just blows me away. 222 00:10:41,507 --> 00:10:42,575 They think we're going to land. 223 00:10:42,575 --> 00:10:43,776 They're going to fix it. 224 00:10:43,776 --> 00:10:46,012 Now they're worried about the flow. 225 00:10:46,012 --> 00:10:48,881 Well, I'm sorry, just-- 226 00:10:48,881 --> 00:10:50,783 They're putting pressure on you. 227 00:10:50,783 --> 00:10:51,684 I don't know. 228 00:10:51,684 --> 00:10:52,518 Yeah. 229 00:10:55,588 --> 00:10:57,990 NARRATOR: The pilots need to think about what will happen 230 00:10:57,990 --> 00:10:59,625 when they descend for landing. 231 00:10:59,625 --> 00:11:01,293 How will the plane behave? 232 00:11:01,293 --> 00:11:03,596 Will they be able to control it? 233 00:11:03,596 --> 00:11:05,831 But several minutes after requesting help 234 00:11:05,831 --> 00:11:08,801 from the ground, they're getting no advice. 235 00:11:08,801 --> 00:11:10,936 [music playing] 236 00:11:10,936 --> 00:11:14,774 As Flight 261 approached Los Angeles off the coast, 237 00:11:14,774 --> 00:11:17,743 the problems on board were about to get far worse. 238 00:11:17,743 --> 00:11:18,744 [music playing] 239 00:11:23,216 --> 00:11:26,786 are flying manually at 32,000 feet in a plane that 240 00:11:26,786 --> 00:11:28,488 has a jammed stabilizer, which is 241 00:11:28,488 --> 00:11:30,123 forcing the plane's nose down. 242 00:11:30,123 --> 00:11:32,993 [music playing] 243 00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:35,729 The pilots have another go at freeing 244 00:11:35,729 --> 00:11:37,664 up the jammed stabilizer. 245 00:11:37,664 --> 00:11:40,734 They switch on both of the motors that control it. 246 00:11:40,734 --> 00:11:41,635 This will click it off. 247 00:11:44,037 --> 00:11:44,838 Holy sh-- 248 00:11:44,838 --> 00:11:47,741 [screaming] 249 00:11:47,741 --> 00:11:50,677 [tense music playing] 250 00:11:54,280 --> 00:11:55,415 Shit, you got it? 251 00:11:55,415 --> 00:11:56,216 Ah! 252 00:11:56,216 --> 00:11:57,017 What are you doing? 253 00:11:57,017 --> 00:11:58,585 Damn, it kicked off. 254 00:12:01,988 --> 00:12:05,358 NARRATOR: At 31,000 feet, Flight 261 plunges 255 00:12:05,358 --> 00:12:07,227 downwards for over a minute. 256 00:12:07,227 --> 00:12:09,796 The crew battles for control. 257 00:12:09,796 --> 00:12:10,897 It just got worse, OK? 258 00:12:10,897 --> 00:12:13,767 [tense music playing] 259 00:12:15,635 --> 00:12:17,637 [grunts] We're stalled. 260 00:12:17,637 --> 00:12:20,540 [indistinct radio chatter] 261 00:12:21,941 --> 00:12:24,544 NARRATOR: At first, they pull back on the control columns 262 00:12:24,544 --> 00:12:25,979 to fight the dive. 263 00:12:25,979 --> 00:12:28,915 Then the pilots push the nose down into the dive 264 00:12:28,915 --> 00:12:30,884 to regain control. 265 00:12:30,884 --> 00:12:33,553 It's a risky maneuver, pushing the plane's speed 266 00:12:33,553 --> 00:12:36,756 to up to 350 miles per hour. 267 00:12:36,756 --> 00:12:37,557 You gotta release it. 268 00:12:37,557 --> 00:12:38,925 You gotta release it. 269 00:12:38,925 --> 00:12:41,561 NARRATOR: The pilots slowly bring the plane out of its dive 270 00:12:41,561 --> 00:12:42,662 and back under control. 271 00:12:46,966 --> 00:12:49,936 [groaning] 272 00:12:49,936 --> 00:12:53,907 [breathing heavily] 273 00:12:53,907 --> 00:12:54,808 Let's get speed brakes. 274 00:12:58,011 --> 00:12:59,079 Give me high pressure pumps. 275 00:12:59,079 --> 00:13:01,848 OK. 276 00:13:01,848 --> 00:13:03,016 Help me back. 277 00:13:03,016 --> 00:13:03,983 Help me back. 278 00:13:03,983 --> 00:13:05,485 OK. 279 00:13:05,485 --> 00:13:06,986 [gasping] 280 00:13:16,696 --> 00:13:19,599 Center, Alaska 261. 281 00:13:19,599 --> 00:13:21,234 We're in a dive here. 282 00:13:21,234 --> 00:13:25,238 I've lost control, vertical pitch. 283 00:13:25,238 --> 00:13:27,407 Alaska 261, say again, sir. 284 00:13:27,407 --> 00:13:30,043 Yeah, we're out of 26,000 feet. 285 00:13:30,043 --> 00:13:32,846 We are in a vertical dive. 286 00:13:32,846 --> 00:13:35,849 Not a dive yet, but we have lost vertical control 287 00:13:35,849 --> 00:13:36,683 of our airplane. 288 00:13:39,219 --> 00:13:41,187 Just help me. 289 00:13:41,187 --> 00:13:46,059 Once we get the speed slope, maybe we'll be OK. 290 00:13:46,059 --> 00:13:48,661 NARRATOR: Maintaining level flight is difficult. 291 00:13:48,661 --> 00:13:51,464 The jammed stabilizer keeps pushing the nose of the plane 292 00:13:51,464 --> 00:13:52,665 down. 293 00:13:52,665 --> 00:13:55,001 [gasping] 294 00:13:55,001 --> 00:13:56,503 We're at 23-7. 295 00:13:56,503 --> 00:14:00,940 Request-- yeah, we got it under control here. 296 00:14:00,940 --> 00:14:03,676 PILOT: No, we don't. 297 00:14:03,676 --> 00:14:05,512 [grunting] 298 00:14:05,512 --> 00:14:06,312 OK. 299 00:14:06,312 --> 00:14:07,147 PILOT: OK. 300 00:14:09,649 --> 00:14:11,351 NARRATOR: To counteract the downward force 301 00:14:11,351 --> 00:14:14,254 of the stabilizer, the pilots use the elevators, 302 00:14:14,254 --> 00:14:17,624 movable panels at the back of the tail linked by cables 303 00:14:17,624 --> 00:14:19,425 to the control column. 304 00:14:19,425 --> 00:14:21,861 The pilots pull with all their might. 305 00:14:21,861 --> 00:14:25,165 The fate of the plane hangs on the strength of their arms. 306 00:14:25,165 --> 00:14:26,866 [baby crying] 307 00:14:26,866 --> 00:14:29,702 In the cabin, frightened passengers try to recover 308 00:14:29,702 --> 00:14:31,704 from the terrifying plunge. 309 00:14:31,704 --> 00:14:34,007 They have no idea what will happen next. 310 00:14:37,510 --> 00:14:40,647 In the cockpit, the pilots struggle to control the plane's 311 00:14:40,647 --> 00:14:43,349 speed so they can land. 312 00:14:43,349 --> 00:14:44,884 JOHN NANCE: They've got a handful of airplane. 313 00:14:44,884 --> 00:14:48,421 They get her stabilized, and they're now in a situation 314 00:14:48,421 --> 00:14:50,657 where they make the decision properly 315 00:14:50,657 --> 00:14:53,660 to go in on an emergency landing to Los Angeles International. 