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Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,566 --> 00:00:03,666 ♪ ♪ 2 00:00:07,066 --> 00:00:11,166 ♪ ♪ 3 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:23,933 Pegasus... Pegasus... Pegasus... 4 00:00:23,933 --> 00:00:25,600 Pegasus, Which has been used to monitor and track 5 00:00:25,600 --> 00:00:27,233 journalists, human rights activists, and dissidents 6 00:00:27,233 --> 00:00:28,800 across the globe. 7 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:30,966 NARRATOR: In collaboration with Forbidden Films, 8 00:00:30,966 --> 00:00:33,266 a two-part investigation... 9 00:00:33,266 --> 00:00:35,866 We immediately realized that this story would be huge. 10 00:00:35,866 --> 00:00:38,500 NSO was established with the ambition 11 00:00:38,500 --> 00:00:40,100 to make the world a safer place... 12 00:00:40,100 --> 00:00:42,533 NARRATOR: Into powerful spyware... 13 00:00:42,533 --> 00:00:44,800 It is a military weapon used against civilians. 14 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:47,800 This is extremely serious for democracies. 15 00:00:47,800 --> 00:00:49,966 NARRATOR: Used around the world... 16 00:00:49,966 --> 00:00:53,966 There is no control over how countries use it, 17 00:00:53,966 --> 00:00:58,000 and they have been using it in the worst way you could imagine. 18 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:00,333 NARRATOR: Now on "Frontline," part one 19 00:01:00,333 --> 00:01:03,000 of "Global Spyware Scandal: Exposing Pegasus." 20 00:01:06,566 --> 00:01:10,966 ♪ ♪ 21 00:01:29,700 --> 00:01:33,500 ♪ ♪ 22 00:01:36,133 --> 00:01:39,566 Our phones are not just our phones. 23 00:01:39,566 --> 00:01:41,500 We call them phones, but they're not phones, 24 00:01:41,500 --> 00:01:43,366 they're computers. 25 00:01:43,366 --> 00:01:45,500 And they're like extensions of our body. 26 00:01:45,500 --> 00:01:48,133 They're with us all of the time. 27 00:01:48,133 --> 00:01:50,600 And if they are turned into a surveillance device, 28 00:01:50,600 --> 00:01:52,600 I don't think it's an exaggeration 29 00:01:52,600 --> 00:01:54,900 to say this was something that even George Orwell 30 00:01:54,900 --> 00:01:56,800 in "1984" couldn't imagine. 31 00:01:56,800 --> 00:02:02,733 ♪ ♪ 32 00:02:02,733 --> 00:02:04,733 It's beyond science fiction. 33 00:02:04,733 --> 00:02:07,733 ♪ ♪ 34 00:02:07,733 --> 00:02:08,866 LAURENT RICHARD (in French): 35 00:02:08,866 --> 00:02:11,466 ♪ ♪ 36 00:02:29,600 --> 00:02:32,200 ♪ ♪ 37 00:02:35,000 --> 00:02:37,700 (multiple international journalists saying "Pegasus") 38 00:02:37,700 --> 00:02:40,233 This technology, it's so far ahead 39 00:02:40,233 --> 00:02:42,666 of government regulation and even of 40 00:02:42,666 --> 00:02:46,566 public understanding of what's happening out there. 41 00:02:46,566 --> 00:02:49,400 ♪ ♪ 42 00:02:53,833 --> 00:02:55,866 All of us suspected that if NSO Group 43 00:02:55,866 --> 00:02:59,666 was giving authoritarian and repressive regimes 44 00:02:59,666 --> 00:03:01,866 such a powerful instrument of surveillance, 45 00:03:01,866 --> 00:03:05,466 that it was pretty likely that this technology would be abused. 46 00:03:05,466 --> 00:03:09,266 But none of us had been able to prove it on a systemic scale. 47 00:03:09,266 --> 00:03:12,333 ♪ ♪ 48 00:03:13,466 --> 00:03:15,433 De acuerdo con la pesquisa acabada 49 00:03:15,433 --> 00:03:17,200 por "The Washington Post," "The Guardian," 50 00:03:17,200 --> 00:03:19,166 "Le Monde" y otros medios... 51 00:03:19,166 --> 00:03:21,533 A joint investigation by 17 news outlets 52 00:03:21,533 --> 00:03:22,733 and Forbidden Stories... 53 00:03:22,733 --> 00:03:24,200 Activists, lawyers, and journalists 54 00:03:24,200 --> 00:03:27,333 are reportedly among those who have been targeted by... 55 00:03:27,333 --> 00:03:31,133 Phone numbers belonging to some big name politicians. 56 00:03:31,133 --> 00:03:34,066 (in Mandarin): 57 00:03:36,766 --> 00:03:41,700 ♪ ♪ 58 00:03:44,033 --> 00:03:45,833 The device that you have 59 00:03:45,833 --> 00:03:48,066 in your pocket could be a spy 60 00:03:48,066 --> 00:03:50,100 that is spying on your life. 61 00:03:50,100 --> 00:03:55,133 ♪ ♪ 62 00:04:06,600 --> 00:04:08,333 (car horn honks) 63 00:04:16,666 --> 00:04:21,000 RICHARD (in French): 64 00:04:25,900 --> 00:04:29,700 (indistinct chatter) 65 00:05:17,233 --> 00:05:21,500 ♪ ♪ 66 00:05:23,266 --> 00:05:25,466 The list doesn't have any names. 67 00:05:25,466 --> 00:05:28,700 You have phone numbers, area country code, 68 00:05:28,700 --> 00:05:31,200 some timestamps as well. 69 00:05:31,200 --> 00:05:33,900 And it's a list that is about 50,000 phone numbers 70 00:05:33,900 --> 00:05:35,700 from 2016 to 2020. 71 00:05:35,700 --> 00:05:40,566 We can't explain where the list is coming from. 72 00:05:40,566 --> 00:05:43,133 We can't, of course, reveal who is our source. 73 00:05:43,133 --> 00:05:47,966 Officially, the Pegasus spyware is not working 74 00:05:47,966 --> 00:05:50,200 on any plus one U.S. phone numbers. 75 00:05:50,200 --> 00:05:51,866 It's not possible. 76 00:05:52,866 --> 00:05:56,266 The numbers, they are mostly in ten countries 77 00:05:56,266 --> 00:06:00,000 most of these governments are known to be clients of NSO group 78 00:06:00,000 --> 00:06:03,500 who make Pegasus. 79 00:06:03,500 --> 00:06:05,833 Pegasus was designed to infect 80 00:06:05,833 --> 00:06:08,433 phones like iPhones or Androids. 81 00:06:08,433 --> 00:06:09,933 And once in the phone 82 00:06:09,933 --> 00:06:13,166 it can extract and access everything from the device-- 83 00:06:13,166 --> 00:06:14,666 the phone books, 84 00:06:14,666 --> 00:06:18,600 geolocation, the messages, the photos, 85 00:06:18,600 --> 00:06:23,166 even the encrypted messages sent by signal WhatsApp. 86 00:06:23,166 --> 00:06:24,733 It can even access 87 00:06:24,733 --> 00:06:27,966 the mic or the camera of your phone remotely. 88 00:06:27,966 --> 00:06:30,633 ♪ ♪ 89 00:06:30,633 --> 00:06:34,633 It's like a person over your shoulder, 90 00:06:34,633 --> 00:06:36,766 a person who will see what you are seeing, 91 00:06:36,766 --> 00:06:38,366 a person who would watch what you are watching, 92 00:06:38,366 --> 00:06:42,600 your emails, your encrypted communication, everything. 93 00:06:42,600 --> 00:06:44,933 So, once you are infected, you're trapped. 94 00:06:44,933 --> 00:06:46,933 ♪ ♪ 95 00:06:48,466 --> 00:06:52,333 Hello? Can you hear me? I can hear you. 96 00:06:52,333 --> 00:06:54,100 I don't see you. 97 00:06:54,100 --> 00:06:55,700 Hello. Hello, Paul. 98 00:06:55,700 --> 00:06:57,466 Hello, Laurent. Hi, Dana. 99 00:06:57,466 --> 00:06:59,233 (on laptop): Hi, how are you? 100 00:06:59,233 --> 00:07:01,433 Hi, Dana. Good, and you? 101 00:07:01,433 --> 00:07:03,733 We decided to reach out to some partners; 102 00:07:03,733 --> 00:07:05,166 "The Washington Post," "The Guardian," 103 00:07:05,166 --> 00:07:07,400 and many other ones. 104 00:07:07,400 --> 00:07:10,300 We wanted to tell you about some information we have 105 00:07:10,300 --> 00:07:11,733 and about a new project we are starting. 106 00:07:11,733 --> 00:07:15,433 We had no names attached to the numbers. 107 00:07:15,433 --> 00:07:17,333 We needed more journalists. 108 00:07:17,333 --> 00:07:19,100 We needed reporters on the ground 109 00:07:19,100 --> 00:07:21,133 who could reach out to some victims. 110 00:07:21,133 --> 00:07:23,200 We need people with tech expertise. 111 00:07:23,200 --> 00:07:26,366 We still have to identify numbers. 