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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,002 --> 00:00:04,303 BEN: Scientists design machines that think for themselves... 2 00:00:04,338 --> 00:00:06,371 I guess I have an aversion to the word "drone". 3 00:00:06,407 --> 00:00:09,141 It implies something mindless. 4 00:00:09,176 --> 00:00:11,777 ...with the potential to become weaponized... 5 00:00:11,812 --> 00:00:13,312 (Popping) 6 00:00:13,347 --> 00:00:16,815 The military would be crazy not to take these technologies 7 00:00:16,850 --> 00:00:19,484 and utilize them in ways that would help us 8 00:00:19,520 --> 00:00:21,553 perform better on the battlefield. 9 00:00:21,589 --> 00:00:22,955 ...or even hacked. 10 00:00:24,592 --> 00:00:27,492 There will always be vulnerabilities. 11 00:00:27,528 --> 00:00:29,995 You can't design them out of your system 12 00:00:30,030 --> 00:00:33,966 just with a sheer force of will and intelligence. 13 00:00:34,001 --> 00:00:36,702 But how will it change the way we fight wars? 14 00:00:36,737 --> 00:00:41,640 It is a fantasy to think that you can delegate the decision 15 00:00:41,675 --> 00:00:44,309 over life and death to a robot. 16 00:00:46,313 --> 00:00:56,321 ♪ 17 00:01:05,699 --> 00:01:07,833 50 years ago, it was pure science fiction to imagine 18 00:01:07,868 --> 00:01:10,202 a U.S. soldier sitting in a bunker in Nevada 19 00:01:10,237 --> 00:01:13,338 could remotely pilot a plane flying thousands of miles away, 20 00:01:13,374 --> 00:01:17,042 and then drop a hellfire missile on an enemy target. 21 00:01:17,077 --> 00:01:19,611 But this is reality in 2016. 22 00:01:19,647 --> 00:01:23,348 Today, unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, 23 00:01:23,384 --> 00:01:25,183 are a vital part of warfare. 24 00:01:25,219 --> 00:01:27,319 They're in the stockpiles of more than two dozen nations, 25 00:01:27,354 --> 00:01:30,155 and target and kill thousands around the world. 26 00:01:30,190 --> 00:01:32,124 The next generation of drone technology 27 00:01:32,159 --> 00:01:34,026 is even more sophisticated. 28 00:01:34,061 --> 00:01:36,395 I found it here, in this idyllic little field 29 00:01:36,430 --> 00:01:38,730 just outside of Budapest, Hungary. 30 00:01:38,766 --> 00:01:41,400 When you look at a flock of starlings in the sky, 31 00:01:41,435 --> 00:01:44,169 their motion is based on very simple rules. 32 00:01:44,204 --> 00:01:47,372 The whole pattern, their motion is some kind of 33 00:01:47,408 --> 00:01:50,242 meta level intelligence or collective intelligence, 34 00:01:50,277 --> 00:01:53,412 and the same kind of thing applies to drones as well. 35 00:01:53,447 --> 00:01:54,746 When I see the whole flock flying, 36 00:01:54,782 --> 00:01:57,382 it's always magical for me after so many years. 37 00:01:57,418 --> 00:01:59,918 This is Gabor Vasarhelyi. 38 00:01:59,953 --> 00:02:02,187 He's part of a team developing technology they hope will be 39 00:02:02,222 --> 00:02:04,656 used in agriculture or search and rescue. 40 00:02:04,692 --> 00:02:06,758 They're working on drone swarms, 41 00:02:06,794 --> 00:02:09,494 which is to say a flock of autonomous drones in the sky, 42 00:02:09,530 --> 00:02:12,631 moving and making decisions as a posse of like-minded robots. 43 00:02:12,666 --> 00:02:14,099 (Beeping noise) 44 00:02:18,038 --> 00:02:19,838 Unlike the typical drones used today, there's no 45 00:02:19,873 --> 00:02:22,174 human operator directing their movement individually. 46 00:02:22,209 --> 00:02:23,542 (Buzzing) 47 00:02:23,577 --> 00:02:25,510 Oh, now you're hearing them kinda creep up, eh? 48 00:02:25,546 --> 00:02:27,112 (Buzzing) 49 00:02:27,147 --> 00:02:28,747 These machines are given a set of instructions... 50 00:02:28,782 --> 00:02:30,582 BEN: Holy ----. 51 00:02:30,617 --> 00:02:32,751 ...then they figure out how to execute them as a team, 52 00:02:32,786 --> 00:02:34,219 solving problems in real time. 53 00:02:35,923 --> 00:02:37,756 (Shrugging) 54 00:02:37,791 --> 00:02:39,624 That beacon in my hands makes the drones track 55 00:02:39,660 --> 00:02:41,860 whoever's holding it, wherever they go. 56 00:02:43,897 --> 00:02:45,464 Notice how they coordinate and keep their distance 57 00:02:45,499 --> 00:02:47,199 from one another automatically. 58 00:02:49,236 --> 00:02:50,669 Ah! 59 00:02:54,608 --> 00:02:56,441 How are they communicating with one another? 60 00:02:56,477 --> 00:03:00,212 The drones have a local communication network. 61 00:03:00,247 --> 00:03:04,116 Every single drone just sends out some info about itself, 62 00:03:04,151 --> 00:03:07,119 and all the drones that are close enough to receive this, 63 00:03:07,154 --> 00:03:09,554 they receive and integrate into the decisions. 