All language subtitles for The.Vietnam.War.2017.Part02.Riding.the.Tiger.480p.x264-mSD eng

(distant helicopter blades
beating)

(radio feedback)

JOHN MUSGRAVE:
I was assigned a listening
post at Con Thien in the fall.

That was like getting
a death sentence at a trial.

Because that's just three
Marines out there with a radio.

And that's the scariest thing
I did.

You're listening for the enemy.

They call you on the radio
every hour,

"Delta, Lima, Papa,
Three, Bravo,

"Delta, Lima, Papa, Three,
Bravo, this is Delta Three.

"If your sit rep is alpha
sierra, key your handset twice.

(two blips of static)

"If your situation report
is all secure,

break squelch twice
on the handset."

(two lower-toned
blips of static)

And if it's not, they keep
thinking you're asleep

so they keep asking you, "If
your sit rep is alpha sierra,"

and then it finally
dawns on them

maybe there's somebody too close
for you to say anything.

So then they say, "If your sit
rep is negative alpha sierra,

key your handset once,"

and you damn near squeeze
the handle off the, you know,

and two on the radio
because they're so close

that you can hear them
whispering to one another.

And that's scary stuff.

That's real scary stuff.

And I'm scared of the dark,
still.

I still got a night light.

When my kids were growing up,

that's the first time
they really found out

that Daddy'd been in a war
when they said,

"Well, why do we need to outgrow
our night lights?

Daddy's still got one."

("So What" by Miles Davis
playing)

JOHN KENNEDY:
Let the word go forth
from this time and place,

to friend and foe alike,

that the torch has been passed
to a new generation

of Americans born in this
century, tempered by war,

disciplined by a hard
and bitter peace,

proud of our...

JACK TODD:
I still believed, very much,

in this concept
of an heroic America,

America being a really
special country,

the best country in the world,
the best democracy,

all the things that
we believe about it, which...

and I didn't really see anything
wrong with that.

I was sure that we were right
to be in Vietnam.

You know, because it started
under Kennedy

and, to me, JFK was God.

Anything that he thought was
right, I thought was right.

NARRATOR:
At 43, John Fitzgerald Kennedy
was the youngest man

ever elected president
of the United States.

He had promised bold
new leadership,

and to his supporters his
inauguration seemed to signal

a new day.

To those new states
whom we welcome

to the ranks of the free,

we pledge our word that one form
of colonial control

shall not have passed away

merely to be replaced
by a far more iron tyranny.

We shall not always expect to
find them supporting our view.

But we shall always hope to find
them strongly supporting

their own freedom and to
remember that, in the past,

those who foolishly
sought power

by riding the back of the tiger
ended up inside.

(cheers and applause)

NARRATOR:
The new president gathered
around him

an extraordinary set of advisors
who shared his determination

to confront communism, including
Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy,

his deputy Walt Rostow,

special military advisor
General Maxwell Taylor,

and Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara,

who had given up his post

as president of the Ford Motor
Company to serve his country.

He was a pioneer in the field
of systems analysis.

Like the president
who picked them,

all of Kennedy's men had served
during World War II.

Each had absorbed what
they all believed

was its central lesson:

ambitious dictatorships needed
to be halted in their tracks

before they constituted
a serious danger

to the peace of the world.

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam,

the National Liberation Front--

labeled by its enemies
the Viet Cong--

was determined to overthrow

the anticommunist and
increasingly autocratic

government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

In North Vietnam,
unbeknownst to Washington,

Ho Chi Minh, the father
of Vietnamese independence,

was now sharing power
with a more aggressive leader,

Le Duan, who was even
more impatient

to reunify his country.

BAO NINH:

LESLIE GELB:
None of us knew anything
about Vietnam.

Vietnam in those days was
a piece on a chessboard,

a strategic chessboard,

not a place with a culture
and a history

that we would have
an impossible time changing,

even with the mighty force
of the United States.

NARRATOR:
Over the next three years,
the United States would struggle

to understand the complicated
country it had come to save,

fail to appreciate
the enemy's resolve,

and misread how the South
Vietnamese people really felt

about their government.

The new president
would find himself caught

between the momentum of war
and the desire for peace,

between humility and hubris,

between idealism and expediency,
between the truth and a lie.

("My Country 'Tis of Thee"
playing)

KENNEDY:
And so, my fellow Americans,

ask not what your country
can do for you,

ask what you can do
for your country.

MUSGRAVE:
I grew up in Missouri,
near Kansas City,

a little community
called Fairmount.

I was born in 1948.

And there were lots of kids
being born in those days

from the guys who were lucky
enough to come home

from World War II.

My dad was a pilot
in the Army Air Corps.

And all of dad's friends

were World War II vets
or Korean vets.

And all of my male teachers
were veterans.

And even my pastor
had been a chaplain.

Well, they were my heroes,
and I wanted to be like them.

NARRATOR:
For all of John Kennedy's
soaring rhetoric,

for all the talent
he gathered around him,

the first months of his
presidency did not go well.

He approved a CIA-sponsored
invasion of Cuba

at the Bay of Pigs
that ended in disaster.

He felt he'd been bullied

by Soviet premier
Nikita Khrushchev

at a summit meeting in Vienna.

He was unable
to keep the Soviets

from building the Berlin Wall.

And in Southeast Asia,
he refused to intervene

against a communist
insurrection in Laos.

Critics accused him of being
immature, indecisive,

inadequate to the task of
combating what seemed to be

a mounting communist threat.

"There are just so many
concessions that we can make

in one year and
survive politically,"

he confided to an aide
in the spring of 1961.

In South Vietnam,
Kennedy felt he had to act.

After the president received
reports

that the Viet Cong
might be in control

of more than half the densely
populated Mekong Delta,

he dispatched General
Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow

to Vietnam.

They urged him to commit
American ground troops.

Kennedy refused.

It would be like taking
a first drink, he said--

the effect would soon wear off
and there would be demands

for another
and another and another.

Instead, in the midst
of a cold war,

with its constant risk
of nuclear confrontation,

the president supported
a new "flexible" way

to confront and contain
communism: limited war.

This is another type of warfare,
new in its intensity,

ancient in its origin--

war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins;

war by ambush
instead of by combat;

by infiltration
instead of aggression.

NARRATOR:
To fight his "limited wars,"

Kennedy hoped to use
the elite Green Berets,

special forces trained
in guerrilla warfare,

counterinsurgency.