112 00:07:26,366 --> 00:07:27,633 Many of them actually haven't been identified yet. 113 00:07:27,633 --> 00:07:30,566 So we'll need your help on this. 114 00:07:30,566 --> 00:07:32,333 The moment they mentioned 115 00:07:32,333 --> 00:07:33,966 the numbers of phone numbers that they had, 116 00:07:33,966 --> 00:07:35,866 the quantity of phone numbers, 117 00:07:35,866 --> 00:07:38,000 tens of thousands, 118 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:40,033 I mean, my jaw just hit the floor. 119 00:07:40,033 --> 00:07:42,533 There is a lot that concern India. 120 00:07:42,533 --> 00:07:44,100 (on cellphone): Ah. 121 00:07:44,100 --> 00:07:45,900 Some people in Mexico. 122 00:07:45,900 --> 00:07:47,400 Information about Hungary. 123 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,000 Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 124 00:07:50,000 --> 00:07:51,933 If Forbidden Stories have got 125 00:07:51,933 --> 00:07:54,533 data that can identify 126 00:07:54,533 --> 00:07:57,266 not just who the customers of NSO are, 127 00:07:57,266 --> 00:07:58,300 but potentially point in the direction of 128 00:07:58,300 --> 00:08:01,200 who the targets are as well, 129 00:08:01,200 --> 00:08:03,033 this is a game changer. 130 00:08:03,033 --> 00:08:05,033 This could be transformative 131 00:08:05,033 --> 00:08:06,800 in terms of our understanding of 132 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:09,633 the whole cyber surveillance industry. 133 00:08:09,633 --> 00:08:13,633 I specialize in national security reporting. 134 00:08:13,633 --> 00:08:18,866 So surveillance is part of my beat, so to speak. 135 00:08:18,866 --> 00:08:22,766 You could see patterns starting to emerge 136 00:08:22,766 --> 00:08:26,166 and you could almost like touch, okay, that might be a story. 137 00:08:26,166 --> 00:08:28,366 You know, here's something that's happening 138 00:08:28,366 --> 00:08:30,633 in Azerbaijan that might be a story. 139 00:08:30,633 --> 00:08:33,333 Okay, I see what the Moroccan story might be. 140 00:08:33,333 --> 00:08:36,200 It's like watching a photo emerge in a darkroom. 141 00:08:39,133 --> 00:08:42,733 We will shortly be arriving at Elephant & Castle. 142 00:08:42,733 --> 00:08:44,666 Change here for the Bakerloo and Northern lines. 143 00:08:47,900 --> 00:08:50,333 We at the "Guardian" have been reporting about NSO 144 00:08:50,333 --> 00:08:51,833 for a long time. 145 00:08:51,833 --> 00:08:53,566 We thought it was really important 146 00:08:53,566 --> 00:08:55,233 to hold this company to account. 147 00:08:55,233 --> 00:08:57,466 Israel has become a world leader in this industry 148 00:08:57,466 --> 00:09:00,766 and exports these tools all over the world. 149 00:09:00,766 --> 00:09:04,266 And, if you like, NSO Group was in many ways, you know, 150 00:09:04,266 --> 00:09:06,633 the jewel in the crown. 151 00:09:06,633 --> 00:09:10,333 The NSO Group was recently valued at $1 billion. 152 00:09:10,333 --> 00:09:12,166 It is one of the most successful companies 153 00:09:12,166 --> 00:09:14,133 in Israel's start-up space. 154 00:09:14,133 --> 00:09:15,966 NSO says they sell the software 155 00:09:15,966 --> 00:09:17,466 to governments around the world 156 00:09:17,466 --> 00:09:19,100 for legitimate purposes-- 157 00:09:19,100 --> 00:09:23,800 fighting terrorism, or violating local laws. 158 00:09:23,800 --> 00:09:27,900 Here was a company founded by three guys in 2010, 159 00:09:27,900 --> 00:09:31,033 that claim to have 40 countries around the world 160 00:09:31,033 --> 00:09:33,100 buying its technology. 161 00:09:33,100 --> 00:09:37,066 That made bold claims about its technology being used 162 00:09:37,066 --> 00:09:39,200 to solve serious crimes 163 00:09:39,200 --> 00:09:42,566 and help facilitate national security enquiries. 164 00:09:42,566 --> 00:09:44,033 This was a big deal. 165 00:09:59,033 --> 00:10:01,766 I can tell you on the last ten years, we only found 166 00:10:01,766 --> 00:10:05,400 three cases of misuse 167 00:10:05,400 --> 00:10:07,533 and we took very serious action 168 00:10:07,533 --> 00:10:10,666 that we are always taking. 169 00:10:10,666 --> 00:10:12,766 And these serious actions meant 170 00:10:12,766 --> 00:10:15,000 that we shut down the system completely. 171 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:19,266 We only sell it to governments or to entities that we know 172 00:10:19,266 --> 00:10:22,100 or we want to believe that they will not misuse the tools. 173 00:10:22,100 --> 00:10:24,366 And this is how we check the customer. 174 00:10:24,366 --> 00:10:26,266 This is how we diligence them. 175 00:10:26,266 --> 00:10:28,466 We have all the mechanism to make sure that they are not 176 00:10:28,466 --> 00:10:29,833 misusing the systems. 177 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:48,900 In the middle of Paris, 178 00:10:48,900 --> 00:10:51,966 in the middle of this big COVID crisis, 179 00:10:51,966 --> 00:10:54,500 we got everyone together 180 00:10:54,500 --> 00:10:56,866   to plan the investigation. 181 00:10:56,866 --> 00:10:59,833 Thank you. Sorry about that. 182 00:10:59,833 --> 00:11:02,966 I'm Dana Priest at the "Washington Post" 183 00:11:02,966 --> 00:11:05,000 and this is Craig Timberg who's joining me. 184 00:11:05,000 --> 00:11:07,600 This is Carmen Aristegui and Sebastién Barragán 185 00:11:07,600 --> 00:11:08,933 from "Aristegui Noticias." 186 00:11:08,933 --> 00:11:11,666 This is Paul Lewis from the "Guardian." 187 00:11:11,666 --> 00:11:13,600 And Steph, many of you will know, 188 00:11:13,600 --> 00:11:15,333 writes a lot about NSO. 189 00:11:15,333 --> 00:11:17,333 This is the "Le Monde" corner. 190 00:11:17,333 --> 00:11:19,566 This is Martin, Christophe, and I'm Damien. 191 00:11:19,566 --> 00:11:22,133 Usually, we see 192 00:11:22,133 --> 00:11:24,766 reporters at other news organizations as our rivals. 193 00:11:24,766 --> 00:11:27,100 We compete against them. 194 00:11:27,100 --> 00:11:30,400 We never want to share information with them because, 195 00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:32,733 you know, we want to keep our stories to ourselves. 196 00:11:32,733 --> 00:11:34,766 And this is just a different way of operating. 197 00:11:34,766 --> 00:11:37,333 This seeing other journalists as partners. 198 00:11:37,333 --> 00:11:39,566 We are really one group. 199 00:11:39,566 --> 00:11:43,600 One group with one goal-- publish those complex stories... 200 00:11:43,600 --> 00:11:45,700 (voiceover): We worked with more than 80 journalists. 201 00:11:45,700 --> 00:11:48,833 And we set a publication date of July 2021 202 00:11:48,833 --> 00:11:52,466 that gave us about a year to investigate the list. 203 00:11:57,633 --> 00:12:01,933 The main task for us and for all the partners was to identify 204 00:12:01,933 --> 00:12:03,933 the names behind the phone numbers. 205 00:12:03,933 --> 00:12:05,600 That was crucial. 206 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:07,266 With phone numbers only we can do nothing. 207 00:12:07,266 --> 00:12:09,566 The data is the beginning of the project. 208 00:12:09,566 --> 00:12:12,033 We need to find sources. We need to go on the field. 209 00:12:12,033 --> 00:12:15,033 This project is about who is spying on who in many countries, 210 00:12:15,033 --> 00:12:18,100 and those countries, most of them are very dangerous. 211 00:12:18,100 --> 00:12:20,766 ♪ ♪ 212 00:12:20,766 --> 00:12:23,433 We had a kaleidoscope of potential victims. 213 00:12:23,433 --> 00:12:25,100 We have the data, but how do we prove 214 00:12:25,100 --> 00:12:27,033 that Pegasus was on the phones? 