64 00:03:09,590 --> 00:03:11,123 Why do you think the military's interested 65 00:03:11,158 --> 00:03:12,524 in this kind of technology? 66 00:03:12,559 --> 00:03:15,093 If you have one big aircraft and someone shoots it, 67 00:03:15,129 --> 00:03:19,498 then it's a lot of damage and then your whole man is gone. 68 00:03:19,533 --> 00:03:23,268 When you have 100 drones instead and someone shoots at it, 69 00:03:23,303 --> 00:03:26,471 then one drone is taken away and the rest can do the same. 70 00:03:26,507 --> 00:03:28,340 That's how mosquitos work, for example. 71 00:03:28,375 --> 00:03:30,308 Like there are many small mosquitos, everybody is just 72 00:03:30,344 --> 00:03:33,078 sipping a little bit of blood, but the whole species goes on. 73 00:03:34,348 --> 00:03:36,415 Air Forces of the future may be stoked on the idea 74 00:03:36,450 --> 00:03:39,151 of drone swarms, but what about the navies? 75 00:03:39,186 --> 00:03:42,154 Here at a NATO research facility in Italy, scientists are 76 00:03:42,189 --> 00:03:44,990 essentially developing autonomous unmanned subs. 77 00:03:45,025 --> 00:03:47,626 But signals travel more slowly underwater, 78 00:03:47,661 --> 00:03:50,695 and that makes it harder to create a submarine swarm. 79 00:03:50,731 --> 00:03:53,765 One of the things we're trying to do is 80 00:03:53,801 --> 00:03:56,168 create the internet for underwater robots. 81 00:03:56,203 --> 00:03:58,203 So we have the internet on land, 82 00:03:58,238 --> 00:04:01,039 and now we're getting the Internet of Things. 83 00:04:01,074 --> 00:04:05,143 Well, we're doing Internet of Things for underwater things. 84 00:04:05,179 --> 00:04:07,179 So, how is the internet underwater? 85 00:04:07,214 --> 00:04:08,613 It sucks! 86 00:04:08,649 --> 00:04:10,282 (Laughing) 87 00:04:10,317 --> 00:04:13,285 John Potter is the scientist in charge of strategic development. 88 00:04:13,320 --> 00:04:14,886 He hopes that the drones they're developing here 89 00:04:14,922 --> 00:04:16,655 will be used to map the oceans. 90 00:04:16,690 --> 00:04:19,024 So when it comes to autonomous... 91 00:04:19,059 --> 00:04:22,227 or when it comes to, let's say, drones in the water, 92 00:04:22,262 --> 00:04:23,795 what is coming over the horizon? 93 00:04:23,831 --> 00:04:26,398 I guess I have an aversion to the word "drone". 94 00:04:26,433 --> 00:04:29,334 It implies something mindless. 95 00:04:29,369 --> 00:04:31,203 From the outset, there was never an option 96 00:04:31,238 --> 00:04:35,373 to go the "drone" route, of having a dumb device. 97 00:04:35,409 --> 00:04:37,576 Because once you put it in the sea, and it dives 98 00:04:37,611 --> 00:04:39,878 and it's gone more than 100 metres away from you, 99 00:04:39,913 --> 00:04:42,314 you don't know what it's up to. 100 00:04:42,349 --> 00:04:43,882 And if you ever want to see it come back... 101 00:04:43,917 --> 00:04:45,417 (Laughing) 102 00:04:45,452 --> 00:04:47,052 ...you want to have something a little smarter than that. 103 00:04:47,087 --> 00:04:48,854 So what would you call them, unmanned...? 104 00:04:48,889 --> 00:04:52,724 So these vehicles are a step forward in autonomy 105 00:04:52,759 --> 00:04:54,392 with respect to what's currently... 106 00:04:54,428 --> 00:04:56,695 typically in operation at the moment. 107 00:04:56,730 --> 00:05:01,066 They're able to adaptively change what they are doing. 108 00:05:01,101 --> 00:05:04,035 So you can put vehicles in and have them work as a team. 109 00:05:04,071 --> 00:05:07,339 And if one vehicle sees something and it knows it has 110 00:05:07,374 --> 00:05:09,708 a team member with maybe a high resolution camera 111 00:05:09,743 --> 00:05:12,511 or imaging system that's just over here somewhere, 112 00:05:12,546 --> 00:05:15,113 and it knows how far away it is, it says, "Hey, Bill. 113 00:05:15,148 --> 00:05:17,382 Come and take a look at this, I think I found a so-and-so. 114 00:05:17,417 --> 00:05:19,518 You wanna check that out, see what you think of it?" 115 00:05:19,553 --> 00:05:21,286 And I guess that's one of the other things people are going to 116 00:05:21,321 --> 00:05:23,722 wonder, is like... is something like an underwater system 117 00:05:23,757 --> 00:05:25,957 like that, could that be weaponized at some point? 118 00:05:25,993 --> 00:05:28,793 That's not something we are really working on here. 119 00:05:28,829 --> 00:05:33,098 How these autonomous abilities eventually translate into 120 00:05:33,133 --> 00:05:37,302 operational systems depends on lots of other folk 121 00:05:37,337 --> 00:05:39,938 and organizations within NATO and elsewhere. 