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[jet engine]
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00:00:06,139 --> 00:00:07,440
FLIGHT ATTENDANT:
Ladies and gentlemen,
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we are starting our approach.
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00:00:08,708 --> 00:00:09,809
PILOT: We lost both engines.
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FLIGHT ATTENDANT: --the
mask over your nose.
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00:00:11,177 --> 00:00:11,978
Emergency descent.
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PILOT: Mayday, Mayday.
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FLIGHT ATTENDANT:
Brace for impact.
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[crash]
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INVESTIGATOR 1:
This is a nasty one.
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INVESTIGATOR 2: Investigation
starting [inaudible]..
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00:00:18,485 --> 00:00:19,386
MAN 1: It's going to crash.
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[jet engine]
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I can't see anything.
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Damn, we're off course.
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00:00:38,071 --> 00:00:39,072
No, I can't see it.
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We're way off.
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On June 1, 1999, as an American
Airlines jet prepared to land
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amidst fierce thunderstorms,
passengers knew
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00:00:48,915 --> 00:00:50,984
they were flying into trouble.
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NEEDS ID: I don't
know what made me
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aware, so doggone aware, that
we were going to have a problem.
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Oh, no.
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NARRATOR: Within minutes, their
worst fears would be realized.
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Other one.
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Other one, other
one, other one.
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COPILOT: Hold on.
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I'm yelling, get
away from the plane.
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Run.
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Get away from the plane.
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[siren]
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EMT (OVER RADIO): Yeah, I
don't know where we're at.
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But there's a road that
goes around the airport.
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But we've got a
lot of people hurt.
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NARRATOR: This is the story of
a tragic and avoidable disaster.
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The investigation would reveal
a lethal combination of pilot
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error, the devastating
effects of severe weather,
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and a dangerous race to
keep the plane on schedule.
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It will also uncover
disturbing evidence
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of an industry-wide failing.
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Despite reliable aircraft
and extensive training,
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modern airlines and their crews
face unprecedented pressures.
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[muffled voiced over radio]
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For a large operator
like American Airlines,
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the pressures start
with the complex task
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00:02:04,424 --> 00:02:06,159
of scheduling their vast fleet.
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Dispatchers direct the
planes around the world in a
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carefully-choreographed dance.
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The strain of maintaining
this efficiency
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affects the entire system.
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[muffled voiced over radio]
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GREGORY FEITH: Of
course, competition
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has become very intense, a lot
of pressure on the dispatchers,
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00:02:34,721 --> 00:02:37,323
pilots, flight
attendants, and basically
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the whole infrastructure,
to accomplish the mission
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and make a dollar.
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[inaudible chatter over radio]
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NARRATOR: Every effort is made
to ensure that nothing disrupts
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these fragile schedules.
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00:02:48,668 --> 00:02:51,137
But there is one
variable that no airline
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can control, the weather.
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On June 1, 1999, American
Airlines Flight 1420
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00:03:02,849 --> 00:03:04,984
is running late.
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00:03:04,984 --> 00:03:06,119
It's the movement
of the storms.
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Everything is sliding
to the Southeast.
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00:03:08,488 --> 00:03:12,025
So yes, we do have a stormy
evening headed our way.
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[side conversation]
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NARRATOR: The delay
of Flight 1420
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put pressure on the pilots
even before takeoff.
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00:03:19,232 --> 00:03:21,868
The responsibility can
fall on flight crews
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to keep a tight
schedule on track.
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Dispatch please.
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Yeah, it's Michael Argo.
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NARRATOR: Crews have
strict legal limits
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on their duty time.
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The first officer
warned the dispatcher
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that they were in danger
of running out of time.
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--time limit at around 11:16.
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NARRATOR: The flight had to
take off in the next hour
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or be canceled.
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The pilots also became
aware of another pressure
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caused by deteriorating
weather near their destination.
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00:03:48,795 --> 00:03:50,363
I mean, well, we've
got this whole situation.
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DON EICK: Pilots had
a weather briefing
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that they got
before they departed
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00:03:54,367 --> 00:03:57,503
Dallas-Fort Worth, which
provided the forecasts,
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00:03:57,503 --> 00:03:58,771
the weather alerts.
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00:03:58,771 --> 00:04:02,208
The dispatcher and the captain
preparing for the flight
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looked at the
weather information
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00:04:03,776 --> 00:04:06,045
and thought they could
get to Little Rock
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00:04:06,045 --> 00:04:09,449
before the
thunderstorms impacted.
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00:04:09,449 --> 00:04:13,252
NARRATOR: The 139 passengers
just wanted to get home.
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00:04:13,252 --> 00:04:15,788
I was traveling with
my son and my daughter.
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00:04:15,788 --> 00:04:17,457
We were coming home
from our vacation.
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00:04:17,457 --> 00:04:19,692
It was my daughter's
first flight.
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00:04:19,692 --> 00:04:21,628
The plane was late
and there were
97
00:04:21,628 --> 00:04:23,630
a lot of delays, of course.
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00:04:23,630 --> 00:04:24,764
It was tiring.
99
00:04:24,764 --> 00:04:26,099
It was frustrating.
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00:04:26,099 --> 00:04:27,266
It was late at night.
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00:04:29,869 --> 00:04:32,839
NARRATOR: Finally, over
two hours behind schedule,
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Flight 1420 leaves Dallas.
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Unknown to the crew,
the storms are already
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massing around Little Rock.
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00:04:44,651 --> 00:04:49,956
40 minutes later, 1420 is 100
miles from its destination.
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00:04:49,956 --> 00:04:52,492
At this point, the
voice-recorder transcript
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reveals a calm and
steady cockpit routine.
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00:04:58,898 --> 00:05:00,433
DISPTACHER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, you're
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00:05:00,433 --> 00:05:02,101
going to still want lower.
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00:05:02,101 --> 00:05:04,103
So far it's OK.
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00:05:04,103 --> 00:05:05,271
So far, so good, Ma'am.
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00:05:05,271 --> 00:05:08,107
American 1420 will let you know.
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00:05:08,107 --> 00:05:10,710
GREGORY FEITH: The first
officer on American 1420
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00:05:10,710 --> 00:05:11,778
was a new hire.
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00:05:11,778 --> 00:05:13,913
He had just recently
completed training.
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00:05:13,913 --> 00:05:16,516
And he had been paired
on one of his first trips
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00:05:16,516 --> 00:05:18,217
with this management captain.
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00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:20,553
So now you had a very
experienced pilot sitting
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00:05:20,553 --> 00:05:22,755
in the left seat, with
the company, paired
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00:05:22,755 --> 00:05:25,525
with a relatively new hire.
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00:05:25,525 --> 00:05:27,827
NARRATOR: The pilots are keeping
a close eye on the storms
122
00:05:27,827 --> 00:05:30,329
ahead.
123
00:05:30,329 --> 00:05:34,100
On-board weather radar scans
a cone-shaped area of sky
124
00:05:34,100 --> 00:05:36,636
in front of the plane.
125
00:05:36,636 --> 00:05:40,807
Potentially-severe
storms show up in red.
126
00:05:40,807 --> 00:05:42,041
There's your big what diddly.
127
00:05:44,477 --> 00:05:46,045
Yeah, we've got to get
over there real quick.
128
00:05:50,950 --> 00:05:52,819
I don't like that.
129
00:05:52,819 --> 00:05:53,853
That's lightning.
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00:05:53,853 --> 00:05:56,289
Sure is.
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00:05:56,289 --> 00:05:58,157
NARRATOR: The American
Airlines dispatcher
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00:05:58,157 --> 00:06:00,593
issues an update on
the shape and formation
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00:06:00,593 --> 00:06:04,097
of the thunderstorms.
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00:06:04,097 --> 00:06:05,631
GREGORY FEITH: The
dispatcher gave this flight
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00:06:05,631 --> 00:06:07,233
crew the weather information.
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00:06:07,233 --> 00:06:10,236
It appeared to him that
there was going to be a gap,
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00:06:10,236 --> 00:06:13,506
or what he called the bowling
alley, where you had two types
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00:06:13,506 --> 00:06:15,408
of thunderstorms or
two thunderstorms
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00:06:15,408 --> 00:06:18,711
with an alley between it, and
that the flight crew, if they
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00:06:18,711 --> 00:06:22,148
had expedited their
travel to Little Rock,
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00:06:22,148 --> 00:06:24,550
could probably make
it up that alley
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00:06:24,550 --> 00:06:27,120
before the two storms
closed together.
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00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:29,956
NARRATOR: But as
Flight 1420 descends,
144
00:06:29,956 --> 00:06:34,827
the plan to beat the storms is
about to go seriously wrong.
145
00:06:34,827 --> 00:06:38,364
The pilots do not realize that
the walls of the bowling alley
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00:06:38,364 --> 00:06:41,100
are closing in.
147
00:06:41,100 --> 00:06:43,936
With 80 miles to go,
the path to Little Rock
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00:06:43,936 --> 00:06:46,906
still appears to be clear.
149
00:06:46,906 --> 00:06:48,908
This is the bowling
alley, right here.
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00:06:48,908 --> 00:06:50,309
COPILOT: Yeah, I know.
151
00:06:50,309 --> 00:06:53,412
PILOT: In fact, there are the
city lights, straight there.
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00:06:53,412 --> 00:06:54,480
COPILOT: You want to go down?
153
00:06:54,480 --> 00:06:56,716
PILOT: Not yet, but pretty soon.
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00:06:56,716 --> 00:06:58,718
American Airlines--
155
00:06:58,718 --> 00:07:01,521
The lightning seem to be
on both sides of the plane.
156
00:07:01,521 --> 00:07:03,556
It lit up the
inside of the plane.
157
00:07:03,556 --> 00:07:09,195
Very quick, you know, just
kaboom-type lightning,
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00:07:09,195 --> 00:07:11,264
which was a little scary.