215 00:12:27,033 --> 00:12:29,166 And that was always going to be the hardest thing 216 00:12:29,166 --> 00:12:32,100 about this project, which was we had data, 217 00:12:32,100 --> 00:12:33,566 which is a very good indication 218 00:12:33,566 --> 00:12:36,100 of who the persons of interest were to these 219 00:12:36,100 --> 00:12:39,233 government clients of NSO, but we couldn't know 220 00:12:39,233 --> 00:12:41,700 whether a phone had been hacked 221 00:12:41,700 --> 00:12:44,033 unless we conducted forensics on it. 222 00:12:44,033 --> 00:12:49,200 ♪ ♪ 223 00:12:56,000 --> 00:12:58,100 Claudio Guarnieri is the head 224 00:12:58,100 --> 00:13:00,266 of Amnesty International's Security Lab. 225 00:13:00,266 --> 00:13:01,800 He worked on 226 00:13:01,800 --> 00:13:05,200 creating a methodology, a platform that we could use 227 00:13:05,200 --> 00:13:07,566 during our investigation 228 00:13:07,566 --> 00:13:10,466 to have phones analyzed. 229 00:13:10,466 --> 00:13:14,033 He's a key element of that investigation. 230 00:13:14,033 --> 00:13:18,233 Without his expertise, nobody in our team 231 00:13:18,233 --> 00:13:22,200 would have been able to detect traces of Pegasus in a phone. 232 00:13:22,200 --> 00:13:26,000 It's a piece of code that look very similarly 233 00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:29,233 to all the others that you are running on your phone, 234 00:13:29,233 --> 00:13:31,266 and it's just designed to do something that it shouldn't. 235 00:13:31,266 --> 00:13:34,900 Pegasus access files on the device, 236 00:13:34,900 --> 00:13:37,700 access and records on the device, 237 00:13:37,700 --> 00:13:42,100 being from WhatsApp, being from the SMS database 238 00:13:42,100 --> 00:13:44,433 that you have on the phone, 239 00:13:44,433 --> 00:13:47,100 or access on the GPS of the device, 240 00:13:47,100 --> 00:13:49,033 record the audio, access the webcam. 241 00:13:49,033 --> 00:13:50,866 These kinds of things. 242 00:13:50,866 --> 00:13:55,400 Apple and companies like it try to create as many layers 243 00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:57,400 of complication as possible for an attacker. 244 00:13:57,400 --> 00:13:59,033 But the unfortunate reality is 245 00:13:59,033 --> 00:14:02,166 that against capabilities like those 246 00:14:02,166 --> 00:14:04,633 that Pegasus customers have, 247 00:14:04,633 --> 00:14:06,000 there's not much you can do 248 00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:08,033 from a digital security perspective. 249 00:14:08,033 --> 00:14:11,966 You can't really stop them meaningfully. 250 00:14:11,966 --> 00:14:14,600 You can only try to make it more complicated. 251 00:14:14,600 --> 00:14:21,733 ♪ ♪ 252 00:14:29,000 --> 00:14:34,500 (indistinct chatter) 253 00:14:34,500 --> 00:14:38,133 At some point we discover 254 00:14:38,133 --> 00:14:40,300 very crucial information; 255 00:14:40,300 --> 00:14:43,200 an information that change entirely the project. 256 00:14:43,200 --> 00:14:48,366 For years we heard rumors about the Pegasus spyware 257 00:14:48,366 --> 00:14:50,000 might have been used against 258 00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:53,966 Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed in 2018 259 00:14:53,966 --> 00:14:57,200 in the consulate of the Saudis in Istanbul. 260 00:14:57,200 --> 00:15:01,600 ♪ ♪ 261 00:15:03,200 --> 00:15:05,066 The minute we found out about this list, 262 00:15:05,066 --> 00:15:07,900 the first thing we all did was to check 263 00:15:07,900 --> 00:15:11,933 for any numbers related to Jamal Khashoggi 264 00:15:11,933 --> 00:15:16,166 or anyone we knew who was associated with him. 265 00:15:16,166 --> 00:15:20,366 And right away, we found two numbers 266 00:15:20,366 --> 00:15:25,066 associated with the two women closest to him in his life. 267 00:15:29,300 --> 00:15:32,200 Jamal Khashoggi's murder, 268 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:40,066 really in the history of the "Post," stands out. 269 00:15:40,066 --> 00:15:43,566 He was an opinion writer for the "Washington Post." 270 00:15:43,566 --> 00:15:47,700 Very gentle, soft-spoken man. 271 00:15:47,700 --> 00:15:50,266 His voice became very important 272 00:15:50,266 --> 00:15:54,500 because he was the single most important dissident 273 00:15:54,500 --> 00:15:56,533 writing about the Saudi regime. 274 00:15:56,533 --> 00:15:57,966 Jamal, let me start with you. 275 00:15:57,966 --> 00:16:01,266 You've compared your crown prince to Putin, 276 00:16:01,266 --> 00:16:02,366 to Iran's supreme leader. 277 00:16:02,366 --> 00:16:03,833 You've said he's creating, 278 00:16:03,833 --> 00:16:04,933 "an interesting form of dictatorship." 279 00:16:04,933 --> 00:16:06,500 How so? 280 00:16:06,500 --> 00:16:10,333 I still see him as a reformer but he is gathering all power 281 00:16:10,333 --> 00:16:11,666 within his hand. 282 00:16:14,533 --> 00:16:16,766 As we speak today, 283 00:16:16,766 --> 00:16:19,033 there are Saudi intellectuals and journalists jailed. 284 00:16:19,033 --> 00:16:21,866 His murder was so cold blooded. 285 00:16:21,866 --> 00:16:24,166 And we, we still don't have the whole story. 286 00:16:27,066 --> 00:16:30,466 Jamal went to the consulate in Istanbul 287 00:16:30,466 --> 00:16:33,233 and then he disappeared. 288 00:16:34,566 --> 00:16:35,866 Senior Turkish officials 289 00:16:35,866 --> 00:16:38,566 have reported that he is in fact in the building 290 00:16:38,566 --> 00:16:41,533 and he is still here. 291 00:16:41,533 --> 00:16:44,333 His close friends and family are still trying to figure out 292 00:16:44,333 --> 00:16:46,133 what this situation is. 293 00:16:46,133 --> 00:16:47,566 They're waiting on an official statement. 294 00:16:47,566 --> 00:16:49,800 I spoke to his fiancée who was also here who told us 295 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:52,200 that they came here to issue a number of documents 296 00:16:52,200 --> 00:16:53,866 so they could marry. 297 00:16:53,866 --> 00:16:58,700 They dispatched an assassination team 298 00:16:58,700 --> 00:17:01,433 that landed in a plane in the, in the airport, 299 00:17:01,433 --> 00:17:04,566 and came in cars 300 00:17:04,566 --> 00:17:08,533 with tools to hack him up, 301 00:17:08,533 --> 00:17:11,666 hack his bones, and carry him out 302 00:17:11,666 --> 00:17:14,366 in a suitcase or suitcases. 303 00:17:14,366 --> 00:17:15,366 (scoffs) 304 00:17:15,366 --> 00:17:19,366 ♪ ♪ 305 00:17:19,366 --> 00:17:21,200 Pretty soon after his murder, people started asking, 306 00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:24,366 was Pegasus used against Jamal? 307 00:17:29,000 --> 00:17:30,666 The word is that 308 00:17:30,666 --> 00:17:32,700 you sold Pegasus to them 309 00:17:32,700 --> 00:17:36,300 and then they turned it around to get Kashoggi. 310 00:17:36,300 --> 00:17:38,300 Khashoggi's murder is horrible. 311 00:17:38,300 --> 00:17:39,666 Really horrible. 312 00:17:39,666 --> 00:17:45,766 And therefore when I first heard the accusations 313 00:17:45,766 --> 00:17:49,600 that our technology had been used on Jamal Khashoggi 314 00:17:49,600 --> 00:17:54,833 or on his relatives, I started an immediate check about it. 315 00:17:54,833 --> 00:17:57,300 And I can tell you, very clear, 316 00:17:57,300 --> 00:18:02,100 we had nothing to do with this horrible murder. 317 00:18:09,500 --> 00:18:13,133 ♪ ♪ 318 00:18:13,133 --> 00:18:15,666 I'm hoping that Hatice, Kashoggi's fiancée, 319 00:18:15,666 --> 00:18:18,866 who we'd all gotten to know on television 320 00:18:18,866 --> 00:18:21,000 because she was outside the consulate 321 00:18:21,000 --> 00:18:23,533 when he didn't reappear, 322 00:18:23,533 --> 00:18:27,633 I'm hoping that Hatice will let us do forensics 323 00:18:27,633 --> 00:18:29,666 on her phone to see for certain 324 00:18:29,666 --> 00:18:33,700 whether she was targeted, and maybe if we get lucky, 325 00:18:33,700 --> 00:18:36,033 whether we can see what they took out of her phone. 