They were meant to be dispatched
to hotspots around the world.

ROBERT RHEAULT:
Khrushchev said, "We're
not going to destroy you

with nuclear weapons,

we're going to destroy you with
wars of national liberation."

Everybody talked about
the fact

that communism was spreading
and it had to be stopped.

You went to Command and
General Staff College

and you were playing
on maps with nuclear weapons

and so forth.

And I escaped from that by
getting into Special Forces.

So that instead of planning
what we were going to do

if World War III broke out,
we were actually doing stuff.

And Vietnam was a place where
we were going to draw the line.

NARRATOR:
Kennedy sent the Green Berets

to the Central Highlands
of Vietnam

to organize mountain tribes
to fight the Viet Cong

and to undertake covert missions
to sabotage their supply bases

in Laos and Cambodia.

But Kennedy understood
that counterinsurgency alone

would never be enough,

so he doubled funding
for South Vietnam's army,

dispatched helicopters and APCs,
armored personnel carriers.

Kennedy also authorized
the use of napalm

and the spraying of defoliants
to deny cover to the Viet Cong

and destroy the crops
that fed them.

A whole array of chemicals
was used,

including one named
for the color of the stripes

on the 55-gallon drums in which
it came-- "Agent Orange."

And the president quietly
continued to increase

the number of American
military advisors.

Within two years, the number
he had inherited would grow

to 11,300,

empowered not only to teach

the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam-- the ARVN--

to fight a conventional war,

but to accompany them
into battle,

a violation of the agreement
that had divided Vietnam

back in 1954.

(gunfire)

The administration did its best
to hide from the American people

the scale of the buildup
that was taking place

on the other side of the world,

fearful that the public
would not support

the more active role advisors
had begun to play in combat.

Mr. President, a Republican
National Committee publication

has said that you are...
have been less than candid

with the American people as
to how deeply we are involved

in Vietnam.

Could you throw
any more light on that?

We have increased our assistance
to the government,

its logistics.

We have not sent combat troops
there.

Though the training missions
that we have there

have been instructed if
they are fired upon to...

they are, would of course, fire
back, to protect themselves.

But we have not sent
combat troops

in the generally understood
sense of the word.

So that I-I feel that we are
being as frank as the...

as we can be.

I think we...
what I have said to you

is a description
of our activity there.

NEIL SHEEHAN:
I was a child of the Cold War.

When I got off the plane in
Saigon on a humid evening

in April 1962,

I really believed in all
the ideology of the Cold War.

On...

That if we lost South Vietnam,

that the rest of Southeast Asia
would fall to the communists.

There was an international
communist conspiracy.

We believed fervently
in this stuff.

NARRATOR:
Neil Sheehan was
a 25-year-old reporter

for United Press International,
UPI.

He had served three years
in the Army in Korea and Japan

before deciding to become
a newspaperman.

Vietnam was his first full-time
overseas assignment,

and his only worry,
he remembered,

was that he would get there
too late and miss out

on the big story.

Sheehan and other reporters rode
along as the ARVN mounted

a series of helicopter assaults
on enemy strongholds

in the Mekong Delta
and elsewhere

and brought terror
to the Viet Cong.

American pilots were
at the controls.

SHEEHAN:
It was a crusade
and it was thrilling.

And you'd climb aboard
the helicopters

with the Vietnamese soldiers who
were being taken out to battle.

And they'd take off.

And they'd contour-fly, they'd
skim across the rice paddies

at about three or four feet
above the paddies,

and then pop up over the tree
lines that lined the fields.

It was thrilling.

I mean it was absolutely
thrilling.

And you believed
in what was happening.

I mean you had the sense
that we're fighting here

and some day we'll win, and
this country will be a better,

better country for our coming.

NARRATOR:
The new M-113 armored
personnel carriers

were capable of churning across
rivers and rice paddies

and right through
the earthen dikes

that separated one field
from the next.

The Viet Cong had nothing
with which to stop them.

JAMES SCANLON:
We were just overwhelming them
with force, with firepower.

And the firefights would be over
in a pretty short time.

MAN ON RADIO:
We have some people
running along the dikes.

Actually, the canal
is perpendicular

to the one you're attacking now.

They have on black uniforms, and
I estimate approximately 3-0.

Do you have them in sight?
Over.

SCANLON:
That's what was causing us
to win, see.

And we were winning
one after the other.

And we were not meeting
a heck of a lot of resistance.

NARRATOR:
Captain James Scanlon had been
stationed in West Germany

and had seen for himself
the brutality with which

the communist East Germans
dealt with anyone

who dared try to escape
to the West.

He was now in the Mekong Delta,

an advisor to the 7th Division
of the ARVN,

and had begun to see evidence
of Viet Cong brutality as well.

SCANLON:
Those of us who talked to the
people who fled East Germany,

we saw the need to stop
the growth of communism,

to stop the dominoes
from being tumbled.

That was a worthy cause.

NARRATOR:
As the ARVN and their advisors
pursued the Viet Cong,

the government of Ngo Dinh Diem
had launched

an ambitious program meant to
gain control of the countryside

by concentrating
the rural population

into thousands of fortified
settlements,

ringed with barbed wire
and moats and bamboo spikes

meant to keep out the Viet Cong.

They were called strategic
hamlets, part of the effort

to win the hearts and minds,
and loyalty,

of the Vietnamese people.

The French had tried something
like it a decade before.

They had called it pacification.

ROBERT McNAMARA:
President Diem's strategic
hamlet program

is making substantial progress.

About 1,600
of the some 14,000 hamlets

have been fortified to date.

NARRATOR:
By the summer of 1962,

news from South Vietnam
seemed so promising

that Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara made sure

the Pentagon was prepared
to implement a plan

for a gradual withdrawal
of American advisors

to be completed by 1965.

So far as most Americans knew,

the United States was achieving
its goal:

a stable, independent,
anticommunist state

in South Vietnam.

It was "a struggle this country
cannot shirk,"

theNew York Tim es said,

and the United States seemed
to be winning it.

But that same summer,
Ho Chi Minh traveled to Beijing

in search of more help
from the Chinese.

The American buildup in
South Vietnam had alarmed him

and the other leaders in Hanoi.

Ho told the Chinese
that American attacks

on North Vietnam itself now
seemed only a matter of time.