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00:07:16,602 --> 00:07:19,639
NARRATOR: Transcripts of a
cockpit voice recordings show
160
00:07:19,639 --> 00:07:22,608
that as the plane
descends, the pilots are
161
00:07:22,608 --> 00:07:24,110
aware of rough weather ahead.
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00:07:27,747 --> 00:07:29,081
Descent checks complete.
163
00:07:29,081 --> 00:07:30,483
We've got to get there quick.
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00:07:30,483 --> 00:07:32,218
NARRATOR: As they
prepare for landing,
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00:07:32,218 --> 00:07:35,054
the pressure on the pilots
will now steadily rack up.
166
00:07:35,054 --> 00:07:35,922
--not required.
167
00:07:35,922 --> 00:07:37,523
Manual brakes?
168
00:07:37,523 --> 00:07:39,592
Manual is fine.
169
00:07:39,592 --> 00:07:41,227
NARRATOR: At first,
as the crew pick
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00:07:41,227 --> 00:07:45,965
their way around the storms,
everything seems steady.
171
00:07:45,965 --> 00:07:47,466
Yeah, actually, there's
a city right there.
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00:07:47,466 --> 00:07:48,501
Yeah.
173
00:07:48,501 --> 00:07:49,569
Breaking through this crowd.
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00:07:49,569 --> 00:07:51,103
Good, doing good.
175
00:07:51,103 --> 00:07:52,738
NARRATOR: Even when
the first indication
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00:07:52,738 --> 00:07:54,774
comes that the
storms are advancing,
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00:07:54,774 --> 00:07:56,709
the pilots take it in stride.
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00:07:56,709 --> 00:07:59,245
Whoa, it looks like it's
moving this way, though.
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00:07:59,245 --> 00:08:01,247
Yeah.
180
00:08:01,247 --> 00:08:03,683
Just some lightning
straight ahead.
181
00:08:03,683 --> 00:08:06,419
I think we're going to
be OK, though, right there.
182
00:08:06,419 --> 00:08:07,253
Yeah.
183
00:08:07,253 --> 00:08:08,855
Right down the bowling alley.
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00:08:08,855 --> 00:08:11,023
NARRATOR: But when pilots
contact the controller
185
00:08:11,023 --> 00:08:13,926
at Little Rock, he gives
the first of a series
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00:08:13,926 --> 00:08:15,862
of alarming weather alerts.
187
00:08:15,862 --> 00:08:17,663
CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
We've got a thunderstorm just
188
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Northwest of the airport,
moving through the area now.
189
00:08:20,032 --> 00:08:25,104
The wind is to 280
at 28, gusts 44.
190
00:08:25,104 --> 00:08:29,242
And I'll have new weather for
you in just a moment, I'm sure.
191
00:08:29,242 --> 00:08:30,977
NARRATOR: Gale-force
winds are gusting
192
00:08:30,977 --> 00:08:33,312
at up to 50 miles
per hour, enough
193
00:08:33,312 --> 00:08:36,649
to blow tiles of a rooftop.
194
00:08:36,649 --> 00:08:41,053
High winds pose a severe
hazard for flight 1420.
195
00:08:41,053 --> 00:08:43,222
Crosswinds could make
it difficult to control
196
00:08:43,222 --> 00:08:45,458
the plane on landing.
197
00:08:45,458 --> 00:08:47,260
The pilots must
quickly determine
198
00:08:47,260 --> 00:08:50,196
if they're within safe limits.
199
00:08:50,196 --> 00:08:52,999
They calculate the strength of
the crosswind from its angle
200
00:08:52,999 --> 00:08:56,168
to their final approach.
201
00:08:56,168 --> 00:08:59,906
The crosswind limit for landing
is 30 knots on a dry runway.
202
00:08:59,906 --> 00:09:00,973
But
203
00:09:00,973 --> 00:09:03,075
Buschmann and Origel
now become confused
204
00:09:03,075 --> 00:09:05,278
about what happens if it rains.
205
00:09:05,278 --> 00:09:07,847
Well, 30 knots is the
crosswind limitation.
206
00:09:07,847 --> 00:09:10,416
But see, 30 knots, but wet--
207
00:09:10,416 --> 00:09:11,284
That's the dry.
208
00:09:11,284 --> 00:09:12,385
PILOT: Yeah, dry.
209
00:09:12,385 --> 00:09:13,286
What's the wet?
210
00:09:13,286 --> 00:09:15,254
20.
211
00:09:15,254 --> 00:09:16,923
It's 25.
212
00:09:16,923 --> 00:09:19,058
NARRATOR: The discussion
is never resolved
213
00:09:19,058 --> 00:09:23,296
and the cross winds will soon
be gusting well over the limit.
214
00:09:23,296 --> 00:09:24,664
PILOT (OVER INTERCOM):
Flight attendants,
215
00:09:24,664 --> 00:09:28,401
prepare for landing, please.
216
00:09:28,401 --> 00:09:30,369
NARRATOR: The pilot's
attention now returns
217
00:09:30,369 --> 00:09:31,604
to the bad weather ahead.
218
00:09:31,604 --> 00:09:34,340
[thunder]
219
00:09:34,340 --> 00:09:37,143
But the task of tracking
the shifting storms
220
00:09:37,143 --> 00:09:40,246
is made more difficult by the
lack of sophisticated radar
221
00:09:40,246 --> 00:09:41,580
at Little Rock.
222
00:09:41,580 --> 00:09:44,450
American 1420,
your equipment's
223
00:09:44,450 --> 00:09:46,452
a lot better than what I have.
224
00:09:46,452 --> 00:09:48,788
How's that final
for 22-F looking?
225
00:09:48,788 --> 00:09:50,256
What's that?
226
00:09:50,256 --> 00:09:54,360
We can see the airport but
we can just barely make it out.
227
00:09:54,360 --> 00:09:56,228
We should be able to make to 22.
228
00:09:56,228 --> 00:09:59,265
That storm is moving closer,
like your radar says.
229
00:09:59,265 --> 00:10:01,567
But it's a little farther
off than you thought.
230
00:10:01,567 --> 00:10:03,869
The controllers are
going, well, your radar is
231
00:10:03,869 --> 00:10:05,638
better than mine and so forth.
232
00:10:05,638 --> 00:10:09,008
The controller in this
accident had a monochromatic,
233
00:10:09,008 --> 00:10:12,578
or basically almost a
black-and-white set of a radar
234
00:10:12,578 --> 00:10:16,148
and could not determine the
intensities of the storm.
235
00:10:16,148 --> 00:10:18,384
NARRATOR: Just eight
miles from the airport,
236
00:10:18,384 --> 00:10:21,954
the pilots now face another
key decision, how to approach
237
00:10:21,954 --> 00:10:24,190
the runway through bad weather.
238
00:10:24,190 --> 00:10:27,827
Controllers routinely ask pilots
if they want to land visually
239
00:10:27,827 --> 00:10:30,563
instead of relying on the
airport's electronic Instrument
240
00:10:30,563 --> 00:10:33,332
Landing System or ILS.
241
00:10:33,332 --> 00:10:36,869
But a visual approach means they
must be able to see the runway.
242
00:10:36,869 --> 00:10:39,538
And this is proving difficult.
243
00:10:39,538 --> 00:10:41,374
No, we can't really
make it out right now.
244
00:10:41,374 --> 00:10:44,543
We're going to have to stay
with you as long as possible.
245
00:10:44,543 --> 00:10:47,913
NARRATOR: Now as the wind
suddenly changes direction,
246
00:10:47,913 --> 00:10:50,149
the pilots problems
quickly mount up.
247
00:10:50,149 --> 00:10:51,917
CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
And the winds kind of kicked
248
00:10:51,917 --> 00:10:53,319
around a little bit right now.
249
00:10:53,319 --> 00:10:56,789
It's 330 at 11.
250
00:10:56,789 --> 00:10:58,224
Whoa.
251
00:10:58,224 --> 00:11:00,226
That's a little
better than it was.
252
00:11:00,226 --> 00:11:03,029
Yet 330 is the tailwind, though.
253
00:11:03,029 --> 00:11:04,797
NARRATOR: The crew
now faces the problem
254
00:11:04,797 --> 00:11:07,333
of having the wind behind
them when they land,
255
00:11:07,333 --> 00:11:10,603
greatly increasing the dangers
of overshooting the runway.
256
00:11:10,603 --> 00:11:12,505
[alarm sounds]
257
00:11:12,505 --> 00:11:16,308
Then the controller calls
in with more bad news.
258
00:11:16,308 --> 00:11:18,511
Right now I have
a wind-shear alert.
259
00:11:18,511 --> 00:11:21,514
NARRATOR: Wind shear is a
sudden change of wind direction
260
00:11:21,514 --> 00:11:23,215
over a short distance.
261
00:11:23,215 --> 00:11:25,151
It is one of the
most feared elements
262
00:11:25,151 --> 00:11:27,153
of a severe thunderstorm.
263
00:11:27,153 --> 00:11:29,789
To combat
constantly-shifting winds,
264
00:11:29,789 --> 00:11:32,625
the pilots are forced to throw
away their previous approach
265
00:11:32,625 --> 00:11:34,727
plans and start again.
266
00:11:34,727 --> 00:11:37,463
They have to reverse the
direction of their approach
267
00:11:37,463 --> 00:11:39,765
so they will be
landing into the wind.
268
00:11:39,765 --> 00:11:41,300
Yeah, we're going to need--
269
00:11:41,300 --> 00:11:44,637
or we would rather go
into the headwind, Sir.
270
00:11:44,637 --> 00:11:46,372
NARRATOR: The pilot's
decision to land
271
00:11:46,372 --> 00:11:49,175
in the opposite direction
is a prudent move.
272
00:11:49,175 --> 00:11:51,177
But it will create
serious problems.
273
00:11:56,116 --> 00:11:59,419
As the pilots of American
Airlines Flight 1420
274
00:11:59,419 --> 00:12:02,822
turn to their new approach,
the aircraft's weather radar,
275
00:12:02,822 --> 00:12:04,758
which scans in
front of the plane,
276
00:12:04,758 --> 00:12:08,061
loses track of
the thunderstorms.
