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NARRATOR: February 12, 2009.
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Just outside Buffalo, New York.
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Gear down.
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Looks alive.
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Gear's down.
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[whimpers]
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Jesus Christ!
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[passengers screaming]
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The airplane entered
an aerodynamic stall.
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[screaming]
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It did not recover.
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[sirens blaring]
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CLINT CROOKSHANKS: It was one of
the grisliest, nastiest scenes
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that I think I've seen.
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NARRATOR: The crash of
Continental Connection flight
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3407 would be one of the NTSB's
most important in decades,
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and would see a grieving
father fight for changes
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to the laws governing
small airlines.
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JOHN KAUSNER: I'm
focused and determined
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to change what exists, and not
have another dad sitting here.
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FLIGHT ATTENDANT:
Ladies and gentlemen,
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we are starting our approach.
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PILOT: We lost both engines.
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FLIGHT ATTENDANT: Put
your mask over your nose.
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Emergency descent.
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Brace for impact!
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NARRATOR: Continental
Connection flight
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3407, operated by Colgan Air,
is en route from Newark, New
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Jersey, to Buffalo, New York.
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It's been a busy flight
for Captain Marvin Renslow.
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He's providing guidance
to a new first officer,
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Rebecca Shaw, a former flight
instructor from Seattle.
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[sneezes]
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Bless you.
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NARRATOR: Shaw's only
been with the airline
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for just over a year.
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Yeah.
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NARRATOR: She must decide if she
now wants to become a captain.
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I don't know what I want
to do with the upgrade.
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It depends where I'm based.
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Well, think of it this way.
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If you stayed on the
queue, obviously,
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you're not making
the captain rate.
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Right.
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But you may have a
better quality of life,
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with regards to buying a
house, having a schedule--
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NARRATOR: Shaw trained
to be a first officer
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on the plane they're flying
now, a Canadian-made Bombardier
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Q400.
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It's a twin engine, popular
with regional airlines.
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The 45 passengers
have had a long night.
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Their plane was held up
for two hours at Newark--
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a delay considerably
longer than their journey.
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Flight 3407 is
heading northwest,
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over upstate New York.
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The trip is only 53 minutes.
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Visibility is poor, and
there's a forecast of snow
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and moderate winds in Buffalo.
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Just some water, please.
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NARRATOR: Ellyce Kausner is
a student at Florida Coastal
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School of Law in Jacksonville.
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She's on her way to visit
her family in Buffalo.
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JOHN KAUSNER: She had five
nieces and nephews at the time,
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and they had a love
luncheon at the kids' school
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with a couple of the nephews.
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And they both wanted
Elly be their guest.
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Any excuse to come
home, she came home.
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She talked to all
of us from Newark.
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Hey.
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JOHN KAUSNER: And she
called us from the lounge.
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Yeah, it's been
over two hours.
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JOHN KAUSNER: She was
PO'd because of the delay.
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Folks from the flight deck,
your first officer speaking.
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It looks like, at this
time, we're about 10,
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maybe 15 minutes
outside of Buffalo.
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Weather in Buffalo
is pretty foggy.
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It's snowing a little bit there.
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I'd like to make sure everyone
remains in their seats,
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so the flight attendants can
prepare the cabin for arrival.
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Thank you.
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FLIGHT DECK: Colgan 3407,
descend and maintain, 2,300.
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REBECCA SHAW: OK, down to 2,300.
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Colgan 3407.
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Let's do a descent
checklist, please.
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We can do the approach
checklist along with it.
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Sure.
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Bug set.
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Set.
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GPWS, landing flaps
selected, 15 degrees.
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NARRATOR: The pilots
go through a list
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of settings for the plane to
continue its landing approach.
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Yup.
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NARRATOR: Passengers can
already glimpse the lights
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of Buffalo's suburbs.
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Clarence Center is on the
approach path for aircraft
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landing at Buffalo's airport.
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Gear down.
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Looks alive.
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Gear's down.
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All right.
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Flaps 15.
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NARRATOR: Extending
the flaps provides
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more lift, allowing
the plane to slow
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to its final approach speed.
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Uh-- [whimpers]
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Jesus Christ!
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NARRATOR: Suddenly, the
control column starts to shake.
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The Q400 is slipping
out of control.
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[passengers screaming]
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Captain Renslow struggles
to keep his plane flying.
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Mother-- ah!
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NARRATOR: But it seems to
have a mind of its own.
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[shaw yelling]
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[passengers screaming]
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Mother bear.
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Should the gear be up?
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Gear up!
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Agh, damn!
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Ah, we're down!
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[screaming]
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Oh, my god!
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NARRATOR: The plane crashes into
a house at 6038 Long Street.
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At air traffic
control in Buffalo,
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flight 3407
disappears from radar.
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DAVID CASE: I'll never forget
the dispatcher's words.
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Plane crash, house on fire.
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I immediately got my
shoes on and my coat on.
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Got in my truck and started
heading down the driveway.
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NARRATOR: Firefighters
don't have far to go.
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6038 Long Street, home
of the Wielinski family,
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is less than a block from
the Clarence Center Station.
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As I turned
towards the village,
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the whole village was aglow.
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You could see the smoke.
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You could see the flame.
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00:07:31,117 --> 00:07:32,752
NARRATOR: Karen Wielinski
and her daughter
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make it out of
their house alive.
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00:07:34,954 --> 00:07:36,789
But her husband,
Douglas, is killed.
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My initial reaction
was, there's no--
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there was no way that
somebody made it out.
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But the EMS, the
division reported
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that they had two
people, and they were
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taking them to the hospital.
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And I said, well, which
firefighters are they?
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And they said, they're
not firefighters, Chief.
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They are survivors
from the house.
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I actually physically had
to go to the ambulance
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and look inside for
myself to to believe.
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NARRATOR: Firefighters have
never seen a blaze like this.
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00:08:06,319 --> 00:08:08,654
DAVID CASE: But if you've
ever gone to a bonfire
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and stood 5 feet from it, and
you couldn't take it anymore,
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that's what it felt
like from 100 feet away.
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MICHAEL ROGOWSKI:
The height of it was
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was just unbelievable,
obviously, because of the fuel
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that was probably added to it.
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And the debris area
was was very large.
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It was a very, very
horrific sight.
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We live in the
town where the plane
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went down right down the road.
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My son was driving
home from a soccer game
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and went right by the plane
crash, and called me up
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and said, there's a
plane down in Clarence.
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It never really entered our
brain that it was Elly's plane.
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NARRATOR: Flight
3407 has crashed 5
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miles short of Buffalo Airport.
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All 49 passengers
and crew are dead,
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including Captain Marvin Renslow
And First officer Rebecca Shaw.
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00:09:02,308 --> 00:09:05,611
But many more people could
easily have been killed.
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You picture a house.
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And to see a plane on
top of this house--
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no more house left,
no more plane.
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Only the tail section.
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You're asking yourself, how in
god's creation did this happen,
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and not wipe the
whole block out?
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JOHN KAUSNER: The next
call was again from my son,
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and said, in fact,
it was Elly's plane.
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And he said, Dad,
there's no survivors.
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At which point, my wife shrieked
and just hit the ground.
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Chris said he'd never heard his
mother make a sound like that,
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00:09:38,778 --> 00:09:40,980
and I hope he never does again.
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So that's when I knew
that she was gone.
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And that was probably within
45 minutes of the accident.
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NARRATOR: The scene
in the morning
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is one of utter devastation.
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Clint Crookshanks
from the NTSB.
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Can I start poking around?
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NARRATOR: Clint Crookshanks is
one of the first Investigators
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on the case.
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00:10:05,304 --> 00:10:06,839
CLINT CROOKSHANKS: When
we arrived on scene,
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there was a fire still burning.
191
00:10:08,341 --> 00:10:10,443
It turns out it was
from a gas line that
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had been broken in the house.
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00:10:12,178 --> 00:10:13,746
The firemen would
put the fire out,
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and it would reignite
every couple of minutes.
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It was one of the
grisliest, nastiest scenes
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00:10:20,419 --> 00:10:21,253
that I think I've seen.
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00:10:24,423 --> 00:10:27,994
NARRATOR: Flight 3407 may
have been a small plane,
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00:10:27,994 --> 00:10:32,298
but it's the worst crash in the
US in more than seven years.
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00:10:32,298 --> 00:10:37,069
It will become one of the NTSB's
most important investigations.
200
00:10:50,108 --> 00:10:52,276
preventing investigators
from examining the wreckage.
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00:10:59,951 --> 00:11:01,119
Right in there.
202
00:11:01,119 --> 00:11:02,320
That's where I think the--
203
00:11:02,320 --> 00:11:03,221
the box--
204
00:11:03,221 --> 00:11:04,956
The airplane had
crashed into a house,
205
00:11:04,956 --> 00:11:06,491
and then it had
burned all night long.
206
00:11:06,491 --> 00:11:09,827
So all the debris was
basically in the house.
207
00:11:09,827 --> 00:11:11,763
LORENDA WARD: Our concern is
that we're losing evidence.