326 00:18:36,033 --> 00:18:38,500 ♪ ♪ 327 00:18:55,266 --> 00:18:57,500 They killed my future. 328 00:18:57,500 --> 00:18:58,800 They killed my life. 329 00:19:01,566 --> 00:19:04,500 I felt inside me something changed and broke. 330 00:19:08,266 --> 00:19:14,133 Do you feel like your phone is doing anything strange? 331 00:19:14,133 --> 00:19:16,433 Do you think it could be hacked? 332 00:19:16,433 --> 00:19:17,800 We can test it 333 00:19:17,800 --> 00:19:21,066 so we could do that if, if you wanted to do it? 334 00:19:21,066 --> 00:19:22,900 We... Okay, you can do that. 335 00:19:22,900 --> 00:19:25,066 Okay, that'd be great. 336 00:19:25,066 --> 00:19:27,333 We just need to plug your phone into our computer. 337 00:19:27,333 --> 00:19:29,466 Okay. So maybe we do that. 338 00:19:29,466 --> 00:19:31,033 Great. 339 00:19:31,033 --> 00:19:33,600 (birds twittering) 340 00:19:42,366 --> 00:19:44,066 (on speakerphone): Hello? 341 00:19:44,066 --> 00:19:46,166 Claudio? 342 00:19:46,166 --> 00:19:47,500 All right. 343 00:19:47,500 --> 00:19:49,233 It's Dana. 344 00:19:49,233 --> 00:19:50,566 Hi. How are you? 345 00:19:50,566 --> 00:19:53,133 I don't know, you tell me. 346 00:19:53,133 --> 00:19:56,733 So I checked both the uploads. 347 00:19:56,733 --> 00:19:59,400 The new one seems clean. 348 00:19:59,400 --> 00:20:01,600 The old one, however, has some traces 349 00:20:01,600 --> 00:20:04,033 on the 6th of October 2018 350 00:20:04,033 --> 00:20:07,966 seems to have been a first compromise. 351 00:20:07,966 --> 00:20:12,233 Which was followed by some additional traces on the ninth. 352 00:20:12,233 --> 00:20:13,466 And then on the 12th. 353 00:20:13,466 --> 00:20:14,666 There is also an additional record 354 00:20:14,666 --> 00:20:17,766 in June of 2019. 355 00:20:17,766 --> 00:20:21,033 But that seems to be probably a failed attempt 356 00:20:21,033 --> 00:20:23,833 and I don't see anything following that. 357 00:20:23,833 --> 00:20:25,200 Okay. 358 00:20:28,433 --> 00:20:30,733 The analysis proved that the phone belonging 359 00:20:30,733 --> 00:20:34,633 to Jamal Kashoggi's fiancée had been infected with Pegasus. 360 00:20:36,966 --> 00:20:38,500 Then we find out the date, 361 00:20:38,500 --> 00:20:40,933 which is four days after his murder, 362 00:20:40,933 --> 00:20:44,366 when she's still trying to figure out what's happening. 363 00:20:46,733 --> 00:20:50,366 And it just seemed like such a ballsy move 364 00:20:50,366 --> 00:20:52,666 to surveil the person 365 00:20:52,666 --> 00:20:57,566 who has become the public face of his disappearance. 366 00:20:57,566 --> 00:21:02,833 ♪ ♪ 367 00:21:15,366 --> 00:21:19,033 We learned that Jamal had a complicated personal life. 368 00:21:20,900 --> 00:21:24,000 Hanan Atr is probably 369 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:27,833 the least known character in Jamal Khashoggi's life. 370 00:21:27,833 --> 00:21:30,200 She's actually his wife. 371 00:21:30,200 --> 00:21:32,066 And most people have not heard of her. 372 00:21:32,066 --> 00:21:37,733 He had secretly married in the United States 373 00:21:37,733 --> 00:21:41,833 in an Islamic ceremony. 374 00:21:41,833 --> 00:21:45,600 What I discovered is Hanan is living in hiding 375 00:21:45,600 --> 00:21:46,933 in the United States 376 00:21:46,933 --> 00:21:51,133 while she waits for her political asylum case. 377 00:21:57,600 --> 00:22:01,533 She was a flight attendant for Emirate Airlines, 378 00:22:01,533 --> 00:22:03,200 and so she flew all over the world, 379 00:22:03,200 --> 00:22:05,600 and she was communicating with him on foreign phones. 380 00:22:05,600 --> 00:22:09,100 ♪ ♪ 381 00:22:11,566 --> 00:22:14,366 He was so happy and I was so happy as well. 382 00:22:17,933 --> 00:22:21,833 This is in his birthday in the restaurant in Washington, 383 00:22:21,833 --> 00:22:24,300 and his friend Maggie behind us, 384 00:22:24,300 --> 00:22:26,366 is the one she made the birthday party. 385 00:22:26,366 --> 00:22:30,800 This all of his friends around us. 386 00:22:30,800 --> 00:22:33,300 This last birthday in his life. 387 00:22:35,066 --> 00:22:38,033 He was careful, but he didn't realize 388 00:22:38,033 --> 00:22:40,133 maybe my device is much dangerous, 389 00:22:40,133 --> 00:22:41,633 and I didn't know as well. 390 00:22:41,633 --> 00:22:44,566 He suspect, but he's not sure, and I am not sure as well. 391 00:22:47,966 --> 00:22:54,066 She allowed me to download her phone 392 00:22:54,066 --> 00:22:59,433 to send a copy to Claudio and to Bill Marczak at Citizen Lab, 393 00:22:59,433 --> 00:23:02,000 who also conducts forensic analysis. 394 00:23:08,366 --> 00:23:10,566 What I did is I analyzed 395 00:23:10,566 --> 00:23:14,533 all the available data on two Android phones 396 00:23:14,533 --> 00:23:17,233 and, and one laptop belonging to Hanan. 397 00:23:17,233 --> 00:23:21,400 On one of the phones, it appears that there were 398 00:23:21,400 --> 00:23:25,200 two separate links to the Pegasus spyware 399 00:23:25,200 --> 00:23:26,933 that were actually opened. 400 00:23:26,933 --> 00:23:30,600 Before Jamal's murder, Hanan had been detained and 401 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:35,866 interrogated in the United Arab Emirates, which is of course 402 00:23:35,866 --> 00:23:37,933 a close ally of Saudi Arabia. 403 00:23:39,166 --> 00:23:43,800 They took me to a office in the airport. 404 00:23:43,800 --> 00:23:45,833 Then they took me to my house. 405 00:23:45,833 --> 00:23:47,066 They searched the whole house. 406 00:23:47,066 --> 00:23:50,033 They take my devices, my family devices. 407 00:23:50,033 --> 00:23:51,366 They have the password. 408 00:23:51,366 --> 00:23:55,000 I was in investigation for 17 hours, 409 00:23:55,000 --> 00:23:57,233 until I got tired, I slept on the floor. 410 00:23:57,233 --> 00:24:00,966 What Bill discovered 411 00:24:00,966 --> 00:24:05,333 was when she was detained at the U.A.E. airport, 412 00:24:05,333 --> 00:24:08,400 somebody who took her phone 413 00:24:08,400 --> 00:24:11,300 then opened a browser on her phone, 414 00:24:11,300 --> 00:24:12,766 and then typed in a URL 415 00:24:12,766 --> 00:24:19,033 that then directed the phone to a website known to Citizen Lab 416 00:24:19,033 --> 00:24:24,033 as being a Pegasus website that activates the infection. 417 00:24:24,033 --> 00:24:27,666 The link to Pegasus was actually typed into 418 00:24:27,666 --> 00:24:30,233 the web browser, character by character. 419 00:24:30,233 --> 00:24:32,633 They made a couple of typos actually while they were 420 00:24:32,633 --> 00:24:34,933 doing it which tells me it was done manually. 421 00:24:36,766 --> 00:24:39,766 We have the smoking gun from Hanan's phone 422 00:24:39,766 --> 00:24:42,266 which is the traces of the spyware. 423 00:24:42,266 --> 00:24:44,800 You know, almost certainly the spyware was installed 424 00:24:44,800 --> 00:24:48,333 and exfiltrated information from, from her phone. 425 00:24:48,333 --> 00:24:51,333 So she was, in my view, monitored. 426 00:24:54,066 --> 00:24:55,800 He was telling me what he's doing, 427 00:24:55,800 --> 00:24:58,033 and what his connection, what his movement, 428 00:24:58,033 --> 00:25:00,200 what is his state of mind. 429 00:25:00,200 --> 00:25:02,200 So you were communicating with him. 430 00:25:02,200 --> 00:25:03,966 A lot. 431 00:25:03,966 --> 00:25:07,566 They tracked my husband through me, a long time back, 432 00:25:07,566 --> 00:25:09,566 before they kill him 433 00:25:09,566 --> 00:25:11,866 because he was telling me, only me, everything. 