316 00:14:53,660 --> 00:14:57,130 And they have to be able to slow the airplane up, 317 00:14:57,130 --> 00:14:59,566 so you've got to experiment a little bit. 318 00:14:59,566 --> 00:15:00,967 Let's take the speed brakes off. 319 00:15:00,967 --> 00:15:02,001 No, no leave them there. 320 00:15:02,001 --> 00:15:02,836 It seems to be helping. 321 00:15:05,772 --> 00:15:08,174 Damn, OK, it really wants to pitch down. 322 00:15:08,174 --> 00:15:09,742 OK. 323 00:15:09,742 --> 00:15:10,710 Don't mess with that. 324 00:15:10,710 --> 00:15:13,780 I agree with you. 325 00:15:13,780 --> 00:15:16,382 NARRATOR: With the plane under temporary control, 326 00:15:16,382 --> 00:15:18,384 the crew makes the fateful decision 327 00:15:18,384 --> 00:15:19,853 to do more troubleshooting. 328 00:15:19,853 --> 00:15:23,389 They need a block of clear space around the aircraft in case 329 00:15:23,389 --> 00:15:25,124 they lose control again. 330 00:15:25,124 --> 00:15:27,861 They contact air traffic control. 331 00:15:27,861 --> 00:15:30,797 Alaska 261, say your conditions. 332 00:15:30,797 --> 00:15:36,903 261, we are at 24,000 feet, kind of stabilized. 333 00:15:36,903 --> 00:15:39,772 We're slowing down here, and we're going 334 00:15:39,772 --> 00:15:41,508 to do a little troubleshooting. 335 00:15:41,508 --> 00:15:45,345 Can you give me a block altitude between 20 and 25? 336 00:15:45,345 --> 00:15:48,381 Alaska 261, maintain block altitude flight level 337 00:15:48,381 --> 00:15:52,318 200 through flight level 250. 338 00:15:52,318 --> 00:15:55,054 NARRATOR: The pilots know they now have clear airspace 339 00:15:55,054 --> 00:15:57,123 above and below the plane. 340 00:15:57,123 --> 00:15:58,925 They try to figure out their next move. 341 00:15:58,925 --> 00:16:00,159 You've got the airplane. 342 00:16:00,159 --> 00:16:01,027 Let me just try it. 343 00:16:01,027 --> 00:16:03,630 OK. 344 00:16:03,630 --> 00:16:04,797 How hard is it? 345 00:16:04,797 --> 00:16:05,598 I don't know. 346 00:16:05,598 --> 00:16:07,033 My adrenaline's going. 347 00:16:07,033 --> 00:16:09,168 It was really rough back there for a while. 348 00:16:09,168 --> 00:16:11,070 Yeah, it is. 349 00:16:11,070 --> 00:16:12,438 Whatever we did is no good. 350 00:16:12,438 --> 00:16:13,539 Let's not do that again. 351 00:16:13,539 --> 00:16:16,976 Yeah, it went to down-- to full nose down. 352 00:16:16,976 --> 00:16:18,544 It's worse than it was before. 353 00:16:18,544 --> 00:16:20,780 Yeah, we're in much worse shape now. 354 00:16:20,780 --> 00:16:23,850 NARRATOR: The crew knows this is no mere electrical problem. 355 00:16:23,850 --> 00:16:25,852 From what they've experienced, they assume 356 00:16:25,852 --> 00:16:29,656 the stabilizer is now jammed. 357 00:16:29,656 --> 00:16:30,957 I think it's at the stop-- 358 00:16:30,957 --> 00:16:32,425 full stop. 359 00:16:32,425 --> 00:16:34,694 And I'm thinking can it get any worse? 360 00:16:34,694 --> 00:16:36,729 But it probably can. 361 00:16:36,729 --> 00:16:39,165 But let's slow it. 362 00:16:39,165 --> 00:16:42,201 Let's get down to 200 knots and see what happens. 363 00:16:44,671 --> 00:16:46,873 NARRATOR: The crisis is worse than ever. 364 00:16:46,873 --> 00:16:50,109 Uncertain about how the plane will react if they try to slow 365 00:16:50,109 --> 00:16:53,112 it down, the pilots must still pull on the elevators 366 00:16:53,112 --> 00:16:54,480 to maintain level flight. 367 00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:58,117 [music playing] 368 00:16:58,117 --> 00:16:59,352 Maintenance, 261. 369 00:16:59,352 --> 00:17:02,322 Are you on? 370 00:17:02,322 --> 00:17:03,289 Yeah, 261. 371 00:17:03,289 --> 00:17:06,025 This is maintenance. 372 00:17:06,025 --> 00:17:08,261 OK, we did both the pickle switch 373 00:17:08,261 --> 00:17:11,331 and the suitcase handles, and it ran away. 374 00:17:11,331 --> 00:17:14,000 It ran away full nose trim down. 375 00:17:14,000 --> 00:17:16,769 MAN: Oh, it ran away trim down? 376 00:17:16,769 --> 00:17:21,074 Hoke-- and now we're in a damn pinch, and we're holding. 377 00:17:21,074 --> 00:17:22,642 We're worse than we were before. 378 00:17:22,642 --> 00:17:25,478 [tense music playing] 379 00:17:32,852 --> 00:17:34,253 You're getting full nose trim down, 380 00:17:34,253 --> 00:17:35,621 but you don't get no nose trim up. 381 00:17:35,621 --> 00:17:36,923 Is that correct? 382 00:17:36,923 --> 00:17:38,458 That's affirm. 383 00:17:38,458 --> 00:17:40,793 We went to full nose down, and I'm 384 00:17:40,793 --> 00:17:42,829 afraid to try it again to see if it would 385 00:17:42,829 --> 00:17:44,497 go in the other direction. 386 00:17:44,497 --> 00:17:46,366 OK, well, your discretion. 387 00:17:46,366 --> 00:17:48,134 If you want to try it, that's OK with me. 388 00:17:48,134 --> 00:17:49,769 If not, that's fine. 389 00:17:49,769 --> 00:17:50,636 We'll see you at the gate. 390 00:17:50,636 --> 00:17:53,439 [tense music playing] 391 00:17:55,274 --> 00:17:56,743 NARRATOR: Maintenance clearly does not 392 00:17:56,743 --> 00:17:59,479 appreciate the significance of the situation. 393 00:17:59,479 --> 00:18:02,048 This is the last the crew will hear from them. 394 00:18:02,048 --> 00:18:05,084 No one can help the pilots now as they struggle with 395 00:18:05,084 --> 00:18:07,420 the plane's jammed stabilizer. 396 00:18:07,420 --> 00:18:09,589 Ever professional, however, they try 397 00:18:09,589 --> 00:18:12,592 to put the passengers at ease. 398 00:18:12,592 --> 00:18:13,926 [indistinct chatter] 399 00:18:13,926 --> 00:18:15,261 (WHISPERING) Is everything OK? 400 00:18:15,261 --> 00:18:16,062 We're going to be OK. 401 00:18:16,062 --> 00:18:18,931 We're just redirecting. 402 00:18:18,931 --> 00:18:22,535 Folks, we have had a flight control problem up front here. 403 00:18:22,535 --> 00:18:23,970 We're working it. 404 00:18:23,970 --> 00:18:26,005 That's Los Angeles off to the right there, 405 00:18:26,005 --> 00:18:28,274 and that's where we're intending to go. 406 00:18:28,274 --> 00:18:31,310 We're pretty busy up here working this situation. 