208
00:11:11,763 --> 00:11:13,364
It's perishable.
209
00:11:13,364 --> 00:11:15,400
And if we can't get in
there and get the fire out,
210
00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:18,336
then we're not able
to maybe get a hold
211
00:11:18,336 --> 00:11:21,339
of evidence that might help
us during the investigation.
212
00:11:21,339 --> 00:11:23,341
NARRATOR: Clint
Crookshanks urgently
213
00:11:23,341 --> 00:11:25,243
needs to recover
the black box flight
214
00:11:25,243 --> 00:11:28,012
recorders, which could
contain valuable clues
215
00:11:28,012 --> 00:11:29,480
about the accident.
216
00:11:29,480 --> 00:11:31,849
We knew that the recorders
were in the tail part
217
00:11:31,849 --> 00:11:33,384
of the airplane.
218
00:11:33,384 --> 00:11:34,452
NARRATOR: Ordinarily,
investigators
219
00:11:34,452 --> 00:11:38,423
don't go near a crash
site that's still burning.
220
00:11:38,423 --> 00:11:40,892
But if the black boxes
can't be rescued,
221
00:11:40,892 --> 00:11:45,963
they may never find out what
brought down flight 3407.
222
00:11:45,963 --> 00:11:49,333
We started looking around and
poking around into the wreckage
223
00:11:49,333 --> 00:11:53,337
and actually found
out where they were.
224
00:11:53,337 --> 00:11:53,971
OK, whoa, whoa.
225
00:11:53,971 --> 00:11:56,441
It's probably in here, OK?
226
00:11:56,441 --> 00:11:58,342
The access panel is
on the other side,
227
00:11:58,342 --> 00:12:00,478
so we're going to have to
cut a hole right there.
228
00:12:00,478 --> 00:12:02,113
OK?
229
00:12:02,113 --> 00:12:03,548
The fire department
produced a chop saw.
230
00:12:03,548 --> 00:12:07,485
We were able to cut a hole
in the side of the fuselage,
231
00:12:07,485 --> 00:12:12,256
and go in and grab the
recorders and pull them out.
232
00:12:12,256 --> 00:12:12,757
All right.
233
00:12:12,757 --> 00:12:13,925
That should do it.
234
00:12:16,494 --> 00:12:18,229
NARRATOR: To the
immense relief of all,
235
00:12:18,229 --> 00:12:21,432
the recorders are undamaged.
236
00:12:21,432 --> 00:12:23,901
Once we took the recorders
out of the airplane,
237
00:12:23,901 --> 00:12:26,437
we put them on the jet, and they
were flown back to Washington,
238
00:12:26,437 --> 00:12:28,239
DC, to our headquarters.
239
00:12:31,442 --> 00:12:35,313
NARRATOR: Now, investigators
are faced with a new hurdle.
240
00:12:35,313 --> 00:12:37,448
What little is left
of the aircraft
241
00:12:37,448 --> 00:12:41,018
is hopelessly jumbled together
with human remains and debris
242
00:12:41,018 --> 00:12:42,987
from the house.
243
00:12:42,987 --> 00:12:44,455
CLINT CROOKSHANKS: It all burned
and settled into the basement.
244
00:12:44,455 --> 00:12:47,158
So we had probably
10 feet of debris
245
00:12:47,158 --> 00:12:48,993
that we had to dig
through in order
246
00:12:48,993 --> 00:12:52,463
to recover all of the airplane.
247
00:12:52,463 --> 00:12:54,298
NARRATOR: Authorities
wonder how they
248
00:12:54,298 --> 00:12:57,034
can salvage any useful
evidence from this chaos.
249
00:13:00,872 --> 00:13:04,842
They get invaluable assistance
from an unusual source.
250
00:13:04,842 --> 00:13:08,012
A group of students learning
to process crime scenes
251
00:13:08,012 --> 00:13:10,248
is enlisted to
separate human remains
252
00:13:10,248 --> 00:13:13,618
from the rest of the debris.
253
00:13:13,618 --> 00:13:15,486
CLINT CROOKSHANKS: They
were graduate students
254
00:13:15,486 --> 00:13:18,456
from a local college, forensic
anthropology students.
255
00:13:18,456 --> 00:13:20,024
And this was good
experience for them
256
00:13:20,024 --> 00:13:21,259
to come dig through
wreckage like this
257
00:13:21,259 --> 00:13:23,161
and look for human remains.
258
00:13:23,161 --> 00:13:25,363
So landing gear
over there, please.
259
00:13:25,363 --> 00:13:27,365
NARRATOR: It's dirty
painstaking work.
260
00:13:27,365 --> 00:13:29,867
But it frees up
investigators to concentrate
261
00:13:29,867 --> 00:13:32,270
on the aircraft ruins.
262
00:13:32,270 --> 00:13:33,504
We were on our
hands and knees,
263
00:13:33,504 --> 00:13:36,040
with brooms, with
little shovels,
264
00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:38,276
scooping out debris,
identifying it
265
00:13:38,276 --> 00:13:40,645
as to house debris
or airplane debris,
266
00:13:40,645 --> 00:13:42,313
and then putting it
in different piles.
267
00:13:45,883 --> 00:13:48,586
The first question for me,
as a structures engineer,
268
00:13:48,586 --> 00:13:50,321
is to figure out if
the whole airplane made
269
00:13:50,321 --> 00:13:54,058
it to the scene of the crash.
270
00:13:54,058 --> 00:13:56,360
NARRATOR: The wreckage is
carefully studied to determine
271
00:13:56,360 --> 00:13:58,229
if the plane's four corners--
272
00:13:58,229 --> 00:14:00,998
nose, tail, and both
wingtips-- are present.
273
00:14:06,037 --> 00:14:08,973
If we find all four corners of
the airplane, then we know that
274
00:14:08,973 --> 00:14:10,975
there was no in-flight breakup.
275
00:14:10,975 --> 00:14:12,910
There was nothing that
departed the airplane
276
00:14:12,910 --> 00:14:15,646
during the flight that may
have caused the accident.
277
00:14:15,646 --> 00:14:18,482
NARRATOR: One wing has
been consumed by fire.
278
00:14:18,482 --> 00:14:20,918
The other is
shattered into pieces.
279
00:14:20,918 --> 00:14:21,619
Hey!
280
00:14:21,619 --> 00:14:22,787
Have a look at this!
281
00:14:22,787 --> 00:14:25,156
NARRATOR: But Investigators
are gradually finding what
282
00:14:25,156 --> 00:14:26,324
they've been searching for.
283
00:14:26,324 --> 00:14:28,526
Oh, yeah, it's the last piece.
284
00:14:28,526 --> 00:14:29,594
It's the left one.
285
00:14:29,594 --> 00:14:31,562
CLINT CROOKSHANKS: It
wasn't until several days
286
00:14:31,562 --> 00:14:33,531
into the investigation, as
we were scraping away some
287
00:14:33,531 --> 00:14:35,466
of the debris, that we
actually found evidence
288
00:14:35,466 --> 00:14:38,402
of the left wing and the nose.
289
00:14:38,402 --> 00:14:40,538
NARRATOR: Investigators
now have all the pieces
290
00:14:40,538 --> 00:14:43,674
they need to conclude
that the entire plane is
291
00:14:43,674 --> 00:14:45,409
at the crash site.
292
00:14:45,409 --> 00:14:48,079
Whatever caused the
disaster was not the result
293
00:14:48,079 --> 00:14:49,213
of a breakup in flight.
294
00:14:57,121 --> 00:15:01,259
The tragedy of flight 3407
is under intense scrutiny at
295
00:15:01,259 --> 00:15:04,061
the NTSB offices in Washington.
296
00:15:04,061 --> 00:15:07,265
Officials there try to determine
if some kind of malfunction
297
00:15:07,265 --> 00:15:09,433
caused the crash.
298
00:15:09,433 --> 00:15:10,735
On this particular
accident, we
299
00:15:10,735 --> 00:15:12,536
knew it was a landing accident.
300
00:15:12,536 --> 00:15:15,139
So we want to check the
aircraft's performance,
301
00:15:15,139 --> 00:15:18,409
and then also, we checked for
flight control continuity.
302
00:15:18,409 --> 00:15:20,111
NARRATOR: Much of
this responsibility
303
00:15:20,111 --> 00:15:22,246
falls to Scott Warren.
304
00:15:22,246 --> 00:15:23,981
SCOTT WARREN: My role
in the investigation
305
00:15:23,981 --> 00:15:27,151
was to be the systems group
chairman for the Safety Board,
306
00:15:27,151 --> 00:15:32,023
so I was in charge of looking
at all of the aircraft systems.
307
00:15:32,023 --> 00:15:34,292
NARRATOR: Warren analyzes
the aircraft's cockpit voice
308
00:15:34,292 --> 00:15:38,262
recorder, or CVR, to determine
if there were any indications
309
00:15:38,262 --> 00:15:39,664
of a problem in the cockpit.