277
00:12:08,061 --> 00:12:10,797
Worse still, the
turn delays landing
278
00:12:10,797 --> 00:12:12,398
by more than 10 minutes.
279
00:12:12,398 --> 00:12:15,235
And with every passing
moment, the storms
280
00:12:15,235 --> 00:12:16,936
are growing in intensity.
281
00:12:20,206 --> 00:12:25,745
Runway Four Right,
111.3042, I think--
282
00:12:25,745 --> 00:12:27,180
I think that was the
airport below us.
283
00:12:27,180 --> 00:12:27,981
PILOT: Yeah, right.
284
00:12:27,981 --> 00:12:29,349
OK.
285
00:12:29,349 --> 00:12:31,484
NARRATOR: Switching runways
and keeping track of the storms
286
00:12:31,484 --> 00:12:34,988
all adding greatly to the
pilot's heavy workload.
287
00:12:34,988 --> 00:12:38,024
Airline pilots, they make
their money when they're
288
00:12:38,024 --> 00:12:39,359
flying into bad weather.
289
00:12:39,359 --> 00:12:42,195
When the weather goes
down, now all of a sudden,
290
00:12:42,195 --> 00:12:44,697
the workload starts to
increase because you
291
00:12:44,697 --> 00:12:47,767
have to factor in
low clouds, rain,
292
00:12:47,767 --> 00:12:49,536
lightning, thunderstorms, wind.
293
00:12:49,536 --> 00:12:53,072
All of these elements start to
bombard you, the closer you get
294
00:12:53,072 --> 00:12:54,674
into the airport environment.
295
00:12:54,674 --> 00:12:56,476
[thunder]
296
00:12:57,777 --> 00:12:59,179
CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): American 1420,
297
00:12:59,179 --> 00:13:02,482
it appears we have a second part
of this storm moving through.
298
00:13:02,482 --> 00:13:08,188
The wind, now, is
340 at 16, gusts 34.
299
00:13:08,188 --> 00:13:10,056
NARRATOR: With the
storms worsening,
300
00:13:10,056 --> 00:13:12,225
the pilots need to
make it to the airport
301
00:13:12,225 --> 00:13:14,661
as quickly as possible.
302
00:13:14,661 --> 00:13:16,596
Do you want to accept the
short approach, keep it tight?
303
00:13:16,596 --> 00:13:18,531
Yeah, but if you
can see the runway
304
00:13:18,531 --> 00:13:19,866
because I don't quite see it.
305
00:13:19,866 --> 00:13:21,634
Yeah, it's-- it's right there.
PILOT: All right.
306
00:13:21,634 --> 00:13:22,769
You see it?
307
00:13:22,769 --> 00:13:23,670
PILOT: You just point me
in the right direction.
308
00:13:23,670 --> 00:13:24,504
I'll start slowing down.
309
00:13:24,504 --> 00:13:25,371
Give me flaps 11.
310
00:13:28,575 --> 00:13:30,543
PILOT (OVER RADIO) Damn, it's
heading right over the field.
311
00:13:30,543 --> 00:13:32,679
American 1420,
did you call me?
312
00:13:32,679 --> 00:13:34,447
Yeah, we got the airport.
313
00:13:34,447 --> 00:13:37,116
But we're going right
in between clouds.
314
00:13:37,116 --> 00:13:40,687
I think it's to my right,
off my 3 o'clock low,
315
00:13:40,687 --> 00:13:42,455
about four miles.
316
00:13:42,455 --> 00:13:44,424
American 1420, that's it.
317
00:13:44,424 --> 00:13:46,359
Do you want to shoot
the visual approach
318
00:13:46,359 --> 00:13:49,028
you want to go out for the ILS?
319
00:13:49,028 --> 00:13:51,431
NARRATOR: A visual
approach will allow 1420
320
00:13:51,431 --> 00:13:53,399
to reach the airport
faster than one
321
00:13:53,399 --> 00:13:56,369
that depends on instruments.
322
00:13:56,369 --> 00:14:00,440
Well, yeah, I can start
the visual if we can do it.
323
00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:04,310
American 1420s cleared,
visual approach, runway 4-Right.
324
00:14:04,310 --> 00:14:06,479
If you lose it, need some
help, let me know, please.
325
00:14:06,479 --> 00:14:08,348
NARRATOR: But a
visual approach means
326
00:14:08,348 --> 00:14:12,285
the pilots must keep the
runway in sight at all times.
327
00:14:12,285 --> 00:14:15,421
The transcripts now reveal
rising confusion of the flight
328
00:14:15,421 --> 00:14:17,624
deck as the captain
struggles to fix
329
00:14:17,624 --> 00:14:19,225
the position of the airport.
330
00:14:19,225 --> 00:14:20,560
OK, did you notice something?
331
00:14:20,560 --> 00:14:22,195
Did you see the airport there?
332
00:14:22,195 --> 00:14:23,029
Where?
333
00:14:23,029 --> 00:14:24,664
There, OK.
334
00:14:24,664 --> 00:14:26,266
You're on a base for it, OK?
335
00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:27,600
It's right there.
336
00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:28,935
PILOT: Well I'm on a base now?
337
00:14:28,935 --> 00:14:30,536
It's like a dogleg.
338
00:14:30,536 --> 00:14:34,407
We're coming in and-- and
there it is, right there.
339
00:14:34,407 --> 00:14:35,875
PILOT: I lost it.
340
00:14:35,875 --> 00:14:37,710
NARRATOR: The pilots
now have to abandon
341
00:14:37,710 --> 00:14:41,314
their direct visual approach and
request help from Little Rock's
342
00:14:41,314 --> 00:14:43,483
Instrument Landing System.
343
00:14:43,483 --> 00:14:46,019
But this delays
landing even further.
344
00:14:46,019 --> 00:14:48,554
Approach American 1420.
345
00:14:48,554 --> 00:14:50,957
CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, yes, Sir?
346
00:14:50,957 --> 00:14:54,160
Yeah, there's a cloud
between us and the airport
347
00:14:54,160 --> 00:14:57,063
and we've lost the field.
348
00:14:57,063 --> 00:14:59,365
We're on a vector.
349
00:14:59,365 --> 00:15:02,135
Well basically, we're on
the last vector you gave us,
350
00:15:02,135 --> 00:15:05,338
which is like a
dogleg, it looks like.
351
00:15:05,338 --> 00:15:06,439
CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): American
352
00:15:06,439 --> 00:15:09,876
1420, can you fly heading 220?
353
00:15:09,876 --> 00:15:12,845
I'll take you up for the ILS.
354
00:15:12,845 --> 00:15:14,981
NARRATOR: This news
footage shows the storm
355
00:15:14,981 --> 00:15:16,950
on the night of the crash.
356
00:15:16,950 --> 00:15:19,819
As heavy rain cuts
visibility even further,
357
00:15:19,819 --> 00:15:22,555
Captain Buschmann
becomes frustrated.
358
00:15:22,555 --> 00:15:24,490
PILOT: See, I hate
droning around
359
00:15:24,490 --> 00:15:26,526
visual, at night in
weather without having
360
00:15:26,526 --> 00:15:28,695
any clue where we are.
361
00:15:28,695 --> 00:15:30,396
RANDY HILL: The thing that
was really getting to me
362
00:15:30,396 --> 00:15:32,832
was I knew we were
getting very low.
363
00:15:32,832 --> 00:15:35,401
I knew that the rain
was not letting up
364
00:15:35,401 --> 00:15:39,305
and that we were being
jolted around quite heavily.
365
00:15:39,305 --> 00:15:41,975
[turbulence]
366
00:15:41,975 --> 00:15:43,810
See how we're going right
in the middle of this crap.
367
00:15:43,810 --> 00:15:44,811
Right.
368
00:15:44,811 --> 00:15:47,580
Approach, American 1420.
369
00:15:47,580 --> 00:15:48,715
I know you're doing
your best, Sir,
370
00:15:48,715 --> 00:15:51,017
but we're getting really
close to this storm.
371
00:15:51,017 --> 00:15:54,454
And we'll keep it really
tight if we have to.
372
00:15:54,454 --> 00:15:57,457
NARRATOR: Four minutes from
touchdown, severe thunderstorms
373
00:15:57,457 --> 00:16:00,059
give the pilots
another major problem.
374
00:16:00,059 --> 00:16:03,997
Blinding rain and thick clouds
are obscuring the airfield.
375
00:16:03,997 --> 00:16:06,899
The visibility on the
runway, known as RVR,
376
00:16:06,899 --> 00:16:08,501
is getting dangerously low.
377
00:16:14,374 --> 00:16:16,109
We're going right into this.
378
00:16:16,109 --> 00:16:18,011
CONTROLLER (OVER RADIO):
American 1420, right now we
379
00:16:18,011 --> 00:16:20,113
have heavy rain on the airport.
380
00:16:20,113 --> 00:16:21,647
I don't have new
weather for you.
381
00:16:21,647 --> 00:16:24,484
But visibility is
less than a mile.
382
00:16:24,484 --> 00:16:29,255
And the runway
4-Right RVR is 3,000.
383
00:16:29,255 --> 00:16:32,091
NARRATOR: Visibility
is down to 3,000 feet.
384
00:16:32,091 --> 00:16:33,593
Can we land?
385
00:16:33,593 --> 00:16:36,562
030 at 45 American 1420.
386
00:16:36,562 --> 00:16:38,464
3,000 RVR, we
can't land on that.
387
00:16:38,464 --> 00:16:39,432
No 3,000 if you--
388
00:16:39,432 --> 00:16:40,233
PILOT: What do we need?
389
00:16:40,233 --> 00:16:41,934
No it's 2,400 RVR.
390
00:16:41,934 --> 00:16:43,202
OK, right.