407 00:18:31,310 --> 00:18:34,080 I don't anticipate any big problems once we get a couple 408 00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:35,882 of subsystems on the line. 409 00:18:35,882 --> 00:18:38,751 But we will be going into LAX, and I 410 00:18:38,751 --> 00:18:42,822 anticipate us parking there in about 20 to 30 minutes. 411 00:18:42,822 --> 00:18:46,092 NARRATOR: In fact, they will never make it to Los Angeles. 412 00:18:46,092 --> 00:18:48,895 A full-blown disaster is about to unfold. 413 00:18:55,601 --> 00:18:58,805 Alaska Airlines Flight 261 has now leveled out. 414 00:18:58,805 --> 00:19:01,741 LA, Alaska 261, we're with you. 415 00:19:01,741 --> 00:19:03,776 We're at 225. 416 00:19:03,776 --> 00:19:06,379 We have a jammed stabilizer, and we're maintaining 417 00:19:06,379 --> 00:19:08,181 altitude with difficulty. 418 00:19:08,181 --> 00:19:11,818 But we can maintain altitude we think, 419 00:19:11,818 --> 00:19:14,954 and our intention is to land at Los Angeles. 420 00:19:17,657 --> 00:19:19,258 NARRATOR: The pilots request to be routed 421 00:19:19,258 --> 00:19:20,693 out over the Pacific Ocean. 422 00:19:23,629 --> 00:19:26,265 Center, Alaska 261. 423 00:19:26,265 --> 00:19:28,368 I need to get down about 10, change 424 00:19:28,368 --> 00:19:32,338 my configurations to make sure I can control the jet. 425 00:19:32,338 --> 00:19:35,842 And I'd like to do that over the bay here if I may. 426 00:19:35,842 --> 00:19:37,910 NARRATOR: If the worst happens, the pilots 427 00:19:37,910 --> 00:19:41,214 don't want to kill people on the ground as well as on the plane. 428 00:19:41,214 --> 00:19:44,717 There are a lot of lives saved that people maybe don't realize 429 00:19:44,717 --> 00:19:47,120 by the fact that this air crew said let's stay out 430 00:19:47,120 --> 00:19:49,088 over the water until we've got this thing 431 00:19:49,088 --> 00:19:51,524 completely under control. 432 00:19:51,524 --> 00:19:54,460 NARRATOR: The crew tries to slow the aircraft down to landing 433 00:19:54,460 --> 00:19:58,331 speed without losing control, but every move they make 434 00:19:58,331 --> 00:20:02,602 could have fatal consequences. 435 00:20:02,602 --> 00:20:06,172 OK, bring the flaps and the slats back up for me. 436 00:20:06,172 --> 00:20:07,039 Slats, too? 437 00:20:07,039 --> 00:20:08,141 Yep. 438 00:20:08,141 --> 00:20:10,176 NARRATOR: Treading a knife edge of control, 439 00:20:10,176 --> 00:20:13,079 the pilots are still trying to free up the stabilizer. 440 00:20:13,079 --> 00:20:15,782 What we want to do is get the nose up 441 00:20:15,782 --> 00:20:19,118 and then let the nose fall through and see if we 442 00:20:19,118 --> 00:20:23,222 can stab it when it's unloaded. 443 00:20:23,222 --> 00:20:24,957 NARRATOR: The only hope for the passengers 444 00:20:24,957 --> 00:20:27,260 is that the pilots' skill and experience 445 00:20:27,260 --> 00:20:30,630 will get the plane to Los Angeles International Airport. 446 00:20:30,630 --> 00:20:31,564 It's on the stop now. 447 00:20:31,564 --> 00:20:32,632 It's on the stop. 448 00:20:32,632 --> 00:20:35,735 Not according to this it's not. 449 00:20:35,735 --> 00:20:38,104 NARRATOR: As one effort after another fails, 450 00:20:38,104 --> 00:20:42,341 the crew wonders if the stabilizer is damaged. 451 00:20:42,341 --> 00:20:46,345 The trim might be, and then it might be if something's 452 00:20:46,345 --> 00:20:47,246 popped back there. 453 00:20:47,246 --> 00:20:48,414 Yeah. 454 00:20:48,414 --> 00:20:50,016 It might be mechanical damage, too. 455 00:20:50,016 --> 00:20:52,652 [tense music playing] 456 00:20:54,020 --> 00:20:55,922 I think it was controllable. 457 00:20:55,922 --> 00:20:57,290 We ought to just try and land it. 458 00:20:57,290 --> 00:20:58,624 Think so? 459 00:20:58,624 --> 00:21:01,494 OK, let's head for LA. 460 00:21:01,494 --> 00:21:04,697 NARRATOR: But just as they prepare to land in Los Angeles, 461 00:21:04,697 --> 00:21:08,201 something in the tail suddenly breaks. 462 00:21:08,201 --> 00:21:09,001 Did you feel that? 463 00:21:09,001 --> 00:21:09,802 Yup. 464 00:21:09,802 --> 00:21:11,137 OK, give me slats. 465 00:21:11,137 --> 00:21:12,138 This is a bitch. 466 00:21:12,138 --> 00:21:12,939 Is it? 467 00:21:12,939 --> 00:21:13,739 Yeah. 468 00:21:13,739 --> 00:21:16,375 [tense music playing] 469 00:21:18,744 --> 00:21:21,180 [screaming] 470 00:21:21,180 --> 00:21:24,517 NARRATOR: The plane dives straight down from 18,000 feet. 471 00:21:24,517 --> 00:21:27,186 [music playing] 472 00:21:27,186 --> 00:21:29,088 [grunting] 473 00:21:29,088 --> 00:21:31,924 To avoid collisions, LA control has warned 474 00:21:31,924 --> 00:21:34,694 the pilots of nearby planes that Alaska 475 00:21:34,694 --> 00:21:37,029 Flight 261 is in difficulty. 476 00:21:37,029 --> 00:21:39,465 These pilots have now reported back to the tower. 477 00:21:42,935 --> 00:21:45,638 [alarms sounding] 478 00:21:45,638 --> 00:21:46,472 Yep. 479 00:21:54,013 --> 00:21:57,016 [alarms sounding] 480 00:22:05,658 --> 00:22:07,560 [gasping] 481 00:22:08,694 --> 00:22:11,197 The plane was being knocked from side to side. 482 00:22:11,197 --> 00:22:12,565 It turned upside down. 483 00:22:12,565 --> 00:22:13,900 It was spinning. 484 00:22:13,900 --> 00:22:16,335 Persons were being thrown against the walls of the plane, 485 00:22:16,335 --> 00:22:18,371 falling out of their seats, on the cockpit 486 00:22:18,371 --> 00:22:20,072 voice recorder screaming-- 487 00:22:22,575 --> 00:22:27,813 unbelievable, horrible last few minutes of their lives. 488 00:22:27,813 --> 00:22:30,082 [alarms sounding] 489 00:22:40,359 --> 00:22:41,994 Uh, here we go. 490 00:22:41,994 --> 00:22:44,931 [tense music playing] 491 00:23:10,189 --> 00:23:13,226 NARRATOR: After a terrifying 60-second dive, 492 00:23:13,226 --> 00:23:15,828 Flight 261 hits the Pacific Ocean 493 00:23:15,828 --> 00:23:17,763 and over 250 miles an hour. 494 00:23:17,763 --> 00:23:20,700 [music playing] 495 00:23:24,070 --> 00:23:27,039 Rescue helicopters were soon at the crash site, 496 00:23:27,039 --> 00:23:29,442 but there were no survivors. 