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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:06,106 --> 00:00:10,176 NARRATOR: Zurich airport, November, 2001. 2 00:00:10,176 --> 00:00:14,848 Crossair flight 3597 is one of the few planes left to land. 3 00:00:14,848 --> 00:00:18,118 The commander was flying out of Zurich 4 00:00:18,118 --> 00:00:20,153 for the last 20 years. 5 00:00:20,153 --> 00:00:22,655 So he was really used to this airport. 6 00:00:22,655 --> 00:00:24,391 Crossair, three-- 7 00:00:24,391 --> 00:00:26,493 NARRATOR: The lone controller in the tower tracks the approach. 8 00:00:26,493 --> 00:00:29,829 Approach runway 28 for you. 9 00:00:29,829 --> 00:00:32,665 I have ground contact, we're continuing on. 10 00:00:32,665 --> 00:00:35,535 Crossair 3597, continue speed reduction 11 00:00:35,535 --> 00:00:37,337 to final approach speed. 12 00:00:37,337 --> 00:00:39,472 NARRATOR: But for some reason, the crew can't find the runway. 13 00:00:39,472 --> 00:00:40,640 Damn. 14 00:00:40,640 --> 00:00:43,743 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 15 00:00:43,743 --> 00:00:46,246 NARRATOR: And the flight ends in disaster. 16 00:00:48,681 --> 00:00:51,651 Crossair 3597, this is Zurich tower. 17 00:00:51,651 --> 00:00:52,852 Do you copy? 18 00:00:52,852 --> 00:00:54,521 We have a possible emergency and a-- 19 00:00:54,521 --> 00:00:56,756 He collided with the hill, so obviously he was too low. 20 00:00:56,756 --> 00:00:58,591 NARRATOR: A terrible mistake sent 21 00:00:58,591 --> 00:01:03,563 a passenger jet dangerously off course, killing 24 people. 22 00:01:03,563 --> 00:01:05,365 The clues will lead investigators 23 00:01:05,365 --> 00:01:08,401 to a trained professional, with an astonishing past. 24 00:01:12,238 --> 00:01:14,674 WOMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 25 00:01:14,674 --> 00:01:15,842 MAN: We lost both engines. 26 00:01:15,842 --> 00:01:17,544 WOMAN: Put the mask over your nose, emergency descent. 27 00:01:17,544 --> 00:01:18,411 MAN: Mayday, Mayday. 28 00:01:18,411 --> 00:01:20,747 WOMAN: Brace for impact. 29 00:01:20,747 --> 00:01:22,749 MAN: This is the last one. 30 00:01:22,749 --> 00:01:24,717 [interposing voices] 31 00:01:24,717 --> 00:01:26,352 MAN: It's going to crash. 32 00:01:43,770 --> 00:01:46,706 NARRATOR: Crossair flight 3597 is cruising 33 00:01:46,706 --> 00:01:50,477 at 27,000 feet above Germany. 34 00:01:50,477 --> 00:01:52,946 As the autopilot flies the plane, 35 00:01:52,946 --> 00:01:56,216 the crew begins reviewing procedures for their landing. 36 00:01:56,216 --> 00:02:00,620 According to the report, the apron and taxiways are wet. 37 00:02:00,620 --> 00:02:02,388 Braking actions not specified. 38 00:02:02,388 --> 00:02:04,891 So the friction report is missing? 39 00:02:04,891 --> 00:02:05,658 Indeed. 40 00:02:05,658 --> 00:02:07,494 That usually means they haven't 41 00:02:07,494 --> 00:02:08,962 been out to check lately. 42 00:02:08,962 --> 00:02:09,829 Indeed. 43 00:02:18,605 --> 00:02:20,573 NARRATOR: It's the last flight of the day 44 00:02:20,573 --> 00:02:22,141 on this busy European route. 45 00:02:25,912 --> 00:02:29,649 The 410 mile journey from Berlin South to Zurich 46 00:02:29,649 --> 00:02:32,819 takes only an hour and a half. 47 00:02:32,819 --> 00:02:35,455 There are many empty seats on board. 48 00:02:35,455 --> 00:02:38,758 A group of 21 passengers never showed up for the flight. 49 00:02:41,828 --> 00:02:44,597 Internet entrepreneur Peter Hogenkamp 50 00:02:44,597 --> 00:02:46,799 is returning from a business trip in Germany 51 00:02:46,799 --> 00:02:49,269 with his partner, Jaqueline Badran. 52 00:02:49,269 --> 00:02:51,938 On that day, we wanted to take the train. 53 00:02:51,938 --> 00:02:55,008 But we had to be in Zurich for that opening 54 00:02:55,008 --> 00:02:57,710 ceremony of that trade show, so we said, 55 00:02:57,710 --> 00:02:59,946 OK, so we need to go by plane. 56 00:02:59,946 --> 00:03:01,381 Yes. 57 00:03:01,381 --> 00:03:03,716 We have got to get some sleep. 58 00:03:03,716 --> 00:03:06,686 It had been a very busy day, so we were very tired 59 00:03:06,686 --> 00:03:08,454 when we arrived at the airport. 60 00:03:08,454 --> 00:03:10,390 How are you? 61 00:03:10,390 --> 00:03:12,959 NARRATOR: Among the passengers is the girl band Passion Fruit, 62 00:03:12,959 --> 00:03:16,029 Germany's answer to the Spice Girls. 63 00:03:16,029 --> 00:03:17,997 They're on their way to perform the last show of a concert 64 00:03:17,997 --> 00:03:18,998 tour. 65 00:03:18,998 --> 00:03:20,199 Yes. 66 00:03:20,199 --> 00:03:23,736 I was shocked when suddenly all the Passion Fruits, all 67 00:03:23,736 --> 00:03:25,305 the three of them are coming over, 68 00:03:25,305 --> 00:03:27,473 and they were sitting right in front of us. 69 00:03:27,473 --> 00:03:29,008 Just what I needed. 70 00:03:29,008 --> 00:03:31,978 [laughter] 71 00:03:31,978 --> 00:03:37,317 NARRATOR: Flight 3597 is an Avro 146 airliner. 72 00:03:37,317 --> 00:03:40,386 It's a British made jet, popular with regional airlines, 73 00:03:40,386 --> 00:03:40,887 like Crossair. 74 00:03:43,823 --> 00:03:46,726 Captain Hans Ulrich Lutz is in command. 75 00:03:46,726 --> 00:03:49,562 He's been with the airline for more than 22 years, 76 00:03:49,562 --> 00:03:51,731 having served as a pilot and an instructor. 77 00:03:51,731 --> 00:03:56,502 So, tell me about the runway and the conditions. 78 00:03:56,502 --> 00:04:00,673 Overcast with light snowfall, visibility 3,000 meters. 79 00:04:00,673 --> 00:04:02,342 NARRATOR: First officer Stephan Lohrer 80 00:04:02,342 --> 00:04:03,876 is a newcomer to the airline. 81 00:04:03,876 --> 00:04:07,380 He's had his pilot's license for just a year and a half. 82 00:04:07,380 --> 00:04:11,517 He was hired by Crossair right out of flight school. 83 00:04:11,517 --> 00:04:12,619 Hello. 84 00:04:12,619 --> 00:04:15,555 [laughter] 85 00:04:17,757 --> 00:04:20,627 The Passion Fruits were being quite noisy. 86 00:04:20,627 --> 00:04:23,796 They were excited, I think, they went from one gig to the other. 87 00:04:23,796 --> 00:04:25,798 So, they were still in their stage clothes. 88 00:04:25,798 --> 00:04:29,435 I said, oh, my God, do I really need this? 89 00:04:29,435 --> 00:04:31,371 Can I just sleep? 90 00:04:31,371 --> 00:04:33,873 [laughter] 91 00:04:33,873 --> 00:04:37,710 It's probably OK to move. 92 00:04:37,710 --> 00:04:39,879 We decided to move back a few rows, 93 00:04:39,879 --> 00:04:42,715 and change the side where we were sitting, 94 00:04:42,715 --> 00:04:46,886 so we were in a very quiet area then. 95 00:04:46,886 --> 00:04:49,555 WOMAN: Oh, my goodness. 96 00:04:49,555 --> 00:04:50,890 Yes, oh, my gosh. 97 00:04:50,890 --> 00:04:52,725 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER: Crossair 3597, 98 00:04:52,725 --> 00:04:55,561 clear to flight level 160. 99 00:04:55,561 --> 00:04:58,898 NARRATOR: The flight is slightly behind schedule. 100 00:04:58,898 --> 00:05:01,901 It's due to land in Zurich in less than half an hour. 101 00:05:01,901 --> 00:05:03,436 According to the latest information, 102 00:05:03,436 --> 00:05:06,572 we'll be using runway 14. 103 00:05:06,572 --> 00:05:09,609 What kind of approach? 104 00:05:09,609 --> 00:05:12,111 ILS approach. 105 00:05:12,111 --> 00:05:13,913 OK. 106 00:05:13,913 --> 00:05:17,150 NARRATOR: An ILS, or instrument landing system approach, 107 00:05:17,150 --> 00:05:19,786 means the pilots will be guided to the runway 108 00:05:19,786 --> 00:05:21,954 by radio signals beamed from the airport. 