122 00:05:39,973 --> 00:05:42,040 It is something that's being considered. 123 00:05:42,075 --> 00:05:46,011 But I would like to see all the stakeholders - which basically 124 00:05:46,046 --> 00:05:50,749 means all of society - become informed, well informed, 125 00:05:50,784 --> 00:05:52,784 and think carefully about this. 126 00:05:52,819 --> 00:05:55,720 What is it that we actually want from autonomous systems? 127 00:05:58,525 --> 00:05:59,958 And that really hit me. 128 00:05:59,993 --> 00:06:02,060 The people developing these systems aren't the ones 129 00:06:02,095 --> 00:06:04,563 who will decide how they're used in military conflict. 130 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:08,099 But whether or not you're comfortable 131 00:06:08,135 --> 00:06:10,402 with autonomous drone swarms, they're coming. 132 00:06:10,437 --> 00:06:12,737 I'm in Portugal, heading out to a NATO research ship 133 00:06:12,773 --> 00:06:14,773 in the Atlantic to get a first-hand view 134 00:06:14,808 --> 00:06:16,408 of underwater drone testing. 135 00:06:17,811 --> 00:06:20,478 I'm gonna have to climb that puppy right there, 136 00:06:20,514 --> 00:06:22,147 like Blackbeard or something. 137 00:06:23,383 --> 00:06:24,950 (Grunting) 138 00:06:26,320 --> 00:06:32,791 ♪ 139 00:06:32,826 --> 00:06:35,860 This is more or less our control centre where we keep 140 00:06:35,896 --> 00:06:38,997 the picture of everything that we have deployed at sea. 141 00:06:39,032 --> 00:06:41,299 This here is the position of the ship, 142 00:06:41,335 --> 00:06:42,734 this is where we are now. 143 00:06:42,769 --> 00:06:46,037 You'll see here these green points is our field of 144 00:06:46,073 --> 00:06:48,340 deployed assets for the current tests we're doing. 145 00:06:48,375 --> 00:06:50,041 This is basically your ocean lab. 146 00:06:50,077 --> 00:06:51,643 It's our ocean lab, exactly. 147 00:06:51,678 --> 00:06:53,345 That's a good way to put it, it's our ocean lab. 148 00:06:54,381 --> 00:06:57,682 Joao Alves is the Coordinator for Underwater Communication. 149 00:06:57,718 --> 00:07:00,251 He and his crew spend weeks at sea experimenting with things 150 00:07:00,287 --> 00:07:04,623 like submarine communication and anti-sub warfare tech. 151 00:07:04,658 --> 00:07:05,991 "Time Bandit." 152 00:07:06,026 --> 00:07:07,792 So these are the anti-submarine warfare ones? 153 00:07:07,828 --> 00:07:10,662 These are the ones that we employ for our multistatic 154 00:07:10,697 --> 00:07:13,031 anti-submarine warfare missions, yes indeed. 155 00:07:13,066 --> 00:07:15,467 Now I know these machines right now are just... 156 00:07:15,502 --> 00:07:18,036 they're doing nothing more than reconnaissance or surveillance 157 00:07:18,071 --> 00:07:21,239 or even just mapping, or anti-submarine warfare 158 00:07:21,274 --> 00:07:25,343 in terms of detecting different possible enemy craft, 159 00:07:25,379 --> 00:07:26,645 but do you think at any point 160 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:28,713 these things could be weaponized? 161 00:07:28,749 --> 00:07:30,181 Do you think that's a possibility? 162 00:07:30,217 --> 00:07:32,350 We, as a science-based research centre, 163 00:07:32,386 --> 00:07:35,053 are interested in developing the autonomy, 164 00:07:35,088 --> 00:07:36,655 the capabilities of these machines. 165 00:07:36,690 --> 00:07:40,325 Then, I mean, it's totally out of our scope, the usage of... 166 00:07:40,360 --> 00:07:43,728 We are very excited on the examples you just gave, 167 00:07:43,764 --> 00:07:47,032 on the improving the reconnaissance, 168 00:07:47,067 --> 00:07:51,436 improving the mapping capabilities... 169 00:07:51,471 --> 00:07:53,705 other than that, I mean, we... 170 00:07:53,740 --> 00:07:54,839 You're not touching the rest? 171 00:07:54,875 --> 00:07:55,907 No, not at all. 172 00:07:55,942 --> 00:07:57,509 I mean, not even our interest. 173 00:07:59,046 --> 00:08:01,746 Joao says he's not interested in weaponizing these drones. 174 00:08:01,782 --> 00:08:04,516 But like other people working on the same autonomous machines, 175 00:08:04,551 --> 00:08:07,052 he doesn't decide how they're ultimately used. 176 00:08:07,087 --> 00:08:09,387 That's up to the military. 177 00:08:14,695 --> 00:08:16,594 BEN: Unlike the carpet bombings of the past, 178 00:08:16,630 --> 00:08:18,630 drone strikes are supposed to be precise, 179 00:08:18,665 --> 00:08:20,598 limiting civilian casualties. 180 00:08:20,634 --> 00:08:22,801 That said, it's tough to know exactly how many people 181 00:08:22,836 --> 00:08:25,570 around the world were killed by drones in the past decade. 