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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,630 --> 00:00:08,700 Tales is the most used live operating system that is designed for preserving security privacy and anonymity 2 00:00:08,710 --> 00:00:09,060 . 3 00:00:09,390 --> 00:00:17,970 Like others we've gone through it can start in almost any computer from a DVD USP stick or SD card and 4 00:00:17,970 --> 00:00:22,350 it's free software and it's based on Debian Linux. 5 00:00:22,350 --> 00:00:30,090 It is a very commonly recommended option for people looking for anonymity online and that's probably 6 00:00:30,090 --> 00:00:37,560 because Edward Snowden has been known to use it tells provides the option of using Tor or to pay an 7 00:00:37,560 --> 00:00:45,720 anonymising service but its main focus in the fall is Tor both Tor and I to pay will be covert in their 8 00:00:45,720 --> 00:00:51,960 own section so don't worry about that with tails or connections to the Internet forced to go through 9 00:00:52,200 --> 00:01:01,590 the toll network to prevent leaks leaks like DNS IP version 6 and a leak if the Tor connection was to 10 00:01:01,590 --> 00:01:02,460 drop. 11 00:01:02,460 --> 00:01:04,260 So that's a good feature of tails. 12 00:01:04,340 --> 00:01:11,430 Another is it tails is configured to not use the computer's hard disks even if some swap space is on 13 00:01:11,430 --> 00:01:11,880 there. 14 00:01:11,880 --> 00:01:19,800 The only storage space used by tails is the RAM or the memory which is automatically securely erased 15 00:01:20,160 --> 00:01:21,830 when the computer shuts down. 16 00:01:21,930 --> 00:01:28,560 Removing evidence of any activities tails is built with encryption software encryption software that 17 00:01:28,560 --> 00:01:36,660 I do recommend things like looks for us being scription hasty CPS everywhere to force browser encryption 18 00:01:37,050 --> 00:01:43,350 open P O or a nautilus wipe which will be touching on throughout the course. 19 00:01:43,350 --> 00:01:47,790 There's two ways to use tails like there is all of the live operating systems. 20 00:01:47,790 --> 00:01:53,920 You can boot it straight using your laptop or your machine or you can boot it into a virtual machine 21 00:01:54,300 --> 00:02:00,720 and if you're considering using tail's in a virtual machine do be aware that this is a less secure option 22 00:02:01,050 --> 00:02:07,650 as the host can compromise a guest and vice versa Telles works better in virtual box as well. 23 00:02:07,650 --> 00:02:13,380 If you're going to use virtualization as it allows for additional features over other virtual machines 24 00:02:13,380 --> 00:02:23,160 like shared folders resizable display shared clipboard etc. shared folders and clipboard or potential 25 00:02:23,160 --> 00:02:30,210 security issues allowing for propagation of tails to the host operating system files or memory and vice 26 00:02:30,210 --> 00:02:31,080 versa. 27 00:02:31,340 --> 00:02:38,280 I would recommend not using shared folders and clipboard in a virtual tails if the adversary could perform 28 00:02:38,280 --> 00:02:40,060 active attacks. 29 00:02:40,060 --> 00:02:46,380 For more information with the risks associated with virtualization entails go to this link and read 30 00:02:46,380 --> 00:02:47,970 this page. 31 00:02:47,970 --> 00:02:55,320 Also note that due to a bug in virtual box the resizable display and share clipboard only work entails 32 00:02:55,690 --> 00:03:02,820 the virtual machine is configured to have a 32 bit processor shared folders work both in 32 bit and 33 00:03:02,820 --> 00:03:04,330 64 bit guess. 34 00:03:04,570 --> 00:03:07,730 And I'm sure this will be fixed at some point. 35 00:03:07,730 --> 00:03:14,820 A live distribution like tales for someone with basic technical skills is probably the fastest and easiest 36 00:03:14,820 --> 00:03:23,190 way to a reasonable secure operating system that provides access to anonymizing services in that all 37 00:03:23,190 --> 00:03:30,130 they have to do is create a bootable CD or USPC dig from the iso image boot from that. 38 00:03:30,150 --> 00:03:36,300 Everything else is pre-configured which can be good or bad depending on your situation. 