109 00:05:21,954 --> 00:05:26,826 And a decision altitude of 1602 feet. 110 00:05:26,826 --> 00:05:29,595 Call me 100 above minimums. 111 00:05:29,595 --> 00:05:30,763 OK. 112 00:05:30,763 --> 00:05:33,800 I'll call 100 above minimums. 113 00:05:33,800 --> 00:05:36,002 NARRATOR: The plane's sophisticated computers 114 00:05:36,002 --> 00:05:37,937 will do most of the work getting them down. 115 00:05:41,507 --> 00:05:44,844 At Zurich airport, the weather is getting worse. 116 00:05:44,844 --> 00:05:47,714 It's snowing, and visibility is dropping. 117 00:05:47,714 --> 00:05:50,983 Crossair 3191, turn left, heading 150. 118 00:05:50,983 --> 00:05:52,819 NARRATOR: In the tower, controllers 119 00:05:52,819 --> 00:05:56,456 have started a nightly routine. 120 00:05:56,456 --> 00:05:59,158 A supervisor sends out a message, notifying crews 121 00:05:59,158 --> 00:06:02,862 that runway 14 is being taken out of service, 122 00:06:02,862 --> 00:06:04,864 because of a controversial new law. 123 00:06:08,634 --> 00:06:11,070 Planes landing on runway 14 must fly 124 00:06:11,070 --> 00:06:13,172 over Germany on their approach. 125 00:06:13,172 --> 00:06:17,977 But people in Germany have long complained about the noise. 126 00:06:17,977 --> 00:06:20,012 Because of the political issue, 127 00:06:20,012 --> 00:06:24,183 airplanes had to fly over Switzerland 128 00:06:24,183 --> 00:06:27,687 in their final descent to the airport of Zurich, 129 00:06:27,687 --> 00:06:28,821 for noise reasons. 130 00:06:35,094 --> 00:06:39,732 There was no other operational, or weather reasons, whatsoever. 131 00:06:39,732 --> 00:06:41,868 It was purely political. 132 00:06:41,868 --> 00:06:44,070 NARRATOR: Switzerland has agreed to shut down 133 00:06:44,070 --> 00:06:47,073 runway 14 after 10:00 PM, to keep 134 00:06:47,073 --> 00:06:49,575 landing planes out of German airspace, 135 00:06:49,575 --> 00:06:50,877 and use runway two instead. 136 00:06:55,515 --> 00:06:59,185 The crew hasn't received this information yet. 137 00:06:59,185 --> 00:07:03,256 But first officer Lohrer is familiar with the new rule. 138 00:07:03,256 --> 00:07:05,958 Should I ask if it's still runway 14? 139 00:07:09,729 --> 00:07:11,798 It's almost 10:00. 140 00:07:11,798 --> 00:07:14,867 Yes, I'm pretty sure it's still 14. 141 00:07:18,704 --> 00:07:21,574 Zurich approach, Crossair 3597, 142 00:07:21,574 --> 00:07:26,145 please confirm the approach in use is the ILS 14. 143 00:07:26,145 --> 00:07:29,248 Crossair 3597, you're identified. 144 00:07:29,248 --> 00:07:35,588 It will be a VOR/DME, approach runway 28 for you. 145 00:07:35,588 --> 00:07:37,590 Oh, hell. 146 00:07:37,590 --> 00:07:39,826 What next? 147 00:07:39,826 --> 00:07:43,129 OK, fine. 148 00:07:43,129 --> 00:07:47,099 NARRATOR: Unlike runway 14, with its sophisticated instrument 149 00:07:47,099 --> 00:07:52,605 landing system, runway 28 is not equipped for ILS landings. 150 00:07:52,605 --> 00:07:56,909 Instead, it has a less accurate navigational system. 151 00:07:56,909 --> 00:08:00,313 It's called VOR/DME. 152 00:08:00,313 --> 00:08:03,249 A radio beacon sends information to the aircraft 153 00:08:03,249 --> 00:08:05,918 about its distance from the runway, and whether it's left 154 00:08:05,918 --> 00:08:07,253 or right of it. 155 00:08:07,253 --> 00:08:12,258 It provides no guidance on the plane's altitude. 156 00:08:12,258 --> 00:08:14,594 Pilots would rather not make VOR approaches, 157 00:08:14,594 --> 00:08:17,196 because they place a greater workload on the flight crew. 158 00:08:20,333 --> 00:08:24,837 He would always prefer an ILS approach, because he gets 159 00:08:24,837 --> 00:08:27,807 guidance on the approach slope. 160 00:08:27,807 --> 00:08:30,343 And he can also use his autopilot 161 00:08:30,343 --> 00:08:34,146 to guide him down, literally on the ground to the runway. 162 00:08:34,146 --> 00:08:37,149 NARRATOR: Because of its less precise technology, 163 00:08:37,149 --> 00:08:39,819 runway 28 was rarely used for landings 164 00:08:39,819 --> 00:08:41,520 before the new noise law. 165 00:08:46,225 --> 00:08:49,962 OK, then, re briefing for runway 28. 166 00:08:49,962 --> 00:08:52,798 That would be chart 13-2. 167 00:08:52,798 --> 00:08:56,202 NARRATOR: Now, captain Lutz abandons the ILS approach 168 00:08:56,202 --> 00:08:59,005 he was planning, and prepares his first officer for 169 00:08:59,005 --> 00:09:02,842 the new non precision approach. 170 00:09:02,842 --> 00:09:05,077 Are you familiar with the 28 approach? 171 00:09:05,077 --> 00:09:08,147 Yes, I've done it a couple of times. 172 00:09:08,147 --> 00:09:10,883 NARRATOR: The crew goes over every detail of how they 173 00:09:10,883 --> 00:09:12,852 will approach Zurich airport. 174 00:09:12,852 --> 00:09:20,259 Drazadingen Zurich, east, 6,000 feet. 175 00:09:20,259 --> 00:09:23,362 NARRATOR: There are only a few planes left to land tonight. 176 00:09:23,362 --> 00:09:24,530 3597. 177 00:09:24,530 --> 00:09:28,834 NARRATOR: Including flight 3597, and two other Crossair 178 00:09:28,834 --> 00:09:32,104 flights just ahead of it. 179 00:09:32,104 --> 00:09:34,340 As the aircraft approached the runway, 180 00:09:34,340 --> 00:09:37,410 controllers need to keep them apart. 181 00:09:37,410 --> 00:09:42,848 Crossair 3597, reduce speed to 180 or less. 182 00:09:42,848 --> 00:09:46,852 Speed 180 or less, Crossair 3597. 183 00:09:46,852 --> 00:09:49,789 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz makes the final turn to line 184 00:09:49,789 --> 00:09:51,424 his jet up with the runway. 185 00:09:51,424 --> 00:09:53,359 160 knots. 186 00:09:56,696 --> 00:09:59,699 NARRATOR: The plane is now in the thick of the heavy weather 187 00:09:59,699 --> 00:10:00,266 surrounding Zurich. 188 00:10:04,236 --> 00:10:06,205 At the airport, the second to last Crossair 189 00:10:06,205 --> 00:10:10,042 flight touches down on runway 28. 190 00:10:10,042 --> 00:10:13,279 Now, with only flight 3597 to land, 191 00:10:13,279 --> 00:10:18,217 the supervisor decides to head home early. 192 00:10:18,217 --> 00:10:20,086 The controller handling the aircraft 193 00:10:20,086 --> 00:10:22,154 is the only controller left in the tower. 194 00:10:25,257 --> 00:10:27,927 Crossair 3597, continue speed reduction 195 00:10:27,927 --> 00:10:29,261 to final approach speed. 196 00:10:31,764 --> 00:10:35,267 PILOT: Zurich tower, this is Crossair 3891. 197 00:10:35,267 --> 00:10:37,003 NARRATOR: She gets a report from one 198 00:10:37,003 --> 00:10:38,404 of the planes that just landed. 199 00:10:38,404 --> 00:10:41,173 PILOT: Visibility approaching 28 was borderline. 200 00:10:41,173 --> 00:10:44,477 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 201 00:10:44,477 --> 00:10:48,180 NARRATOR: But Captain Lutz knows Zurich airport well. 202 00:10:48,180 --> 00:10:50,950 He continues toward the runway. 203 00:10:50,950 --> 00:10:52,852 Gear down. 204 00:10:52,852 --> 00:10:56,088 NARRATOR: The plane begins the final stage of its approach. 205 00:10:56,088 --> 00:10:58,190 Cabin crew, prepare for landing. 206 00:11:01,260 --> 00:11:03,829 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz begins slowing the jet, 207 00:11:03,829 --> 00:11:05,331 and puts it into a steep descent. 208 00:11:15,007 --> 00:11:17,777 Six miles is checked. 