310
00:15:39,664 --> 00:15:40,364
REBECCA SHAW (ON RECORDING):
Flight attendants can
311
00:15:40,364 --> 00:15:42,066
prepare the cabin for arrival.
312
00:15:42,066 --> 00:15:44,302
Thank you.
313
00:15:44,302 --> 00:15:47,204
Is that ice on the windshield?
314
00:15:47,204 --> 00:15:50,141
NARRATOR: He discovers that
six minutes before the crash,
315
00:15:50,141 --> 00:15:54,011
the crew of Flight 3407 had
noticed a buildup of ice
316
00:15:54,011 --> 00:15:55,446
on the aircraft.
317
00:15:55,446 --> 00:15:57,081
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): Got it on my side.
318
00:15:57,081 --> 00:15:59,583
You don't have yours?
319
00:15:59,583 --> 00:16:01,452
Oh, yeah.
320
00:16:01,452 --> 00:16:03,120
Oh, it's lots of ice.
321
00:16:03,120 --> 00:16:07,658
NARRATOR: Ice can be a deadly
threat to any airplane.
322
00:16:07,658 --> 00:16:09,660
SCOTT WARREN: If an
aircraft has ice on it,
323
00:16:09,660 --> 00:16:11,595
it will have more drag on it,
so it'll require more power
324
00:16:11,595 --> 00:16:13,631
to maintain a given airspeed.
325
00:16:17,301 --> 00:16:19,070
MARVIN RENSLOW: Oh, yeah.
326
00:16:19,070 --> 00:16:21,138
That's the most I've seen on the
leading edges in a long time.
327
00:16:21,138 --> 00:16:24,342
NARRATOR: Until a year ago,
Rebecca Shaw had no experience
328
00:16:24,342 --> 00:16:26,544
with ice on an aircraft.
329
00:16:26,544 --> 00:16:29,146
I'd never seen
icing conditions.
330
00:16:29,146 --> 00:16:30,514
Never de-iced.
331
00:16:30,514 --> 00:16:33,384
Never experienced any of that.
332
00:16:33,384 --> 00:16:35,786
ROGER COX: When ice
accretes on a wing,
333
00:16:35,786 --> 00:16:39,123
it adds weight to the airplane,
but most importantly, it
334
00:16:39,123 --> 00:16:40,691
changes the shape of the wing.
335
00:16:40,691 --> 00:16:43,294
And of course, it's the shape--
the curved shape of the wing--
336
00:16:43,294 --> 00:16:44,662
that actually creates the lip.
337
00:16:44,662 --> 00:16:47,732
So by changing the
lift characteristics
338
00:16:47,732 --> 00:16:51,302
of the airplane, it makes
it less able to fly.
339
00:16:51,302 --> 00:16:53,070
You know, I'd
have freaked out.
340
00:16:53,070 --> 00:16:57,375
Like, I'd have seen this much
ice and thought, oh my gosh,
341
00:16:57,375 --> 00:16:59,677
we were going to crash.
342
00:16:59,677 --> 00:17:00,878
[sighs]
343
00:17:00,878 --> 00:17:03,180
ROGER COX: Observing that
there was ice on the airplane
344
00:17:03,180 --> 00:17:04,749
was an important thing to do.
345
00:17:04,749 --> 00:17:06,751
But then, it would
be important to turn
346
00:17:06,751 --> 00:17:09,520
around and verify that your
anti-ice and de-ice equipment
347
00:17:09,520 --> 00:17:10,621
was on.
348
00:17:10,621 --> 00:17:13,224
And there was no indication
on the voice recorder
349
00:17:13,224 --> 00:17:15,760
that they actually rechecked.
350
00:17:15,760 --> 00:17:17,661
NARRATOR: The CVR
reveals that only minutes
351
00:17:17,661 --> 00:17:20,531
after the crew detected
ice, a device called
352
00:17:20,531 --> 00:17:22,366
the stick shaker went off.
353
00:17:22,366 --> 00:17:24,201
[rebecca shaw yelling]
354
00:17:24,201 --> 00:17:27,338
It was a warning that the plane
was about to stall, literally,
355
00:17:27,338 --> 00:17:28,539
to fall out of the sky.
356
00:17:31,509 --> 00:17:35,880
Shortly afterwards, the
aircraft did precisely that.
357
00:17:35,880 --> 00:17:38,616
[screaming]
358
00:17:40,718 --> 00:17:42,253
We know there were
icing conditions.
359
00:17:42,253 --> 00:17:44,221
The only question
was, were they bad
360
00:17:44,221 --> 00:17:48,292
enough to induce this
airplane to have a failure?
361
00:17:48,292 --> 00:17:50,227
NARRATOR: Ice is now
the chief suspect
362
00:17:50,227 --> 00:17:53,531
in the crash of Flight 3407.
363
00:17:53,531 --> 00:17:56,400
If it's ice, let's prove it.
364
00:17:56,400 --> 00:17:57,435
CLINT CROOKSHANKS:
We were all convinced
365
00:17:57,435 --> 00:17:59,470
that we had an icing accident.
366
00:17:59,470 --> 00:18:01,772
We said, yeah, it's going
to be an icing accident.
367
00:18:01,772 --> 00:18:04,575
We just got to make sure we
look for these few key aspects
368
00:18:04,575 --> 00:18:08,212
of icing, verify
that, and we're good.
369
00:18:08,212 --> 00:18:10,448
NARRATOR: But some of the
victim's family members
370
00:18:10,448 --> 00:18:12,249
are less convinced.
371
00:18:12,249 --> 00:18:14,885
Our initial thought was that
it was an ice-related incident,
372
00:18:14,885 --> 00:18:17,655
that it was the icy night
that brought the plane down.
373
00:18:17,655 --> 00:18:21,158
And as we began to talk to
people who knew airline travel,
374
00:18:21,158 --> 00:18:24,395
who were pilots themselves,
they would look kind of askance
375
00:18:24,395 --> 00:18:25,362
and say, I don't think so.
376
00:18:25,362 --> 00:18:28,165
That doesn't make sense.
377
00:18:28,165 --> 00:18:31,502
NARRATOR: Some investigators
share that suspicion.
378
00:18:31,502 --> 00:18:33,871
Scott Warren knows a
plane like the Q400
379
00:18:33,871 --> 00:18:37,741
has a sophisticated
de-icing system.
380
00:18:37,741 --> 00:18:39,643
It's designed to keep
ice from building
381
00:18:39,643 --> 00:18:42,313
up on the wings and other
critical parts of the aircraft.
382
00:18:45,683 --> 00:18:47,918
To prevent ice
accumulating, the plane
383
00:18:47,918 --> 00:18:50,354
has rubber bladders along
the front of the wings,
384
00:18:50,354 --> 00:18:52,790
called de-icing boots.
385
00:18:52,790 --> 00:18:55,759
A series of valves uses
air from the engines
386
00:18:55,759 --> 00:18:59,530
to inflate the boots and
crack the ice off the wing.
387
00:18:59,530 --> 00:19:02,967
Those boots are designed
to inflate periodically.
388
00:19:02,967 --> 00:19:07,838
And that inflation breaks off
the ice that's accumulated
389
00:19:07,838 --> 00:19:09,673
on those leading edges.
390
00:19:09,673 --> 00:19:13,544
NARRATOR: Warren now wonders
if the crew of flight 3407
391
00:19:13,544 --> 00:19:17,414
actually turned on their
de-icing equipment.
392
00:19:17,414 --> 00:19:20,851
He studies data from the plane's
other black box, its flight
393
00:19:20,851 --> 00:19:23,954
data recorder, or FDR.
394
00:19:23,954 --> 00:19:26,824
It tracks the workings of
crucial aircraft systems,
395
00:19:26,824 --> 00:19:30,828
including the
de-icing mechanism.
396
00:19:30,828 --> 00:19:32,796
SCOTT WARREN: We know
from the FDR data
397
00:19:32,796 --> 00:19:35,866
that the deicing system had
been selected on by the crew.
398
00:19:35,866 --> 00:19:39,503
And it was on during the
majority of the flight,
399
00:19:39,503 --> 00:19:40,804
and certainly, at the
end of the flight,
400
00:19:40,804 --> 00:19:44,375
it was recorded in
the on position.
401
00:19:44,375 --> 00:19:47,344
NARRATOR: But now, Warren needs
to figure out if the device was
402
00:19:47,344 --> 00:19:49,346
actually working.
403
00:19:49,346 --> 00:19:50,848
SCOTT WARREN: Just because the
data records that the system is
404
00:19:50,848 --> 00:19:53,684
on, that's a start, but you
can't necessarily believe
405
00:19:53,684 --> 00:19:55,853
that one piece of information.
406
00:19:55,853 --> 00:19:57,688
NARRATOR: The only
way to know is
407
00:19:57,688 --> 00:20:00,457
to find what remains of the
plane's de-icing system,
408
00:20:00,457 --> 00:20:05,863
and determine if it was active
when the aircraft went down.