39 00:03:36,390 --> 00:03:44,490 Because people faced different types of adversaries and tails is a one fits all solution tail's in combination 40 00:03:44,490 --> 00:03:52,620 with Tor could give people a false sense of security privacy and anonymity against a nation state who 41 00:03:52,620 --> 00:03:59,800 has targeted you or sites you visit or even doing large scale traffic co-relation attacks. 42 00:03:59,820 --> 00:04:01,220 It is not good enough. 43 00:04:01,320 --> 00:04:05,400 The nature of the Internet makes anonymity very difficult. 44 00:04:05,400 --> 00:04:12,120 In lay a sections on VPN ends Tor and other anonymizing services we will explore this more and talk 45 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:19,270 about how these systems can be de anonymized and ways to potentially avoid this deep anonymization and 46 00:04:19,380 --> 00:04:20,000 tails. 47 00:04:20,010 --> 00:04:27,480 Like all software and operating systems will have flaws and tails will inherit the flaws of the software 48 00:04:27,480 --> 00:04:29,090 that it uses to. 49 00:04:29,100 --> 00:04:37,490 Here we have a somewhat recent incident relating to tales I just want to read what the security researchers 50 00:04:37,490 --> 00:04:38,710 said. 51 00:04:38,790 --> 00:04:43,570 We publicize the fact that we've discovered these issues for a very simple reason. 52 00:04:43,590 --> 00:04:51,180 No user should put full trust into any particular security solution by bringing to light the fact that 53 00:04:51,180 --> 00:04:56,230 we have found verifiable flaws in such a widely trusted piece of code. 54 00:04:56,310 --> 00:05:04,110 We hope to remind the tail user base that no security is infallible even when the issues we've found 55 00:05:04,110 --> 00:05:05,970 are fixed by the tails team. 56 00:05:05,970 --> 00:05:12,330 The community should keep in mind that there are most certainly all the flaws still present and likely 57 00:05:12,330 --> 00:05:13,760 known to others. 58 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:23,130 Intersections on operating system and application trust we discuss the issues of vulnerabilities and 59 00:05:23,130 --> 00:05:30,780 potential deliberate back doors the same issues of vulnerabilities and possible back doors applies with 60 00:05:30,780 --> 00:05:36,570 tales to either deliberate coerced or accidental methods. 61 00:05:36,600 --> 00:05:43,350 Trust should be distributed if your adversary is a nation state and the consequences are high. 62 00:05:43,430 --> 00:05:51,420 The security privacy and anonymising controls discussed in this cause shall be used in combination with 63 00:05:51,420 --> 00:05:53,100 this level of adversary. 64 00:05:53,100 --> 00:06:00,330 For example you might be using a hot spot fire a boosted antenna a mile away from the Internet cafe 65 00:06:00,330 --> 00:06:09,660 that you actually connected to with tails with nested veep's ends with g.p email etc cetera tails would 66 00:06:09,660 --> 00:06:17,490 only be a piece of the anonymizing solution in order to be anonymous from a nation state against hackers 67 00:06:17,940 --> 00:06:25,140 adversaries of moderate means and where consequences are moderate tales and toile works well to provide 68 00:06:25,140 --> 00:06:27,520 security privacy and anonymity. 69 00:06:27,510 --> 00:06:31,620 And I would recommend it as a live operating system for this. 70 00:06:31,650 --> 00:06:38,300 It is much much better than using Tor browser and your normal operating system alone. 71 00:06:38,340 --> 00:06:46,690 You have no security isolation if you do that the NSA already exploits the bug in Firefox to deal anonymize 72 00:06:46,710 --> 00:06:54,540 Tor uses tails would have helped to mitigate this type of attack by providing isolation and a separate 73 00:06:54,540 --> 00:07:00,330 security domain based on the section on threat landscape that we've gone through. 