434 00:25:11,866 --> 00:25:15,000 ♪ ♪ 435 00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:17,200 I didn't know this much they track him through me 436 00:25:17,200 --> 00:25:18,966 all the time. 437 00:25:18,966 --> 00:25:20,566 Mm-hmm. Yeah. 438 00:25:20,566 --> 00:25:23,333 Why is this all come in my life? 439 00:25:23,333 --> 00:25:26,700 They did track Jamal, and to kill him through me, 440 00:25:26,700 --> 00:25:28,200 long time back. 441 00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:31,733 ♪ ♪ 442 00:25:47,566 --> 00:25:52,500 ♪ ♪ 443 00:26:07,233 --> 00:26:09,400 Getting evidence on the device of Hanan, 444 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:11,033 on the device of Hatice, 445 00:26:11,033 --> 00:26:12,700 all of that was breaking 446 00:26:12,700 --> 00:26:16,400 the narrative of the C.E.O. of NSO Group 447 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:19,433 who told to the press that that spyware 448 00:26:19,433 --> 00:26:22,900 were never used against the... Jamal or the relatives of Jamal. 449 00:26:22,900 --> 00:26:27,900 ♪ ♪ 450 00:26:32,600 --> 00:26:33,766 In the list, 451 00:26:33,766 --> 00:26:37,300 we saw more than 15,000 Mexican numbers. 452 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:42,900 Mexico was among the very first customers 453 00:26:42,900 --> 00:26:44,100 of the NSO Group. 454 00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:51,633 One of Mexico's best-known journalists is Carmen Aristegui 455 00:26:51,633 --> 00:26:53,766 and she was part of our investigation. 456 00:26:53,766 --> 00:26:55,800 ♪ ♪ 457 00:26:58,800 --> 00:27:01,533 She has maybe more followers 458 00:27:01,533 --> 00:27:03,766 than the president of Mexico. 459 00:27:03,766 --> 00:27:06,500 And we needed to understand 460 00:27:06,500 --> 00:27:09,500 who those phone numbers in Mexico belongs to. 461 00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:16,633 (phone chiming) 462 00:27:16,633 --> 00:27:18,066 CARMEN: Hola. 463 00:27:18,066 --> 00:27:19,366 Hola, Carmen, es Arthuro de "Forbidden Stories." 464 00:27:19,366 --> 00:27:20,700 ¿Cómo estás? 465 00:27:20,700 --> 00:27:22,966 CARMEN: ¿Cómo estás? Qué gusto. 466 00:27:22,966 --> 00:27:28,000 Forbidden tuvo un universo de más de 50,000 números, 467 00:27:28,000 --> 00:27:31,100 pero había que saber de quién eran esos números. 468 00:27:31,100 --> 00:27:34,633 Se tenía que investigar uno por uno. 469 00:27:34,633 --> 00:27:37,366 ARTHUR: Y, Carmen, hay muchos contactos de tu teléfono 470 00:27:37,366 --> 00:27:38,800 en nuestra lista. 471 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:41,066 CARMEN: Uf. Okey. 472 00:27:41,066 --> 00:27:43,933 ARTHUR: Lo que, lo que podemos hacer ahora 473 00:27:43,933 --> 00:27:47,000 es que puedes entrar los números en tu teléfono 474 00:27:47,000 --> 00:27:50,633 para decirme a quién pertenecen los números. 475 00:27:50,633 --> 00:27:52,266 CARMEN: Así lo vamos a hacer. 476 00:27:53,266 --> 00:27:55,200 (muttering) 477 00:27:56,866 --> 00:27:59,266 Tengo un directorio nutrido 478 00:27:59,266 --> 00:28:02,233 y entonces ese directorio lo cruzamos 479 00:28:02,233 --> 00:28:06,000 con los números de Forbidden y los números de mi directorio. 480 00:28:07,266 --> 00:28:11,233 El tercero es, Sandra Nogales 481 00:28:11,233 --> 00:28:13,700 que por muchos años fue mi asistente. 482 00:28:14,866 --> 00:28:18,033 !¡¡Ah, caray! Tengo aquí una sorpresa. 483 00:28:18,033 --> 00:28:22,000 El séptimo número corresponde a Karina Maciel. 484 00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:25,366 Karina Maciel es la productora de mi programa 485 00:28:25,366 --> 00:28:29,300 en la cadena de televisión CNN en México. 486 00:28:29,300 --> 00:28:31,766 Otro colega periodista 487 00:28:31,766 --> 00:28:35,566 de la revista Processo, Alejadro Caballero. 488 00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:40,433 Al cruzar, empezaron a salir nombres, nombres, nombres, 489 00:28:40,433 --> 00:28:43,233 nombres, nombres y nosotros decíamos: 490 00:28:43,233 --> 00:28:45,366 ¿hasta dónde va a terminar esto? 491 00:28:46,866 --> 00:28:50,700 Ah, caray, el que sigue es Alejandro Encinas, 492 00:28:50,700 --> 00:28:57,033 es un muy importante político de la izquierda. 493 00:28:57,033 --> 00:29:02,466 Y estaban ahí políticos, diplomáticos, abogados, 494 00:29:02,466 --> 00:29:07,233 periodistas, activistas, defensores de derechos humanos. 495 00:29:07,233 --> 00:29:09,533 Ah, caray. (laughs) 496 00:29:09,533 --> 00:29:14,033 Bueno, aquí te puedo decir que está mi hermana. 497 00:29:14,033 --> 00:29:18,066 Aquí aparece mi hermana, Teresa Aristegui Flores. 498 00:29:19,900 --> 00:29:22,633 Es mi hermana, pero no está relacionada 499 00:29:22,633 --> 00:29:25,333 con ninguna actividad pública. 500 00:29:27,266 --> 00:29:31,600 Yo intuyo que aquí nadie se salva, 501 00:29:31,600 --> 00:29:35,300 Si hicieron esto, imagínate, ya perdieron el pudor. 502 00:29:35,300 --> 00:29:38,666 ÓÓsea, pudieron haber espiado a su gato, ¿no? 503 00:29:38,666 --> 00:29:41,466 A su perro, al canario. 504 00:29:41,466 --> 00:29:43,866 (laughs) ÓÓsea... 505 00:29:43,866 --> 00:29:46,166 ¿Estás de acuerdo? A su propia familia. 506 00:29:52,833 --> 00:29:54,233 We knew 507 00:29:54,233 --> 00:29:56,133 from a previous investigation that Carmen's phone 508 00:29:56,133 --> 00:30:00,300 was heavily targeted with Pegasus in 2015 and 2016. 509 00:30:04,400 --> 00:30:07,933 So from that date, she is still investigating 510 00:30:07,933 --> 00:30:10,366 NSO Group, the Pegasus spyware 511 00:30:10,366 --> 00:30:13,733 or the agents and operators who are using that in Mexico. 512 00:30:14,833 --> 00:30:17,166 CARMEN: Durante los años que fui espiada, 513 00:30:17,166 --> 00:30:18,700 estuvimos realizando investigaciones 514 00:30:18,700 --> 00:30:20,733 periodísticas importantes para México 515 00:30:20,733 --> 00:30:23,933 relacionadas con la Casa Blanca 516 00:30:23,933 --> 00:30:25,633 del presidente Enrique Peña Nieto. 517 00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:35,066 Una casa en un barrio muy lujoso de la Ciudad de México, 518 00:30:35,066 --> 00:30:38,600 en posesión del presidente de México, de Enrique Peña Nieto, 519 00:30:38,600 --> 00:30:40,733 y de su familia, que no podían explicar. 520 00:30:43,266 --> 00:30:47,033 Que desde luego no podía haber obtenido el presidente 521 00:30:47,033 --> 00:30:49,466 con los ingresos que el presidente 522 00:30:49,466 --> 00:30:52,600 pudo haber tenido como presidente, como gobernador 523 00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,233 o como hijo de una familia de clase media. 524 00:30:58,433 --> 00:31:02,366 ♪ ♪ 525 00:31:04,366 --> 00:31:09,700 Es que yo sospecho que mi teléfono está intervenido 526 00:31:09,700 --> 00:31:12,700 y el teléfono de mi hijo Emilio está intervenido 527 00:31:12,700 --> 00:31:17,466 es cuando Emilio, un chico menor de edad, me pregunta: 528 00:31:17,466 --> 00:31:20,300 "¿Oye, mamá, eh, tú sabes por qué recibo 529 00:31:20,300 --> 00:31:22,100 estos mensajes tan extraños?" 530 00:31:22,100 --> 00:31:25,500 Y yo le digo: "Yo también estoy recibiendo mensajes extraños." 531 00:31:28,300 --> 00:31:30,666 ♪ ♪ 532 00:31:30,666 --> 00:31:34,533 (chattering indistinctly) 533 00:31:36,366 --> 00:31:39,533 Que hicieras clic para ver algún problema 534 00:31:39,533 --> 00:31:41,100 de tu visa en Estados Unidos. 535 00:31:41,100 --> 00:31:43,733 Claro, claro, claro, ¿qué puede estar mal con tu visa, no? 536 00:31:43,733 --> 00:31:45,700 CARMEN: Sí, pero era imposible que no hicieras clic. 537 00:31:45,700 --> 00:31:47,800 A ver, yo veía mi visa y decía, 538 00:31:47,800 --> 00:31:51,233 pues que vigencia tiene... tiene. 