409
00:20:05,863 --> 00:20:08,899
Clint Crookshanks' team
hunts for a crucial component
410
00:20:08,899 --> 00:20:09,833
of the system--
411
00:20:09,833 --> 00:20:10,801
the valves.
412
00:20:10,801 --> 00:20:12,736
Excuse me.
413
00:20:12,736 --> 00:20:13,237
OK.
414
00:20:13,237 --> 00:20:14,905
Everyone, I just--
415
00:20:14,905 --> 00:20:15,739
CLINT CROOKSHANKS:
For the de-ice valves,
416
00:20:15,739 --> 00:20:17,408
we said, here's
what it looks like.
417
00:20:17,408 --> 00:20:19,009
Look for something like this.
418
00:20:19,009 --> 00:20:21,679
If we can find those valves,
then we can test them and see
419
00:20:21,679 --> 00:20:24,281
if they're operating correctly.
420
00:20:24,281 --> 00:20:25,916
SCOTT WARREN: The valves
were very important to us,
421
00:20:25,916 --> 00:20:29,053
because they are the key
component that moves air
422
00:20:29,053 --> 00:20:32,056
from the engines where
the bleed air originates
423
00:20:32,056 --> 00:20:32,823
for the de-icing system.
424
00:20:47,738 --> 00:20:49,039
OK, good.
425
00:20:49,039 --> 00:20:49,807
Five more to go.
426
00:20:59,917 --> 00:21:02,086
NARRATOR: Five of the
plane's six de-icing valves
427
00:21:02,086 --> 00:21:04,822
are eventually recovered.
428
00:21:04,822 --> 00:21:05,856
SCOTT WARREN: Some
were badly burned.
429
00:21:05,856 --> 00:21:07,625
Some were in fairly good shape.
430
00:21:07,625 --> 00:21:11,328
And we took those valves, and
we conducted as much testing
431
00:21:11,328 --> 00:21:13,764
on those valves as we thought
was appropriate for the level
432
00:21:13,764 --> 00:21:15,366
of damage.
433
00:21:15,366 --> 00:21:17,901
We looked at the level of
electrical conductivity,
434
00:21:17,901 --> 00:21:20,070
and we looked at the
pressure testing.
435
00:21:20,070 --> 00:21:23,340
We looked at a wide
variety of things,
436
00:21:23,340 --> 00:21:27,011
depending on the condition
of the valve itself.
437
00:21:27,011 --> 00:21:28,646
And as far as we could
tell, all those valves
438
00:21:28,646 --> 00:21:30,881
were working properly.
439
00:21:30,881 --> 00:21:32,650
Is that ice on the windshield?
440
00:21:32,650 --> 00:21:33,917
I've got it on my side.
441
00:21:33,917 --> 00:21:35,419
NARRATOR: Now,
investigators have
442
00:21:35,419 --> 00:21:36,887
to consider the possibility.
443
00:21:36,887 --> 00:21:37,454
Oh, yeah.
444
00:21:37,454 --> 00:21:39,390
Oh, it's lots of ice.
445
00:21:39,390 --> 00:21:40,958
NARRATOR: But there is
so much ice on the wings,
446
00:21:40,958 --> 00:21:43,394
that the de-icing system
couldn't get rid of it
447
00:21:43,394 --> 00:21:44,395
fast enough.
448
00:21:44,395 --> 00:21:46,363
Oh, yeah.
449
00:21:46,363 --> 00:21:49,933
That's the most I've seen on the
leading edges in a long time.
450
00:21:49,933 --> 00:21:52,069
NARRATOR: It has
happened before.
451
00:21:52,069 --> 00:21:55,472
In Roselawn, Indiana, a
French-built commuter plane
452
00:21:55,472 --> 00:21:59,610
crashed in 1994 after suffering
a catastrophic buildup of ice
453
00:21:59,610 --> 00:22:00,644
on the wind.
454
00:22:09,153 --> 00:22:11,989
By analyzing how much power
was needed for the plane
455
00:22:11,989 --> 00:22:14,792
to maintain its
airspeed, investigators
456
00:22:14,792 --> 00:22:17,161
reach a surprising conclusion.
457
00:22:17,161 --> 00:22:19,997
Basically, the aircraft
was flying as if it had
458
00:22:19,997 --> 00:22:22,633
a relatively small
amount of ice on it,
459
00:22:22,633 --> 00:22:24,468
but a very manageable
amount of ice.
460
00:22:24,468 --> 00:22:25,636
Looks normal.
461
00:22:25,636 --> 00:22:26,704
SCOTT WARREN: It
was not overloaded.
462
00:22:26,704 --> 00:22:29,006
It was not excessive.
463
00:22:29,006 --> 00:22:31,709
NARRATOR: If ice didn't
bring down the plane,
464
00:22:31,709 --> 00:22:35,979
something else must
have caused it to stall.
465
00:22:35,979 --> 00:22:39,183
Warren studies the
Q400 operating manual
466
00:22:39,183 --> 00:22:41,985
to learn the plane's
stall speed, the velocity
467
00:22:41,985 --> 00:22:43,887
at which it can
no longer generate
468
00:22:43,887 --> 00:22:46,557
enough lift to stay in the air.
469
00:22:46,557 --> 00:22:48,192
He discovers that
in the conditions
470
00:22:48,192 --> 00:22:54,732
flight 3407 was flying through,
it's roughly 111 knots.
471
00:22:54,732 --> 00:22:57,000
He now compares the
plane's stall speed
472
00:22:57,000 --> 00:22:59,670
with its actual airspeed
just before the stall
473
00:22:59,670 --> 00:23:02,072
warning went off.
474
00:23:02,072 --> 00:23:08,212
131 knots, well above
the danger zone.
475
00:23:08,212 --> 00:23:09,113
Flaps 15.
476
00:23:12,883 --> 00:23:14,852
When the stick
shaker went off--
477
00:23:14,852 --> 00:23:16,553
Uh, oh!
478
00:23:16,553 --> 00:23:19,523
Jesus Christ!
479
00:23:19,523 --> 00:23:23,127
--they were not necessarily
at the edge of a stall.
480
00:23:27,097 --> 00:23:30,934
They were still 20 knots
or so away from the stall.
481
00:23:30,934 --> 00:23:32,870
NARRATOR: This new
revelation deepens
482
00:23:32,870 --> 00:23:35,239
the mystery of flight 3407.
483
00:23:35,239 --> 00:23:38,909
If it wasn't stalling, why
did it fall out of the sky?
484
00:23:46,108 --> 00:23:48,477
to the critical
seconds before flight
485
00:23:48,477 --> 00:23:51,247
3407 went out of control.
486
00:23:51,247 --> 00:23:54,717
They look for clues that could
explain why the stall warning
487
00:23:54,717 --> 00:23:56,585
went off when the
aircraft was flying
488
00:23:56,585 --> 00:24:00,089
well within its safety margins.
489
00:24:00,089 --> 00:24:02,892
They discover that this plane
has a unique feature, known
490
00:24:02,892 --> 00:24:05,227
as a reference speed switch.
491
00:24:05,227 --> 00:24:08,497
It governs the sensitivity
of the plane's stall warning.
492
00:24:08,497 --> 00:24:10,799
ROGER COX: Very few
airplanes, in my experience,
493
00:24:10,799 --> 00:24:12,034
have such a switch.
494
00:24:12,034 --> 00:24:13,636
This airplane is
the only one I know
495
00:24:13,636 --> 00:24:16,972
of that has an actual switch
on the overhead panel.
496
00:24:16,972 --> 00:24:19,575
It was designed by
the manufacturer
497
00:24:19,575 --> 00:24:21,610
to be an extra safety feature.
498
00:24:21,610 --> 00:24:23,612
Some kind of
variable ref speed?
499
00:24:23,612 --> 00:24:26,115
NARRATOR: Pilots are supposed
to turn on the reference speed
500
00:24:26,115 --> 00:24:27,950
switch when they're
going to be flying
501
00:24:27,950 --> 00:24:29,752
through icing conditions.
502
00:24:29,752 --> 00:24:31,253
And we'll probably
be picking up some ice.
503
00:24:31,253 --> 00:24:34,123
NARRATOR: When in the
increased position,
504
00:24:34,123 --> 00:24:37,893
it reminds pilots to fly faster
to counteract any drag effect
505
00:24:37,893 --> 00:24:41,163
ice will have on the aircraft.
506
00:24:41,163 --> 00:24:43,198
ROGER COX: When you
are in icing conditions
507
00:24:43,198 --> 00:24:45,668
and ice does accrue
on the wing, it can
508
00:24:45,668 --> 00:24:49,004
cause the stall speed to go up.
509
00:24:49,004 --> 00:24:51,707
And so this ref speed
switch correspondingly
510
00:24:51,707 --> 00:24:55,644
causes the warning to come on
sooner or at a higher speed.
511
00:24:55,644 --> 00:24:59,682
What that switch does is it
basically changes the trigger
512
00:24:59,682 --> 00:25:01,116
settings for the stick shaker.