74 00:07:00,330 --> 00:07:06,150 You should now be able to determine for yourself what tails will protect you from and what it won't 75 00:07:06,150 --> 00:07:06,680 . 76 00:07:06,680 --> 00:07:10,970 So let's go through some of the main things that tails won't protect you from. 77 00:07:10,980 --> 00:07:15,540 First one is firmware rootkit and bios attacks. 78 00:07:15,570 --> 00:07:23,520 Remember the irate man from the NSA catalog that created persistence on the hard drive firmware tails 79 00:07:23,620 --> 00:07:26,120 offers no resistance to this. 80 00:07:26,130 --> 00:07:37,170 Another example you can watch here is a video of PGE keys and e-mails been stolen from Tales via remote 81 00:07:37,270 --> 00:07:39,000 firmware infection 82 00:07:46,120 --> 00:07:49,960 . 83 00:07:50,040 --> 00:07:52,630 Won't protect you from hardware compromisers. 84 00:07:52,650 --> 00:07:59,940 Remember the silly spawn hardware key logger in the catalog and the rangemaster the EVGA cable retro 85 00:07:59,940 --> 00:08:01,320 reflector. 86 00:08:01,350 --> 00:08:08,220 These are hardware compromises tails obviously isn't designed to protect you from tails or the Tor browser 87 00:08:08,430 --> 00:08:13,540 will have a unique fingerprint as the OS is a standard build. 88 00:08:13,690 --> 00:08:20,110 It will be obvious to a knowledgeable observer that using tails in the direct quote here from the tail's 89 00:08:20,120 --> 00:08:24,940 Web site tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default. 90 00:08:24,930 --> 00:08:30,970 The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted by default except in the 91 00:08:30,960 --> 00:08:37,000 encrypted persistent volume but tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents such as new 92 00:08:37,020 --> 00:08:40,800 PGE or encrypt your storage devices such as locks. 93 00:08:40,800 --> 00:08:46,620 It is also likely that the files you may create will contain evidence if you need to access the local 94 00:08:46,620 --> 00:08:49,150 hard disk of the computer you are using. 95 00:08:49,140 --> 00:08:55,540 Be conscious that you might then leave trace of your activities with tails on it. 96 00:08:55,620 --> 00:09:01,960 Tails doesn't clear the meta data of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the subject and or the 97 00:09:01,950 --> 00:09:06,150 headers of your encrypted email messages in the section on metor data. 98 00:09:06,150 --> 00:09:09,220 We will cover mitigations to this. 99 00:09:09,300 --> 00:09:13,980 You shouldn't use the same tail section for different identities. 100 00:09:14,040 --> 00:09:21,480 I don't access your standard email in the same session as you in a forum where using a different identity 101 00:09:21,780 --> 00:09:27,930 you would need to restart tails or use a different environment for each identity because it may be possible 102 00:09:27,930 --> 00:09:30,220 to correlate those identities together. 103 00:09:30,370 --> 00:09:40,460 If you have an adversary of reasonable means close mail leaks plaintext of encrypted emails to map service 104 00:09:40,470 --> 00:09:40,560 . 105 00:09:40,570 --> 00:09:45,950 Now this is a clause for not specifically a tails flaw but it is a problem. 106 00:09:46,170 --> 00:09:52,560 So if you want to use clause you need to look at this page and look at the mitigations but it seems 107 00:09:52,570 --> 00:09:56,490 the main mitigation really is to use pop instead of IMAP 108 00:09:59,220 --> 00:10:06,040 and your new searches for download tails will be logged by at least one nation state the United States 109 00:10:06,070 --> 00:10:07,450 via the NSA. 110 00:10:07,440 --> 00:10:13,150 There was a leaked document detailing this which is here. 111 00:10:13,230 --> 00:10:19,780 This fingerprint identifies users searches for the tail's software program viewing documents relating 112 00:10:19,770 --> 00:10:23,000 to tales of viewing web sites that detailed tales. 113 00:10:23,040 --> 00:10:29,040 Now this is a document that relates to or is in reference to the NSA key school surveillance system 114 00:10:29,040 --> 00:10:29,550 . 