209 00:11:17,777 --> 00:11:18,978 Yes. 210 00:11:18,978 --> 00:11:20,279 Flaps 33. 211 00:11:23,115 --> 00:11:26,018 Flaps 33 selected. 212 00:11:26,018 --> 00:11:27,219 Final check. 213 00:11:27,219 --> 00:11:31,891 Final check, confirmed three greens. 214 00:11:31,891 --> 00:11:34,794 Is checked. 215 00:11:34,794 --> 00:11:38,798 116 knots. 216 00:11:38,798 --> 00:11:41,200 NARRATOR: The descent gets even steeper. 217 00:11:44,470 --> 00:11:47,473 Full flaps set. 218 00:11:47,473 --> 00:11:48,474 Checked. 219 00:11:55,531 --> 00:11:59,201 Captain Lutz expects it to come into view any second now. 220 00:12:05,474 --> 00:12:06,842 100 above. 221 00:12:06,842 --> 00:12:10,546 Do we have ground contact? 222 00:12:10,546 --> 00:12:11,380 Yes. 223 00:12:17,253 --> 00:12:20,489 NARRATOR: Passengers prepare themselves for landing. 224 00:12:20,489 --> 00:12:23,826 We were pretty close to the airport, 225 00:12:23,826 --> 00:12:27,329 so you think, OK, this is going smoothly. 226 00:12:27,329 --> 00:12:29,098 But it was dark, and it was snowing, 227 00:12:29,098 --> 00:12:32,568 so we couldn't see anything. 228 00:12:32,568 --> 00:12:34,870 NARRATOR: In the tower, the controller 229 00:12:34,870 --> 00:12:39,341 monitors the flight to make sure it's lined up with the runway. 230 00:12:39,341 --> 00:12:42,344 Crossair 3597, cleared to land, runway 28. 231 00:12:47,917 --> 00:12:49,518 24, the minimum. 232 00:12:49,518 --> 00:12:51,353 24. 233 00:12:51,353 --> 00:12:53,355 NARRATOR: The flight has hit minimum descent altitude, 234 00:12:53,355 --> 00:12:56,459 2,400 feet above sea level, 1,000 feet 235 00:12:56,459 --> 00:12:58,027 above the ground near Zurich. 236 00:13:03,132 --> 00:13:06,869 Minimum descent altitude is the minimum height you can descend, 237 00:13:06,869 --> 00:13:09,972 before you need to decide whether you can see the runway, 238 00:13:09,972 --> 00:13:11,574 and continue the approach visually, 239 00:13:11,574 --> 00:13:15,411 or you have to make a decision to go around. 240 00:13:15,411 --> 00:13:18,414 I have ground contact, we're continuing on. 241 00:13:22,151 --> 00:13:25,454 RECORDED FEMALE VOICE: 500, 500. 242 00:13:25,454 --> 00:13:28,157 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz still can't see the runway lights, 243 00:13:28,157 --> 00:13:31,494 but knows that the flight ahead of him has the same problem. 244 00:13:31,494 --> 00:13:33,162 Damn. 245 00:13:33,162 --> 00:13:34,897 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 246 00:13:34,897 --> 00:13:38,501 NARRATOR: They should almost be on top of the runway by now. 247 00:13:38,501 --> 00:13:42,071 But for some reason, they still can't see it. 248 00:13:42,071 --> 00:13:43,639 Make a go around? 249 00:13:43,639 --> 00:13:44,373 Yeah. 250 00:13:44,373 --> 00:13:47,443 Crossair 3597, cleared to land. 251 00:13:47,443 --> 00:13:49,178 NARRATOR: The crew decides to abort the landing. 252 00:13:49,178 --> 00:13:50,579 Go around. 253 00:13:50,579 --> 00:13:51,547 Go around. 254 00:13:51,547 --> 00:13:53,949 NARRATOR: And pushes the plane to its limits, 255 00:13:53,949 --> 00:13:57,419 in an effort to get it to climb. 256 00:13:57,419 --> 00:14:00,589 Captain Lutz throttles up his plane's four jet engines, 257 00:14:00,589 --> 00:14:02,825 as he aborts his landing at the Zurich airport. 258 00:14:07,663 --> 00:14:08,931 But it's too late. 259 00:14:08,931 --> 00:14:12,468 There's not enough time for the engines to get to full power, 260 00:14:12,468 --> 00:14:15,504 and clear a tree covered hill suddenly looming dead ahead. 261 00:14:18,307 --> 00:14:20,676 Residents of a nearby village witnessed flight's 262 00:14:20,676 --> 00:14:24,613 3597's final moments. 263 00:14:24,613 --> 00:14:27,283 I was walking down with my dog. 264 00:14:27,283 --> 00:14:29,485 All of a sudden, I saw that aircraft 265 00:14:29,485 --> 00:14:33,289 coming from behind the forest, the little hill. 266 00:14:33,289 --> 00:14:36,492 And I thought, oh, it's very low, 267 00:14:36,492 --> 00:14:39,195 and it's not on the same route as aircrafts 268 00:14:39,195 --> 00:14:43,566 normally are coming to land at the airport of Zurich. 269 00:14:43,566 --> 00:14:45,134 NARRATOR: The jet clips the treetops. 270 00:14:49,071 --> 00:14:52,074 [screams] 271 00:14:52,074 --> 00:14:56,212 Suddenly, it was shaking very hard. 272 00:14:56,212 --> 00:14:57,213 What's happening? 273 00:14:57,213 --> 00:14:58,247 Something is wrong. 274 00:15:03,485 --> 00:15:07,389 [screams] 275 00:15:07,389 --> 00:15:09,191 NARRATOR: Moments later, the aircraft 276 00:15:09,191 --> 00:15:10,659 plunges into the hillside. 277 00:15:10,659 --> 00:15:11,427 Ah! 278 00:15:18,667 --> 00:15:21,737 Crossair 3597, this is Zurich tower. 279 00:15:21,737 --> 00:15:22,805 Do you copy? 280 00:15:22,805 --> 00:15:26,742 Crossair 3597, this is Zurich tower, do you copy? 281 00:15:26,742 --> 00:15:29,578 All of a sudden, the whole sky in the West 282 00:15:29,578 --> 00:15:33,716 was getting really orange, like a big fire. 283 00:15:33,716 --> 00:15:36,518 Like an explosion. 284 00:15:36,518 --> 00:15:39,088 NARRATOR: The impact tears the aircraft apart. 285 00:15:39,088 --> 00:15:43,025 The wings broke off, and the fuel is in the wings. 286 00:15:43,025 --> 00:15:46,695 So the flames really sort of shot inside the plane. 287 00:15:52,468 --> 00:15:55,371 Crossair 3597, this is Zurich tower. 288 00:15:55,371 --> 00:15:56,372 Do you copy? 289 00:16:00,276 --> 00:16:01,710 This is Zurich tower. 290 00:16:01,710 --> 00:16:04,146 We have a possible emergency in approach sector East. 291 00:16:04,146 --> 00:16:06,215 I repeat, approach sector East. 292 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:14,590 NARRATOR: Crossair 3597 has crashed 293 00:16:14,590 --> 00:16:19,561 near the village of Basserdorf, Northeast of Zurich. 294 00:16:19,561 --> 00:16:21,563 Some people have survived the accident, 295 00:16:21,563 --> 00:16:24,300 including Peter Hogenkamp and Jacqueline Badran. 296 00:16:28,570 --> 00:16:31,573 I don't have any memory of how we really walked out, 297 00:16:31,573 --> 00:16:34,677 because the back was cut off. 298 00:16:34,677 --> 00:16:37,513 And we were just able to walk out there. 299 00:16:37,513 --> 00:16:39,348 NARRATOR: One member of Passion Fruit 300 00:16:39,348 --> 00:16:43,319 also survives, but her two bandmates seated just one row 301 00:16:43,319 --> 00:16:44,753 ahead of her have been killed. 302 00:16:48,624 --> 00:16:52,261 Within minutes, emergency workers get to the crash site. 303 00:16:55,264 --> 00:16:58,200 Hey, over here. 304 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:00,135 Over here! 305 00:17:00,135 --> 00:17:01,837 Over here! 306 00:17:01,837 --> 00:17:06,342 NARRATOR: 24 of the 33 people on board Flight 3597 307 00:17:06,342 --> 00:17:09,712 are dead, including Captain Lutz and first officer Stephan 308 00:17:09,712 --> 00:17:10,546 Lohrer. 309 00:17:17,486 --> 00:17:20,155 Daniel Knecht, an investigator from Switzerland's 310 00:17:20,155 --> 00:17:24,860 Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau arrives on the scene. 311 00:17:24,860 --> 00:17:29,398 DANIEL KNECHT: I got the call from our rescue service, 312 00:17:29,398 --> 00:17:31,500 about half past ten in the evening. 313 00:17:31,500 --> 00:17:33,869 Half an hour later, I was on the accident site. 314 00:17:33,869 --> 00:17:36,872 The rear part of the fuselage was quite intact. 