497 00:23:29,442 --> 00:23:31,911 The plane had broken up on impact. 498 00:23:31,911 --> 00:23:35,348 88 passengers and crew, including three young children, 499 00:23:35,348 --> 00:23:36,315 died instantly. 500 00:23:36,315 --> 00:23:39,185 [waves crashing] 501 00:23:40,586 --> 00:23:43,990 The investigation into Alaska Airlines Flight 261 502 00:23:43,990 --> 00:23:47,460 began, but the wreckage lay 700 feet down. 503 00:23:47,460 --> 00:23:50,129 So National Transportation Safety Board officials 504 00:23:50,129 --> 00:23:53,065 called on Navy submersibles to retrieve the debris 505 00:23:53,065 --> 00:23:54,333 from the ocean floor. 506 00:23:54,333 --> 00:23:56,302 RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: We set up a base of operations, 507 00:23:56,302 --> 00:23:58,471 and we had a remote operating vehicle 508 00:23:58,471 --> 00:24:00,973 with the side-scanning sonar which they used 509 00:24:00,973 --> 00:24:03,676 to map the debris field and get an idea of how 510 00:24:03,676 --> 00:24:05,144 widely spread the wreckage was. 511 00:24:05,144 --> 00:24:08,414 [music playing] 512 00:24:14,320 --> 00:24:16,522 NARRATOR: At the National Transportation Safety Board 513 00:24:16,522 --> 00:24:19,091 headquarters in Washington, the investigators' 514 00:24:19,091 --> 00:24:21,260 immediate concern was to find out what 515 00:24:21,260 --> 00:24:22,928 had brought the plane down. 516 00:24:22,928 --> 00:24:25,931 The first clues came from the cockpit voice recordings. 517 00:24:25,931 --> 00:24:27,533 LA, Alaska 261. 518 00:24:27,533 --> 00:24:28,868 We're with you. 519 00:24:28,868 --> 00:24:30,870 We're at 225. 520 00:24:30,870 --> 00:24:33,506 We have a jammed stabilizer, and we're maintaining 521 00:24:33,506 --> 00:24:35,541 altitude with difficulty. 522 00:24:35,541 --> 00:24:37,943 We immediately suspected some problem 523 00:24:37,943 --> 00:24:40,279 in the tail of the airplane, which 524 00:24:40,279 --> 00:24:41,647 is where the controls are. 525 00:24:41,647 --> 00:24:43,315 Just something was wrong back there, 526 00:24:43,315 --> 00:24:45,785 and that was the key piece of wreckage to look for. 527 00:24:45,785 --> 00:24:50,790 [indistinct radio chatter] 528 00:24:50,790 --> 00:24:53,092 NARRATOR: The MD-83 that crashed was 529 00:24:53,092 --> 00:24:56,962 a revised version of the Douglas Corporation's popular DC-9. 530 00:24:56,962 --> 00:25:00,299 Over 2,000 were delivered to airlines worldwide. 531 00:25:00,299 --> 00:25:02,501 The engines were at the rear of the plane, 532 00:25:02,501 --> 00:25:05,771 and the distinctive T-shaped tail was an essential element 533 00:25:05,771 --> 00:25:07,106 of the design. 534 00:25:07,106 --> 00:25:10,109 In a big turbojet aircraft, one of the rather brilliant 535 00:25:10,109 --> 00:25:13,045 elements of the design is that since you are going 536 00:25:13,045 --> 00:25:14,880 to be loading passengers and cargo, 537 00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:17,550 you want to be able to have that aircraft load it a little nose 538 00:25:17,550 --> 00:25:18,751 heavy or a little tail heavy. 539 00:25:18,751 --> 00:25:21,153 Well, in order to do that, you actually had to have 540 00:25:21,153 --> 00:25:23,389 that entire stabilizer moving. 541 00:25:23,389 --> 00:25:25,791 But the ones that are the most difficult to engineer 542 00:25:25,791 --> 00:25:27,426 are the T-tailed airplanes, where 543 00:25:27,426 --> 00:25:30,329 you have the vertical stabilizer and the horizontal sitting 544 00:25:30,329 --> 00:25:31,197 on top. 545 00:25:31,197 --> 00:25:33,466 And we call that stabilizer trim, 546 00:25:33,466 --> 00:25:35,701 and that is an essential element of what 547 00:25:35,701 --> 00:25:38,971 makes these aircraft so usable. 548 00:25:38,971 --> 00:25:42,875 NARRATOR: In the MD-83, a motorized jackscrew on the tail 549 00:25:42,875 --> 00:25:45,778 moves the horizontal stabilizer up and down. 550 00:25:45,778 --> 00:25:48,914 As the stabilizer moves up, the nose of the airplane 551 00:25:48,914 --> 00:25:50,049 moves down. 552 00:25:50,049 --> 00:25:52,752 As the stabilizer moves down, the nose moves up. 553 00:25:55,721 --> 00:25:58,691 But what role have the two-foot jackscrew played 554 00:25:58,691 --> 00:26:00,860 in the loss of Flight 261? 555 00:26:00,860 --> 00:26:04,130 The investigators were anxious to inspect it as soon as it was 556 00:26:04,130 --> 00:26:05,898 recovered from the ocean floor. 557 00:26:05,898 --> 00:26:09,802 The jackscrew wasn't mated with the nut 558 00:26:09,802 --> 00:26:10,970 that it screws into. 559 00:26:10,970 --> 00:26:12,772 It was just by itself. 560 00:26:12,772 --> 00:26:15,341 And the nut was found in another piece of structure 561 00:26:15,341 --> 00:26:17,576 a few feet away from where the jackscrew was. 562 00:26:17,576 --> 00:26:21,981 To have a screw separate itself from a nut with very 563 00:26:21,981 --> 00:26:24,817 thick threads surprised us. 564 00:26:24,817 --> 00:26:28,387 Secondly, we noticed that there was a curled piece of brass 565 00:26:28,387 --> 00:26:32,758 around the jackscrew, and all of the threads 566 00:26:32,758 --> 00:26:36,061 that you can see here, these ridges, were gone. 567 00:26:36,061 --> 00:26:39,131 They had been stripped out, and the remnants of those 568 00:26:39,131 --> 00:26:43,903 were found coiled on the jackscrew. 569 00:26:43,903 --> 00:26:46,505 NARRATOR: Once the thread had been stripped off the nut, 570 00:26:46,505 --> 00:26:49,108 the jackscrew could no longer turn. 571 00:26:49,108 --> 00:26:52,077 The pilots could not have known the real nature of the problem. 572 00:26:52,077 --> 00:26:55,347 [music playing] 573 00:26:58,717 --> 00:27:01,821 RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: The crew was confronted with a situation 574 00:27:01,821 --> 00:27:03,522 that had never occurred before. 