The Chinese promised to equip
and arm tens of thousands

of Vietnamese soldiers.

Meanwhile, the Politburo
in Hanoi had directed

that every able-bodied
North Vietnamese man

be required to serve
in the armed forces.

("Honky Tonk Pt. 1"
by Bill Doggett playing)

NARRATOR:
Inspired by their
president's call,

thousands of young Americans
would join the Peace Corps

and other organizations to help
project American ideals

and goodwill around the world.

("Honky Tonk Pt. 1" continues)

RUFUS PHILLIPS:
We were not only there in
Vietnam to stop communism,

but there had to be
something positive.

We're trying to find out what
the Vietnamese people want

and to help them get it.

And that was very simple

but, if you think about it,
also very complex.

But it went to the heart,
I thought,

of what we were trying to do.

("Dirty Overalls"
by Woody Guthrie playing)

NARRATOR:
Pete Hunting, a 22-year-old
from Oklahoma City,

would go to Vietnam right after
college to do what he could

to help poor villagers
in the countryside.

WOODY GUTHRIE:
♪ I was a soldier in the fight

♪ And I fought till we won

♪ My uniform's
my dirty overhauls. ♪

HUNTING (dramatized):
Dear Margo,

I finally finished up my work
in Phan Rang last week.

Had spent a month
working on a windmill

I'd promised the people
of one hamlet.

Cost a lot of money, too, which
I paid out of my own pocket.

GUTHRIE:
♪ Well, I'll give you my sweat,
I'll give you my blood. ♪

HUNTING (dramatized):
I'm in soaring spirits today

despite all the natural
disasters, political intrigues,

and subversive activities.

NARRATOR:
Pete Hunting worked

for the International
Voluntary Services,

a nonprofit organization
committed to improving

agriculture, education,
and public health.

He was one of hundreds
of dedicated aid workers

in South Vietnam.

GUTHRIE:
♪ My hoe is my gun.

HUNTING (dramatized):
Latest news on this side
of the world

is that I'll almost definitely
be extending over here

for another two years,

providing the country stays
in one piece that long.

NARRATOR:
Two years after he arrived,

Pete Hunting was driving
in the Mekong Delta

when he ran into
a Viet Cong ambush.

He was shot five times
in the head...

(gunshot)

the first American
civilian volunteer

to be killed in Vietnam.

(helicopter blades beating,
voices on radio)

(distorted sound of gunfire,
explosion)

People used to joke in Vietnam

about winning the hearts
and minds.

And you hear that expression,
but that should not be a joke.

It's a serious, serious problem.

If you pull off
a military operation,

and it may be successful
on the military basis,

but you destroy a village,

then you've created
a village of resistance.

NARRATOR:
Few advisors understood
the unique challenges

of fighting
an insurgency in Vietnam

better than Lieutenant
Colonel John Paul Vann.

A career soldier from Virginia,

he was the senior
American advisor

to the 7th ARVN Division
in the Mekong Delta.

Small, wiry and abrasive,
John Paul Vann was convinced

he knew how to defeat
the Viet Cong.

PHILIP BRADY:
John Paul Vann was simply
the most remarkable soldier

I ever met.

Period.

The biggest challenge
of John Paul Vann's life

was somehow saving Vietnam,
winning.

That, to him,
was the ultimate challenge.

(explosion)

NARRATOR:
When it became clear to Vann

that the tactics the Americans
had taught the ARVN

were beginning to make more
enemies than friends,

he sought out newspapermen
to spread the word.

NEIL SHEEHAN:
He was able to explain to us
what was going on.

The important thing was not
to alienate the population.

That if you got sniper fire
from a hamlet,

you sent in riflemen
to take out the sniper.

You didn't shell the place,
because you were going to kill

women and kids
and destroy houses

and you were going to turn
the population against you.

NARRATOR:
Most press coverage
of Vietnam was upbeat

in the tradition
of previous wars.

But a handful of young reporters
including Neil Sheehan,

David Halberstam
of theNew York Times,

and Malcolm Browne
of the Associated Press,

who spent time in the field
with officers like Vann,

were beginning to see that
from the Vietnamese countryside,

things looked very different
than they did

from the press offices
in Washington or Saigon.

SHEEHAN:
So it was terribly important
that we not only win the war

but that we as reporters report
the truth

that would help to win the war.

We were very fervent in wanting
to report the truth

because it was very important
to the welfare of our country

and to the welfare of the world.

NARRATOR:
Sheehan and his colleagues began
asking tough questions

about what constituted progress,
what victory would look like,

and if the people
in the countryside,

where 80% of South Vietnam's
population lived,

could ever trust the government
in Saigon.

SHEEHAN:
I remember going, during one
of Robert McNamara's visits,

out to one of these hamlets.

The Vietnamese general
who commanded the area

was telling McNamara what
a wonderful thing this was.

And the-the... some of these
farmers were down

digging a ditch around the...
around the hamlet.

And I looked at their faces
and they were really angry.

I mean it was very obvious to me

that if these people could,
they'd cut our throats.

NARRATOR:
Farmers resented being forced
to abandon their homes

and move to strategic hamlets.

Corrupt officials
siphoned off funds.

And villagers blamed
the Diem regime

for failing to protect them
from guerrilla attacks.

As the people's anger grew, so
did the ranks of the Viet Cong.

SHEEHAN:
It turned out that the Viet Cong
were recruiting men

right out of those strategic...
so-called strategic hamlets.

And then the whole program
fell apart.

NGUYEN NGOC:

NARRATOR:
Nguyen Ngoc's father was
a postal clerk south of Danang.

His brothers and sisters taught
in South Vietnamese schools.

But he joined the revolution,
and as a political officer,

wrote poems, songs, and slogans
to inspire the people

in the countryside
to support the Viet Cong.

DUONG VAN MAI:
The Viet Cong cadre would come
in and talk to them

and their message is usually
(speaking Vietnamese),

which means "turn your grief
into action.

"Do something about it.

"Join us.

"We'll fight together.

"We'll liberate the country from
this corrupt, unjust government.

"We'll throw out the foreigners.

"We'll reunify the country.

"And we'll bring in
this great regime

"that will take care of you

and bring economic
and social justice."

NARRATOR:
The Viet Cong ran rival
local governments,

complete with their own tax
collectors and school teachers,

spies and propagandists,
and province chiefs.