539 00:31:51,233 --> 00:31:53,433 Fuera de la vigencia, ¿qué problema puede tener? 540 00:31:53,433 --> 00:31:55,600 Pero, sabe, es algo que es inevitable, 541 00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:57,500 que hagas un clic. Que les piques. 542 00:31:58,566 --> 00:32:03,566 Sabemos que Pegasus se vendió a la Procuraduría General 543 00:32:03,566 --> 00:32:06,933 de la República, se vendió Pegasus al Ejército, 544 00:32:06,933 --> 00:32:10,166 se vendió Pegasus al CISEN, al Sistema de Inteligencia, 545 00:32:10,166 --> 00:32:15,933 se vendió Pegasus a algunas instancias de caracter publico. 546 00:32:20,633 --> 00:32:22,866 SOURCE (voice distorted): No puedo decirles mi nombre. 547 00:32:25,733 --> 00:32:29,600 No puedo referir con exactitud la institución 548 00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:32,666 en la cual me desempeñé. 549 00:32:32,666 --> 00:32:37,400 Y puede resultar peligroso para mí la identificación 550 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:41,333 y el conocimiento de que yo tengo o tuve acceso 551 00:32:41,333 --> 00:32:43,166 a cierta información. 552 00:32:45,733 --> 00:32:50,100 El sistema Pegasus, pues era toda una novedad para nosotros. 553 00:32:50,100 --> 00:32:54,900 El procedimiento era tener el número objetivo, 554 00:32:54,900 --> 00:32:59,000 hacer lo que se denominaba la ingeniería social, 555 00:32:59,000 --> 00:33:03,933 que es búsqueda de información en fuentes abiertas 556 00:33:03,933 --> 00:33:09,900 del objetivo con la finalidad de elaborar mensajes de texto 557 00:33:09,900 --> 00:33:12,433 que pudieran ser enviados al dispositivo móvil. 558 00:33:14,066 --> 00:33:17,400 Debiera ser uno o dos intentos muy precisos 559 00:33:17,400 --> 00:33:20,533 con información que le resultara útil al objetivo 560 00:33:20,533 --> 00:33:22,766 y que este pudiera dar clic. 561 00:33:24,000 --> 00:33:29,200 Si lográbamos el éxito de que diera clic en el mensaje, 562 00:33:29,200 --> 00:33:33,166 eso automáticamente instalaba el software en el equipo móvil, 563 00:33:33,166 --> 00:33:37,000 y a partir de ahí, ya podíamos tener acceso al teléfono, 564 00:33:37,000 --> 00:33:38,333 a toda la información. 565 00:33:38,333 --> 00:33:41,500 Los resultados, pues, eran increíbles 566 00:33:41,500 --> 00:33:43,466 porque una vez que se lograba 567 00:33:43,466 --> 00:33:45,700 instalar infectar el dispositivo, 568 00:33:45,700 --> 00:33:49,266 se tenía acceso pleno al equipo móvil. 569 00:33:52,266 --> 00:33:55,600 Era una pantalla negra. 570 00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:58,033 En la parte superior izquierda teníamos 571 00:33:58,033 --> 00:34:00,266 la visualización principal 572 00:34:00,266 --> 00:34:04,533 y en la parte del lado derecho y abajo 573 00:34:04,533 --> 00:34:10,133 estaban, digamos, módulos o pestañas en donde se tenía 574 00:34:10,133 --> 00:34:14,933 cada una de las aplicaciones de las que se extraía información. 575 00:34:14,933 --> 00:34:18,500 Por ejemplo, teníamos el cuadro de la aplicación 576 00:34:18,500 --> 00:34:20,966 de WhatsApp, Telegram. 577 00:34:20,966 --> 00:34:26,000 Abajo teníamos los micrófonos, el micrófono, las cámaras, 578 00:34:26,000 --> 00:34:31,400 la geolocalización y dependiendo de lo que nos interesara, 579 00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:34,133 le dábamos clic y era lo que se proyectaba 580 00:34:34,133 --> 00:34:36,066 en la visualización principal. 581 00:34:38,133 --> 00:34:41,900 A partir de la infección cualquier información 582 00:34:41,900 --> 00:34:46,266 que sea eliminad podemos verla nosotros. 583 00:34:46,266 --> 00:34:49,166 Y a sea en fotos o conversaciones. 584 00:34:49,166 --> 00:34:51,933 Pero podemos seguir viéndolas. 585 00:34:57,100 --> 00:35:01,666 CARMEN: Cuando empiezas a saber qué cosa es Pegasus, 586 00:35:01,666 --> 00:35:03,100 te vas de espaldas. 587 00:35:04,333 --> 00:35:08,666 Quedas desnudo frente a un poder 588 00:35:08,666 --> 00:35:11,166 que no sabes quién detenta. 589 00:35:11,166 --> 00:35:15,500 Quedas vulnerable frente a alguien 590 00:35:15,500 --> 00:35:18,233 que está observándote bajo una lupa. 591 00:35:18,233 --> 00:35:22,100 Pueden estar contigo en la oficina, en la regadera, 592 00:35:22,100 --> 00:35:26,600 en la cocina con un amigo, con una fuente. 593 00:35:26,600 --> 00:35:29,266 Todo el tiempo. 594 00:35:32,966 --> 00:35:37,766 ♪ ♪ 595 00:35:53,933 --> 00:35:58,233 ♪ ♪ 596 00:35:58,233 --> 00:36:01,533 All the time during this investigation, 597 00:36:01,533 --> 00:36:04,500 we tried every day to identify 598 00:36:04,500 --> 00:36:07,600 the person behind that phone number. 599 00:36:07,600 --> 00:36:10,266 (indistinct phone chatter) 600 00:36:10,266 --> 00:36:12,233 This is what all the partners 601 00:36:12,233 --> 00:36:14,800 in Forbidden's team were doing most of the time. 602 00:36:14,800 --> 00:36:17,066 Basically, the consortium had access 603 00:36:17,066 --> 00:36:21,900 to a list of potential targets. 604 00:36:21,900 --> 00:36:23,500 Exactly. 605 00:36:23,500 --> 00:36:27,033 To be sure that you was indeed infected or surveilled, 606 00:36:27,033 --> 00:36:29,266 we would have to run forensic analysis. 607 00:37:13,166 --> 00:37:17,266 (gently): Of course, of course. 608 00:37:20,600 --> 00:37:22,533 (sighs) 609 00:37:24,433 --> 00:37:27,800 I saw one number in the list that belonged to a friend, 610 00:37:27,800 --> 00:37:29,900 a journalist in Azerbaijan. 611 00:37:35,233 --> 00:37:37,800 Her name is Khadija Ismayilova. 612 00:37:37,800 --> 00:37:40,633 She's an award-winning investigative reporter 613 00:37:40,633 --> 00:37:42,533 and an outspoken critic of the government, 614 00:37:42,533 --> 00:37:44,633 renowned for her exposés 615 00:37:44,633 --> 00:37:46,833 of corruption at the hands of the country's president. 616 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:50,566 Azerbaijan, you have a lot of oil and gas. 617 00:37:52,500 --> 00:37:54,433 It's a dictatorship. 618 00:37:54,433 --> 00:37:57,800 And the dictator's name is Ilham Aliyev. 619 00:37:57,800 --> 00:38:00,600 And this person and this state 620 00:38:00,600 --> 00:38:03,466 is extremely violent 621 00:38:03,466 --> 00:38:07,366 against dissidents, political opponents, journalists. 622 00:38:09,600 --> 00:38:13,200 I first met Khadija Ismayilova in Azerbaijan 623 00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:16,233 in about 2006, 2007. 624 00:38:17,500 --> 00:38:21,200 Khadija Ismayilova relentlessly kept on exposing 625 00:38:21,200 --> 00:38:25,000 the wrongdoing and the corruption of the Aliyev regime. 626 00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:27,533 She showed how, you know, 627 00:38:27,533 --> 00:38:29,400 they were having their hands 628 00:38:29,400 --> 00:38:33,100 into a big chunk of the Azerbaijani economy. 629 00:38:33,100 --> 00:38:36,200 She was showing how they were, you know, taking money 630 00:38:36,200 --> 00:38:37,800 in a covert way, 631 00:38:37,800 --> 00:38:39,733 how they were stealing money, basically, from the people. 632 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:44,366 (speaking Azerbaijani): 633 00:38:47,200 --> 00:38:50,100 (shouting) 634 00:38:52,866 --> 00:38:54,466 She kept on doing what she was doing. 635 00:38:54,466 --> 00:38:56,100 And she got arrested. 636 00:38:56,100 --> 00:38:58,733 She got thrown behind bars. 637 00:39:03,600 --> 00:39:06,000 After all this investigating reporting, 638 00:39:06,000 --> 00:39:08,833 Khadija became a prime target 639 00:39:08,833 --> 00:39:11,966 for the government in Baku and for the Aliyevs. 