391
00:16:43,202 --> 00:16:44,203
Yeah, we're fine.
392
00:16:44,203 --> 00:16:50,877
All right, 15, and
landing gear down.
393
00:16:53,646 --> 00:16:54,547
And lights, please.
394
00:17:02,688 --> 00:17:05,558
RENEE SALMANS: As we descended,
we descended through a very
395
00:17:05,558 --> 00:17:07,660
dark, black cloud.
396
00:17:07,660 --> 00:17:12,031
The rain seemed to
be going horizontal.
397
00:17:12,031 --> 00:17:14,901
NARRATOR: The cross winds
are way over the limit.
398
00:17:14,901 --> 00:17:17,370
The pilots could divert
to another airport.
399
00:17:17,370 --> 00:17:22,375
But they don't, even as
the weather gets worse.
400
00:17:22,375 --> 00:17:28,448
Wind-shear alert, center
field wind, 350 at 32, gusts 45,
401
00:17:28,448 --> 00:17:33,086
north boundary wind
310 at 29, Northeast
402
00:17:33,086 --> 00:17:36,055
boundary wind 320 at 32.
403
00:17:36,055 --> 00:17:37,390
[machinery beeping]
404
00:17:37,390 --> 00:17:41,160
The jolts seemed to be much
stronger than I'd ever felt.
405
00:17:41,160 --> 00:17:42,962
You could tell that
the thunderheads were
406
00:17:42,962 --> 00:17:44,664
extremely close to the plane.
407
00:17:44,664 --> 00:17:47,166
I said words to the effect
that, if he tries to land
408
00:17:47,166 --> 00:17:48,668
in this weather, we'll crash.
409
00:17:48,668 --> 00:17:49,669
Flaps 28?
410
00:17:49,669 --> 00:17:51,838
Add 20.
411
00:17:51,838 --> 00:17:55,908
NARRATOR: Then visibility falls
drastically below the limit.
412
00:17:55,908 --> 00:18:01,681
American 1420, the runway
Four Right RVR is now 1,600.
413
00:18:01,681 --> 00:18:02,849
Damn.
414
00:18:02,849 --> 00:18:04,617
NARRATOR: The crew are rattled.
415
00:18:04,617 --> 00:18:07,320
Under pressure, they
begin to make mistakes.
416
00:18:07,320 --> 00:18:08,521
I can't see anything.
417
00:18:08,521 --> 00:18:10,189
Looking for 460.
418
00:18:10,189 --> 00:18:11,424
COPILOT: It's there.
419
00:18:11,424 --> 00:18:12,692
MARK SCHMIDT:
Couldn't see anything.
420
00:18:12,692 --> 00:18:15,361
The wind was throwing the
plane around so violently.
421
00:18:15,361 --> 00:18:16,629
I think it was
enough of a crosswind
422
00:18:16,629 --> 00:18:18,764
that I was afraid we were
going to land on the wing.
423
00:18:18,764 --> 00:18:20,166
We felt like were
going to tip over.
424
00:18:20,166 --> 00:18:21,834
I mean, it just felt that bad.
425
00:18:21,834 --> 00:18:23,002
You want 40 flaps?
426
00:18:23,002 --> 00:18:25,771
Yeah, I thought I called it.
427
00:18:25,771 --> 00:18:28,074
I knew, the way he
was jockeying the plane
428
00:18:28,074 --> 00:18:30,042
and the sounds of the
engines, that he was trying
429
00:18:30,042 --> 00:18:31,477
to get lined up for the runway.
430
00:18:31,477 --> 00:18:32,311
And I couldn't see it.
431
00:18:32,311 --> 00:18:33,146
I couldn't see it.
432
00:18:33,146 --> 00:18:34,447
But I could tell we were close.
433
00:18:34,447 --> 00:18:36,816
And I kept thinking,
where's the runway?
434
00:18:36,816 --> 00:18:40,353
Wind is 330 at 28.
435
00:18:40,353 --> 00:18:41,888
PILOT: I'm going to
stay above it a little.
436
00:18:41,888 --> 00:18:43,055
There's a runway
up to your right.
437
00:18:43,055 --> 00:18:44,357
You got it?
- No.
438
00:18:44,357 --> 00:18:45,591
COPILOT: I got the
runway in sight.
439
00:18:45,591 --> 00:18:46,626
You're right on course.
PILOT: I got it.
440
00:18:46,626 --> 00:18:47,326
- Stay where you are.
- I got it.
441
00:18:47,326 --> 00:18:48,694
I got it.
442
00:18:48,694 --> 00:18:50,463
MARK SCHMIDT: Most of the people
at that point, in the plane,
443
00:18:50,463 --> 00:18:53,399
were just holding on really
tight, just looking forward,
444
00:18:53,399 --> 00:18:55,501
I mean, like rigid.
445
00:18:55,501 --> 00:18:57,803
I suspected the worst.
446
00:18:57,803 --> 00:18:58,604
I mean, I really did.
447
00:18:58,604 --> 00:18:59,839
We might not get down.
448
00:19:04,244 --> 00:19:06,446
NARRATOR: In the midst
of fierce thunderstorms,
449
00:19:06,446 --> 00:19:10,483
Flight 1420 is about to
land at Little Rock Airport.
450
00:19:10,483 --> 00:19:12,852
Low visibility and
high winds make
451
00:19:12,852 --> 00:19:14,454
the final approach treacherous.
452
00:19:14,454 --> 00:19:17,924
Wind 330 at 25.
453
00:19:17,924 --> 00:19:19,059
500 feet.
454
00:19:19,059 --> 00:19:22,162
Plus 20.
455
00:19:22,162 --> 00:19:24,931
CONTROLLER (OVER
RADIO): Winds 330 at 23.
456
00:19:24,931 --> 00:19:25,765
Damn, we're off course.
457
00:19:25,765 --> 00:19:26,666
No, I can't see it.
458
00:19:26,666 --> 00:19:27,467
We're way off.
459
00:19:27,467 --> 00:19:28,501
I can't see anything.
460
00:19:28,501 --> 00:19:29,302
Got it?
461
00:19:29,302 --> 00:19:32,305
Got it.
462
00:19:32,305 --> 00:19:47,087
COPILOT: 100 feet, 50
feet, 40, 30, 20, 10,
463
00:19:47,087 --> 00:19:49,055
[boom]
464
00:19:49,055 --> 00:19:51,524
[startled screams]
465
00:19:51,524 --> 00:19:53,893
We hit the runway real hard.
466
00:19:53,893 --> 00:19:56,429
We didn't slow down.
467
00:19:56,429 --> 00:19:57,230
COPILOT: We're down.
468
00:19:57,230 --> 00:19:58,398
We're sliding.
469
00:19:58,398 --> 00:19:59,699
Oh, no.
470
00:19:59,699 --> 00:20:02,802
RANDY HILL: We were still
going very, very, very fast.
471
00:20:02,802 --> 00:20:04,904
And at that point, I
thought, we're dead.
472
00:20:04,904 --> 00:20:05,805
On the brakes.
473
00:20:05,805 --> 00:20:09,743
[screeching]
474
00:20:09,743 --> 00:20:11,211
[screaming]
475
00:20:11,211 --> 00:20:12,679
PASSENGER: Help me.
476
00:20:12,679 --> 00:20:14,347
MARK SCHMIDT: It was just chaos.
477
00:20:14,347 --> 00:20:17,550
It was terrifying, quite
literally, terrifying.
478
00:20:17,550 --> 00:20:18,351
Other one.
479
00:20:18,351 --> 00:20:19,419
PILOT: Other one, other one.
480
00:20:26,626 --> 00:20:29,095
[boom]
481
00:20:42,942 --> 00:20:45,445
RANDY HILL: When the
plane actually stopped,
482
00:20:45,445 --> 00:20:49,249
there was a moment of
absolute, total silence.
483
00:20:52,385 --> 00:20:54,521
RENEE SALMANS: There
was fire in front of me.
484
00:20:54,521 --> 00:20:56,623
And I could see debris.
485
00:20:56,623 --> 00:20:57,991
And it was silent.
486
00:20:57,991 --> 00:21:01,695
And I thought, oh,
my gosh, I'm dead.
487
00:21:05,999 --> 00:21:09,102
MARK SCHMIDT: Well, I knew
we were in deep trouble.
488
00:21:09,102 --> 00:21:11,371
You know, it's a process
that started in some way.
489
00:21:11,371 --> 00:21:12,672
It's got to end.
It's going to end.
490
00:21:12,672 --> 00:21:14,341
And when it ends, how
do I get out of here?
491
00:21:17,243 --> 00:21:18,244
[sirens]
492
00:21:18,244 --> 00:21:19,245
RENEE SALMANS:
Within those minutes,
493
00:21:19,245 --> 00:21:22,182
I heard a small scream.
494
00:21:22,182 --> 00:21:25,485
And I heard it get louder
and louder and louder,
495
00:21:25,485 --> 00:21:27,287
like it was on a megaphone.
496
00:21:27,287 --> 00:21:29,723
And it hit me,
that's my daughter.
497
00:21:29,723 --> 00:21:34,127
And it's like, oh, OK, we got
to get out of here, you know,
498
00:21:34,127 --> 00:21:36,529
we got to do something.
499
00:21:36,529 --> 00:21:38,365
NARRATOR: The passengers
struggled to get out
500
00:21:38,365 --> 00:21:40,967
before fire engulfed the cabin.
501
00:21:40,967 --> 00:21:42,802
MARK SCHMIDT: I had
a broken scapula,
502
00:21:42,802 --> 00:21:45,705
a dislocated shoulder,
and cracked ribs,
503
00:21:45,705 --> 00:21:47,073
and all sorts of stuff going on.
504
00:21:47,073 --> 00:21:48,675
But I didn't feel a thing.
505
00:21:48,675 --> 00:21:50,910
I just wanted to get out.
506
00:21:50,910 --> 00:21:52,679
I was not going to
die in that thing.
