All language subtitles for 10-11-2023chgchfggjieee

Has the war reached a stalemate? Is it possible
to say that the counter-offensive has either been

stopped or that the goals that the Ukrainian
command set for itself have failed to achieve?

Some objectives yes, indeed. Looking at the
way the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian

defense forces in the Zaporizhzhya
region started to take place,

I saw the prospect of a better option -
reaching the Azov coast by the end of 2023,

yes there was a prospect. But again, it was a
calculation, it was an analysis in accordance

with the situations that we have already
seen, in accordance with the campaigns

that have already been conducted. What is
happening now is a very different format.

There are big problems with minefields, but the
main problem is that for the enemy human life does

not matter at all. They do not build their defense
on some tactical tricks that cannot be broken,

no. They build their defenses on bodies
like bricks, that's how I can compare it.

The problems with the Russian command not counting
their losses and it's hard to be rational about

it. They continue to hold their positions
at all costs, regardless of any casualties.

Even last year, when the AFU fighters
were liberating the northern bridgehead,

when the Russians had huge losses, they could
not hold the positions they had managed to

take since the beginning of the invasion.
They were retreating to Kharkiv region,

retreating precisely because they could not
hold those positions and they were fleeing.

So also the right bank of the Kherson
region. The conditions were created for

them so extreme that they were forced to
flee from the right bank of the Kherson

region. Despite the fact that they used
their human resources irrationally in '22,

but they fled. Now they remain in positions that
should have been abandoned long ago, where the

losses are extremely high, but they remain. And
that's a problem that also needs to be addressed.

When the enemy uses exclusively such tactics,
not some cunning or tactical level, not some

high-tech advantage, no, but the most banal
meat, this has to be fought with new methods.

It's not a dead end, but we have to reformat
the overall concept of warfare. In a sense,

it involves finding opportunities to inflict
significantly greater losses on the enemy,

both in terms of manpower and equipment, so
that all their capabilities to compensate

for human resources and the mechanized
component are in deficit every month.

That is, first of all, the
technological component should work.

There is hope, indeed, that F-16s in
combination with other means of defeat

will also have an impact on this situation.
But the long-awaited F-16s should not be seen

as some kind of separate gamechanger, no.
If the Ukrainians get the F-16 on its own,

it won't change anything. To dominate the air,
you also need air defenses. Not the ones that

covered Ukrainian cities, but ones that could
be used in the combat zone near the battle line,

short and medium range. Among other things, but
to the F-16 we also need ATACMS, for example,

its modifications M39 and M39A1, they are ideal
for destroying airfields and equipment on them.

But on the whole, so far, we do
see mostly positional warfare,

positional battles along the battle lines.
Although there are some bridgeheads that give us

hope that by the end of 2023 we will see not only
positional actions, but some kind of advancement.

If we're talking about
something on a larger scale,

I don't rule out that it could
happen in the spring of 2024.