182 00:08:25,605 --> 00:08:27,238 Estimates range from the thousands 183 00:08:27,274 --> 00:08:29,841 to the tens of thousands, and it's even harder to figure out 184 00:08:29,876 --> 00:08:32,143 how many of those killed or injured were civilians. 185 00:08:32,179 --> 00:08:35,480 ♪ 186 00:08:35,515 --> 00:08:38,249 But it's not just the numbers that alarm some critics. 187 00:08:38,285 --> 00:08:40,919 Have you seen a US president go on TV to say, 188 00:08:40,954 --> 00:08:43,688 "Tonight, I ordered airstrikes in Libya"? 189 00:08:43,724 --> 00:08:45,690 Or Pakistan or Yemen? 190 00:08:45,726 --> 00:08:47,692 They don't do that anymore. 191 00:08:47,728 --> 00:08:50,095 Because something about drone technology and other 192 00:08:50,130 --> 00:08:55,133 weapons technology has enabled US presidents and politicians 193 00:08:55,168 --> 00:08:57,769 to basically shift what the norm is. 194 00:08:57,804 --> 00:09:01,139 Naureen Shah is the director of Amnesty International USA's 195 00:09:01,174 --> 00:09:03,341 Security and Human Rights Program. 196 00:09:03,376 --> 00:09:05,043 She's a vocal opponent of the US military's 197 00:09:05,078 --> 00:09:06,878 targeted killing campaigns, 198 00:09:06,913 --> 00:09:09,013 and worries about the autonomous technologies in development. 199 00:09:10,383 --> 00:09:13,885 So the idea that this could reduce civilian casualties 200 00:09:13,920 --> 00:09:16,154 to you is impossible? 201 00:09:17,324 --> 00:09:19,657 Our concern is it actually would increase civilian casualties, 202 00:09:19,693 --> 00:09:21,659 increase the risk of civilian casualties. 203 00:09:21,695 --> 00:09:24,896 I of course agree that if we can keep people out of harm's way, 204 00:09:24,931 --> 00:09:27,565 that's vital. 205 00:09:27,601 --> 00:09:30,468 But if you don't have governments having to weigh 206 00:09:30,504 --> 00:09:34,739 the costs to their own citizens, when they decide to go to war, 207 00:09:34,775 --> 00:09:36,474 then you're really making it so that their stakes 208 00:09:36,510 --> 00:09:38,576 are a lot lower. 209 00:09:38,612 --> 00:09:41,813 And that could mean that the US and other governments 210 00:09:41,848 --> 00:09:44,549 are just engaging a lot more in warfare than they did before, 211 00:09:44,584 --> 00:09:47,252 just not calling it warfare, and we already see that. 212 00:09:47,287 --> 00:09:50,722 The US is using lethal force right now in Libya, Syria, 213 00:09:50,757 --> 00:09:55,360 Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia. 214 00:09:55,395 --> 00:09:58,496 There's something kind of invisible about the use of 215 00:09:58,532 --> 00:10:00,765 autonomous weapons, or robots. 216 00:10:00,801 --> 00:10:03,668 Something that enables policy makers to think, well, 217 00:10:03,703 --> 00:10:06,704 we could go... we could use lethal force in a surgical way, 218 00:10:06,740 --> 00:10:08,506 in a limited way, and we wouldn't even have to have 219 00:10:08,542 --> 00:10:10,008 a big public debate about it. 220 00:10:10,043 --> 00:10:13,144 We're supposedly just at war all the time. 221 00:10:13,180 --> 00:10:16,848 But at what point is this technology just inevitable? 222 00:10:19,386 --> 00:10:22,587 One of the things that is so difficult 223 00:10:22,622 --> 00:10:25,924 is that technology is fascinating for all of us. 224 00:10:25,959 --> 00:10:30,094 And it's so fascinating that it creates 225 00:10:30,130 --> 00:10:31,796 almost a kind of glee. 226 00:10:31,832 --> 00:10:34,232 It's a fixation that our generation has 227 00:10:34,267 --> 00:10:37,202 on the possibilities provided by technology. 228 00:10:37,237 --> 00:10:39,204 It can make us better than our own selves, 229 00:10:39,239 --> 00:10:44,209 that somehow a robot is more selfless than a human being is, 230 00:10:44,244 --> 00:10:46,544 doesn't have the prejudices of a human being, and that 231 00:10:46,580 --> 00:10:50,748 can solve the fundamental gruesomeness of war. 232 00:10:50,784 --> 00:10:55,753 It is a fantasy to think that you can delegate the decision 233 00:10:55,789 --> 00:11:00,291 over life and death to a robot and somehow that inherently 234 00:11:00,327 --> 00:11:03,761 makes it more humane and more precise and more lawful. 235 00:11:03,797 --> 00:11:06,764 Because there's nothing that would give us any reason 236 00:11:06,800 --> 00:11:09,300 to believe that a robot has human empathy, 237 00:11:09,336 --> 00:11:12,403 that it has the ability to make a judgment about who is 238 00:11:12,439 --> 00:11:15,607 a civilian and who is not a civilian, and whether or not in 239 00:11:15,642 --> 00:11:18,743 those particular circumstances a civilian really poses a threat. 