315 00:17:36,872 --> 00:17:40,476 It was also the region where most of the survivors 316 00:17:40,476 --> 00:17:44,213 stepped out without injury. 317 00:17:44,213 --> 00:17:47,216 NARRATOR: For Peter Hogenkamp and his partner, 318 00:17:47,216 --> 00:17:51,487 it appears moving to the rear of the plane saved their lives. 319 00:17:51,487 --> 00:17:53,389 I think it was just good luck. 320 00:17:53,389 --> 00:17:56,525 I think it would have been a whole different story if we 321 00:17:56,525 --> 00:17:57,693 wouldn't have changed seats. 322 00:18:00,596 --> 00:18:03,832 So, the Passion Fruits may have saved our lives. 323 00:18:03,832 --> 00:18:06,702 NARRATOR: While rescuers care for the survivors, 324 00:18:06,702 --> 00:18:09,071 Knecht and his team survey the crash site. 325 00:18:12,608 --> 00:18:14,910 The location of the wreckage, far from the airport, 326 00:18:14,910 --> 00:18:18,514 is of interest to the investigators. 327 00:18:18,514 --> 00:18:22,551 Four kilometers and 50 meters from the runway. 328 00:18:22,551 --> 00:18:26,555 The aircraft was not where he was intended to be. 329 00:18:26,555 --> 00:18:29,191 He collided with a hill East of runway 28, 330 00:18:29,191 --> 00:18:32,294 so obviously he was too low. 331 00:18:32,294 --> 00:18:37,699 And the first question was, why was this aircraft too low? 332 00:18:37,699 --> 00:18:39,935 NARRATOR: The black box flight recorders 333 00:18:39,935 --> 00:18:43,539 are found in the wreckage. 334 00:18:43,539 --> 00:18:44,706 They're in good condition. 335 00:18:55,392 --> 00:18:58,395 is the worst aviation disaster on Swiss territory 336 00:18:58,395 --> 00:18:59,463 in over a decade. 337 00:19:02,599 --> 00:19:04,668 They're under pressure to find answers fast. 338 00:19:08,405 --> 00:19:10,641 While work continues at the crash, 339 00:19:10,641 --> 00:19:12,676 a command post is established nearby. 340 00:19:16,847 --> 00:19:19,750 Jean Overney heads the Swiss Investigation Bureau. 341 00:19:19,750 --> 00:19:23,454 He takes charge of the Crossair file. 342 00:19:23,454 --> 00:19:24,989 [speaking french] 343 00:19:24,989 --> 00:19:27,658 The public was very anxious about this crash. 344 00:19:27,658 --> 00:19:29,426 The media were raising many questions, 345 00:19:29,426 --> 00:19:33,263 so we naturally had to open a more in-depth investigation. 346 00:19:33,263 --> 00:19:34,932 [speaking french] 347 00:19:34,932 --> 00:19:36,600 NARRATOR: The accident happened at the end 348 00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:38,702 of a long day for Captain Lutz. 349 00:19:38,702 --> 00:19:40,704 But given his background, investigators 350 00:19:40,704 --> 00:19:43,340 must consider other causes. 351 00:19:43,340 --> 00:19:46,276 We knew that the captain was very experienced. 352 00:19:46,276 --> 00:19:52,282 He had about 17,000 flight hours during his whole career, flight 353 00:19:52,282 --> 00:19:54,618 instructor, flight examiner, within the company, 354 00:19:54,618 --> 00:19:57,454 for more than 20 years. 355 00:19:57,454 --> 00:20:00,524 NARRATOR: The flight recorders are sent to a lab in Paris 356 00:20:00,524 --> 00:20:01,625 to extract their data. 357 00:20:03,961 --> 00:20:06,296 At the same time, investigators have 358 00:20:06,296 --> 00:20:10,834 begun retrieving fragments of wreckage from the crash site. 359 00:20:10,834 --> 00:20:14,038 They look for telltale signs of trouble. 360 00:20:14,038 --> 00:20:16,373 DANIEL KNECHT: The position of switches is very important. 361 00:20:16,373 --> 00:20:19,643 Also, if you have some indication panels, for example, 362 00:20:19,643 --> 00:20:22,980 with bulbs in it, you can, after a crash, 363 00:20:22,980 --> 00:20:27,017 you can analyze the different wires in the bulbs. 364 00:20:27,017 --> 00:20:31,588 And then you can determine which, for example, 365 00:20:31,588 --> 00:20:34,925 indications, or even warnings, were active at the moment 366 00:20:34,925 --> 00:20:35,926 of the impact. 367 00:20:40,998 --> 00:20:44,401 NARRATOR: An investigator comes across an intriguing piece 368 00:20:44,401 --> 00:20:45,736 of wreckage. 369 00:20:45,736 --> 00:20:48,038 Oil gauges provide information about the oil 370 00:20:48,038 --> 00:20:52,743 flowing to the plane's four turbofan engines. 371 00:20:52,743 --> 00:20:55,846 Curiously, one of them is installed upside down. 372 00:20:58,916 --> 00:21:02,719 This raised a lot of questions for us, and for the media. 373 00:21:02,719 --> 00:21:04,354 Everyone wanted to know how you could 374 00:21:04,354 --> 00:21:08,025 fly a plane with an instrument installed upside down. 375 00:21:08,025 --> 00:21:09,693 [speaking french] 376 00:21:09,693 --> 00:21:11,462 It wasn't a very important instrument. 377 00:21:11,462 --> 00:21:14,765 You could still read it, even if it was installed upside down. 378 00:21:14,765 --> 00:21:16,366 [speaking french] 379 00:21:16,366 --> 00:21:19,870 NARRATOR: But if this obvious problem was never fixed, 380 00:21:19,870 --> 00:21:21,772 what else could be wrong with the plane? 381 00:21:24,441 --> 00:21:27,878 Obviously, there were maintenance issues here. 382 00:21:27,878 --> 00:21:29,713 We looked at how the company was doing 383 00:21:29,713 --> 00:21:31,115 the maintenance of the planes. 384 00:21:31,115 --> 00:21:33,050 [speaking french] 385 00:21:35,786 --> 00:21:37,988 NARRATOR: While this review is being launched, 386 00:21:37,988 --> 00:21:40,624 investigators study the plane's engines 387 00:21:40,624 --> 00:21:41,925 to determine if they were running 388 00:21:41,925 --> 00:21:42,960 at the time of the crash. 389 00:21:46,563 --> 00:21:50,567 Soil, tree branches, and other debris lodged inside the engine 390 00:21:50,567 --> 00:21:53,137 suggest they were. 391 00:21:53,137 --> 00:21:55,906 We checked them out visually, and we 392 00:21:55,906 --> 00:21:58,742 saw that the four engines were turning 393 00:21:58,742 --> 00:22:00,911 at the moment of the accident. 394 00:22:00,911 --> 00:22:03,147 NARRATOR: Authorities need to be sure. 395 00:22:03,147 --> 00:22:05,749 They will have to check their findings against data 396 00:22:05,749 --> 00:22:07,084 from the flight recorders. 397 00:22:10,420 --> 00:22:12,990 In the meantime, the location of the crash 398 00:22:12,990 --> 00:22:14,858 suggests something may have tragically 399 00:22:14,858 --> 00:22:17,928 misled the crew on their descent toward Zurich airport. 400 00:22:17,928 --> 00:22:20,631 Knecht focuses on the flight charts they 401 00:22:20,631 --> 00:22:22,933 use to plan their approach. 402 00:22:22,933 --> 00:22:24,768 Is the problem with the approach, 403 00:22:24,768 --> 00:22:26,436 or is the problem with the aircraft? 404 00:22:26,436 --> 00:22:30,440 This kind of question was dominant when 405 00:22:30,440 --> 00:22:32,976 we started the investigation. 406 00:22:32,976 --> 00:22:35,679 Are you familiar with the 28 approach? 407 00:22:35,679 --> 00:22:37,447 Yes, I've done it a couple of times. 408 00:22:37,447 --> 00:22:39,049 NARRATOR: The approach chart provides pilots 409 00:22:39,049 --> 00:22:41,451 with directions to the runway. 410 00:22:41,451 --> 00:22:42,719 Trazadingen Zurich. 411 00:22:42,719 --> 00:22:44,955 NARRATOR: Details about radio frequencies, 412 00:22:44,955 --> 00:22:48,025 as well as altitudes and speed for various stages 413 00:22:48,025 --> 00:22:49,960 of the landing. 414 00:22:49,960 --> 00:22:51,895 When investigators study an approach 415 00:22:51,895 --> 00:22:53,797 chart like the one the crew used, 416 00:22:53,797 --> 00:22:56,833 they make a shocking discovery. 