All language subtitles for 07-01-2023cffcxereee

It should be stated that the enemy is having
some success in the Avdiivka direction,

and in areas sensitive enough for the
AFU, but clearly at a prohibitive "cost",

which in no way allows us to assess these events
as an "unequivocal victory for the enemy".

And it is obvious that the further away, the "size
of the check" for the enemy "for Avdiivka" will

grow more intensively and actively. I described
at the end of last year how it will happen:

- the pauses between periods of activation

will begin to grow gradually;
- the scope and volume of attacking

assault actions (especially in terms of width
along the front and the number of attacked

areas) will gradually begin to narrow;
- the current tactical regroupings will

be replaced by bigger and longer ones - the enemy
will pull additional reserves in this direction.

Until the number and volume of the enemy forces
and means capable of conducting active (offensive)

actions reach the critical figures, then the
Avdiivka offensive of the enemy and will stop.

Already now in this direction we can observe the
enemy's transition to attacks by small infantry

groups, mostly without armored vehicles or "small
columns" of 3-4 units, among which there are no

more than 2 tanks. Obviously, the enemy was so
"impressed" by the volume and size of its own

losses during the initial and subsequent stages
of its offensive against the Avdiivka area of AFU

defense that it changed its methodology of
conducting it, at least at the tactical level.

Much more interesting is the question of how
far this new methodology will allow the Russian

command to achieve its goals. After all, this
method of petty "chewing through" significantly

affects the timing and speed of accomplishment of
the tasks set for the Russian troops, and clearly

not for the better. They can "chewing through"
in this way until the very "end of the century".

Moreover, there is no guarantee that the

AFU will not find effective ways
to counteract these small bites.

In addition, the result does not change
significantly if you do not attack the enemy

with the whole company at once, but in small
"parts". For example, a notional-calculated

company will travel the same path in both cases,
only the time it takes to grind it down changes.

This approach significantly reduces the scope of
tasks it can potentially accomplish in reality.

It makes sense to use such
tactics only in two cases,

when you don't care about the moral and
psychological state of your personnel,

or you have so many of them that you don't
care about the dynamics of their number.

As far as I understand, this is exactly the
way the Russian command operates. It does not

care how and at what rate its personnel is being
worn down, but the task set must be accomplished,

even if it does not correspond to the real
situation. It does not even occur to him

that the meaning and scope of such tasks should
somehow be brought in line with the realities.

Avdiivka is yet another eloquent illustration of
this approach by Russian commanders to planning,

organizing and conducting combat operations.