507
00:21:52,679 --> 00:21:56,049
I got out of that plane,
probably, in 10 seconds.
508
00:21:58,885 --> 00:22:01,054
I'm yelling, get
away from the plane,
509
00:22:01,054 --> 00:22:04,090
run, get away from
the plane, go, go, go.
510
00:22:12,432 --> 00:22:15,635
Some folks looked like
they'd been in an explosion.
511
00:22:15,635 --> 00:22:16,836
Their clothes were tattered.
512
00:22:16,836 --> 00:22:19,672
I saw a man using his cell
phone to call for help.
513
00:22:19,672 --> 00:22:21,541
EMT (OVER RADIO): OK, I
don't know where we're at.
514
00:22:21,541 --> 00:22:24,411
But there's a road that
goes around the airport.
515
00:22:24,411 --> 00:22:26,613
Well, we got a lot
of people hurt.
516
00:22:26,613 --> 00:22:29,549
[thunder rumbling]
517
00:22:29,549 --> 00:22:31,484
[lightning crashes]
518
00:22:37,824 --> 00:22:40,293
NARRATOR: Traveling at
over 100 miles an hour,
519
00:22:40,293 --> 00:22:42,929
the aircraft ran off
the end of the runway,
520
00:22:42,929 --> 00:22:45,432
plowed down a
25-foot embankment,
521
00:22:45,432 --> 00:22:47,934
and slammed into
a steel walkway.
522
00:22:47,934 --> 00:22:51,971
The plane was ripped
into several pieces.
523
00:22:51,971 --> 00:22:54,808
The wreckage finally came
to rest on the muddy banks
524
00:22:54,808 --> 00:22:55,875
of the Arkansas River.
525
00:23:08,688 --> 00:23:11,424
10 passengers died in the crash.
526
00:23:11,424 --> 00:23:13,560
Captain Bushman was
killed instantly
527
00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:16,196
when the cockpit was split
open by the steel walkway.
528
00:23:20,266 --> 00:23:22,969
It was a shame I hadn't--
literally, a shame, that I had
529
00:23:22,969 --> 00:23:26,706
not done more to save people.
530
00:23:26,706 --> 00:23:28,374
That's the worst
nightmare I have.
531
00:23:28,374 --> 00:23:30,844
[sirens]
532
00:23:44,324 --> 00:23:46,459
NARRATOR: The US National
Transportation Safety
533
00:23:46,459 --> 00:23:48,595
Board was immediately notified.
534
00:23:48,595 --> 00:23:51,965
Greg Feith was NTSB's
chief investigator.
535
00:23:54,567 --> 00:23:57,270
The night American
1420 happened,
536
00:23:57,270 --> 00:24:01,174
I received a phone call about
1 o'clock in the morning,
537
00:24:01,174 --> 00:24:03,710
from our communications
center at the NTSB,
538
00:24:03,710 --> 00:24:05,311
advising that there
had been an aircraft
539
00:24:05,311 --> 00:24:07,947
accident at Little
Rock and there may
540
00:24:07,947 --> 00:24:09,382
be some fatalities involved.
541
00:24:13,219 --> 00:24:14,921
NARRATOR: Fellow
investigator, Don Eick,
542
00:24:14,921 --> 00:24:16,756
was quickly on the scene.
543
00:24:16,756 --> 00:24:19,058
There's a sense of
adrenaline as an accident
544
00:24:19,058 --> 00:24:21,261
occurs like this,
where you're being
545
00:24:21,261 --> 00:24:23,296
launched to the accident scene.
546
00:24:23,296 --> 00:24:27,634
And there's a strong urge to get
there to try to find out what
547
00:24:27,634 --> 00:24:29,802
happened, to document
the facts so we
548
00:24:29,802 --> 00:24:32,639
can prevent it from happening.
549
00:24:32,639 --> 00:24:34,574
NARRATOR: The NTSB
set up a command
550
00:24:34,574 --> 00:24:36,476
center close to the site.
551
00:24:36,476 --> 00:24:38,811
They would spend
the next 18 months
552
00:24:38,811 --> 00:24:41,214
piecing together the events
that led to the crash.
553
00:24:44,183 --> 00:24:46,653
GREGORY FEITH: We did have
a basic idea, when we got
554
00:24:46,653 --> 00:24:48,955
on scene, of what had happened.
555
00:24:48,955 --> 00:24:50,623
We just didn't know why.
556
00:24:50,623 --> 00:24:52,759
We knew the airplane went
off the end of the runway.
557
00:24:52,759 --> 00:24:54,761
We knew that the pilots
couldn't stop it.
558
00:24:54,761 --> 00:24:57,163
We knew that the
aircraft was destroyed
559
00:24:57,163 --> 00:24:58,531
going through this catwalk.
560
00:24:58,531 --> 00:25:01,768
We knew that the subsequent
post-crash fire killed people.
561
00:25:01,768 --> 00:25:04,704
We just didn't
why at that point.
562
00:25:04,704 --> 00:25:07,807
NARRATOR: The NTSB worked
backwards from the impact,
563
00:25:07,807 --> 00:25:10,076
piecing together the
sequence of events
564
00:25:10,076 --> 00:25:15,648
from the final approach, all the
way back to Dallas-Fort Worth.
565
00:25:15,648 --> 00:25:17,584
The first question
for investigators
566
00:25:17,584 --> 00:25:21,387
was why the pilots had been
unable to stop the plane.
567
00:25:21,387 --> 00:25:24,724
Analysis of the tire tracks
left by the skidding plane
568
00:25:24,724 --> 00:25:28,795
showed a complete loss of
control after touchdown.
569
00:25:28,795 --> 00:25:31,197
GREGORY FEITH: When you look at
the width of those tire tracks,
570
00:25:31,197 --> 00:25:34,033
you then see that the airplane
wasn't going straight,
571
00:25:34,033 --> 00:25:36,302
but in fact, it was
sliding sideways.
572
00:25:36,302 --> 00:25:42,842
Here you have this machine that
weighs 130, 140,000 pounds.
573
00:25:42,842 --> 00:25:45,545
It has 100 or so people on it.
574
00:25:45,545 --> 00:25:48,815
It is sliding, uncontrolled,
off to this runway.
575
00:25:48,815 --> 00:25:50,750
[lighting clap]
576
00:25:53,152 --> 00:25:55,989
NARRATOR: Something had gone
terribly wrong on landing
577
00:25:55,989 --> 00:25:59,292
and investigators
had to find out why.
578
00:25:59,292 --> 00:26:02,061
They questioned the
survivors of Flight 1420,
579
00:26:02,061 --> 00:26:04,631
who would provide an
extremely important clue.
580
00:26:12,272 --> 00:26:14,842
The NTSB investigators
needed to find
581
00:26:14,842 --> 00:26:20,447
out why Flight 1420 had slid,
uncontrolled, off the runway.
582
00:26:20,447 --> 00:26:22,416
They set out to interview
surviving passengers--
583
00:26:22,416 --> 00:26:23,517
[rings doorbell]
584
00:26:23,517 --> 00:26:25,552
--many of whom were
local to Little Rock.
585
00:26:25,552 --> 00:26:28,322
Their eyewitness testimony
would point the inquiry
586
00:26:28,322 --> 00:26:31,358
towards the most important
mechanical system used to slow
587
00:26:31,358 --> 00:26:33,527
a plane down after landing.
588
00:26:33,527 --> 00:26:36,997
We were really interested in,
were those passengers that were
589
00:26:36,997 --> 00:26:40,401
sitting in a position right near
the wings, who could look out
590
00:26:40,401 --> 00:26:42,569
the windows and
tell us whether they
591
00:26:42,569 --> 00:26:45,873
saw the ground spoilers deploy.
592
00:26:45,873 --> 00:26:47,775
NARRATOR: Spoilers
are large flaps that
593
00:26:47,775 --> 00:26:50,377
flip up on landing,
literally spoiling
594
00:26:50,377 --> 00:26:52,079
the airflow over the wings.
595
00:26:52,079 --> 00:26:54,114
This prevents them
from giving lift
596
00:26:54,114 --> 00:26:56,417
and allows braking
to take effect.
597
00:26:56,417 --> 00:26:58,218
Crucially, none
of the passengers
598
00:26:58,218 --> 00:27:01,488
saw the spoilers deploy.
599
00:27:01,488 --> 00:27:03,957
To check their
testimony, the NTSB
600
00:27:03,957 --> 00:27:07,561
examined information from
the airplane's black boxes.
601
00:27:07,561 --> 00:27:10,798
The flight data recorder, which
monitors the systems on board
602
00:27:10,798 --> 00:27:13,367
during flight, confirmed
that the spoilers
603
00:27:13,367 --> 00:27:16,770
had failed to deploy.
604
00:27:16,770 --> 00:27:19,740
The implications
were catastrophic.
605
00:27:19,740 --> 00:27:23,710
Flight 1420 had no hope
of stopping in time.
606
00:27:23,710 --> 00:27:26,013
COPILOT: On the brakes.
607
00:27:26,013 --> 00:27:26,947
We're sliding.
608
00:27:26,947 --> 00:27:27,748
PILOT: Oh, no.
609
00:27:32,853 --> 00:27:34,955
NARRATOR: So was the
failure of the spoilers
610
00:27:34,955 --> 00:27:37,224
to deploy a mechanical problem?
611
00:27:37,224 --> 00:27:43,130
Or in the confusion of final
approach, was it pilot error?
612
00:27:43,130 --> 00:27:47,134
To find out, the NTSB would make
clever use of the Cockpit Voice
613
00:27:47,134 --> 00:27:48,669
Recorder, or CVR.
614
00:27:48,669 --> 00:27:50,070
PILOT (ON CVR): --just
barely make it out.
615
00:27:50,070 --> 00:27:51,672
(ON FAST FORWARD)
Sliding [inaudible]..
616
00:27:51,672 --> 00:27:52,873
COPILOT (ON CVR):
You want 40 flaps?