417 00:22:56,833 --> 00:23:00,871 The chart does not show the hill the plane hit. 418 00:23:00,871 --> 00:23:03,507 An approach chart is a very important thing, 419 00:23:03,507 --> 00:23:06,743 because an indication which is not correct on this approach 420 00:23:06,743 --> 00:23:09,079 chart could mislead a crew. 421 00:23:09,079 --> 00:23:13,183 And so, easily make them do something wrong. 422 00:23:13,183 --> 00:23:18,755 So, tell me about the runway and the conditions. 423 00:23:18,755 --> 00:23:20,657 Overcast with light snowfall. 424 00:23:20,657 --> 00:23:23,760 NARRATOR: A faulty chart would certainly have been a danger 425 00:23:23,760 --> 00:23:26,563 to a crew unfamiliar with Zurich airport, 426 00:23:26,563 --> 00:23:31,168 but Lutz had flown in and out of Zurich countless times. 427 00:23:31,168 --> 00:23:35,038 He and his first officer were both based in the city. 428 00:23:35,038 --> 00:23:40,577 The commander was flying out of Zurich, I think, 429 00:23:40,577 --> 00:23:43,046 for the last 15 to 20 years. 430 00:23:43,046 --> 00:23:46,617 So he was really used to this airport. 431 00:23:46,617 --> 00:23:49,720 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the approach chart, 432 00:23:49,720 --> 00:23:51,521 while faulty, could have tripped up 433 00:23:51,521 --> 00:23:53,790 some crews, but not this one. 434 00:23:58,962 --> 00:24:03,066 Some definitive news finally arrives. 435 00:24:03,066 --> 00:24:05,102 The engine data from the black box 436 00:24:05,102 --> 00:24:07,871 confirms the observations at the crash site. 437 00:24:07,871 --> 00:24:11,742 We could see, quite easily, that the engines 438 00:24:11,742 --> 00:24:13,577 worked absolutely normally. 439 00:24:13,577 --> 00:24:16,213 NARRATOR: Another potential cause of the accident 440 00:24:16,213 --> 00:24:18,915 is eliminated from the list, mechanical failure. 441 00:24:21,151 --> 00:24:25,122 Investigators now consider a different possibility. 442 00:24:25,122 --> 00:24:26,990 I was covering the approach West position 443 00:24:26,990 --> 00:24:28,258 on the night of the accident. 444 00:24:28,258 --> 00:24:30,727 NARRATOR: Could air traffic control have 445 00:24:30,727 --> 00:24:32,829 somehow mishandled the plane? 446 00:24:32,829 --> 00:24:35,932 Investigators study records from the night of the accident, 447 00:24:35,932 --> 00:24:39,269 and make a disconcerting find. 448 00:24:39,269 --> 00:24:42,806 Zurich airport's control tower was understaffed 449 00:24:42,806 --> 00:24:43,940 at the time of the accident. 450 00:24:43,940 --> 00:24:46,009 He left before his shift ended. 451 00:24:46,009 --> 00:24:48,245 NARRATOR: The supervisor in the tower 452 00:24:48,245 --> 00:24:51,114 went home early, leaving a lone controller to guide 453 00:24:51,114 --> 00:24:55,652 flight 3597 in for its landing. 454 00:24:55,652 --> 00:24:58,789 She was relatively young, and let's say she didn't 455 00:24:58,789 --> 00:25:01,658 have that much experience. 456 00:25:01,658 --> 00:25:04,261 NARRATOR: Investigators now study transcripts 457 00:25:04,261 --> 00:25:06,797 of conversations between that air traffic 458 00:25:06,797 --> 00:25:08,265 controller and the flight crew. 459 00:25:08,265 --> 00:25:10,167 Crossair 3597. 460 00:25:10,167 --> 00:25:11,301 Cleared to land. 461 00:25:11,301 --> 00:25:13,937 NARRATOR: They find no indication the controller gave 462 00:25:13,937 --> 00:25:16,039 the crew faulty instructions, but they 463 00:25:16,039 --> 00:25:18,342 do come across the radio call by the pilot 464 00:25:18,342 --> 00:25:21,011 of the Crossair flight that landed minutes earlier. 465 00:25:21,011 --> 00:25:24,047 PILOT: Crossair 3891. 466 00:25:24,047 --> 00:25:26,283 Visibility approaching 28 was borderline. 467 00:25:26,283 --> 00:25:29,619 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 468 00:25:29,619 --> 00:25:32,789 NARRATOR: That pilot warned of poor conditions on the approach 469 00:25:32,789 --> 00:25:33,724 to runway 28. 470 00:25:33,724 --> 00:25:35,359 She had options. 471 00:25:35,359 --> 00:25:37,794 NARRATOR: They wonder why the controller 472 00:25:37,794 --> 00:25:39,363 didn't shut the runway down. 473 00:25:39,363 --> 00:25:41,698 Because of poor visibility, she could 474 00:25:41,698 --> 00:25:45,235 have reopened runway four, in spite of the noise by law. 475 00:25:45,235 --> 00:25:46,903 This would have allowed the crews 476 00:25:46,903 --> 00:25:49,906 to make an instrument approach. 477 00:25:49,906 --> 00:25:50,974 But she didn't do that. 478 00:25:50,974 --> 00:25:53,810 Thank you, Crossair 3891. 479 00:25:53,810 --> 00:25:55,078 Have a good evening. 480 00:25:55,078 --> 00:25:57,180 It would have been much easier to fly ILS 481 00:25:57,180 --> 00:25:59,816 approaches in this kind of area, regardless 482 00:25:59,816 --> 00:26:02,319 of this political issue. 483 00:26:02,319 --> 00:26:05,222 NARRATOR: It's suspected that without her supervisor present, 484 00:26:05,222 --> 00:26:07,190 the controller lacked the experience 485 00:26:07,190 --> 00:26:09,760 to make such an important call. 486 00:26:09,760 --> 00:26:11,862 [speaking french] 487 00:26:11,862 --> 00:26:13,997 So it's clear that to make the decision 488 00:26:13,997 --> 00:26:16,066 not to allow an approach on runway 28, 489 00:26:16,066 --> 00:26:18,168 and instead make it on runway 14, 490 00:26:18,168 --> 00:26:20,871 demanded a certain kind of confidence, 491 00:26:20,871 --> 00:26:22,072 a certain kind of courage. 492 00:26:22,072 --> 00:26:23,240 [speaking french] 493 00:26:24,941 --> 00:26:27,944 NARRATOR: However, captain Lutz also heard the same warning. 494 00:26:27,944 --> 00:26:29,346 PILOT: Was borderline. 495 00:26:29,346 --> 00:26:32,849 We could only see the runway from 1.3 miles out. 496 00:26:32,849 --> 00:26:34,251 Gear down. 497 00:26:34,251 --> 00:26:38,088 NARRATOR: He kept going in spite of it. 498 00:26:38,088 --> 00:26:40,690 Investigators are now certain that the controller 499 00:26:40,690 --> 00:26:44,895 was in no way responsible. 500 00:26:44,895 --> 00:26:47,130 A pilot can always say no. 501 00:26:47,130 --> 00:26:50,233 He can always recheck the clearance. 502 00:26:50,233 --> 00:26:53,703 If he thinks that landing is probably not possible, 503 00:26:53,703 --> 00:26:56,239 he is free to retract an approach clearance, 504 00:26:56,239 --> 00:26:58,375 and ask for a different one. 505 00:26:58,375 --> 00:27:01,144 NARRATOR: Jean Overney can't understand why Captain 506 00:27:01,144 --> 00:27:03,413 Lutz didn't do exactly that. 507 00:27:03,413 --> 00:27:05,215 He should have known that he didn't 508 00:27:05,215 --> 00:27:08,919 have to make a non precision approach in bad weather. 509 00:27:08,919 --> 00:27:11,121 [speaking french] 510 00:27:12,055 --> 00:27:14,324 When we saw the mistake the pilot had made, 511 00:27:14,324 --> 00:27:19,796 we immediately asked ourselves, well, how is it possible? 512 00:27:19,796 --> 00:27:22,165 Because for an experienced pilot, who was an instructor, 513 00:27:22,165 --> 00:27:24,835 this was a really basic mistake. 514 00:27:24,835 --> 00:27:27,437 [speaking french] 515 00:27:27,437 --> 00:27:29,940 NARRATOR: Overney is beginning to wonder if something 516 00:27:29,940 --> 00:27:33,743 in Lutz's long career is hiding clues about his behavior 517 00:27:33,743 --> 00:27:34,911 on the night of the accident. 