575 00:27:03,522 --> 00:27:07,326 There is no failed jackscrew procedure 576 00:27:07,326 --> 00:27:10,696 in the quick reference handbooks that they have available. 577 00:27:10,696 --> 00:27:12,097 There is no training for it. 578 00:27:12,097 --> 00:27:15,568 [music playing] 579 00:27:18,971 --> 00:27:20,606 NARRATOR: When the jackscrew jammed, 580 00:27:20,606 --> 00:27:23,609 the crew was unable to adjust the stabilizer. 581 00:27:23,609 --> 00:27:25,444 JEFF GUZZETTI: We felt that it was due to the fact 582 00:27:25,444 --> 00:27:27,780 that these nut threads had worn away, 583 00:27:27,780 --> 00:27:30,850 and it was just too hard for that jackscrew 584 00:27:30,850 --> 00:27:33,419 under the power of the electric motor to turn. 585 00:27:33,419 --> 00:27:35,321 That gave the flight crew an indication 586 00:27:35,321 --> 00:27:36,755 that there was a problem. 587 00:27:36,755 --> 00:27:38,224 NARRATOR: The crew knew they had a problem 588 00:27:38,224 --> 00:27:41,260 in the tail of the plane, but they had no idea what. 589 00:27:41,260 --> 00:27:43,495 Two motors controlled the jackscrew, 590 00:27:43,495 --> 00:27:45,297 and they tried each of them in turn. 591 00:27:45,297 --> 00:27:47,499 But the pilots' attempts to free the jammed 592 00:27:47,499 --> 00:27:51,503 stabilizer inadvertently made the situation worse. 593 00:27:51,503 --> 00:27:52,972 We're at 23-7. 594 00:27:52,972 --> 00:27:57,409 Request-- yeah, we got it under control here. 595 00:27:57,409 --> 00:27:59,445 No, we don't. 596 00:27:59,445 --> 00:28:01,080 RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: Where they went wrong 597 00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:06,785 was that they wanted to try both the alternate and the primary 598 00:28:06,785 --> 00:28:08,854 trim motors at the same time. 599 00:28:08,854 --> 00:28:10,589 NARRATOR: When the pilot switched both 600 00:28:10,589 --> 00:28:13,559 the electric motors on, the jackscrew moved, 601 00:28:13,559 --> 00:28:17,630 but the threads had given way, and the jackscrew was now held 602 00:28:17,630 --> 00:28:20,666 only by a single retaining nut. 603 00:28:20,666 --> 00:28:24,236 From here on, the plane was doomed. 604 00:28:24,236 --> 00:28:26,772 That end nut was never designed 605 00:28:26,772 --> 00:28:30,009 to hold the loads generated aerodynamically 606 00:28:30,009 --> 00:28:30,809 by the airplane. 607 00:28:30,809 --> 00:28:33,412 [music playing] 608 00:28:34,713 --> 00:28:35,581 Let's get speed brakes. 609 00:28:38,717 --> 00:28:39,785 Give me high pressure pumps. 610 00:28:39,785 --> 00:28:42,221 OK. 611 00:28:42,221 --> 00:28:44,456 JOHN NANCE: Now we know-- in the glaring light of hindsight, 612 00:28:44,456 --> 00:28:48,227 now when we turn the situation around in time and look back, 613 00:28:48,227 --> 00:28:51,964 we can see that this air crew and no air crew 614 00:28:51,964 --> 00:28:54,233 should have ever been fooling with the trim 615 00:28:54,233 --> 00:28:56,902 and trying to run it back and forth. 616 00:28:56,902 --> 00:28:59,104 [gasping] 617 00:28:59,104 --> 00:29:03,208 NARRATOR: The retaining nut grew weaker and weaker. 618 00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:06,946 JEFF GUZZETTI: Then finally, through the loads beating down 619 00:29:06,946 --> 00:29:11,383 on that nut, the nut finally failed. 620 00:29:11,383 --> 00:29:12,184 Feel that? 621 00:29:12,184 --> 00:29:12,985 Yup. 622 00:29:12,985 --> 00:29:14,186 OK, give me slats. 623 00:29:14,186 --> 00:29:15,587 JEFF GUZZETTI: The jackscrew slid completely out 624 00:29:15,587 --> 00:29:18,524 of the acme nut, allowing the horizontal stabilizer 625 00:29:18,524 --> 00:29:22,761 to move well beyond its aerodynamic limits. 626 00:29:22,761 --> 00:29:23,862 This is a bitch. 627 00:29:23,862 --> 00:29:24,663 Is it? 628 00:29:24,663 --> 00:29:26,332 Yeah. 629 00:29:26,332 --> 00:29:28,200 [screaming] 630 00:29:28,200 --> 00:29:30,803 NARRATOR: The stabilizer forced the plane down, 631 00:29:30,803 --> 00:29:33,238 and now completely out of control, 632 00:29:33,238 --> 00:29:35,374 it rolled over into its final dive. 633 00:29:35,374 --> 00:29:38,210 [music playing] 634 00:29:43,983 --> 00:29:45,951 It was clear to the investigators 635 00:29:45,951 --> 00:29:47,619 that the failure of the jackscrew screw 636 00:29:47,619 --> 00:29:50,422 was the only explanation for the plane's erratic flight 637 00:29:50,422 --> 00:29:52,458 path and final dive. 638 00:29:52,458 --> 00:29:54,293 But why had this happened? 639 00:29:54,293 --> 00:29:56,328 Why have the jackscrew failed? 640 00:30:00,900 --> 00:30:03,169 The investigators began looking deeper 641 00:30:03,169 --> 00:30:05,505 into the condition of the faulty jackscrew 642 00:30:05,505 --> 00:30:08,307 on Alaska Airlines Flight 261. 643 00:30:08,307 --> 00:30:11,144 What had caused it to fail? 644 00:30:11,144 --> 00:30:15,348 There was no lubrication or visible grease on the working 645 00:30:15,348 --> 00:30:16,682 area of the screw. 646 00:30:16,682 --> 00:30:19,485 That was surprising and strange. 647 00:30:19,485 --> 00:30:21,888 [music playing] 648 00:30:35,234 --> 00:30:38,104 NARRATOR: The discovery of no grease on the jackscrew 649 00:30:38,104 --> 00:30:39,839 alarmed the investigators. 650 00:30:39,839 --> 00:30:42,542 They alerted the Federal Aviation Administration, 651 00:30:42,542 --> 00:30:46,946 who ordered an immediate check on all the MD-80s in the USA. 652 00:30:46,946 --> 00:30:49,882 This led to a shocking discovery. 653 00:30:49,882 --> 00:30:54,087 At Alaska Airlines, in 6 of its fleet of 34 planes, 654 00:30:54,087 --> 00:30:57,023 the jackscrew assembly needed to be replaced 655 00:30:57,023 --> 00:30:58,758 after failing new inspections. 656 00:30:58,758 --> 00:31:02,128 [music playing] 657 00:31:02,128 --> 00:31:04,030 No grease is the culprit. 658 00:31:04,030 --> 00:31:07,834 No grease, or inadequate grease, is the only thing that 659 00:31:07,834 --> 00:31:11,170 can give you that wear rate. 660 00:31:11,170 --> 00:31:12,705 NARRATOR: A simple lack of grease 661 00:31:12,705 --> 00:31:14,807 led to the failure of the jackscrew 662 00:31:14,807 --> 00:31:17,510 and the loss of 88 lives. 