To make matters worse,

ARVN troops and American
advisors now found themselves

confronted by a new threat:

battalions of well-armed
Viet Cong soldiers,

as well as by local guerrillas.

SHEEHAN:
We'd armed them.

You could hear the arming
of the Viet Cong.

Back in early '62, they only had
one machine gun per battalion.

(single gunfire burst)

It was sporadic fire.

Then, as they captured more and
more of these American arms,

when you made contact, it fi...

it would build up into
a drumfire of automatic

and semi-automatic weapons.

(cacophony of gunfire bursts)

RUFUS PHILLIPS:
Secretary McNamara decided
that he would draw up

some kind of a chart
to determine

whether we were winning or not.

And he was putting things in

like numbers of weapons
recovered,

numbers of Viet Cong killed.

Very statistical.

And he asked Edward Lansdale,

who was then in the Pentagon
as head of Special Operations,

to come down and look at this.

And so Lansdale did and he said,
"There's something missing."

And McNamara said, "What?"

And Lansdale said, "The feelings
of the Vietnamese people."

You couldn't reduce this
to a statistic.

NARRATOR:
Robert McNamara had vowed
to make America's military

"cost-effective."

He demanded that everything
be quantified.

In Saigon,
General Paul D. Harkins,

head of the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam,

known as MACV,
dutifully complied.

He and his staff generated
mountains of daily, weekly,

monthly, and quarterly data

on more than a hundred
separate indicators,

far more data than could ever be
adequately analyzed.

(typewriter keys clacking)

General Harkins had little use
for skeptical reporters

like Neil Sheehan.

Bad news was to be buried.

Harkins ignored the alarming
after action reports

John Paul Vann and other
officers were sending in

from the field.

DONALD GREGG:
I was going to be made head
of the Vietnam desk

at CIA headquarters.

And the first person of
importance that I met

was General Harkins.

And he started out by saying,

"Mr. Gregg, I don't care what
you hear from anybody else,

"I can tell you without a doubt
we're going to be out of here

with a military victory
in six months."

JAMES MOSSMAN:
The country's 12 million
peasants

can scarcely remember
what peace was like.

They're caught between
the predatory guerrillas

and the almost equally
demanding soldiery.

Their lives are lived in a state
of permanent uncertainty,

punctuated by bouts of violence

as government forces come
to grips

with the black-clad
communist rebel forces

called the Viet Cong.

HUY DUC:

NGUYEN NGOC:

CAO XUAN DAI:

On our side we were
not as committed

and we were...

our leaders were corrupt
and incompetent.

And so deep down
we'll always have this fear,

this suspicion that in the end
it'll be the communists who won.

TOM VALLELY:
When John Kennedy assembled

what he thinks is the best
and the brightest,

20 years before that in
a cave in the northern part

of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh
also put together

his best and the brightest.

And these guys are at it
for a while.

And when we show up,
they were far along

to consolidating their victory
over this inevitable conflict

between Ho Chi Minh
and John F. Kennedy's vision.

The more you think about
the American strategy,

the more you know

that it was never going to work
out particularly well.

RHEAULT:
I was at my top of my
game when I was in combat.

You don't have the luxury
to indulge your fear

because other people's lives
depend upon

you keeping your head cold.

You know, when something
goes wrong,

they call it emotional numbing.

It's not very good
in civilian life,

but it's pretty useful
in combat.

To be able to get absolutely
very cold

about what needs to be done
and to stick with it.

To me it's, it's a little bit
distressing to realize

that I was at my best

doing something as terrible
as war.

MOSSMAN:
President Kennedy has staked
his reputation in Asia

on saving South Vietnam
from communism.

As the army makes the sweep
towards the village

suspected of harboring
Viet Cong,

it can't tell whether it will
meet resistance.

The troops round up all the
young men they can find,

since they can't tell who is
a communist just by looking.

Those who try to run for it
are shot

on the assumption
they have something to hide.

TRAN NGOC CHAU (in English):

NARRATOR:
Each of South Vietnam's
44 provinces had its own chief.

Some were simply political
appointees,

corrupt allies of
President Diem.

Tran Ngoc Chau, province chief
of Kien Hoa, was different.

A privileged judge's son from
the old imperial city of Hue,

he and two of his brothers
had fought against the French

with the Viet Minh.

But he had refused to join
the Communist Party;

he admired their dedication,
but disliked the way

they punished those who dared
differ with them.

Instead, he left the Viet Minh,

became a major in the army
fighting against them,

and eventually so impressed Diem
with his insider's knowledge

of communist tactics that
he was promoted to colonel

and made chief of Kien Hoa,
a Viet Cong stronghold.

PHILLIPS:
He was absolutely incorruptible.

And people came to really
understand that here's a guy

who's, even though it's not
an elected system,

who never... nevertheless
really represents us.

NARRATOR:
"Give me a budget that equals
the cost

of one American helicopter,"
Chau liked to say,

"and I'll give you
a pacified province.

"With that much money, I can
raise the standard of living

"of the rice farmers,

"and government officials
can be paid enough

so they won't think it necessary
to steal."

Rather than hunt down
the Viet Cong,

he sought to persuade them.

TRAN NGOC CHAU (in English):

("Walk, Don't Run"
by the Ventures playing)

NARRATOR:
Back home, Americans were paying
little attention

to what was happening
in Vietnam.

They were watching
The Beverly Hillbillies

andGunsm oke on TV,

were interested in whether
the Yankees would win

the World Series again

and in the recent death
of Marilyn Monroe.

("Stand By Me"
by Ben E. King playing)

But some Americans had been
growing impatient

with the slow pace
of social change.

BILL ZIMMERMAN:
We were told in the '50s

that we lived in the best
country in the world.

In the middle of, you know,
trying to figure out

what it meant to be a citizen
of the...

of this best country
in the world,

suddenly the civil rights
movement exploded

into our consciousness.

BEN E. KING:
♪ When the night has come...

ZIMMERMAN:
We didn't think
we had any power.

We didn't think we could be
actors in history,

that we could affect things.

KING:
♪ No, I won't be afraid

♪ Oh, I won't...

ZIMMERMAN:
And suddenly, you know,

these young black students
in the South

were doing exactly that.

And it just blew the tops
of our heads off.

KING:
♪ So darling, darling,
stand by me ♪

♪ Oh, stand by me

♪ Oh, stand, stand by me

♪ Stand by me

♪ If the sky
that we look upon... ♪

NARRATOR:
Other Americans were concerned
about the proliferation

of nuclear weapons in the world.