518 00:27:42,837 --> 00:27:49,810 out the possible causes of the crash of Crossair flight 3597. 519 00:27:49,810 --> 00:27:52,780 They hope the answer lies in the cockpit voice recorder, 520 00:27:52,780 --> 00:27:56,450 or CVR, of the doomed jet. 521 00:27:56,450 --> 00:27:59,387 After waiting many days for its data to be sent back 522 00:27:59,387 --> 00:28:03,457 from France, they now pore over it carefully, 523 00:28:03,457 --> 00:28:05,826 listening for any clues that might explain why 524 00:28:05,826 --> 00:28:08,963 the plane was flying so close to the ground, so far 525 00:28:08,963 --> 00:28:09,797 from the airport. 526 00:28:09,797 --> 00:28:12,066 HANS LUTZ: 16 knots. 527 00:28:12,066 --> 00:28:13,534 LNAV is engaged. 528 00:28:13,534 --> 00:28:17,038 NARRATOR: Authorities get more than they expected. 529 00:28:17,038 --> 00:28:19,540 Not only is the CVR complete, but 530 00:28:19,540 --> 00:28:21,976 Captain Lutz offers a running commentary 531 00:28:21,976 --> 00:28:23,044 on everything he does. 532 00:28:23,044 --> 00:28:28,249 And on inbound track 275. 533 00:28:28,249 --> 00:28:30,985 Speed is checked, flaps 18. 534 00:28:30,985 --> 00:28:34,021 NARRATOR: It's practically a roadmap to understanding 535 00:28:34,021 --> 00:28:36,023 what went on in the cockpit. 536 00:28:36,023 --> 00:28:37,325 HANS LUTZ: Flaps 33. 537 00:28:37,325 --> 00:28:41,095 That's not usual, that the pilot flying 538 00:28:41,095 --> 00:28:46,500 is talking so much about what he is doing, or what he is seeing. 539 00:28:46,500 --> 00:28:49,904 And for the investigation, this helped a lot. 540 00:28:49,904 --> 00:28:51,272 100 above. 541 00:28:51,272 --> 00:28:53,174 Do we have ground contact? 542 00:28:53,174 --> 00:28:54,909 STEPHEN LOHRER (BY CVR): Yes. 543 00:28:54,909 --> 00:28:58,179 NARRATOR: Investigators learned that the crew of flight 3597 544 00:28:58,179 --> 00:29:00,181 was looking for the runway, and believed 545 00:29:00,181 --> 00:29:02,083 it would soon come into view. 546 00:29:02,083 --> 00:29:07,388 From the CVR, we saw that the commander, 547 00:29:07,388 --> 00:29:11,392 and also his co-pilot, were not feeling some fear, 548 00:29:11,392 --> 00:29:15,563 or feeling that something was not going as they planned. 549 00:29:15,563 --> 00:29:17,865 NARRATOR: But what they didn't know 550 00:29:17,865 --> 00:29:22,603 was that the plane was actually four miles shy of its target. 551 00:29:22,603 --> 00:29:23,471 Damn. 552 00:29:23,471 --> 00:29:26,140 He said he saw the runway 1.3 miles. 553 00:29:26,140 --> 00:29:27,875 RECORDED FEMALE VOICE: 300. 554 00:29:27,875 --> 00:29:30,144 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz obviously thought his jet was closer 555 00:29:30,144 --> 00:29:32,580 to the runway than it was. 556 00:29:32,580 --> 00:29:34,982 Investigators consider the possibility 557 00:29:34,982 --> 00:29:40,588 he was misled by his distance measuring equipment, or DME. 558 00:29:40,588 --> 00:29:45,326 It's supposed to tell pilots how far they are from the airport. 559 00:29:45,326 --> 00:29:48,963 The DME indication would have given this distance, 560 00:29:48,963 --> 00:29:52,566 and then he would have detected immediately-- 561 00:29:52,566 --> 00:29:53,467 Damn. 562 00:29:53,467 --> 00:29:56,637 --that he was below the approach pass. 563 00:29:56,637 --> 00:30:02,476 NARRATOR: Perhaps the DME from flight 3597 was faulty. 564 00:30:02,476 --> 00:30:03,744 It's been recovered from the wreckage, 565 00:30:03,744 --> 00:30:09,650 but it's impossible to tell what information it gave the pilots. 566 00:30:09,650 --> 00:30:12,653 However, there is another way to check whether the instrument 567 00:30:12,653 --> 00:30:15,589 was functioning or not. 568 00:30:15,589 --> 00:30:18,592 The DME distance is not recorded on the FDR, 569 00:30:18,592 --> 00:30:24,098 but on two occasions, the pilots mentioned the distance. 570 00:30:24,098 --> 00:30:25,933 Six miles is checked. 571 00:30:25,933 --> 00:30:27,968 Yes. 572 00:30:27,968 --> 00:30:31,505 NARRATOR: Investigators compare the time Lutz checked his DME 573 00:30:31,505 --> 00:30:34,008 with radar data on the aircraft's location, 574 00:30:34,008 --> 00:30:36,944 at that exact same time. 575 00:30:36,944 --> 00:30:39,447 They can see that when Lutz's instruments were telling him 576 00:30:39,447 --> 00:30:44,985 he was six miles out, that's precisely where he was. 577 00:30:44,985 --> 00:30:48,122 So, we knew that the pilots had 578 00:30:48,122 --> 00:30:51,959 an indication for the distance available at that time. 579 00:30:51,959 --> 00:30:54,628 NARRATOR: An instrument problem can now be crossed off 580 00:30:54,628 --> 00:30:58,966 the list as a factor in the crash, which 581 00:30:58,966 --> 00:31:00,534 only heightens the mystery. 582 00:31:00,534 --> 00:31:03,471 I have ground contact, we're continuing on. 583 00:31:03,471 --> 00:31:05,706 NARRATOR: If the instrument was working, 584 00:31:05,706 --> 00:31:08,409 why did Lutz think he was closer to the runway 585 00:31:08,409 --> 00:31:11,479 than he actually was? 586 00:31:11,479 --> 00:31:13,714 The answer lies not in what investigators 587 00:31:13,714 --> 00:31:16,183 hear on the cockpit voice recorder, 588 00:31:16,183 --> 00:31:18,185 but what they don't hear. 589 00:31:18,185 --> 00:31:21,522 I don't see anything after six miles. 590 00:31:21,522 --> 00:31:23,390 Do we have ground contact? 591 00:31:23,390 --> 00:31:26,060 NARRATOR: Neither pilot read out a DME check 592 00:31:26,060 --> 00:31:27,728 after the six mile reading. 593 00:31:27,728 --> 00:31:29,663 Yes. 594 00:31:29,663 --> 00:31:32,032 NARRATOR: It tells investigators that Lutz wasn't monitoring 595 00:31:32,032 --> 00:31:36,704 his vital instruments during the final minutes of his approach. 596 00:31:36,704 --> 00:31:39,507 Instead, he was preoccupied with spotting 597 00:31:39,507 --> 00:31:41,542 the lights of the runway. 598 00:31:41,542 --> 00:31:45,012 That's not what pilots are supposed to do. 599 00:31:45,012 --> 00:31:46,614 [speaking french] 600 00:31:46,614 --> 00:31:49,283 The pilot flying is supposed to keep his eyes 601 00:31:49,283 --> 00:31:52,019 on the instruments, because all the information he needs 602 00:31:52,019 --> 00:31:53,687 is there. 603 00:31:53,687 --> 00:31:56,090 He only switches to flying by sight when the non flying 604 00:31:56,090 --> 00:32:00,694 pilot says runway in sight. 605 00:32:00,694 --> 00:32:03,764 Only then can the captain take his eyes off the instruments, 606 00:32:03,764 --> 00:32:07,768 and fly by sight, because the landing is performed visually. 607 00:32:07,768 --> 00:32:09,637 [speaking french] 608 00:32:13,607 --> 00:32:16,043 NARRATOR: If Lutz had checked his instruments, 609 00:32:16,043 --> 00:32:20,047 he would have known how far from the runway he actually was. 610 00:32:20,047 --> 00:32:21,215 RECORDED FEMALE VOICE: 500. 611 00:32:21,215 --> 00:32:22,383 NARRATOR: But how had he ended up 612 00:32:22,383 --> 00:32:23,584 such a long distance from it? 613 00:32:23,584 --> 00:32:24,552 RECORDED FEMALE VOICE: 400. 614 00:32:24,552 --> 00:32:25,553 Confirmed, three greens. 615 00:32:25,553 --> 00:32:27,054 RECORDED FEMALE VOICE: 400. 616 00:32:27,054 --> 00:32:29,723 Is checked. 617 00:32:29,723 --> 00:32:32,593 116 knots. 618 00:32:32,593 --> 00:32:35,062 NARRATOR: Further analysis of the black box data 619 00:32:35,062 --> 00:32:38,132 reveals that Lutz put his plane into a steep descent, 620 00:32:38,132 --> 00:32:43,437 as it began its final approach to Zurich airport. 