Original subtitles

Yesterday on the basis of OSINT it was discovered that the AFU bypassed the

enemy positions southeast of Novoprokopivka. Today a number of military officers publicly

confirmed fighting in this area just before the main enemy defense line.

What does this information give us?

It is obvious that despite the fierce concentration of enemy troops in a small area,

the enemy cannot stop the offensive. This advance directly into the enemy's main line of defense

occurs at a maintained pace. I emphasize again - this is already happening in front of the main

defense line, on which (according to doctrines) the pace of the AFU should fall and wither,

so that the enemy can make a powerful counterattack on the Ukrainian side.

Because the enemy clung to the "Security Zone," he lost significant reserves not

in the most important places. The main thing is that there he spent the most "cadre part",

which by logic should have been waiting for its "star time" behind the main line of defense.

Therefore, now the enemy "does not withdraw behind the main line of defense", but it is

"displaced" and recycled by the defense forces of Ukraine. This is a significant difference,

as the former is the result of planned tactics and strategy,

while the latter is due to a lack of resources and is an uncontrolled process.

And the main thing is the proper place of the advance. The enemy's main line of defense is

built competently by heights, but beyond Novoprokopivka and up to the Dnipro River

there is an interesting "topographical" situation: the main line passes through appreciable heights,

but the reserve positions and the second line of defense due to the

peculiarities of the relief go already in the lowlands. The enemy understands this,

and surely this can justify his actions to "cling" to the Security Zone.

As a matter of fact, if you are confidently entrenched on the main line of defense (for

which battles are already going on) - you get a tangible advantage in heights on

the reserve positions and the second (last continuous) line of defense of the enemy.

There is an opinion that positions "along the main line" may be "slightly easier". This is

what some analysts explain a certain "chaos" and haste in the enemy's actions regarding the

transfer of reserves and constant attempts to counterattack on occasion and without.

I would also like to touch upon the topic of the night mass drone strike on Russian territory,

and specifically one of the episodes - the strike on the airfield in Pskov,

during which 4 to 6 IL-76 aircraft were damaged and disabled. This is

a heavy military transport aircraft, of which Russia had about 100 in service.

From the Ukrainian border to Pskov in a straight line is 700 kilometers. That is,

the question arises, how could several UAVs overcome such a distance

undetected and without being shot down by "unparalleled in the world" air defense?

Another point, what route did they fly ?

About 400 kilometers is near the border with Belarus. Then it is the Pskov region,

bordering Latvia and Estonia - NATO member countries.

So, what does it mean that Russia has no air defense along the border with

Belarus and in the area bordering with scary and aggressive NATO countries?

What can we do when one third of all active air defense was destroyed by

Ukrainians, one third is in Ukraine to cover the occupation troops, and the remaining one

third has to be concentrated to protect at least Moscow and the Crimean bridge. At the same time,

this air defense is becoming steadily less and less every day.

In such conditions of acute shortage, even the insidious and aggressive NATO is not

so scary for the Russian command and it is exposing the advanced location. It

is a pity that no one will take advantage of the situation and,

unlike Russia, will not violate the borders of a sovereign state.

I imagine that, with such trends,

will be with Russian air defense at the end of 2023. Russia, are you asleep?