240 00:11:20,714 --> 00:11:23,448 But some scientists completely disagree with Naureen, 241 00:11:23,483 --> 00:11:25,850 and think that it is in fact possible to program a robot 242 00:11:25,886 --> 00:11:28,453 to act in a more humane, precise and lawful way 243 00:11:28,488 --> 00:11:30,288 than a human soldier. 244 00:11:30,323 --> 00:11:33,258 And here on the Georgia Tech campus, they tried to prove it. 245 00:11:33,293 --> 00:11:38,696 ♪ 246 00:11:38,732 --> 00:11:42,267 So if you did something bad, and you felt guilty about it, 247 00:11:42,302 --> 00:11:44,369 you would be less likely to do it again. 248 00:11:44,404 --> 00:11:47,171 We want the robot to experience... to behave in... 249 00:11:47,207 --> 00:11:48,673 A similar way, right. 250 00:11:48,708 --> 00:11:51,709 The robots... None of these robots feel emotions, okay? 251 00:11:51,745 --> 00:11:52,877 They don't feel anything. 252 00:11:52,913 --> 00:11:54,279 They're not sentient. 253 00:11:54,314 --> 00:11:56,681 But people can perceive them as feeling things. 254 00:11:58,551 --> 00:12:00,818 Ron Arkin is a roboticist and professor. 255 00:12:00,854 --> 00:12:02,320 He's developing technology 256 00:12:02,355 --> 00:12:04,555 designed to program ethics into robots. 257 00:12:04,591 --> 00:12:07,992 There are issues associated with human war fighters 258 00:12:08,028 --> 00:12:12,230 who occasionally are careless, make mistakes, 259 00:12:12,265 --> 00:12:14,732 and in some cases commit atrocities. 260 00:12:14,768 --> 00:12:18,202 So you really think that you can program a robot to be 261 00:12:18,238 --> 00:12:22,373 a better and more efficient killer than a human being, 262 00:12:22,409 --> 00:12:25,977 and without making the same kind of mess ups that we might see, 263 00:12:26,012 --> 00:12:29,681 say in friendly fire or civilian casualties? 264 00:12:29,716 --> 00:12:31,516 I'm not interested in making them better and more efficient 265 00:12:31,551 --> 00:12:34,852 killers; I'm interested in making them better protectors 266 00:12:34,888 --> 00:12:38,256 of non-combatants and better protectors of civilians while 267 00:12:38,291 --> 00:12:41,592 they are conducting missions than human war fighters are. 268 00:12:41,628 --> 00:12:45,363 So my goal is to make them better adhere to international 269 00:12:45,398 --> 00:12:48,399 humanitarian law as embodied in the Geneva conventions 270 00:12:48,435 --> 00:12:49,834 and the rules of engagement. 271 00:12:49,869 --> 00:12:52,036 You cannot shoot in a no-kill zone, 272 00:12:52,072 --> 00:12:55,440 you cannot shoot people that have surrendered, 273 00:12:55,475 --> 00:12:58,509 you cannot carry out some summary executions. 274 00:12:58,545 --> 00:13:00,044 These systems should have the right to 275 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:01,713 refuse an order as well, too. 276 00:13:01,748 --> 00:13:02,947 - Really? - Yeah. 277 00:13:02,983 --> 00:13:04,749 This is not just a decision of when to fire, 278 00:13:04,784 --> 00:13:06,551 it's also a decision of when not to fire. 279 00:13:06,586 --> 00:13:11,356 So that if someone tells it to attack something that is 280 00:13:11,391 --> 00:13:13,291 against international humanitarian law, 281 00:13:13,326 --> 00:13:15,193 and its programming tells it that this is against 282 00:13:15,228 --> 00:13:17,595 international humanitarian law, it should not engage 283 00:13:17,630 --> 00:13:19,097 that particular target. 284 00:13:19,132 --> 00:13:20,565 So will these weapon systems, 285 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:23,301 could they be like the Tesla self-driving car? 286 00:13:23,336 --> 00:13:26,604 You know, you won't get into as many accidents. 287 00:13:26,639 --> 00:13:29,040 Yes, and that's the argument that self-driving cars use. 288 00:13:29,075 --> 00:13:30,541 It's the same sort of thing. 289 00:13:30,577 --> 00:13:32,477 They say that human beings are the most dangerous things 290 00:13:32,512 --> 00:13:35,480 on the road because we get angry, we drink, 291 00:13:35,515 --> 00:13:38,149 we are distracted. 292 00:13:38,184 --> 00:13:40,885 It'd be better to have the robots driving us there. 293 00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:42,387 Look at 9/11. 294 00:13:42,422 --> 00:13:44,288 There was no reason an aircraft should've crashed 295 00:13:44,324 --> 00:13:45,790 into those buildings. 296 00:13:45,825 --> 00:13:49,160 It's an easy task for a control system, now and then, 297 00:13:49,195 --> 00:13:51,629 to be able to change its altitude when it recognizes 298 00:13:51,664 --> 00:13:55,099 it's in a collision course and avoid that particular object. 