663 00:31:17,510 --> 00:31:20,880 But why did this happen at Alaska Airlines? 664 00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:23,816 The investigators' attention now switched to the company's 665 00:31:23,816 --> 00:31:26,319 maintenance program. 666 00:31:26,319 --> 00:31:29,355 What emerged was deeply worrying. 667 00:31:29,355 --> 00:31:30,623 RICHARD RODRIGUEZ: We interviewed 668 00:31:30,623 --> 00:31:33,759 all the mechanics who had worked on these airplanes. 669 00:31:33,759 --> 00:31:37,830 We knew that they had been falsifying records or not doing 670 00:31:37,830 --> 00:31:40,233 the work they had indicated. 671 00:31:40,233 --> 00:31:42,135 NARRATOR: The mechanics at Alaska Airlines 672 00:31:42,135 --> 00:31:44,537 complained that they were pressured to keep the planes 673 00:31:44,537 --> 00:31:46,939 in the air, or that their recommendations 674 00:31:46,939 --> 00:31:49,375 were overruled by supervisors. 675 00:31:49,375 --> 00:31:51,878 Some allege that records were altered to show 676 00:31:51,878 --> 00:31:53,412 work done that was not done. 677 00:31:53,412 --> 00:31:56,015 [music playing] 678 00:31:57,850 --> 00:32:00,586 Alaska Airlines has long been one of America's most 679 00:32:00,586 --> 00:32:04,090 successful airlines, but in the early 1990s, 680 00:32:04,090 --> 00:32:06,993 the economic downturn hit the company hard. 681 00:32:06,993 --> 00:32:10,563 Its response was to costs to revive its fortunes. 682 00:32:10,563 --> 00:32:13,199 [music playing] 683 00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:16,936 Pilots, maintenance workers, management, and others 684 00:32:16,936 --> 00:32:18,471 had to make sacrifices. 685 00:32:18,471 --> 00:32:19,872 Jobs were lost. 686 00:32:19,872 --> 00:32:21,274 Pay was cut. 687 00:32:21,274 --> 00:32:24,777 And every hour aircraft spent on the ground was seen as waste. 688 00:32:27,480 --> 00:32:29,582 Two years of aggressive axe wielding 689 00:32:29,582 --> 00:32:32,518 saw costs come down by $80 million. 690 00:32:32,518 --> 00:32:33,786 Profits leaped. 691 00:32:33,786 --> 00:32:36,489 It was a corporate triumph. 692 00:32:36,489 --> 00:32:40,293 In Alaska's case in the early '90s, this airline had to do 693 00:32:40,293 --> 00:32:44,430 an incredible job of reforming itself from a fairly high-cost 694 00:32:44,430 --> 00:32:46,532 carrier to a lower cost carrier that 695 00:32:46,532 --> 00:32:48,834 could compete head on with Southwest 696 00:32:48,834 --> 00:32:49,802 Airlines and with others. 697 00:32:49,802 --> 00:32:50,603 And they did it. 698 00:32:50,603 --> 00:32:51,904 They did it brilliantly. 699 00:32:51,904 --> 00:32:54,941 Nobody really believed that it could happen. 700 00:32:54,941 --> 00:32:56,876 NARRATOR: Alaska Airlines began flying 701 00:32:56,876 --> 00:32:58,844 the planes more intensively. 702 00:32:58,844 --> 00:33:03,182 It doubled the average daily use of its fleet. 703 00:33:03,182 --> 00:33:05,518 Keeping the planes in the air earning money 704 00:33:05,518 --> 00:33:07,486 put maintenance schedules under pressure. 705 00:33:07,486 --> 00:33:10,156 [music playing] 706 00:33:14,293 --> 00:33:18,030 John Liotine was a former lead mechanic at Alaska Airlines' 707 00:33:18,030 --> 00:33:20,032 Oakland maintenance facility, where 708 00:33:20,032 --> 00:33:21,234 he worked for eight years. 709 00:33:24,103 --> 00:33:26,839 Liotine felt that the new pressures on maintenance 710 00:33:26,839 --> 00:33:28,841 put passengers' lives at risk. 711 00:33:28,841 --> 00:33:32,245 He was to pay dearly for expressing those concerns. 712 00:33:32,245 --> 00:33:35,514 We have used an actor to portray his experiences, 713 00:33:35,514 --> 00:33:37,883 based on his sworn testimony to the NTSB. 714 00:33:37,883 --> 00:33:40,486 [music playing] 715 00:33:41,787 --> 00:33:44,357 Liotine claimed that planes were being pushed 716 00:33:44,357 --> 00:33:46,259 back into service too quickly. 717 00:33:46,259 --> 00:33:49,895 Sometimes rather than wait for a replacement part or repair, 718 00:33:49,895 --> 00:33:53,065 supervisors passed planes fit for service, 719 00:33:53,065 --> 00:33:55,568 free to carry passengers up into the air. 720 00:33:55,568 --> 00:33:58,738 [music playing] 721 00:34:04,944 --> 00:34:09,081 In October 1998, over 15 months before the crash, 722 00:34:09,081 --> 00:34:12,218 John Liotine became so worried that he did something that 723 00:34:12,218 --> 00:34:14,687 would change his life forever. 724 00:34:14,687 --> 00:34:17,556 He reported Alaska Airlines to the US Department 725 00:34:17,556 --> 00:34:20,159 of Transportation, alleging violations 726 00:34:20,159 --> 00:34:23,829 in maintenance procedures. 727 00:34:23,829 --> 00:34:27,900 There were very few voices at Alaska who had 728 00:34:27,900 --> 00:34:29,035 concerns about the maintenance. 729 00:34:29,035 --> 00:34:30,436 There should have been more, and there should 730 00:34:30,436 --> 00:34:31,537 have been people listening. 731 00:34:31,537 --> 00:34:34,240 John Liotine is a hero in my book. 732 00:34:34,240 --> 00:34:37,043 [music playing] 733 00:34:38,377 --> 00:34:41,847 NARRATOR: In December 1999, over a year before the crash, 734 00:34:41,847 --> 00:34:43,983 the Federal Aviation Administration 735 00:34:43,983 --> 00:34:46,085 and Department of Transportation officials 736 00:34:46,085 --> 00:34:47,720 moved on Alaska Airlines. 737 00:34:47,720 --> 00:34:50,656 [music playing] 738 00:35:01,067 --> 00:35:03,736 The case was referred to federal prosecutors, 739 00:35:03,736 --> 00:35:06,906 and the FBI raided Alaska's maintenance facilities 740 00:35:06,906 --> 00:35:08,574 and seized thousands of records. 741 00:35:11,210 --> 00:35:14,280 The raid was the opening shot in a federal grand jury 742 00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:16,382 investigation that would last three years. 