621 00:32:43,437 --> 00:32:45,472 But it's readily apparent his approach 622 00:32:45,472 --> 00:32:48,075 profile was out of sync with the trajectory 623 00:32:48,075 --> 00:32:48,976 laid out in his chart. 624 00:32:53,247 --> 00:32:55,082 The approach profile for runway 28 625 00:32:55,082 --> 00:32:58,819 calls for pilots to make a gradual and steady descent, 626 00:32:58,819 --> 00:33:01,422 which would bring them to 2,400 feet, 627 00:33:01,422 --> 00:33:04,191 after they've cleared the hills around Zurich. 628 00:33:04,191 --> 00:33:07,595 Then, pilots have to level off until they spot the runway. 629 00:33:11,098 --> 00:33:13,834 When investigators compare the approach Lutz made, 630 00:33:13,834 --> 00:33:17,838 with the approach profile he was supposed to follow, 631 00:33:17,838 --> 00:33:20,341 they find that his overly steep descent 632 00:33:20,341 --> 00:33:26,113 brought him to 2,400 feet well before he cleared the hills. 633 00:33:26,113 --> 00:33:29,283 Then, he continued to descend until he hit the ground. 634 00:33:32,820 --> 00:33:34,855 It's beginning to look like Lutz had 635 00:33:34,855 --> 00:33:37,625 violated one of the cardinal rules of flying. 636 00:33:41,462 --> 00:33:43,731 Aircraft making non precision approaches 637 00:33:43,731 --> 00:33:46,467 are supposed to level off at minimum descent 638 00:33:46,467 --> 00:33:51,872 altitude, or safe height, until they have the runway in view. 639 00:33:51,872 --> 00:33:54,541 This safe height is intended to keep the aircraft 640 00:33:54,541 --> 00:33:56,410 above any potential hazards. 641 00:34:00,881 --> 00:34:03,884 DANIEL KNECHT: It's really a basic error. 642 00:34:03,884 --> 00:34:08,689 Every pilot is trained to respect such minimums. 643 00:34:08,689 --> 00:34:12,159 Not only with VOR/DME approaches, 644 00:34:12,159 --> 00:34:13,827 but also with ILS approaches. 645 00:34:13,827 --> 00:34:16,330 NARRATOR: But Captain Lutz kept his aircraft 646 00:34:16,330 --> 00:34:20,834 in a steep descent, without even pausing at 2,400 feet. 647 00:34:20,834 --> 00:34:23,504 The logical next question for investigators, 648 00:34:23,504 --> 00:34:26,206 could he see the runway or not? 649 00:34:26,206 --> 00:34:27,608 I have ground contact. 650 00:34:27,608 --> 00:34:28,876 We're continuing on. 651 00:34:28,876 --> 00:34:33,514 What does he mean by ground contact? 652 00:34:33,514 --> 00:34:35,683 NARRATOR: They need to know if it was even 653 00:34:35,683 --> 00:34:37,584 possible for Lutz to see the runway 654 00:34:37,584 --> 00:34:39,520 when he reported ground contact. 655 00:34:42,690 --> 00:34:44,925 They retrace his steps in a simulator, 656 00:34:44,925 --> 00:34:49,463 programmed with the weather he was facing that night. 657 00:34:49,463 --> 00:34:56,203 Six miles from runway, altitude 3,300 feet. 658 00:34:56,203 --> 00:35:00,207 4.8 miles, 2,400 feet. 659 00:35:00,207 --> 00:35:01,709 Still no runway in sight. 660 00:35:04,745 --> 00:35:06,947 No, he couldn't see the runway, 661 00:35:06,947 --> 00:35:09,383 because there was a hill between him and the runway. 662 00:35:09,383 --> 00:35:12,386 And at that altitude, there is no way he could see it. 663 00:35:12,386 --> 00:35:14,421 [speaking french] 664 00:35:14,421 --> 00:35:16,223 NARRATOR: The conclusion, captain 665 00:35:16,223 --> 00:35:20,494 Lutz had clearly violated his minimum descent altitude. 666 00:35:20,494 --> 00:35:23,630 Whether there is flat terrain or hills, 667 00:35:23,630 --> 00:35:26,834 minimums are set accordingly. 668 00:35:26,834 --> 00:35:29,503 And in no way you can just pass the minimums, 669 00:35:29,503 --> 00:35:31,739 whether there is hills or not. 670 00:35:31,739 --> 00:35:33,574 NARRATOR: This discovery raises questions, 671 00:35:33,574 --> 00:35:37,244 not just about Lutz's actions, but his young first officers 672 00:35:37,244 --> 00:35:38,278 as well. 673 00:35:38,278 --> 00:35:40,280 24, the minimum. 674 00:35:40,280 --> 00:35:42,583 24. 675 00:35:42,583 --> 00:35:44,785 We're continuing on. 676 00:35:44,785 --> 00:35:47,588 NARRATOR: A first officer should not let his captain breach 677 00:35:47,588 --> 00:35:50,924 minimum descent altitudes. 678 00:35:50,924 --> 00:35:52,760 [speaking french] 679 00:35:52,760 --> 00:35:55,496 NARRATOR: The co-pilot could have said no, stop. 680 00:35:55,496 --> 00:35:56,530 We can't see the runway. 681 00:35:56,530 --> 00:35:58,265 We're not descending. 682 00:35:58,265 --> 00:35:59,500 [screams] 683 00:35:59,500 --> 00:36:03,003 He considered his captain an old pilot 684 00:36:03,003 --> 00:36:07,608 with a lot of experience, not making any mistakes. 685 00:36:07,608 --> 00:36:10,477 Most probably, he was trusting him too much. 686 00:36:10,477 --> 00:36:16,316 And also, by being submissive, maybe he 687 00:36:16,316 --> 00:36:21,622 wouldn't speak up on time, just to keep harmony in the cockpit. 688 00:36:21,622 --> 00:36:23,791 NARRATOR: There were no mechanical failures, 689 00:36:23,791 --> 00:36:27,828 or instrument problems with the plane. 690 00:36:27,828 --> 00:36:30,364 Nor was the air traffic controller negligent 691 00:36:30,364 --> 00:36:32,833 in any way. 692 00:36:32,833 --> 00:36:36,036 But it is now clear that Captain Lutz made a series 693 00:36:36,036 --> 00:36:40,641 of catastrophic piloting errors that doomed flight 3597, 694 00:36:40,641 --> 00:36:42,810 and claimed the lives of 24 people. 695 00:36:49,625 --> 00:36:53,296 flying record, to see if there's anything in his long background 696 00:36:53,296 --> 00:36:57,834 that could explain why he crashed flight 3597. 697 00:36:57,834 --> 00:37:01,037 What they discover is truly alarming. 698 00:37:01,037 --> 00:37:05,041 Lutz applied to flight school when he was 17 years old. 699 00:37:05,041 --> 00:37:07,476 He was rejected three times, because 700 00:37:07,476 --> 00:37:09,045 of his lack of education. 701 00:37:09,045 --> 00:37:12,815 He finally got his license at the age of 20, 702 00:37:12,815 --> 00:37:15,985 but continually failed exams to upgrade, 703 00:37:15,985 --> 00:37:18,020 due to his inadequate comprehension 704 00:37:18,020 --> 00:37:19,856 of navigation systems. 705 00:37:19,856 --> 00:37:22,558 Captain Lutz may have had a long career, 706 00:37:22,558 --> 00:37:24,760 but it was not a stellar one. 707 00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:28,998 Years of flying, and flying hours 708 00:37:28,998 --> 00:37:32,668 don't say anything about competence. 709 00:37:32,668 --> 00:37:34,070 NARRATOR: For some reason, though, 710 00:37:34,070 --> 00:37:36,372 his record as a below average pilot 711 00:37:36,372 --> 00:37:40,843 didn't prevent Crossair from hiring him in 1979. 712 00:37:40,843 --> 00:37:44,847 There was a red line through his career, 713 00:37:44,847 --> 00:37:48,451 where several incidents happened before, 714 00:37:48,451 --> 00:37:52,421 and he had missed several checks. 715 00:37:52,421 --> 00:37:56,859 Well, he had some limits. 716 00:37:56,859 --> 00:37:59,395 But what's hard to understand for me, 717 00:37:59,395 --> 00:38:03,532 is that they were identified, and the decision 718 00:38:03,532 --> 00:38:07,370 was made to keep him flying. 719 00:38:07,370 --> 00:38:09,705 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz's limited abilities 720 00:38:09,705 --> 00:38:11,574 continued in his new job. 721 00:38:14,043 --> 00:38:17,046 While commanding a sightseeing tour of the Swiss Alps, 722 00:38:17,046 --> 00:38:21,550 he made a navigation error, and ended up in Italy. 