All language subtitles for 20-02-2023yugdyqe76da

The Russian occupiers in Ukraine are
incapable of attacking on all fronts.

I often emphasize that the Russian occupiers do
not currently have sufficient forces and means for

a full-scale offensive. I will now explain what
it means to be unable to advance on all fronts.

The fact is that an offensive
requires not only significant

resources for the offensive itself,
but also the retention of territory.

For example, the temporarily occupied
Zaporizhzhya region is now held by 30

battalion-tactical groups, hereinafter referred to
as groups. In order to implement an offensive on

the front of just over 100 km, each group will
have to cover a front of 2 to 4 km in length.

And it would seem that, given the functionality
of these formations, allowing them to control from

2 to 4 km of the front, 30 groups is quite
enough to attack and move the front line.

But, in fact, they are not.

First, in the Zaporizhzhia region
there are no full-fledged groups,

since almost every unit has a shortage
of both equipment and personnel. That is,

they are all fundamentally incapable of performing
their functions, and can cover much smaller areas.

Second, suppose these 30 groups go
on the offensive along the entire

front in the Zaporizhzhya region,
and who will remain in the rear?

What about reserves, rotations,
restoration of unit readiness, and so on?

Especially if the Ukrainians break through the
Russian offensive, who will be on the defensive?

And lastly, Vuhledar... The enemy
offensive front there was less than 10 km,

and to be more precise, the main direction
was even less than 3 km. But in this area

were completely exhausted and
exsanguinated almost 9 groups,

which had much better equipment than the
current Zaporizhzhya group of the invaders.

That is, the Russian army set an anti-record
for the use of groups at Vuhledar.

They failed the offensive not even in the
ratio of 1 group per 1 km, but 3 groups per

1 km! I don't even know who, where, and when else
could embarrass themselves like this... Ah yes,

the same army of occupants in 2022 practically
on every beachhead of combat operations.

And now, the most interesting thing,
or rather, our favorite rubric "this

entertaining mathematics". If at the moment
the incomplete groups of Russian troops are

not able to fulfill their functions even
in the proportion of 1 group per 1 km,

then how many resources do they
need for 400 km of frontline?

Thus, speaking of a great,
large-scale, epic offensive,

it should be understood that it will be,
but not in the way it is drawn or presented.

It will be a movement in strictly defined
directions, along a narrow front. For example,

in the Zaporizhzhya region - the maximum risk
will be conditional for a small city Orikhiv.

In the direction of Kreminna-Lyman, they will
certainly launch an offensive, but they will not

succeed. Bakhmut - they will press to the maximum,
they still have enough resources for this in this

sector. Marinka and Avdiivka - no options for
enemy forces. Kup'yans'k - they will start,

but they won't pull it out - it's a dead end.

consequences, there is an order - there
is no obstacle to comply. But it's like

stepping on a rake all the time and hoping
it will break before your forehead does.