617
00:27:52,873 --> 00:27:55,242
PILOT (ON CVR): Yeah,
I thought I called it.
618
00:27:55,242 --> 00:27:56,643
GREGORY FEITH: One
of the key elements
619
00:27:56,643 --> 00:28:00,380
that the CVR team was
listening for was the setting
620
00:28:00,380 --> 00:28:01,748
of the spoiler handle.
621
00:28:01,748 --> 00:28:03,517
We saw, on the
flight data recorder,
622
00:28:03,517 --> 00:28:06,019
that the ground
spoilers didn't deploy.
623
00:28:06,019 --> 00:28:10,257
We wanted to know if the handle
had been actually armed or not.
624
00:28:10,257 --> 00:28:13,827
And we were looking for
a specific click sound.
625
00:28:13,827 --> 00:28:15,229
[click]
626
00:28:15,229 --> 00:28:19,266
We couldn't find that sound on
the accident CVR, which led us
627
00:28:19,266 --> 00:28:23,003
to believe that the handle was
never in the armed position
628
00:28:23,003 --> 00:28:23,937
at touchdown.
629
00:28:31,011 --> 00:28:34,114
NARRATOR: Intensely busy in
the cockpit, the pilot simply
630
00:28:34,114 --> 00:28:36,350
forgot to arm the spoilers.
631
00:28:36,350 --> 00:28:40,154
Have they deployed, the MD-80
aircraft might have overshot
632
00:28:40,154 --> 00:28:41,855
the runway, but it
would have stopped
633
00:28:41,855 --> 00:28:43,857
before hitting the catwalk.
634
00:28:43,857 --> 00:28:47,394
The pilots had made serious
and ultimately, fatal errors.
635
00:28:47,394 --> 00:28:50,297
But investigators
wanted to know why.
636
00:28:50,297 --> 00:28:53,400
They suspected that pressures
earlier in the flight
637
00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:55,335
led to these mistakes.
638
00:28:55,335 --> 00:28:57,070
They turned their
attention to the weather.
639
00:29:05,212 --> 00:29:08,282
It was clear to us that severe
weather had been in the area
640
00:29:08,282 --> 00:29:10,417
around the time of the accident.
641
00:29:10,417 --> 00:29:13,086
How it played a part
was one of the things
642
00:29:13,086 --> 00:29:14,688
we had to try to discover.
643
00:29:14,688 --> 00:29:17,991
And putting the radar
images in, the observations,
644
00:29:17,991 --> 00:29:20,961
trying to put it all together,
would take weeks, of course,
645
00:29:20,961 --> 00:29:23,463
to get this information done.
646
00:29:23,463 --> 00:29:26,533
NARRATOR: The NTSB wanted to
know what role the weather had
647
00:29:26,533 --> 00:29:29,203
played in the crash,
and had the pilots been
648
00:29:29,203 --> 00:29:31,805
fully aware of the dangers.
649
00:29:31,805 --> 00:29:34,208
See how we're going right
in the middle of this crap.
650
00:29:34,208 --> 00:29:36,643
GREGORY FEITH: One of the
concerns that all pilots have,
651
00:29:36,643 --> 00:29:38,412
when they're trying
to land an aircraft,
652
00:29:38,412 --> 00:29:42,249
is of course, making sure that
the crosswinds that they may
653
00:29:42,249 --> 00:29:44,718
experience don't
exceed the capabilities
654
00:29:44,718 --> 00:29:47,721
of either themselves
or the aircraft.
655
00:29:47,721 --> 00:29:53,360
The winds now, 350 at 30 45.
656
00:29:53,360 --> 00:29:54,761
Can we land?
657
00:29:54,761 --> 00:29:56,763
This particular
flight crew had
658
00:29:56,763 --> 00:29:59,233
a limitation not
imposed by themselves,
659
00:29:59,233 --> 00:30:00,701
but imposed by the company.
660
00:30:00,701 --> 00:30:04,238
And that they were not allowed
to exceed a 10-knot crosswind
661
00:30:04,238 --> 00:30:06,006
on a wet runway.
662
00:30:06,006 --> 00:30:08,008
NARRATOR: Crosswind
limitations are clearly
663
00:30:08,008 --> 00:30:10,143
stated in the operating manual.
664
00:30:10,143 --> 00:30:13,680
The crew of 1420 were flying
beyond regulation limits.
665
00:30:17,351 --> 00:30:21,154
The effect of the winds can be
seen in this NTSB animation,
666
00:30:21,154 --> 00:30:23,890
showing the captain's
desperate last maneuvers.
667
00:30:23,890 --> 00:30:25,692
DON EICK: Winds definitely
impacted the flight.
668
00:30:25,692 --> 00:30:27,027
If you look at the
animation, you'll
669
00:30:27,027 --> 00:30:29,329
see him fighting the winds.
670
00:30:29,329 --> 00:30:31,465
Definitely not good.
671
00:30:31,465 --> 00:30:33,333
COPILOT (ON CVR): We're down.
672
00:30:33,333 --> 00:30:35,002
On the brakes.
673
00:30:35,002 --> 00:30:36,503
PILOT: Other one, other one.
COPILOT: Other one.
674
00:30:36,503 --> 00:30:37,738
DON EICK: But when
you start talking
675
00:30:37,738 --> 00:30:42,376
about wet runway, thunderstorms,
not a good scenario.
676
00:30:42,376 --> 00:30:45,679
NARRATOR: But we're the crew
of 1420 aware of the hazards
677
00:30:45,679 --> 00:30:47,914
posed by the severe weather?
678
00:30:47,914 --> 00:30:51,752
For the NTSB, previous
accidents had made the dangers
679
00:30:51,752 --> 00:30:54,354
of thunderstorms all too clear.
680
00:30:54,354 --> 00:30:58,925
In 1994, a US Air DC-9
fell victim to wind
681
00:30:58,925 --> 00:31:00,694
shear in North Carolina.
682
00:31:00,694 --> 00:31:05,999
The plane stalled at 250
feet and fell from the sky.
683
00:31:05,999 --> 00:31:09,069
A Delta TriStar crashed
after flying into the most
684
00:31:09,069 --> 00:31:11,238
severe kind of wind
shear that created
685
00:31:11,238 --> 00:31:13,707
an intense downdraft of air.
686
00:31:13,707 --> 00:31:17,277
So should the crew of 1420
have aborted the approach?
687
00:31:20,180 --> 00:31:22,749
This NTSB weather
animation overlays
688
00:31:22,749 --> 00:31:24,751
the path of the
aircraft with ground
689
00:31:24,751 --> 00:31:26,853
radar images of the storm.
690
00:31:26,853 --> 00:31:29,456
Bushman and Origel
landed in lightning,
691
00:31:29,456 --> 00:31:32,159
torrential rain, and
hail, and the cross winds
692
00:31:32,159 --> 00:31:33,794
gusting well over the limit.
693
00:31:33,794 --> 00:31:35,529
DON EICK: Based on the
information that we had
694
00:31:35,529 --> 00:31:39,333
from ground-based weather
radar, the flight crew of 1420
695
00:31:39,333 --> 00:31:42,636
should have been seeing
majority of that storm.
696
00:31:42,636 --> 00:31:44,304
They would have been
seeing the leading
697
00:31:44,304 --> 00:31:47,541
edge going green,
rapidly changing
698
00:31:47,541 --> 00:31:50,344
the yellow, to bright red.
699
00:31:50,344 --> 00:31:51,678
I can't see anything.
700
00:31:51,678 --> 00:31:54,314
Looking for a 460.
701
00:31:54,314 --> 00:31:56,783
GREGORY FEITH: As they
progressed towards Little Rock,
702
00:31:56,783 --> 00:31:59,986
they started to paint
the bad weather, not only
703
00:31:59,986 --> 00:32:01,688
their on-board
radar, but they could
704
00:32:01,688 --> 00:32:05,992
see, out the window, lightning.
705
00:32:05,992 --> 00:32:10,364
And one of the key statements
that this captain made,
706
00:32:10,364 --> 00:32:13,900
which basically summarized
the entire flight,
707
00:32:13,900 --> 00:32:17,003
was the captain saying,
I hate droning around
708
00:32:17,003 --> 00:32:19,005
visual at night, in
weather, without having
709
00:32:19,005 --> 00:32:20,407
any clue where we are.
710
00:32:20,407 --> 00:32:25,011
I hate droning around at night
when I don't know where I am.
711
00:32:25,011 --> 00:32:27,080
That was such a key statement.
712
00:32:27,080 --> 00:32:30,117
It was at that point,
by an experienced,
713
00:32:30,117 --> 00:32:33,053
10,000-hour captain, that
he should have abandoned
714
00:32:33,053 --> 00:32:34,788
the approach going
into Little Rock
715
00:32:34,788 --> 00:32:39,760
and either gone to his alternate
or made his way back to Dallas.
716
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:41,361
But to make a
statement like that
717
00:32:41,361 --> 00:32:44,931
and then continue an approach
to an airport, where you have
718
00:32:44,931 --> 00:32:48,535
a thunderstorm in
progress over the airport,
719
00:32:48,535 --> 00:32:50,470
is a recipe for disaster.
720
00:32:50,470 --> 00:32:52,472
NARRATOR: But the pilots
were not the only ones
721
00:32:52,472 --> 00:32:54,474
to be heavily criticized.
722
00:32:54,474 --> 00:32:58,578
As the investigation continued,
American Airlines flight policy
723
00:32:58,578 --> 00:32:59,813
would come under fire.
724
00:32:59,813 --> 00:33:03,250
And an industry-wide scandal
was about to be exposed.
725
00:33:07,154 --> 00:33:10,290
For months after the
crash of Flight 1420,
726
00:33:10,290 --> 00:33:13,327
the NTSB dug deeper
into the circumstances
727
00:33:13,327 --> 00:33:15,128
surrounding the accident.