Perhaps it would be a good thing
to put Khrushchev and Kennedy

on an island and not let either
one of them off

until they came to an agreement.

KING:
♪ Stand by me

♪ And darling, darling,
stand by me. ♪

(bicycle bells ring,
motors rumble)

SHEEHAN:
And if you were in a cafe when
Diem was giving a speech,

somebody would get up
and shut the radio off,

it would be coming in
over the radio.

Somebody would get up and
they'd just shut the radio off.

I mean, he was not connected
with... to his own population.

PHAN QUANG TUE:
Diem was simply the opposite
of what democracy was.

South Vietnam, in the
competition against the North,

that should been, should have
been a golden opportunity

to have that society open
with the free press,

free expression.

But there was not much choice

if the two system are
structurally dictator

and oppressive systems--

one under the Communist
Party, one under a family.

CHAU (speaking English):

NARRATOR:
Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu,
had been the architect

of the strategic hamlet program,

ran a personal political party
that mirrored the techniques

and the ruthlessness
of the communists,

and supervised a host of
internal security units

that spied on and seized enemies
of the regime.

Some reporters
who probed too deeply

into what Diem and Nhu
were doing

were ordered out of the country.

(gunshot)

When an American journalist
objected,

Nhu's sharp-tongued wife told
him Vietnam had no use

for "your crazy freedoms."

Meanwhile,
out in the countryside,

John Paul Vann and other
advisors had begun to notice

that the corruption within
Diem's regime had filtered down

to the commanders in the field.

Troops, who had once been
willing to engage the enemy,

now seemed strangely reluctant.

God, I was told so many
times, "(speaking Vietnamese)."

You know, "Scanlon,
(speaking Vietnamese)."

Um...

very dangerous, you know,
going out there.

NEIL SHEEHAN:
John Vann would go out
with them at night.

And he noticed that somebody
would always cough

or make some other
slight noise when it turned out

that the Viet Cong were heading
into the ambush site.

They did not want to get
in a fight.

NARRATOR:
South Vietnamese officers
were chosen

less for their combat skill
than for their loyalty

to President Diem,
and their men knew it.

RHEAULT:
What we should've done is

either forced the Vietnamese--
I mean really forced them--

to clean up their act.

And if they wouldn't clean up
their act to say,

"We're out of here.

"Because we don't bet
on losing horses.

"This is a losing horse.

You are not going to win
this insurgency."

We, as Americans, should have
understood the desire

of the Vietnamese people
to have their own country.

I mean we did the same thing
to the Brits.

NARRATOR:
In October of 1962, the United
States and the Soviet Union

came closer than they would ever
come again

to mutually assured destruction.

Good evening,
my fellow citizens.

This government,
as promised, has maintained

the closest surveillance of
the Soviet military buildup

on the island of Cuba.

Within the past week,

unmistakable evidence
has established the fact

that a series of offensive
missile sites

is now in preparation
on that imprisoned island.

NARRATOR:
The Soviets had secretly placed
nuclear missiles

90 miles
from the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged
President Kennedy to bomb Cuba.

He resisted and instead ordered
a naval blockade

to stop Soviet ships
from resupplying the island.

For 13 excruciating days,
the world held its breath.

Finally, in exchange
for a private pledge

to remove American missiles
from Turkey,

Khrushchev agreed to remove
his missiles from Cuba.

Neither the United States
nor the Soviet Union

wanted so direct
a confrontation ever again.

From now on, limited wars,

like the growing conflict
in Vietnam,

would assume
still greater importance.

MUSGRAVE:
I'd grown up in the shadow
of the mushroom cloud.

And I remember the...
watching President Kennedy speak

during the Cuban Missile Crisis

and wondering if I was
ever gonna kiss a girl.

And so this was just continuing
that battle

against the Russians.

Only we were fighting,
you know, their, their proxies,

the Vietnamese there--
but it was monolithic communism.

It didn't matter to me
where it was, I was going to go

if my government said
we needed to be there.

We were probably the last kids
of any generation

that actually believed

our government
would never lie to us.

SHEEHAN:
We had been writing stories
about all the flaws

on the Saigon side--
about how they wouldn't fight,

about the corruption,
they wouldn't obey orders,

the disorganization.

And then all of a sudden the
Viet Cong, for the first time,

the "raggedy-ass
little bastards"

as the Harkins's people
in Saigon called them,

stood and fought.

And suddenly all the flaws
on the Saigon side

were illuminated by this.

Like a star shell, it
illuminated the battlefield.

Everything came out.

NARRATOR:
A few days after Christmas 1962,

the 7th ARVN Division got
orders to capture

a Viet Cong radio transmitter

broadcasting from a spot some
40 miles southwest of Saigon

in a village called Tan Thoi.

The village was surrounded
by rice paddies.

An irrigation dike linked it to
a neighboring hamlet-- Ap Bac.

Intelligence suggested
no more than 120 guerrillas

were guarding the transmitter.

John Paul Vann helped draw up
what seemed to be

a foolproof plan of attack.

Supported by helicopters and
armored personnel carriers,

some 1,200 South Vietnamese
troops would attack the village

from three sides.

When the surviving Viet Cong
tried to flee through the gap

left open for them, as they
always had whenever outnumbered

and confronted
by modern weapons,

artillery and airstrikes
would destroy them.

Vann would observe the fighting
from a spotter plane.

But the intelligence underlying
it all turned out to be wrong.

There were more than 340 Viet
Cong, not 120, in the area.

Communist spies
had tipped them off

that they were soon to be
attacked.

And this time they would not
flee without a fight.

Among them was Le Quan Cong,

who had been a guerrilla fighter
since 1951, when he was 12.

NARRATOR:
At 6:35 in the morning
on January 2, 1963,

ten American helicopters ferried
an ARVN company

to a spot just north
of Tan Thoi.

They met no resistance.

Meanwhile, two South Vietnamese
Civil Guard battalions

approached Ap Bac
from the South on foot.

The Viet Cong commander let the
Civil Guards get within 100 feet

before giving the order to fire.

Several South Vietnamese
soldiers were killed.

Survivors hid behind a dike.

(gunfire)

Ten more helicopters,

filled with troops and escorted
by five helicopter gunships,

roared in to help.