513
00:25:01,116 --> 00:25:02,718
So we had to ask
the manufacturer,
514
00:25:02,718 --> 00:25:04,086
how does this switch work?
515
00:25:04,086 --> 00:25:05,321
ROGER COX: And
what we found was,
516
00:25:05,321 --> 00:25:08,190
it was part of the
systems description
517
00:25:08,190 --> 00:25:10,826
that the crews got when
they went through training.
518
00:25:10,826 --> 00:25:11,927
But they didn't get
a lot of training
519
00:25:11,927 --> 00:25:13,329
on how to handle that switch.
520
00:25:13,329 --> 00:25:18,167
It seemed like it was too
simple to worry about.
521
00:25:18,167 --> 00:25:22,204
NARRATOR: Investigators need to
know if the crew of flight 3407
522
00:25:22,204 --> 00:25:25,240
had turned on the
reference speed switch,
523
00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:28,143
triggering the stick shaker
at a faster-than-normal speed.
524
00:25:30,879 --> 00:25:34,717
The flight data recorder doesn't
show whether the switch was on.
525
00:25:34,717 --> 00:25:38,687
Investigators must find another
way of determining its position
526
00:25:38,687 --> 00:25:39,822
at the time of the accident.
527
00:25:45,861 --> 00:25:47,830
[phone ringing]
528
00:25:47,830 --> 00:25:49,631
Clint here.
529
00:25:49,631 --> 00:25:50,833
NARRATOR: Clint Crookshanks
is given a new priority.
530
00:25:50,833 --> 00:25:51,900
All right.
531
00:25:51,900 --> 00:25:53,235
I'll see if we have it.
532
00:25:53,235 --> 00:25:55,037
NARRATOR: Recover the
ice protection panel
533
00:25:55,037 --> 00:25:57,873
from the Q400 cockpit,
where the reference
534
00:25:57,873 --> 00:26:00,009
speed switch is housed.
535
00:26:00,009 --> 00:26:02,745
Since the panel was in
the cockpit, finding it
536
00:26:02,745 --> 00:26:04,780
is a challenge.
537
00:26:04,780 --> 00:26:06,715
CLINT CROOKSHANKS: Most of
the front end of the airplane
538
00:26:06,715 --> 00:26:09,385
was consumed by fire, and
so we didn't find anything
539
00:26:09,385 --> 00:26:13,722
except for little balls of
molten aluminum, little wire
540
00:26:13,722 --> 00:26:16,225
bundles, and a lot of ash.
541
00:26:16,225 --> 00:26:18,127
NARRATOR: But after
an extensive search,
542
00:26:18,127 --> 00:26:20,229
Crookshanks discovers
that the ice
543
00:26:20,229 --> 00:26:22,765
protection panel is
one of the few pieces
544
00:26:22,765 --> 00:26:24,700
of the cockpit that survived.
545
00:26:24,700 --> 00:26:26,268
Bingo.
546
00:26:26,268 --> 00:26:27,903
NARRATOR: However,
the knobs and switches
547
00:26:27,903 --> 00:26:30,773
are barely recognizable.
548
00:26:30,773 --> 00:26:34,076
Crookshanks examines the charred
panel to check the position
549
00:26:34,076 --> 00:26:37,112
of the reference speed switch.
550
00:26:37,112 --> 00:26:39,948
It was set to activate
stall warnings
551
00:26:39,948 --> 00:26:43,252
at higher-than-normal speeds.
552
00:26:43,252 --> 00:26:44,820
CLINT CROOKSHANKS:
We did find the ref
553
00:26:44,820 --> 00:26:46,088
speed switch in the
wreckage, and it
554
00:26:46,088 --> 00:26:48,690
was in the increased position.
555
00:26:48,690 --> 00:26:51,427
NARRATOR: This discovery
only raises more questions.
556
00:26:51,427 --> 00:26:53,295
[yawns]
557
00:26:53,295 --> 00:26:54,997
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): And we'll probably
558
00:26:54,997 --> 00:26:56,231
be picking up some ice.
559
00:26:56,231 --> 00:26:57,366
NARRATOR: The cockpit
voice recorder
560
00:26:57,366 --> 00:27:00,302
indicates that as Renslow
was beginning his descent
561
00:27:00,302 --> 00:27:03,806
into Buffalo, he
commanded his plane to fly
562
00:27:03,806 --> 00:27:06,008
at the normal approach speed.
563
00:27:06,008 --> 00:27:07,709
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): Gear down.
564
00:27:07,709 --> 00:27:09,845
NARRATOR: But what's strange
is that with his reference
565
00:27:09,845 --> 00:27:12,114
speed switch on,
he actually should
566
00:27:12,114 --> 00:27:13,816
have been flying faster--
567
00:27:13,816 --> 00:27:15,451
[sneezes]
568
00:27:15,451 --> 00:27:19,822
--as this is what the switch
would remind him to do.
569
00:27:19,822 --> 00:27:21,457
So why wasn't he?
570
00:27:21,457 --> 00:27:24,993
The plane's computer warned
the crew to fly faster,
571
00:27:24,993 --> 00:27:27,463
according to the settings
they had configured,
572
00:27:27,463 --> 00:27:30,466
by displaying a set of red
bars in the airspeed indicator.
573
00:27:30,466 --> 00:27:32,067
But you may have a
better quality of life
574
00:27:32,067 --> 00:27:33,836
with regards to--
575
00:27:33,836 --> 00:27:35,838
NARRATOR: These bars are meant
to warn the pilots that a stick
576
00:27:35,838 --> 00:27:37,473
shaker activation is imminent.
577
00:27:37,473 --> 00:27:39,308
If you're looking at
the airspeed indicator,
578
00:27:39,308 --> 00:27:42,144
you should be aware that
you're getting slow,
579
00:27:42,144 --> 00:27:46,281
and the stall
warning may come on.
580
00:27:46,281 --> 00:27:47,516
Jesus Christ!
581
00:27:47,516 --> 00:27:50,853
NARRATOR: It seems Renslow and
Shaw were caught off-guard.
582
00:27:50,853 --> 00:27:55,023
Still, they could have easily
corrected the situation.
583
00:27:55,023 --> 00:27:56,992
Once the stick
shaker had activated,
584
00:27:56,992 --> 00:28:00,195
they could have
turned the switch off,
585
00:28:00,195 --> 00:28:02,097
or they could have
put the nose down
586
00:28:02,097 --> 00:28:03,265
and increased their airspeed.
587
00:28:03,265 --> 00:28:05,400
NARRATOR: It's clear
to investigators
588
00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:09,204
that flight 3407 wasn't
in danger of stalling
589
00:28:09,204 --> 00:28:11,140
when the stick shaker went off.
590
00:28:11,140 --> 00:28:13,175
So now, they need
to know exactly
591
00:28:13,175 --> 00:28:17,146
what happened after the
stall warning was activated.
592
00:28:17,146 --> 00:28:19,348
An animated simulation
of the crash
593
00:28:19,348 --> 00:28:22,151
is constructed,
based on information
594
00:28:22,151 --> 00:28:24,253
from the flight recorders.
595
00:28:24,253 --> 00:28:28,357
Watch what happens just after
the stick shaker goes off.
596
00:28:28,357 --> 00:28:29,992
NARRATOR: It
illustrates that just
597
00:28:29,992 --> 00:28:31,894
after the stick
shaker was triggered,
598
00:28:31,894 --> 00:28:34,196
the plane suddenly pulled up.
599
00:28:34,196 --> 00:28:37,132
This action dramatically
slowed the aircraft,
600
00:28:37,132 --> 00:28:39,535
and at this point, it did stall.
601
00:28:39,535 --> 00:28:42,838
Essentially, the airplane
entered an aerodynamic stall
602
00:28:42,838 --> 00:28:44,206
from which it did not recover.
603
00:28:44,206 --> 00:28:46,208
It pitched over
and hit the ground.
604
00:28:46,208 --> 00:28:48,410
NARRATOR: Investigators
are dumbfounded.
605
00:28:48,410 --> 00:28:53,215
Flight 3407 wasn't stalling
when the stick shaker went off.
606
00:28:53,215 --> 00:28:56,785
But a few seconds later, it was.
607
00:28:56,785 --> 00:28:59,354
The crew's every action
during that brief time
608
00:28:59,354 --> 00:29:02,524
now demands careful scrutiny.
609
00:29:02,524 --> 00:29:05,060
What did they do?
610
00:29:05,060 --> 00:29:06,395
NARRATOR: It's a puzzle.
611
00:29:06,395 --> 00:29:08,964
How could a trained
flight crew take a plane
612
00:29:08,964 --> 00:29:12,534
that wasn't stalling, and in
the space of a view moments,
613
00:29:12,534 --> 00:29:14,503
make it fall from the sky?
614
00:29:14,503 --> 00:29:16,572
ROGER COX: Any time you
have an apparent stall
615
00:29:16,572 --> 00:29:18,941
for no apparent reason,
that's a mystery.
616
00:29:18,941 --> 00:29:24,112
We would expect that no flight
crew would stall an airliner.