115 00:10:29,730 --> 00:10:35,280 So you search for tail you download tails it's going to Marki for more active surveillance at least 116 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:39,150 in the United States and probably in other nation states. 117 00:10:39,180 --> 00:10:42,200 The developers of tales are anonymous. 118 00:10:42,450 --> 00:10:47,700 It would be easier to determine how much you can trust the developers of tails if you could have some 119 00:10:47,700 --> 00:10:49,500 understanding of who they were. 120 00:10:49,500 --> 00:10:56,530 We don't so this is a negative tails doesn't yet have deterministic and reproducible builds reproducible 121 00:10:56,550 --> 00:11:03,330 bills or a set of software development practices which create a verifiable path from human readable 122 00:11:03,340 --> 00:11:10,920 source code to binary code with reproducible build multiple parties redo build in impenetrably and ensure 123 00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:12,940 they all get exactly the same result. 124 00:11:13,020 --> 00:11:19,800 Although tails is open source someone could cleverly backdoor or mis configured tales to be less secure 125 00:11:19,870 --> 00:11:26,700 or vulnerable reproduceable build help mitigate the chance of getting back doors tails doesn't have 126 00:11:26,700 --> 00:11:32,480 deterministic and reproducible builds yet but no operating system does fully have them yet. 127 00:11:32,790 --> 00:11:39,810 There is a lack of physical and or virtual isolation toward vacation happens within the tails operating 128 00:11:39,820 --> 00:11:40,290 system. 129 00:11:40,290 --> 00:11:48,420 It would be safer to happen at a separate physical or logical device like on a hardware router or a 130 00:11:48,420 --> 00:11:51,390 virtual gateway like you have with nix. 131 00:11:51,480 --> 00:11:56,480 Because of this lack of physical and or virtualization The result is a weakness. 132 00:11:56,490 --> 00:12:04,140 If tails gets routed the adversary could bypass the tail's protection and get the users real or IP easier 133 00:12:04,230 --> 00:12:10,120 than if the Tor and forcing proxy was hosted on a separate device. 134 00:12:10,120 --> 00:12:17,700 Devices laptops that you will use to run the tails live operating system have hardware serial numbers 135 00:12:17,790 --> 00:12:23,550 such as on the motherboard that can be uniquely identified to that motherboard. 136 00:12:23,550 --> 00:12:30,040 This could potentially be got fire malware that was running on tails this hardware information could 137 00:12:30,030 --> 00:12:35,130 then tie the device back to the purchaser and identify who you are. 138 00:12:35,130 --> 00:12:41,470 This is a concern when you're running tails or any live operating system normally natively on the laptop 139 00:12:41,460 --> 00:12:42,420 or device. 140 00:12:42,420 --> 00:12:47,330 This for me is quite a big weakness of running live operating systems and tails. 141 00:12:47,470 --> 00:12:54,120 But if you use virtual machines they do hide hardware serials from malicious software which could get 142 00:12:54,120 --> 00:13:01,230 onto tails which is a security positive for using live operating systems in virtual environments as 143 00:13:01,230 --> 00:13:03,570 opposed to natively on the host. 144 00:13:03,580 --> 00:13:10,100 If you're using tails and virtual box of VM where directly on your hard drive it creates a virtual hard 145 00:13:10,100 --> 00:13:15,710 drive that uses as a temporary hard drive while tails is running one's tales is closed. 146 00:13:15,710 --> 00:13:22,420 This virtual drive is deleted but it's not necessarily permanently deleted deleted files depending on 147 00:13:22,410 --> 00:13:27,840 the hard drive might only be marked as new sectors or not want completely. 148 00:13:27,860 --> 00:13:31,400 And this is more of a variable with solid state drives. 149 00:13:31,410 --> 00:13:36,170 This is a virtual machine issue though and not a tails issue. 150 00:13:36,960 --> 00:13:41,430 There are all weaknesses but we're going to cover those specifically in the section on Tor. 151 00:13:41,460 --> 00:13:43,300 Those are just tails weaknesses 17637