743 00:35:16,382 --> 00:35:19,151 [music playing] 744 00:35:19,151 --> 00:35:22,121 No criminal charges were brought against the airline. 745 00:35:22,121 --> 00:35:25,091 Alaska's officials denied that any unsafe planes 746 00:35:25,091 --> 00:35:27,460 were put into service or that passengers' 747 00:35:27,460 --> 00:35:29,795 lives were ever at risk. 748 00:35:29,795 --> 00:35:32,665 But the investigation revealed hundreds of violations 749 00:35:32,665 --> 00:35:36,435 of federal regulations. 750 00:35:36,435 --> 00:35:38,437 Alaska Airlines was fined. 751 00:35:38,437 --> 00:35:41,974 The FAA insisted on changes to the company's maintenance 752 00:35:41,974 --> 00:35:43,342 and safety procedures. 753 00:35:43,342 --> 00:35:46,178 The FAA also suspended two supervisors 754 00:35:46,178 --> 00:35:47,446 for falsifying records. 755 00:35:47,446 --> 00:35:50,216 [music playing] 756 00:35:55,855 --> 00:35:59,225 Like other whistleblowers, John Liotine would pay heavily 757 00:35:59,225 --> 00:36:01,560 for his efforts to save lives. 758 00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:04,864 Alaska Airlines put him on paid leave from his job, 759 00:36:04,864 --> 00:36:08,234 costing him thousands of dollars in regular overtime earnings. 760 00:36:08,234 --> 00:36:11,036 [music playing] 761 00:36:16,342 --> 00:36:19,745 Then, in January 2000, Liotine saw 762 00:36:19,745 --> 00:36:21,847 his worst nightmare come true. 763 00:36:21,847 --> 00:36:25,117 The kind of accident he had tried to prevent now 764 00:36:25,117 --> 00:36:27,486 took place just off the California coast. 765 00:36:39,165 --> 00:36:43,202 After the loss of Flight 261, mechanic John Liotine went 766 00:36:43,202 --> 00:36:46,672 back to his own work records. 767 00:36:46,672 --> 00:36:49,675 Incredibly, he found that he had a direct link 768 00:36:49,675 --> 00:36:51,544 to the crashed airliner. 769 00:36:51,544 --> 00:36:54,647 Two years before, at the plane's last overhaul, 770 00:36:54,647 --> 00:36:58,151 he had ordered that the jackscrew on this very airplane 771 00:36:58,151 --> 00:36:59,619 be replaced. 772 00:36:59,619 --> 00:37:00,720 He then went off shift. 773 00:37:00,720 --> 00:37:03,422 [music playing] 774 00:37:03,422 --> 00:37:05,625 When investigators examined the record, 775 00:37:05,625 --> 00:37:08,161 they found that Liotine's recommendation had been 776 00:37:08,161 --> 00:37:11,297 overruled by the next shift and the plane put 777 00:37:11,297 --> 00:37:14,500 back into service. 778 00:37:14,500 --> 00:37:17,470 It would be two years before the next overhaul, 779 00:37:17,470 --> 00:37:19,505 but time ran out. 780 00:37:19,505 --> 00:37:23,376 Four months before the overhaul was due, Flight 261 crashed. 781 00:37:23,376 --> 00:37:26,145 [music playing] 782 00:37:30,349 --> 00:37:34,687 Alaska Airlines labeled Liotine a disruptive influence. 783 00:37:34,687 --> 00:37:37,056 He sued the company for libel. 784 00:37:37,056 --> 00:37:39,792 Alaska settled, but Liotine could no longer 785 00:37:39,792 --> 00:37:42,528 work in the industry he loved. 786 00:37:42,528 --> 00:37:45,198 I get calls almost every week of somebody saying, 787 00:37:45,198 --> 00:37:46,332 should I blow the whistle? 788 00:37:46,332 --> 00:37:48,568 And I always tell them, you need to know. 789 00:37:48,568 --> 00:37:51,604 You need to be prepared to find another line of work, 790 00:37:51,604 --> 00:37:53,306 because you will not work in the industry, 791 00:37:53,306 --> 00:37:55,141 and you will not work in the government. 792 00:37:55,141 --> 00:37:57,977 In most cases, it's almost impossible 793 00:37:57,977 --> 00:38:00,947 to be a whistleblower and survive your career. 794 00:38:00,947 --> 00:38:03,749 [music playing] 795 00:38:12,024 --> 00:38:14,427 NARRATOR: As the investigators continued their work 796 00:38:14,427 --> 00:38:18,331 into Flight 261, they made another disturbing discovery 797 00:38:18,331 --> 00:38:21,601 about the drive to cut costs at Alaska Airlines. 798 00:38:21,601 --> 00:38:24,337 To keep planes flying more intensively, 799 00:38:24,337 --> 00:38:29,342 Alaska had dramatically extended the intervals between service. 800 00:38:29,342 --> 00:38:32,678 This was significant, because when a plane is designed, 801 00:38:32,678 --> 00:38:34,947 every part has a schedule listing 802 00:38:34,947 --> 00:38:38,517 when it is to be serviced and when it must be replaced. 803 00:38:38,517 --> 00:38:41,888 You're supposed to go in and inspect every so many hours, 804 00:38:41,888 --> 00:38:44,023 and that's different on parts all over the planes. 805 00:38:44,023 --> 00:38:46,359 Some things you have to look at after every flight. 806 00:38:46,359 --> 00:38:48,127 Other things have to be inspected 807 00:38:48,127 --> 00:38:51,364 every two or three days. 808 00:38:51,364 --> 00:38:54,066 NARRATOR: In 1996, Alaska Airlines 809 00:38:54,066 --> 00:38:57,603 extended the intervals between MD-80 jackscrew inspections 810 00:38:57,603 --> 00:39:00,473 by 400%. 811 00:39:00,473 --> 00:39:03,643 Before 1996, jackscrews were inspected 812 00:39:03,643 --> 00:39:05,711 every 600 flight hours. 813 00:39:05,711 --> 00:39:10,149 Now there was over 2,500 between each service. 814 00:39:10,149 --> 00:39:14,086 If you had 600 hours between inspection points and greasing 815 00:39:14,086 --> 00:39:17,590 points, we have no chance of ever having a metal-to-metal 816 00:39:17,590 --> 00:39:18,891 contact situation. 817 00:39:18,891 --> 00:39:21,928 But if you put that out to 2,000 hours or 2,500 hours, 818 00:39:21,928 --> 00:39:25,998 now what you do is eat into some of these protective stages, 819 00:39:25,998 --> 00:39:29,135 these barriers that we have towards catastrophic failure. 820 00:39:29,135 --> 00:39:31,437 [music playing] 821 00:39:31,437 --> 00:39:32,905 Investigations division-- 822 00:39:32,905 --> 00:39:36,375 NARRATOR: In its final report into the crash of Flight 261, 823 00:39:36,375 --> 00:39:40,379 the NTSB concluded that Alaska Airlines' extended service 824 00:39:40,379 --> 00:39:43,015 intervals to the jackscrews on its MD-80s 825 00:39:43,015 --> 00:39:45,184 were a significant contributor to the crash. 