617
00:29:24,112 --> 00:29:27,115
So the question is, why?
618
00:29:27,115 --> 00:29:28,417
NARRATOR: The focus
of the investigation
619
00:29:28,417 --> 00:29:32,154
now switches from the
plane to the crew.
620
00:29:32,154 --> 00:29:34,323
Specifically, on
the moves they made
621
00:29:34,323 --> 00:29:36,458
during the critical
seconds after the stall
622
00:29:36,458 --> 00:29:38,493
warning sounded.
623
00:29:38,493 --> 00:29:41,363
ROGER COX: We wanted to see if
the way they flew the airplane
624
00:29:41,363 --> 00:29:43,999
was the way they were
trained, according
625
00:29:43,999 --> 00:29:46,468
to the standard operating
procedures that are portrayed
626
00:29:46,468 --> 00:29:48,971
in their flight manuals.
627
00:29:48,971 --> 00:29:52,040
NARRATOR: The flight data
recorder retains information
628
00:29:52,040 --> 00:29:55,611
from more than 1,000 different
aspects of the Q400's flight
629
00:29:55,611 --> 00:29:58,080
operations.
630
00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:01,583
From the airspeed and altitude
to the position of the rudder
631
00:30:01,583 --> 00:30:05,320
pedals and throttles,
it also records
632
00:30:05,320 --> 00:30:08,223
the movements of the most
critical flight control--
633
00:30:08,223 --> 00:30:10,859
the control column.
634
00:30:10,859 --> 00:30:13,495
Pilots use the control
column to change the position
635
00:30:13,495 --> 00:30:16,999
of the elevators and
ailerons, which manage
636
00:30:16,999 --> 00:30:19,868
the direction of the plane.
637
00:30:19,868 --> 00:30:22,471
The flight data recorder
stores information, not just
638
00:30:22,471 --> 00:30:24,640
about the control
columns position,
639
00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:28,644
but how much force is
applied to it as well.
640
00:30:28,644 --> 00:30:32,347
The FDR records what the
control positions were.
641
00:30:32,347 --> 00:30:34,349
It has sensors built
into the control column.
642
00:30:34,349 --> 00:30:37,119
It has sensors built
into the control wheel.
643
00:30:37,119 --> 00:30:38,887
NARRATOR: What
Scott Warren finds
644
00:30:38,887 --> 00:30:42,591
when analyzing the control
columns position is stunning.
645
00:30:42,591 --> 00:30:45,594
In response to the stick
shaker, Captain Renslow
646
00:30:45,594 --> 00:30:48,330
should have pushed the
column forward to bring
647
00:30:48,330 --> 00:30:50,532
the nose down and gain speed.
648
00:30:50,532 --> 00:30:54,369
But for some reason, he
did the exact opposite.
649
00:30:54,369 --> 00:30:56,305
SCOTT WARREN: We found that
the crew, instead of pushing
650
00:30:56,305 --> 00:30:58,340
forward, which is the
normal response to a stick
651
00:30:58,340 --> 00:31:01,310
shaker triggering,
the crew was actually
652
00:31:01,310 --> 00:31:03,512
pulling back on the controls.
653
00:31:03,512 --> 00:31:06,515
NARRATOR: This had the effect
of pulling the nose up, causing
654
00:31:06,515 --> 00:31:09,184
the airspeed to drop
and tipping the aircraft
655
00:31:09,184 --> 00:31:10,419
into an actual stall.
656
00:31:13,922 --> 00:31:16,925
Captain Renslow had apparently
mishandled one of the most
657
00:31:16,925 --> 00:31:19,328
elemental piloting maneuvers--
658
00:31:19,328 --> 00:31:22,431
how to recover from a stall.
659
00:31:22,431 --> 00:31:25,033
Above everything, it
requires gaining air
660
00:31:25,033 --> 00:31:28,236
speed to get out of the red.
661
00:31:28,236 --> 00:31:30,706
ROGER COX: The recovery
procedure is fairly
662
00:31:30,706 --> 00:31:32,574
simple and straightforward.
663
00:31:32,574 --> 00:31:34,676
It requires pushing
forward on the controls
664
00:31:34,676 --> 00:31:37,112
and adding full power.
665
00:31:37,112 --> 00:31:40,716
At any point in time, had
the captain pushed forward
666
00:31:40,716 --> 00:31:44,086
on those flight controls,
he had a reasonably good
667
00:31:44,086 --> 00:31:47,556
chance of recovering quickly.
668
00:31:47,556 --> 00:31:49,424
JOHN KAUSNER: From
everything we've gained,
669
00:31:49,424 --> 00:31:52,060
that stall was recoverable
on a repeated number
670
00:31:52,060 --> 00:31:53,395
of levels and a repeated basis.
671
00:31:53,395 --> 00:31:55,097
There was no reason for
their plane to go down.
672
00:31:55,097 --> 00:31:57,632
NARRATOR: Investigators also
learned that First Officer
673
00:31:57,632 --> 00:32:00,736
Shaw, in trying to help
Renslow deal with the crisis,
674
00:32:00,736 --> 00:32:03,105
inadvertently made things worse.
675
00:32:03,105 --> 00:32:05,607
I put the flaps up!
676
00:32:05,607 --> 00:32:07,609
NARRATOR: She
retracted the flaps,
677
00:32:07,609 --> 00:32:10,312
reducing the amount
of lift as the plane
678
00:32:10,312 --> 00:32:12,748
struggled to stay in the air.
679
00:32:12,748 --> 00:32:15,150
ROGER COX: Had the First
Officer simply called out,
680
00:32:15,150 --> 00:32:18,487
you're stalled, advanced the
power, pushed the nose over,
681
00:32:18,487 --> 00:32:20,589
the airplane would have
been able to recover.
682
00:32:20,589 --> 00:32:22,557
SCOTT WARREN: From a
human point of view,
683
00:32:22,557 --> 00:32:25,494
it's sad to recognize that
those sorts of things happened
684
00:32:25,494 --> 00:32:27,596
and the tragedy
that came from that.
685
00:32:33,611 --> 00:32:36,347
to properly respond
to the stall warning
686
00:32:36,347 --> 00:32:40,618
was the primary cause of
the crash of Flight 3407.
687
00:32:40,618 --> 00:32:44,622
As the issue is now pilot error
rather than mechanical failure,
688
00:32:44,622 --> 00:32:47,291
human performance
investigator, Evan Byrne,
689
00:32:47,291 --> 00:32:49,526
is brought on board.
690
00:32:49,526 --> 00:32:53,631
His first question-- why
hadn't either Renslow or Shaw
691
00:32:53,631 --> 00:32:59,536
noticed that their airspeed was
too low for the icy conditions?
692
00:32:59,536 --> 00:33:02,139
Byrne listens to the
cockpit voice recording
693
00:33:02,139 --> 00:33:04,541
to try to understand what might
have led to that oversight.
694
00:33:04,541 --> 00:33:05,409
REBECCA SHAW (ON
RECORDING): Exactly.
695
00:33:05,409 --> 00:33:06,810
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): Where
696
00:33:06,810 --> 00:33:08,212
you could be home with
your husband to take
697
00:33:08,212 --> 00:33:09,613
care of and all that stuff.
698
00:33:09,613 --> 00:33:11,348
NARRATOR: He learns
that the crew had been
699
00:33:11,348 --> 00:33:13,517
talking throughout the flight.
700
00:33:13,517 --> 00:33:17,221
The conversation continued
during a landing approach.
701
00:33:17,221 --> 00:33:21,558
It's a violation of a rule known
as the sterile cockpit, which
702
00:33:21,558 --> 00:33:24,528
bans nonessential conversation
during critical phases
703
00:33:24,528 --> 00:33:25,195
of a flight.
704
00:33:25,195 --> 00:33:27,364
--be upgraded in six months.
705
00:33:27,364 --> 00:33:29,199
Blah, blah, blah.
706
00:33:29,199 --> 00:33:30,401
[laughter on recording]
707
00:33:30,401 --> 00:33:31,669
EVAN BYRNE: Quite
simply, it prohibits
708
00:33:31,669 --> 00:33:33,504
conversations that
aren't related
709
00:33:33,504 --> 00:33:34,672
to the operation of the flight.
710
00:33:34,672 --> 00:33:36,140
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): Let's
711
00:33:36,140 --> 00:33:37,474
do a descent checklist, please.
712
00:33:37,474 --> 00:33:39,543
We can do the approach
checklist along with it.
713
00:33:39,543 --> 00:33:41,612
REBECCA SHAW (ON
RECORDING): Yeah, sure.
714
00:33:41,612 --> 00:33:42,846
Bug set.
715
00:33:42,846 --> 00:33:44,815
NARRATOR: Byrne also discovers
that because of the cockpit
716
00:33:44,815 --> 00:33:48,085
banter, the crew performed
critical checklists
717
00:33:48,085 --> 00:33:49,687
and briefings late.
718
00:33:49,687 --> 00:33:51,155
Off.