728
00:33:15,128 --> 00:33:18,432
The question was, who
would take responsibility?
729
00:33:18,432 --> 00:33:20,934
American Airlines was
reluctant to admit
730
00:33:20,934 --> 00:33:22,870
that their pilots
had knowingly flown
731
00:33:22,870 --> 00:33:25,906
into a severe thunderstorm.
732
00:33:25,906 --> 00:33:28,775
Initially, they tried to pin
the blame on the controller
733
00:33:28,775 --> 00:33:30,043
at Little Rock.
734
00:33:30,043 --> 00:33:32,779
American started legal action
against the authorities
735
00:33:32,779 --> 00:33:36,149
responsible for
airport controllers.
736
00:33:36,149 --> 00:33:39,686
American's lawyers claimed
that the crew of Flight 1420
737
00:33:39,686 --> 00:33:43,891
had not been given all
current weather information.
738
00:33:43,891 --> 00:33:46,760
American 1420,
your equipment's
739
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:48,762
a lot better than what I have.
740
00:33:48,762 --> 00:33:51,698
How's that final
for 22F looking?
741
00:33:51,698 --> 00:33:54,701
NARRATOR: But after interviewing
the controller at Little Rock,
742
00:33:54,701 --> 00:33:57,337
investigators were unconvinced.
743
00:33:57,337 --> 00:34:01,275
It's highly unlikely that the
flight crew wasn't sufficiently
744
00:34:01,275 --> 00:34:04,077
informed about the
nature of the weather
745
00:34:04,077 --> 00:34:07,347
and the severity of the
weather, not only en route,
746
00:34:07,347 --> 00:34:11,318
but of course, during the course
of the landing at Little Rock.
747
00:34:11,318 --> 00:34:14,254
NARRATOR: The focus
turned back on the pilots.
748
00:34:14,254 --> 00:34:16,123
Lawyers representing
the passengers
749
00:34:16,123 --> 00:34:18,759
were determined to get
American Airlines to accept
750
00:34:18,759 --> 00:34:22,396
liability for the crash.
751
00:34:22,396 --> 00:34:25,299
I mean, it is about
money, in a way,
752
00:34:25,299 --> 00:34:29,836
because you want to make them
pay because I saw the letters
753
00:34:29,836 --> 00:34:32,306
that they would write
back to my lawyer,
754
00:34:32,306 --> 00:34:34,942
minimizing what we
had been through,
755
00:34:34,942 --> 00:34:40,314
minimizing my daughter's burns,
cuts, the psychological effects
756
00:34:40,314 --> 00:34:45,652
that had on my son, at age
15, and my daughter and me,
757
00:34:45,652 --> 00:34:47,554
and just minimizing everything.
758
00:34:47,554 --> 00:34:49,923
So you want to find
a way to hurt them.
759
00:34:49,923 --> 00:34:52,159
NARRATOR: Renee Salmans
and many other survivors
760
00:34:52,159 --> 00:34:54,294
attended the NTSB
public hearings
761
00:34:54,294 --> 00:34:58,131
held in Little Rock, eight
months after the disaster.
762
00:34:58,131 --> 00:35:00,233
With the captain
dead, the copilot
763
00:35:00,233 --> 00:35:02,669
was the first to testify.
764
00:35:02,669 --> 00:35:04,104
As we went off the
end of the runway,
765
00:35:04,104 --> 00:35:05,672
I could see the runway
lights coming up.
766
00:35:05,672 --> 00:35:07,374
And I knew we were going
off the end of the runway.
767
00:35:07,374 --> 00:35:09,042
I couldn't see anything
in front of us.
768
00:35:09,042 --> 00:35:11,178
All I thought was, the
gear would collapse
769
00:35:11,178 --> 00:35:13,580
and we would continue to slide.
770
00:35:13,580 --> 00:35:14,748
It's got to be OK.
771
00:35:14,748 --> 00:35:18,452
And then all of a sudden,
I felt the impact.
772
00:35:18,452 --> 00:35:20,487
Well, I followed it
as close as I could.
773
00:35:20,487 --> 00:35:21,755
You bet.
774
00:35:21,755 --> 00:35:23,190
I wanted to know what happened.
775
00:35:23,190 --> 00:35:25,726
I went to all of
the NTSB hearings.
776
00:35:25,726 --> 00:35:27,627
I was outraged.
777
00:35:27,627 --> 00:35:28,996
I was mad.
778
00:35:28,996 --> 00:35:32,032
For me, they didn't ask him
the right questions, you know?
779
00:35:32,032 --> 00:35:34,167
I wanted to ask him,
what were you thinking?
780
00:35:34,167 --> 00:35:37,671
Why did you all play
chicken with our lives?
781
00:35:37,671 --> 00:35:39,172
NARRATOR: The
co-pilot's testimony
782
00:35:39,172 --> 00:35:40,807
was highly controversial.
783
00:35:40,807 --> 00:35:43,510
In his account of the final
moments of the flight,
784
00:35:43,510 --> 00:35:47,114
he claims to have told the
captain to abort the approach,
785
00:35:47,114 --> 00:35:49,182
otherwise known as a go around.
786
00:35:49,182 --> 00:35:51,818
OFFICIAL: Who can call for
abandoning the approach?
787
00:35:51,818 --> 00:35:53,387
Either pilot.
788
00:35:53,387 --> 00:35:56,156
OFFICIAL: Did you call for
a go around at any time?
789
00:35:56,156 --> 00:35:57,257
MICHAEL ORIGEL: Yes, Sir, I did.
790
00:35:57,257 --> 00:35:58,825
It sounds like, after
reviewing the tape,
791
00:35:58,825 --> 00:36:00,394
you can definitely hear the go.
792
00:36:00,394 --> 00:36:04,598
And the around, it seems like
he talked the same time I did.
793
00:36:04,598 --> 00:36:06,600
And I looked over at him.
794
00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:09,403
And he brought the
airplane back on course.
795
00:36:09,403 --> 00:36:11,571
NARRATOR: However,
when NTSB specialists
796
00:36:11,571 --> 00:36:13,740
studied the cockpit
voice tapes, they
797
00:36:13,740 --> 00:36:14,808
couldn't hear this statement.
798
00:36:14,808 --> 00:36:16,109
PILOT (ON CVR): Damn,
we're off course.
799
00:36:16,109 --> 00:36:17,477
No, I can't see it.
800
00:36:17,477 --> 00:36:20,313
We're way off.
801
00:36:20,313 --> 00:36:22,849
Even though he stood
by that statement,
802
00:36:22,849 --> 00:36:24,184
we could never validate it.
803
00:36:24,184 --> 00:36:26,553
That led to a
controversial finding
804
00:36:26,553 --> 00:36:30,590
because we weren't really sure
if that took place or not.
805
00:36:30,590 --> 00:36:34,094
NARRATOR: The NTSB asked
the copilot tough questions.
806
00:36:34,094 --> 00:36:37,597
But was American Airlines
training also at fault?
807
00:36:37,597 --> 00:36:41,134
Greg Feith put an American
Airlines manager on the stand.
808
00:36:41,134 --> 00:36:45,205
What were the rules for pilots
flying near thunderstorms?
809
00:36:45,205 --> 00:36:46,506
GREGORY FEITH: When
asked the question,
810
00:36:46,506 --> 00:36:48,341
he basically
responded that he just
811
00:36:48,341 --> 00:36:51,812
didn't want his pilots flying
into that type of weather.
812
00:36:51,812 --> 00:36:56,450
Our pilots are forbidden to
enter or depart a terminal area
813
00:36:56,450 --> 00:36:58,652
blanketed by thunderstorms.
814
00:36:58,652 --> 00:37:01,888
NARRATOR: To the NTSB, this
policy simply wasn't clear
815
00:37:01,888 --> 00:37:03,123
cut enough.
816
00:37:03,123 --> 00:37:06,059
Well, that's a very
subjective call for a pilot.
817
00:37:06,059 --> 00:37:07,694
Pilots need boundaries.
818
00:37:07,694 --> 00:37:09,129
You have to set limits.
819
00:37:09,129 --> 00:37:12,032
If there's convective activity,
that is thunderstorm activity,
820
00:37:12,032 --> 00:37:14,568
it's within five nautical
miles of the airport,
821
00:37:14,568 --> 00:37:18,305
there's lightning, there's
wind shear, don't go there.
822
00:37:18,305 --> 00:37:20,273
[jet engine]
823
00:37:27,080 --> 00:37:28,381
NARRATOR: The
deeper they looked,
824
00:37:28,381 --> 00:37:32,052
the more the NTSB found that
flying into thunderstorms
825
00:37:32,052 --> 00:37:34,187
was disturbingly widespread.
826
00:37:34,187 --> 00:37:36,890
Extraordinary evidence
given at the hearings
827
00:37:36,890 --> 00:37:39,659
reveal that the problem spread
through the whole industry.
828
00:37:45,532 --> 00:37:48,568
Expert analysts
from MIT spent weeks
829
00:37:48,568 --> 00:37:50,871
recording the flight
paths of planes landing
830
00:37:50,871 --> 00:37:52,472
at Dallas-Fort Worth.
831
00:37:52,472 --> 00:37:56,042
They waited for thunderstorms
and watched how pilots reacted.
832
00:38:00,313 --> 00:38:02,549
Their animation plots
the planes coming
833
00:38:02,549 --> 00:38:06,820
in to land, overlaid with
radar images of the storms.
834
00:38:06,820 --> 00:38:09,789
Anything yellow or orange
is a potentially-severe
835
00:38:09,789 --> 00:38:11,158
thunderstorm.
836
00:38:11,158 --> 00:38:14,261
Of the 2000 encounters
with thunderstorms,
837
00:38:14,261 --> 00:38:17,531
two out of three pilots
flew into the storm
838
00:38:17,531 --> 00:38:18,698
and landed their aircraft.
839
00:38:22,669 --> 00:38:25,272
GREGORY FEITH: I was very
surprised by the testimony
840
00:38:25,272 --> 00:38:26,573
at the public hearing.