826 00:39:45,184 --> 00:39:47,019 Nor with any of your supervisors 827 00:39:47,019 --> 00:39:49,322 up the chain in the engineering area. 828 00:39:51,824 --> 00:39:53,159 JAY MALONEY: I don't recall any-- 829 00:39:53,159 --> 00:39:57,463 With carriers doing anything to save a dime, maintenance, 830 00:39:57,463 --> 00:39:59,565 safety took a back seat. 831 00:39:59,565 --> 00:40:02,501 And one of the shocking things about Alaska 832 00:40:02,501 --> 00:40:06,205 is that they were allowed to increase inspection intervals. 833 00:40:06,205 --> 00:40:08,074 And it was very shocking, because that 834 00:40:08,074 --> 00:40:09,976 is the only way we have safety. 835 00:40:14,246 --> 00:40:15,982 NARRATOR: The extended maintenance intervals 836 00:40:15,982 --> 00:40:21,287 meant that lack of grease in the jackscrew went undiscovered. 837 00:40:21,287 --> 00:40:24,357 But now, investigators also wondered if the failure 838 00:40:24,357 --> 00:40:26,959 of the jackscrew assembly revealed a basic floor 839 00:40:26,959 --> 00:40:30,329 in the plane's design. 840 00:40:30,329 --> 00:40:34,000 They found that the MD-80 broke one of the fundamental rules 841 00:40:34,000 --> 00:40:35,468 of aircraft design. 842 00:40:35,468 --> 00:40:38,971 It was not fail safe. 843 00:40:38,971 --> 00:40:40,373 JOHN NANCE: The design philosophy 844 00:40:40,373 --> 00:40:44,076 that has made aviation so safe is that we should never, ever 845 00:40:44,076 --> 00:40:47,480 have a situation in which one catastrophic failure 846 00:40:47,480 --> 00:40:49,115 of some component of the airplane 847 00:40:49,115 --> 00:40:50,816 causes us to lose the airplane. 848 00:40:50,816 --> 00:40:54,153 These backups to the backup backing up the backups 849 00:40:54,153 --> 00:40:57,456 is why we can get on an airplane with almost 100% assurance 850 00:40:57,456 --> 00:41:00,292 that we're going to get where we want to go safely. 851 00:41:00,292 --> 00:41:03,529 NARRATOR: There was no backup to the jackscrew and its nut. 852 00:41:03,529 --> 00:41:06,866 Engineers never envisioned a situation on the MD-80 853 00:41:06,866 --> 00:41:08,901 where the jackscrew might fail. 854 00:41:08,901 --> 00:41:12,438 With inspections every 600 flight hours and replacements 855 00:41:12,438 --> 00:41:15,374 every 2,000 hours, the designers did not 856 00:41:15,374 --> 00:41:19,979 add an additional redundant backup system. 857 00:41:19,979 --> 00:41:22,348 It was utterly laughable that they 858 00:41:22,348 --> 00:41:23,783 said it was a redundant system. 859 00:41:23,783 --> 00:41:27,386 There's one screw, and there's one nut. 860 00:41:27,386 --> 00:41:28,821 That's all there is. 861 00:41:28,821 --> 00:41:31,223 It's not redundant. 862 00:41:31,223 --> 00:41:32,591 --investigations division. 863 00:41:32,591 --> 00:41:35,294 NARRATOR: In its final report, the National Transportation 864 00:41:35,294 --> 00:41:38,764 Safety Board concluded that the crash of Flight 261 865 00:41:38,764 --> 00:41:41,667 was due to the lack of adequate greasing and the 866 00:41:41,667 --> 00:41:43,202 stretched service intervals. 867 00:41:43,202 --> 00:41:45,871 When coupled with the design of the jackscrew, 868 00:41:45,871 --> 00:41:49,375 these failures led to a completely avoidable accident 869 00:41:49,375 --> 00:41:51,343 and the loss of 88 lives. 870 00:41:51,343 --> 00:41:54,213 [music playing] 871 00:42:06,525 --> 00:42:09,495 Three years after the crash of Flight 261, 872 00:42:09,495 --> 00:42:11,697 the relatives and friends of the dead 873 00:42:11,697 --> 00:42:15,134 dedicated a permanent memorial at Port Hueneme close 874 00:42:15,134 --> 00:42:16,368 to the crash site. 875 00:42:16,368 --> 00:42:18,037 Janice Stokes. 876 00:42:18,037 --> 00:42:19,972 [bell tolls] 877 00:42:24,243 --> 00:42:27,079 JOHN NANCE: I think the best thing 878 00:42:27,079 --> 00:42:30,716 and the only thing in our infinite inadequacy of making 879 00:42:30,716 --> 00:42:33,686 up for the loss from this life is to say something that we've 880 00:42:33,686 --> 00:42:35,454 been able to say in a lot of other accidents 881 00:42:35,454 --> 00:42:36,922 to other grieving families. 882 00:42:36,922 --> 00:42:40,126 And that is those deaths will not be in vain. 883 00:42:40,126 --> 00:42:42,128 We will not let them be in vain. 884 00:42:42,128 --> 00:42:44,396 Every one of those lives will be made 885 00:42:44,396 --> 00:42:47,800 to count in terms of making sure that 3, 4, 5 or 10 886 00:42:47,800 --> 00:42:49,001 other people do not die. 887 00:42:49,001 --> 00:42:51,537 [music playing] 888 00:42:52,838 --> 00:42:54,306 MAN: Miss Carol Karlsson. 889 00:42:54,306 --> 00:42:57,243 [bell tolls] 890 00:42:57,243 --> 00:42:59,411 Colleen was different. 891 00:42:59,411 --> 00:43:06,719 She was adventurous, and there's nobody like that in our family. 892 00:43:06,719 --> 00:43:13,526 And I don't know what we can do except to remember Colleen 893 00:43:13,526 --> 00:43:16,862 and to live our lives now a little bit better for her. 894 00:43:16,862 --> 00:43:19,565 [music playing] 895 00:43:20,966 --> 00:43:22,501 MAN: Ryan Busche. 896 00:43:22,501 --> 00:43:24,737 None of us are the same anymore. 897 00:43:24,737 --> 00:43:28,541 It's like walking into a giant storm, wave 898 00:43:28,541 --> 00:43:32,745 after wave forming up, coming in, because it never stops. 899 00:43:35,414 --> 00:43:38,050 Grief over the loss of a child is not 900 00:43:38,050 --> 00:43:42,354 something I wish on anybody. 901 00:43:42,354 --> 00:43:46,692 This plane went down because of neglect. 902 00:43:46,692 --> 00:43:50,863 It seems like such an unholy type of loss. 903 00:43:50,863 --> 00:43:55,401 What a hard way to die so an airline can, you know, 904 00:43:55,401 --> 00:43:56,835 make more money. 905 00:43:56,835 --> 00:43:57,836 [music playing] 68414

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