299 00:13:55,135 --> 00:13:56,801 We chose not to do that. 300 00:13:56,836 --> 00:14:01,105 We choose to trust human beings over and over and over again, 301 00:14:01,141 --> 00:14:03,241 but that's not always the best solution. 302 00:14:08,782 --> 00:14:10,214 BEN: If there's one thing I've learned over the last few years, 303 00:14:10,250 --> 00:14:12,316 it's that it's possible to hack virtually everything 304 00:14:12,352 --> 00:14:16,054 running on code - from a nuclear enrichment facility to an SUV. 305 00:14:16,089 --> 00:14:19,190 But what about the drone swarms of the future? 306 00:14:19,225 --> 00:14:21,726 Here in Texas, there's a team of researchers that demonstrated 307 00:14:21,761 --> 00:14:25,029 how military drones used today are hackable. 308 00:14:25,065 --> 00:14:28,066 Todd Humphreys is the director of the Radionavigation Lab. 309 00:14:29,135 --> 00:14:30,668 So this is our arena. 310 00:14:30,703 --> 00:14:32,170 BEN: Nets for the drones? 311 00:14:32,205 --> 00:14:33,905 TODD: The nets' for the FAA. 312 00:14:33,940 --> 00:14:35,940 So there's a future, you think, 313 00:14:35,975 --> 00:14:38,076 wherein you could see a ton of these things? 314 00:14:38,111 --> 00:14:42,046 Dinner table-sized drones possibly, like in a swarm? 315 00:14:42,082 --> 00:14:43,247 Oh yeah. 316 00:14:43,283 --> 00:14:44,916 - Attacking a target? - That's right. 317 00:14:44,951 --> 00:14:48,753 And they have no regard for their own life, right? 318 00:14:48,788 --> 00:14:50,421 So these are suicide drones. 319 00:14:50,457 --> 00:14:53,558 They pick their target, they go directly at it, 320 00:14:53,593 --> 00:14:57,562 and the kinds of close-in weapons systems and... 321 00:14:57,597 --> 00:15:00,264 large-scale weapon systems that our US destroyers 322 00:15:00,300 --> 00:15:02,867 and the Navy have today or other ships, 323 00:15:02,902 --> 00:15:05,403 they'll be no match against 16 of these at once. 324 00:15:05,438 --> 00:15:07,872 Right, and it all starts here in Austin. 325 00:15:07,907 --> 00:15:12,110 Well, we don't intend to do development 326 00:15:12,145 --> 00:15:13,544 of war machines here. 327 00:15:13,580 --> 00:15:16,280 But I will say that our somewhat whimsical games 328 00:15:16,316 --> 00:15:19,550 that we'll be playing, they are going to engage 329 00:15:19,586 --> 00:15:22,153 our operators and our drones in scenarios 330 00:15:22,188 --> 00:15:25,289 that are applicable to all sorts of fields. 331 00:15:25,325 --> 00:15:28,226 One of those so-called whimsical games he and his students 332 00:15:28,261 --> 00:15:31,629 showed me was a drone version of Capture the Flag. 333 00:15:32,632 --> 00:15:34,298 (Popping) 334 00:15:34,334 --> 00:15:36,501 But that's not all they've been up to. 335 00:15:36,536 --> 00:15:38,569 Back in 2011, when the Iranians claimed to have hacked 336 00:15:38,605 --> 00:15:41,239 a US military drone, Todd and his team proved that 337 00:15:41,274 --> 00:15:43,641 it was indeed possible, and demonstrated how 338 00:15:43,676 --> 00:15:45,977 a simple method called spoofing could have been used 339 00:15:46,012 --> 00:15:47,745 to jack US military hardware. 340 00:15:50,150 --> 00:15:52,517 Every drone has a few vital links. 341 00:15:52,552 --> 00:15:55,153 One of them is to its ground controller, 342 00:15:55,188 --> 00:15:58,689 and one of them is to overhead satellites for navigation. 343 00:15:58,725 --> 00:16:01,092 Spoofing attacks one of those vital links. 344 00:16:01,127 --> 00:16:05,263 It basically falsifies a GPS signal, makes a forged signal, 345 00:16:05,298 --> 00:16:09,767 sends it over to the drone and convinces the drone that 346 00:16:09,802 --> 00:16:12,537 it's in a different place or at a different time, you know, 347 00:16:12,572 --> 00:16:15,606 because GPS gives us both time and position. 348 00:16:15,642 --> 00:16:18,042 And you've actually proven this is possible? 349 00:16:18,077 --> 00:16:19,810 We've demonstrated it, yeah. 350 00:16:19,846 --> 00:16:22,013 So we've done this, we've done it with a drone, 351 00:16:22,048 --> 00:16:24,982 we've done it with a 210-foot super yacht. 352 00:16:25,018 --> 00:16:27,118 So this is back in 2011 it was possible. 353 00:16:27,153 --> 00:16:28,519 - Yeah. - How about now? 354 00:16:28,555 --> 00:16:30,221 Have drones kind of caught up to this? 355 00:16:30,256 --> 00:16:32,790 Have engineers realized that, you know, 356 00:16:32,825 --> 00:16:34,292 when you put this autonomous thing in the air, 357 00:16:34,327 --> 00:16:37,628 essentially it can be overtaken by a hostile actor? 