723 00:38:21,550 --> 00:38:24,453 He only realized his mistake when his passengers 724 00:38:24,453 --> 00:38:25,988 spotted road signs in Italian. 725 00:38:29,959 --> 00:38:32,762 In another incident, he wrecked a one and a half million 726 00:38:32,762 --> 00:38:34,997 dollar aircraft, after inadvertently 727 00:38:34,997 --> 00:38:37,500 retracting the landing gear, while the plane 728 00:38:37,500 --> 00:38:38,567 was still on the tarmac. 729 00:38:42,405 --> 00:38:46,142 Lutz's failures forced Crossair to fire him as an instructor, 730 00:38:46,142 --> 00:38:50,980 but they allowed him to continue flying passenger planes. 731 00:38:50,980 --> 00:38:54,483 I personally do pilot assessments. 732 00:38:54,483 --> 00:38:57,687 And he would never have gone through my assessment 733 00:38:57,687 --> 00:39:01,457 with a positive recommendation. 734 00:39:01,457 --> 00:39:02,591 OK. 735 00:39:02,591 --> 00:39:04,427 Approach course 137. 736 00:39:04,427 --> 00:39:06,963 NARRATOR: Investigators wonder why Crossair 737 00:39:06,963 --> 00:39:09,799 allowed Lutz to stay on as a pilot, if he 738 00:39:09,799 --> 00:39:12,001 was not entirely competent. 739 00:39:12,001 --> 00:39:15,004 The answer appears to be, they may have had little choice. 740 00:39:20,609 --> 00:39:24,480 Investigators' first glimpse into the problems at Crossair 741 00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:28,651 came after they found the upside down gauge at the crash site. 742 00:39:28,651 --> 00:39:30,152 [speaking french] 743 00:39:30,152 --> 00:39:32,054 We had to check if the employees had received 744 00:39:32,054 --> 00:39:34,790 the proper training, if they had the qualifications 745 00:39:34,790 --> 00:39:37,960 required for this kind of work. 746 00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:40,997 NARRATOR: No glaring maintenance issues were found. 747 00:39:40,997 --> 00:39:43,632 But a closer look at Crossair's hiring practices 748 00:39:43,632 --> 00:39:47,136 explains why Captain Lutz was allowed to keep flying. 749 00:39:47,136 --> 00:39:49,705 The airline may have grown too fast 750 00:39:49,705 --> 00:39:51,540 throughout the 80s and 90s. 751 00:39:51,540 --> 00:39:53,909 [speaking french] 752 00:39:54,710 --> 00:39:57,079 The company expanded very rapidly. 753 00:39:57,079 --> 00:39:59,582 And with that success, it's clear that you have 754 00:39:59,582 --> 00:40:02,184 to quickly increase the staff. 755 00:40:02,184 --> 00:40:04,820 Office workers, mechanics, that's one thing. 756 00:40:04,820 --> 00:40:07,656 But pilots, you have to go out and find them. 757 00:40:07,656 --> 00:40:09,592 [speaking french] 758 00:40:09,592 --> 00:40:13,829 In those days, they were desperate for pilots. 759 00:40:13,829 --> 00:40:16,499 And somehow, no decision was made 760 00:40:16,499 --> 00:40:20,536 to lay him off because of his questionable performance 761 00:40:20,536 --> 00:40:22,038 during his career. 762 00:40:22,038 --> 00:40:24,607 NARRATOR: Captain Lutz's failings caught up 763 00:40:24,607 --> 00:40:27,877 with him on November 24, 2001. 764 00:40:27,877 --> 00:40:30,246 Make a go around? 765 00:40:30,246 --> 00:40:31,080 Go around. 766 00:40:34,116 --> 00:40:36,419 NARRATOR: 24 people paid with their lives. 767 00:40:48,731 --> 00:40:50,866 After the accident report was issued, 768 00:40:50,866 --> 00:40:53,202 sweeping changes were made. 769 00:40:53,202 --> 00:40:56,772 Swiss aviation authorities had Crossair increase the number 770 00:40:56,772 --> 00:40:59,041 of employees overseeing pilots. 771 00:40:59,041 --> 00:41:01,544 They also scrutinized other airlines, 772 00:41:01,544 --> 00:41:03,779 to determine if there were other substandard performers 773 00:41:03,779 --> 00:41:04,814 like Lutz. 774 00:41:12,154 --> 00:41:15,825 One thing is for sure, that the selection process 775 00:41:15,825 --> 00:41:18,127 has improved considerably. 776 00:41:18,127 --> 00:41:22,565 And, of course, awareness of people's 777 00:41:22,565 --> 00:41:27,303 performance during their career was increased considerably. 778 00:41:27,303 --> 00:41:31,574 NARRATOR: Crossair went out of existence in 2002. 779 00:41:31,574 --> 00:41:34,143 It was folded into the Swiss national carrier. 780 00:41:36,679 --> 00:41:43,586 As Crossair became Swiss, they adopted the previous Swissair 781 00:41:43,586 --> 00:41:45,087 selection process. 782 00:41:45,087 --> 00:41:50,092 And I can say today, which is already nine years since, 783 00:41:50,092 --> 00:41:53,095 that safety has improved considerably, 784 00:41:53,095 --> 00:41:56,999 and also quality of the pilots that are 785 00:41:56,999 --> 00:41:59,502 hired by companies like Swiss. 786 00:42:05,141 --> 00:42:08,777 NARRATOR: Since the crash of Flight 3597, 787 00:42:08,777 --> 00:42:11,113 Zurich's runway 28 has been upgraded 788 00:42:11,113 --> 00:42:13,215 with both an instrument landing system, 789 00:42:13,215 --> 00:42:15,951 and an automatic warning, that alerts controllers when 790 00:42:15,951 --> 00:42:18,787 a plane's approach is too low. 791 00:42:18,787 --> 00:42:22,892 There has never been another accident involving that runway. 792 00:42:22,892 --> 00:42:26,128 But the Crossair tragedy, and the circumstances that spawned 793 00:42:26,128 --> 00:42:29,698 it, isn't an isolated case. 794 00:42:29,698 --> 00:42:33,802 Regional airlines have boomed worldwide since the 1980s, 795 00:42:33,802 --> 00:42:36,839 particularly in the United States, where they account 796 00:42:36,839 --> 00:42:38,974 for half of all flights, and carry 797 00:42:38,974 --> 00:42:41,710 100 million passengers a year. 798 00:42:41,710 --> 00:42:45,748 In the rush to fulfill consumer demand for cheap air travel, 799 00:42:45,748 --> 00:42:49,151 these airlines often hire less experienced pilots, 800 00:42:49,151 --> 00:42:51,720 and pay them far lower salaries than their counterparts 801 00:42:51,720 --> 00:42:54,657 at major carriers. 802 00:42:54,657 --> 00:42:57,826 Some even neglect to test their pilots for basic skills. 803 00:43:00,262 --> 00:43:05,234 There is no such thing as a compulsory pilot assessment 804 00:43:05,234 --> 00:43:07,269 before they get hired, does not exist. 805 00:43:11,407 --> 00:43:15,678 NARRATOR: In February of 2009, one of Colgan air's planes 806 00:43:15,678 --> 00:43:18,581 crashed in Buffalo, New York, killing 50 people. 807 00:43:22,051 --> 00:43:23,953 The accident was blamed on the actions 808 00:43:23,953 --> 00:43:27,756 of an inexperienced crew, an eerie reminder 809 00:43:27,756 --> 00:43:29,191 of the Crossair disaster. 810 00:43:29,191 --> 00:43:31,293 It underlined the urgency of improving 811 00:43:31,293 --> 00:43:34,863 oversight of smaller carriers. 812 00:43:34,863 --> 00:43:37,132 [speaking french] 813 00:43:37,132 --> 00:43:39,201 If you're making a product for a large company, 814 00:43:39,201 --> 00:43:42,738 and you make a mistake, you may lose part of the market. 815 00:43:42,738 --> 00:43:44,273 You may lose some clients. 816 00:43:44,273 --> 00:43:46,875 But an airline company can lose a plane, 817 00:43:46,875 --> 00:43:49,144 its crew, and passengers. 818 00:43:49,144 --> 00:43:51,914 The stakes are very different. 819 00:43:51,914 --> 00:43:54,149 [speaking french] 63875

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