LE QUAN CONG:

NARRATOR:
Viet Cong machine guns hit
14 of the 15 aircraft.

Five would be destroyed, killing
and wounding American crewmen.

LE QUAN CONG:

NARRATOR:
The enemy concentrated
their fire on the ARVN

struggling to get out
of the downed helicopters.

"It was like shooting ducks
for the Viet Cong,"

an American crewman remembered.

Colonel Vann circled
helplessly overhead.

He radioed the ARVN commander,

urging him to send an APC unit
to rescue the men.

SCANLON:
I got the word from John Vann

that American helicopters
were down.

They were right in front
of the Viet Cong positions.

We had Americans killed
and wounded

and we had to get over there
right away.

NARRATOR:
Like Vann, Captain Scanlon
was only an advisor.

Captain Ly Tong Ba,
his ARVN counterpart,

would have to give the order
to advance.

Scanlon liked and admired him.

SCANLON:
I turned to Ba and said,

"Hey, you know, you got to get
over there right away."

And Ba said to me,
"I'm not going."

NARRATOR:
Ba's superiors within the ARVN,
far from the battlefield,

had told him to stay put.

And John Vann, my boss, was,
uh, screaming at me over the...

over the radio to get them
over there.

NARRATOR:
It took Scanlon an hour
to convince Captain Ba to move.

Another two hours were lost

before the APCs could make
their way through the paddies

toward the trapped men.

The firing had died down.

SCANLON:
Everything was quiet.

You could see the open
expanse of rice fields.

And my reaction was,
hey, it was all over.

NARRATOR:
The first two APCs
dropped their ramps.

Infantry squads stepped out,

prepared to spray the tree line
with automatic fire

as they advanced.

In the past,
that had been enough

to make the Viet Cong
scurry away.

This time was different.

Eight of the APCs
came under attack.

Within minutes, six of their
gunners had been killed,

shot through the head.

SCANLON:
And boy, we got raked.

So it was like a pool table.

We were on the green

and they were in the pockets
shooting at us.

NARRATOR:
When Captain Ba managed
to convince

a few more APCs to advance,

guerrillas leapt
from their foxholes

and hurled hand grenades
at them.

None did any real damage,

but the drivers were so
demoralized that they halted,

turned around, and withdrew
behind the wrecked helicopters.

From his spotter plane,

Vann begged the ARVN to make
a simultaneous assault

on the enemy by all the
remaining ground forces.

ARVN commanders refused.

That night,
the Viet Cong melted away,

carrying most of their dead
and wounded with them.

At least 80 South Vietnamese
soldiers had been killed.

So had three American advisors,
including Captain Ken Good,

a friend of Scanlon's.

SCANLON:
We stacked the armored personnel
carriers with bodies,

stacked them up on top
till they...

we couldn't stack anymore.

And, um, I wouldn't let the
Vietnamese touch the Americans.

So I carried Americans out.

And, um...

And I was... I was exhausted.

They told me about
Ken Good getting killed.

And Ken and I had worked so hard
with our two battalions.

And to hear that...
he got killed hurt.

(voice breaking):
Great guy.

NARRATOR:
Reporters arrived from Saigon

before all of the ARVN dead
could be removed.

They were horrified at what they
saw and tried to find out

what had really happened.

John Paul Vann took Neil Sheehan
and David Halberstam aside

and told them.

The Battle of Ap Bac had been

"a miserable goddamn
performance."

"The ARVN won't listen,"
he said.

"They make the same mistakes
over and over again

in the same way."

But back in Saigon,

General Harkins immediately
declared victory.

"The ARVN forces had
an objective," he said.

"We took that objective.

"The VC left and their
casualties were greater

"than those of
the government forces.

What more do you want?"

When Halberstam and Sheehan
reported

that Ap Bac had in fact
been a defeat,

the U.S. Commander
in the Pacific denied it all

and urged the reporters
to "get on the team."

SHEEHAN:
Ap Bac was terribly important.

They had shot down five
helicopters,

which they previously had been
terrified of.

They'd stopped the armored
personnel carriers.

They demonstrated
to their own people

that you could resist
the Americans and win.

LE QUAN CONG:

NARRATOR:
In Hanoi, the Battle of Ap Bac
was seen

by Party First Secretary Le Duan
and his Politburo allies

as evidence
of the inherent weakness

of the South Vietnamese regime.

Even when faced with American
advisors and weaponry,

the Viet Cong had learned
how to inflict heavy casualties

on Saigon's forces,
and get away again.

In Saigon, President Diem
claimed the ARVN were winning,

not losing.

Ap Bac had only been
a momentary setback.

And he resented Americans
telling him

how to fight his battles
or run his country.

The president's sister-in-law,
Madame Nhu, went further.

She denounced the Americans
as "false brothers."

"We don't have a prayer
of staying in Vietnam,"

President Kennedy privately told
a friend that spring.

"These people hate us.

"But I can't give up a piece
of territory like that

to the communists and then get
the people to reelect me."

(loud commotion)

ED HERLIHY:
Buddhist monks and nuns
are joined

by thousands of sympathizers

to protest
the government's restrictions

on the practice of
their religion in South Vietnam.

SHEEHAN:
Diem began by alienating
the rural population.

And that started the Viet Cong.

And now he was alienating
the urban population.

HERLIHY:
Seventy percent of the
population is Buddhist

and the demonstrators clashed
with the police

during the week-long series
of incidents like this.

NARRATOR:
In the months that followed
the Battle of Ap Bac,

South Vietnam plunged into civil
strife that had little to do

with the Viet Cong.

Religion and nationalism
were at its heart.

A Catholic minority had for
years dominated the government

of an overwhelmingly
Buddhist country.

That spring in the city of Hue,

Christian flags had been
flown to celebrate

the 25th anniversary
of the ordination

of Diem's older brother
as a Catholic bishop.

But when the Buddhists
of the city flew their flags

to celebrate the 2,527th
birthday of Lord Buddha,

police tore them down.

Protesters took to the streets.

The Catholic deputy province
chief sent security forces

to suppress the demonstration.

The soldiers opened fire.

(two gunshots)

Eight protesters died.

The youngest was 12;
the oldest was 20.

The Diem regime blamed
the Viet Cong.

Monks throughout the country
demanded an apology.

They also called for an end
to discrimination

by Catholic officials.

Many Buddhists had come to see
Diem's policies

as a direct threat
to their religious beliefs.