841
00:38:26,573 --> 00:38:28,575
Given the fact that they're
flying the best equipment,
842
00:38:28,575 --> 00:38:31,144
typically have the best
training, have the best
843
00:38:31,144 --> 00:38:34,047
information available to
them, for those decisions
844
00:38:34,047 --> 00:38:37,350
to be made to continue
into harm's way,
845
00:38:37,350 --> 00:38:41,021
it was very surprising to me
that they tried to do that.
846
00:38:41,021 --> 00:38:44,391
Pilots know that if we go
into that thunderstorm,
847
00:38:44,391 --> 00:38:46,326
we may not come out
of that thunderstorm.
848
00:38:46,326 --> 00:38:50,597
And if we do, it may not
be, basically, in one piece.
849
00:38:50,597 --> 00:38:53,166
NARRATOR: Why did so many
pilots fly into danger?
850
00:38:56,236 --> 00:39:00,240
The MIT researchers found pilots
were more reckless if they were
851
00:39:00,240 --> 00:39:02,576
behind schedule,
if it was night,
852
00:39:02,576 --> 00:39:04,444
and if aircraft in
front of them were
853
00:39:04,444 --> 00:39:06,613
also flying into bad weather.
854
00:39:06,613 --> 00:39:08,181
DON EICK: In the
Little Rock case,
855
00:39:08,181 --> 00:39:11,251
two of those three
elements were present.
856
00:39:11,251 --> 00:39:13,453
It was night and they
were running late.
857
00:39:22,095 --> 00:39:25,031
NARRATOR: The MIT investigation
was chilling evidence
858
00:39:25,031 --> 00:39:26,800
that the crash at
Little Rock was
859
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:29,502
part of a much wider problem.
860
00:39:29,502 --> 00:39:32,539
We're not seeing a major
improvement, to put it baldly.
861
00:39:32,539 --> 00:39:35,475
There's a limited
time for training.
862
00:39:35,475 --> 00:39:37,510
Weather was a
significant part that set
863
00:39:37,510 --> 00:39:39,779
up the stage of this accident.
864
00:39:39,779 --> 00:39:44,217
We do not condone
any operation to be
865
00:39:44,217 --> 00:39:46,353
conducted in such weather.
866
00:39:46,353 --> 00:39:49,956
It is a known
severe-weather hazard.
867
00:39:49,956 --> 00:39:54,327
And it should have been
suspended, no operation.
868
00:39:54,327 --> 00:39:56,229
NARRATOR: Ironically,
it also emerged
869
00:39:56,229 --> 00:39:58,665
that new technology
may be partly to blame
870
00:39:58,665 --> 00:40:00,900
for bad decision making.
871
00:40:00,900 --> 00:40:03,370
DON EICK: Might it be
we're desensitizing pilots?
872
00:40:03,370 --> 00:40:06,339
We're putting weather
radar on board aircraft.
873
00:40:06,339 --> 00:40:09,309
We're putting wind-shear
detection systems on airplanes.
874
00:40:09,309 --> 00:40:13,880
Most of these systems only
react when you're in the hazard.
875
00:40:13,880 --> 00:40:16,149
That time, it may be too late.
876
00:40:16,149 --> 00:40:19,119
NARRATOR: The root causes
behind the crash of 1420
877
00:40:19,119 --> 00:40:20,287
went even deeper.
878
00:40:20,287 --> 00:40:23,423
Why were the pilots
so determined to land?
879
00:40:23,423 --> 00:40:26,726
Greg Feith found the answer,
back at Dallas-Forth Worth,
880
00:40:26,726 --> 00:40:29,229
before the flight
even left the ground.
881
00:40:29,229 --> 00:40:32,666
There, he found signs of a
deadly condition in aviation
882
00:40:32,666 --> 00:40:34,734
known as, "get-there-itis."
883
00:40:34,734 --> 00:40:37,037
GREGORY FEITH: There may have
been a sense of get-there-itis.
884
00:40:37,037 --> 00:40:38,204
The flight crew
knew that they were
885
00:40:38,204 --> 00:40:39,939
pushing their 14-hour duty day.
886
00:40:39,939 --> 00:40:41,908
It had been a long duty day.
887
00:40:41,908 --> 00:40:43,810
The airport's right there.
888
00:40:43,810 --> 00:40:44,911
Let's try it.
889
00:40:44,911 --> 00:40:47,981
Let's see if we can
accomplish the mission.
890
00:40:47,981 --> 00:40:49,182
Pilots are goal oriented.
891
00:40:49,182 --> 00:40:50,450
We're mission oriented.
892
00:40:50,450 --> 00:40:53,053
We will stick our nose in
there to try and see if we
893
00:40:53,053 --> 00:40:54,521
can accomplish the mission.
894
00:40:54,521 --> 00:40:56,956
Sometimes we will
accomplish that mission.
895
00:40:56,956 --> 00:41:00,360
But sometimes we get too far
into it that we can't bail out,
896
00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:04,397
we don't have any more
options, and bad things happen.
897
00:41:04,397 --> 00:41:08,001
NARRATOR: For Flight 1420, the
pressures of get-there-itis
898
00:41:08,001 --> 00:41:11,504
sparked a fatal series of
mistakes and misjudgments.
899
00:41:11,504 --> 00:41:12,906
--460-- 60
900
00:41:12,906 --> 00:41:15,709
NARRATOR: At the end of a long
day, rushing to beat the storms
901
00:41:15,709 --> 00:41:19,979
and get the passengers to their
destination, the crew of 1420
902
00:41:19,979 --> 00:41:23,850
made a basic mistake that
cost 11 people their lives.
903
00:41:23,850 --> 00:41:25,919
They forgot to arm the spoilers.
904
00:41:25,919 --> 00:41:27,187
MARK SCHMIDT: They
were so busy trying
905
00:41:27,187 --> 00:41:28,988
to get the plane on the
ground that they forgot
906
00:41:28,988 --> 00:41:31,057
to do what they needed to do.
907
00:41:31,057 --> 00:41:32,559
They didn't have time to do it.
908
00:41:36,129 --> 00:41:39,065
NARRATOR: After the accident,
American Airlines revised
909
00:41:39,065 --> 00:41:40,900
their checklist procedures.
910
00:41:40,900 --> 00:41:43,636
Both pilots must now
confirm that the spoilers
911
00:41:43,636 --> 00:41:47,107
are armed, ready for landing.
912
00:41:47,107 --> 00:41:52,312
In October, 2001, the NTSB
published their report.
913
00:41:52,312 --> 00:41:55,248
They concluded that the two
main causes of the crash
914
00:41:55,248 --> 00:41:58,618
were first, the decision
to land in a thunderstorm,
915
00:41:58,618 --> 00:42:02,622
and second, the pilot's
failure to arm the spoilers.
916
00:42:02,622 --> 00:42:06,393
American Airlines declined
to take part in this program
917
00:42:06,393 --> 00:42:07,727
or comment on the findings.
918
00:42:12,766 --> 00:42:15,835
As an investigator,
I had over two years
919
00:42:15,835 --> 00:42:21,007
to basically criticize, and
determine what the captain
920
00:42:21,007 --> 00:42:22,575
was trying to accomplish.
921
00:42:22,575 --> 00:42:26,479
That particular captain had
seconds to make decisions,
922
00:42:26,479 --> 00:42:28,548
based on the information
he was getting.
923
00:42:28,548 --> 00:42:31,684
And while it's unfair for
an accident investigator
924
00:42:31,684 --> 00:42:36,289
like myself to start pointing
the finger, I wasn't there.
925
00:42:36,289 --> 00:42:39,359
They'd got nothing but flak.
926
00:42:39,359 --> 00:42:41,861
You can understand it.
927
00:42:41,861 --> 00:42:48,168
But I can't understand a person
wanting to kill himself either.
928
00:42:48,168 --> 00:42:51,204
We've been out and visited his
grave at the Air Force Academy
929
00:42:51,204 --> 00:42:52,539
a couple, three times.
930
00:42:52,539 --> 00:42:56,476
And the guy just got caught
up in a bad, bad situation.
931
00:42:56,476 --> 00:42:58,511
I mean, been there, done that.
932
00:43:04,117 --> 00:43:07,554
NARRATOR: One year after
the crash, the survivors
933
00:43:07,554 --> 00:43:09,856
of Flight 1420
gathered at the site
934
00:43:09,856 --> 00:43:13,026
to remember those who died.
935
00:43:13,026 --> 00:43:16,129
For surviving passengers,
the effects of the crash
936
00:43:16,129 --> 00:43:18,031
are long lasting and profound.
937
00:43:22,302 --> 00:43:25,305
RENEE SALMANS: We, as a family,
worked long and hard to work
938
00:43:25,305 --> 00:43:26,105
through it.
939
00:43:26,105 --> 00:43:28,174
We had many talks.
940
00:43:28,174 --> 00:43:30,944
It blew apart a lot
of relationships.
941
00:43:30,944 --> 00:43:35,381
You find out who your
real friends are.
942
00:43:35,381 --> 00:43:36,950
SURVIVOR: The
impact of the crash
943
00:43:36,950 --> 00:43:39,252
is something that I try
to block out of my mind
944
00:43:39,252 --> 00:43:44,791
because I still feel a reaction.
945
00:43:48,294 --> 00:43:49,529
MARK SCHMIDT: People
ask me if I'm OK.
946
00:43:49,529 --> 00:43:51,865
Well, no, I'm not OK.
947
00:43:51,865 --> 00:43:53,433
No, we'll never be OK.
948
00:43:53,433 --> 00:43:55,435
I mean, what is this OK stuff?
949
00:43:55,435 --> 00:43:56,970
You're different.
950
00:43:56,970 --> 00:43:58,538
And deal with it.
951
00:43:58,538 --> 00:43:59,539
I mean, that's the
way we're going to be.
73749
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