640 00:39:18,300 --> 00:39:22,366 I don't know how to, to proceed with Khadija, 641 00:39:22,366 --> 00:39:25,633 because I don't want us to put Khadija in danger. 642 00:39:25,633 --> 00:39:28,633 The thing that is quite difficult is how 643 00:39:28,633 --> 00:39:30,666 to get in touch with Khadija 644 00:39:30,666 --> 00:39:34,700 without communicating on electronic device. 645 00:39:34,700 --> 00:39:36,666 This is very sensitive, right? Yeah. 646 00:39:36,666 --> 00:39:39,433 This is very, very sensitive, especially for her, 647 00:39:39,433 --> 00:39:40,900 because she's basically on probation. 648 00:39:40,900 --> 00:39:43,766 That's gonna be a risk anyway. 649 00:39:43,766 --> 00:39:48,533 We learned that Khadija was about to go to Turkey 650 00:39:48,533 --> 00:39:53,366 for some personal reasons, and so we set up immediately a team 651 00:39:53,366 --> 00:39:55,833 who went to Turkey to meet Khadija 652 00:39:55,833 --> 00:39:58,033 once she landed in the airport. 653 00:40:02,066 --> 00:40:05,600 ♪ ♪ 654 00:40:20,233 --> 00:40:22,566 Now, I'm nervous. (chuckles) 655 00:40:22,566 --> 00:40:24,400 I'm nervous too. 656 00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:26,800 I cannot stand still. 657 00:40:28,933 --> 00:40:30,500 (sighs) 658 00:40:32,366 --> 00:40:35,366 There she is. Khadija! 659 00:40:37,433 --> 00:40:41,033 (laughs) 660 00:40:42,533 --> 00:40:45,600 So many years! 661 00:40:47,200 --> 00:40:50,533 (indistinct chatter) 662 00:40:57,600 --> 00:40:59,866 (indistinct chatter) 663 00:40:59,866 --> 00:41:01,633 It's a good size. 664 00:41:01,633 --> 00:41:04,533 We can take these off, right? 665 00:41:13,833 --> 00:41:18,233 So we have about 1,000 numbers from Azerbaijan 666 00:41:18,233 --> 00:41:20,866 and you're among them. Oh! 667 00:41:20,866 --> 00:41:22,566 And then we also have 668 00:41:22,566 --> 00:41:24,766 some people who are your friends. 669 00:41:24,766 --> 00:41:29,233 Okay, and what does that program do? 670 00:41:29,233 --> 00:41:32,733 So what the program does is, it basically, 671 00:41:32,733 --> 00:41:35,766 without you knowing, um, 672 00:41:35,766 --> 00:41:38,433 it installs things on your phone. (bleep) 673 00:41:38,433 --> 00:41:42,533 And then it allows... 674 00:41:42,533 --> 00:41:44,633 Even if I didn't click on anything? 675 00:41:44,633 --> 00:41:47,766 Yes, so the secrecy of this, it's called Pegasus, 676 00:41:47,766 --> 00:41:50,600 and the secrecy of it is that 677 00:41:50,600 --> 00:41:54,166 you don't actually see or you don't do anything. 678 00:41:54,166 --> 00:41:57,166 So before, you had to click on something, to be infected. 679 00:41:57,166 --> 00:42:00,466 In this case, it all happens in the background, 680 00:42:00,466 --> 00:42:03,500 and you have no idea that you are infected. 681 00:42:03,500 --> 00:42:05,266 (bleep) And when you're infected, 682 00:42:05,266 --> 00:42:07,300 it's transmitting your messages 683 00:42:07,300 --> 00:42:10,600 your images, everything that's happening on your phone, 684 00:42:10,600 --> 00:42:14,500 including on signal, because they have the phone itself. 685 00:42:14,500 --> 00:42:16,466 And it's legal to sell it? 686 00:42:16,466 --> 00:42:21,033 Yes, so what we know is that most likely, 687 00:42:21,033 --> 00:42:24,433 sometimes in 2018, the government got it. 688 00:42:24,433 --> 00:42:27,600 Okay. And we have a lot of data 689 00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:29,500 from 2019. 690 00:42:29,500 --> 00:42:32,600 And, you know, that was a big year of protest. 691 00:42:32,600 --> 00:42:34,100 You were on a hunger strike with other people. 692 00:42:34,100 --> 00:42:35,466 Yeah, yeah. 693 00:42:35,466 --> 00:42:37,100 You guys had a woman march. Yeah. 694 00:42:37,100 --> 00:42:38,900 You were leading the march. 695 00:42:38,900 --> 00:42:41,000 (quietly): (bleep) 696 00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:42,666 (laughs) 697 00:42:42,666 --> 00:42:46,200 It's... kind of the most, like, in the country. 698 00:42:49,766 --> 00:42:53,800 So one way for us to verify that, you know, 699 00:42:53,800 --> 00:42:57,433 what exactly, you know, was done in your case 700 00:42:57,433 --> 00:42:59,400 would be to do forensic on your phone. 701 00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:01,766 Yes, why not? 702 00:43:06,166 --> 00:43:11,066 Is there any way to avoid this surveillance? 703 00:43:11,066 --> 00:43:13,900 Yes, we will set you up with a new device 704 00:43:13,900 --> 00:43:17,166 that you will be able to use. 705 00:43:17,166 --> 00:43:19,400 And a phone. Is there a balcony? 706 00:43:20,433 --> 00:43:25,300 ...be some way, you know, to do it like... 707 00:43:25,300 --> 00:43:27,333 There are other ways to communicate. 708 00:43:27,333 --> 00:43:29,433 Yeah. 709 00:43:36,433 --> 00:43:39,433 It's like... 710 00:43:39,433 --> 00:43:41,733 It makes you to want 711 00:43:41,733 --> 00:43:44,066 to live in the bubble. 712 00:43:45,766 --> 00:43:49,966 But then, like, so no one can enter. 713 00:43:49,966 --> 00:43:53,866 Like, in some sort of... 714 00:43:55,700 --> 00:44:00,000 Like living, like living inside the condom. 715 00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:03,266 But then you cannot reproduce. 716 00:44:10,733 --> 00:44:15,100 ♪ ♪ 717 00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:24,366 That's her phone. 718 00:44:27,300 --> 00:44:29,166 You don't need any cables? 719 00:44:29,166 --> 00:44:30,566 Nope. Okay. 720 00:44:38,666 --> 00:44:41,933 Do you know if she still has a backup of the phone? 721 00:44:41,933 --> 00:44:44,066 Yes, she does. Yes, she does. Okay. 722 00:44:44,066 --> 00:44:47,200 Well, right now I'm trying to jailbreak the phone. 723 00:44:47,200 --> 00:44:48,833 (phone chimes) 724 00:44:50,566 --> 00:44:53,033 Hopefully, it works. 725 00:45:02,766 --> 00:45:06,300 So right now, I am... 726 00:45:08,833 --> 00:45:10,700 navigating through the phone. 727 00:45:14,900 --> 00:45:16,133 So I'm looking for things 728 00:45:16,133 --> 00:45:18,433 that might have executed network activity 729 00:45:18,433 --> 00:45:20,633 that is connectable to the company, 730 00:45:20,633 --> 00:45:24,600 any leftovers of malicious executions. 731 00:45:27,500 --> 00:45:29,000 Um, accounts that we know of-- anything, 732 00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:33,900 essentially, that tells me the history of this phone. 733 00:45:40,266 --> 00:45:43,800 That's interesting, that's not something I've seen before. 734 00:45:52,200 --> 00:45:54,333 We see processes 735 00:45:54,333 --> 00:45:57,533 that we know are connected to Pegasus, 736 00:45:57,533 --> 00:45:59,833 We see some iMessage accounts 737 00:45:59,833 --> 00:46:03,566 that are connected to the attacks. 738 00:46:04,700 --> 00:46:07,666 Because this might indicate what was the entry point. 739 00:46:07,666 --> 00:46:09,400 Oh, it was Apple Music, what the (bleep)? 740 00:46:09,400 --> 00:46:11,833 Oh, really? 741 00:46:11,833 --> 00:46:15,333 That's, that's weird. 742 00:46:15,333 --> 00:46:18,966 So they might have started using Apple Music to exploit it? 743 00:46:21,866 --> 00:46:24,233 Um... 744 00:46:24,233 --> 00:46:25,833 I have to do some more digging on this, 745 00:46:25,833 --> 00:46:27,400 because I need to look at 746 00:46:27,400 --> 00:46:30,233 what specifically these applications are. 747 00:46:34,133 --> 00:46:37,100 She's definitely among the ones most targeted. 