DUONG VAN MAI:
My family was against
what Diem was doing.

My mother was convinced

that Diem was destroying
the Buddhist faith.

She would go to the pagodas and
listen to the monks' speeches.

And she was just
extremely upset.

She was not alone.

There was a lot of people
like her.

NARRATOR:
American officials urged Diem
and his brother Nhu

to make meaningful concessions
to the Buddhists,

for the sake
of maintaining unity

in the struggle
against communism.

They refused.

On June 10, 1963, Malcolm Browne
of the Associated Press

received an anonymous tip:

something important was going
to happen the next day

at a major intersection
in Saigon.

He took his camera.

To protest the Diem regime's
repression,

a 73-year-old monk named
Quang Duc set himself on fire.

As a large, hushed crowd watched
him burn to death,

another monk repeated
over and over again

in English and Vietnamese,

"A Buddhist monk becomes
a martyr.

A Buddhist monk
becomes a martyr."

SHEEHAN:
I remember they held the ashes

of the monk who burned himself
to death

where it was kept in one
of the main pagodas.

And lines of people came to pass
by, and I saw these women,

not rich women, ordinary
Vietnamese women,

take off the one piece of gold
they had on, their wedding ring,

and drop it in the bottle
to contribute to the struggle.

And I thought to myself,
"This regime is over.

It's the end."

NARRATOR:
Soon other monks
would become martyrs.

Fresh outbursts by Madame Nhu
only made things worse.

Burning monks made her clap
her hands, she said.

If more monks wanted
to burn themselves,

she would provide the matches.

The only thing they have done,

they have barbecued
one of their monks,

whom they have intoxicated, whom
they have abused the confidence.

And even that barbecuing
was done

not even with self-sufficient
means

because they-they used
imported gasoline.

DUONG VAN MAI:
They thought she was arrogant,

she was power hungry.

They suspected her and her
husband of being corrupt.

Nhu ran the secret police, which
arrested and tortured people.

People feared the Diem regime.

Perhaps more than they feared
it, they really hated it.

NARRATOR:
Students, including
many Catholics,

rallied to the Buddhist cause.

So did some army officers.

People among the military
had to ask the question,

"Can we continue this kind
of situation like that

"when the whole country,
country was almost burning

with the kind of protest
from the Buddhists?"

You see?

ZIMMERMAN:
I first became aware of Vietnam
because of a burning monk.

We had watched the civil rights
movement in the South

and it had set the standard
for us

to stand up against injustice,
allow yourself to be beaten up,

allow yourself to be attacked
by a dog

or hit by a police truncheon.

And we had enormous respect

for people who were willing
to go that far.

And then one day in 1963,

we saw on television
a picture of a monk in Saigon.

This was an extraordinary act.

Why was a Buddhist monk
burning himself

on the streets of Saigon?

NARRATOR:
The protests continued.

Tensions between Washington
and Saigon steadily worsened.

The more the Kennedy
Administration demanded change,

the more Diem and his brother
Nhu seemed to resist.

The White House announced that
a new American ambassador,

former senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, was being sent to Saigon,

a man eminent enough,
the president hoped,

to make Diem listen more closely
to American advice.

Diem professed to be
unimpressed.

"They can send ten Lodges,"
he said,

"but I will not let myself
or my country be humiliated,

not if they train their
artillery on this palace."

He did promise the outgoing
ambassador, Frederick Nolting,

that he would take no further
repressive steps

against the Buddhists.

Then, a few minutes after
midnight on August 21, 1963,

with Nolting gone and
Henry Cabot Lodge's arrival

still one day away,
Diem cut the phone lines

of all the senior American
officials in Saigon

and sent hundreds
of his Special Forces

storming into Buddhist pagodas
in Saigon, Hue,

and several other
South Vietnamese cities.

Some 1,400 monks and nuns,

students and ordinary citizens
were rounded up and taken away.

(shouting)

Martial law was imposed,
public meetings were forbidden,

troops were authorized to shoot
anyone found on the streets

after 9:00.

PETER ROBERTS:
Tanks guard a pagoda in Saigon

during South Vietnam's
bafflingly complicated crisis

that has the government of
President Ngo Dinh Diem,

students, and Buddhists,
and the United States government

all trying to guess one
another's next move.

NARRATOR:
When college students protested
in support of the monks,

Diem closed Vietnam's
universities.

High school students
then poured into the streets.

He shut down
all the high schools

and the grammar schools, too,

and arrested thousands
of school children,

including the sons and daughters
of officials

in his own government.

PHAN QUANG TUE:
I participated
in the demonstrations.

I strongly believed that that
government has to be overthrown

because it's a dictator
government.

We couldn't stand it anymore

and this is an opportunity
to rise against it.

NARRATOR:
Phan Quang Tue was a law student
that summer.

His father was a prominent
nationalist whom Diem had jailed

for calling for
greater democracy.

PHAN QUANG TUE:
I was and I'm still a Catholic,

not a very good Catholic.

I don't practice religiously.

But I'm a Catholic.

I was rightly arrested

because I did participate
in demonstration.

And I was interrogated

and briefly tortured,
beaten a little bit.

HERLIHY:
Henry Cabot Lodge took over
as U.S. ambassador

in the midst of the turmoil.

And he has reported
to have demanded

that President Diem's brother
Nhu be ousted

or U.S. aid to Vietnam
will be cut.

NARRATOR:
In the wake of the pagoda raids,

a small group of South
Vietnamese generals

contacted the CIA in Saigon.

Diem's brother Nhu was now
largely in control

of the government, they said.

What would Washington's reaction
be if they mounted a coup?

President Kennedy
and his senior advisors

happened to be out of town,
so Roger Hilsman, Jr.,

assistant secretary of state
for Far Eastern affairs

and a critic of the Diem regime,

took it upon himself to draft
a cable with new instructions

for Ambassador Lodge.

The U.S. government could
no longer tolerate a situation

in which power lay in Nhu's
hands, it said.

Diem should be given a chance
to rid himself of his brother.

If he refused, Lodge was
to tell the generals,

"then we must face the
possibility that Diem himself

cannot be preserved."

The president was vacationing at
Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.

Undersecretary of State George
Ball read part of the cable

to him over the phone.

Since the early 1950s,

the United States government
had encouraged

and even orchestrated other Cold
War coups in Iran, Guatemala,

the Congo, and elsewhere.