719
00:33:51,155 --> 00:33:52,723
Hydraulic pressure and--
720
00:33:52,723 --> 00:33:56,326
NARRATOR: Distracted, the crew
probably didn't see the red bar
721
00:33:56,326 --> 00:33:58,195
indicating they were
flying too slowly
722
00:33:58,195 --> 00:34:00,831
for the conditions the plane
had been configured for.
723
00:34:00,831 --> 00:34:02,499
--on.
724
00:34:02,499 --> 00:34:04,735
Approach checklist complete.
725
00:34:04,735 --> 00:34:05,869
Rock and roll.
726
00:34:05,869 --> 00:34:08,205
When crews deviate from
standard operating procedures
727
00:34:08,205 --> 00:34:11,241
and perform checklists late
or don't make the required
728
00:34:11,241 --> 00:34:12,843
call-outs, they
become more vulnerable
729
00:34:12,843 --> 00:34:16,714
to subtle mistakes that
they may make inadvertently.
730
00:34:16,714 --> 00:34:20,217
That could lead to
startle and surprise
731
00:34:20,217 --> 00:34:23,420
or unanticipated events that
they have to respond to.
732
00:34:23,420 --> 00:34:25,422
NARRATOR: The evidence
is unequivocal.
733
00:34:25,422 --> 00:34:29,126
The crew of flight 3407
was badly distracted
734
00:34:29,126 --> 00:34:30,360
throughout the approach.
735
00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:32,129
He came in when
we interviewed.
736
00:34:32,129 --> 00:34:34,798
And he said, yeah, you're going
to be upgraded in six months.
737
00:34:34,798 --> 00:34:36,033
NARRATOR: They had
forgotten a key setting
738
00:34:36,033 --> 00:34:41,205
they had made that required
them to fly faster than normal.
739
00:34:41,205 --> 00:34:43,440
They had missed indications
that they were flying
740
00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:46,577
too slow for icing conditions.
741
00:34:46,577 --> 00:34:49,413
Then, Captain Renslow
had reacted incorrectly
742
00:34:49,413 --> 00:34:51,248
to a stall warning--
743
00:34:51,248 --> 00:34:52,783
Jesus Christ!
744
00:34:52,783 --> 00:34:53,650
NARRATOR: --sealing
the fate of the plane.
745
00:34:57,488 --> 00:34:59,590
Evan Byrne wonders,
what could have
746
00:34:59,590 --> 00:35:01,592
caused a trained
airline flight crew
747
00:35:01,592 --> 00:35:04,561
to have made such missteps?
748
00:35:04,561 --> 00:35:06,897
He finds a clue on the
cockpit voice recording.
749
00:35:06,897 --> 00:35:09,700
[yawns]
750
00:35:09,700 --> 00:35:12,803
MARVIN RENSLOW (ON
RECORDING): Excuse me.
751
00:35:12,803 --> 00:35:15,773
[groans]
752
00:35:15,773 --> 00:35:18,408
NARRATOR: The crew was
showing signs of fatigue.
753
00:35:18,408 --> 00:35:21,612
Could Renslow and Shaw have
been too tired to function
754
00:35:21,612 --> 00:35:23,480
effectively on the flight deck?
755
00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:24,782
It's a tough question.
756
00:35:24,782 --> 00:35:27,217
Answering it will
require tracking
757
00:35:27,217 --> 00:35:30,821
their movements during the 72
hours leading up to the crash.
758
00:35:30,821 --> 00:35:33,524
Byrne interviews the
families of the pilots.
759
00:35:33,524 --> 00:35:34,691
Can I speak to
Mrs. Renslow, please?
760
00:35:37,661 --> 00:35:40,197
NARRATOR: He studies the
pilots mobile phone bills
761
00:35:40,197 --> 00:35:41,632
and records of text messages.
762
00:35:43,801 --> 00:35:46,670
He searches the
airline's computer system
763
00:35:46,670 --> 00:35:48,972
to determine if and
when the crew used
764
00:35:48,972 --> 00:35:50,841
it to check their schedules.
765
00:35:50,841 --> 00:35:53,877
He needs to track
their every move.
766
00:35:53,877 --> 00:35:55,679
And what time did
Rebecca leave the house?
767
00:35:55,679 --> 00:35:58,615
EVAN BYRNE: We're talking to
colleagues or other pilots,
768
00:35:58,615 --> 00:36:00,784
check airmen, instructors.
769
00:36:00,784 --> 00:36:04,655
And we ask all those
people about the pilots,
770
00:36:04,655 --> 00:36:06,390
about their recent activities.
771
00:36:06,390 --> 00:36:09,860
NARRATOR: He learns that neither
pilot actually lived anywhere
772
00:36:09,860 --> 00:36:12,996
near Newark, but could
not afford to stay
773
00:36:12,996 --> 00:36:15,999
in hotels on their salaries.
774
00:36:15,999 --> 00:36:20,337
Captain Renslow was earning
$60,000 a year at Colgan Air.
775
00:36:20,337 --> 00:36:24,842
First Officer Shaw was being
paid less than $16,000 a year,
776
00:36:24,842 --> 00:36:28,278
substantially less than
an average bus driver.
777
00:36:28,278 --> 00:36:31,481
As a result, both pilots
had made long cross-country
778
00:36:31,481 --> 00:36:32,983
commutes to Newark--
779
00:36:32,983 --> 00:36:35,552
Captain Renslow, from
his home in Florida,
780
00:36:35,552 --> 00:36:37,821
and Rebecca Shaw, from
Seattle, Washington.
781
00:36:42,726 --> 00:36:45,028
In fact, Shaw had
commuted all night
782
00:36:45,028 --> 00:36:49,833
from Seattle on a cargo flight
that connected through Memphis.
783
00:36:49,833 --> 00:36:52,569
Captain Renslow had spent the
night in the airline's crew
784
00:36:52,569 --> 00:36:56,940
lounge at Newark Airport after
having already worked two days.
785
00:37:00,711 --> 00:37:05,415
He was seen sleeping on
a couch in the lounge.
786
00:37:05,415 --> 00:37:07,050
It was against
company rules, but
787
00:37:07,050 --> 00:37:09,419
pilots who couldn't afford
housing near the airport
788
00:37:09,419 --> 00:37:12,055
did it anyway.
789
00:37:12,055 --> 00:37:15,425
Records show that at 3:10
AM, the morning of the crash,
790
00:37:15,425 --> 00:37:17,427
Renslow was awake.
791
00:37:17,427 --> 00:37:20,497
He checked his work schedule in
the airline's computer network.
792
00:37:29,573 --> 00:37:32,709
Next stop, Buffalo.
793
00:37:32,709 --> 00:37:35,012
NARRATOR: At 7:29
AM, Rebecca Shaw
794
00:37:35,012 --> 00:37:37,614
sent a text message
to her husband,
795
00:37:37,614 --> 00:37:39,616
telling him she'd
arrived safely in Newark.
796
00:37:42,319 --> 00:37:43,020
Hi, honey.
797
00:37:43,020 --> 00:37:44,221
It's me.
798
00:37:44,221 --> 00:37:46,957
NARRATOR: Phone records indicate
that later in the morning,
799
00:37:46,957 --> 00:37:50,928
Captain Renslow was on
the phone several times.
800
00:37:50,928 --> 00:37:53,630
Rebecca Shaw was
noticed having a nap,
801
00:37:53,630 --> 00:37:56,934
catching up on the rest she'd
lost flying the night before.
802
00:38:00,704 --> 00:38:01,805
It's not a lot of sleep.
803
00:38:05,008 --> 00:38:07,044
EVAN BYRNE: We ultimately
concluded that it was likely
804
00:38:07,044 --> 00:38:09,446
that both crew members
were experiencing
805
00:38:09,446 --> 00:38:12,115
some effects of fatigue at
the time of the accident.
806
00:38:12,115 --> 00:38:14,952
JOHN KAUSNER: Her job is
to watch the airspeed.
807
00:38:14,952 --> 00:38:16,820
Her job was to watch
the instrument panel.
808
00:38:16,820 --> 00:38:19,690
And my view is, she was
fatigued to the point
809
00:38:19,690 --> 00:38:21,491
where it's, like, right here.
810
00:38:21,491 --> 00:38:23,093
And you're so dull.
811
00:38:23,093 --> 00:38:24,294
I think that's where she was,
and he just was not capable.
812
00:38:24,294 --> 00:38:27,831
He was just-- he shouldn't
have been flying an airplane.
813
00:38:33,955 --> 00:38:37,692
of flight 3407
leads John Kausner
814
00:38:37,692 --> 00:38:40,528
to rally support and
become a fierce advocate
815
00:38:40,528 --> 00:38:43,397
for changes in the industry.
816
00:38:43,397 --> 00:38:46,500
He raises awareness among
both lawmakers and the public
817
00:38:46,500 --> 00:38:48,836
about the need to improve
regulations governing
818
00:38:48,836 --> 00:38:52,540
pilots at regional airlines.