748 00:46:43,933 --> 00:46:46,933 ♪ ♪ 749 00:46:48,266 --> 00:46:49,433 It's important 750 00:46:49,433 --> 00:46:51,666 to rectify this story, which is that 751 00:46:51,666 --> 00:46:55,233 these technologies are exclusively used 752 00:46:55,233 --> 00:46:57,100 for good purposes and for fighting evil 753 00:46:57,100 --> 00:47:00,800 and for fighting crime and terrorism and all that. 754 00:47:04,866 --> 00:47:06,466 (dog barking) 755 00:47:08,666 --> 00:47:10,100 Okay, so-- no, Khadija is coming. 756 00:47:10,100 --> 00:47:11,433 (chuckles) 757 00:47:11,433 --> 00:47:13,766 Hi, Claudio. 758 00:47:13,766 --> 00:47:16,433 (on phone): Hi. 759 00:47:16,433 --> 00:47:19,000 So now tell me how bad it is. 760 00:47:22,566 --> 00:47:29,633 (on phone): Okay, there are definitely some records 761 00:47:29,633 --> 00:47:34,300 that, that indicate various points 762 00:47:34,300 --> 00:47:37,400 where the phone seemed to have been compromised. 763 00:47:37,400 --> 00:47:38,800 Mm-hmm. 764 00:47:38,800 --> 00:47:40,966 (voiceover): So I started feeling like 765 00:47:40,966 --> 00:47:44,333 a plague doctor in the 1300s. 766 00:47:44,333 --> 00:47:47,033 I'm basically kind of just keeping the death count. 767 00:47:48,533 --> 00:47:51,566 I'm contributing to creating a trauma here, 768 00:47:51,566 --> 00:47:55,433 and I can see it in many cases, like I can see it, that they are 769 00:47:55,433 --> 00:47:58,166 right now, they're going through a dramatic moment, 770 00:47:58,166 --> 00:48:03,333 and I'm like that person in the room that is breaking it. 771 00:48:04,666 --> 00:48:06,800 (on phone): There are also some more recent records 772 00:48:06,800 --> 00:48:11,233 from even as recent as early May of this year, 773 00:48:11,233 --> 00:48:13,433 so until a couple of weeks ago. 774 00:48:13,433 --> 00:48:15,533 But all in all, it seems like 775 00:48:15,533 --> 00:48:19,166 this probably extended between 2019 and 2020. 776 00:48:19,166 --> 00:48:21,466 2020 at the very least. 777 00:48:21,466 --> 00:48:24,166 I've been told that you will not know 778 00:48:24,166 --> 00:48:28,700 what exactly had been monitored or recorded. 779 00:48:28,700 --> 00:48:33,300 Yeah, with this kinds of... kind of monitoring technology, 780 00:48:33,300 --> 00:48:37,533 the point where they have that level of access to the device, 781 00:48:37,533 --> 00:48:41,100 virtually everything is possible, so... 782 00:48:44,533 --> 00:48:45,766 Yeah, thank you. 783 00:48:45,766 --> 00:48:48,100 Have a good day, bye-bye. 784 00:48:48,100 --> 00:48:50,066 Bye. 785 00:48:50,066 --> 00:48:53,400 That's not great news. Yeah. 786 00:49:03,333 --> 00:49:05,800 All night I've been thinking about 787 00:49:05,800 --> 00:49:08,166 what did I do with my phone? 788 00:49:08,166 --> 00:49:10,833 And I feel guilty. 789 00:49:10,833 --> 00:49:14,066 I feel guilty to... for the messages I've sent. 790 00:49:14,066 --> 00:49:18,266 I feel guilty for the information sources that, 791 00:49:18,266 --> 00:49:22,233 that... who send me, thinking that 792 00:49:22,233 --> 00:49:26,700 some encrypted messaging ways are secure. 793 00:49:26,700 --> 00:49:31,233 They did it and they didn't know that my phone is infected. 794 00:49:31,233 --> 00:49:35,933 I mean, my family members are also victimized. 795 00:49:35,933 --> 00:49:38,666 The... 796 00:49:38,666 --> 00:49:41,633 the sources are victimized, everyone. 797 00:49:41,633 --> 00:49:44,533 I mean, people I've been working with, 798 00:49:44,533 --> 00:49:49,500 people who told me their private secrets are victimized. 799 00:49:49,500 --> 00:49:51,833 Everyone, I mean, it's not just me. 800 00:49:51,833 --> 00:49:56,800 I, I put so many people in danger. 801 00:49:56,800 --> 00:49:58,333 And... 802 00:49:59,833 --> 00:50:02,600 And I'm angry. 803 00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:05,766 Again, I'm angry, I'm angry with the government, 804 00:50:05,766 --> 00:50:09,833 I'm angry with the companies that produce all these tools 805 00:50:09,833 --> 00:50:12,500 and sell it to the bad guys, 806 00:50:12,500 --> 00:50:15,900 like Aliyev's regime. 807 00:50:15,900 --> 00:50:19,266 It, it's... 808 00:50:19,266 --> 00:50:22,233 it's really... it's despicable. 809 00:50:22,233 --> 00:50:24,600 It's heinous. 810 00:50:41,366 --> 00:50:44,366 Khadija is not a terrorist, Khadija is not a criminal. 811 00:50:46,100 --> 00:50:48,966 She's a journalist that is taking a lot of risk 812 00:50:48,966 --> 00:50:52,400 to write some stories to make sure people will get access 813 00:50:52,400 --> 00:50:54,033 to independent information. 814 00:50:54,033 --> 00:50:56,566 So that was one more evidence 815 00:50:56,566 --> 00:50:59,400 of the global misuse of that spyware. 816 00:50:59,400 --> 00:51:03,833 ♪ ♪ 817 00:51:08,866 --> 00:51:10,433 Powerful governments manage 818 00:51:10,433 --> 00:51:14,366 to retain their power by seeing off threats 819 00:51:14,366 --> 00:51:17,600 from people who are campaigning for democracy 820 00:51:17,600 --> 00:51:19,600 or holding them to account, telling the truth. 821 00:51:19,600 --> 00:51:21,866 And, you know, here's a company 822 00:51:21,866 --> 00:51:23,333 that gave them a tool to do that. 823 00:51:25,166 --> 00:51:27,800 It's a military weapon used against civilians. 824 00:51:29,600 --> 00:51:31,300 And the civilians, they don't have 825 00:51:31,300 --> 00:51:34,566 any mechanism to help them in seeking justice, 826 00:51:34,566 --> 00:51:36,900 any mechanism to find some traces, 827 00:51:36,900 --> 00:51:39,866 any mechanisms to know that at least they are the target. 828 00:51:43,733 --> 00:51:45,500 You got a real sense 829 00:51:45,500 --> 00:51:48,700 that it was free for all. 830 00:51:48,700 --> 00:51:50,666 That there is no control over how countries use it, 831 00:51:50,666 --> 00:51:55,433 and they have been using it in the worst way you could imagine. 832 00:51:57,033 --> 00:51:59,833 Even after months of investigating 833 00:51:59,833 --> 00:52:02,800 we kept discovering new things 834 00:52:02,800 --> 00:52:04,866 new names from the list-- 835 00:52:04,866 --> 00:52:08,600 politicians, heads of state, and even a princess. 836 00:52:11,533 --> 00:52:14,233 Hello, my name is Latifa al-Maktoum. 837 00:52:14,233 --> 00:52:15,833 And I'm making this video 838 00:52:15,833 --> 00:52:20,666 because it could be the last video I make, yeah. 839 00:52:21,833 --> 00:52:23,233 (sighs) 840 00:52:23,233 --> 00:52:27,566 ♪ ♪ 841 00:52:29,166 --> 00:52:31,133 (music ends) 842 00:52:34,166 --> 00:52:38,900 Go to pbs.org/frontline for a Q&A with the journalists 843 00:52:38,900 --> 00:52:41,900 at Forbidden Stories who led the Pegasus investigation. 844 00:52:41,900 --> 00:52:44,500 And once on the phone it can extract 845 00:52:44,500 --> 00:52:46,366 and access everything from the device. 846 00:52:46,366 --> 00:52:50,066 Everything, so once you are infected, you're trapped. 847 00:52:50,066 --> 00:52:52,900 And an archive of stories with our reporting partners 848 00:52:52,900 --> 00:52:55,466 on the Pegasus project. 849 00:52:55,466 --> 00:52:58,700 Connect with "Frontline" on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, 850 00:52:58,700 --> 00:53:01,766 and stream anytime on the PBS app, YouTube, 851 00:53:01,766 --> 00:53:03,966 or pbs.org/frontline. 852 00:53:06,400 --> 00:53:11,566 ♪ ♪ 853 00:53:31,600 --> 00:53:34,666 For more on this and other "Frontline" programs, 854 00:53:34,666 --> 00:53:37,566 visit our website at pbs.org/frontline. 855 00:53:37,566 --> 00:53:41,333 ♪ ♪ 856 00:53:46,466 --> 00:53:50,633 ♪ ♪ 857 00:53:55,033 --> 00:53:59,333 "Frontline's" "Global Spyware Scandal: Exposing Pegasus" 858 00:53:59,333 --> 00:54:02,133 is available on Amazon Prime Video. 859 00:54:04,166 --> 00:54:08,366 ♪ ♪ 65041

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