358 00:16:37,664 --> 00:16:40,965 I'd like to be able to say yes, but no. 359 00:16:41,000 --> 00:16:46,404 The FAA has... has charged a tiger team to looking into this, 360 00:16:46,439 --> 00:16:48,673 and they came back after two years of study and have 361 00:16:48,708 --> 00:16:52,143 put together a set of proposals that would make 362 00:16:52,178 --> 00:16:54,979 commercial airliners more resilient to spoofing, 363 00:16:55,014 --> 00:16:57,648 more... have better defenses against spoofing. 364 00:16:57,684 --> 00:17:02,486 They've also looked at even smaller unmanned aircraft. 365 00:17:02,522 --> 00:17:05,590 But things move slowly in the world of commercial airliners. 366 00:17:05,625 --> 00:17:10,194 And as far as smaller unmanned aircraft, I think those of us 367 00:17:10,230 --> 00:17:13,497 who are just playing around with the small toys and such 368 00:17:13,533 --> 00:17:16,334 aren't really thinking so much about security at this point. 369 00:17:16,369 --> 00:17:19,437 So we know that hacking drones are possible, and yet 370 00:17:19,472 --> 00:17:22,540 people are starting to think about creating drone swarms. 371 00:17:22,575 --> 00:17:23,774 Mm-hmm. 372 00:17:23,810 --> 00:17:26,210 What if your drone swarm... you send one off 373 00:17:26,246 --> 00:17:29,347 and you're thinking you're gonna destroy your enemy, 374 00:17:29,382 --> 00:17:31,115 and all of a sudden it turns right back around 375 00:17:31,150 --> 00:17:32,950 and it comes at you because it's been hacked? 376 00:17:32,986 --> 00:17:34,385 Right. 377 00:17:34,420 --> 00:17:36,220 I mean, do you have to prepare it to be able to destroy 378 00:17:36,256 --> 00:17:38,456 your own drone swarm? 379 00:17:38,491 --> 00:17:40,024 Absolutely. 380 00:17:40,059 --> 00:17:43,694 I believe you have to have a killswitch for your own swarm, 381 00:17:43,730 --> 00:17:46,697 your own resources, your assets, and that 382 00:17:46,733 --> 00:17:49,133 that must be an ironclad kill switch. 383 00:17:49,168 --> 00:17:53,070 The only way to think about security is as an arms race. 384 00:17:53,106 --> 00:17:57,141 There will always be vulnerabilities, 385 00:17:57,176 --> 00:18:02,046 and you can't somehow design them out of your system 386 00:18:02,081 --> 00:18:06,217 just with sheer force of will and intelligence. 387 00:18:06,252 --> 00:18:10,087 ♪ 388 00:18:12,692 --> 00:18:14,258 BEN: I'm at the Pentagon in Washington 389 00:18:14,294 --> 00:18:16,127 to meet with Robert Work. 390 00:18:16,162 --> 00:18:18,696 He's basically the number two at the Department of Defense, 391 00:18:18,731 --> 00:18:21,999 which is why he gets the Blackhawk helicopter treatment. 392 00:18:22,035 --> 00:18:24,835 We're heading out to the US Army Research Lab 393 00:18:24,871 --> 00:18:27,138 at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. 394 00:18:27,173 --> 00:18:30,341 Work is leading the Third Offset Strategy, an initiative 395 00:18:30,376 --> 00:18:32,677 aimed at building up the military's tech capabilities 396 00:18:32,712 --> 00:18:36,814 to counter big-time adversaries like Russia or China. 397 00:18:36,849 --> 00:18:39,850 The strategy calls for the US military to focus on robotics, 398 00:18:39,886 --> 00:18:43,888 miniaturization, 3D printing, and autonomous systems. 399 00:18:43,923 --> 00:18:46,957 So why is the US government so interested in autonomous 400 00:18:46,993 --> 00:18:49,960 weapons systems and autonomous machinery for the military? 401 00:18:49,996 --> 00:18:52,963 Autonomy and artificial intelligence 402 00:18:52,999 --> 00:18:55,666 is changing our lives every day. 403 00:18:55,702 --> 00:19:00,971 And the military would be crazy not to take these technologies 404 00:19:01,007 --> 00:19:04,508 and utilize them in ways that would help us perform better 405 00:19:04,544 --> 00:19:05,843 on the battlefield. 406 00:19:05,878 --> 00:19:07,912 I mean, would it be crazy because other countries 407 00:19:07,947 --> 00:19:09,313 are going to do it too? 408 00:19:09,349 --> 00:19:11,749 We know that other great powers like Russia and China 409 00:19:11,784 --> 00:19:15,853 are investing a lot of money in autonomy and AI, 410 00:19:15,888 --> 00:19:18,189 and they think differently about it than we do. 411 00:19:18,224 --> 00:19:21,192 You know, we think about autonomy and AI 412 00:19:21,227 --> 00:19:23,694 of enabling the human to be better. 413 00:19:23,730 --> 00:19:28,099 Authoritarian regimes sometimes think about taking the human 414 00:19:28,134 --> 00:19:30,167 out of the equation and allowing the machine 415 00:19:30,203 --> 00:19:32,737 to make the decision, and we think that's very dangerous. 