Kennedy decided to approve
Hilsman's cable

in part because he thought
his top advisors

had already endorsed it.

They had not.

And somehow, because of a cable
that came out from Washington,

Lodge decided that the only
solution was to get rid

of not just Ngo Dinh Nhu,
the bad brother,

but also of Diem himself.

And that started us
on this whole business

of promoting a coup.

And it was not a good idea.

I just had a feeling
of impending disaster.

NARRATOR:
On September 2, 1963,

Labor Day, Walter Cronkite
of CBS News

interviewed President Kennedy.

The president used the
opportunity to deliver a message

to President Diem.

Mr. President, the only hot war
we've got running at the moment

is of course the one in Vietnam,

and we've got our difficulties
there, quite obviously.

I don't think that unless
a greater effort is made

by the government to win
popular support

that the war can be won
out there.

In the final analysis,
it's their war.

Hasn't every indication
from Saigon been

that President Diem
has no intention

of changing his pattern?

If he doesn't change it,

of course, that's his decision.

He has been there ten years
and, as I say,

he has carried this burden

when he has been counted out
on a number of occasions.

Our best judgment is

that he can't be
successful in this basis.

But I don't agree with those
who say we should withdraw.

That would be a great mistake.

That'd be
a great mistake.

I know people don't like
Americans to be engaged

in this kind of an effort.

47 Americans have been killed.

We're in a very

desperate struggle
against the communist system.

And I don't want Asia to pass
into the control of the Chinese.

Do you think that this
government still has time

to-to regain the support
of the people?

I do.

With changes in policy
and perhaps in personnel,

I think it can.

If it doesn't make
those changes,

I would think that
the chances of winning it

would not be very good.

NARRATOR:
Despite the cable,
Kennedy and his advisors

were sharply
divided about a coup.

Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor,
Vice President Lyndon Johnson,

and the head of the CIA
all cautioned against it,

because, while none of them
especially admired Diem,

they did not believe there was
any viable alternative.

GREGG:
Fritz Nolting was called in.

And he said, "As difficult
as they are to deal with,

"there is nobody with the guts
and sangfroid in Vietnam

"of Diem and his brother Nhu.

"And if we let them go
we will be saddled

by a descending cycle
of mediocre generals."

And he was absolutely correct.

NARRATOR:
But several State Department
officials believed

that without fresh leadership,
South Vietnam could not survive.

The debate intensified.

"My God," the president said,

"my administration
is coming apart."

In the end,
Kennedy instructed Lodge

to tell the renegade generals

that while the United States
does not wish

to stimulate a coup,
it would not thwart one either.

The generals laid their plans.

(gunfire)

On November 1, 1963,
troops loyal to the plotters

seized key installations
in Saigon

and demanded Diem and Nhu
surrender.

REPORTER:
The battle for the city
went on for 18 hours

and most of it was centered
on the presidential palace.

Just after 6:30 in the morning
Saturday, the shooting ceased.

(people cheering)

NARRATOR:
Diem and Nhu escaped,
took sanctuary in a church,

and agreed to surrender
to the rebels in exchange

for the promise of safe
passage out of the country.

They were picked up in an
armored personnel carrier...

(gunshot)

And murdered soon
after they climbed inside.

(gunshot)

Madame Nhu survived the coup.

She was on a goodwill tour
in the United States.

PHAN QUANG TUE:
The system was overthrown
on November 1.

I was released November 4.

And it was the most exciting
moment in the life of Saigon.

The excitement,
you could feel it in the air.

DUONG VAN MAI:
I was thinking that,
yeah, it's a good thing.

Diem was making it impossible
to win the war

because people were
so against him

that the war would be lost
if he stayed in power.

My father was a bit worried

because he didn't know
who was going to replace Diem.

NARRATOR:
Ambassador Lodge reported
to Washington

that "every Vietnamese has
a smile on his face today."

"The prospects are now for
a shorter war," he said,

"provided the generals
stay together.

"Certainly officers
and soldiers

who can pull off an operation
like this," he continued,

"should be able to do
very well on the battlefield

if their hearts are in it."

President Kennedy was
not so sure.

He was appalled that Diem
and Nhu had been killed.

Three days later, he dictated
his own rueful account

of the coup and his
concerns for the future.

KENNEDY:
Monday, November 4, 1963.

Over the weekend the
coup in Saigon took place.

It culminated three months
of conversation,

which divided the government
here and in Saigon.

I feel that we must bear a good
deal of responsibility for it,

beginning
with our cable of August

in which we suggested the coup.

I should not have given
my consent to it

without a roundtable conference.

I was shocked by the death
of Diem and Nhu.

The way he was killed made it
particularly abhorrent.

The question now is whether
the generals can stay together

and build a stable government or
whether public opinion in Saigon

will turn on this government
as repressive and undemocratic

in the not-too-distant future.

NARRATOR:
Kennedy would not live
to see the answer

to the question he had asked.

He was murdered in Dallas
18 days later.

There were now 16,000 American
advisors in South Vietnam.

Their fate and the fate of
that embattled country rested

with another American president,
Lyndon Baines Johnson.

(distorted rock music playing)

SHEEHAN:
We thought we were the
exceptions to history,

we Americans.

History didn't apply to us.

We could never fight a bad war.

We could never represent
the wrong cause.

We were Americans.

Well, in Vietnam it proved

that we were not
an exception to history.

(distorted rock music continues)

("Mean Old World"
by Sam Cooke playing)

♪ This is a mean old world
to live in all by yourself ♪

♪ This is a mean old world
to live in ♪

♪ All by yourself

♪ This is a mean world
to be alone ♪

♪ Without someone
to call your own ♪

♪ This is a mean old world
to try and live in ♪

♪ All by yourself

♪ I wish I had someone,
someone ♪

♪ Who'd love me true

♪ I wish I had someone
who loved me true ♪

♪ If I had someone
who loved me true ♪

♪ Then I know I wouldn't be
so blue ♪

♪ This is a mean old world
to try and live in ♪

♪ All by yourself

♪ Lord, I find myself dreaming

♪ I found a love

♪ Sometimes I find myself
dreaming ♪

♪ I found a love

♪ Sometimes I dream
I've really found a love ♪

♪ Someone who loved me true
as the stars above ♪

♪ For this is a mean old world
to try and live in ♪

♪ All by yourself.