819
00:38:52,540 --> 00:38:54,041
JOHN KAUSNER: This
is just saying
820
00:38:54,041 --> 00:38:56,844
we support 3407 families, their
fight for aviation safety.
821
00:38:56,844 --> 00:38:58,012
And these representatives
and congressmen
822
00:38:58,012 --> 00:38:59,547
and senators have
done that for us,
823
00:38:59,547 --> 00:39:01,582
and we're very appreciative.
824
00:39:01,582 --> 00:39:05,553
NARRATOR: He takes his fight
all the way to Washington, DC.
825
00:39:05,553 --> 00:39:07,021
JOHN KAUSNER: We
needed to do something.
826
00:39:07,021 --> 00:39:10,658
And so we began to advocate
in Washington weekly.
827
00:39:10,658 --> 00:39:11,892
Every other week,
I mean, we've made
828
00:39:11,892 --> 00:39:13,194
innumerable trips down there.
829
00:39:13,194 --> 00:39:15,896
And immediately, the
families just gelled.
830
00:39:15,896 --> 00:39:19,767
We all attended the
hearings and began to say,
831
00:39:19,767 --> 00:39:21,936
this is what we can do.
832
00:39:21,936 --> 00:39:24,438
NARRATOR: The crash
of Flight 3407
833
00:39:24,438 --> 00:39:27,575
exposed wide-ranging
shortcomings in the regulations
834
00:39:27,575 --> 00:39:29,644
that govern regional airlines.
835
00:39:29,644 --> 00:39:33,681
These smaller airlines now make
up 1/2 of all daily passenger
836
00:39:33,681 --> 00:39:35,483
flights in the US.
837
00:39:35,483 --> 00:39:38,919
Their pilots are generally
younger, less experienced,
838
00:39:38,919 --> 00:39:42,456
earn less, and work long hours.
839
00:39:42,456 --> 00:39:45,559
Their levels of safety are
way different from the majors.
840
00:39:45,559 --> 00:39:51,065
They have a much lower threshold
in training, in ability--
841
00:39:51,065 --> 00:39:53,567
so in pay, obviously,
so they can't attract
842
00:39:53,567 --> 00:39:54,869
a higher-qualified pilot.
843
00:39:54,869 --> 00:39:57,538
There are pretty
low wages, pretty
844
00:39:57,538 --> 00:39:59,607
difficult working conditions.
845
00:39:59,607 --> 00:40:04,612
And we don't seem to attract
the same level of applicant
846
00:40:04,612 --> 00:40:05,946
that we used to.
847
00:40:05,946 --> 00:40:08,616
Some regional airlines
get into a bind,
848
00:40:08,616 --> 00:40:13,988
and they have to hire the first
people that meet the minimums.
849
00:40:13,988 --> 00:40:17,091
NARRATOR: In the US, of the
seven fatal accidents involving
850
00:40:17,091 --> 00:40:19,827
passenger jets over
the past 10 years,
851
00:40:19,827 --> 00:40:22,029
five have involved
regional airlines.
852
00:40:26,000 --> 00:40:29,570
Those include the crash of
Delta Connection flight 5191
853
00:40:29,570 --> 00:40:33,641
in August 2006, which killed
49 people when the crew
854
00:40:33,641 --> 00:40:35,109
took off from the wrong runway.
855
00:40:41,082 --> 00:40:44,752
John Kausner's campaign to
change laws governing pilots
856
00:40:44,752 --> 00:40:46,153
has paid off.
857
00:40:46,153 --> 00:40:47,822
JOHN KAUSNER: We
relied on your support.
858
00:40:47,822 --> 00:40:48,656
We needed your support.
859
00:40:48,656 --> 00:40:50,157
You nurture us.
860
00:40:50,157 --> 00:40:52,193
We want to thank all
of you from all of us.
861
00:40:52,193 --> 00:40:55,129
NARRATOR: A year and a
half after the crash,
862
00:40:55,129 --> 00:40:59,266
under pressure from Kosner and
other victim's family members.
863
00:40:59,266 --> 00:41:02,136
The US Senate passed a bill,
which toughens training
864
00:41:02,136 --> 00:41:04,972
requirements and
forces the FAA to draw
865
00:41:04,972 --> 00:41:07,141
up new rules on pilot fatigue.
866
00:41:10,845 --> 00:41:13,681
Studies into the problem
of overtired pilots
867
00:41:13,681 --> 00:41:14,648
are already underway.
868
00:41:18,018 --> 00:41:20,588
At the University
of Iowa, researchers
869
00:41:20,588 --> 00:41:23,157
are developing a system that
could help pilots resist
870
00:41:23,157 --> 00:41:27,728
fatigue, stay engaged with
the critical task of flying,
871
00:41:27,728 --> 00:41:35,136
and prevent future tragedies
like that of flight 3407.
872
00:41:35,136 --> 00:41:39,673
Thomas Schnell is a
human factors engineer.
873
00:41:39,673 --> 00:41:42,743
THOMAS SCHNELL: We use a
number of neurocognitive and
874
00:41:42,743 --> 00:41:47,915
physiological sensors that
we apply on subjects, pilots,
875
00:41:47,915 --> 00:41:49,750
that we invite for our studies.
876
00:41:49,750 --> 00:41:51,318
--114 is going to
be free floating.
877
00:41:51,318 --> 00:41:53,120
OK.
878
00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:53,554
Welcome.
879
00:41:53,554 --> 00:41:55,723
Just go ahead.
880
00:41:55,723 --> 00:41:57,191
NARRATOR: He's studying how
pilots stay alert on the flight
881
00:41:57,191 --> 00:42:00,161
deck as a test subject conducts
a cross-country journey
882
00:42:00,161 --> 00:42:01,128
in a simulator.
883
00:42:01,128 --> 00:42:04,031
Using sensors, he can
determine how alert
884
00:42:04,031 --> 00:42:07,101
and engaged a pilot really is.
885
00:42:07,101 --> 00:42:09,136
The research could lead
to the development of
886
00:42:09,136 --> 00:42:11,806
fatigue detectors on airplanes.
887
00:42:11,806 --> 00:42:15,876
THOMAS SCHNELL: We are trying to
predict pilot state, so that we
888
00:42:15,876 --> 00:42:18,112
can adjust something
on the flight deck
889
00:42:18,112 --> 00:42:20,748
to prevent the problem
from getting worse
890
00:42:20,748 --> 00:42:23,117
or starting in the first place.
891
00:42:23,117 --> 00:42:28,255
We monitor brain activity,
eye movement activity, heart,
892
00:42:28,255 --> 00:42:32,092
the EKG, and respiration,
and other parameters,
893
00:42:32,092 --> 00:42:35,763
in an effort to figure out
what the pilots or the crew's
894
00:42:35,763 --> 00:42:36,730
state is.
895
00:42:36,730 --> 00:42:37,765
Are they fatigued?
896
00:42:37,765 --> 00:42:39,066
Overworked?
897
00:42:39,066 --> 00:42:41,202
Are they disengaged
or distracted?
898
00:42:45,072 --> 00:42:47,408
This section is where
they were really drowsy,
899
00:42:47,408 --> 00:42:50,911
and you can see that gaze
has become kind of bored.
900
00:42:55,249 --> 00:42:57,251
NARRATOR: Schnell
instructs the flight
901
00:42:57,251 --> 00:43:00,187
simulator to trigger a major
systems failure in the cockpit.
902
00:43:03,757 --> 00:43:04,792
It's no good.
903
00:43:04,792 --> 00:43:06,060
Everything's good.
904
00:43:06,060 --> 00:43:07,828
Hydraulic systems have failed.
905
00:43:07,828 --> 00:43:10,264
Flaps not applicable.
906
00:43:10,264 --> 00:43:11,966
THOMAS SCHNELL: Crank
up that heat map,
907
00:43:11,966 --> 00:43:15,803
so we can see what this
brain activity was.
908
00:43:15,803 --> 00:43:16,804
Brace for impact.
909
00:43:16,804 --> 00:43:18,806
[alarm blaring]
910
00:43:18,806 --> 00:43:21,308
THOMAS SCHNELL: When a crew is
fatigued, what you might see
911
00:43:21,308 --> 00:43:24,445
is their reaction to
events may slow down.
912
00:43:24,445 --> 00:43:29,450
So you'll see mistakes being
made on the flight deck.
913
00:43:29,450 --> 00:43:32,686
NARRATOR: It's precisely these
kinds of mistakes on the part
914
00:43:32,686 --> 00:43:41,695
of Renslow and Shaw that
ultimately crashed flight 3407
915
00:43:41,695 --> 00:43:42,963
and killed 50 people.
916
00:43:47,468 --> 00:43:49,970
It's a tragedy that
should not have happened.
917
00:43:49,970 --> 00:43:52,172
That was foreseeable,
was preventable,
918
00:43:52,172 --> 00:43:54,808
and it's repeatable, if we
don't do something about it.
919
00:43:54,808 --> 00:43:57,878
I'm focused and determined to
change what exists, and not
920
00:43:57,878 --> 00:44:00,247
have another dad sitting here.
72223
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