416 00:19:32,772 --> 00:19:34,672 That's not our conception at all. 417 00:19:34,707 --> 00:19:36,273 It's more like Iron Man, 418 00:19:36,309 --> 00:19:40,411 where you would use the machine as an exoskeleton 419 00:19:40,446 --> 00:19:43,547 to make the human stronger, allow the human to do more; 420 00:19:43,583 --> 00:19:46,684 an autonomous intelligence that's a part of the machine 421 00:19:46,719 --> 00:19:49,754 to help the human make better decisions. 422 00:19:49,789 --> 00:19:51,622 Would taking humans out of the loop 423 00:19:51,657 --> 00:19:54,058 give your adversary an advantage? 424 00:19:54,093 --> 00:19:56,794 This is a question just like cyber vulnerability 425 00:19:56,829 --> 00:19:58,396 that keeps us up at night. 426 00:19:58,431 --> 00:20:04,435 Would a network that is working at machine speed all the time 427 00:20:04,470 --> 00:20:06,537 be able to beat a network 428 00:20:06,572 --> 00:20:10,107 in which machines and humans work together? 429 00:20:10,143 --> 00:20:13,878 Um, and in certain instances like... 430 00:20:13,913 --> 00:20:18,115 as I said, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, 431 00:20:18,151 --> 00:20:19,784 machines will always beat humans. 432 00:20:19,819 --> 00:20:21,752 I mean, that will always happen. 433 00:20:21,788 --> 00:20:25,389 This is a competition, and we think that the way this will go 434 00:20:25,425 --> 00:20:29,160 for the next multiple decades is 435 00:20:29,195 --> 00:20:31,128 AI and autonomy will help the human. 436 00:20:31,164 --> 00:20:34,498 And you will never try to make it go all automatic. 437 00:20:34,534 --> 00:20:36,667 But we have to watch, and we have to be careful, 438 00:20:36,702 --> 00:20:38,436 and make sure that that doesn't happen. 439 00:20:40,139 --> 00:20:42,440 But not everyone thinks about the Third Offset Strategy 440 00:20:42,475 --> 00:20:44,442 in such an optimistic way. 441 00:20:44,477 --> 00:20:46,143 In fact, some people think it's only creating a new 442 00:20:46,179 --> 00:20:49,914 arms race for robotic war tools that could escalate quickly. 443 00:20:49,949 --> 00:20:51,982 Naureen Shah is one of those people. 444 00:20:53,653 --> 00:20:56,454 What would you say to the DOD policy-makers who are actually 445 00:20:56,489 --> 00:21:00,458 looking into researching autonomous weapons systems? 446 00:21:00,493 --> 00:21:03,461 I would say ban these weapons systems, 447 00:21:03,496 --> 00:21:06,931 because you yourselves know what the consequences would be 448 00:21:06,966 --> 00:21:08,632 if other governments had them. 449 00:21:08,668 --> 00:21:10,968 Look at this issue not from the perspective just of 450 00:21:11,003 --> 00:21:13,871 the US government, but from how to keep communities 451 00:21:13,906 --> 00:21:17,475 all around the world safe from unlawful use of lethal force. 452 00:21:17,510 --> 00:21:20,711 If the US government is concerned about what it sees as 453 00:21:20,746 --> 00:21:22,780 bad actors having these weapons systems, 454 00:21:22,815 --> 00:21:24,281 then it shouldn't develop them. 455 00:21:24,317 --> 00:21:26,817 Once you start to manufacture these weapons systems and 456 00:21:26,853 --> 00:21:29,353 authorize arms sales to all these countries, 457 00:21:29,388 --> 00:21:31,288 this technology is going to proliferate, 458 00:21:31,324 --> 00:21:34,959 and it will unfortunately spiral out of control. 459 00:21:34,994 --> 00:21:36,327 We know that you can do it. 460 00:21:36,362 --> 00:21:38,529 We know that the technology is tantalizing, 461 00:21:38,564 --> 00:21:42,032 but you know that if you start down this road, 462 00:21:42,068 --> 00:21:44,235 you're going to a very, very dangerous place, 463 00:21:44,270 --> 00:21:45,870 and you shouldn't go there. 464 00:21:47,573 --> 00:21:49,373 At this point, it might be too late. 465 00:21:49,408 --> 00:21:51,242 These war toys are on the way. 466 00:21:51,277 --> 00:21:54,144 And the thing is, almost every developer of autonomous machines 467 00:21:54,180 --> 00:21:56,981 I met is separated from the people who actually decide 468 00:21:57,016 --> 00:21:59,416 how their creations will enter war. 469 00:21:59,452 --> 00:22:02,887 So while researchers toss around ideas about humane battles 470 00:22:02,922 --> 00:22:05,556 or friendly killer robots, you get the feeling 471 00:22:05,591 --> 00:22:07,525 conflict isn't going to be any less horrifying 472 00:22:07,560 --> 00:22:09,593 using autonomous bots. 473 00:22:09,629 --> 00:22:13,063 Whether it's stick and stones, guns, missiles, or drones, 474 00:22:13,099 --> 00:22:16,233 people will always go to war, and it's always brutal. 475 00:22:16,269 --> 00:22:18,202 Even if a robot is fighting for you. 44922

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