Original subtitles

In the new shipment of military aid to Ukraine, another batch of cluster munitions is included.

During one of the interviews, I noticed comments from Ukrainian military personnel

who believe that these cluster munitions are primarily used against Russian occupiers

in open areas but are less effective in attacks on trenches. Why, considering the

large number of projectiles and their spread, are they not as effective against trenches?

When it comes to open trenches, submunitions used in cluster munitions can indeed cause damage.

However, when dealing with fortified structures with tunnels and enclosed

shelters, submunitions often lack the power to inflict significant harm.

People inside such shelters usually remain relatively safe.

The idea that cluster munitions can be used to clear minefields is also not entirely accurate.

If something explodes near a mine, it will also explode. In essence, this is how demining systems

work; they use explosives to clear an area. So if a shell explodes near a mine, well, you know.

On the other hand, if you have a large minefield, you will need to create a lunar landscape.

Since there are many submunitions, some of them may detonate, such as anti-personnel mines.

But it's like playing Russian roulette—some may detonate, and some may not. So in fact you can

use it, but purposefully - no, it is better to use special means and equipment for this.

The other thing is that there are a lot of questions about how to use these tools now amid

the ubiquity of drones and reconnaissance assets. But that's a separate topic.

It seems that the extensive mine-laying conducted by Russian occupiers came as

a surprise to Ukraine's allies but not to the Ukrainian General Staff,

which regularly emphasized the need for significant resources for demining.

The Russians effectively mined more than their military doctrine had anticipated,

causing surprise. Even leading Western analysts acknowledge and

clearly emphasize that the scale of mine-laying exceeded expectations.

In any case, the level of mine contamination is exceptionally high. However, there are other

important aspects to consider. Knowledge of how to interact with mines is widespread. But modern

detection tools can detect engineered means of detonation, making them more risky to use.

For example, ORYX publishes documented losses on both sides and analyzes their causes.

We see that FPV drones play a big role and they are able to detect and immediately attack targets.

In fact, they have changed the rules of engagement

and this represents a new reality that has only recently emerged.

Currently, there is no clear military doctrine on how to interact with minefields and engineering

assets in the face of the FPV drone threat. There is a need to develop strategies that will

allow effective use of engineering means, but minimize risks to one's own troops.

I have seen testimonies from Ukrainian military that very often they have to

clear minefields manually at night. Equipment is a target and as soon as

some equipment appears on the battlefield, it is immediately visible from a great distance.

For example, a helicopter can detect vehicles and engage them from a long range. At the same time,

a small group of sappers can hide behind trees in a forest belt and go undetected by a helicopter.

That is why it is difficult to use engineering equipment and not only it. For the same reason,

the offensive is carried out by mobile assault groups. But this is the subject of the next video.